Chapter 2

Examples of Accidents Involving Multilingual Communication

Difficulties and Cultural Diversity

Introduction

Having considered the sociolinguistic characteristics of language and misunderstanding in

the last chapter this chapter gives details of shipping accidents in which those
misunderstandings have taken place presented according to the circumstances in which they
occurred i.e.:

1) On board manoeuvring of the vessel under pilotage

2) External communication ship to shore and ship to ship

3) Inability to read instructions

4) The cultural dimension

5) In emergency situations

2.1 On Board Manoeuvring Under Pilotage

This is one of the most critical areas when it comes to clarity of communication. During a
pilotage operation there is often no time and no searoom in which to rectify an error which
has arisen due to misunderstandings of engine or helm orders or if tug orders or other
information are not clearly understood.

Several reports have emphasised that safety is compromised where pilots are unable to
communicate effectively with the crew. Such problems lead to increased pressure on the
pilot as well as a reduction in the bridge officer’s effectiveness. For example from 1975 to
1996 there were at least 24 incidents in Canadian pilotage waters in which problems with
language and communication led directly to an incident occurring (a,

1996; MCB, 1997)

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The issue has already been highlighted by recent witnesses to the US House of
Representatives sub-committee on Coastguard and Maritime transportation who have
suggested that English language difficulties are posing problems for US pilots. The types of
problems raised “poor or non existent English speaking capability of master and bridge
crews on foreign flag ships” and “situations where a captain cannot communicate
effectively with the helmsman or other crew members on the bridge” (b, 1977)

Pilots very often perform their pilotage in their own mother tongue. This means that the
radio communication to shore based parties is established in a language unintelligible to the
master or officer in charge. Therefore, the master or officer very often has no choice but to
follow the recommendations. This can be dangerous because the pilot does not know the
manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel the way that the ship’s own staff do. This
circumstance has already caused accidents, e.g. the collision of the Polish ship Stanyslaw
Kulcinsky with the Kattwykbridge on the river Elbe in 1991 when German pilots under shore
based radar assistance during fog, were speaking in German only, a language not
understood by the Polish master. The recommendations in English for the manoeuvres
were given too late. The master can only gain his own impression of the situation if
communication on his bridge is established in a language that he understands. In this case
English would have been the language most useful to him.

Misunderstandings of instructions can often place a vessel in a dangerous position. The

following incidents highlight the fact that situations that may at first be under control can
easily develop into high stress scenarios with an accident the final outcome.

Ship grounding during berthing

The ship was a small coasting vessel with a crew of five, German being the predominant
language, but the Master speaking English. During berthing although the stern rope
messenger was sent ashore the pilot was not made aware of the fact. With only the head
rope apparently taking the strain there was a danger of breaking loose so the pilot ordered
the ship to be let go so that it could drift. While the vessel was drifting further difficulties
were encountered in manoeuvring, the result being that it grounded.

The pilot stated “I believe that poor communication was the real difficulty; many orders
given by me were undertaken after several attempts, if at all. Had I been made aware of the

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stern rope messenger being ashore at my first pass, I would have ordered the ship to be
pulled alongside with the capstan..... With a lack of a common language, and suggestions
being turned into orders and vice-versa, things were made much more difficult”. (c, 1992)

Misinterpreting local instructions and dialects

Although two people may be speaking the same language, a local dialect or saying may be
misunderstood or misinterpreted by someone who is not familiar with it. The following
incident highlights such a situation, with a resultant accident that could have been avoided.

In this incident two ships collided in the River Barrow (Eire). A 1,500 grt cargo vessel was
outward bound from New Ross while a motor tanker, in ballast around 2,000 grt was inward
bound to the same port. The outward bound vessel had two pilots on board, the inward
bound vessel one. The incident occurred in good visibility on a bend in the river.

Initially the inward bound ship had been under the control of the pilot. As the two vessels
approached each other however the Master retook the wheel and requested the pilot to use
the radiotelephone as he could not understand the local dialect or the local expressions
being used by the cargo vessel pilot. The pilot told the cargo vessel pilot that he was going
to keep to the port side of the river coming up, a starboard to starboard passing. The
master was unaware of this arrangement and would have been opposed to such a
manoeuvre if he had known about it. No instruction was given by the pilot to Master to
effect a starboard to starboard passing.

Communication breakdown had therefore occurred between the Master and the pilots of
both vessels, the opposing vessel because he could not understand the local dialect, his own
vessel because no clarification had been given to him and he had not sought clarification of
the pilots intentions. The ships as a result collided

The Wealthy River - 1996

The WEALTHY RIVER, a Chinese ship, was under pilotage in a dredged channel outside the
entrance jetties at Charleston Harbour, South Carolina, and approaching the Pilots
disembarkation position. The American pilot indicated, as a matter of courtesy, that the
pilot boat was alongside to port. The Chinese captain, who spoke very little English,

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misinterpreted this as a command to turn to hard to port, and ordered the helmsman to do
so. The vessel, which had been in the centre of the channel, swung to port and proceeded
towards the north edge of the channel. Before the situation could be corrected the ship had
left the dredged channel and grounded almost immediately.

The passage had been taking place in the dark, the Pilot had been unable to see the
helmsman turn the wheel to port and had been unable to understand the conversation
between master and helmsman (Walsh, 1997; Anon d, 1996).

Seadaniel and Testbank - 1980

On 22nd July 1980 a Panamanian bulk carrier, the SEADANIEL, was inward bound in the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), while a German containership, the TESTBANK, was
outward bound, both vessels with Pilots onboard. The channel that the two vessels were
navigating was narrow and required them to pass quite close together. The SEADANIEL was
manned by a crew of 33 of which the master and radio officer were British nationals and the
crew were Chinese. The TESTBANK was manned by a crew of mixed nationals, but
predominantly German.

Pilotage in the MRGO was compulsory for the foreign vessels involved, being undertaken by
two pilot’s associations, the Associated Branch Pilots (ABP) and the Crescent River Port Pilots
Association (CRPA). The ABP conduct pilotage from the sea to 33 miles from the entrance
and the CRPA then relieve the ABP and pilot the vessels to New Orleans. This was the
pattern followed during this incident. When the pilots were changing over they discussed
various aspects of the ships' characteristics but as the ABP Pilot had not had any difficulty
communicating with the foreign crew he did not discuss the language differences with the
CRPA pilot.

The passage of the SEADANIEL continued without incident until the two vessels approached
each other. As the ships were approaching, the orders given by the pilot on the SEADANIEL
were not followed as accurately as he would have liked. This created a situation that
resulted in the pilot raising his voice and the Chinese helmsman becoming upset and failing
to understand the instruction given.

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As the vessels approached each other the SEADANIEL took an unexpected turn to port due
to an erroneous rudder response to the pilot’s starboard rudder order. This resulted in a
collision with the TESTBANK, raking her down the port side. The probable cause of the
incorrect manoeuvre was the application of port rudder by the helmsman of the SEADANIEL
when the pilot had ordered starboard rudder (NTSB, 1981).

The Bright Field - 1996

A miscommunication between the Pilot and the Master of the BRIGHT FIELD may also have
precipitated a collision between the vessel and a quayside shopping centre on the New
Orleans Riverwalk.

When the Pilot first boarded the vessel it appeared that the Master could understand him
fully. Everything continued normally until a problem occurred with the mechanics of the
vessel and when the Pilot queried the Master as to what the problem was he received no
reply. As they approached the quay the order for full astern prior to the impact occurring,
was not carried out, however with the little control that remained the Pilot managed to
avoid a number of docked vessels.

The initial investigation into the accident focused on a number of issues including that of
whether language barriers between the American River Pilot and the Chinese crew affected
responses. The Pilot suggested that the Chinese master spoke only a ‘kind of broken English’
and that he had not received any response to his commands to put the engine full astern,
away from the riverbank (e, 1996).

Four Canadian pilotage incidents

During 1990 there were two incidents where ineffective communication between the Pilot
and the Master had serious consequences. In July 1990 the ENERCHEM FUSION ran
aground, due to problems in confirming the Master’s intentions of taking over the conduct
of the vessel from the Pilot. The vessel was carrying 8,000 tonnes of petroleum products
and although a serious pollution incident was avoided the vessel was declared a constructive
total loss. Similar problems in communicating intentions between the Master and Pilot
resulted in the grounding of the LAKE ANINA, a Norwegian chemical tanker.

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During 1991 two further incidents resulted from failures in the communication of intentions
between master and pilot. The IRVING NORDIC grounded in the St. Lawrence River suffering
structural damage, the lack of effective information exchange between Master and Pilot
contributing to the accident. The Yugoslavian MALINSKA also ran aground because although
both Pilot and Master had calculated the vessel’s position neither had consulted with the
other and the Master did not know the Pilots intentions (Ayeko, 1997).

2.2 Ship and Shore Communication

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) are being used in waterways world-wide as a means of
diminishing operational and environmental risk in maritime transportation (Young, 1994).
Their functions include :

•= Vessel traffic management, by an active and passive traffic organisation service.

•= Visual and electronic aids to navigation

•= Crisis management for search and rescue and pollution

•= Information services including publications, radio broadcasts, navtext, satellite acquisition

of safety and traffic data for commercial and military purposes and port state control
implementation surveillance

VTS Centres monitor the traffic in many highly-frequented areas. They also give instructions
and advice in critical situations. But VTS operators are also human beings and mistakes may
occur in their analysis. It has to be taken into consideration that a VTS operator only has a
restricted view of the situation. He can only follow the movements of the participating
vessels on the radar screen. He does not know, for instance, the characteristics of the ships.
Therefore it is difficult for him to give exact advice to avoid dangerous situations.
Communication problems and neglect of radio calling procedures make the situation even
worse. Due to communication misinterpretations accidents occur as the following examples
show.

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Insufficient Details from VTS

In May 1995 the German motorvessel „Aphrodite“ collided with the Maltese motorvessel
„Anglia“ in the entrance to the port of Rostock (Germany). One of the reasons was that the
VTS-operator did not inform the vessels involved sufficiently well about the traffic situation
in the narrow entrance, it remains unclear whether this was due to a lack English skills or for
other reasons.

Lack of English Skills

On board a ship with a multilingual crew a common working language has to be established.
In most cases this is the English language but often not all members of the crew have the
necessary command of this language. Thery have only restricted language skills of that
generally accepted working language. Multilingual crews frequently consist of seafarers
with very different language standards which prevent them creating a common on board
language. Often there are different words for one term and even this can cause
misunderstandings.

The English language has been the language of seafaring since the late 1960s. In
international conventions, (e.g. STCW) basic standards have been laid down but not
accurately specified. However compared to STCW 78, the revision STCW 95 is clearer
though not yet specific.

Many examples have been documented, e.g. the accident on the „Ever Obtain“. This Chinese
vessel had engine trouble in the Red Sea. In order to obtain tug assistance Stavanger Radio
was called via Inmarsat. The Stavanger Rescue Co-ordination Centre was unable to
understand the English spoken by the officer on board the „Ever Obtain„. Only after the ship
contacted its headquarters in Taipei, could assistance be rendered via the company. (See
also below under Emergencies)

Lack of understanding with shore station via pilots

Pilots often perform their pilotage in their own mother tongue. This means that the radio
communication to shore-based parties is established in a language which may be

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unintelligible to the master or officer in charge. Therefore, the officer or master has no
choice but to follow the pilot’s recommendations. This is dangerous because the pilot does
not know the manoeuvring characteristics of the vessel compared with the officers and
master. This circumstance has caused accidents, e.g. the collision of the Polish MV
„Stanyslaw Kulcinsky“ with the Kattwykbridge on the river Elbe in 1991, when German pilots
under shore based radar assistance during foggy weather were talking in German only - a
language not understood by the Polish master. The subsequent recommendations in English
for the manoeuvres were given too late. In this, as in other instances, the master or officer
in charge could not obtain their own impression of the situation as the radio communication
with shore based parties was not intelligible to them.

Communication hampered by panicking radio-operator

External communication problems can also be caused by an officer or radio-operator in

panic. When the Polish Ro-Ro Ferry „Jan Heweliusz“ capsized in 1993 near the isle of Ruegen
the watchofficer at first gave a wrong position to the rescue centre, probably due to panic

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Similarly when the officers of Polish motorvessel „Boleslaw Krzywousty“ was ablaze and
under heavy rocket fire from the Eritrean Coast of the Red Sea on 05 th January 1990. The
officers failed to radio their correct position although being repeatedly asked to do so by
responding coast radio stations and vessels. The position they gave was not geographically
possible and long delays resulted. (A voice record of this extraordinary event is kept at
Wismar University-Germany, Dept. of Maritime Studies Warnemuende, Maritime
Communications Section).

Disregard of specific instructions

Failure to act on the advice of vessel traffic controllers, in addition to a disregard for
international collision prevention regulations, can in certain circumstances have catastrophic
results. The following incident involved both factors, the result being the loss of a vessel and
widespread pollution of an area of outstanding natural beauty.

Tuo Hai and Tenyo Maru - 1991

The central fact in this incident was that the TUO HAI sailed through a large concentration of
fishing vessels operating in Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone waters and ignored repeated
directives from vessel traffic controllers to change course. The visibility conditions were
poor and the actions of the TUO HAI violated international navigation rules.

The TUO HAI collided with the TENYO MARU, a stern trawling fish factory ship carrying more
than 450,000 gallons of bunker and diesel fuel, with the result that the TENYO MARU sank
and 120,000 gallons of intermediate fuel oil were released together with 53,000 gallons of
diesel oil. Oil continued to leak from the wreckage of the vessel for up to a year after the
incident.

The report of the accident by the Transport Safety Board of Canada blamed the inability of
the crew of the TUO HAI for failing to understand the Vessel Traffic Service instructions in
English and that neither vessel was using the appropriate collision avoidance procedures in
dense fog (Anon f, 1993; Anon g, 1993; Anon h, 1994; Anon i, 1995; Anon j, 1995).

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Seiko - 1993

The initial problems were that the SEIKO had a non English speaking Master, who was not in
possession of up to date charts of the area. The problem for the Dover Coastguard was that,
during heavy weather, they had to try and talk the ship into an anchorage off the south
coast of England. Initially the Master altered course directly for the specified anchorage co-
ordinates without taking into account the shallows between the SEIKO, and the anchorage.
Considerable difficulty was experienced in passing the correct course to him, and the ships'
owners were also utilised via a link call through North Foreland radio to achieve an effective
contact. Ultimately the coastguard had to talk the vessel away from the coast and towards
anchorage with the Wandelaar pilots.

Etilico - 1994

The central fact in this case was that a Spanish chemical tanker, the ETILICO, was not
obeying the Collision Regulations as it passed through the Dover Straits and became
involved in a close quarters situation with the OOCL BRAVERY. The Watchkeeping officer did
not understand even basic maritime phrases such as “what is your position”. A short while
later another close quarters situation occurred with an unidentified vessel, the estimated
pass being between 100 and 400 metres. When the Master later came on the radio and
found that he was in the wrong traffic lane the vessel changed lanes and almost collided
with a major channel buoy.

2.3 Ship to Ship Communication Accidents

Ship to ship communications are open to many different types of errors involving a number
of factors. Communication between ships in restricted waters is usually done for
navigational purposes and so a certain degree of technical language knowledge may be
required in order for the communication to be successfully achieved.

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Intership communications may be dependent on ships having the ability to recognise one
another. All to often the call “ship on my port side” is heard on traffic channels indicating
that one vessel is trying to communicate with a specific vessel the name of which cannot be
ascertained. Even if communication is correctly established there then follows the problem
of the vessels understanding each other.

Some examples of ship to ship communication accidents are shown below :

MT Butt and Fishing Vessel

In July 1993 the German motor-tanker „Butt„ collided with a Dutch fishing vessel near the
approach to IJmuiden. The fishing vessel was on the way to the fishing ground and had
therefore set no additional fishing signals. The fishing vessel had to give way to the motor-
tanker. Although the visibility was good the watchkeeper on the fishing vessel did not see
the tanker. The watch-officer on board the tanker tried to call the fishing vessel several
times on VHF channel 16 without a reply. After the collision it was found out that the fishing
vessel did not use channel 16 and therefore manoeuvring agreements could not be made.

MV Achat and MV Oslo in collision, Oslofjord 1987

The German Achat collided with the Norwegian Oslo in Oslofjord in July 1987. The Oslo
carried out a manoeuvre without giving notice to the Achat. The collision occurred despite
the fact that a call or signal could nave averted the casualty.

In April 1985 the German motorvessel „Sangerhausen“ collided with the Yugoslavian
motorvessel „Grobnik“ on the river Elbe close to the entrance to the Kiel-Canal. This
accident was caused by a mistake made by the pilots. The pilot on motor-vessel
„Sangerhausen“ made some manoeuvre agreements with the supposed „Grobnik“ without
checking if he had contacted the right vessel. He had mistakenly spoken to another vessel
close behind the „Grobnik„. When he later on altered his course the collision happened.

Manoeuvre co-ordination with other vessel not regarded necessary

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It is conspicuous that during the development of a collision very often no effort was made to
ask the opponent about his intentions. The possibility of direct manoeuvre agreements is
often not regarded useful, even when the officers on participating vessels speak the same
mother tongue. Manoeuvre agreements seldom take place. The reason why can only be
presumed. Of course, it has to be taken into consideration that in high frequented areas
with restricted visibility it could be difficult to safely identify the collision opponent.
Another reason are psychic barriers existing to contact an „invisible„ communication
partner. Inexperienced officers therefore often shun to call unidentified vessels.
Furthermore lack of language skills and adverse experiences may also prevent officers from
contacting unidentified vessels.

Unfortunately, many watch officers do not sufficiently know their own ship and its
manoeuvring characteristics. It may also happen that misjudgements occur when too small
passage distances are accepted or the rate of turn is overestimated. Therefore the reason
that a direct contact on radio to avoid a collision in due time was not made can base on poor
language skills or lack of knowledge and experience with the ship as well.

In March 1996 the German motorvessel „Breitenburg“ collided with the Russian motorvessel
„Vrissi“ close to Cape Bon in the Mediterranean Sea. Although the visibility was excellent
and the traffic not that heavy the collision occurred. The Russian vessel normally should
have given way to the „Breitenburg“ and the watchofficer trusted this rule. The Russian
officer did not follow these regulations which caused the accident. By means of
communicating shortly through VHF a simple manoeuvre agreement could have been made
in order to avoid the critical situation.

Other examples are given in the annex.

Neglect of radio calling procedures

To be successful with direct manoeuvre agreements, it is essential that radio communication

takes place according to international rules. In this connection an unambiguous
identification of the communicating partners should be a must. How necessary this is, will be
demonstrated by the following examples:

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In April 1985 the German motorvessel „Sangerhausen“ collided with the Yugoslavian
motorvessel „Grobnik“ on the river Elbe close to the entrance to the Kiel-Canal. This
accident was caused by a mistake made by the pilots. The pilot on motor-vessel
„Sangerhausen“ made some manoeuvre agreements with the supposed „Grobnik“ without
checking if he had contacted the right vessel. He had mistakenly spoken to another vessel
close behind the „Grobnik„. When he later on altered his course the collision happened.

A similar accident took place in April 1987 in the port of Wyk (Germany) between the
German passenger vessels „Adler VII“ and „Nordfriesland“. Here, the agreements were
made directly from ship to ship without pilot’s participation.

2.4 Written Instructions and Skills

Language difficulties linked to inadequate training can create situations which reult in
serious injuries being incurred by seafarers. The norm today at sea is multi-national crewing
of vessels, the ship will be built in one country and owned in another. Subsequent sales and
purchases along with shifts in registration can result in problems of documentation and
written instructions held aboard. Manuals and maintenance histories will be passed from
owner to owner and may not be presented any language of those currently operating the
ship. This situation has contributed to accidents both at sea and in port.

The sinking of the Honduras registered Alte Weser in the Great Belt, May 2nd 1995

The Honduras registered vessel „Alte Weser“ was sailing with a German master, a Lithuanian
chief officer and a Polish crew. The Lithuanian officer could not speak English fluently. He did
not understand the technical instructions for the operation of the navigation equipment of
the vessel. That was one reason why he grounded the vessel in the Great Belt. The resultant
sinking of the ship caused the death of the master.

MV „Anjola“ - Grounding near Juist Island (German Bight) - October 29 th 1996

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The Antigua and Barbuda registered vessel „Anjola“ grounded near Juist Island in stormy
seas due to an engine break down. The Polish master and the Polish chief engineer could not
read the German engine instructions from the German shipyard, dated from the time when
the vessel was sailing under German flag. English manuals were not available. Due to
misinterpretation the engine could not be restarted and the vessel began to drift and
grounded.

MV „Westwind“ - Grounding at Alands Islands (Finland) - March 12 th 1995

The Antigua and Barbuda registered vessel „Westwind“ was manned with a German master
and a Polish crew. The crew was unable to understand the English language.

Therefore the Chief officer translated all instructions into Polish.

In the inquiry into the grounding it was found out that the chart in use was not up to date.
The German shipping company provided the vessel with German and English sea charts. The
corrections for the German sea charts were carried out by the Polish chief officer because he
was unable to understand German. His corrections from German caused several errors on
the chart including the characteristics of the lights which caused the grounding.

One case reported in Lloyd’s List, concerned a ship forced to seek salvage assistance in the
North Atlantic. This was not because any critical situation had arisen but simply because
“the ship’s crew could not work the equipment, were unable to read the manuals and could
not communicate with each other. (k, 1993).

Kayax - 1995 (In Port)

The KAYAX was a 23, 277 dwt Panamanian registered bulk carrier with a crew of 17, the
Master being South Korean, the rest of the crew comprising of Indonesian, South Korean
and Chinese. Day to day communication on the ship was conducted mainly in English
together with gestures and sign language. The senior officers used their native language,
Korean, to communicate between themselves.

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The accident occurred in Portland, Victoria, Australia when an Australian MSA inspector was
on board the KAYAX to conduct grain loading and Port State Control inspections. The
surveyor requested, as part of the inspection, the lowering of the port lifeboat to the deck
position and its return to its embarkation position at the davit head. In this position the
surveyor asked for the lifeboat engine to be run ahead and astern. During this operation the
lifeboat became detached and fell first onto the deck and subsequently 20 metres in to the
sea.

The Korean master, Indonesian Second Mate, Korean oiler and Chinese ordinary seaman
were in the lifeboat at the time of the incident and all were injured, the second mate
sustaining serious head and spine injuries.

It was concluded that the crew who had entered the lifeboat initially (not the Master) were
insufficiently practised in using the on-load release gear. While attempting to do so the on-
load release mechanism was activated because the safety pin that would have prevented
the release of the lifeboat’s quadrant was not in position and the release system was in the
armed condition.

The languages used in the instruction manual and on the notices inside the boat were
inappropriate for the ships' crew, being only in Japanese and English. They were therefore
unable to read them properly or communicate with each other. Difficulties in
communication between the crew members contributed to the accident. (Anon l, 1995;
Anon m, 1995; Grey, 1995; MIIU, 1995)

MV Unitas - Death of an AB in main hatch in Mostyn, July 10th 1994

The German vessel Unitas was manned with German officers and Kiribati crew. The crew
had not received work safety instructions in English and had insufficient information in
English concerning the dangerous cargo. It was due to this that a crewmember entered a
hatch although it was dangerous and forbidden. He was asphyxiated in the hatch and lost
his life along with the chief officer who had gone in to try to save him.

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2.5 Cultural Factors
The problems of misunderstanding due to differences in the interpretation of words and
expressions between people of different cultures have contributed directly to accidents and
indirectly in other ways. (See also Chapter 4)

The following are examples :

Insufficient verbal co-ordination between master and officers, officers and ratings

The second officer of an German chemical tanker manned with German officers and a
Filipino crew gave orders to prepare the cargo handling equipment for loading chemicals.
For this procedure it was necessary to open some valves. The instructions were detailed and
clear. After he had given the orders the officer asked a crewman, whether he had
understood and knew what to do. The seafarer gave an affirmative reply. Later he opened
the wrong valves and was injured by mechanical parts moved by compressed air. The
analysis of the accident showed that the man had had not understood what he was
instructed to do. It was more of a cultural problem for him to admit that he did not know
what to do or to ask for a demonstration, this was aggravated by a lack English skills.

The collision on MV „Anjola“ referred to earlier can also be attributed mostly to a cultural
problem. The Filipino chief officer thought that his German master would take over the
command automatically once he came onto the bridge. This was not the masters’ custom or
intention. The chief officer did not ask the master if he was to continue with navigation and
he did not inform him about a dangerous situation, as a result the ship collided with
another vessel. This accident was not caused by lack of language skills but partially due to
cultural and custom differences. For the master it was quite clear that the officer of the
watch would continue with navigation as long as no other orders were given by him. It is
noted that the „IMO-Standard Marine Communication Phrases“ expects the master in a case
like this to inform the officer of the watch with the phrase : „I now take over the command.“
For the watchofficer, on the other hand, it seemed to have been implied that the master by
being there, would take over the command. Cultural barriers avoided a clearing question to
clarify the situation.

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MV „Alexandria“ MV „Xin Hua 7“ - collision near Pusan (Korea) - June 30 th 1995

The Liberian flag vessel „Alexandria“ approached Pusan. She had to give way the Chinese
vessel „Xin Hua 7“. The Filipino chief officer did not continue with navigation when the
German master entered the bridge although they did not talk to each other. The chief officer
thought that the master would automatically take over command and did not alter the
course. He also did not inform the master about the critical situation. This was the reason
why the collision happened.

2.6 Under Emergencies

Operation of the vessel

In emergency situations involving the operation of a vessel it is important that crew

members are able to communicate quickly and effectively, information vital to resolving
such situations. The types of situation that might arise include fire and flood, and the
following case illustrates the problems that can occur.

Scandinavian Star (a) - 1988

The SCANDINAVIAN STAR has been involved in two incidents involving fires on board. In the
first incident in March 1988 the ship was on the Cozumel, Mexico to St Petersburg leg of a
cruise. Approximately four hours into the voyage a fire started in the engine room, caused
by an oil leak. The fire was observed by the motorman who was Honduran who then
reported the fire to the watch engineer who was Filipino. The two men did not share a
common language and consequently they had to communicate by hand signals. (Anon n,
1990)

While, in this case the language communication problem did not lead to any loss of life the
signs that problems might occur existed. However, one of the recommendations of the
National Transportation Safety Board of the USA was that SeaEscape (the Shipowner) should

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‘require that the officers and crew of passenger ships are able to communicate with each
other and with a majority of the passengers’ (Anon n, 1990).

Lines of Communication

Should an accident occur there may be problems in resolving the situation if language or
communication difficulties exist between the various parties involved. Thus problems in the
line of communication will be of concern.

Ever Obtain - 1993

The EVER OBTAIN, a 30,254 dwt ship built in 1983 suffered an engine room flood and loss of
power during a voyage from Kaoshiung to Jeddah, which ultimately resulted in it having to
be towed to Suez for engine repairs. The principal issue

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arising from this incident was the breakdown in communication, despite the fact that the EVER OBTAIN
had the latest Inmarsat approved satellite communication equipment on board.

When the EVER OBTAIN reported the incident to the Stavanger Rescue Coordinating Centre (RCC) they
were “unable to understand the level of English spoken by the Radio Officer on board the ship”. After
the initial distress call had been received Stavanger RCC then tried to contact the EVER OBTAIN by
Inmarsat and Telex but both methods were unsuccessful. The ship had to contact its own company
headquarters in Tapei to request assistance which was initially provided by a US Navy missile destroyer,
prior to the arrival of a Greek salvage tug.

Sea Empress 1996

The initial incident that led to the Sea Empress becoming grounded in Milford Haven was not due to
communication failure. Concerns have however been raised as to the post accident events, one of
which was apparently communication failure in the salvage operation. (Rood, 1996).

Communication between the salvor’s liaison officer and the Master of the DE YUE was not a problem,
although the media interpreted the situation as such at the time. Although the Master had no
understanding of English some of the senior officers had sufficient knowledge of English for the correct
procedures and requests to be followed. The reason the DE YUE was not utilised was not due to
language problems but rather to differences in opinion as to how the tug should have been used (MAIB,
1997).

A problem did however occur in respect of the effectiveness of communication between the co-salvors
and the other parties legitimately involved in the salvage operation. This is best explained by the official
enquiry report which says:

“The salvors were well used to managing their own groups of staff and had effective communications
within these groups. However, communications to others on board were, due to the numbers involved,
somewhat less effective. This is no serious reflection on the workings of the salvors.....but it did result in
many persons on board feeling unsure of who was in charge. Recognising that each [supernumerary]
had a counterpart ashore to whom he reported either in the form of an individual or an organisation,
any deficiency in communications on board the casualty was amplified, possibly many times over....”.

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Failure to communicate with passengers verbally

When passengers are involved in a Maritime incident it is likely that there will be a range of languages
being spoken. It is therefore important that the crew can clearly direct them in whatever action is
required in order that injury and potential loss of life are minimised.

St. Malo

An accident involving the High Speed Ferry, the ST. MALO, was principally down to navigational
problems with the craft being taken through an area outside of the prescribed channel. Once the
accident had occurred however there were some reported language problems with an entirely French
crew trying to evacuate a largely British and German passenger complement (Anon o, 1995).

Scandinavian Star (b) - 1990

The SCANDINAVIAN STAR had left Oslo for Fredrikshaven in an unfinished state of repair, with work still
being carried out on board and many of the exits blocked. Due to an hurried preparation period prior to
sailing many of the crew had not undertaken fire or lifeboat drill and many did not know their
emergency number or duties.

Shortly after sailing an arsonist started three fires, the latter of which spread rapidly. Due to the lack of
preparation and a lack of leadership from the ships' officers there was a failure to appraise the extent of
the fire or number of people evacuated. Little attempt was made to deal with the fire and the crew
generally acted individually rather than in a co-ordinated fashion.

Further, communication problems existed between the crew and between crew and passengers and
emergency evacuation procedures were not passed in a language that the passengers could understand.
This was despite the fact that the ferry was running on a regular Scandinavian route. Thus passengers
were only aware of the panic and confusion and not the underlying reasons and they were unaware of
where the fires were, information that was essential for a safe evacuation. The crew had been hired on
understanding that they spoke English but clearly did not and this failure was a significant factor in the
high death toll of 158.

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Failure to communicate with passengers in written form

Communication can also take place in written form and where passengers are involved it is important
that any information necessary for their safety should be written in a language that they can
understand, particularly if the crew do not speak their language.

Tallink - 1995

The TALLINK, a ro-ro ferry ran aground off the island of Suomenlinna near Helsinki shortly after leaving

for Tallinn. While 1100 people were evacuated with only one passenger slightly injured a number of

them complained that they could not understand the evacuation procedures that were given only in

Estonian (Anon p, 1995) Post accident problems

Incidents that may originally have originated due to unforeseen circumstances can be exacerbated if
there is a failure in communication between those whose responsibility it is to try and resolve the
problem. The following example clearly highlights what can occur where language problems exist.

Matilda Bay - 1997

The MATILDA BAY had been crossing the Great Australian Bight on a passage from Melbourne to
Freemantle. The Chief Officer was Malaysian, the rest of the officers were British and the ratings were
from the Philippines.

A repair team had been working forward trying to secure a detached booby hatch lid in heavy seas
when a sea came over the forecastle head and knocked the team over and out of sight of the bridge.
The Chief Officer who was leading the work team was pushed under the windlass and severely injured,
while the other team members were pushed onto the windlass but not injured.

A Filipino lookout had seen the sea come over and when the water cleared was unable to see the team
members. He ran into the wheelhouse to report that a man had gone overboard but the watchkeeper
was unable to understand what was being said. There was considerable confusion as to how many
men, if any, had gone overboard and the ship was turned around to search for them before it was
realised that all of the team members were still on board. The confusion lasted about 15 minutes and
during this period the Chief Officer lay injured under the windlass. When the problem was eventually
resolved he was taken to the sick bay but died of his injuries.

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The chief officer had not informed the bridge of his intentions and none of the three men in the team
were in contact with the bridge by radio. This in itself contributed to the accident as the master could
have taken a safer course of action to allow the repairs to be undertaken. A further contributing factor
to the confusion after the accident was the language difficulties, and this delayed the treatment to the
Chief Officer. (Brewer, 1997; Anon, 1997)

2.7 Conclusions

Many of the incidents shown above indicate that the watchkeepers did not have a clear understanding
of a common language

Watchkeeping officers are required to have a knowledge of written and spoken English adequate to be
able to understand charts, nautical publications, meteorological information and messages concerning
the ships' safety and operation. Their knowledge should also be adequate to communicate with other
ships and coast stations and multilingual crew, and use IMO Standard Maritime Communication Phrases
(ISF, 1995; IMO, 1996).

Following the implementation of STCW 95 a vessel should not be able to sail without the navigating and
senior officers having an adequate knowledge of the English language in order to perform certain tasks
and communicate with other vessels.

Further, under the STCW 95 regulations, the English language requirements not only apply to navigation
watchkeepers but also to engineer watchkeepers who are required to demonstrate an ability to
interpret engineering publications written in English. Clearly a ship operating with a crew that cannot
undertake basic tasks not only contravenes STCW 95 regulations but also numerous other international
safety at sea regulations (IMO, 1995).

Nowadays, it is usual for large oil and chemical companies to charter the better part of the tonnage
required to carry their cargoes. These vessels are chartered from shipping companies outside the oil
interests. To evaluate the quality of ship and crew, vetting inspections are performed. These inspections
are based on guidelines established by consultative organisations such as OCIMF in London. The
guidelines also include the evaluation of communication between crewmembers. The oil companies

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collect the vetting reports in different systems, such as Ship Inspection Report Exchange (SIRE) from BP
in order to exchange information about ships.

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