Eland G Garcia
Eland G Garcia
Eland G Garcia
DECISION
PERALTA, J : p
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with the CA, which
dismissed it in a Decision dated February 28, 2006, which reads: DICcTa
Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed that despite the
opportunity, or the right allowed in the Order dated July 17, 1999 of the trial
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court, for the petitioner to cross-examine respondents' witnesses and to
comment on the documentary evidence presented ex parte after the default
order against the same petitioner, the latter evasively moved to set aside
respondents' evidence in order to suspend further proceedings that were
intended to abort the pre-trial conference. They added that petitioner
neglected to avail itself of, or to comply with, the prescription of the rules
found in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court by opting not to avail itself of the
hearing of its opposition to the summary judgment after receiving the Order
dated August 20, 1999; by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or
admission in the records; and by not objecting to the decretal portion of the
said Order dated August 20, 1999, which stated that the motion for
summary judgment has been submitted for resolution without further
argument. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that the trial court
wrongly appreciated falsified evidence, respondents asserted that
petitioner's counsel failed to study carefully the records of the proceedings
for the presentation of the evidence ex parte to be able to know that it was
not only a single-day proceeding, and that more than one witness had been
presented. They further averred that the trial court did not only rely on the
photographs of the houses of the occupants of the property in question.
Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents asseverated
that their complaint alleged joint causes of action for quieting of title under
Art. 476 of the New Civil Code and for the review of the decree of
registration pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree or P.D.
No. 1529, because they are complimentary with each other.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court is the
propriety of the summary judgment in this particular case of quieting of title.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto
has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for a summary
judgment. ITECSH
Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated, because
the copy of the motion for summary judgment was served only on August
20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing. It also added that even if
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the petitioner received a copy of the motion only on August 20, 1999, there
was no hearing conducted on that date because the trial court issued an
order giving petitioner 10 days within which to file its comment or
opposition.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was
correct in its observation that there was substantial compliance with due
process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule was
substantially complied with because when the respondents filed the motion
for summary judgment on August 9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a
copy thereof on the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that the
motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of
the filing thereof.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and
in all situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is found
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one's evidence in
support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of
previous notice, but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be
heard. 47
Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an
action for quieting of title. This particular argument, however, is misplaced.
This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of a
summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation. 48
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the grant of
summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted only
if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if,
while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such
issues are not genuine. 49
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue
is the determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment, and
the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court
found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate
conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows
otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to
clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They merely
reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed
some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and
uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more litigious or
genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the
merits. DHETIS
In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved, the trial
court merely stated that:
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs'
cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is
based on the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings
of Lot 9250, Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of
244,112 square meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335, Tagaytay Cadastre,
containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While defendant
Eland in its answer practically and mainly interposed the defenses of:
(a) the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not the parcel of
land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b) the claim
of the plaintiffs is barred by prior judgment of this Court in said Land
Registration Case; and (c) plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the Statute
of Limitation since Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660 has become
incontrovertible. HScDIC
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial court, propounded
thus:
The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable. Summary
judgment is not only limited to solving actions involving money claims.
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Court, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be allowed. The term "genuine issue" has been defined
as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up
in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact, which call for the
presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Thus, even if on their face
the pleadings appear to raise issues, but when the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine,
then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a
matter of law.
Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the same Answer
Ad Cautelam, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as they
appear to be well aware of the proceedings in said Land Registration
Case No. TG-423 and inspite of such knowledge, plaintiffs never
bothered to present their alleged claims in the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration come into
question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value. — The decree of registration shall not be reopened
or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any
person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land
or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation
of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry
of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include
an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-
660 of petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued
on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case
No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence, applying the
above provisions, it would seem that the period of one (1) year from the
issuance of the decree of registration has not elapsed for the review thereof.
However, a closer examination of the above provisions would clearly indicate
that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not the proper
remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or
decree when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within
one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. 56 However, the
basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud.
Shedding light on the matter is a discussion presented in one of the
recognized textbooks on property registration, 57 citing decisions of this
Court, thus:
As further pointed out in the same book, 61 the petition for review must
be filed within one year from entry of the decree of registration. As written:
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the registration court. 62 After the lapse of said
period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to
reopening or review.
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a
review of the decree of registration would have been the appropriate
remedy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised by the
petitioner are necessarily rendered inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland
Philippines, Inc. is hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated February 28,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed
the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the resolution
dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay
City, is hereby REVERSED a n d SET ASIDE. Consequently, the resolution
dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay
City in Civil Case No. TG-1784 is hereby declared NULL and VOID. n
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Carpio, * Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
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Footnotes
* Designated to sit as an additional Member, in lieu of Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated February 10, 2010.
47. Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48108, September 26, 1990, 190 SCRA
43.
48. See Carlos v. Sandoval, et al., G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, SCRA
574 116, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, November 18,
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2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts. 48 & 60, and Roque v.
Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
49. Mariano Nocom v. Oscar Camerino, et al., G.R. No. 182984, February 10,
2009, 578 SCRA 390, citing Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R. No.
172592, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 516.
50. National Power Corporation v. Loro, et al., G.R. No. 175176, October 17,
2008, 569 SCRA 648, citing Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No.
163269, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 512, 535.
51. Id.
52. Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 117574, January 2, 1997,
266 SCRA 88, citing Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 75282, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 207, 212, citing Auman v.
Estenzo, No. L-40500, 27 February 1976, 69 SCRA 524; Loreno v. Estenzo,
No. L-43306, 29 October 1976, 73 SCRA 630; Viajar v. Estenzo, No. L-45321,
30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 684.
53. G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 438.
56. Lopez v. Padilla, G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44.
57. Justice Agcaoili (ed.), Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land
Titles and Deeds), 297-298 (2006).
58. Serna v. CA, G.R. No. 124605, June 18, 1999, 308 SCRA 527.
59. Walstrom v. Mapa, G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Cruz
v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-27644, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109; Libudan v.
Palma Gil, G.R. No. L-21164, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17.
60. 26 Phil. 581 (1914).
61. Supra note 57 at 302-304.
62. Gomez v. CA, G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA 491.
63. 48 Phil. 836 (1926).
64. Ramos v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 94033, May 29, 1995, 244 SCRA 418.
65. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Sunico, 36 Phil. 279 (1917).
66. Supra note at 60.
67. Rivera v. Moran, 48 Phil. 863 (1926).
68. Republic v. Sioson, G.R. No. L-13687, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 533.
n Note from the Publisher: The phrase "Resolution dated November 3, 1999"
reads as "Resolution dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006" in
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/173289.htm.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.
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n Note from the Publisher: The phrase "Resolution dated November 3, 1999"
reads as "Resolution dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006" in
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/173289.htm.