BYSTANDER INTERVENTION IN EMERGENCIES: DIFFUSION OF

RESPONSIBILITY
John M. Darley and Bibb Latane (1968)

“Ss overheard an epileptic seizure. They believed either that they alone heard the
emergency, or that 1 or 4 unseen others were also present. As predicted the presence
of other bystanders reduced the individual's feelings of personal responsibility and
lowered his speed of reporting (p < .01).” (p. 377)

“In general, personality and background measures were not predictive of helping.
Bystander inaction in real-life emergencies is often explained by "apathy," "alienation,"
and "anomie." This experiment suggests that the explanation may lie more in the
bystander's response to other observers than in his indifference to the victim.” (Ibid.)

“Although the attacker took more than half an hour to kill Kitty Genovese, not one of the
38 people who watched from the safety of their own apartments came out to assist her.
Not one even lifted the telephone to call the police (Rosenthal, 1964).” (Ibid.)

“Their conclusions ranged from "moral decay," to "dehumanization produced by the

urban environment," to "alienation," "anomie," and "existential despair." An analysis of
the situation, however, suggests that factors other than apathy and indifference were
involved.” (Ibid.)

“There are obvious humanitarian norms about helping the victim, but there are also
rational and irrational fears about what might happen to a person who does intervene
(Milgram & Hollander, 1964).” (Ibid.)

"I didn't want to get involved," is a familiar comment, and behind it lies fears of physical
harm, public embarrassment, involvement with police procedures, lost work days and
jobs, and other unknown dangers.” (Ibid.)

“In certain circumstances, the norms favoring intervention may be weakened, leading
bystanders to resolve the conflict in the direction of non-intervention. One of these
circumstances may be the presence of onlookers.” (Ibid.)

“The responsibility for helping was diffused among the observers; there was also
diffusion of any potential blame for not taking action; and finally, it was possible that
somebody, unperceived, had already initiated helping action.” (Ibid.)

“A second possibility is that potential blame may be diffused. However much we may
wish to think that an individual's moral behaviour is divorced from considerations of
personal punishment or reward, there is both theory and evidence to the contrary
(Aronfreed, 1964; Miller & Bollard, 1941, Whiting & Child, 19S3). It is perfectly
reasonable to assume that, under circumstances of group responsibility for a punishable
act, the punishment or blame that accrues to any one individual is often slight or non-
existent.” (p. 378)
“Finally, if others are known to be present, but their behavior cannot be closely
observed, any one bystander can assume that one of the other observers is already
taking action to end the emergency. Therefore, his own intervention would be only
redundant—perhaps harmfully or confusingly so. Thus, given the presence of other
onlookers whose behavior cannot be observed, any given bystander can rationalize his
own inaction by convincing himself that "somebody else must be doing something."
(Ibid.)

“These considerations lead to the hypothesis that the more bystanders to an

emergency, the less likely, or the more slowly, any one bystander will intervene to
provide aid. To test this proposition it would be necessary to create a situation in which
a realistic "emergency" could plausibly occur.” (Ibid.)

PROCEDURE

Overview

“A college student arrived in the laboratory and was ushered into an individual room
from which a communication system would enable him to talk to the other participants.”
(Ibid.)

“The dependent variable was the speed with which the subjects reported the emergency
to the experimenter. The major independent variable was the number of people the
subject thought to be in the discussion group.” (Ibid.)

Subjects

“Fifty-nine female and thirteen male students in introductory psychology courses at New
York University were contacted to take part in an unspecified experiment as part of a
class requirement.” (Ibid.)

Method

“Over the intercom, the experimenter explained that he was interested in learning about
the kinds of personal problems faced by normal college students in a high pressure,
urban environment.” (Ibid.)

“First, subjects would remain anonymous, which was why they had been placed in
individual rooms rather than face-to-face. (The actual reason for this was to allow tape
recorder simulation of the other subjects and the emergency.) Second, since the
discussion might be inhibited by the presence of outside listeners, the experimenter
would not listen to the initial discussion, but would get the subject's reactions later, by
questionnaire. (The real purpose of this was to remove the obviously responsible
experimenter from the scene of the emergency.)” (Ibid.)
Group size variable

“The major independent variable of the study was the number of other people that the
subject believed also heard the fit.” (Ibid.)

Variations in group composition

“In one three-person condition, the taped by-stander voice was that of a female, in
another a male, and in the third a male who said that he was a premedical student who
occasionally worked in the emergency wards at Bellevue hospital.” (Ibid.)

Time to help

“The major dependent variable was the time elapsed from the start of the victim's fit until
the subject left her experimental cubicle.” (Ibid.)

“Finally the subject filled out a questionnaire concerning her thoughts and feelings
during the emergency, and completed scales of Machiavellianism, anomie, and
authoritarianism (Christie, 1964), a social desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964),
a social responsibility scale (Daniels & Berkowitz, 1964), and reported vital statistics
and socioeconomic data.” (Ibid.)

RESULTS

Plausibility of Manipulation

“Judging by the subjects' nervousness when they reported the fit to the experimenter, by
their surprise when they discovered that the fit was simulated, and by comments they
made during the fit (when they thought their microphones were off), one can conclude
that almost all of the subjects perceived the fit as real.” (Ibid.)

Effect of Group Size on Helping

“The cumulative distributions of response times for groups of different perceived size
(Figure 1) indicates that, by any point in time, more subjects from the two-person groups
had responded than from the three-person groups, and more from the three-person
groups than from the six-person groups. (p. 380)

Speed of Response

“An analysis of variance indicates that the effect of group size is highly significant (p < .
01). Duncan multiple-range tests indicate that all but the two- and three-person groups
differ significantly from one another (p <.OS). (Ibid.)

Victim's Likelihood of Being Helped

“From the data of this experiment, it is possible mathematically to create hypothetical
groups with one, two, or five observers. The calculations indicate that the victim is about
equally likely to get help from one bystander as from two. The victim is considerably
more likely to have gotten help from one or two observers than from five during the first
minute of the fit.” (Ibid.)

Effect of Group Composition on Helping the Victim

“As Table 2 shows, the variations in sex and medical competence of the other
bystander had no important or detectable affect on speed of response. Subjects
responded equally frequently and fast whether the other bystander was female, male, or
medically experienced.” (p. 380-381)

Sex of the Subject and Speed of Response

“Coping with emergencies is often thought to be the duty of males, especially when
females are present, but there was no evidence that this was the case in this study.
Male subjects responded to the emergency with almost exactly the same speed as did
females (Table 2).” (p. 381)

Reasons for Intervention or Nonintervention

“The only thoughts checked by more than a few subjects were "I didn't know what to do"
(18 out of 65 subjects), "I thought it must be some sort of fake" (20 out of 65), and "I
didn't know exactly what was happening" (26 out of 65).” (Ibid.)

“It is possible that subjects were ashamed to report socially undesirable rationalizations,
or, since the subjects checked the list after the true nature of the experiment had been
explained to them, their memories might have been blurred.” (Ibid.)

Individual Difference Correlates of Speed of Report

“Personality measures showed no important or significant correlations with speed of

reporting the emergency. In fact, only one of the 16 individual difference measures, the
size of the community in which the subject grew up, correlated (r = -.26, p < .05) with
the speed of helping.” (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

“When those subjects who intervened stepped out of their rooms, they found the
experimental assistant down the hall. With some uncertainty, but without panic, they
reported the situation.” (Ibid.)

“Subjects who failed to report the emergency showed few signs of the apathy and
indifference thought to characterize "unresponsive bystanders.”” (p. 381-382)
“Many of these subjects showed physical signs of nervousness; they often had
trembling hands and sweating palms. If anything, they seemed more emotionally
aroused than did the subjects who reported the emergency.” (p. 382)

“The emotional behavior of these nonresponding subjects was a sign of their continuing
conflict, a conflict that other subjects resolved by responding.” (Ibid.)

“The fit created a conflict situation of the avoidance-avoidance type.” (Ibid.)

“On the one hand, subjects worried about the guilt and shame they would feel if they did
not help the person in distress. On the other hand, they were concerned not to make
fools of themselves by overreacting, not to ruin the ongoing experiment by leaving their
intercom, and not to destroy the anonymous nature of the situation which the
experimenter had earlier stressed as important.” (Ibid.)

“For subjects in the two-person condition, the obvious distress of the victim and his
need for help were so important that their conflict was easily resolved. For the subjects
who knew there were other bystanders present, the cost of not helping was reduced
and the conflict they were in more acute.” (Ibid.)

“Male subjects reported the emergency no faster than did females. These results (or
lack of them) seem to conflict with the Berkowitz, Klanderman, and Harris (1964) finding
that males tend to assume more responsibility and take more initiative than females in
giving help to dependent others. Also, females reacted equally fast when the other
bystander was another female, a male, or even a person practiced in dealing with
medical emergencies.” (Ibid.)

“It might be helpful in understanding this lack of difference to distinguish two general
classes of intervention in emergency situations: direct and reportorial.” (Ibid.)

“Direct intervention (breaking up a fight, extinguishing a fire, swimming out to save a

drowner) often requires skill, knowledge, or physical power. It may involve danger.”
(Ibid.)

“A second way of dealing with an emergency is to report it to someone qualified to

handle it, such as the police.” (Ibid.)

“The effects of group size on speed of helping, therefore, are due simply to the
perceived presence of others rather than to the influence of their actions.” (p. 382-383)

“These explanations generally assert that people who fail to intervene are somehow
different in kind from the rest of us, that they are "alienated by industrialization,"
"dehumanized by urbanization," "depersonalized by living in the cold society," or
"psychopaths." These explanations serve a dual function for people who adopt them.”
(p. 383)
“First, they explain (if only in a nominal way) the puzzling and frightening problem of
why people watch others die. Second, they give individuals reason to deny that they too
might fail to help in a similar situation.” (Ibid.)

“The explanation of bystander "apathy" may lie more in the bystander's response to
other observers than in presumed personality deficiencies of "apathetic" individuals.
Although this realization may force us to face the guilt-provoking possibility that we too
might fail to intervene, it also suggests that individuals are not, of necessity, "non-
interveners" because of their personalities. If people understand the situational forces
that can make them hesitate to intervene, they may better overcome them.” (Ibid.)