Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana
Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana
Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana
DECISION
CARPIO, J : p
property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment of the mortgage debt on 15
April 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.
Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-
35 from Spouses Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of
P80,000. Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled
TCT No. T-35 and issued TCT No. T-3244 20 in her name. Likewise, the
Assessor's Office of Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No. 90210. 21 DETACa
Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for
Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They
claimed that Buena entered the property and caused the construction of
structures without any court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order
dated 21 September 2007 granting the preliminary injunction. Thereafter,
the case was submitted for resolution.
In a Decision 22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor
of respondents. The lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage
between Uy and Rosca; (2) the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the
house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties
were not entitled to their respective claims for damages. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint
filed by plaintiff Uy is hereby DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction
and bond are cancelled and are rendered of no force and effect. The
claims for damages of both parties are hereby DENIED. Cost against
both parties.
SO ORDERED. 23
Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for
being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states
that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they
actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property. Uy also
insists that he did not give his consent to the sale which prejudiced his rights
and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give physical possession of the
house and lot to the alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that
the sale is valid, that the consideration paid was unreasonably low and
unconscionable such that it constitutes an equitable mortgage. Uy insists
that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered buyers in good
faith.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely
on the re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which
had previously been passed upon exhaustively by both the trial and
appellate courts. Respondents added that only questions of law may be
raised under Rule 45. Since the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts were supported by substantial evidence and none of the recognized
exceptions allowing this Court to exercise its power to review is present,
then the petition should be dismissed.
We agree with respondents.
The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial
and appellate courts. We find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In
petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in
the present case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law. Here, Uy
would like us to review again the factual circumstances surrounding the
Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the Spouses Lacsamana and to declare
the Deed of Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of consideration and
consent. Clearly, these are questions of fact which are within the purview of
the trial and appellate courts to determine. Also, the issues raised do not
come within the purview of the recognized exceptions 28 for this Court to
take cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this
Court is not the proper venue to consider factual issues as it is not a trier of
facts.
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the
property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid
marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage." 29 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio —
Always presume marriage. 30 However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In
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Pugeda v. Trias , 31 we held that testimony by one of the parties to the
marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person
who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be
admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals, 32 we held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929, 33
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, 34 which is applicable to the
present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca
cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that
they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person
solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the
clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the
municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the
marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those
mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest,
or minister who solemnized the marriage.
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate
which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing
officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even
the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant
evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the
documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married
to each other. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision state:
. . . In the case under consideration, the presumption of
marriage, on which plaintiff Uy anchored his allegations, has been
sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of evidence
showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually
married to each other, to wit:
First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Batangas on 12 November
1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth paragraph of his Petition,
to quote: "I am married (not legally)."
Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of
the Province of Batangas executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's
Petition for Naturalization categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4
thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).
Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as
late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff Uy also known by his Chinese name
of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single" when filling up his civil
status therein.
Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758
establishes that plaintiff Uy was an alien duly registered with the
Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his civil status was
single.
Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of
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Batangas, establishes in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not
legally married to defendant Rosca.
Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness
reveals that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their
marriage was not consummated.
For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of
their marriage certificate by presenting public documents, namely:
First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the
Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G. Uy, to be admitted a citizen of
the Philippines";
Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of
plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca and the descriptive word
"legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;
Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation
executed and signed by defendant Rosca, stating that she is the wife
of plaintiff Uy;
Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant
Rosca with their children;
Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca
dated 19 July 1985 wherein she admitted being the wife of plaintiff
Uy;
Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by
defendant Rosca admitting she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was
not testified to nor identified by Rosca;
Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976
signed by defendant Rosca admitting her status as married;
to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise,
plaintiff Uy presented defendant Rosca as an adverse witness
purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his marriage with the latter.
However, this presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own
evidence and most importantly, by the more superior evidence
presented by the defendants.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited
as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that
plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was
not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo , this Court held that
persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent
any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently
overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff
Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and
defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for
plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they
were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. 35
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to
Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the
Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not
incapacitated from getting married. Article 147 provides:
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Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. ETHIDa
7. Records, Vol. I, p. 7.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Records, Vol. I, pp. 225-226.
10. Docketed as LRC Consulta No. 1194.
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. (E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. v. Shen Dar Electricity and
Machinery Co., Ltd., 648 Phil. 572, 580-581 (2010).
29. Section 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
30. Delgado vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian , 516
Phil. 130 (2006).
31. 114 Phil. 781 (1962).
33. Approved on 4 December 1929. Effective six months after its approval.
34. An Act to Amend the Marriage Law, so as to Grant Facilities for Securing
Marriage Licenses, Among Other Purposes. Approved and effective on 3
November 1936.
40. Id., citing Magallon v. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).
41. See Stuart v. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083, 1084 (1962). Citations omitted.