Central University Of South Bihar

SH - 7,Gaya- Panchanpur road, Village:- Karhara ,

Post :- Fatehpur , P.S. – Tekari ,District – Gaya
(Bihar) , Pin – 824236

A topic study of “Offence of abetment” (sections

107-120) Chapter V of Indian Penal Code
Submitted to : Submitted by :
Dr. Pawan Kumar Mishra Ritesh Kumar
PhD(Law, University of North BA-LLB(H)
Bengal) 2018-23
Professor (Head and Dean) CUSB1813125078

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 Acknowledgement
I am very glad to get this opportunity to prepare a report on the above topic.
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Dr. Pawan
Kumar Mishra, my teacher of Law of Crimes-1[IPC], who gave me the golden
opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic “Offence of abetment”
which also helped me in doing a lot of research and I came to know about so
many new things. I am really thankful to and fortunate enough to get constant
encouragement, support and guidance from all Teaching staffs of the School of
Law and Governance who helped me in successfully completing my project
work. I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in
finalizing this project within the limited time frame.

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Table of contents
Topic Page no.

Introduction 04

Parties to a crime 04

Important element: Mens Rea 05

Methods of Abetment 06

Section 108: Abettor 10

Scope and ingredients of section 108 12

Section 108A: Abetment in India of offence outside India 13

Liability of an Abettor 14

Section 109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in 14

consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment.
Section 110. Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with a 15
different intention from that of abettor
Section 111. Liability of abettor when one act abetted and .different act done 15

Section 112. Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and 16
for act done
Section 113. Liability of abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted 16
different from that intended by the abettor
Section 114. Abettor present when offence is committed 17

Section 115. Abetment of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for 18

life.— If offence not committed
Sections 116-120 20-22

Bibliography and online sites 22

OFFENCE OF ABETMENT

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INTRODUCTION
Law keeps a check on human behaviour. It categories them into criminal and non-criminal
behaviours. However, every non-criminal behaviour even something as simple as buying a
knife for your kitchen becomes criminal when there are criminal intentions behind it.

The concept of abetment widens the horizons of criminal law to incorporate these criminal
intentions and penalize them even when the person who bought the knife did not actually kill
anyone but handed it over to someone else to do it. To explain the concept of abetment, the
word ‘abet’ should be given a deep scrutiny. In general use, it means to aid, advance, assist,
help and promote. In Corpus Juris Secundum (encyclopedia of United States law at the federal and
state levels), the meaning of the word ‘abet' has been given as under :

To abet has been defined as meaning to aid; to assist or to give aid; to command, to procure, or to
counsel; to countenance; to encourage, counsel, induce, or assist, to encourage or to set another on to
commit.1

Thus, any act of an individual, Which aids, helps or assists another to commit a crime, falls
Within the offence of abetment. The term ‘abetment’, in criminal law, thus indicates that
there is a distinction between the person abetting the commission of an offence (or abettor)
and the perpetrator of the offence or the principal offender.

In usual parlance, a person is held to be liable only if he or she has personally committed a
crime. Detouring from the usual concept, the concept of Abetment says, that he who has
helped the criminal or provided him with any assistance in any form can also be  held to be
liable. This article will discuss at length, the nitty gritty of Abetment laws in India.

PARTIES TO A CRIME

Chapter V (Of Abetment) of the IPC provides for the law governing the liability of all those
considered in law to have abetted the commission of offences
At the very outset, it Will be useful to compare and contrast briefly the position in English
law as compared to the Indian position. In English law, persons who themselves are not the
main offenders, but who assist or aid them, are known as accessories. 2 English law recognises
three types of accessories:

(1) Accessories before the fact;

(2) Accessories at the fact; and
(3) Accessories after the fact.

Further, when there are two or more parties to a crime, then they are classed into:

1) Principals in the First Degree, i.e., those who actually commit the crime or offence
with their own hands or through innocent agent;
2) Principals in the Second Degree, i.e., those who are present at the commission of the
and extend aid and assistance for its commission;

1
Kartar Singh v State of Punjab (1 99 4) Cr LJ 3139 (SC) , para 62 .
2
For details see, Russell on Crime, JW Cecil Turner (ed), vol 1, 12th edn, Stevens & Sons, London, 1964, p 131,
et seq.

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 3) Accessories before the fact, i.e., those who though not present in the scene of
occurrence or where the crime is committed, counsel, procure or command another to
commit the crime; and
4) Accessories after the fact, i.e. those who knowing that a person has committed an
offence knowingly receive, relieve, comfort, harbour or assist him from escaping from
the clutches of law.

However the Indian Penal Code makes a broad distinction between principals and abettors
but does not recognise the accessory after the fact except that harbouring of offenders has
been made a substantive offence in some cases.3 Under the Indian Penal Code(sec 107)
abetment is constituted in the following ways :
1) by instigating a person to commit an offence; or
2) by engaging in a conspiracy to commit an offence; or
3) by intentionally aiding a person to commit an offence.

Abetment is an offence only if the act abetted would itself be an offence punishable under the
Indian Penal Code or under any other law for the time being in force. It was held in Gangula
Mohan Reddy v. State Of Andhra Pradesh4 that abetment involves mental process of
instigating or intentionally aiding person to do certain thing. Some positive act by accused is
essential to constitute abetment.

IMPORTANT ELEMENT : MENS REA

The essence of abetment is active and intentional assistance of a person to the perpetrator of
an offence. It is therefore essential to keep in mind when considering the law relating to
abetment is the requirement of mens rea as a precondition for liability. As can be gauged
from a plain reading of s 107, instigation, engaging with another in a conspiracy to do a thing
or intentionally aiding another are all acts in which the person abetting knowingly encourages
or assists another person in the commission of the offence. Thus, knowledge about the act
and its effect is implicit in the construction of the provision itself. It has been held in a case 5
that in order to convict a person of abetting the commission of a crime, it is not only
necessary to prove that he has taken part in those steps of the transaction which are innocent,
but in some way or other, it is absolutely necessary to connect him with those steps of the
transaction which are criminal.
The position is, however, different in the case of offences where the statute itself
provides that no mens rea is required to make a person liable. Thus, for an act where the
doing of an act itself amounts to an offence, as for example, in the sale of obscene books or
other objects under s 292, IPC, or where strict liability exists in public welfare or social
legislations,9 mens rea is not required for proving abetment. The Supreme Court, while
considering the validity of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention Act) 1987,
concurred With the Bombay High Court judgment 6 stating that ‘when no mens rea is essential
in the substantive offence, the same is also not necessary in the abetment thereof’.7

3
Refer to sections 130, 136, 201, 212, 216 and 216-A of the I.P.C.
4
(2010) 2 Cri. LJ. 2110 (SC).
5
Shrilal v state of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 MB 155, p 156
6
State of Maharashtra v Abdul Aziz AIR 1962 Bom 243, (1962) 64 BOMLR 16.
7
Kartar Singh v State of Punjab (1994) Cr LJ 3139 (SC), para 69.

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METHODS OF ABETMENT
Abetment can be committed through various methods. It can be caused by aiding, conspiracy
and instigation.

(1) Abetment by Instigation

The word instigate literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to
do any thing. It denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to
stimulate or incite. A person is said to instigate another when he urges forward or provokes,
incites, urges or encourages such person to do an act prohibited by law.8
In order to constitute abetment by instigation some active proceeding towards the
perpetration of the crime is necessary.9 To instigate means to actively suggest or stimulate by
any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation, or
of hints, insinuation or encouragement. 10 Any form of language may be used but there must
be reasonable certainty in regard to the meaning of the words which an inciter may use.
However, the actual words need not be proved.11A and B discovering that C intended to
commit theft in Z’s house, arranged together to persuade him to steal therefrom certain
articles for them. Here A and B will be liable for abetment and C for committing theft.
Mere acquiescence, silent assent or verbal permission would not constitute instigation. For
instance, A tells B that he intends to murder C. B says ’do as you like’. A kills C. B cannot be
said to have instigated A to murder C, because instigation means some active suggestion or
support to stimulation to the commission of the act. Advice per se does not amount to
instigation.
Wilful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact ― Explanation I to
section 107 of the Indian Penal Code says that instigation may be constituted of wilful
misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact by one who is bound to disclose it.
The illustration to this explanation amply explains the instigation by wilful misrepresentation.
Instigation by wilful concealment is there where concealment relates to a material fact which
one owes a legal duty to disclose.
Instigation by letter ― Instigation may be direct or it may be by a letter. Where A writes
a letter to B instigating thereby to murder C, the offence of abetment by instigation is
complete as soon as the contents of the letter become known to B.12 If the letter never reaches
B it is only an attempt to abet but not abetment. 13 A mere request to do a thing may amount to
instigation. For instance, A offers bribe to B, a public servant. B refuses to accept but A
commits abetment. Similarly where A offers a bribe to B, a servant to sell his master’s goods
at less than the price of the goods, A is guilty of instigations.14

8
Ramabtar Agarwalla v State (1983) Cr LJ 122 (Ori).
9
R. v. Taylor, 44 L.J.M.C. 67.
10
Aminuddin, (1922) 24 Bom. LR. 534.
11
Prem Narain, AIR. 1957 All. 177.
12
Sheo Dial Mal, (1894) 16 All. 389.
13
Ransford, (1874) 13 Cox. 9.
14
Reg. v. De Kromme, 17 Cox 492.

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 Direct instigation. — Instigation is direct where one commands, orders, counsels or
encourages directly to do an act. For instance, A orders his servant B to beat C. Here A would
be liable for instigating B to cause hurt to C.15
In order to convict a person of abetting the commission of a crime by instigation, there
must be proof of direct incitement; it is not enough that a person has taken part in those steps
of the transaction which are innocent, but it is absolutely necessary to connect him in some
way or other with those steps of the transaction which are criminal. 16 Sometimes even an
indirect suggestion amounts to instigation provided it is affirmative and likely to produce the
desired result. For instance, A knew that B was likely to meet M’s wife W for an innocent
purpose. A with a View to provoke M tells him that the likely meeting between B and W is
for some illicit purpose. Now here since the suggestion was made by A with a View to
provoke M to attack, B would be guilty of abetment by instigation.
    But silent approval shown in anyway that had the effect of inciting and encouraging the
offence is abetment. In Queen v. Mohit,17 a woman prepared herself to become sutti in the
presence of the accused persons. They followed her upto the pyre and stood by her step sons
crying "Ram Ram". One of the accused also admitted that he told the woman to say "Ram
Ram". It was held that all those that followed her to the pyre and stood by her crying "Ram
Ram" would be guilty of abetment as they actively connived and countenanced the act of
becoming ’sutti’.
(2) Abetment by conspiracy
Abetment by conspiracy consists when two or more persons engage in a conspiracy for the
doing of a thing and an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of the conspiracy and
in order to the doing of that thing. Thus in order that abetment by conspiracy may be
constituted, three things are necessary :—
i. a conspiracy between two or more persons;
ii. an act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of that conspiracy; and
iii. such an act or illegal omission must also take place in order to the doing of the
thing conspired.
Conspiracy means an agreement between two or more persons :
a) to do an illegal act, or
b) to do an act which is not illegal by illegal means.

Thus it is clear that for an offence under the second clause of section 107 a mere combination
of persons or agreement is not enough; an act or illegal omission must also take place in
pursuance of the conspiracy and the act or illegal omission must also be in order to the doing
of the thing agreed upon between them. But for an offence under section 120A a mere
agreement is enough if the agreement is to commit an offence. 18 For abetment by conspiracy
an overt act or illegal omission in pursuance of that conspiracy must be done even though the
agreement is to commit an offence.

15
Rasookoollah, (1869) 12 W.R. (Cr.) 51
16
Queen v. Nimchand, 20 W.R. (Cr) 41
17
3 N.W.P. 316
18
Pramatha Nath v. Saroj Ranjan, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 876

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Clause (2) has to be read together with Explanation 5 of section 108, which provides that it is
not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor
should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It would be sufficient if he
engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed. The illustration
attached with the explanation makes the position amply clear.
A mere conspiracy would not amount to abetment. If conspirators are detected before they
have done more than discussed plans, with a general intention to commit an offence, they
would not be liable as abettors. However, if their plan was to commit an offence they would
be liable for conspiracy under section 120-B  of the Code.
In Pandala Venkatasami,19 it was held that if a person prepares, in conjunction with others a
copy of an intended false document and buys a stamped paper for the purpose of writing such
false document and also asks for information as to a fact to be inserted in such false
document, he would be guilty for abetment of forgery because these are the acts done to
facilitate the commission of the offence. Where a woman, believing herself to be pregnant,
but actually not being with child, conspires With some other person to administer drugs to
herself, to use instruments on herself, with intent to procure abortion, she would be liable for
conspiracy to procure abortion.20
Conviction for Conspiracy.— No person can be convicted for conspiracy if the charge
against all other conspirators has failed,21 or if other alleged conspirators are acquitted. 22 In
case of a Charge of conspiracy against several persons, it would not be necessary for the
prosecution to prove, before it can be held established that each conspirator knew and had
personal communication with all the rest, because some of them might be intermediaries.23
In Haradhan Chakrabarty V. Union of India, 24 the petitioner was charged with offence of
abetment by conspiracy of commission of offence of theft by his officer Major Trilokchand
and nine others. It was alleged that Major Trilokchand committed theft of 250 wheel drums
and nine others including the appellant abetted the offence. Major Trilokchand was found
guilty but eight abettors were acquitted by the Court martial. Later on Major Trilokchand was
also acquitted by the High Court in appeal and the special leave petition filed by the Union of
India against the order of the High Court was also dismissed. Thereafter, Major Trilokchand
was reinstated in the service. The petitioner then claimed that he alone cannot be convicted of
abetment by conspiracy and as such claimed to be reinstated in the service. It was held that
the principal offender Major Trilokchand was acquitted as substantive offence against him
was not established and out of nine abettors eight were also acquitted, therefore, only
petitioner cannot be held guilty of abetment by conspiracy because one cannot conspire with
one self.
(3) Abetment by Aid
A person abets the doing of a thing who intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing. Clause 3 of section 107 must be read with Explanation 2 of the

19
(1881) 3 Mad. 4.
20
Whitechurch, (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 420
21
Jogjiban Ghose, (1909) 10 Cri. LJ. 125.
22
Faguna Kant, 1959 Cri. LJ. 917; See also Topandas, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 881.
23
Burn, (1909) 11 Bom. LR. 1153 : 1909 Cri. L]. 30.
24
1990 Cri. LJ. 1246 (S.C.).

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section and if read together it becomes clear that a person cannot be held guilty of aiding the
doing of an act when the act has not been done at all. Mere intention to facilitate, even
coupled with an act calculated to facilitate, is not sufficient to constitute abetment, unless the
act which it is intended to facilitate actually takes place and is facilitated thereby. 25 For
instance, if a servant keeps open the gate of his master’s house, so that thieves may enter, and
thieves do not come, he cannot be held to have abetted the commission of theft. But if such a
person, after having opened the door or before it, informs possible thieves that he is going to
keep the door open, then he encourages by his conduct to commit theft and is guilty of
abetment by instigation; or if prior to the opening of the gate he had entered into an
agreement with the thieves to keep the door open he would be guilty of abetment by
conspiracy.
A mere giving of an aid does not make the act an abetment of an offence, if the person who
gives the aid does not know that an offence was being committed or contemplated. The
intention should be to aid the commission of an offence. But if the person who lends his
support does not know or has no reason to believe that the act which he was aiding or
supporting was in itself a criminal act, it cannot be said that he intentionally aids or facilitates
the doing of the offence.26 For instance A, B and C are friends. A and B have fallen out so
much so that A is determined to kill B. A goes to the house of C, and on some pretext or
other induces C to call B to his house. C has not the least idea that A would kill B on his
arrival. B arrives and is murdered by A. A had committed murder. In this case, there is no
doubt that C aided in calling B to his house but he never knew why A wanted him to send for
B. Whatever C did, he did intentionally, for it was certainly his intention that B should come.
But, it was not C’s intention that a crime should be committed. Therefore, C cannot be held
guilty of abetment of murder.
‘A’ intends to kill ’B’ . He prepares poison and mixes the same with some food material and
gets the same placed at the dining table of ’B’ through B’s servant who is in the knowledge of
the same. In this case A will be liable for abetting the offence of murder in case B was killed .
Otherwise A will be liable for abetting to attempt to murder. The servant will also be liable
for abetment by aiding.
Mere presence does not amount to aiding.— Mere presence at the commission of an
offence does not amount to intentional aid, unless it was intended to have that effect. To be
present and aware that an offence is about to be committed does not constitute abetment
unless the person so present holds some position of authority, rank or influence of such a
nature, that his countenancing the offence, under the Circumstances, be held a direct
encouragement or unless some specific duty of prevention rests on him which he leaves
unfulfilled in such a manner that he may be safely taken as having joined in conspiracy for
preparation of the offence.27
Aid by illegal omission.— Aid may be rendered by act as well as by illegal omission. When
the law imposes on a person a duty to discharge, his failure to discharge renders him liable to
punishment.28 In Queen V. Kali Churn,29 a head-constable who knew that certain persons
25
Huda S.; The Principles of the Law of Crimes p. 95.
26
Per Mukerjee J. in Ram Nath, (1924) 47 All. 268 at p. 275
27
Lakshmi, (1886) Cr.R.No. 5 of 1886 Unrep. Cr. C. 303.
28
Emp. v. Latif Khan, 20 Bom. 394.
29
21 W.R. (Cr.) 11.

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were likely to be tortured for the purpose of extorting confession, purposely kept out of the
way. He Was guilty of abetment within the meaning of Explanation 2. In such cases it is
necessary to show that the accused intentionally aided the commission of the offence by his
non-interference.30 But an omission to give information that a crime has been committed does
not amount to aiding, unless such omission involves a breach of legal obligation.31
Aid by act.— In Emp. v. Faiyaz Hossein,32 a zamindar lent a house to a Police Officer who
was investigating a case, knowing that the house would be used for torturing a suspected
thief. He was guilty of abetment.
In Emp. v. Ram Lal,33 some persons did their best to dissuade a woman from becoming a
suttee. They had also given information to the nearest police station, but finding it impossible
to dissuade her complied with her wishes and helped her in becoming sutti. They were all
held guilty of abetment.
By affording facility.— The facility given must however, be such as is essential for the
commission of the crime. The mere act of allowing an illegal marriage to take place at one’s
house does not amount to abetment. 34 Similarly, it was held in Emperor v. Umi, 35 that mere
consent to be present at an illegal marriage or actual presence in it, or the grant of
accommodation in a house for the marriage does not necessarily constitute abetment of such
illegal marriage; but the priest who officiates and solemnizes such illegal marriage is guilty of
abetting an offence of bigamy under section 494 Indian Penal Code. So also in Malan, 36 the
accused who held the antarpat (i.e.  Screen) during the performance of a marriage which he
knew was a void marriage under section 494 Indian Penal Code, was held liable for abetment
by aiding.
Attempt— The abetment of an offence is itself a substantive offence. Abetment is an offence
within the meaning of the term under section 40, I.P.C. also. Therefore, attempt to commit
the offence of abetment will be well covered by the provisions of section 511 of the Code.37
In receiving consideration of Rs. 10,000 ’A’ agrees to supply ’8’ with tools so that he could
derail a Calcutta bound train. A supplied the tools to B. In this case the offence abetted by
intentional aiding has not been accomplished. But A has facilitated the commission of
derailment Which has not been committed. Therefore A will be liable for attempting to abet
by intentionally aiding the derailment of the train.
Section 108. Abettor.—A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an
offence, or the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person
capable by law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the
abettor.
Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence
although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act.
30
Khaja Noorul Hossein v. Fabre Tonnere, 24 W.R. (Cr.) 26.
31
Queen v. Khadim, 4 B.L...RA (Cr.) 7.
32
16  A.W.N. 194.
33
36 All. 26.
34
Queen v. Kudum, (1864) W.R. 13.
(1882) 6 Bom. 126
35
(1882) 6 Bom. 126.
36
(1957) 60 Bom. L. R. 428
37
R. Spier, (1887) P.R. N0. 49 of 1887.

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Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted
should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused.
Illustrations
a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is guilty of abetting B to commit
murder.
b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D recovers from
the wound. A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of
committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that
of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustrations
a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to commit an act Which would be
an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence, and
having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the act be committed or not, is guilty
of abetting an offence.
b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to
do an act which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act in
the absence of A and thereby causes Z's death. Here, though B was not capable by law
of committing an offence, A is liable to be punished in the same manner as if B had
been capable by law of committing an offence, and had committed murder, and he is
therefore subject to the punishment of death.

c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B, in consequence of the unsoundness

of his mind, being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what
is wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the house in consequence of A's instigation. B
has committed no offence, but A is guilty of abetting the offence of setting fire to a
dwelling-house, and is liable to the punishment provided for that offence.
d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates B to take property belonging
to Z out of Z ’s possession. A induces B to believe that the property belongs to A. B
takes the property out of Z's possession, in good faith, believing it to be A's property.
B, acting under this misconception, does not take dishonestly, and therefore does not
commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting theft, and is liable to the same punishment as
if B had committed theft.
Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an
abetment is also an offence. 
Illustration
A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C
commits that offence in consequence of B’s instigation. B is liable to be punished for his
offence with the punishment for murder; and, as A instigated B to commit the offence, A is
also liable to the same punishment.

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Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by
conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is
sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed.

Illustration
A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A shall administer the poison. B
then explains the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to administer the poison, but
without mentioning A’s name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures and delivers it to
B for the purpose of its being used in the manner explained. A administers the poison; Z dies
in consequence. Here, though A and C have not conspired together, yet C has been engaged
in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered. C has therefore committed the
offence defined in this section and is liable to the punishment of murder.
SCOPE AND INGREDIENTS OF SECTION 108
The major difference between sections 107 and 108 is that while the former covers the ‘doing
of a thing’, the latter provision covers the abetment of an ‘offence’ specifically. Thus, s 108
defines abettor to be a person who abets:
1) the commission of an offence; or
2) the commission of an act which would be an offence if committed by a person
capable of committing an offence in law.
The abettor could be either an instigator, or a conspirator, or a person giving aid to the
commission of a crime as defined in s 107. The crucial aspect is that the abetment must be of
an offence or an act which amounts to an offence. Hence, if the thing abetted is not an
offence, then the person abetting will not be considered an abettor falling within the coverage
of s 108 and cannot be held liable to punishment as provided in law.
A very important aspect of the definition of abettor is to be found in the explanations and
illustrations provided with the main definition of abettor in s 108. The section itself states that
for the offence of abetment, it is not essential that the person abetted should be capable in law
of committing that offence, or that such person should have the same guilty intention as that
of the abettor. Thus, if one employs a child below seven years or a lunatic to commit the
offence, such persons will be treated in law as innocent agents.38
The definition of ‘abettor’ has been expanded and explained through five explanatory
clauses which are part of the section itself. We shall examine these clauses briefly below.
Explanation 1: Abetment of Illegal Omission is an Offence
This may be despite the abettor himself not being bound to do that act. A case under this
explanation arises when a private person instigates a police officer to leave a scene of a
cognisable offence, which is his duty to prevent. Here, the policeman is guilty of an illegal
omission and the private person is guilty of abetting the police officer in his illegal Omission,
although, the latter was not himself liable to do the act.
Explanation 2: Abetted Act Need not be Committed: Effect of Abetment is Immaterial .
In this category, abetment depends upon instigation and not upon the effect it has upon
another. The offence of abetment is complete with the instigation, notwithstanding the fact
38
As they are entitled to exemption as provided in ss 82 and 84, Indian Penal Code 1860.

12
that the act abetted is not committed or the person abetted refuses to do the thing or in doing
it, the expected result did not follow. To illustrate this, if A instigates B to defame C, even if
B refuses to do so, A is liable as abettor by instigating B to defame C. Similarly, if A
instigates B to murder D, and B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D, but D recovers from
the wound, A is guilty of instigating B to murder in spite of the fact that the act of B did not
produce the desired effect, i.e., the death of D. 39 In a case,40 A handed over a certain amount
to B to pay it to a Medical Officer as a bribe. But B misappropriated the amount, whereupon
he was convicted. Subsequently, A was prosecuted and convicted for bribing the Medical
Officer even though the latter was not bribed at all.
Explanation 3: Person Abetted Need not be Capable of Committing an Offence There is
no prerequisite of s 108 that for abetment, the person abetted should be capable by law of
committing the offence, or that he should have any guilty intention or knowledge or should
commit an offence. Thus, the explanation along with the illustration makes it clear that if a
person has caused injury to another through innocent agents such as a child or lunatic, he will
Still be liable. The employment of an agent legally incompetent to commit an offence does
not absolve the abettor from his criminal liability. The innocent agent is merely his tool and
the abettor is really responsible.
Explanation 4: Abetment of an Abetment is an Offence
Abetment of an abetment is an offence when the principal abetment was an offence. In this
case, the substantive abetment must be the abetment of an offence. It is not necessary that
such an offence should be committed. For example, when A, the servant of B was approached
by C with the intention of robbing B, who reported the fact to B, and B, wishing to entrap C,
allowed A to assist C in robbing him, whereupon A, made over his master’s goods to C, who
was then prosecuted for abetment of theft by A. The question was whether A had committed
the theft, and C abetted him. A could, on facts, not be convicted of the theft since he had
removed the goods with his master’s consent. However, it was held that C was liable for
abetment for the theft (which in fact, did not take place) using expln 4 and the illustration
provided therein.41
Explanation 5: Abettor Need not Concert in Abetment by Conspiracy
In a conspiracy, it is not necessary that all the conspirators should have been aware of the
details of the plot to make them liable. Very often, conspiracies are hatched in secrecy and all
cannot be equally trusted with plans. Anyhow, all Will be equal under this clause with the
main criminal, even though they were not directly connected with him.
Section 108A. Abetment in India of offences outside India —A person abets an offence
within the meaning of this Code, who, in India, abets the commission of any act without and
beyond India which would constitute an offence if committed in India.
Illustration
A, in India, instigates B, a foreigner in Goa, to commit a murder in Goa. A is guilty of
abetting murder.
Nature and scope of provision

39
State of Maharashtra v. Pandurang Ramji (1971) ILR Bom 1061.
40
Provincial Government CP v. Murlidhar AIR 1942 Nag 74.;
41
Troylukho Nath Chowdhry (1878) ILR 4 Cal 366.

13
This section provides for the punishment of abetment of the commission of an offence
outside India. The abetment is committed in India though the person abetted is on a foreign
territory, or the offence abetted is or may be committed outside India. It is also necessary for
the application of this section that the offence abetted shall constitute an offence if committed
in India.
This illustration has become obsolete and ought, therefore, to be substituted because Goa,
being part of Indian territory, is no more a place outside India.

LIABILITY OF AN ABETTOR
Section 109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence and
where no express provision is made for its punishment.—Whoever abets any offence
shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express
provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the
punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation.— An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when
it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with
the aid which constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the
exercise of B’s official functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence defined in
section 161.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation, commits that
offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence and is liable to the same punishment as B.
(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the poison and
delivers it to B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the conspiracy,
administers the poison to Z, in A’s absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of
murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy and is liable to the punishment for
murder.
COMMENT
This section provides for the same punishment to the abettor as that which may be inflicted
on the principal offender provided that —
a) the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment; and
b) no express provision is made in the code for the punishment of such an abetment.
This section only lays down that if separate punishment has not been provided by the Code
for an abetment then it would be punishable with the punishment provided for the original
offence.42
The explanation makes it clear that the abetment may be of any one of the three kinds i.e.
instigation, aiding or conspiracy.

42
Seahawks Ayyar v. Venkatasubha Chetty , A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 487.

14
 In Munnuswamy and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 43 A was waiting for D at roadside. B
and C followed D on bicycle. D was. also on bicycle. A, B and C stopped D. Apprehending
danger D started running for life but was overpowered by A and B. Thereafter A and B held
hands of D and on being exhorted by A to stab D the third accused C inflicted blows with a
knife on some vital parts of the body of D. Injuries were caused to vital organs like chest and
parietal region resulting in death of D. From the facts and circumstances it is clear that the
three appellants must have entered into a conspiracy for killing D and pursuant thereto A
waited at the spot while B and C followed the deceased on their bicycle. All of them chased
D and when he was overpowered by A and B, C inflicted injuries on being ordered by A. In
the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the act of C was merely his
individual act. It was held that this is a case of abetment by conspiracy in which all the three
conspirators were present and actively participated when plan was executed. Therefore C was
guilty of murder under section 302 and A and B were guilty of the offence under section 302
read with section 109, Indian Penal Code.

Section 110. Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with a different
intention from that of abettor.--Whoever abets the commission of an offence shall, if the
person abetted does the act with a different intention or knowledge from that of the abettor,
be punished with the punishment provided for the offence which would have been committed
if the act had been done with the intention or knowledge of the abettor and with no other.
COMMENT
This section provides that though the person abetted commits the offence with different
intention or knowledge from that of the abettor, yet the abettor would be punished with the
punishment provided for the offence abetted. This section should be read conjointly with
Explanation 3 to section 108. If the two are read together it becomes clear that the liability of
the person abetted is not affected by this section and a person may be guilty of abetment
although the person abetted may not even be capable by law of committing the offence or has
not the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.44
Section 111. Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done.— When an
act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same
manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it :
Proviso.— Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was
committed under the influence of the instigation, or With the aid or in pursuance of the
conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that
purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the
food of Y, Which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence
of A’s instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of
the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the
child to put the poison into the food of Y.

43
2002 Cri L.J. 3915 (SC)
44
Pramath Nath Harabab , (1953) 1 Cal. 81.

15
(b) A instigates B to burn Z’s house. B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits
theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house. is not guilty of
abetting the theft, for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the
burning.

(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at mid-night for the purpose of
robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and
being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable
consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.

SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE

Section 111 enunciates what is called in law, the principle of constructive liability. Thus, as
contrasted to ss 109 and 110, which covered the situation when the act done is the act abetted,
s 111 comprehends a situation when the act abetted is different from the act actually
committed. Based on the principle of criminal law that ‘every man is presumed to intend the
natural and probable cause of his act’, the section stipulates that the abettor is liable for the
act committed, though different from the act abetted, if the result is a natural and probable
consequence of an act, which is likely or which can reasonably be expected to follow from
such act. It follows that if an act cannot be expected to ensue as a result of the abetment, then
it cannot be said to be the probable consequence of an act abetted. The acts constituting
abetment are the same as provided for in s 107, namely, abetment by way of instigation,
aiding and in pursuance of conspiracy.
Thus, the principle of probable consequence of an act can be described as an act which is
likely or which can reasonably be expected to follow from such an act.45 An unusual or
unexpected consequence cannot be described as a probable one, since it is a well-established
rule in criminal law that provisions have to be strictly construed. Hence, if a wider
interpretation is given to the term “probable consequence’ in the section, it will be impossible
to fix limits to an abettor’s liability.

Section 112. Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act
done.— If the act for which the abettor is liable under the last preceding section is committed
in addition to the act abetted, and constitutes a distinct offence, the abettor is liable to
punishment for each of the offences.
Illustration
A instigates B to resist by force a distress made by a public servant. B, in consequence, resists
that distress. In offering the resistance, B voluntarily causes grievous hurt to the officer
executing the distress. As B has committed both the offence of resisting the distress, and the
offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment for both these
offences; and, if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous hurt in resisting the
distress, A will also be liable to punishment for each of the offences.
45
Girija Prasad Singh v. Emperor A.I.R. 1935 All 346.

16
PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING SECTION 112
This section virtually pushes to its logical consequence the rule enacted in section 111. It
enlarges the liability of the abettor who shall be liable for the offence abetted as well as the
offence committed provided that the two offences were distinct.

Section 113. Liability of abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted different from
that intended by the abettor.— When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the
abettor of causing a particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence
of the abetment, caused a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is
liable for the effect caused in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the
act with the intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was likely
to cause that effect.
Illustration
A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B, in consequence of the instigation, causes
grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was
likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.
PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING SECTION 113
This section supplements the provision in s 112, which deals with the doing of a different act
to the act abetted, while s 113 deals with a case where the act done is the same as the act
abetted, but with a different effect. The liability of the abettor is consequently different in the
two cases. In the earlier section, liability is contingent upon whether the act is a probable
consequence of abetment. However, in s 113, the requirement for ‘knowledge of the
likelihood of the effect’ has been provided. The measure of criminal responsibility in a case
arising from s 111 is the probability of the consequence; however in s 113, it is not the
probability, but the knowledge of the likelihood of the effect produced. Knowledge is
subjective, but probability is objective. In this section, the facts warranting inference must be
stronger.

Section 114. Abettor present when offence is committed.— Whenever any person, who is
absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for
which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be
deemed to have committed such act or offence.
SCOPE OF SECTION 114
There are three essential ingredients of the section:
1) The abetment should be prior to the commission of the offence;
2) The abetment must be complete by itself; and
3) The abettor must be present at the time of the commission of the act.
If these ingredients are present, the section provides that the abettor shall be deemed to be
liable for the punishment as if he had himself committed the offence. Thus, the section
applies to a case where a person abets the commission of an offence sometime before it takes

17
place and happens to be present at the time When the offence is committed, and is not
applicable to a case where the abetment is at the time when the offence takes place and the
abettor helps in the commission of the offence. In such a case, the person is guilty of
committing the offence itself and not merely of abetment.46
Distinction between sections 114 and 34.— Under section 34 if a criminal act is done by
several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of them is liable as if it
were done by himself alone although only one of them may have committed the actual crime.
Section 114 refers to cases where a person either by instigating or by aiding or by conspiring
previous to the commission of the act renders himself liable as an abettor by being present
only when the act is committed, although he may have taken no active part in the doing of it.
Both these sections contemplate cases where an offence has been consummated. The effect of
section 114 seems to be to confine the punishment for abetment, as provided in sections 109,
115 and 116, to persons who abet an offence and are absent when the offence abetted takes
place, those who are present being deemed as principals. Cases under section 114 must fall
under section 107 and have the additional element of presence at the commission of crime.
Cases falling under section 34 are, however, distinct from cases of abetment and will apply to
all offences described under the Penal Code, for otherwise the section would apparently serve
no useful purpose.
Section 114 may be said to be wider than section 34 in one respect. For instance, an instigator
working through an innocent agent would not be liable under section 34, while he could be
liable under section 114.
Section 114 introduces a statutory fiction whereby an abettor is treated as if he had actually
committed the offence himself, by reason of his presence at the time and place of the offence.
There need not be any abetment in a case under section 34; so also there need be no common
intention in a case under section 114.

Section 115. Abetment of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.— If
offence not committed— Whoever abets the commission of an offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life, shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the
abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such
abetment, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine ;
If act causing harm be done in consequence.— and if any act for which the abettor is
liable in consequence of the abetment, and which causes hurt to any person, is done, the
abettor shall be liable to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration
A instigates B to murder Z. The offence is not committed. If B had murdered Z, he would
have been subject to the punishment of death or imprisonment for life. Therefore, A is liable
to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also to a fine ; and if any

46
Mahadeo Nath v. Emperor AIR 1941 Pat 550; Vijayaranga Naidu AIR1927 Mad 1115.

18
hurt be done to Z, in consequence of the abetment, he will be liable to imprisonment for a
term which may extend to fourteen years and to fine.
Section 116. Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment-If offence be not
committed.— Whoever abets an offence punishable with imprisonment shall, if that offence
be not committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this
Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of any description
provided for that offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term
provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for that offence, or with both ;
If abettor or person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to prevent offence.
— and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public servant, whose duty it is to prevent the
commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished with imprisonment of any
description provided for that offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the . longest
term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the
exercise of B’s official function. B refuses to accept the bribe. A is punishable under this
section.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence, A has
nevertheless committed the offence defined in this section, and is punishable accordingly.
(c) A, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent robbery, abets the commission of robbery.
Here, though the robbery be not committed, A is liable to one-half of the longest term of
imprisonment provided for that offence, and also to fine.
(d) B abets the commission of a robbery by A, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent
that offence. Here, though the robbery be not committed, B is liable to one-half of the longest
term of imprisonment provided for the offence of robbery, and also to fine.

COMMENT
Various sections of this Chapter deal with different situations relating to abetment. These
are :
i. Cases where no offence is committed. Here the offender is punishable under sections
115 and 116 for the mere abetment to commit a crime.

ii. Where the very act abetted is committed, then sections 109 and 110 shall apply.

iii. Where some act different than What was abetted but naturally flowing from the act
abetted is committed, here section 111 or 113 may apply.
This section provides for the punishment of abetment of an offence punishable with
imprisonment. The two conditions for application of para 1 of this section are very much
similar to those of the preceding section, namely, that (i) the offence abetted be not

19
committed, and (ii) no express provision is made by the Code for the punishment of such
abetment. Illustrations attached clearly exemplify the position under both the paras.

Section 117. Abetting commission of offence by the public or by more than ten persons.
— Whoever abets the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or
class of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration
A affixes in a public place a placard instigating a sect consisting of more than ten members to
meet at a certain time and place, for the purpose of attacking the members of an adverse sect,
while engaged in a procession. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
COMMENT
The definition of abetment does not require that the persons abetted should be a defined and
not be a fluctuating body of men. This section is based on this principle and therefore, one
may be punished for abetment though the prosecution may be unable to name the men
abetted. The persons abetted may be "public generally", or "any number or class of persons
exceeding ten".
The posting of a leaflet inciting the public to commit an offence would not be punished
under this section, if it was removed before anybody could have read it. In order to constitute
an offence under this section in this case either the public should have read the leaflets or that
they should have been exposed to public gaze. 47 But instigating railway workers to lie on the
railway line in the event of a strike would be an offence.48
PUNISHMENT FOR CONCEALING DESIGNS OR PLANS TO COMMIT
OFFENCES
Sections 118-120, IPC, deals With a special form of abetment by way of concealing of a
design to commit crimes. The essence of the crime consists in the concealment, despite
knowledge of the plans for committing an offence, thereby enabling the offence to be
committed. Such concealment inherently involves two aspects:
1) First, the criminal design on the part of persons intending to commit a crime;
2) Secondly, the concealment by another or others of the design to commit the offence.
Sections 118-120 deal with concealment prior to the commission of the crime, in contrast to
ss 202 and 203, IPC, which deal with concealment subsequent to the commission of the
offence.

Section 118. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with death or

imprisonment for life.— Whoever intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he

47
Emperor v. Parimal Chatterjee, A.I.R.  1932 Cal. 760.
48
S. Subramania Ayyar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1933 Mad. 279.

20
will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment
for life;
49
[voluntarily conceals, by any act or omission or by the use of encryption or any other
information hiding tool, the existence of a design] to commit such offence or makes any
representation which he knows to be false respecting such design,
If offence be committed— if offence be not committed.— shall, if that offence be
committed, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years ; or
If the offence be not committed— with imprisonment of either description, for a term
which may extend to three years, and in either case shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration
A, knowing that a dacoity is about to be committed at B, falsely informs the Magistrate that a
dacoity is about to be committed at C, a place in an opposite direction, and thereby misleads
the Magistrate with intent to facilitate the commission of the offence. The dacoity is
committed at B in pursuance of the design. A is punishable under this section.
COMMENT
Sections 118, 119 and 120 deal with concealment of design to commit an offence previous to
the commission of an offence. This section deals with the law of criminal concealment. The
essence of the crime consists in the facility given by concealment to the offenders for the
perpetration of crime. This section recognises two kinds of concealment : (i) concealment by
misrepresentation, and (ii) concealment by non-disclosure. The former affects the public
generally and the latter only those upon whom it lies to make the disclosure. A concealment
to be criminal must be intentional or, at least, with knowledge that it will thereby facilitate the
commission of crime. Section 118 relates to an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life.
There must be an obligation on the person concealing the offence to disclose. 50 It must be
shown that the act or omission was likely to facilitate the commission of an offence.51

Section 119. Public servant concealing design to commit offence which it is his duty to
prevent.— Whoever, being a public servant, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely
that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence which it is his duty as such public
servant to prevent,
52
[voluntarily conceals, by any act or omission or by the use of encryption or any other
information hiding tool, the existence of a design] to commit such offence, or makes any
representation which he knows to be false respecting such design,
if offence be committed.— shall, if the offence be committed, be punished with
imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to
one-half of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for that
offence, or with both ;
49
Substituted by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (10 of 2009).
50
Bahadur, (1882) P.R. No. 34 of 1882.
51
Kesree, (1866) 1 Agra 37.
52
Substituted by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (10 of 2009).

21
 if offence be punishable with death; etc.—or, if the offence be punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years ;
if offence be not committed.— or, if the offence be not committed shall be punished with
imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to
one-fourth part of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for
the offence, or with both.
Illustration
A, an officer of police, being legally bound to give information of all designs to commit
robbery which may come to his knowledge, and knowing that B designs to commit robbery,
omits to give such information with intent to facilitate the commission of that offence. Here
A has by Illegal omission concealed the existence of B’s design, and is liable to punishment
according to the provision of this section.
COMMENT
Section 118 deals with those cases where the offence of concealment is committed by men of
public or those who are non-public servants. Section 119 deals with offences Similar to that
of section 118 committed by public servants, that is the same principle as contained in section
118 is extended to public servants with severe penalty. '

Section 120. Concealing design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment—

Whoever, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the
commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment.
voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to commit
such offence, or makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design,
if offence be committed—if offence be not committed—shall, if the offence be committed,
be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which
may extend to one-fourth, and
if the offence be not committed, to one-eighth, of the longest term of such imprisonment, or
with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.

COMMENT
Sections 120 and 118 are basically based on the same principle. The main point of distinction
between the two is that section 118 deals with offences punishable with death or
imprisonment for life; while section 120 deals with offences punishable with imprisonment.
Offences punishable with fine only are not included in these sections.

End🌹🌹

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Indian Penal Code” book by Prof. S. N. Mishra, published by Central
Law Publications (19th edition)

“Criminal Law” book by P S A Pillai, published by LexisNexis (12 th

edition)

Online sites
https://blog.ipleaders.in/abetment-ipc
https://indiankanoon.org

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