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Semantic maps and the typology of colexification: Intertwining polysemous

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Chapter · January 2008

DOI: 10.1075/slcs.106.09fra

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 Semantic maps and the typology
of colexification
Intertwining polysemous networks
across languages

Alexandre François
Lacito (CNRS), Fédération TUL

Building upon the model of Semantic Maps (Haspelmath 2003), which

typologists have designed mainly for grammatical semantics, this chapter
discusses methodological issues for a model in lexical typology.
By breaking up polysemous lexemes of various languages into their semantic
“atoms” or senses, one defines an etic grid against which cross-linguistic
comparison can be undertaken. Languages differ as to which senses they
colexify, i.e., lexify identically. But while each polysemous lexeme as a whole
is language-specific, individual pairings of colexified senses can be compared
across languages. Our model, understood as an empirical, atomistic approach to
lexical typology, is finally exemplified with the rich polysemies associated with
the notion “breathe”. Intertwined together, they compose a single, universal
network of potential semantic extensions.

Keywords:  breathe; colexification; etic grid; lexical typology; methodology;

polysemy; semantic maps; sense; soul; spirit

1.  General issues of lexical typology*

At first sight, the capacity of the human brain to detect analogies in one’s environment
is infinite, and should logically result in lexical polysemy having no limits. And indeed,
the more languages we explore, the more examples we find of unique metaphors and
unexpected cases of semantic shift  – probably one of the most thrilling mysteries
and charms of language discovery. But what generally happens is that we focus our

*I would like to thank Martine Vanhove, Maria Kotjevskaja-Tamm, Sergueï Sakhno and Fran-
çoise Rose for their precious comments on a previous version of this article.
 Alexandre François

attention on the most exotic cases, and overlook the information that is of most inter-
est for the hunter of semantic universals: namely, that a great deal of lexical polysemies
are in fact widespread across the world’s languages, and, as such, deserve to be high-
lighted and analyzed.
This observation meets the agenda of lexical typology. Indeed, one of the main-
stays of typological linguistics is precisely to show that cross-linguistic variation, far
from being random and infinite, can in fact be reduced to a limited range of possible
cases. And it is the purpose of this whole volume to show that the search for univer-
sals and typological tendencies, which has already proven fruitful in phonological or
grammatical studies, may perfectly apply to the study of the lexicon too, provided the
specific methodological issues it raises are properly addressed.
Generally speaking, one central issue raised by linguistic typology is the neces-
sity to ascertain the comparability of languages. Languages can only be contrasted
with accuracy provided a standard of comparison is proposed, defining the common
ground against which commonalities and differences can be observed across lan-
guages. Studies in grammatical typology have already begun to identify some of the
relevant criteria for the comparison of grammar systems. They consist in the many
functional features that emerge out of the observation of actual categories in natural
languages: such notions as number, animacy, deixis, telicity, agentivity …, form a solid
functional basis for the cross-linguistic analysis of specific points of grammar. But in
the less explored domain of lexical typology, the comparability of languages seems less
easy to delineate.
Several reasons may account for this scientific gap. For one thing, there is still the
widespread idea that grammars are tidy and regular, while lexicons would be open-
ended, exuberant and idiosyncratic. With such a perception, it is deemed unlikely that
the typological project might come up with any satisfying generalizations in the lexical
domain as much as it does in the observation of grammars. Also, the accurate descrip-
tion of lexical data often requires taking into account the many functional properties
of real-world referents, to say nothing of the pitfalls of culture-specific vocabulary; this
seems to make the comparative project a difficult challenge.
The aim of this article is to discuss and illustrate the possibility of comparing the
world’s lexicons, by resorting to a methodological tool which has already proven its
efficiency among grammar typologists: semantic maps. For a given notion taken as
the map’s pivot, I will suggest a method for drawing a universal network of poten-
tial semantic extensions, following the observation of polysemies attested across the
world’s languages. A useful concept for this study is the notion of colexification, which
will be introduced in 3.2. Finally, the last part of this paper will illustrate the poten-
tials of this method, by analyzing the complex semantic network associated with the
notion “breathe”.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

2.  Ensuring the comparability of lexicons

2.1  Monosemy vs. polysemy

The first issue that has to be addressed when studying the lexicon, is the nature of
the objects to be compared. Indeed, the comparative project will be directly affected
by theoretical choices regarding the nature of the word, whether it is understood as
intrinsically monosemous, or capable of genuine polysemy. This discussion relates to
ongoing debates (see Geeraerts 1993; Nerlich et al. 2003; Riemer 2005) which I will
only mention briefly here in relation to the present discussion.
When Saussure defined the sign as the arbitrary pairing of a form (the “signifier”)
and a concept (the “signified”), he insisted that each concept can only be characterized
negatively, insofar as it contrasts with other words of the same language: “Concepts
(…) are purely differential; they are defined not positively by their contents, but nega-
tively by their relationship to the other elements of the system.”1 This conception of
semantics has led to the structuralist view that the meaning of a given word in one
language will never match exactly the meaning of its most usual translation in another
language: its “semantic outline”, as it were, is unique to that particular system, and can-
not be found identical anywhere else. In such a framework, the very project of a lexical
typology, aiming to compare lexicons across languages, seems not only difficult, but
simply out of the question.
Directly inherited from this structuralist standpoint is the monosemist approach,
whereby a polysemous lexical unit will be analyzed as fundamentally organized
around a unique general meaning; its different attested senses in context are under-
stood as resulting from the combination of that core meaning with the pragmatics
of each specific speech situation. Conversely, the polysemist approach considers the
multiplicity of meanings to form an intrinsic property of each polysemous word at the
semantic level, with no necessity, or even legitimacy, to reduce this multiplicity to an
artificial unity. Several attempts have been proposed to reconcile these two contrary
approaches, for example, around the notions of “prototype” (Rosch 1973) or “radial
categories” (Lakoff 1987).
It is not the purpose of this article to solve such long-discussed issues. What is rel-
evant here is to underline that each point of view is an attempt to handle the dialectic
between unity and multiplicity, which is inherent to the paradox of polysemy. Now, it
appears that cross-linguistic comparison can be carried out with more precision if the

.  “Les concepts (…) sont purement différentiels, définis non pas positivement par leur
contenu, mais négativement par leurs rapports avec les autres termes du système” (Saussure
1972 [1916]: 162).
 Alexandre François

facts of polysemy are stated explicitly from the perspective of a multiplicity of senses.
The idea that each polysemy is fundamentally underlied by a single abstract mean-
ing, though intellectually appealing it may be, results in definitions that are difficult
to apprehend with precision, and to test against actual data. To quote the words of
Haspelmath (2003: 214), “general-meaning analyses are not particularly helpful if one
wants to know in what way languages differ from each other.”
Whatever theoretical viewpoint one adopts concerning polysemy, the only rep-
resentation that really allows cross-linguistic comparison is therefore one that explic-
itly spells out the multiplicity of senses making up a word’s polysemy. The question
whether these senses are to be understood as pragmatically defined contextual uses
of a central meaning (monosemist approach), or as autonomous components at the
semantic level (polysemist approach), is somewhat a secondary issue. What is essential
is to find a method that will allow us to describe each polysemous network in the full
detail of its internal components.

2.2  Overlapping polysemies

A first illustration can be proposed, with the English word straight. Roughly speaking,
this adjective may be broken into at least the following senses2 (see 3.1. for a discussion
of the method):

〈rectilinear〉 (a straight line) 〈heterosexual〉 (gay or straight)

〈frank〉 (straight talking) 〈undiluted〉 (straight whisky)
〈honest〉 (a straight guy) 〈directly〉 (straight to the point)
〈classical〉 (a straight play) 〈immediately〉 (straight away)

Its closest translation in French, droit, shows a slightly different range of senses:

〈rectilinear〉 (un trait droit)

〈directly〉 (aller droit au but)
〈honest〉 (un type droit)
〈right-hand〉 (le côté droit)

Now, a strictly monosemist approach would probably try to define the core meaning
of straight by resorting to a general definition, sufficiently abstract so as to encompass
all its contextual uses in English. Then it would also propose a unique definition for
French droit; and because the meanings attested for these two words are so close to
each other, it is likely that the two general definitions would end up being quite similar,

.  Throughout this paper, angled brackets 〈…〉 are used to represent senses, insofar as they
form an element of a polysemous network.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

and therefore unable to grasp clearly what is common and what is different between
straight and droit. The comparison becomes much easier and clearer if the comparison
is carried out at the level of the senses. It is then easy to observe that the two words
share exactly three senses: 〈rectilinear〉, 〈directly〉, 〈honest〉; that French droit adds to
these a sense 〈right-hand〉, while English straight adds a number of other senses which
have no equivalent in French.
This configuration may be illustrated visually in the form of two overlapping
sets (Figure 1). The elements of the sets are the senses, presented here in no spe-
cific order. The sets themselves refer to the lexical units – the words – that happen
to group these senses in their own polysemies. One may talk here of two “overlap-
ping polysemies”.

〈undiluted〉 〈frank〉
〈classical〉
〈heterosexual〉 〈rectilinear〉
〈immediately〉 〈honest〉 〈right-hand〉
〈directly〉

Fr. droit
Eng. straight

Figure 1.  Overlapping polysemies: Eng. straight vs. Fr. droit.

In sum, the fine-grained comparison of lexicons across the world’s languages can
be efficient provided each polysemous network is first broken down into its seman-
tic atoms or “senses”. This may be done regardless of one’s theoretical preferences –
whether these senses are taken as actual semantic sub-categories in the speakers”
minds, or merely contextual manifestations of a deeper meaning. This approach,
whereby a given word is analyzed into its semantic atoms, is the first step before lan-
guages can be compared with precision, showing which senses each language lexifies
together. In this new perspective, the primary unit of observation for lexical typology
is no longer the word – a complex, highly language-specific entity – but the sense – a
functionally-based, language-independent criterion (3.1.).
These observations form the basic principles of the model I will introduce in the
remainder of this article. Section 3 will first discuss the methodology for isolating senses,
and for observing the way languages group them together; I will then introduce the con-
cept of “colexification”. Section 4 will discuss the principles underlying the representation
of lexical semantic maps, drawing on the principles set out by Haspelmath (2003). The
model here delineated should provide empirical tools for the observation and analysis of
polysemy across languages. Hopefully, it should also make it possible for future research
 Alexandre François

to detect certain typological tendencies among the lexical structures of the world’s
languages, and eventually pave the way for the formulation of lexical universals.

3.  Towards a typology of colexification

For each specific notion taken as the object of study (see 4.3.), the empirical method
here adopted follows two steps:

–– First, select the word that lexifies this notion in one language, and identify the
various senses which form part of its polysemy, in this particular language.
–– Second, once a list of senses has been proposed for this first language, observe a
second language, to see which of these senses are also lexified together (or “colexi-
fied”), and what new senses have to be added to the list. Then proceed to another
language, and expand the list accordingly.

To use a chemical metaphor, one could say that the comparison of different molecules
requires first to identify the nature of the atoms that take part in their structure (3.1.);
and then, once each molecule has been broken up into its components, to observe the
bonds that connect these atoms together (3.2.).

3.1  Senses: The atoms within each molecule

Imagine we want to observe the various polysemies attested cross-linguistically around
the notion “rectilinear”. The first step is to select, in any language, a word that may trans-
late (“lexify”) this notion; for example, English straight. What now has to be done, before
being able to compare it with a word from another language – or with another word of
the same language – is to break down this lexical unit into its own various senses.
Most of the time, this is done intuitively, as probably most dictionaries do: obvi-
ous functional considerations seem sufficient to analyze, say, 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈frank〉
as two distinct senses, deserving separate treatment. However, on some occasions one
may object to the arbitrariness of such intuitive choices, when two senses appear to be
so close, that their distinction might be an artifact of the linguist’s analysis. In the case
of straight (2.2.), for instance, one may argue that the psychological senses 〈frank〉 and
〈honest〉 form in fact a single meaning for the native speaker of English, so that we are
dealing with a case of vagueness 〈frank, honest〉 rather than a case of polysemy, strictly
speaking, between two separate senses.
Trying to resolve such a tricky debate with a definite answer might result in unver-
ifiable and irreconcilable points of view. Luckily, there is one way out of this dilemma,
which is to base all sense distinctions upon the empirical observation of contrasts
between languages. For example, the fact that French lexifies 〈rectilinear〉 with 〈honest〉
but not with 〈frank〉 suffices to justify the choice of distinguishing between the two
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

latter meanings as if they were two separate senses. Even though this may fail to rep-
resent faithfully the language-internal perception of an English native speaker, at least
this serves efficiently the purpose of cross-linguistic comparison: it becomes then easy
to state the facts by saying that these two senses are treated the same in English, and
not in French. The same reasoning would apply to 〈directly〉 and 〈immediately〉, which
despite their semantic closeness, must be distinguished due to the different treatment
they receive in French. The repetition of the same procedure, for each word under
scrutiny, makes it possible to define with precision the list of its possible senses.
This empirical method of defining senses based on cross-linguistic comparison
has the valuable advantage that it helps “sidestep the vexing problem of distinguishing
between polysemy and vagueness” (Haspelmath 2003: 231). Now, a corollary of this
approach is that the list of senses for a given word is likely to evolve during the process
of cross-linguistic comparison. Indeed, the more languages are considered, the more
new distinctions are likely to be found, thereby resulting in the need to split up certain
senses that were initially not distinguished. For example, suppose the examination of
nine languages showed the meaning 〈horizontally rectilinear〉 to be always lexified in
the same way as 〈vertically rectilinear〉: this would result in the initial grouping of these
two meanings as a unique vague sense 〈rectilinear (horiz. or vertic.)〉, with no empiri-
cal reason for splitting it in two. But once a tenth language is considered that forces to
make this distinction, then the former sense 〈rectilinear〉 will have to be cracked down
into two separate senses, for the purpose of cross-linguistic comparison. As a result,
the description given for each polysemous lexeme in the first nine languages may have
to be revised, due to the introduction of a new semantic distinction after the tenth
language has been examined.
Note that this remark is not necessarily an issue for the semantic analysis itself:
one will simply have to describe 〈horizontally rectilinear〉 and 〈vertically rectilinear〉
as two potentially separate senses, which simply happen to be formally indistinct in
the first nine languages, but distinguished in the tenth. The problem rather arises
at the practical level, if one thinks of setting up a typological database: for it means that
the semantic descriptions made at a given point in time, during the constitution of the
database, are likely to evolve as more and more distinctions are considered from new
languages. This can entail the necessity for the first languages entered in the database
to be reassessed again and again as the list of descriptive senses grows. When this takes
the form of a semantic map (section 4), this also means our maps will have to integrate
the capacity to evolve constantly, and adapt to whatever new input comes in. This is
probably feasible, but likely to raise certain technical questions.3

.  In the grammatical domain, Haspelmath (2003: 231) reassures us on this point, by saying:
“the typical experience is that after a dozen languages have been examined, fewer and fewer
 Alexandre François

Despite these potential issues on the practical side, it is important to see that this
method, by basing every semantic distinction on empirical data, provides a safe anti-
dote against the vagaries of intuition; it ensures that the whole process of semantic
analysis is always verifiable – and therefore falsifiable.

3.2  Colexification: The bonds between the atoms

In itself, the result of the preceding step pretends to be little more than a list of notions
(senses). For one thing, these notions can be shown – using the cross-linguistic method
described above – to be functionally distinct from each other; but at the same time,
the way they were compiled implies that they are potentially linked together in at least
some of the world’s lexicons. No particular claim is being made at this stage, except
that this non-arbitrary selection of notions should provide a useful “etic grid” against
which language-specific, “emic” categorizations are to be observed.
But what is really relevant to our typological study is not so much these atoms
per se, as the bonds that each particular language creates between them. Once a list of
senses is arrived at, the phenomenon most relevant for the second stage of observation
may be called colexification.

(1) Aˉgivenˉlanguageˉisˉsaidˉtoˉcolexifyˉtwoˉfunctionallyˉdistinctˉsensesˉif,ˉandˉ
onlyˉif,ˉitˉcanˉassociateˉthemˉwithˉtheˉsameˉlexicalˉform4

For example, Figure 1 showed that English colexifies the senses 〈immediately〉 and
〈undiluted〉; 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈right-hand〉 are colexified in French; 〈rectilinear〉 and
〈directly〉 are colexified both in English and in French. One of the advantages of the
term “colexification”, which I am proposing here, is to be purely descriptive, and neutral
with respect to semantic or historical interpretations – contrary to the term “semantic
shift”, chosen for example by Anna Zalizniak (this volume).
One interest of the colexification model is to be readily exploitable for typological
research. For example, one may want to check what proportion of the world’s lan-
guages colexify the two senses 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈honest〉, as French and English do: is
this connection found only in a few scattered languages? Is it an areal phenomenon
covering, say, Western Europe? Is it well represented in other parts of the world? Or is
it universally common?

functions need to be added to the map with each new language.” It remains to be seen whether
this comforting statement also applies to the richer realm of lexicons.
.  The term “lexical form” may refer to a lexeme or a construction, or occasionally to a lexical
root (but see below for a discussion).
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

Incidentally, because the list of senses is initially based on the polysemy of a spe-
cific word in a given language, it is logical that the first stage of the observation will
show these senses to be colexified in the language under consideration. For example,
because the initial sense list was built as the description of English straight, then it
necessarily results that these senses are all “colexified” in English. At this stage of the
research, due to a bias in favour of the language taken as the starting point, such an
observation is circular, and has little interest. But these representations become rapidly
more informative as other languages are considered. For instance, French adds to the
list a new sense 〈right-hand〉, which is not lexified by English straight. As more lan-
guages are explored, and the list aggregates more and more senses, it will eventually
come closer to a universal grid of potentially interconnected notions – with less and
less risk of an ethnocentric bias in favour of a specific language.

3.3  Strict vs. loose colexification

Strictly speaking, the notion of colexification should be understood as “the capac-
ity, for two senses, to be lexified by the same lexeme in synchrony”. However,
nothing prevents the model from being extended, so as to make provision for several –
hierarchized? – levels of colexification. These may include the linking of two senses by
a single lexeme across different periods of its semantic history (e.g., droit also meant
“right, true” in Old French); their association in the form of doublets (e.g., Fr. droit and
direct), or other etymologically related forms (Eng. straight and stretch); the impact of
lexical derivation (Eng. straight → straighten; Fr. droit → droiture “honesty”) or com-
position (Eng. straight → straightforward); and so on.
Ideally, for the sake of accuracy and future reference, the different types of formal
relations should be kept distinct in the representation of the data, e.g., with the use
of different symbols. In particular, “strict colexification” (same lexeme in synchrony)
should be carefully distinguished from “loose colexification” (covering all other
cases mentioned here). This will be done here formally, in tables (section 5.2., and
Appendix 2), with the use of respectively “+” vs “[+]” signs; and in maps (section 7.3.),
with the use of solid vs. dotted lines. To take an example, one can represent the colexi-
fication of 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈honest〉 in English as “strict colexification”, because both
can be lexified with exactly the same form in synchrony (straight). As for the sense
〈simple, easy to understand〉, it can also be said to be somehow part of the lexical
field of straight, but only indirectly, through the compound form straightforward; in
other words, English shows “strict colexification” between 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈honest〉,
but “loose colexification” between 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈simple〉.
Finally, in the framework of a typological survey carried out around a specific
notion, I propose that the senses to be included in the universal list – and in the map
derived from it  – should fill one condition: that is, they should only include those
 Alexandre François

senses that are attested to be in strict colexification in at least one language of the world.
For example, supposing one language L1 were found where exactly the same form in
synchrony might translate both senses 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈simple〉, then this would be
a sufficient condition for the latter sense to be included in the sense list associated
with 〈rectilinear〉. This being done, it will be possible to state that some languages –
like L1 – colexify these two senses directly (“strictly”), while others  – like English –
colexify them only indirectly (“loosely”), and others again do not colexify them at
all. Conversely, if no language can be found where the two senses are strictly colexi-
fied, then it is probably a safe principle to exclude them from the sense list, to avoid
the risk of widening and blurring indefinitely the boundaries of a polysemous
network. This principle will be useful, for example, in 5.3.2., when discussing the rela-
tionship between “breathe” (Latin spīro) and “die” (Latin ex-spīro). Indeed, because
these two senses often show some specific semantic relationship through lexical der-
ivation, it would be tempting to include them in the same sense list, and consider
them as indirectly colexified. However, because no language can be found – for obvi-
ous reasons – where these two senses are expressed by exactly the same form (“strict
colexification”), it is preferable that the sense “die” be kept away from the sense list
of “breathe”.

3.4  Interpreting colexification

In principle, the colexification model itself consists first and foremost in stating the
facts – that is, detecting and documenting the cases of colexification that are empiri-
cally attested across languages. The interpretation of these semantic connections,
whether it takes a historical or a cognitive perspective or otherwise, arguably belongs
to another phase of the study.
For each pair of senses s1 and s2, several configurations may come out of the data,
suggesting possible questions for the typological study of the lexicon.
In case the colexification of s1 and s2 appears to be attested nowhere, this
may be because the two senses are directly opposite – e.g., 〈rectilinear〉 vs. 〈curved〉;
cognitively divergent  – 〈rectilinear〉 vs. 〈slow〉; or simply unlikely to be related  –
〈rectilinear〉 vs. 〈green〉.
If two senses s1 and s2 are colexified in at least one language, this is normally
the sign  – setting aside the case of accidental homophony  – that the human brain
has proven able to perceive these senses as somehow “semantically connected”. This
connection may be direct or indirect, via historical paths that may or may not be still
perceived in synchrony. It is then the purpose of semantic or etymological studies, to
propose a convincing explanation for that connection: is the relationship between s1
and s2 a case of metaphor, metonymy, hyperonymy, analogical extension …? Is it pos-
sible to reconstruct the direction taken historically by this extension (from s1 to s2,
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

or the reverse)? Is it useful to reconstruct a missing link5 between two senses whose
relation is intuitively opaque?
Sometimes one may want to take the reverse perspective, and try to answer the
question why a language does not colexify two senses s1 and s2, that is, treats them
separately, when other languages treat them alike. Most often, this state of affairs
will be simply considered, just like many other linguistic features, to result from a
chance distribution between languages. In some cases, however, hypotheses may be
proposed that would draw a correlation between a specific case of colexification (or of
non-colexification), and, say, the language’s environment. For example, Brown (2005a)
suggests that the colexification of 〈hand〉 – 〈arm〉 may be influenced by the geographi-
cal situation of the community. According to him, the use of “tailored clothing cover-
ing the arm” in colder environments tends to make the contrast between the hand
and the arm more salient, thus favoring the existence of two separate lexical items.
Likewise, Brown (2005b) sees another correlation between the lexical distinction
〈finger〉 – 〈hand〉 and cultural practises in terms of farmers vs. hunter-gatherers.6
Regardless of the likelihood of these hypotheses, it is instructive to see that the facts of
colexification may receive various sorts of functional explanations, whether semantic,
historical, cognitive or cultural – thereby opening fascinating debates.
It may be a subject for discussion, how one should interpret the statistics of colexi-
fication. That is, supposing the colexification of s1 and s2 is particularly widespread in
the world’s languages, should we see this as a sign that these two senses are particularly
“close”? that their semantic connection is – functionally or cognitively – particularly
“tight”? This brings in the intuitively appealing notion of degrees of “closeness” in the
semantic connection. For example, supposing 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈honest〉 turned out to
be statistically more often colexified than, say, 〈rectilinear〉 and 〈right-hand〉, one may
think that the first pair of senses is more deeply motivated than the second pair (?).
Admittedly, however, it may be debatable whether semantic closeness should be mea-
sured, as I am tentatively proposing here, on statistics based on actual colexification
data – rather than assessed, say, on the basis of each notion’s ontological properties.

.  For example, the spatial notion 〈rectilinear〉 is metaphorically associated with social nor-
mality (cf. the straight and narrow), as opposed to eccentricity or originality; hence such senses
as 〈classical〉, 〈not homosexual〉, 〈not on drugs〉, etc. In this case, the meaning 〈satisfying the
social norm〉 could be described as the missing semantic link  – whether in diachrony or in
synchrony – between several members of this polysemous network.
.  “Languages of farmers tend more strongly to lexically distinguish “finger” from “hand” than
those of hunter-gatherers, which tend more strongly to use a single term to denote both “finger”
and “hand’ ” (Brown 2005b: 527). Brown’s rather unconvincing hypothesis resorts to the saliency
of the finger in those societies which make use of finger rings; he claims that this cultural habit
is more developed among farmers.
 Alexandre François

Crucially, the descriptive concept of colexification lends itself to just the same sort
of observations, tests and representations as any other language feature. For example,
specific pairings of senses may be represented in the form of geographical maps, using
isoglosses or coloured spots.7 Instances of colexification may be attributed to genetic
subgroups and protolanguages (see François forthcoming), or result from local inno-
vations. They may also be borrowed through language contact, and take part in areal
phenomena. They may change through time, be subject to analogical levelling, and so
on and so forth.
To take just one example, the senses 〈hear〉 and 〈feel〉 are colexified in several areas
of the world: Catalan sentir, Italian sentire, Mwotlap yon̄teg, Bislama harem:

– Knowing that Latin lexified distinctively sentīre “feel” and audīre “hear”, Catalan and
Italian evidently illustrate a case of late semantic merger between the two words.
Historically speaking, this is a parallel innovation in these two languages, whether
due to areal or to typological convergence.
– Conversely, the colexification 〈hear〉 – 〈feel〉 found in Mwotlap is also attested in all
known languages of Vanuatu, and was demonstrably inherited from a similar pat-
tern in their common proto-language: Proto North-Central Vanuatu *roŋo “hear,
smell, feel” (Clark n.d.), from Proto Oceanic *roŋor.
– Finally, the presence of exactly the same colexification in Bislama, the pidgin/creole
of Vanuatu, historically results from language contact. The verb harem “hear, smell,
feel”, despite reflecting English hear him in its form, borrows its semantics directly
from the lexical structures of Oceanic languages, the vernacular substrate of Bis-
lama (Camden 1979: 55–56).

In sum, colexification may result historically from typological convergence, from

genetic inheritance, or from contact-induced change … just like any other structural
feature of a language.

3.5  Typological prospects

The observation of colexification does not only provide insights on individual lan-
guages or language groups. In theory, one can also conceive the possibility of formu-
lating typological hypotheses in this domain, just like in other domains of language
research. The following paragraphs attempt not to state actual facts – most examples in
this section being hypothetical – but to define the form that future research will be able

.  See Brown’s maps on the colexification of “hand”/“arm”, “finger”/“hand”, as well as and
Kay & Maffi’s on “green”/“blue” or “red”/“yellow”, in the World Atlas of Language Structures by
Haspelmath et al. (2005).
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

to give to the formulation of universals, whether absolute or implicational, regarding

the typology of colexification.
An absolute universal would take the form (2), or its shorter equivalent (2ʹ):

(2) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguageˉlexifiesˉsenseˉs1ˉwithˉtheˉformˉX,ˉthenˉsenseˉs2ˉwillˉbeˉlexified
ˉinˉtheˉsameˉway.’
(2ʹ) ‘Allˉlanguagesˉcolexifyˉtheˉpairˉofˉsensesˉs1–s2.’

An example of this – of course subject to empirical check – could be the pair 〈male
fish〉 vs. 〈female fish〉, which is apparently never formally split in the world’s lexicons –
as opposed to mammals, for which separate lexification is common. Interestingly,
this theoretical case should normally not come up in the data, given the method cho-
sen to distinguish between senses in the first place (3.1.): the condition was to retain
only those sense distinctions that are attested in at least one language. Yet a lighter
version of (2ʹ), in terms of statistical tendencies (“Most languages colexify…”)
would be perfectly acceptable, as would its symmetrical counterpart (“Very few lan-
guages colexify …”).
As for implicational universals, they can associate two cases of colexification:

(3) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguageˉcolexifiesˉs1ˉandˉs2,ˉthenˉitˉwillˉalsoˉcolexifyˉs3ˉandˉs4.’

For example, a likely assumption would suggest that if a language colexifies 〈arm〉 and
〈hand〉, then it will do the same for 〈leg〉 and 〈foot〉.8 Or if it colexifies 〈paternal uncle〉
and 〈maternal uncle〉, then it will also colexify 〈paternal aunt〉 and 〈maternal aunt〉 …
A subtype of this formula would be (3ʹ):

(3ʹ) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguageˉcolexifiesˉs1ˉandˉs2,ˉthenˉitˉwillˉalsoˉcolexifyˉs2ˉandˉs3.’

For example, if a language colexifies 〈upper arm〉 and 〈hand〉, then it will probably
colexify 〈forearm〉 and 〈hand〉 too. Or, if 〈word〉 and 〈language〉 are colexified, then
〈speech〉 should be able to take the same form. As these (fictitious) examples sug-
gest, this sort of formula typically applies when the three senses can be conceived as
showing some form of – logical, cognitive …  – ordering, so that s3 typically comes
“between” s1 and s2: e.g., because the forearm is physically located between the upper
arm and the hand, the colexification of the latter two makes it likely that the item in
the middle should be lexified identically. The case of word < speech < language which I
intuitively suggest here would illustrate a similar, but more figurative, case of ontologi-
cal hierarchy between referents.

.  Counterexamples to this potential universal can however be found, such as Lo-Toga (Torres
Is, Vanuatu, Oceanic group; pers. data), where 〈arm〉 = 〈hand〉, but 〈leg〉 ≠ 〈foot〉.
 Alexandre François

Another variant of this formula would be (4):

(4) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguageˉcolexifiesˉs1ˉandˉs2,ˉthenˉitˉwillˉnotˉcolexifyˉs2ˉandˉs3.’

–  whichˉmayˉbeˉalsoˉformulatedˉas:
(4ʹ) ‘Althoughˉthereˉmayˉexistˉlanguagesˉthatˉcolexifyˉs1ˉandˉs2,ˉandˉothersˉ
thatˉcolexifyˉs2ˉandˉs3,ˉnoˉlanguageˉcolexifiesˉtogetherˉtheˉthreeˉsensesˉ
s1–s2–s3.’

One possible example of such a formula would be: if a language colexifies 〈person〉
and 〈male person〉, then it will not colexify – that is, it will treat distinctively – 〈male
person〉 and 〈husband〉. Indeed, one can think of many languages where 〈person〉 and
〈male person〉 go together (as with French homme), and many languages where 〈male
person〉 is the same as 〈husband〉 (as with Latin vir), but none – until further research
is done – where the three are lexified the same.
Another kind of implicational universal would associate colexification with a cri-
terion outside the lexicon, as in (5)–(5ʹ):
(5) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguageˉcolexifiesˉs1ˉandˉs2,ˉthenˉitˉwillˉhaveˉtheˉlinguisticˉpropertyˉP.’
(5ʹ) ‘IfˉaˉlanguageˉhasˉtheˉlinguisticˉpropertyˉP,ˉthenˉitˉwillˉcolexifyˉs1ˉandˉs2.’

An example of (5) could be a statement about parts of speech, such as: if a language
colexifies 〈black〉 and 〈darken〉, then it treats adjectives as (a subclass of) verbs. A pos-
sible illustration of (5ʹ) would be something like: if a language doesn’t distinguish
count nouns from mass nouns, then it will colexify 〈wood〉 and 〈tree〉. Needless to say,
all these examples are intuitive, and would only make sense if confirmed by relevant
empirical data.
Finally, one could conceive possible correlations between certain instances of
lexification and specific properties of the language’s environment. This would lead to
universals – or at least tendencies – such as:
(6) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguageˉcolexifiesˉs1ˉandˉs2,ˉthenˉitsˉenvironmentˉwillˉhaveˉtheˉ
propertyˉP.’
(6ʹ) ‘Ifˉaˉlanguage’sˉenvironmentˉhasˉtheˉpropertyˉP,ˉthenˉthisˉlanguageˉwillˉ
colexifyˉs1ˉandˉs2.’

The term “environment”, used in a functional perspective, encompasses all properties

that are not strictly linguistic, but which are somehow associated with the language or
its speaking community. One could thus imagine the following sort of hypothesis: if a
language colexifies 〈cow〉 and 〈bull〉 under a single term, it is likely that this language is
used in a society where this particular gender difference is functionally less relevant  –
that is, where cattle farming is not practiced traditionally. Similar types of correla-
tion were mentioned in 3.4. above, with Brown’s cultural-cognitive interpretations of
certain cases of colexification.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

4.  Lexical semantic maps

So far, the method here exposed has entailed the identification and manipulation of
senses, in the form of unordered lists. The only visual representation proposed (Figure 1)
took the simple form of overlapping sets, still with no specific internal organization.
Yet the high number of senses involved, combined with the number of languages
potentially explored, would ideally require defining a more sophisticated way of orga-
nizing and presenting the results of our semantic observations. This is what I will now
propose to do, in a form suggested by current research in grammar typology,9 and
systematized by Haspelmath (2003): semantic maps.

4.1  General principles of semantic maps

Here is how Haspelmath (2003: 213) defines semantic maps: “A semantic map is a geo-
metrical representation of functions in “conceptual/semantic space” that are linked by
connecting lines and thus constitute a network.”
Essentially speaking, a semantic map takes the form of a two-dimensional chart,
and represents a selection of meanings (“senses” in my terminology, “functions” in
Haspelmath’s). These meanings are ordered in space according to certain principles,
and explicitly interconnected, thus forming a semantic network. In itself, this semantic
map constitutes an etic grid which claims to be language-independent, “a coherent
chunk of a universal network”. This universal grid then serves to visualize the “emic”
categorizations which are made by each specific language: for a given form in a given
language – usually understood in synchronical terms – it then becomes possible to
identify, on the universal map, those meanings that are covered by this form, and those
that fall without its scope.10
The whole methodology presented by Haspelmath is compatible with the model
of lexical typology which I here propose to develop. The only difference is that he
explicitly designs his model as a way to represent “the geometry of grammatical mean-
ing”, while the present discussion deals with the lexicon. Yet, even if all his examples are
taken from facts of grammar, he himself suggests that his model should theoretically
be compatible with the lexical domain too (2003: 237). In a way, the following pages
may be seen as an attempt to apply to the lexicon the principles defined by Haspelmath
for drawing semantic maps.

.  See, for example, Anderson (1982) for the perfect; Croft et al. (1987) for the middle voice;
Jurafsky (1996) for the diminutive; etc.
.  For a visual illustration of this principle, see Figure 4, and the figures in Appendix 3.
 Alexandre François

Of course, several authors have already proposed to represent lexical semantics, and
in particular polysemous networks, in the visual form of a diagram or map. But most
often, their intention was to illustrate a pattern of polysemy specific to one language, or
one group of languages.11 By contrast, the maps I propose to draw here claim to have a
universal value, that is, to provide results that are virtually independent from any par-
ticular group of languages. This is coherent with the stance taken by Haspelmath for
his grammatical maps: “The configuration of functions shown by the map is claimed
to be universal” (2003: 217). Of course, the quality and precision of a map will depend
on the number and genetic diversity of the languages observed. But essentially, what-
ever result comes out of such a study, should be able to claim universal relevance. An
important consequence of this principle is that any new data from a natural language
should therefore be able to falsify these results. As Haspelmath (2003:  232) puts it,
“Every semantic map can be interpreted as making a universal claim about languages,
that can be falsified easily.”

4.2  Connecting senses together

In comparison with the simple format of a sense list, the main interest of semantic
maps is to organize the polysemous network in a way that makes explicit the various
semantic connections between these senses. This is shown visually, on the one hand,
by the iconic grouping of close senses in contiguous areas of the map; and on the other
hand, by the use of explicit connecting lines to visualize semantic paths.
Judgments of closeness between senses are established in a dual fashion: first, by
taking into account the ontological properties of each sense; second, by examining
empirical data from various languages.
The intrinsic ontological properties of each sense can legitimately be taken into
account in order to suggest a semantically plausible ordering between senses. For
example, suppose one came across an array of senses such as the one observed with
the verb ōl in Mwotlap (François, in prep.):12 〈creak〉; 〈name a child so-and-so〉; 〈crow〉;

.  Thus, the maps found in Matisoff (1978) intend to represent certain semantic associations
specific to the Tibeto-Burman family; those in Evans (1992) or Evans & Wilkins (2000: 560)
apply to Australian languages; Enfield (2003) to Southeast Asian languages; Tyler & Evans (2003
[2001]: 125) propose a semantic network specific to the polysemy of English over … Some proj-
ects aim at representing semantic associations at the level of the whole lexicon, but they are
still, by definition, restricted to a single language – cf. Gaume et al. (this volume) for French; or
software such as Thinkmap’s Visual Thesaurus® for English. (www.visualthesaurus.com)
.  Even though this list of senses, as well as its representation in Figure 2, are drawn after
the polysemy of just one word in one language, I propose that it is fictitiously understood, for
the purpose of this demonstration, as if resulting from cross-linguistic comparison. Indeed the
forms of reasoning that apply in both cases – whether we consider one polysemous network,
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

〈mention s.o.’s name〉; 〈yell〉; 〈invoke a divinity〉; 〈scream〉; 〈bark〉; 〈hail s.o.〉; 〈call s.th.
such-and-such〉… This kind of simple list, presented in random order, makes it hard
to identify the semantic links between these senses. But functional considerations
allow certain senses to be grouped according to their common semantic properties.
Thus, several senses refer to the emission of intense high-pitched sounds, whether
by humans (〈yell〉, 〈scream〉), animals (〈crow〉, 〈bark〉 …) or objects (〈creak〉). Other
senses refer to human social activities that consist in uttering the name of another
person; this can be done for the purpose of calling out to someone (〈hail s.o.〉, 〈invoke
a divinity〉), or for the purpose of referring to them (〈mention s.o.〉). Finally, the act of
uttering a name may refer to the social act of giving a name to someone – typically a
child – or to something.
Semantic connections can then be proposed, which chain senses according to
their functional similarities. These connections may then easily be represented in
space, in the form a visual graph such as Figure 2:

(cock)
crow mention s.o.
(anaimal)
cry
(dog) (s.o.) (s.o.) (s.o.) call s.o.’s name a child
bark scream yell hail s.o. name so-and-so
(thing)
creak invoke name s.th.
divinity so-and-so

Figure 2.  Senses may be linked based on functional properties.

Crucially, because the semantic connections here proposed are supposedly based on
ontological properties of the notions referred to, this means they must normally be
conceived as independent of any specific language. That is, even though the list of
senses itself was initially based on the observation of actual languages, ultimately the
fact that a sense s2 will be understood as forming the missing semantic link between
s1 and s3, should not depend on any particular language, but simply on the intrinsic
properties of each sense. For example, the act of “hailing someone (by shouting their
name)” constitutes a logical transition between “shouting (in general)” and “uttering
s.o.’s name”. This organization of meaning must be understood as driven not by idio-
syncrasies of any specific language, but rather by universal characteristics of the real

or the intertwining of several such networks into one  – are fundamentally the same, at this
particular stage of the study.
 Alexandre François

world – or more exactly, of the world as it is perceived by the human brain and filtered
by human activities.
This being said, it remains obvious that the connections proposed between each
two senses, and more generally the semantic map that results from these connections,
cannot be directly observed in the material world, and thus constitute hypotheses on
part of the observer. This means that they must be amenable to proof or demonstra-
tion, that they are open to debate, and that they should be falsifiable. The problem
is, at least some of these semantic hypotheses  – about how two senses should be
connected – may ultimately depend on the linguist’s intuition. This is potentially an
issue (see also the discussion in 3.1.), because the conscious representations of the
world by an observer do not necessarily match the subconscious connections which
are actually made by the speaker’s brain. It is therefore necessary to define a method of
falsification that would rest on empirical observation.
The method suggested by Haspelmath indeed resorts to observable data from
actual languages. The basic idea is that senses should be arranged in space in such a
way that each lexical unit in one language “occupies a contiguous area on the seman-
tic map” (2003:  216). Furthermore, each specific connecting line should reflect the
existence of at least one attested case of a direct lexical connection between these two
senses, in any of the world’s languages. Thus, supposing one language were found that
only colexified a sense si and a distant sense sj but none of the other senses tentatively
proposed in-between, then the background map should be redesigned, and a “short-
cut” connecting line added between these two senses. Conversely, if all words colexify-
ing si and sj also include, in their polysemy, the various intermediate steps proposed
along the functionally-based semantic chain, then the hypothetical map can be said to
be confirmed by empirical data.
Incidentally, it may happen, on some occasions, that two distinct paths may be
defined in order to relate two senses on the map, with no strong reason for choosing
between these two paths. We shall see precisely an example of this in 5.3.4., where two
different semantic hypotheses will be shown to equally account for the colexification of
〈breath〉 and 〈supernatural power〉. Insofar as this sort of hypothesis is also supported
by empirical data – in this case, the existence of two distinct sense chains attested in the
world’s languages – nothing prevents us from representing this double path on the map.

4.3  Choosing a pivot notion

In section 3 above, I briefly mentioned the necessity to choose a specific notion (sense)
as the pivot of the map. This requires justification, especially because this principle
seems to differ from Haspelmath’s (2003: 232) method for drawing grammatical maps.
Choosing a specific sense (e.g., 〈hail s.o.〉) as the pivot entails that the empirical
data to be observed must consist exclusively of lexical units that specifically include
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

this sense in their polysemy. This important requirement is a precaution against the
risk of starting an open-ended map with ever-shifting boundaries. For example, con-
sider the colexification of 〈hail〉 and 〈(animal) cry〉. If 〈hail〉 were not given any special
status, nothing would then prevent us from including in the data words that encom-
pass 〈(animal) cry〉 as one of their senses, yet having no connection with 〈hail〉: for
example, a verb meaning “(animal) cry; (s.o.) cry out in pain; weep …” (cf. Eng. cry).
If this were allowed, then the map would extend so as to include all the semantic con-
nections associated with the sense 〈weep〉, and so on and so forth. Such a map with no
center would shift indefinitely … so as to gradually enclose the whole lexicon. Despite
the immense interest of potentially achieving a map that would represent the global
“geography of the human mind” (Croft 2001), such a configuration would rapidly lead
to uncontrollable results that would raise obvious technical issues, and whose signifi-
cance in terms of scientific information would end up being questionable. It is therefore
safer to circumscribe in advance the scope of the map that is to be drawn, by providing
one sense with the special status of pivot or centre. Incidentally, I propose to translate
typographically the special status of the pivot notion, by using small uppercase and
braces – e.g., {hail} – as opposed to the other senses of the network – e.g., 〈bark〉.
There is a corollary to this principle. If two senses s1 and s2 are attested to be
colexified in the world’s languages, the map centered on s1 will be a different map from
the one centered on s2. Thus, the choice of {hail} as the pivot will trigger a specific
semantic network – one that can be called, in short, the “lexical map of {hail}” – which
will tell a totally different story from the choice of {(animal) cry}. Quite logically, how-
ever, one can predict that these two maps will have a whole chunk in common  – that
is, the connection between these two senses, plus whatever further senses are attested
to colexify with these two senses together. Thus, supposing a language were found
that colexified 〈(animal) cry〉 – 〈scream〉 – 〈hail〉 – 〈call〉, then each of the four semantic
maps centered on each of these senses would necessarily have to include this particular
chain of senses – along with other ramifications specific to each map.
Finally, note that the status of pivot of a lexical map has nothing to do with the
notion of prototype, which is only relevant to the description of individual lexemes.
Thus, it is perfectly possible that a typological map centered on the sense {hail} incor-
porates a lexeme X whose polysemy encompasses only those senses that appear to
the left of 〈hail〉 in Figure 2 above (〈hail〉, 〈scream〉, 〈creak〉, 〈(animal) cry〉 …). In
this particular language, it is likely that a prototype-based approach would describe
this word X as being built around the prototypical meaning “shout with high-pitched
voice, scream”; the sense 〈hail〉 would be nothing more than a peripheral offshoot of
that core meaning – regardless whether or not it is the pivot of the universal map that
includes it.
Another difference is that the definition of a prototypical meaning, in the
(language-internal) description of a word, constitutes an interpretative claim about
 Alexandre François

this word that may be challenged or falsified. On the contrary, the selection of a
given notion as the pivot of a (universal) lexical map entails no claim at all: it is sim-
ply an arbitrary choice, the starting point before any lexical map may even begin to
be drawn.

5.  Elaborating a universal map for “breathe”

In order to illustrate in full detail the typological method I am here advocating, I now
propose to delve into a specific notion, and build the lexical semantic map that will
best render the various polysemies associated with it in the world’s languages. This is
what I will do in the remainder of this article, around the notion “breathe”.
The notion “breathe” is here understood as the physiological activity of breathing
characteristic of humans and animals. I will first observe, for each language of the cor-
pus, the set of other senses with which this notion is colexified. Then I will attempt to
draw the lexical map of the notion {breathe}. The final form taken by these two steps
appear respectively as Table 2 and Figure 5 in Appendix 2.
This small case study rests on a corpus of 16 lexical headwords in 13 genetically
diverse languages. Each entry consists of either a single word, or a lexical root, in which
case several words are encompassed under the same entry. In particular, it is frequent
that the noun and the verb associated with the notion {breathe} differ formally from
each other; in this case, I have organized arbitrarily the data in the appendices in such
a way that the default headword is the noun, while the cognate verb, when formally
different from it, has a secondary status (loose colexification).13
The lexical database presented in Appendix 1 shows a total of 114 words involved
in the comparison. Of course, richer data, taken from more languages, would logically
result in richer results, with even higher typological significance. However, the corpus
here analyzed was judged at least sufficient for the purpose of illustrating the typologi-
cal method here proposed.

5.1  A first overview of the verb “breathe”

In Makonde, a Bantu language of Tanzania, the verb ku-pumula colexifies 〈breathe〉
and 〈take a rest〉. This semantic connection has a transparent motivation. In the first
place, the physiological act of breathing becomes particularly significant – “cognitively
salient” – after one has held his breath while making a physical effort. The act of sitting

.  This is why Table 2 shows plain “+” signs in the rows 〈act of breathing〉 and 〈puff of breath〉,
but bracketed “[+]” signs, standing for loose colexification, in the first row 〈breathe〉. See also the
isolectic sets in the maps of Appendix 3.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

down for a minute after an intense effort, or even of resting for a whole day after a week
of work, can be seen as a semantic expansion of this initial meaning, even when what
is relevant is not so much the act of breathing per se, as that of ceasing an effort. If we
add 〈pause for breath〉 as the missing semantic link (3.4.) between these two senses, the
polysemy of ku-pumula can be represented using a string of three senses 〈breathe〉 –
〈pause for breath〉 – 〈take a rest〉. This is a classical case of colexification originating in
semantic extension.
Makonde is not the only language to have developed this polysemy. English shows
a case of loose colexification (3.2.) between breathe and take a breather. The colexifica-
tion, whether strict or loose, of 〈breathe〉 and 〈take a rest〉 is also attested in Sar (noun
koo), in Arabic (root r.w.ḥ), in Nahuatl (verb imi’iyo), in Mwotlap (verb mōkheg), in
Nêlêmwa (root horêâ-), in Russian (root *du[x]); but not in Latin, Greek or Inuit. This
is enough evidence to propose this case of colexification as typologically significant.
Interestingly, Mwotlap mōkheg can also equally be used for any period of rest, i.e.,
not only minutes of pause within hours of work, but also days of pause within months
of work – that is, what we would call “take a vacation”. Since certain languages do not
go that far in the semantic expansion of {breathe} (e.g., English would hardly describe
a month-long holiday as take a breather), it is wiser to define formally not three but
four different senses here: 〈breathe〉, 〈pause for breath〉, 〈take a rest〉 and 〈take a vaca-
tion〉. Out of these four senses, we will say that English colexifies only three, whereas
Mwotlap covers them all. Incidentally, this proposal does not involve the claim that
these senses are necessarily distinct for the Mwotlap speaker – and it is perfectly likely
that 〈take a rest〉 and 〈take a vacation〉 should be grouped together under an emic
approach. But what is relevant here, for the specific purpose of language comparison,
is that these two functional situations are colexified in Mwotlap, but distinguished in
English; hence the choice to treat them, in an etic perspective, as if they were distinct
semantic units (see discussion in 3.1.). Incidentally, Russian otdyx, etymologically
connected with dyšat’ “breathe”, means both “rest” and “vacation”.
In a similar way, the Nêlêmwa verb horêân has added an extension to the mean-
ing 〈take a rest〉, namely 〈stop doing s.th., cease〉 (e.g., Co horêân o khiiboxa pwaxim
tavia “Stop beating your dog!”). This semantic offshoot clearly adds a new sense to the
potential polysemy of {breathe}.
The same observations can be made for other senses related to {breathe}. In
some languages (e.g., Greek pneō), the same verb is used for 〈breathe〉, for 〈blow〉 (i.e.,
a person blowing actively into s.th., like a flute) and/or for 〈(wind) blow〉. A further
connection that is sometimes attested is between 〈blow〉 and 〈whisper〉, with a shift
towards the notion of articulated speech. Thus in Araki (François 2002), the verb sono
connects the notions 〈blow, puff〉, 〈blow into s.th.〉 and 〈talk, tell a story〉 – see also
the derived noun sonosono “speech, story; language”. Likewise, the French verb souffler
means both 〈blow, puff〉 and 〈whisper, prompt〉.
 Alexandre François

But the latter example of colexification potentially raises an issue, because it

involves the sense 〈blow〉 rather than 〈breathe〉 (“breathe” is m̈apu in Araki, respirer in
French). Consequently, it should be kept aside from the semantic network of {breathe}
strictly speaking, to avoid the risk of shifting the center of observation from one sense
to the other, and thus expanding infinitely each polysemous network (see 4.3.). In
other words, the evidence so far allows us to include 〈blow〉 among the senses directly
connected to {breathe}, and 〈utter〉 among the senses directly connected to {blow};
but it does not illustrate any colexification between {breathe} and 〈utter〉.
Of course, the conclusion would be different if we came across languages that did
witness the colexification of these two senses. This is in fact the case with the noun
horêâ- in Nêlêmwa, which means both 〈breath, breathing〉 and 〈spoken message〉. The
English phrase I won’t breathe a word also illustrates the potential connection between
〈breathe〉 and 〈utter〉, arguably via a missing link 〈whisper〉 (as in breathe a prayer).
These two examples finallyq legitimize the inclusion of 〈utter, speak〉 in the map
of {breathe}.

5.2  From the sense list to the map

Before going any further, it may be useful to recapitulate our first findings in a visual
form. A simple way to do so would be to draw a table, based on the list of senses that
have been observed to potentially colexify with the pivot notion {breathe}. Each col-
umn corresponds to one of the languages I have been reviewing so far, representing
a subset of my corpus. This leads to Table 1, a partial representation of the sense list
under construction here (see Appendix 2 for the complete table).14

Table 1.   Examples of colexification associated with {breathe}

english russian mwotlap nlmwa araki  french
breathe du[x] mōkheg horêân sono souffler
breathe + + + +
take a rest [+] [+] + + +
be on vacation [+] +
cease to do +
(wind) blow + [+] +
(s.o.) blow + [+] + + +
whisper + + +
utter, speak + [+] + +

.  The typographical contrast between plain plus “+” and bracketed plus “[+]” corresponds
respectively to strict and loose colexification (see 3.2.).
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

Note that Araki sono and French souffler are included here for the sake of cross-
linguistic comparison. However, as discussed above, they cannot take part in the
corpus, because the sense {breathe} chosen as this study’s pivot (first row) does not
belong to their polysemy.
This representation in the form of a table has the advantage of being clear and
straightforward. Yet, it has the drawback of treating all senses on the same level. It may
be more interesting to underline the semantic links that relate certain senses with oth-
ers, and which form functional subsets within the network (see 4.2.). For example, we
have seen that the sense 〈be on vacation〉 is a semantic extension of the sense 〈take a
rest〉, itself being closer to the more literal meaning 〈pause for breath〉; and that 〈cease
to do〉 is another, independent offshoot of 〈make a pause〉. The chain 〈breathe〉 – 〈pause
for breath〉 – 〈take a rest〉 – 〈be on vacation〉 thus has a coherence of its own, which is
clearly distinct from the chain 〈breathe〉 – 〈blow〉 – 〈whisper〉 – 〈speak〉.
A more informative and graphic representation would thus take the form of
a semantic map, a diagram showing all the senses attested, together with the most
likely semantic connections that link them. These connections are first based on
intrinsic semantic properties, and are then checked against empirical data (see 4.2.).15
This brings about the tentative map of Figure 3.

utter, speak take a vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow 

Figure 3.  A first semantic map for {breathe}.

.  To be precise, the polysemy of Nêlêmwa horêâ- “breath, breathing; spoken message” raises
an issue, because it does not include the senses (〈blow〉 and 〈whisper〉) which functional consid-
erations suggest to posit as intermediate between 〈breathe〉 and 〈speak〉 (“whisper” in Nêlêmwa
is nyomamat). In theory, a rigorous application of the principles exposed in 4.2. should trigger a
shortcut line between these two senses. However, the strong functional motivation of 〈whisper〉
as a likely missing link, and the fact that the whole chain is empirically attested in other lan-
guages, suggests we may be dealing with a case I have not discussed yet: that is, the possibility
that an initial chain of senses s1–s2–s3–s4 may have evolved historically so that some interme-
diate links got lost – via lexical replacement – and only s1 and s4 remained colexified. Although
this is debatable, I choose to infringe the rule here, and to keep on the map the intermediate
steps of the path, based on functional motivations. This is why the Nêlêmwa set appears as non-
contiguous in Figure 4, in spite of the ideal design of semantic maps in Haspelmath’s terms.
 Alexandre François

Once it is established  – albeit incompletely  – a semantic map like Figure 3 consti-

tutes a universal etic grid against which emic categories of specific languages may be
described. Each lexical headword (word or root) selects a particular subset out of the
total range of potential senses. This is made clear by Figure 4, which converts the data
of Table 1 into graphic sets. By analogy with the concept of isoglosses, I propose to call
these sets “isolectic sets”.

utter, speak take a vacation

whisper take a rest

Nêlêmwa horêâ-
English breathe (s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do
Mwotlap mōkheg
Russian*du[x]- (wind) blow 

Figure 4.  Some isolectic sets around the notion {breathe}.

The most instructive point here, in terms of typology, is that the array of cross-
linguistic variation, far from being infinite and random, appears to be relatively lim-
ited. Of course, the more languages are considered, the more senses will appear in
the chart. But even at the small scale of these first observations, the fact that the
same patterns of polysemy recur again and again across language families is, in itself,
of considerable interest in the search for potential language universals. This sort
of cross-linguistic comparison can help see which patterns of polysemy are typo-
logically more common than others (see 3.4.): for example, while the four languages
presented here all share the colexification of 〈breathe〉 with 〈take a rest〉, only one has
gone as far as to include the meaning 〈cease to do〉. Of course this result with only
four languages is not significant; but the possibility of extending the observation to
virtually hundreds of languages suggests the sort of research that may be carried out
in the future.

5.3  Exploring the noun “breath”

The preceding paragraphs have presented the principal cases of colexification associ-
ated with the verb “breathe” in my corpus. A much richer semantic network arises if
one addresses the domain of nouns. Many languages possess a noun which is cognate
with the verb “breathe” (Eng. breath) – I will call it here “the {breathe} noun”.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

5.3.1  “Breath”, “breath of air”, “scent” …

In some languages, as one would expect, this deverbal noun carries with it part of the
polysemy of the verb “breathe”; but most often, languages provide that noun with its
own polysemy, which warrants a specific description. Thus, to take the case of Mwot-
lap, the verb mōkheg “breathe; take a rest; be on vacation” has a directly derived noun
nō-mōkheg, which means equally “breathing”, “rest” and “vacation”. But it also pos-
sesses a cognate noun nō-mōkhe with its own particular semantics: “breath”, “smell”,
“breath of life”, etc.
The literal meaning of the {breathe} noun is normally to designate the physical
activity, or manner, of breathing (Eng. pause for breath; be short of breath). In some
languages, it also expresses the portion of air inhaled or exhaled during the act of
breathing, including its physical properties such as temperature or smell (hot breath;
bad breath). By extension, the same word is sometimes used for all sorts of smells,
even when unrelated to an actual process of human breathing: e.g., Mwotlap nō-mōkhe
tētēnge “the scent (lit. the breath) of flowers”. Through a similar shift between man and
nature, the human activity of breathing is sometimes colexified with natural phenom-
ena involving motion of air, such as 〈breath of air〉, 〈wind〉 or even 〈cold air〉.
These different senses seem to be articulated into two chains: on the one hand, a
chain 〈human act of breathing〉 – 〈air in motion: breath of air〉 – 〈wind〉 – 〈cold air〉; on
the other hand, a chain 〈human act of breathing〉 – 〈air coming from human mouth〉 –
〈smell coming from human mouth〉 – 〈smell, scent in general〉. To take just one exam-
ple, Latin spīritus, derived from spīro “breathe”, is attested with all these meanings
(except for 〈cold air〉).

5.3.2  “Life”, “spirit”, “mind”, “feelings” …

But probably the most significant polysemy that is attested with {breathe} nouns is
the lexical field of “life” and “soul”. This time, among the various properties associated
with the act of breathing, the one which is most relevant here is a universal physiologi-
cal observation: namely, that the phenomenon of breathing is the most salient property
that distinguishes a live creature from a dead body.
Thus, {breathe} nouns or verbs are frequently – perhaps universally – attested in
phrases related to the semantic notions of “life” and “death”: see Eng. breath of life; draw
one’s last breath; breathe life into s.th. … In Latin, the verb exspīro (from spīro “breathe”)
means literally “breathe s.th. out”, but also serves as a euphemism for “breathe one’s
last, die” (> Eng. expire). Russian iz-dyxat” “die”, etymologically connected to the root
du[x], is exactly parallel to Latin ex-spīro.16

.  The reason why the sense 〈die〉 is not represented on the final semantic map of {breathe}
(Appendix 2) is because this meaning is always obtained indirectly, through lexical  – or
 Alexandre François

This is how certain languages have come to colexify 〈breath〉 and 〈life〉. More pre-
cisely, the {breathe} noun is often related, whether historically or synchronically, with
a word whose meaning could be described as “the principle of life, insofar as it can be
conceived as specific of an individual”. Indeed, while these languages often possess a
separate noun for the abstract concept “life” (Greek bios, Lat. vīta, Arabic ʕaiša …),
they also often make use of another term when it comes to embodying this abstract
principle, as it were, into an individual being. This is how many – if not all – cultures
around the world have elaborated the non-trivial notion of the soul or spirit: that is, the
vital force of an individual, insofar as it is opposed to the inert body.
Needless to say, a wide variety of conceptions can be carried by this notion of
spirit, depending on cultures, religions, times and people. Despite the risk of simplifi-
cation, this diversity can perhaps be reduced to a few prototypical concepts. At least,
I shall mention here those concepts that are lexified, among the world’s languages, in
direct connection with the notion {breathe}.
In some languages, the {breathe} noun embraces the psychological activity of
an individual, in its various manifestations. For example, Classical Latin animus17 is
attested with the following meanings: 〈vital principle of an individual: soul〉; 〈seat of
reason and intelligence: mind〉; 〈seat of will and desire: will〉; 〈seat of feelings and pas-
sions: “heart”〉; 〈seat of courage and vital energy〉; 〈strong passions: pride〉…
The semantic range is not necessarily as wide as this, and is sometimes restricted to
just a certain type of feeling. To take another Latin example, the noun spīritus, besides
its other meanings mentioned in 5.3.1., is also attested with psychological senses; but
as far as Classical Latin is concerned, these are essentially restricted to 〈pride, arro-
gance, self-importance〉. During the later history of Latin and of Romance languages,
the set of psychological meanings related to spīritus has enriched considerably. Thus,
French esprit has a wide polysemy of its own, which includes 〈mind, thought〉, 〈intelli-
gence〉, 〈wit〉, 〈seat of feelings〉, 〈character, moral disposition〉, 〈frame of mind, mood〉.
A few phrases illustrate these senses, such as garder à l’esprit “keep in mind”, avoir
l’esprit vif “have a quick mind”, avoir de l’esprit “to be witty”, avoir l’esprit à rire “to be in

phraseological – derivation, but never directly (“strict colexification”). For obvious reasons, no
language is found where 〈die〉 and 〈breathe〉 are expressed by exactly the same form in syn-
chrony. As a principle, those senses which are attested nowhere in strict colexification with the
pivot notion do not qualify for inclusion in its semantic map (see 3.3.).
.  Admittedly, animus did not have 〈breathe〉 nor 〈breath〉 among its senses in the “synchrony”
of Classical Latin. However, it is etymologically linked to Greek anemos “wind” and Sanskrit
aniti “breathes”; and more importantly, it is closely cognate with the noun anima, whose wide
polysemy does include 〈breath〉 and 〈wind〉. As a result, I take anima as the relevant headword
for Latin (see 7.1.3.); animus is only included in the corpus by virtue of its synchronic cognacy
with anima (“loose colexification”).
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

a mood for laughing”, dans l’esprit de l’époque “in the spirit of the age”, esprit d’équipe
“team spirit”, retrouver ses esprits “to collect one’s wits” … Incidentally, because French
esprit  – like Eng. spirit  – no longer shows any connection with {breathe} in syn-
chrony, it can only be included in our corpus on a historical basis. In case we want
to restrict our observations to synchronical polysemies, then the examination of this
root should be restricted to Classical Latin spīritus, whose semantic array is already
wide (7.1.3.).
Similar semantic extensions can be found in other languages, including in the
form of synchronically coexisting senses. For example, it is remarkable that Standard
Arabic also translates some of the psychological senses of Fr. esprit with rūḥ a noun
related to {breathe} (7.1.10.): e.g., rūḥ al-taʕ āun “team spirit”, al-rūḥ al-ḥarbiya
“warlike spirit”. The polysemy of Russian dux also presents similar characteristics in
synchrony – even more if one considers the whole set of words that form the cognate
set of the root *du[x]18 (7.1.4.).

5.3.3  “Soul”, “spirit”, “supernatural being” …

The group of senses just reviewed (〈spirit〉, 〈mind〉, 〈character〉 …) forms a branch of
its own in the semantic map of {breathe}, covering the domain of psychological and
mental qualities of the socialized person. It should be carefully distinguished from
another concept: the soul. The semantic nuance is familiar to all Latinists, since it is
formally distinguished in Latin as (masculine) animus vs. (feminine) anima. While
animus describes the various faculties, feelings and emotions of individuals in their
social activities, anima has a deeper existential meaning, as it refers to the primal fac-
ulty of being alive – see also the derived noun animal “living being”. Therefore, nouns
like anima will be typically used in contexts dealing not with social behaviour, but
with death. In this perspective, the soul can be described as “that part of an individual
which leaves the body when death comes.” Depending on the cultural context, this
separation from the body will be understood either as the complete disappearance of
the soul, or, on the contrary, as its survival in different forms: migration of the soul
to an invisible abode of the dead, restless wandering as a ghost in the present world,
reincarnation (metempsychosis) into a new human body, or metamorphosis into a
supernatural being.
One may think that these cultural issues are not relevant for our linguistic study,
but they are. Only the understanding of such religious beliefs makes it possible to define
a satisfactory semantic path between, on one end of the semantic chain, the notion of
breathing, and on the other end, the representation of ghosts and other supernatural

.  Amongst the various lexical items that are etymologically related with this root, the noun
duša “soul, spirit …” has received special attention in Wierzbicka (1992: 31ff.).
 Alexandre François

beings, whether in an animist or a monotheist context. This polysemy can be illus-

trated again with Fr. esprit (< spīritus): besides the mental and moral senses used in a
social context (taking over the semantics of animus), it can also refer to the soul of a
living being (anima), including in the form of a ghost (e.g., croire aux esprits “believe in
ghosts”). Finally, esprit can designate any supernatural being of divine nature (l’esprit
du fleuve “the spirit of the river”), whether good (esprits célestes “heavenly spirits”) or
evil (esprit malin “evil spirit”); and in the context of a monotheist religion, the same
word may even come close to referring to the supreme divinity par excellence, as in
le Saint-Esprit “the Holy Spirit”.
This impressive range of “spiritual” meanings is not exclusive to the lexicon
of Latin (animus, anima, spīritus) and of its daughter languages. Surprisingly simi-
lar patterns of polysemy are found elsewhere: Greek psūkhē and pneuma; Sanskrit
ātman; Russian du[x]; Arabic rūḥ and nafs; Aleut anri; Nahuatl imi’iyo; and so forth
(see Appendix 1).

5.3.4  Going from “breath” to “supreme spirit”

To be precise, there are two ways one could account for the inclusion of supernatural
beings in the semantic map of {breathe}. One hypothesis would involve a generaliza-
tion process, whereby the soul of a human individual, insofar as it is said to survive
after death in the supernatural form of a ghost, would serve as a model for all other
supernatural creatures, even when they do not originate in a deceased person. In this
case, the likeliest semantic chain would be:

〈breath〉 – 〈(breath of) life〉 – 〈vital force of an individual, s.o.’s spirit〉 – 〈immaterial
part of an individual that survives death: soul〉 – 〈s.o.’s ghost〉 – 〈supernatural
being, even when not of human origin; a spirit, good or evil〉

The likeliness of this scenario is confirmed by the existence of similar seman-

tic shifts with other lexemes, though unrelated to {breathe}. For example, the
Mwotlap noun na-tmat (François, in prep.), etymologically “dead person”, is a poly-
semous word that colexifies 〈deceased person〉 – 〈wandering soul of a deceased per-
son, ghost〉 – 〈monster, spirit; any supernatural being, whether good or bad〉 – 〈the
Biblical Devil〉.
A second hypothesis would make a shortcut between the very act of breathing and
the notion of divinity, with no need to posit 〈soul, ghost〉 as a missing link. Indeed, in
many cultures, the immateriality of divine entities is metaphorically compared with an
invisible breath of air, a magic wind. This divine wind may sometimes be “blown into”
a thing or a person to endow it with holiness or supernatural power. This metaphor,
for example, underlies the use of Eng. inspiration (for an artist, a poet, a prophet) from
Latin inspīro “blow into”. Likewise, the Classical Greek pneuma, literally “breath, breath
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

of air …” is attested with the meaning “divine breath”,19 but never with the sense “soul”
or “ghost”. Finally, a process of metonymy triggers the shift from 〈divine breath〉 to
〈the divine entity or supernatural being from whom a divine breath emanates〉. These
examples would therefore rather advocate for a second semantic path:
〈breath of air emanating from a human person〉 – 〈divine breath: supernatural
power emanating from an immaterial entity〉 – 〈supernatural being exhaling
divine breath, divine spirit〉

Because both chains seem to be semantically likely and empirically grounded, I prefer
not to choose between them (see discussion in 4.2.). Such ambiguity is not necessarily
an issue, and may well depend on the specifics of each language or culture. It can be
easily represented on the typological map of {breathe} by drawing two distinct paths
leading from 〈breathing〉 to 〈supernatural being〉: see Figure 5 in Appendix 2.

5.3.5  From “soul” to reflexive marking

Finally, a further extension from the sense 〈soul〉, 〈spirit〉 is the designation of an
individual’s “person”, “essence” or “ego” – what one may define as one’s inner, deeper
identity, as opposed, for example, to one’s social representation. This more or less
corresponds to the semantics of English self.
Even more interestingly, this quite abstract meaning has sometimes grammatical-
ized into a reflexive marker, in a way precisely parallel to English (know) your self >
(know) yourself. This semantic path is witnessed in three languages in my corpus. In
Sanskrit (7.1.1.), the famous concept ātman (etymologically “breathing”, from an-
“breathe”) has a wide semantic array, going from 〈breath of life〉 to 〈vital force〉, 〈soul〉
and 〈the self, the abstract person〉 as well as 〈essence, peculiarity (of something)〉. But
one of its principal uses in texts seems to be as a grammatical marker for reflexive; this
is especially clear from the list of dozens of compounds based on ātma- (of which only
a short selection is given in the Appendix), e.g., ātma-jña “knowing one’s self ”, ātmê-
śvara “master of one’s self ”, ātma-ghāta “suicide”, ātma-grāhin “selfish”…
Likewise, the ordinary reflexive marker for Standard Arabic is nafs-ī (1sg possessed
form of nafs, parallel to Eng. “my-self ”). This is in fact a noun nafs meaning 〈soul〉,

.  Historically speaking, this specific sense, despite being already attested in Plato’s works,
was later spread by the Septuagint in their translation of the Bible. Whereas the noun psūkhē
“soul, spirit” had lost its etymological relationship to “breath”, the noun pneuma was still syn-
chronically the word for “breath, blow of air”: this is probably why it was chosen to translate
Hebrew ruach “breath, air; strength; wind; spirit; courage; temper; Spirit” (Vine 1985: 240; see
the cognate Arabic rūḥ in the appendix). Exactly in the same way, the semantic calque took place
in Latin with spīritus “breath, blow of air; soul …” rather than animus, because the connection of
the latter noun with “wind, breath” was then no longer perceptible.
 Alexandre François

〈essence, being, abstract person〉, 〈self〉, 〈mind, psyche〉 as well as 〈the same〉 … And
crucially, this whole semantic array is closely connected – via loose colexification  –
with the noun nafas “breathing, breath, breath of life” (root n.f.s). This example
confirms the relevance of a semantic chain 〈breathing〉 – 〈breath of life〉 – 〈vital force〉 –
〈person, self〉 – 〈reflexive〉.
The other Arabic root with a similar polysemy, r.w.ḥ apparently does not go that
far, at least for Standard Arabic. However, Naïm (2007: 315) reports the grammatical-
ization of rūḥ as a reflexive marker in modern Yemeni Arabic (as in ʔalaṭṭim rūḥ-ī “I’m
hitting myself ”).20 This confirms the potential bridge between lexicon and grammar,
which is potentially present within this lexical field of {breathe}.

5.4  Drawing a more complete map for “breathe”

The previous sections have surveyed the main patterns of polysemy, regarding both
the verb “breathe” and the cognate noun “breath”, based on a corpus of 16 lexical head-
words (covering 114 words altogether) in 13 languages. These observations result first
in a comparative sense chart (Table 2 in Appendix 2), and in the typological map of
{breathe} (Figure 5).21
The reader will find in Appendix 3 a representation of eleven significant lexical
headwords of the corpus, in the form of “isolectic sets” (see 5.2.). Crucially, these fig-
ures show clearly how the universal semantic map was carefully drawn on an empiri-
cal basis. Indeed, following the methodological principles stated in 4.2., senses must
be organized on the universal map so that each isolectic set covers a contiguous part
of the map; and every semantic chain proposed, based on functional or ontological
properties, must be confirmed empirically by the existence of such polysemous chains
in actual languages. With just one exception already noted (fn.16), these two method-
ological requirements are rigorously fulfilled by the universal map I propose.
The interest of this typological map lies both in its complexity and its simplic-
ity. First, knowing how universal the activity of breathing is, it is impressive to see
how each language has proven capable of evolving its own way, bringing about highly
sophisticated, culture-specific vocabulary such as “the self ”, “divine inspiration”, or “be
on vacation”. Yet, by the same token, probably even more instructive is the extent to
which remote languages can follow just the same semantic paths, well beyond genetic

.  Technically, although this is an instance of the noun rūḥ, this specific polysemy should
count as loose rather than strict colexification (see 3.3.) in the map of rūḥ̣, because it involves
the same lexeme across two distinct états de langue: the chain 〈breath〉 – 〈soul〉 – 〈spirit〉 –
〈person〉 … belongs to Standard Arabic, but the grammaticalization 〈person〉 – 〈reflexive〉 to
Yemeni Arabic. See Figure 15.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

boundaries and historical times. Thanks to this type of typological survey, certain met-
aphors sometimes believed to be specific of certain civilizations (e.g., the connection
“breath”  – “soul” – “spirit” found in the Bible) can appear to be in fact widespread
among the world’s cultures. It is probable that lexical typology, as much as grammatical
typology, will tell us a lot about the universality of our perceptions and feelings, and
about the unity of mankind.

6.  Conclusion

Of course, such a semantic map is by no way comprehensive; it will always be possible

to improve it by increasing the number of languages considered. Rather, the objective
of the present overview was essentially to explain and illustrate a possible method for
undertaking research in lexical typology. My objective was to find a satisfying bal-
ance between the two conflicting demands at stake in language typology: the search
for universals vs. the respect for each language’s uniqueness. On the one hand, typo-
logical comparison requires that linguistic data be observed from a universalist angle,
through the definition of language-independent, functionally-based criteria that could
be observed – or at least looked for – in potentially any language of the world. On the
other hand, the need for comparison should not sacrifice the subtle nuances that make
each language unique. Hopefully, the Colexification Model proposed here, based on
the definition of minimal semantic atoms and the observation of their interactions
in the various languages of the world, should provide a satisfying balance between
language-specific analyses and a more universal approach.
More issues still deserve to be addressed. For example, the question of dia-
chrony, and specifically of the directionality of semantic change, could be researched
in the future. Also, the representation of the data could be improved, e.g., by using
three dimensions instead of two, or by adding various attributes for each semantic
connection  – distinguishing metaphors from metonymies, or statistically frequent
cases from rarities… Finally, little has been said here about the possible applications of
this model, whether in a universalist, cognitivist perspective, or in the reconstruction
of historical change in particular language groups.
Obviously, the domain of lexical typology still provides ground for substan-
tial debate and reflection, from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint. But
while we pursue these necessary discussions, we must not forget to collect the raw
material for this research – namely, fine-grained lexical data gathered from various
parts of the world. This work of documentation and analysis is especially urgent for
endangered languages, most of which have so far received too little attention from
lexicographers.
 Alexandre François

7.  Appendices

7.1  Appendix 1: Lexical data

7.1.1  Sanskrit
Source: Monier-Williams 1970 [1899]; Stchoupak et al. 1987 [1932].
• Lexical item: ātman.
1. breath. 2. (breath of) life; principle of life, vital force. 3. the individual soul, spiritual
force of the person. 4. the self, abstract individual; oneself (reflexive pronoun), one’s
own. 5. the person, esp. body. 6. understanding, intellect, mind. 7. essence, charac-
ter, peculiarity. 8. effort, firmness. 9. highest personal principle of life, Brahma.
Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):

ātma-vat animated, having a soul. ātma-bhāva 1. existence of the soul. 2. the
ātma- 1. soul. 2. self, one’s own… self, proper or peculiar nature.
ātma-grāhin taking for one’s self, selfish. ātma-yoga union with the supreme spirit.
ātma-ghāta suicide. ātma-víd knowing the nature of the soul
ātma-jña 1. knowing one’s self. or supreme spirit.
2. knowing the supreme ātma-sáni granting the breath of life.
spirit. ātma-dhīna 1. depending on one’s own
ātma-jyotis the light of the soul or will. 2. one whose existence
supreme spirit. depends on the breath or on
ātma-tā essence, nature. the principle of animal life:
ātma-dā granting breath or life. sentient.
ātma-pāta descent of the soul, re-birth. ātmê-śvara master of one’s self.

Cognate form: an (3sg án-iti)

(cognate with Greek anemos “wind”, Latin anima)
1. breathe, respire. 2. gasp. 3. live, be alive. 4. move, go (?).
Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):

aná breath, respiration. ánila 1. air, wind. 2. the god of wind.

aná-vat-va the state of being endowed 3. wind as one of the humors of the
with breath or life. body. 4. rheumatism.
anana breathing, living.

7.1.2  Classical Greek

Source: Bailly (1950 [1894]).
• Lexical item: psūkhē.
1. (s.o.’s) breath, puff of air. 2. breath of life, vital force. 3. (s.o.’s) life. 4. living
being; person. 5. darling. 6. soul (vs. body): seat of feelings and passions, heart. 7.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

(s.o.’s) moral disposition, character; nature (of s.th.). 8. seat of intelligence, mind.
9. seat of will and desire. 10. soul separated from body and surviving in hell; ghost.
11. butterfly.
Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):

psūkhikos 1. vital. 2. living being; animal. 3. cool down (s.th.). 4. get cold;
3. terrestrial, material. 4. of the fall, die.
soul, spiritual. psūkhos 1. fresh breath of air; cold air,
psūkhō 1. breathe, blow air. 2. breathe coldness. 2. winter.
out, reject. psūkhros 1. cold. 2. sterile. 3. vain,
useless. 4. lifeless. 5. indifferent,
impervious.

• Lexical item: pneuma.

1. breath of air; wind. 2. act of breathing; (s.o.’s) breath. 3. sound (of flutes). 4. breath
of life, life. 5. breathlessness. 6. smell, scent. 7. enthusiasm, energy, fervor; wrath.
8. divine breath, divine power. 9. spirit, supernatural being, whether good (angel)
or bad (devil); Holy Spirit. 10. aspiration (phonetics).
Cognate form: pneō.
1. (wind) blow. 2. (s.o.) breathe, blow. 3. be alive. 4. be in a particular moral
disposition (pride, anger, arrogance …). 5. exhale a smell, smell (good or bad).
6. play the flute. 7. (passive) be inspired, be wise.

7.1.3  Classical Latin

Source: Gaffiot (1934).
• Lexical item: anima.
(cognate with Greek anemos “wind”, Skr. aniti “breathes”)
1. air in motion, breath of air. 2. act or manner of breathing. 3. breath (good or
bad). 4. (breath of) life; principle of life, vital force. 5. being, creature, person.
6. darling. 7. soul (opp. body) that survives death; souls of the dead.

Cognate form: animus.

1. principle of life (opp. body). 2. mind, thought, seat of intelligence. 3. opinion,
thought. 4. seat of will and desire; will, intention. 5. seat of feelings: soul, heart.
6. feelings, emotions, passions. 7. frame of mind, mood. 8. courage, energy, fervor,
pride, arrogance. 9. darling.
Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):
animal living being, animal.
animōsus 1. courageous, bold. 2. proud. 3. ardent.
 Alexandre François

• Lexical item: spīritus

1. air in motion, breath of air. 2. act or manner of breathing; breath. 3. sigh.
4. smell, scent. 5. (breath of) life; principle of life. 6. divine breath; magic or poetic
inspiration. 7. soul (opp. body). 8. self, person. 9. pride, arrogance, self-impor-
tance. 10. feelings, state of mind, moral disposition.
Cognate form: spīro.
1. (wind) blow. 2. (sea) bubble. 3. breathe. 4. be alive. 5. be inspired. 6. (s.o., s.th.)
exhale a smell. 7. breathe out (s.th.). 8. (fig) exude [cruelty …].

7.1.4  Russian
Sources: Sakhno (2005: 89 ff.); Pauliat (1991).
• Lexical item: dux.
1. breathing, breath. 2. breath of life. 3. spirit (of s.o./s.th.): moral disposition,
frame of mind. 4. mood (good or bad). 5. morale, courage. 6. supernatural being
(good or evil); God (Svjatoj dux “Holy Spirit”). 7. ghost.
Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):
dut’ 1. (s.o./wind) blow. 2. drink a lot. otdyx 1. pause, rest. 2. leisure,
zaduvat’ 1. (wind) start blowing. vacation.
2. (s.o.) blow (candle+). peredyška short pause, respite.
vozdux 1. air. 2. open space, outside. dušok bad smell.
dyšat’ breathe. duxi perfume.
doxnut’ breathe, blow. duša 1. soul, spirit. 2. seat of
dyxanie breathing, breath. feelings, heart. 3. inhabitant,
dyxatel’nyj respiratory. person.
dušit’ strangle, suffocate; oppress. duševnyj 1. psychic, mental.
uduš’e breathlessness, asthma. 2. sincere, cordial.
doxnut’ die. duxovnyj spiritual; holy, sacred;
izdyxat’ die. ecclesiastical.
vzdyxat’ sigh. duxovenstvo clergy.
otdyxat’ take rest. vdoxnovenie (poetic/magic) inspiration,
enthusiasm.
oduševlënnyj animate.

7.1.5  Mandarin Chinese

Source: [no author] (1990); [no author] (1996).
• Lexical item: qì.
1. weather, atmosphere. 2. gas. 3. air. 4. (s.o.’s) breath. 5. smell (good or bad), scent.
6. (s.o.’s) manner, ways, attitude, style. 7. (s.o.’s) spirits, moral strength, morale.
8. energy, vital force, vital breath. 9. annoy, irritate (s.o.).
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):

qìhòu weather, climate. qìwèi 1. smell, scent. 2. (fig) taste, style,
qìxiàng 1. meteorology. 2. (fig) fashion.
atmosphere. qìpài style; stylishness.
qìchuăn breathless, asthmatic. qìpò 1. character strength; boldness,
qìxī 1. breath; last breath. 2. smell, daring; will. 2. majesty.
scent. 3. (fig) taste, style, fashion. qìyàn arrogance, insolence.
qìshì 1. strength, vigor, energy. qìgài manner, ways.
2. momentum, impetus. 3. majesty. qìzhì character, (good) moral qualities.
qìlì strength, vigor, energy; effort. qìjié honesty, frankness.
qìnăo get angry. qìliàng open-mindedness, tolerance.
qìfèn furious, angry, exasperated. qìnĕi disheartened, depressed.
qìhuà angry words; words (huà) uttered qìxing character, disposition; mood.
in a fit of anger. qìshèng be in a bad mood.
qìshì xiōngxiōng  fierce, furious, arrogant.

7.1.6  Inuit/Aleut
Eskimo-Aleut family. Spoken in Greenland and Alaska.
Source: N. Tersis (pers. comm.); Fortescue et al. (1994).
• Lexical item: (Inuit) ani- “breathe, blow”.
Cognate, derived and compound forms:

aniqniq breathing; breath. aniqnii-q-pu-q breathe one’s last, die.

aniqsaaqtuq-puq breathe. aniqsaaq spirit, ghost.

Cognate form: (Aleut) anr(i) “breathe, blow”.

1. breath. 2. voice. 3. principle of life, life. 4. spirit, soul. 5. ghost.
Cognate form: anrari “be alive”.

7.1.7  Nahuatl
Spoken in Mexico. Source: Marie-Noëlle Chamoux (pers. comm.)
• Lexical item: imi’iyo ~ i’iyac.
1. breath. 2. smell (esp. bodily smell). 3. V + imi’iyo “take rest”.

7.1.8  Mwotlap
Austronesian; Oceanic subgroup. Spoken in Vanuatu. Source: François (in prep.)
• Lexical item: nō-mōkhe.
1. (s.o.’s) breath. 2. breath of life, life; principle of life. 3. smell (good or bad),
scent (of s.o./s.th).
 Alexandre François

Cognate form: mōkheg.

1. breathe; breathe into. 2. perceive a smell. 3. pause, take rest; be on vacation;

be retired.

7.1.9  Nêlêmwa
Austronesian; Oceanic subgroup. Spoken in New Caledonia. Source: Bril (2005)

• Lexical item: horêâ-t.

1. (s.o.’s) breath, breathing. 2. breath of life, life. 3. spoken message.

Cognate form: horêân.

1. breathe. 2. be alive. 3. pause, take rest. 4. cease to do.

7.1.10  Standard Arabic

Source: Reig (1983); Naïm (2007).

• Lexical item: rūḥ [root r.w.ḥ]

1. breath of life. 2. soul, soul of the dead; mind; spirit. 3. supernatural power, spirit
(good or evil); divinity. 4. character, moral disposition; spirit. 5. morale, mental
strength. 6. perfume essence, alcohol.

Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):

rūḥī 1. spiritual. 2. alcoholic. istirāḥa take a rest, relax, be quiet.

rūḥānī spiritual; divine; immaterial; rāḥa rest, quietness; ease, comfort.
sacred. rūḥ-ī lit. “my soul” > grammaticalized
arwāḥiyah animism. as a reflexive marker (“myself ”)
rīḥ breath of air, wind. in modern Yemeni Arabic
rāʔiḥah smell, scent (good or bad).
mirwaḥah fan, propeller.
rawwaḥa ventilate, air; put scent in.

• Lexical item: nafas [root n.f.s]

1. breathing. 2. puff of air, breath. 3. sip. 4. breath of life.

Cognate form: nafs.

1. soul, vital force of the individual. 2. essence, being, the person itself. 3. the self;
Reflexive marker (myself, yourself …). 4. the same. 5. psyche; psycho-. 6. jinx,
curse on s.o.
 Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 

Cognate, derived and compound forms (selection):

tanaffasa 1. breathe, blow. 2. be reassured. nafsiya psychology.

tanaffus breathing, breath. naffasa comfort, appease.
nafsī psychic, psychological. tanāfasa compete, rival

7.1.11  Beja
Afro-asiatic family. Spoken in Sudan.
Source: Martine Vanhove (pers. comm.), after Roper (1928).

• Lexical item: šūk.

1. breathing, breath. 2. soul.

7.1.12  Makonde
Niger-Congo; Bantu subgroup. Spoken in Tanzania. Source: Sophie Manus (pers. comm.)

• Lexical item: ku-pumula.

1. breathe. 2. take rest.

7.1.13  Sar
Nilo-Saharan; Sara–Bongo–Baguirmian subgroup. Spoken in Chad and Sudan.
Source: Pascal Boyeldieu (pers. comm.)

• Lexical item: koo.

1. breathing, breath. 2. air, gas.
taa koo/take/breath/“pause for breath, take a rest”

7.2  Appendix 2: Results and semantic map

7.3  Appendix 3: Some isolectic sets for “breathe”

The following pages represent eleven lexical entries (out of the sixteen of the corpus)
in the form of “isolectic sets” (see 5.2.). The universal map presented in Appendix 2 is
reproduced identically for each language, and used as a visual etic grid against which
the emic categorizations made by each language are visualized.
Each isolectic set consists of two levels. The greyed area with a solid line repre-
sents “strict” colexification: it shows the semantic contour of the lexical entry itself (the
one in the title). On the other hand, the dotted line allows supplementing this first area
with indirect or “loose” colexification – generally, other forms in the same language
cognate with the lexical entry (see 3.3.). These isolectic sets are further commented
upon in 5.4.
  Alexandre François

Table 2.  Lexical data on the polysemy of {breathe}

sanskrit greek greek latin latin russian mandarin aleut+ nahuatl mwotlap nelemwa arabic arabic beja  sar
ātman psūkhē pneuma anima spīritus dux qì anri imi'iyo mōkhe horêâ rūh. nafas šūk koo
breathe [+] [+] [+] [+] [+] [+] [+] + [+] +
(s.o.) blow [+] [+] [+] [+] [+] [+] + [+] +
whisper, utter + +
take a rest [+] + [+] + [+] [+] [+]
be on vacation [+] [+]
cease to do +
(wind) blow [+] [+] [+] [+]
air, wind [+] [+] + + + [+] + [+] +
cold (air) [+]
puff of breath + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
smell, scent + + [+] + + + [+]
act of + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
breathing
(breath of) life + + + + + + + + + + +
living being, [+] [+] [+] [+]
animal
vital force of + + + + + + + + + + + +
individual
person; self + + + + [+] [+]
oneself + [+] [+]
(reflexive)

mind, thought + + + [+] + + + + + [+]
intelligence, wit + +
will and feelings: + + [+] + + + +
heart
pride, arrogance, + [+] + + [+]
wrath
frame of mind, + [+] + + + +
mood
soul of indiv. + + + + [+] + + +
(immortal)
ghost + + + + +
divine breath or + + + +
power
magic power, + + [+] +
inspiration
supernatural + + + + +
being, God
Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 utter, speak be on vacation

V
whisper take a rest
E
R
 Alexandre François

B (s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

Y

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
N vital force
O smell, scent soul of individual mind,
U (immortal) thought
divine breath,
N
supernatural ghost seat of will
Y
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 5.  The semantic map of {breathe}.


utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 6.  Isolectic set for Sanskrit ātman.

Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

 Alexandre François

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 7.  Isolectic set for Greek psūkhē.


utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 8.  Isolectic set for Greek pneuma.

Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

 Alexandre François

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 9.  Isolectic set for Latin anima.


utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 10.  Isolectic set for Latin spīritus.

Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

 Alexandre François

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
animal
air in motion, act of
cold (air) the person,
wind 
(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 11.  Isolectic set for Russian dux.


utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 12.  Isolectic set for Chinese qì.

Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

 Alexandre François

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 13.  Isolectic set for Nêlêmwa horêâ‑.



utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 14.  Isolectic set for Mwotlap mōkhe–.

Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

 Alexandre François

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 15.  Isolectic set for Standard Arabic rūḥ.


utter, speak be on vacation

whisper take a rest

(s.o.) blow pause for breath cease to do

(wind) blow  oneself

(reflexive)
living being,
air in motion, animal
cold (air) act of
wind the person,

(breath of) the self
life
(human) living part of
puff of breath individual:
vital force
smell, scent soul of individual mind,
divine breath, (immortal) thought
supernatural ghost seat of will
power & feelings: mental skills:
heart intelligence,
(s.o.'s) magic power supernatural being wit
strong passions:
of supernatural (good/bad): spirit
courage, pride, frame of
origin: inspiration arrogance, wrath… mind, mood

Figure 16.  Isolectic set for Standard Arabic nafas.

Semantic maps and the typology of colexification 
 Alexandre François

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