FULL CASE

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 202242 - July 17, 2012]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has constantly
been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional challenge.

As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the process of
selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay the
resolution of the issue a day longer. Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an
option.

Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one
(1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the
pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action for prohibition and injunction.

Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the annals of history bear witness to the
fact that the exercise of appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive
prerogative of the executive and legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of
American origins, both the Malolos Constitution1 and the 1935 Constitution2 had vested the
power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. It was during these times that the country became witness to the
deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to
ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body.3ςrνll

Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power under the 1973 Constitution,4 the
appointment of judges and justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body. It was
absolute, except that the appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political
pressure and partisan activities,5 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are
provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz:ςrαlαω

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four
years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three
years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall
keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for
the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It
may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
chanrobles virtual law library

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated
one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.6 Perhaps in order
to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of
Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words,
Congress had only one (1) representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from
the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7 Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit
in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition,9 setting forth the following
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITIONςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ

Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs no interpretation in that the JBC
shall have only one representative from Congress.

II

The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated and decided on a JBC
composed of only seven (7) members.

III

Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC composed of the one member from the
Senate and one member from the House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as
they did in the other provisions of the Constitution.

IV

The composition of the JBC providing for three ex-officio members is purposely designed for a
balanced representation of each of the three branches of the government.

One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no right (not even right) to sit in the
said constitutional body and perform the duties and functions of a member thereof.

VI

The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is illegal and
unconstitutional.10ςrνll
chanrobles virtual law library

On July 9, 2012, the JBC filed its Comment.11 It, however, abstained from recommending on
how this constitutional issue should be disposed in gracious deference to the wisdom of the
Court. Nonetheless, the JBC was more than generous enough to offer the insights of various
personalities previously connected with it.12ςrνll
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents defended their position as
members of the JBC in their Comment13 filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the crux of
the controversy is the phrase "a representative of Congress."14 Reverting to the basics, they cite
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution15 to determine the meaning of the term

"Congress." It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
are permanent and mandatory components of "Congress," such that the absence of either divests
the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic terms, the
House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa, is not Congress.16 Bicameralism, as
the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in
the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution speaks of "a representative from Congress," it should mean one representative
each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.17ςrνll

Tracing the subject provision s history, the respondents claim that when the JBC was
established, the Framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby
allocating "a representative of the National Assembly" to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism, the legislative system
finally adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. According to
respondents, if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a
bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC.18ςrνll

The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of inadvertence, the respondents urge the Court
to look beyond the letter of the disputed provision because the literal adherence to its language
would produce absurdity and incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress.19 In other words,
placing either of the respondents in the JBC will effectively deprive a house of Congress of its
representation. In the same vein, the electorate represented by Members of Congress will lose
their only opportunity to participate in the nomination process for the members of the Judiciary,
effectively diminishing the republican nature of the government.20ςrνll

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render the latter s purpose nugatory. While they admit that the
purpose in creating the JBC was to insulate appointments to the Judiciary from political
influence, they likewise cautioned the Court that this constitutional vision did not intend to
entirely preclude political factor in said appointments. Therefore, no evil should be perceived in
the current set-up of the JBC because two (2) members coming from Congress, whose
membership to certain political parties is irrelevant, does not necessarily amplify political
partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely
provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees.21ςrνll

The Issues

In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising from the petition, as well as the myriad
of counter-arguments proffered by the respondents, the Court synthesized them into
two: Ï‚ηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been met in this case; andcralawlibrary

(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.
chanrobles virtual law library

The Power of Judicial Review

In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed with locus standi to file the petition,
as a citizen and taxpayer, who has been nominated to the position of Chief Justice.22ςrνll

For the respondents, however, petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning the constitutionality
of the JBC s current composition.23 As outlined in jurisprudence, it is well-settled that for locus
standi to lie, petitioner must exhibit that he has been denied, or is about to be denied, of a
personal right or privilege to which he is entitled. Here, petitioner failed to manifest his
acceptance of his recommendation to the position of Chief Justice, thereby divesting him of
a substantial interest in the controversy. Without his name in the official list of applicants for
the post, the respondents claim that there is no personal stake on the part of petitioner that would
justify his outcry of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the mere allegation that this case is of
transcendental importance does not excuse the waiver of the rule on locus standi, because, in the
first place, the case lacks the requisites therefor. The respondents also question petitioner s
belated filing of the petition.24 Being aware that the current composition of the JBC has been
in practice since 1994, petitioner s silence for eighteen (18) years show that the
constitutional issue being raised before the Court does not comply with the "earliest
possible opportunity" requirement.

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the
nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court views the petition as
essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.25ςrνll

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in
the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the
very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for
declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.26ςrνll

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to
the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After
all, the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending
two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

The Courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution,
is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.27 Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these
conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal
branch of government is put in issue.

Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal conflict of rights
and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,28 the
Court summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers,
there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there
must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.

In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus,
taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.29ςrνll

In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes
his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the
government are spent for lawful purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC derives
financial support for its functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner
possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC s proceedings are not
tainted with illegality and that its composition and actions do not violate the
Constitution."30ςrνll

Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions that he had brought before the Court
where his legal standing was sustained. Although this inventory is unnecessary to establish locus
standi because obviously, not every case before the Court exhibits similar issues and facts, the
Court recognizes the petitioner s right to sue in this case. Clearly, petitioner has the legal
standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the outcome of this
controversy.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
"personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC s duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to
judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court s ruling. More importantly, the
legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon, lest a
constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has
a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time,
armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the composition of the
JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.

With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant
in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.31 The allegations of constitutional
violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the
government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from
the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of the issues
raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of
the magistrates in our judicial system.

The Composition of the JBC

Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an understanding of the composition of the
JBC as stated in the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It
reads:ςrαlαω

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies
the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC
composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and "a
representative of Congress."

As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative
of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative
of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean
what they say.33 Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.34ςrνll

The raison d être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained;35 and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.36ςrνll

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. 38 The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.39 In short, every meaning to be
given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute
since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and
its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
"Congress" used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense.
No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative
may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed
out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
memorandum,40 "from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that
each category of members pertained to a single individual only."41ςrνll

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.42 Not any
of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the
subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic
aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.

Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus:ςrαlαω

MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.

On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the appointments of members of the
Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them.
If there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointment. In this proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of
a board composed of seven members called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the
President will still appoint the member of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees
of this Council.

xxx     xxx     xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints
four of them who are regular members.

xxx     xxx     xxx

MR. CONCEPCION. The only purpose of the Committee is to eliminate partisan

politics.43ςrνll

xxx     xxx     xxx

MR. RODRIGO. If my amendment is approved, then the provision will be exactly the same as
the provision in the 1935 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.

xxx     xxx     xxx

If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of the Judicial and Bar Council,
this will be a diminution of the appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the
President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The appointing power will be
limited by a group of seven people who are not elected by the people but only appointed.
Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no uniformity in our constitutional
provisions on appointments. The members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the
government. Even a municipal judge cannot be appointed by the President except upon
recommendation or nomination of the three names by this Committee of seven people,
commissioners of the Commission on Elections, the COA and the Commission on Civil Service
even ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come under this restriction. Why are we going
to segregate the Judiciary from the rest of our government in the appointment of high-ranking
officials?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just besmirch the honor of our
President without being effective at all because this Council will be under the influence of the
President. Four out of seven are appointees of the President and they can be reappointed when
their term ends. Therefore, they would be kowtow the President. A fifth member is the Minister
of Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member represents the Legislature. In all
probability, the controlling part in the legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this
representative form the National Assembly is also under the influence of the President. And may
I say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that event the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is an appointee of
the President. So it is futile he will be influence anyway by the President.44 [Emphases supplied]

At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves
a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of
the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and
eventually muddle the JBC s voting process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The
aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which
the Constitution itself created. While it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers
provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd
composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word "Congress" in
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.

Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress,
the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.45 On
this score, the Court cites the insightful analysis of another member of the Court and JBC
consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.46 Thus:Ï‚rαlαω

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the
JBC reflects the Commission s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major
elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government while the regular members are
composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal branch of
government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-
officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

xxx     xxx     xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers
under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial
branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch of in the matter of
its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent
powers requires the Senate and House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies
in furtherance of Congress role under our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and,
in fact, necessitates the separateness of the two houses of Congress as they relate inter se,
no such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other two co-equal
branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign
the same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding
aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have any more quantitative
influence as the other branches in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]

More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed rules of constitutional
construction, the Court finds the above thesis as the paramount justification of the Court s
conclusion that "Congress," in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as
one body. It is evident that the definition of "Congress" as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government - to legislate.47 In the passage of laws, the Constitution is
explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress non-legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation,48 the declaration
of an existence of a state of war,49 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice-
President,50 and impeachment.51 In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs precise
language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether the two
houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber;
and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other branches of
government.

This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between
the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Hence, the term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme
which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single
representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government.

Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in
response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of
the Judiciary.52 To ensure judicial independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped
that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an
active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.

Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,
would, as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it, "negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution."53ςrνll

To quote one former Secretary of Justice:ςrαlαω

The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other sectors represented
in the JBC must be corrected especially when considered vis-à-vis the avowed purpose for its
creation, i.e., to insulate the appointments in the Judiciary against political influence. By
allowing both houses of Congress to have a representative in the JBC and by giving each
representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the other members of the
JBC, is accorded greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of judges.54 [Emphasis
supplied]

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or
half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution,
providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional
doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to
the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it. 55 Hence, any act of
the government or of a public official or employee which is contrary to the Constitution is
illegal, null and void.

As to the effect of the Court s finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional,
it bears mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all.56 This rule, however, is not absolute. In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,57 the Court
explained:ςrαlαω
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden
on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds
that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all
its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine
as to who should remain as the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a matter
beyond the province of the Court and is best left to the determination of Congress.

Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the
House of Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position
to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the
Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this
constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn
power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct,
by reading into the law what is not written therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the

Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council
is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article

VIII of the 1987 Constitution.This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
 No Part - Inhibited for being a JBC applicant.

**
 On leave. Also no part- lnhibited for being a JBC applicant.
1
 Article 80 Title X of the Malolos Constitution provides: "The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National Assembly in concurrence with
the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely
independent of the Legislative and Executive Powers."

2
 Section 5 Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court
and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments."

3
 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, 437.

4
 Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President."

5
 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p. 487.

6
 List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex-Officio and Regular Members, Ex Officio Secretaries and
Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, Judicial and Bar Council, rollo, pp.
62-63.

7
 Id.

8
 Comment of the JBC, p. 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive Meeting, January 12,
2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 2001.

9
 Rollo, pp. 3-69.

10
 Id. at 17-18.

11
 Id. at 76-106.

12
 Id. at 80.

13
 Id. at 117-163.

14
 Id. at 142.
15
 "The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum."

16
 Id.

17
 Rollo, p. 143.

18
 Id. at 148.

19
 Id.

20
 Id.

21
 Id. at 150-153.

22
 Id. at 78.

23
 Id. at 131.

24
 Id. at 131-133.

25
 Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

xxx

26
 1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
lαω  lιbrαrÿ
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

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(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.
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27
 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 27 (2006).

28
 522 Phil. 705 (2006).

29
 LAMP v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012.
30
 Rollo, p. 6.

31
 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003), citing Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-157.

32
 National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493 Phil. 241, 250 (2005);
Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., 437 Phil. 289 (2002).

33
 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 31 at 885, citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

34
 Id.

35
 Id.

36
 Id.

37
 Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), Naga Plant v. Gomez, G.R. No. 154491, November
14, 2008, 571 SCRA 18, 37; People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA
115, 139; and Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71 (1989), citing Co Kim Chan v. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil. 371 (1945).

38
 People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 115, 139; Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71 (1989), citing Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, 75 Phil. 371 (1945).

39
 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154, 180 (2001).

40
 Memorandum of Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisimbing, dated March 14, 2007; rollo, p.
95-103.

41
 Id. at 103

42
 Ursua v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 157, 163 (1996).

43
 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, p. 445.

44
 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, pp.486-487.

45
 Comment of Respondents, rollo, pp. 142-146.
46
 Comment of JBC; id. at 91-93.

47
 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 27(1) - Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise,
he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a
law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

48
 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 24 - All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

49
 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 23 (1) - The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.

50
 1987 Constitution, Article 7 Section 4 - The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted
to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. The person having the highest number
of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
51
 1987 Constitution, Article 11 Section 3 (1) - The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω
lιbrαrÿ
xxx

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
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52
 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates Records of the
Constitutional Convention, p. 487.

53
 Comment of the JBC, rollo, p. 104.

54
 Memorandum of Justice Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera, Comment of the JBC, id. at 105-
106.

55
 Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935,
December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 137-138, citing Cruz, Philippine Political law, 2002 ed. p. 12.

56
 Claudio S. Yap v. Thennamaris Ship's Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies Inc.,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369, 380.

57
 G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 516-517.
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DISSENTING OPINION

ABAD, J.:
Some of my colleagues who have been nominated to the position of Chief Justice like me have
inhibited themselves from this case at the outset. I respect their judgments. I, on the other hand,
chose not to inhibit myself from the case since I have found no compelling reason for doing so.

I take no issue with the majority of the Court on the threshold question of whether or not the
requisite conditions for the exercise of its power of judicial review have been met in this case. I
am satisfied that those conditions are present.

It is the main question that concerns me: whether or not each of the Senate and the House of
Representatives is entitled to one representative in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), both with
the right to vote independently like its other members.

The problem has arisen because currently one representative each from the Senate and the House
of Representatives take part as members of the JBC with each casting one vote in its
deliberations. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez challenges this arrangement, however, citing
Section 8( 1) of Article VI II of the 1987 Constitution which literally gives Congress just one
representative in the JBC. Thus:ςrαlαω

"Article VIII, Section 8. (l) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector."1 (Emphasis ours)

The majority heavily relies on the wordings of Section 8(1) above. According to them, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution used plain, unambiguous, and certain terms in crafting
that section and, therefore, it calls for no further interpretation. The provision uses the
indefinite article "a" signifying "one" before the word "representative" which in itself is in
singular form. Consequently, says the majority, Congress should have but just one
representative in the JBC. Section 8(1) uses the term "Congress" in its generic sense,
without any special and specific mention of the two houses that compose it, namely the
Senate and the House of Representatives.

The majority also invokes the doctrine of noscitur a sociis which states that a proper
interpretation may be had by considering the words that accompany the term or phrase in
question.2 By looking at the enumeration in Section 8(1) of who the JBC members are, one
can readily discern that every category of membership in that body refers just to a single
individual.

There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction: first, verba legis, that

is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed; second, where there is
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima, meaning that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers; and third, ut magis valeat quam
pereat, meaning that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.3ςrνll

There is no question that when the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) deliberated on

the provisions regarding the composition of the JBC, the members of the commission
thought, as the original draft of those provisions indicates, that the country would have a
unicameral legislative body, like a parliament. For this reason, they allocated the three "ex
officio" membership in the council to the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative from the National Assembly, evidently to give representation in the JBC to
the three great branches of government.

Subsequently, however, the ConCom decided, after a very close vote of 23 against 22, to adopt a
bicameral legislative body, with a Senate and a House of Representatives. Unfortunately, as Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the ConCom, admits, the committee charged with making
adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the JBC, failed to consider the impact
of the changed character of the legislature on the inclusion of "a representative of the Congress"
in the membership of the JBC.4ςrνll

Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be given a reasonable
interpretation at all times.5 The Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit and
reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, or
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers. 6 Applying a verba legis or
strictly literal interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions meaningless and
lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort
should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter. 7ςrνll

To insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate or the House of
Representatives should sit at any time in the JBC, is to ignore the fact that while these two
houses of Congress are involved in the common task of making laws, they are separate and
distinct.8 Senators are elected by the people at large, while the Members of the House of
Representatives, by their respective districts or sectors. They have detached administrative
organizations and deliberate on laws separately, indeed, often coming up with dissimilar drafts of
those laws. Clearly, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives can by itself claim to
represent the Congress. Those who drafted Section 8(1) did not intend to limit the term
"Congress" to just either of the two Houses.

Notably, the doctrine that a proper interpretation may be had by considering the words that
accompany the term or phrase in question should apply to this case. While it is true that Section
8(1) provides for just "a representative of the Congress," it also provides that such representation
is "ex officio." "Ex officio" is a Latin term, meaning "by virtue of one s office, or position."9 This
is not too different from the idea that a man, by virtue of being a husband to his wife, is also a
father to their children. So in Section 8(1), whoever occupies the designated office or position
becomes an "ex officio" JBC member. For instance, if the President appoints Mr. X as Chief
Justice, Mr. X automatically becomes the chairman of the JBC, an attached function, by virtue of
his being the Chief Justice. He replaces the former Chief Justice without need for another
appointment or the taking of a separate oath of office. In the same way, if the President appoints
Mr. Y as Secretary of Justice, Mr. Y also automatically becomes a member of the JBC, also an
attached function, by virtue of his being the Secretary of Justice.

Now, under the rules of the Senate, the Chairman of its Justice Committee is automatically the
Senate representative to the JBC. In the same way, under the rules of the House of
Representatives, the Chairman of its Justice Committee is the House representative to the JBC.
Thus, there are two persons in Congress, not just one, who hold separate offices or positions with
the attached function of sitting in the JBC. Section 8(1) cannot be literally applied simply
because there is no office, serving both the Senate and the House of Representatives, with the
attached function of sitting as member in the JBC.

Inevitably, if the Court were to stick to the literal reading of Section 8(1), which restricts JBC
representation to just one person holding office in Congress and working under both houses, no
one will qualify as "ex officio" member of JBC. No such individual exists. Congress would
consequently be denied the representation that those who drafted the Constitution intended it to
have.

Allowing a Senator and a Congressman to sit alternately at any one time cannot be a solution
since each of them would actually be representing only his half of Congress when he takes part
in JBC deliberations. Allowing both, on the other hand, to sit in those deliberations at the same
time with half a vote each is absurd since that would diminish their standing and make them
second class members of JBC, something that the Constitution clearly does not contemplate. It is
presumed when drafting laws that the legislature does not intend to produce undesirable
consequences. Thus, when a literal translation would result to such consequences, the same is to
be utterly rejected.10ςrνll

Indeed, the JBC abandoned the half-a-vote practice on January 12, 2000 and recognized the right
of the Senator and the Congressman attending their deliberations to cast one vote each. Only by
recognizing this right can the true spirit and intent of Section 8(1) be attained.

With respect to the seven-man membership of the JBC, the majority assumes that by providing
for an odd-numbered composition those who drafted the Constitution sought to prevent the
possibility of a stalemate in voting and that, consequently, an eight-man membership is out of the
question. But a tie vote does not pose a problem. The JBC s main function is to choose at least
three nominees for each judicial position from which the President will select the one he would
want to appoint. Any tie in the voting is immaterial since this is not a yes or no proposition. Very
often, those in the shortlist submitted to the President get even votes. On the other hand, when a
yes or no proposition is voted upon and there is a tie, it merely means that the proposition is lost
for failure to get the plurality of votes.

The majority points out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution created the JBC as a response
to a public clamor for removing partisan politics from the selection process for judges and
justices of the courts. It thus results that the private sector and the three branches of government
have been given active roles and equal voices in their selection. The majority contends that, if it
were to allow two representatives from the Congress in the JBC, the balance of power within that
body will tilt in favor of Congress.

But, it is not partisan politics per se that Section 8(1) intends to remove from the appointment
process in the judiciary, but partisan domination of the same. Indeed, politicians have distinct
roles in that process. For instance, it is the President, a politician, who appoints the six regular
members of the JBC. And these appointees have to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment, composed of politicians. What is more, although it is the JBC that screens
candidates for positions in the judiciary, it is the President who eventually appoints them.

Further, if the idea was to absolutely eliminate politics from the JBC selection process, the
framers of the Constitution could simply have barred all politicians from it. But the Constitution
as enacted allows the Secretary of Justice, an alter-ego of the President, as well as representatives
from the Congress to sit as members of JBC. Evidently, the Constitution wants certain
representatives of the people to have a hand in the selection of the members of the judiciary.

The majority also holds the view that allowing two members of the Congress to sit in the JBC
would undermine the Constitution s intent to maintain the balance of power in that body and give
the legislature greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of members of the
Judiciary.

But this fear is unwarranted. The lawmakers hold only two positions in that eight-man body.
This will not give them greater power than the other six members have. Besides, historically, the
representatives from the Senate and the lower house have frequently disagreed in their votes.
Their outlooks differ.

Actually, if the Court would go by numbers, it is the President who appoints six of the members
of the JBC (the Chief Justice, the Secretary of Justice, and the four regular members), thus
establishing an edge in favor of presidential appointees. Placing one representative each from the
Senate and the House of Representatives rather than just one congressional representative
somewhat blunts that edge. As the OSG correctly points out, the current practice contributes two
elective officials in the JBC whose membership is totally independent from the Office of the
President.

Lastly, the presence of an elected Senator and an elected member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC is more consistent with the republican nature of our government
where all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives
chosen by them.

For the above reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

CASE DIGEST
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, GR No. 202242, 2012-07-17
Facts:
Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one
(1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2) representatives from
each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution? These... are the
pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action for prohibition and injuncti
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political
pressure and partisan activities,[5] the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need
to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend... nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are
provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the
Constitution, viz:... n compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.[6]
Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the... exclusive body, the
House of Representatives and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In
other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives... and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.[7] Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote... each.[8] At present, Senator Francis Joseph
G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the... legislature.
Issues:
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the...
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part lies
the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or... special members of the JBC
composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and "a
representative of Congress."
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of
Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what
the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may... designate
only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain
terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.[32] It is a well-settled... principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say.[33] Verba legis non est recedendum from... the words of a statute there
should be no departure.[34]
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word "Congress" used
in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives... is being referred to,
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The
foregoing declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the
Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum,[40] "from the enumeration of the
membership of the JBC, it is patent that each category of members pertained to a single
individual only."[41]
Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.[42] Not
any of these instances, however, is present in the case at... bench. Considering that the language
of th... the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort
extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus:
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,... the
term "Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a pretext of
oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with
firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single... representative of Congress, as one of the
co-equal branches of government.
Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in
response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of
the Judiciary.[52] To ensure judicial independence, they adopted... a holistic approach and hoped
that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of government would have an
active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would, as
one former congressman and member of
Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondents' contention that both the Senate and the
House of Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the Court is not in a position
to stamp its imprimatur on such a construction at the risk of expanding the... meaning of the
Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the remedy lies in the amendment of this
constitutional provision. The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver's intent. The solemn
power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include... the power to
correct, by reading into the law what is not written therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial
and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a...
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Principles:
Verba legis non est recedendum... he raison d' être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained;[35] and second, because the Constitution is... not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be
present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail. [36]... noscitur a sociis, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is founded or with... which it is associated.[37] This is because a word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be
modified or restricted by the latter.[38] The particular words, clauses... and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole.
A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give... effect to all its provisions whenever
possible.[39] In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained
from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words... or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the
latter.
doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality... is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.