Codoy vs. Calugay Case Digest
Codoy vs. Calugay Case Digest
Codoy vs. Calugay Case Digest
Calugay
FACTS:
Respondents Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the
RTC Misamis Oriental a petition for probate of the holographic will of Matilde.
Petitioners Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an
impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde
executed the holographic will.
The trial court denied the probate of the holographic will of Matilde. On appeal, respondents
presented testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon;
(3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline
Calugay.
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It held that in accordance with the case of
Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811
of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the probate
denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the holographic will. And the rule
requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential
is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available
lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts
are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert
evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay
witnesses.
According to the CA, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses
definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the
holographic will were those of the testator herself. Thus, the CA sustained the authenticity of the
holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or
mandatory.
2. Whether or not the CA is correct in allowing the probate of the will despite the absence
of three (3) credible witnesses as provided under Article 811 of the Civil Code.
3. Whether or not the holographic will of Matilde was written, dated and signed by Matilde,
the testator.
RULING:
1
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a
statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
mandatory.
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims
to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased
and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit
will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
2
NO. In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the
laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of
the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses
to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
3
NO. The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before
the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only
chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former
lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of
the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,
and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous
flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the
holographic will.
We, therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the
deceased.