NO PLACE FOR KIDS

The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration

The Annie E. Casey Foundation

About the Author: Richard A. Mendel is an independent founders of UPS, and his siblings, who named the
writer and researcher specializing in poverty-related Foundation in honor of their mother. The primary
issues in youth, employment, and community eco- mission of the Foundation is to foster public policies,
nomic development. He has written extensively about human-service reforms, and community supports that
youth crime prevention and juvenile justice issues, more effectively meet the needs of today’s vulner-
including five major publications for the Annie E. able children and families. In pursuit of this goal, the
Casey Foundation and three nationally disseminated Foundation makes grants that help states, cities, and
reports published by the American Youth Policy neighborhoods fashion more innovative, cost-effective
Forum. responses to these needs.

For more information and to download copies of this

The Annie E. Casey Foundation is a private charitable
report, visit www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.
organization dedicated to helping build better futures
for disadvantaged children in the United States. It ©2011, The Annie E. Casey Foundation, Baltimore,
was established in 1948 by Jim Casey, one of the Maryland
 Table of Contents

Introduction 2

What’s Wrong With America’s Juvenile Corrections Facilities? 5

1. Dangerous 5

2. Ineffective 9

3. Unnecessary 13

4. Obsolete 16

5. Wasteful 19

6. Inadequate 22

Is It Really Safe to Reduce Juvenile Confinement? 26

How Should States Go About Reforming Juvenile Corrections? 28

Priority 1: Limit Eligibility for Correctional Placements 28

Priority 2: Invest in Promising Non-Residential Alternatives 30

Priority 3: Change the Financial Incentives 31

Priority 4: Adopt Best Practice Reforms for Managing 32

Youth Offenders
Priority 5: Replace Large Institutions With Small, 34
Treatment-Oriented Facilities for the
Dangerous Few
Priority 6: Use Data to Hold Systems Accountable 36

Conclusion: Embracing Better Policies, Programs, and 38

Practices in Juvenile Corrections

Endnotes 40

Additional resources and state-level data for many of the report’s research find-
ings are available at www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.

1
 Introduction

For more than a century, the predominant strat- three-fifths of the total youth population, were
egy for the treatment and punishment of serious just 37 percent of the confined youth.
and sometimes not-so-serious juvenile offenders
America’s heavy reliance on juvenile incarceration
in the United States has been placement into
is unique among the world’s developed nations.
large juvenile corrections institutions, alterna-
(See Fig. 1 on p. 3.) Though juvenile violent
tively known as training schools, reformatories,
crime arrest rates are only marginally higher in
or youth corrections centers.
the United States than in many other nations,
Excluding the roughly 25,000 youth held in a recently published international comparison
detention centers daily awaiting their court trials found that America’s youth custody rate (includ-
or pending placement to a correctional program, ing youth in both detention and correctional
the latest official national count of youth in cor- custody) was 336 of every 100,000 youth in 2002
rectional custody, conducted in 2007, found that —nearly five times the rate of the next highest
roughly 60,500 U.S. youth were confined in cor- nation (69 per 100,000 in South Africa).2 A
rectional facilities or other residential programs number of nations essentially don’t incarcerate
each night on the order of a juvenile delinquency minors at all. In other words, mass incarceration
of troubled and troublemaking adolescents is nei-
ther inevitable nor necessary in a modern society.

State juvenile corrections systems in the United

States confine youth in many types of facilities,
including group homes, residential treatment
centers, boot camps, wilderness programs, or
county-run youth facilities (some of them locked,
others secured only through staff supervision).
But the largest share of committed youth—
about 40 percent of the total—are held in locked
long-term youth correctional facilities operated
primarily by state governments or by private
firms under contract to states.3 These facilities
court.1 For perspective, that’s more adolescents
are usually large, with many holding 200–300
than currently reside in mid-sized American
youth. They typically operate in a regimented
cities like Louisville, Kentucky; Nashville,
(prison-like) fashion, and feature correctional
Tennessee; Baltimore, Maryland; or Portland,
hardware such as razor-wire, isolation cells, and
Oregon. A high proportion of these confined
locked cell blocks.
youth are minority. According to the most recent
national count, two of every five confined youth Yet these institutions have never been found to
are African Americans and one-fifth are His- reduce the criminality of troubled young people.
panic; non-Hispanic white youth, who comprise Quite the opposite: For decades now, follow-up

2
 FIGURE 1
YOUTH INCARCERATION RATE: UNITED STATES VS. OTHER NATIONS

350 336.0

300
JUVENILE INCARCERATION RATE
250 PER 100,000 YOUTH POPULATION
INCARCERATION RATE

200

150

100
68.0 69.0
46.8 51.3
50
24.9 33.0
18.6 23.1
3.6 11.3 4.1
0.1
0
AUSTRALIA ENGLAND FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY ITALY JAPAN NETHERLANDS NEW SCOTLAND SOUTH SWEDEN USA
& WALES ZEALAND AFRICA

Source: Hazel, Neal, Cross-National Comparison of Youth Justice, London: Youth Justice Board, 2008.

studies tracking youth released from juvenile However, an avalanche of research has emerged
corrections facilities have routinely reported over the past three decades about what works and
high rates of recidivism. Meanwhile, reports of doesn’t work in combating juvenile crime. This
pervasive violence and abuse have been regularly report provides a detailed review of this research,
emerging from these facilities for as long as any- and it comes to the following conclusion: We
one can remember. now have overwhelming evidence showing that
wholesale incarceration of juvenile offenders is a
Nonetheless, incarceration in secure congregate-
counterproductive public policy. While a small
care youth corrections facilities has persisted
number of youthful offenders pose a serious
as the signature characteristic and the biggest
threat to the public and must be confined, incar-
budget line item of most state juvenile justice
cerating a broader swath of the juvenile offender
systems across the nation. This status quo has
population provides no benefit for public safety.
been buttressed in part by public fears of youth
It wastes vast sums of taxpayer dollars. And more
crime and by politicians’ fears of being labeled
often than not, it harms the well-being and
“soft” on crime. The aversion to change has been
dampens the future prospects of the troubled
further reinforced by the closely guarded eco-
and lawbreaking youth who get locked up. Other
nomic interests of communities that host these
approaches usually produce equal or better
facilities — and of the workers employed to staff
results—sometimes far better— at a fraction of
them. Finally, states’ continuing reliance on these
the cost.
institutions has been abetted by a lack of proven
alternatives: if not correctional confinement The idea of shuttering youth corrections facili-
for youthful offenders, what? Until the 1980s, ties and substantially shrinking the number of
juvenile crime prevention and treatment experts youth in confinement may sound radical. But the
had few answers. reality is that in large swaths of the nation— on
the east coast, west coast, and in middle America,

3
in big states and small, red states and blue—it’s legal cases concerning conditions of confine-
already happening. Often prompted by lawsuits ment in juvenile facilities. “The model has been
and revelations of abuse, or by mounting budget around for 150 years, and has proven a failure by
pressures, or by studies showing high recidivism, any measure.”6
many states have slashed their juvenile correc-
The main body of this report details six pervasive
tions populations in recent years—causing no
flaws in the states’ long-standing heavy reliance
observable increase in juvenile crime rates. The
on large, prison-like correctional institutions.
trend is continuing, though the pace of change
Specifically, the report will show that these facili-
remains uneven—in part because the isolated
ties are frequently: (1) dangerous, (2) ineffective,
changes are occurring largely under the radar, not
(3) unnecessary, (4) obsolete, (5) wasteful, and
as part of any organized movement. The winds
(6) inadequate. A subsequent chapter addresses
of change are blowing, but they have not yet
the question of public safety, finding that states
gathered gale-force intensity.
where juvenile confinement was sharply reduced
The evidence is clear that these changes must in recent years experienced more favorable
continue. The weight of expert opinion solidly trends in juvenile crime than jurisdictions which
concurs. maintained or increased their correctional facility
populations.
“We have to recognize that incarceration of
youth per se is toxic,” says Dr. Barry Krisberg, Finally, the report provides recommendations for
the longtime president of the National Council states on how to reduce juvenile incarceration
on Crime and Delinquency now on faculty at the and redesign their juvenile corrections systems.
University of California-Berkeley, “so we need to
The time has come for states to embrace a
reduce incarceration of young people to the very
fundamentally different orientation to treating
small dangerous few. And we’ve got to recog-
adolescent offenders—an approach grounded in
nize that if we lock up a lot of kids, it’s going to
evidence that promises to be far more humane,
increase crime.”4
cost-effective, and protective of public safety than
Douglas Abrams, a juvenile justice scholar at the our time-worn and counterproductive reliance
University of Missouri, concluded in 2007 that on juvenile incarceration.
“More than a century after the creation of the
nation’s first juvenile court grounded in reha-
bilitative impulses, many states still maintain
inhumane, thoroughly ineffective juvenile pris-
ons that neither rehabilitate children nor protect
public safety.”5

“The best word to describe America’s addiction

to training schools is ‘iatrogenic’—a cure that
makes problems worse,” says Paul DeMuro,
who served as commissioner of the Pennsylvania
juvenile corrections system in the late 1970s and
has since served as an expert witness in numerous

4
 What’s Wrong With America’s Juvenile
Corrections Facilities?

What is so wrong with juvenile incarceration? The case against America’s youth prisons and
correctional training schools can be neatly summarized in six words: dangerous, ineffective,
unnecessary, obsolete, wasteful, and inadequate.

1. Dangerous America’s juvenile corrections institutions subject

confined youth to intolerable levels of violence, abuse, and other forms
of maltreatment.

Since 1970, systemic violence, abuse, and/or time—one or more state-funded youth correc-
excessive use of isolation or restraints have been tions facilities displayed a systemic or recurring
documented in the juvenile corrections facili- failure to protect confined youth from serious
ties of 39 states (plus the District of Columbia physical or psychological harm in the forms
and Puerto Rico). In 32 of those states (plus of violence from staff or other youth, sexual
Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico), the abusive assaults, and/or excessive use of isolation or
conditions have been documented since 1990, restraints. In other words, states have been iden-
and in 22 states (plus Washington, DC), the tified not for one or a handful of isolated events,
maltreatment has been documented since 2000. but for a sustained pattern of maltreatment.*
(See Fig. 2 on p. 7.)
Combined over the past four decades, 57 lawsuits
Included in these figures are states where: (a) law- in 33 states plus the District of Columbia and
suits filed by the U.S. Justice Department and/or Puerto Rico have resulted in a court-sanctioned
public interest legal advocates have succeeded in remedy in response to alleged abuse or otherwise
producing a court-sanctioned remedy to address unconstitutional conditions in juvenile facilities.
alleged violence or abuse in juvenile facilities; Of these lawsuits, 52 have included allegations
and/or (b) authoritative reports written by of systemic problems with violence, physical or
reputable media outlets or respected public or sexual abuse by facility staff, and/or excessive use
private agencies have presented solid evidence of isolation or restraint. The remaining lawsuits
of maltreatment. In all cases, the evidence have been limited to other types of unconsti-
shows that—at least at one particular point in tutional conditions, such as failure to provide

*Even in three of the 11 states where dangerous/abusive conditions have not been demonstrated conclusively enough to
meet all of the above conditions, substantial evidence of maltreatment has been reported in at least one facility since 2000.

5
required services (education, health care, and improved education or mental health services,
mental health treatment), fire safety and other and more. And meaningful improvements have
environmental safety issues, or lack of required been achieved in many jurisdictions. However,
access to mail and to attorneys.* the map does show how frequently problem-
atic conditions have arisen in juvenile facili-
In many states, including several where there
ties throughout the nation in recent decades.
has not been successful litigation, media reports
Moreover, the fact that so many states
or investigations undertaken
have experienced these problems since
by advocacy organizations or That so many states
2000 suggests that few lessons have
government watchdog agencies have experienced been learned from past outbreaks of
have also documented systemic
abuses in youth corrections
these problems maltreatment, or that large juvenile
corrections facilities are, by their very
facilities. For instance, a 1998 since 2000 suggests
nature, exceedingly difficult to oper-
series in the Arkansas Demo- that few lessons ate in a consistently safe and humane
crat-Gazette revealed violent
have been learned fashion.
and deplorable conditions in
state youth facilities.7 In Con- from past mal- More specifically, America’s youth
necticut in 2002, audit reports treatment, or that corrections institutions suffer from the
released jointly by the state’s following safety and abuse problems:
large juvenile
Child Advocate and Attorney
corrections facili- Widespread physical abuse and exces-
General’s offices revealed exces-
sive use of force by facility staff. A March
sive use of force and restraint ties are exceedingly 2008 Associated Press story found
and other problems at the state’s
difficult to operate that 13,000 claims of abuse had been
training school,8 as well as staff-
in a consistently reported from 2004 through 2007 in
sanctioned violence and other
state-run juvenile facilities nationwide.
maltreatment in a second state- safe and humane
Of these, 1,343 instances of abuse had
funded facility.9 In North Caro-
fashion. been officially confirmed by authori-
lina, a nine-month newspaper
ties.10 Countless more claims had
series about abuses in one youth
never been investigated properly, or never filed
facility in 2003 prompted a major investigation
by youth due to lack of functioning grievance
by the state auditor that detailed problematic and
systems and/or fear of retribution.
often abusive conditions in facilities throughout
the state. An epidemic of sexual abuse. In 2010, the
federal Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) released
The map on page 7 is not meant to imply that
the first-ever national study on sexual abuse in
dangerous or abusive conditions persist in the
youth corrections facilities. For the study, BJS
states identified. In most cases, revelations of
surveyed a representative sample of the 26,650
widespread maltreatment have led to court-
youth confined in large juvenile facilities nation-
ordered or state-sponsored reforms—increased
wide and found that 12 percent of them—more
staffing, new policies on isolation and restraint,
than 3,000 young people—had been victimized

*In recent years, the pace of private class-action litigation over conditions of confinement has slowed considerably. Passed in 1995,
the Prison Litigation Reform Act placed difficult new restrictions on private lawsuits over facility conditions. Then in 2003, a
federal court ruling further limited the compensation available to attorneys in class-action lawsuits—even in some cases where
conditions are found to be problematic. Absent these developments, the number of successful lawsuits would likely be higher.

6
sexually during the prior year by staff or of abused youth and the lack of a functioning
other youth in their facilities. Of these youth, grievance system.12
nearly half reported incidents involving physi-
Rampant overreliance on isolation and restraint.
cal force or other forms of threats or coercion
While no national data are available on the use
and unwanted genital contact. The remaining
of isolation and restraints, excessive reliance on
incidents involved sexual relations between staff
these practices was alleged in 46 of the 57 suc-
(most often female staff ) and confined youth. In
cessful lawsuits filed against juvenile corrections
13 of the facilities surveyed, at least 20 percent of
agencies since 1970. In Ohio, youth confined in
confined youth reported either being forced into
state correctional facilities spent 66,023 hours in
sexual acts by staff or other youth and/or sexual
seclusion in July 2009—an average of more than
relations (including genital contact) with staff.11
50 hours per resident.13 And that was one year
In Texas, 750 complaints of sexual abuse were
after an intensive review of Ohio’s youth correc-
filed by youth confined in the state correctional
tions facilities concluded that isolation “is used
facilities from 2000 to 2007—most of which
too often, for too long, and without adequate
had never been addressed due to intimidation
treatment or educational opportunities. The

FIGURE 2

SYSTEMIC OR RECURRING MALTREATMENT IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONS FACILITIES IN THE STATES: 1970 TO PRESENT

WA

MT ND
OR ID ME
MN
VT
SD WI NH
WY NY MA
MI
CT RI
NE IA
NV PA NJ
UT IN OH MD DE
CA IL
CO WV
KS DC
MO VA
KY

AZ NC
OK TN
NM
AR SC

MS AL GA
TX
LA
FL
Puerto Rico

AK
HI
Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented since 2000.

Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 1990 but not since 2000.

Violent/abusive conditions clearly documented after 1970 but not since 1990.

Evidence but no proof of violent/abusive conditions since 2000.

For this map, “systemic or recurring maltreatment” is identified when clear evidence has emerged from federal investigations, class-action lawsuits, or authoritative
reports written by reputable media outlets or respected public or private agencies showing that—at least at one particular time—one or more state-funded youth
corrections facilities repeatedly failed to protect youth from violence by staff or other youth, sexual assaults, and/or excessive use of isolation or restraints.
“Evidence but no proof” is indicated when credible reports of maltreatment have emerged, but not enough to satisfy the above criteria.

For more information, visit www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.

7
extended—at times, months on end—use of Also, in many facilities staff are frequently
isolation (i.e., segregation) must be immediately subjected to taunting and other belligerent
revisited and dramatically changed.”14 A 2003 behaviors.
review in California found that on any given day,
In many states, abuse and maltreatment have
about 450 youth (10–12 percent of the popula-
reached crisis proportions in recent years.
tion) in six of the state’s large youth corrections
facilities were confined to their rooms for 23 In Florida, the Orlando Sun Sentinel has
hours per day.15 reported that “One of the most egregious child
abusers in Florida is the very agency that’s sup-
Unchecked youth-on-youth violence. Thirty-eight
posed to rehabilitate troubled youths: the state
of the 57 successful lawsuits filed over conditions
Department of Juvenile Justice.”20
of confinement since 1970 have alleged failure
to protect youth from harm. At the Plainfield In New York, a governor’s task force reported
Juvenile Correctional Facility in Indiana, four in December 2009 that “there is compelling
youths suffered broken jaws in assaults by other evidence that New York’s juvenile justice system
youth in a seven-month period in 2003–04.16 At is unsafe.” The task force described the youth
corrections system as “badly broken” and declared
that “the need for systemwide reform is urgent.”21

In Texas, investigations undertaken in the wake

of a lurid sex-abuse scandal in 2007 revealed
a breakdown in the state’s juvenile corrections
agency so pervasive that the agency was placed
into receivership.

In Ohio, a 2008 fact-finding report completed

in connection with a class-action lawsuit against
the state’s Department of Youth Services sup-
ported all of the alleged failures: unnecessary
the Evins Regional Juvenile Center in Texas, staff force; arbitrary and excessive use of isolation
documented 1,025 youth-on-youth assaults in and seclusion; arbitrary and excessive discipline;
2005, and 568 more in the first half of 2006— inadequate mental health, medical, and dental
an average of about three assaults every day.17 care; inadequate education services; inadequate
A review of safety conditions in California youth structured programming; broadly inadequate
institutions in 2003 declared that “One might training of staff; an unsafe living environment;
easily conclude that an intense atmosphere of and a dysfunctional grievance system.22
fear permeates California’s youth corrections
California’s youth corrections system has
facilities.”18
remained in perpetual crisis for more than a
Frequent violence against staff. Staff working in decade. In March 2006, a team of nationally
youth facilities are also assaulted, injured, and recognized experts assembled to assist in imple-
otherwise abused with disturbing frequency. In menting court-ordered reforms observed, “This
four Arizona juvenile correctional facilities, for is a system that is broken almost everywhere you
instance, 484 assaults on staff were reported in look.” The experts listed 18 severe and systemic
2003—an average of 40 incidents per month.19 deficiencies—including “high levels of violence

8
 and fear,” “unsafe conditions for youth and However, the first-ever nationally representative
staff,” “frequent lockdowns,” and “capitulation survey of youth in correctional care, published in
to gang culture”—and they concluded: “It is not 2010, confirms that, while not ubiquitous, abuse
just reform that is needed. Everything needs to and maltreatment remain widespread in America’s
be fixed.”23 youth corrections facilities. Among youth in
secure corrections facilities or camp programs,
Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
42 percent said they were somewhat or very afraid
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, South Caro-
of being physically attacked. More specifically, 30
lina, and South Dakota have also suffered high-
percent were afraid of attack from another youth,
profile juvenile corrections abuse scandals over
and 27 percent were afraid of attack from a staff
the past 10 to 15 years, and serious problems
member. (Many were afraid of attack from both
have been cited in several other states as well.
youth and staff.) In addition, 45 percent of youth
Of course, abuse and maltreatment are not omni- confined in secure correctional facilities and camp
present in juvenile correctional facilities. Some programs reported that staff “use force when they
facilities provide humane care for confined youth, don’t really need to,” and 30 percent said that
offering meaningful rehabilitative treatment in a staff place youth into solitary confinement or lock
safe and caring environment. Others fall short of them up alone as discipline.24
this ideal, but still protect youth from severe forms
Given the inability of public officials to prevent
of abuse and maltreatment. Even in the worst
maltreatment or even to clean up facilities where
facilities, many staff are highly dedicated with a
inhumane conditions are revealed, it would be dif-
deep concern for the well-being of their charges.
ficult to argue that correctional confinement offers
a safe venue to rehabilitate delinquent youth.

2. Ineffective The outcomes of correctional confinement are

poor. Recidivism rates are almost uniformly high, and incarceration
in juvenile facilities depresses youths’ future success in education
and employment.

An extensive Internet search and literature review and the measures employed to track recidivism
plus limited outreach to state corrections agencies over different lengths of time. While these varia-
for this publication identified recidivism analyses tions make comparing recidivism outcomes from
for youth exiting juvenile correctional placements one state to another problematic, the overall
in 38 states, plus the District of Columbia. body of recidivism evidence indicates plainly
that confinement in youth corrections facilities
These recidivism studies vary in many important
doesn’t work well as a strategy to steer delinquent
dimensions, including the populations examined
youth away from crime. (See Fig. 3 on p. 10.)

9
FIGURE 3

STATE JUVENILE RECIDIVISM RESULTS: OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH RELEASED FROM CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY

Recidivism Measure Tracking Period States Reporting Range of Recidivism Results

1 year DE, FL, MD, OK, SC, VA 37 – 67 percent

Rearrest for a new crime 2 years HI, MD, NC, NY, SC, VA 68 – 82 percent
(misdemeanor or felony) 3 years CA, NY, TN, VA 74 – 75 percent
> 3 years NY, SC 73 – 89 percent

1 year DE, FL 34 – 45 percent

Rearrest for a new
felony offense 2 years MI 37 percent
> 3 years NY 83 percent (boys only)

Adjudication/conviction for a 2 years AK, HI, MD, NY, VA 38 – 58 percent

new offense (misdemeanor 3 years MD, NY, VA 45 – 72 percent
or felony) > 3 years NY, SC, WA 60 – 85 percent

2 years MD, MN, OR 22 – 43 percent

Adjudication/conviction for a
3 years MN, OR 34 – 53 percent
new felony offense
> 3 years NY 65 percent

Return to correctional custody 2 years HI, LA, MD, MO, NJ, NY, VA, WI 15 – 46 percent
(juvenile or adult) for a new 3 years IN, LA, MD, MO, NY, VA 16 – 62 percent
offense > 3 years SC 31 percent

Return to correctional custody 2 years AZ, KS, OH, TX 34 – 46 percent

(juvenile or adult) for a new 3 years AZ, IN, MO, TX 24 – 51 percent
offense or technical violation

Sources: All figures are taken from state juvenile recidivism studies. A complete list of state recidivism studies can be found online at www.aecf.org/
noplaceforkids.

Rearrest. Available studies of youth released Missouri, which dismantled its training schools
from residential corrections programs find that in the early 1980s and now operates a widely
70 to 80 percent of youth are rearrested within praised network of small, treatment-oriented
two or three years. Of the six states reporting youth facilities. Excluding Missouri, available
juvenile or adult arrests within two years of studies show that 26 to 62 percent of youth
release, none showed less than a 68 percent rear- released from juvenile custody are re-incarcerated
rest rate, and virtually all states reporting three- on new criminal charges within three years and
year rearrest rates converge at about 75 percent. 18 to 46 percent within two years. (In Missouri,
the three-year re-incarceration rate is just
New Adjudications/Convictions. Available stud-
16.2 percent.)
ies find that 38 to 58 percent of youth released
from juvenile corrections facilities are found Long-term cohort studies paint even a bleaker
guilty of new offenses (as a juvenile or an adult) picture of training schools’ impact on future
within two years and 45 to 72 percent within offending. In New York State, 89 percent of
three years. boys and 81 percent of girls released from state
juvenile corrections institutions in the early 1990s
Return to custody. Recidivism studies examin-
were arrested as adults by age 28. Among boys,
ing return to custody are skewed by data from

10
65 percent were convicted of felonies by age 28, In 2009, for instance, an intensive long-term
and 71 percent were incarcerated in an adult jail study of more than 1,300 juvenile offenders
or prison.25 In South Carolina, a 1995 study of compared the success of youth sentenced to
youth born in 1967 showed that 82 percent of juvenile corrections facilities versus similar youth
those who were incarcerated as juveniles were later who remained in the community under proba-
imprisoned or placed on probation as adults.26 tion supervision. Controlling statistically for 66
different background characteristics, the study
Other Research. In addition to recidivism analy-
found that placement in a correctional institu-
ses, criminologists have conducted more sophis-
tion resulted in a small but statistically insignifi-
ticated studies in recent years to pinpoint the
cant increase in both self-reported offending and
impact of juvenile confinement on the criminal
likelihood of rearrest compared with alternative
careers of delinquent youth, and to compare the
sanctions. “The results show no marginal gain
effectiveness of youth corrections facilities to a
from placement in terms of averting future
range of alternative treatments and punishments.
offending,” the authors concluded.27
This research reveals two critical lessons.
Using a technique called “meta-analysis,” which
First, the vast majority of studies find that incar-
allows scholars to aggregate results from multiple
ceration is no more effective than probation or
studies, a 2009 paper by Mark Lipsey assessed
alternative sanctions in reducing the criminality of
the results of 361 high-quality research studies
adjudicated youth, and a number of well-designed
measuring the effects of programs designed to
studies suggest that correctional placements actually
rehabilitate juvenile offenders. Lipsey reported
exacerbate criminality.

FIGURE 4

COMMUNITY SUPERVISION VS. CORRECTIONAL CONFINEMENT IN OHIO: SUBSEQUENT

INCARCERATION IN A STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, BY YOUTH RISK LEVEL

RECLAIM: Youth placed into community supervision programs

CCF: Youth committed to and released from a Community Corrections Facility
DYS RELEASES: Youth committed to and released from a state youth corrections facility
DYS DISCHARGES: Youth discharged from parole or aftercare following release from a state youth corrections facility

60

51 50
50
47 46
SUBSEQUENT INCARCERATION RATE

43 44
40 41
40 39
37

30 29

22
20

10 8
4

0
LOW MODERATE HIGH VERY HIGH

Source: Lowenkamp & Latessa, Evaluation of Ohio’s RECLAIM Funded Programs, Community Corrections Facilities,
and DYS Facilities, 2005.

11
“no significant relationship in this overall analysis Damaging Youths’ Futures. Beyond its failure
between recidivism effects and the level of to reduce future offending and protect public
juvenile justice supervision.”28 safety, juvenile incarceration also damages young
people’s future success. Youth in confinement
An eye-opening study in Montreal tracked 779
typically face long odds in their hopes to suc-
low-income boys from the time they were
ceed in school and the labor market. Most are
kindergartners (in 1984) up through age 25.
far below grade level in academic achievement,
Involvement in the juvenile justice system proved
and a substantial percentage suffer from learning
by far the strongest predictor of adult crimi-
disabilities or mental health disor-
nality of all the many variables
ders. Also, many or most come from
examined. Holding other fac- The overall body of
high-poverty neighborhoods. Yet the
tors constant, youth incarcer- recidivism evidence evidence is clear that incarceration
ated as juveniles were 38 times
indicates plainly itself creates a significant additional
as likely as youth with equivalent
that confinement in barrier to success.
backgrounds and self-reported
offending histories to be sanc- youth corrections Follow-up studies have long shown
tioned for crimes they committed that youth released from juvenile
facilities doesn’t
as adults. 29
correctional facilities seldom succeed
work well as a in school. A 1987 study of youth
Second, incarceration is especially
strategy to steer released from a training school found
ineffective for less-serious youthful
that only 28 percent reenrolled in
offenders. Many studies find that delinquent youth
school and remained enrolled one
incarceration actually increases away from crime. year after release.33 A 2006 study
recidivism among youth with lower-
found that just one-third of youth
risk profiles and less-serious offend-
exiting a Pennsylvania correctional camp pro-
ing histories.
gram who said they intended to return to school
In a recent Ohio study, low- and moderate-risk actually did so.34 A recent analysis of young
youth placed into community supervision pro- people included in the National Longitudinal
grams proved less likely to re-offend than similar Youth Survey found that incarceration at age
youth placed into correctional facilities and only 16 or earlier led to a 26 percent lower chance of
one-fifth as likely to be incarcerated for subse- graduating high school by age 19.35
quent offenses.30 (See Fig. 4 on p. 11.) In Florida,
Juvenile incarceration also exacts a heavy toll on
a 2007 study involving more than 40,000 youth-
youths’ future employment. One study found
ful offenders found that those assessed as low
that—holding all other variables constant—
risk who were placed into residential facilities
individuals incarcerated as juveniles or young
not only re-offended at a higher rate than similar
adults suffered a 5 percent reduction in employ-
youth who remained in the community, they also
ment (equivalent to about three weeks less work
re-offended at a higher rate than high-risk youth
per year) four years after release. Black youth
placed into correctional facilities.31 In Virginia,
saw a 9 percent (five weeks per year) reduction.
low-risk youth released from correctional facilities
Even 15 years after release, those who had been
had substantially higher rearrest rates than similar
incarcerated in their youth worked 10 percent
youth placed on probation.32
fewer hours per year than similar individuals who
had not been incarcerated.36

12
3. Unnecessary A substantial percentage of youth confined
in youth corrections facilities pose minimal risk to public safety.

A tragic irony of the abuses and regrettable October 2007) showed that just 26 percent were
outcomes detailed in the previous sections is committed for a violent index offense.38 Among
that many of the youth confined in juvenile youth confined in “long-term secure” facilities,
correctional facilities have no records of serious which includes most training schools and youth
offending that would necessitate their confine- prisons, the rate was 38 percent.39
ment to protect the public. Incarceration is
In New York, 53 percent of youth admitted to
particularly inappropriate for these lower-risk
the state’s youth corrections facilities in 2007
youth—increasing their odds of recidivism and
were placed for a misdemeanor. All were younger
damaging their prospects for a successful transi-
than 16 when they committed their offenses.40 In
tion to adulthood.
Florida’s youth corrections system, 58 percent of
Just 12 percent of the nearly 150,000 delinquent all youth placed into Department of Juvenile Jus-
youth placed into residential programs by juve- tice residential facilities in 2008–09—including
nile courts for delinquency offenses in 2007 were 56 percent of those placed into secure facilities—
committed for any of the four serious violent were committed for misdemeanors or technical
crimes (murder, rape, robbery, or aggravated violations of probation, not felony offenses. Just
assault) that the FBI defines as “violent index 13 percent were for serious violent crimes.41 In
offenses.”37 (See Fig. 5 below.) The most recent Arkansas, just 15 percent of commitments to
one-day snapshot of adjudicated youth confined state youth corrections facilities in 2007 involved
in residential facilities nationwide (taken in a serious felony crime, while 42 percent involved

FIGURE 5
MOST SERIOUS OFFENSE OF ALL COMMITTED YOUTH IN THE U.S.: 2007

TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS
STATUS OFFENSES
11.7%
0.9% HOMICIDE
%

PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES 2.8%

4.1

8.0% RAPE/SEXUAL ASSAULT

VIOLENT
DRUG OFFENSES 8.6%
25.9% INDEX 8.6% ROBBERY
OFFENSES
8.5% AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
PROPERTY OFFENSES 25.9%

10.9%

OTHER PERSON OFFENSES

Source: Sickmund, et al. (2011). “Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement.”
Available at www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp.

13
misdemeanors. Three-fourths of the youth incar- treatment. Most states pay the full cost to incar-
cerated for a misdemeanor had no prior adjudi- cerate juveniles in state facilities. Meanwhile,
cations.42 In South Carolina, only one of the top in the 38 states where local courts or probation
10 offenses resulting in correctional placements agencies oversee community supervision and
in 2008–09 was a violent felony. Instead, the treatment programs, substantial state funding
most common offenses were probation violations is rarely provided. Thus, local juvenile justice
and contempt of court.43 officials often face a perverse choice between offer-
ing cost-effective community-based programming
Why are juvenile courts sending so many
(at considerable expense to local government)
low-level offenders to correctional institutions?
or committing youth to more expensive and less
Available evidence and expert opinion point to
effective custody programs (at no local expense).
four driving factors:
Dumping Grounds. Juvenile corrections systems
have become the primary point of service for
youth with mental health conditions and other
serious disadvantages—youth who would be
more appropriately and effectively served by
other human service systems.

Mental Health. “During the 1990s, state after

state experienced the collapse of public mental
health services for children and adolescents and
the closing of many—in some states, all—of
their residential facilities for seriously disturbed
youths,” explains Dr. Thomas Grisso, a leading
Lack of Programs and Services. Low-level expert on mental health and juvenile justice.
youthful offenders are being placed into resi- “The juvenile justice system soon became
dential programs due to a widespread failure the primary referral for youths with mental
in most jurisdictions to invest in high-quality disorders.”45
community-based programming for delinquent
Public Schools. So-called “zero tolerance” poli-
youth. This dynamic, which plays out in states
cies have caused a substantial increase in school
and communities nationwide, was described
suspensions and expulsions in the past two
aptly in the 1990s by then-Governor Christine
decades, as well as an alarming number of stu-
Todd Whitman of New Jersey: “A judge in one
dents being arrested and referred to the juvenile
county has many options to craft appropriate
justice system for disorderly behavior that was
orders for young offenders. In the next county
once considered routine and handled informally
over, especially if it is an urban county, a judge
within the schools. Youth taken to court for
may have very few options between probation
minor offenses “generally get some sort of slap
and incarceration. That’s like choosing between
on the wrist, such as a few days of community
aspirin or a lobotomy for a migraine.”44
service,” concluded a 2007 report from the Chil-
Counterproductive Financial Incentives. Many dren’s Defense Fund, “but they also get a record.
local juvenile courts and probation agencies face If the youth comes before the court again, this
strong financial incentives to place youth in state original charge likely will increase the penalty
custody, rather than providing community-based and minor charges can add up over time.”46

14
 Child Welfare. Youth involved in the child Excessive Lengths of Stay. For all of these
welfare system are also at high risk for placement reasons, America’s juvenile correctional facilities
into juvenile justice facilities. Studies find that are too often incarcerating the wrong kids…and
youth who have been abused or neglected as for the wrong reasons. However, admissions are
children and become involved in the child wel- only half the equation that determines the size
fare system are far more likely than other youth of the confined population. Equally important is
to be arrested as juveniles.47 Once arrested, these how long these young people remain in custody
so-called “dual-jurisdiction” youth face exagger- once admitted. Here, too, the signs point toward
ated risks both for pre-trial detention and for widespread excess.
commitment into youth corrections facilities or
Average lengths of stay vary widely from one
other out-of-home placements.48
state to the next. In its 2009 Yearbook, the
Punishing Defiance, Not Delinquency. Many Council of Juvenile Correctional Administra-
youth without serious offending histories are tors (CJCA) reported that the average placement
placed into custody for repeatedly violating rules duration for boys was less than six months in
and/or behaving disrespectfully toward judges, four states and more than 18 months in three
probation officers, and other authorities. In New others, while the majority of states reporting data
York City, “markers of institutional compliance had average lengths of stay ranging from 6–12
and noncompliance”—including probation months (13 states) or 12–18 months (9 states).51
violations, prior status offenses, or failure to This wide variation in commitment lengths is
admit their crimes and express remorse—are inconsistent with the evidence that longer spells
the “driving forces behind dispositional recom- of confinement have either no impact or a coun-
mendations and orders,” a recent study found. terproductive impact on future offending.
“Youth who demonstrate to the court that they
A recent study of New York City youth released
cannot or will not obey its orders are identified
from juvenile facilities found that, in terms of
as prime candidates for incarceration.” The study
future recidivism, “The impact of length of stay
also found that “despite the profound impact
is minimal.” A longitudinal study on youth in
that they have on the risk of incarceration, these
Philadelphia and Phoenix found that “There is
[markers of institutional non-compliance] are
little or no marginal benefit, at least in terms of
not very predictive of the risk of recidivism.”49
reducing future rate of offending, for retaining
Nationwide, nearly 12 percent of delinquent an individual in institutional placement longer.”
youth in secure correctional custody have been The analysis found essentially no difference in
incarcerated for violating probation or aftercare future offending for youth held 3–6 months
rules, not for committing new criminal offenses. vs. 6–9 months, 9–12 months, or more than
In some states, the share rises as high as 20 or 12 months.52 A study of youth in California
even 30 percent,50 even though many youth youth facilities in the early 1980s linked longer
confined on these technical violations have never periods of juvenile incarceration to heightened
been adjudicated for a violent or serious offense. criminality during adulthood.53 More recently,
Often, the decision to place a youth in a residen- a study of youth released from Florida youth
tial facility for probation violations or for violat- corrections facilities “revealed no consistent
ing aftercare rules is made at the sole discretion relationship between length of confinement and
of a probation or parole officer. recidivism.”54

15
4. Obsolete Scholars have identified a number of interventions and
treatment strategies in recent years that consistently reduce recidivism
among juvenile offenders. None require—and many are inconsistent
with—incarceration in large correctional institutions.

As recently as the 1970s, the study of juvenile Programs tend to succeed when they address specific
crime and delinquency remained in its infancy. risk factors known to influence delinquent and
Experts and scholars could not point to a single criminal behavior. These risk factors include
delinquency prevention or intervention program anger and anti-social feelings, lack of self-control,
model with solid scientific evidence of effective- lack of affection or weak supervision from
ness. Since then, however, we have accumulated parents, lack of role models, and poor academic
a wealth of new knowledge about the causes of skills. One oft-cited study found that programs
delinquency and about what works and doesn’t targeting these and other “criminogenic needs”
work in reversing delinquent behavior. By aggre- resulted in an average recidivism reduction of
gating and analyzing the results of hundreds of more than 20 percent. The same study found
evaluation studies, scholars have clarified the cru- that programs designed primarily to promote
cial characteristics that distinguish effective juve- fear of punishment (i.e., shock incarceration or
nile intervention and treatment programs from “scared straight”) increased recidivism, as did
those that are ineffective or counterproductive. interventions aimed at other goals such as boost-
ing self-esteem, talking about personal/emotional
Programs offering counseling and treatment
problems, or improving physical fitness.56
typically reduce recidivism, while those focused on
coercion and control tend to produce negative or So-called “cognitive behavior therapies” offer a
null effects. The most striking finding of recent particularly effective and economical method for
research is that juvenile rehabilitation programs reversing delinquency. This approach, which is
tend to work if, and only if, they focus on help- usually taught in a group format and involves
ing youth develop new skills and address per- role-playing, aims to help participants change
sonal challenges. A 2009 analysis examining 361 their thinking patterns and develop new prob-
evaluation studies determined that the strongest lem-solving and perspective-taking skills. The
results are achieved by programs employing a training is not expensive—typically costing
“therapeutic intervention philosophy.” Programs $1,000 per participant. Yet a recent review found
employing therapeutic counseling, skill-building, that cognitive behavioral training programs are
and case management approaches all produced associated with a 26 percent reduction in recidi-
an average improvement in recidivism results vism—the most of any treatment modality.57
of at least 12 percent. By contrast, programs
Evidence-Based Models. A handful of specific
oriented toward surveillance, deterrence, or disci-
treatment methodologies have emerged over
pline all yielded weak, null, or negative results.55
the past 25 years that consistently lower the

16
recidivism rates of serious and chronic juvenile families are then reunited and provided with
offenders when measured against conventional ongoing support until the home situation is
treatment and supervision approaches in care- stabilized. In several scientific studies, MTFC
fully constructed scientific trials. has proven superior to placement into group
homes—where high-need youthful offenders
Multisystemic Therapy (MST) and Functional
with less-serious offending histories are often
Family Therapy (FFT) are intensive family treat-
placed. In one study, serious and chronic youth-
ment models for delinquent youth. In MST,
ful offenders participating in MTFC were twice
therapists lead a regimented three- to five-month
as likely as comparable youth placed into group
family intervention process involving multiple
homes to complete the program (and not run
contacts each week in the family’s home and sur-
away), and they spent an average of 75 fewer
rounding community. FFT employs office-based
days incarcerated over the subsequent two-year
counseling (an average of 12 sessions) designed
period.60
first to engage family members and then to sup-
port meaningful behavior changes that improve Based on these results, MST, FFT, and MTFC
family interaction and address the underlying have all attracted substantial attention, and the
causes of delinquent behavior. Costs average models are being adopted in a number of juris-
$6,000 to $9,500 per youth for MST and dictions nationwide. Thus far, these efforts have
$3,000 to $3,500 for FFT, whereas a typical stay achieved encouraging but not uniform success.
in a juvenile corrections facility (9 to 12 months
The most favorable real-world outcomes have
at $241 per day) costs $66,000 to $88,000.
occurred when MST and FFT are employed as
Both MST and FFT have been analyzed in an alternative to incarceration or other residential
numerous scientific evaluation studies over the placements. In Florida, the Redirection Pro-
past 25 years, including several randomized trials, gram provides evidence-based family treatment
and they have realized superior results in most. (primarily MST or FFT) as an alternative to
Experimental studies of MST have resulted in incarceration or residential placement for less-
arrest rates 25 to 70 percent lower than youth serious youth offenders. An April 2010 report
receiving usual services. In most studies, MST by Florida’s Office of Policy Program Analysis &
youth have spent less than half as many days Government Accountability found that, com-
confined for subsequent offenses.58 In a study pared to comparable youth placed into residen-
involving chronic offenders in Utah who had tial facilities, youth participating the Redirection
previously been incarcerated, FFT participants Program were 9 percent less likely to be arrested
proved nearly six times more likely to avoid for a new crime (and 15 percent less likely to be
rearrest (40 percent vs. 7 percent) than youth arrested for a new violent felony); 14 percent
receiving other treatments.59 less likely to be convicted of a new felony; and
35 percent less likely to be sentenced to an adult
In Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care
prison.61 As of August 2008, the Redirection Pro-
(MTFC), troubled and delinquent youth are
gram had saved taxpayers $41.6 million over the
placed with specially trained foster families for
prior four years by steering less-serious offenders
six to nine months while their parents (or legal
away from expensive residential confinement and
guardians) receive intensive counseling and
by reducing recidivism.62 (See Fig. 6 on p. 18.)
parent training. After a series of home visits, the

17
 FIGURE 6

SAVINGS GENERATED BY FLORIDA’S REDIRECTION PROGRAM

Savings
Costs of Residential Placements Averted (2,033 youth) $50.8 million
Savings from Reduced Recidivism $ 5.2 million
Savings Subtotal $56.0 million
Costs
Youth Referred to Treatment 2,867
Youth Completing Treatment 2,033
Cost of Redirection Treatment $14.4 million
Net Savings (Savings Subtotal–Costs) $41.6 million

Source: Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability, Redirection Saves $36.4 million and Avoids $5.2 million in Recommitment and Prison Costs,
Report No. 09-27, May 2009.

Despite these successes, however, no state has Rigorous career preparation and vocational train-
“scaled up” any of these evidence-based models ing—such as those provided by YouthBuild. A
to serve all or nearly all youth who could benefit. program for high-risk youth and young adults
In a recent essay, MST designer Scott Henggeler now operating in more than 250 sites nation-
and a colleague estimated that 15,000 juvenile wide, YouthBuild serves many court-involved
offenders per year participate in MST, FFT, or youth and combines remedial academic educa-
MTFC currently. “If 160,000 juvenile justice tion with hands-on construction skills training.65
youth are placed annually and we assume that
Mental health and substance abuse treatment
an equal number are at high risk of placement,”
programs. Several promising programs, some with
Henggeler noted, “then fewer than 5% of
strong evidence of effectiveness, provide targeted
eligible high-risk juvenile offenders in the U.S.
treatment services to address mental health and
are treated with an evidence-based treatment
substance abuse problems. These include:
annually.”63
Mental health diversion projects—such as the
Other Promising Approaches. Though they lack
Enhanced Mental Health Services Initiative
the powerful scientific evidence of MST, FFT,
in Texas66 and the Behavioral Health/Juvenile
and MTFC, a number of other alternatives have
Justice program in Ohio67—that steer youth to
also demonstrated promising results in reducing
mental health treatment;
delinquency and obviating the need for correc-
tional confinement. These include: Specialty court programs—such as the nearly
500 juvenile drug courts operating nation-
Wraparound services. Such as those offered by
wide,68 and mental health treatment courts.
the Wraparound Milwaukee program—pool
While debate over their efficacy continues, these
resources from a variety of funding streams (juve-
models work with delinquent youth with serious
nile justice, community mental health, Medicaid,
substance abuse or emotional disturbances and
others) to pay for coordinators who help develop
supervise their participation in court-ordered
care plans and access an array of services tailored
treatment plans, rather than assigning them to
to the needs of youth with behavioral disorders
routine probation;69 and
or other mental health conditions.64

18
 Family-focused, non-residential substance abuse Intensive advocate/mentor programs. Under this
treatment methods for adolescents—for example, approach, local agencies assign dedicated advo-
Multidimensional Family Therapy and Brief cates to track, supervise, and mentor delinquent
Strategic Family Therapy—have demonstrated youth in the community. Youth Advocate
substantial reductions in substance abuse and Programs, Inc.; Southwest Key; and the Choice
delinquency in scientific evaluation studies.70 program are serving hundreds of youth each year
Indeed, a recent study found that substance- in multiple sites. While none of these efforts
abusing youthful offenders who received any has been carefully evaluated, all have reported
type of substance abuse treatment achieved small positive results in terms both of recidivism and
but statistically significant reductions in alcohol academic/employment outcomes.
use, and those receiving extended treatment also
reduced marijuana use.71

5. Wasteful Most states are spending vast sums of taxpayer money and
devoting the bulk of their juvenile justice budgets to correctional institu-
tions and other facility placements when non-residential programming
options deliver equal or better results for a fraction of the cost.

One of the most telling traits of juvenile incar- average daily cost nationwide to incarcerate one
ceration, one of the characteristics that distin- juvenile offender in 2008 was $241. That trans-
guishes it most clearly as an obsolete response to lates to an average cost of $66,000 to $88,000
adolescent lawbreaking, is cost. to incarcerate a young person in a juvenile
correctional facility for 9 to 12 months.72 This
Confining juvenile offenders in correctional
sum is many times the cost of: tuition and fees
institutions and other residential settings is far
at a public four-year university ($7,605) or a
more expensive than standard probation or con-
public two-year community or technical col-
ventional community supervision and treatment
lege ($2,713);73 average per pupil expenditures
programs. It is also many times more expensive
for public elementary and secondary schools
than new evidence-based treatment models
nationwide ($10,259);74 high-quality mentor-
like Multisystemic Therapy, Functional Family
ing programs such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters
Therapy, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster
(slightly less than $1,000 per participant);75
Care. Other promising approaches also cost a
or the YouthBuild career preparation program
fraction as much as incarceration.
($17,000 per participant).76
Indeed, the dollar figures associated with juvenile
Yet, despite the problematic conditions and poor
confinement can be jaw-dropping. According
outcomes, most states continue to rely heavily
to the American Correctional Association, the

19
 FIGURE 7
ANNUAL COST OF JUVENILE INCARCERATION VERSUS OTHER YOUTH INVESTMENTS

$100,000

$88,000

$80,000

$60,000

$40,000

$20,000 $17,000
$16,140
$10,259
$7,605
$2,713 $987
$0
YOUTH TUITION AND TUITION, FEES, TUITION AND ANNUAL COST YOUTHBUILD BIG BROS /
INCARCERATION FEES AT A ROOM & BOARD FEES FOR OF PUBLIC BIG SISTERS
12 MONTHS PUBLIC AT A PUBLIC PUBLIC SCHOOL MENTORING
UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY TWO-YEAR PROGRAMS
COLLEGE

Sources: American Correctional Association (for costs of youth incarceration); College Board (for costs at public universities and public two-year colleges), U.S. Census Bureau
(for costs of public education), Cohen and Piquero (2008) (for costs of YouthBuild), and Public Private Ventures (for costs of Big Brothers Big Sisters program).

For more information, visit www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.

on residential placements even for youth posing the state government is responsible both for
minimal risks to public safety. The result is correctional facilities and for probation and
wholesale misallocation—and waste—of taxpayer community-based supervision: Both states spend
resources. (See Fig. 7 above.) about twice as much on facilities as they do on
probation supervision and non-residential treat-
Though no official data set is available to docu-
ment services—even though the vast majority of
ment the budget of every state for juvenile cor-
youth referred to juvenile courts are never placed
rections generally or for residential confinement
in residential facilities.79
specifically, the American Correctional Associa-
tion77 and the CJCA78 both attempt to collect These lopsided budgets are especially problem-
state juvenile corrections spending data each year. atic given the evidence that correctional place-
Though incomplete, their reports suggest that ments are an inefficient use of taxpayer money.
in all the states combined, taxpayers spent about
A 2006 study compared the costs and effective-
$5 billion in 2008 to confine and house youthful
ness of community supervision and treatment
offenders in juvenile institutions.
programs versus residential confinement in Ohio.
Data on how much states and localities spend Community programs had far lower costs (aver-
on non-residential supervision and treatment age of $8,539 per youth) than placement into
programs are even harder to find. But there’s a community corrections facility ($36,571) or
no doubt that residential programs consume state training school ($57,194). Except for the
the bulk of all juvenile justice resources in most highest-risk offenders, community programs led
states. For instance, in Maryland and Florida to rearrest and subsequent confinement rates that

20
were equal to or better than those resulting from system—a return of $14 for every extra dollar
confinement.80 spent on treatment.82

A 1990 study in Wayne County (Detroit), Added Costs of Defending the Indefensible.
Michigan, randomly assigned serious but The outsized expense of correctional confine-
non-violent youth offenders to either intensive ment grows even larger when states face the
community supervision or state custody. Many added costs of complying with legal settlements
of the youth placed in intensive supervision imposed through litigation over conditions of
were arrested during the period they might confinement.
otherwise have been incarcerated, mostly for
Since 1999, when the Los Angeles Times began
minor offenses. Youth placed in state custody, by
documenting widespread violence and maltreat-
contrast, proved more inclined toward serious
ment in California Youth Authority facilities, the
and violent offending following release, and they
annual cost of confining one youth in California
were less likely to desist from delinquency. The
has grown from $45,000 to $252,000.83 (See
biggest difference was price: taxpayer costs for
Fig. 8 below.) By comparison, in-state tuition
youth in state custody were three times those for
and fees at the state’s flagship university, the
youth in intensive supervision.81
University of California–Berkeley, were less than
Even more dramatic disparities emerge from $11,000 in 2010–11.84 In New York, where
studies comparing residential confinement with facility populations have also dropped dramati-
the evidence-based treatment models (like MST cally, daily costs in the depopulated facilities have
and FFT) described earlier. The Washington exploded to sometimes absurd levels. The state
State Institute for Public Policy found that while spent $170 million in the 2010–11 fiscal year to
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care costs oversee fewer than 700 youth,85 which translates
$7,000 more per young person than a conven- to a daily cost of $665 per day—more than
tional group home placement, each placement the $619 required to reserve a deluxe room for
in MTFC ultimately saves an estimated $96,000 a night at the renowned Waldorf Astoria hotel
in lower costs to victims and the criminal justice in Manhattan.86 In other states, too, the costs

FIGURE 8
IMPACT OF LITIGATION ON COSTS OF JUVENILE CONFINEMENT IN CALIFORNIA

$300,000

$252,000
$250,000
State signs consent decree $218,000
$200,000 to resolve lawsuit over
conditions of confinement. $178,000

$150,000
$115,000
$100,000 $92,545
$83,233
$63,961
$43,565 $49,111 $56,247
$50,000 $36,118 $39,425 $40,528

$0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Source: Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities, Little Hoover Commission, 2008.

21
 required to improve conditions and comply with programs crucial to the well-being of children,
settlement agreements have been substantial. families, and communities. Teachers are being
laid off in many jurisdictions; police officers
Perhaps the biggest cost associated with America’s
as well. Summer youth employment programs
continuing overreliance on correctional facilities
and afterschool recreational programs are being
and other residential placements is what econo-
defunded. These cutbacks are particularly dam-
mists refer to as opportunity cost—the lost value
aging for youth at risk for involvement in the
of benefits that could be realized if these funds
juvenile justice system. Yet many states continue
were reapplied to more productive uses.
to spend tens or hundreds of millions of dollars
In this era of mass unemployment and runaway committing youth to correctional facilities that
deficits at every level of government, public are dangerous, ineffective, wasteful, and often
agencies are slashing the budgets of many unnecessary.

6. Inadequate Despite their exorbitant daily costs, most juvenile

correctional facilities are ill-prepared to address the needs of many
confined youth. Often, they fail to provide even the minimum services
appropriate for the care and rehabilitation of youth in confinement.

To a remarkable extent, the adolescent boys and released the first-ever survey of youth confined by
girls confined by America’s juvenile corrections America’s juvenile justice systems. This Survey of
systems suffer from severe disadvantage. In fact, Youth in Residential Placement revealed that the
many placements into juvenile facilities are young people locked inside our nation’s deep-end
prompted more by the difficulties young people juvenile justice facilities are overwhelmingly the
face—their deep and unmet needs—than by the product of tragic circumstances. (See Fig. 9 on
crimes they have committed. In effect, juvenile p. 24.)
justice has become the treatment system of last
Three of every 10 youth confined in correc-
resort for many needy youth.
tional facilities had, on at least one occasion,
But by and large, juvenile corrections facilities attempted suicide. Seventy percent said that they
are both poorly positioned and ill-equipped to had personally “seen someone severely injured or
provide effective treatment for youth with severe killed,” and 72 percent said that they had “had
mental health conditions, learning disabilities, something very bad or terrible happen to you.”87
out-of-control substance abuse habits, and other Among committed youth in all types of juvenile
acute needs. facilities, 30 percent had been physically and/
or sexually abused.88 More than 60 percent of
Youth in Dire Need. In 2010, the U.S. Office
youth included in the survey suffered with anger
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
management issues.89 Half exhibited elevated

22
 Widespread Racial and Procedural Injustice

In addition to the many practical shortcomings of our nation’s juvenile correctional

facilities—violence and abuse, poor outcomes, fiscal waste, and inadequate treatment
services—the legal processes used to incarcerate youth often violate core American
values of fairness and due process. The most glaring of these injustices involve racial
inequities and the failure to provide youth with effective legal representation.

Unequal Treatment. At virtually every stage of the juvenile justice process, youth of
color—Latinos and African Americans, particularly—receive harsher treatment than their
white counterparts, even when they enter the justice system with identical charges and
offending histories. Compared with white juveniles, African-American youth are: more
likely to be formally charged (and less likely to have their cases dismissed or diverted
from court); far more likely to be detained pending trial; and more likely to be commit-
ted to a residential facility (and less likely to receive a probation sentence). Among youth
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, African-American youth are more likely than
white youth to be placed and, if placed, more likely to be sent to a state youth correctional
facility, rather than a private group home or residential treatment center. Finally, African-
American youth are nine times as likely to be sentenced to adult prisons as white youth.90
Piled one on top of the other, the ultimate impact of these serial disparities is an enor-
mous cumulative disadvantage for youth of color.

Lack of Effective Legal Representation. The right to an attorney is fundamental to the

American system of justice, and—given their lesser maturity and weaker understanding
of the legal system—quality legal representation is especially important for youthful
offenders. Nonetheless, effective representation remains a scarce commodity for court-
involved youth. In 2009, a comprehensive review of juvenile indigent defense found that
“modern-day juvenile courts continue to deny many low-income youth nationwide the
legal representation to which they are entitled under the United States Constitution.”91
Pointedly, this study asserted that the nation’s “broken” indigent defense systems for
juvenile offenders “increase the likelihood that low-income youth will suffer the conse-
quences of false confessions, unconstitutional guilty pleas, wrongful convictions, pretrial
detention, and incarceration in secure facilities.”92

23
 FIGURE 9
TRAUMATIC PASTS OF CONFINED YOUTH: PERCENTAGE OF YOUTH
IN JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES WHO HAVE EVER...

ATTEMPTED SUICIDE 30%

“SEEN SOMEONE SEVERELY INJURED OR KILLED” 70%

“HAD SOMETHING VERY BAD OR TERRIBLE HAPPEN TO YOU” 72%

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Source: Online data analysis of the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention.

symptoms for anxiety, and half for depression score four years below grade level on average.
as well.93 More than two-thirds reported serious Most have been suspended from school, and
substance abuse problems, and 59 percent said most have been left back at least one grade.97
that they had been getting drunk or high several
Glaring Lack of Effective Support. Most of the
times per week (or daily) in the months leading
young people involved in the deep end of our
up to their arrest.94
nation’s juvenile justice systems have significant
A number of other recent studies have also found emotional, cognitive, and intellectual defi-
mental health problems at epidemic levels among cits—needs often rooted in severe trauma and
confined youth. On average, the research finds deprivation. They need serious help. Yet in most
that about two-thirds of youth confined in juve- cases, juvenile correctional facilities are unable to
nile facilities suffer from one or more diagnosable provide it. Crucial gaps are commonplace.
mental health conditions—several times the
Mental Health Treatment. Among all youth in
rate of youth in the general population. About
correctional confinement nationwide, more than
one of every five youth in custody has a mental
half are held in facilities that do not conduct
health disturbance that significantly impairs their
mental health assessments for all residents. When
capacity to function.95 Though these symptoms
assessments are performed, they are often done
can sometimes be caused or exacerbated by the
in a haphazard fashion or by untrained staff. The
confinement experience itself, there is little doubt
Survey of Youth in Residential Placement found
that juvenile justice youth suffer an unusually
that two of every five youth in a residential com-
high prevalence of mental illness.
mitment program had not received any mental
Youth confined in juvenile justice facilities also health counseling. Amazingly, youth with serious
suffer from learning disabilities at exceptional mental health symptoms (anger, anxiety, suicidal
rates96—and they exhibit extremely low levels of feelings, attention deficits—even hallucinations)
academic achievement and school success. Stud- were less likely than other youth to receive coun-
ies find that youth in correctional confinement seling.98 On the other hand, troubling reports

24
have emerged in recent years showing that many (55 percent) believe that youth in their facilities
confined youth are given powerful psychotropic are punished unfairly by staff, and nearly half (42
medications—called atypicals—sometimes with- percent) are afraid of being physically attacked.
out appropriate diagnosis and oversight.99 Over 40 percent of youth in correctional facili-
ties say that staff are disrespectful and that they
Substance Abuse Treatment. The Survey of Youth
physically restrain youth without justification.104
in Residential Placement also found significant
gaps in the scope and quality of substance abuse Transitional Support. Whatever benefits youth
treatment. One-fifth of confined youth reside in derive from the treatment and assistance they
juvenile facilities that do not screen any residents receive (or don’t receive) while confined in
for substance abuse, and another 17 percent juvenile facilities, young people exiting residen-
reside in facilities that screen some but not all tial placements will be tested severely during
youth.100 Despite the pervasiveness of substance their transitions home. Yet the scope and quality
abuse, 42 percent of youth residing in juvenile of aftercare support provided by youth correc-
corrections facilities do not receive any substance tions agencies nationwide is notoriously weak.
abuse treatment. This includes 35 percent of
youth who report daily use of alcohol and drugs
prior to being removed from their homes.101

Educational Programming. Available evidence

suggests that the quality of education services
offered to confined youth is often deficient.
“Nationally, the educational programs of many
state juvenile justice systems receive failing
grades,” reported a team of scholars in 2003.
“Recurrent problems include overcrowding,
frequent movement of students, lack of qualified
teachers, an inability to address gaps in students’
According to Pat Arthur, a senior attorney for
schooling, and a lack of collaboration with
the National Center for Youth Law, “Very little
the public school system.”102 Including both
is done to help young people make the transi-
detained and committed youth, just 45 percent
tion from school in the correctional setting to an
of those with a previously diagnosed learning
appropriate school placement upon reentry.”105
disability receive special education services while
Despite the prevalence of severe substance abuse
in custody.103
and psychiatric disorders among confined youth,
Treatment Environment. Even if juvenile correc- few facilities take concerted action to sustain
tions facilities provide high-quality education, mental health and substance abuse treatment or
mental health, and substance abuse treatment to reinstate health insurance coverage as youth
services, youth are unlikely to benefit when the transition home.106
overall environment of the facility is permeated
with fear, violence, or maltreatment. Yet the
majority of youth in correctional confinement

25
 Is It Really Safe to Reduce Juvenile Confinement?

Jurisdictions that have substantially reduced youth confinement in recent times have not suffered any
increase in juvenile offending. Indeed, sharply reducing juvenile custody populations seems not to
exert any independent upward impact on juvenile offending rates.

United States: 1997 to 2007. Between 1997 and correctional facilities had dropped to under
2007, the date of the most recent Census of 1,500—an 85 percent decline.111 Even includ-
Juveniles in Residential Placement, the share of ing the substantial number of California youth
the juvenile population confined in correctional housed in county-run correctional camps, the
custody nationwide declined from 256 of every state’s incarcerated juvenile population declined
100,000 youth to 194 — a 24 percent reduc- 50 percent from 1999 through 2008.112
tion. The rate at which adjudicated youth were
Contrary to the common presumption that more
confined in facilities described as long-term
incarceration breeds less crime, California’s juve-
secure care correctional facilities—which include
nile crime rates have declined substantially during
most training schools and youth prisons—plum-
this period of rapid de-incarceration. The arrest
meted 41 percent over this decade.107 Despite the
rate for property index offenses fell steadily from
reduced reliance on incarceration, juvenile crime
1995 through 2009.113 The juvenile arrest rate for
rates fell across the board from 1997 to 2007,
violent index crimes also declined substantially,
including a 27 percent drop in the juvenile arrest
falling in 2009 to its lowest level since 1970.114
rate for violent index crimes.108 Clearly during
this decade, reduced juvenile incarceration did More detailed analysis of trends in within California
not spark a new wave of youth violence. provides no suggestion that greater reliance on
incarceration improves public safety. In a July 2010
A more detailed analysis comparing trends at the
publication, the Center on Juvenile and Criminal
state level finds no correlation between juvenile
Justice analyzed California’s juvenile crime and
confinement rates and violent youth crime.
correctional trends at the county level. “Across the
When states are broken into four groups based on
state, the lowest-level and fastest-declining coun-
the change in their rates of juvenile confinement
ties in terms of juvenile incarceration rates did not
from 1997 to 2007, the states that decreased
have significantly different juvenile crime rates or
juvenile confinement rates most sharply (40
changes in crime rates compared to counties with
percent or more) saw a slightly greater decline in
the highest-level and fastest-increasing juvenile
juvenile violent crime arrest rates than states that
incarceration rates,” the report found.115
increased their youth confinement rates. States
that reduced juvenile confinement slightly (0 to Texas Before and After 2007. Unlike California,
20 percent) or moderately (20 to 40 percent) Texas began to steadily increase its incarcerated
saw a smaller reduction in juvenile violent felony juvenile population in the mid-1990s. Between
arrest rates.109 (See Fig. 10 on p. 27.) 1995 and 2000, Texas doubled the number of
youth in state custody and then permitted popu-
California 1996 to 2009. On a typical day in
lations to fall only modestly over the subsequent
1996, the California Youth Authority incarcer-
six years.116 Yet, despite pursuing a diametrically
ated 10,000 youth.110 By June 2010, the average
opposite incarceration policy, Texas achieved
daily population of committed youth in state
juvenile crime outcomes eerily similar to California

26
 FIGURE 10
JUVENILE VIOLENT INDEX ARREST TRENDS IN STATES WITH DECLINING AND
INCREASING JUVENILE CONFINEMENT RATES (1997–2007)

-0

-10

-20

-30 -29.1
-32.1

-40
MEDIAN CHANGE IN JUVENILE VIOLENT ARREST RATES, 1997 TO 2007 -40.9
-43.1
-50
11 STATES WITH LARGEST 12 STATES WITH MID-SIZED 10 STATES WITH SMALL 12 STATES WITH INCREASED
DROP IN CONFINEMENT RATES DROP IN CONFINEMENT RATES DROP IN CONFINEMENT RATES CONFINEMENT RATES
(-40% TO -60%) (-20% TO -40%) (-20% TO 0%) (+1% TO +136%)

Source: Author’s analysis, using data from the 1997 and 2007 Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement; and 1997 and 2007 FBI
Arrest Statistics, both available at www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb.

from 1995 through 2006. The two states had to 2,250 in August 2009 and 1,800 by August
virtually identical juvenile arrest rates for serious 2010.118 Yet again, contrary to the theories of
index crimes in 1995 and saw an identical 51 incapacitation and general deterrence, neither the
percent decline over the subsequent 11 years.117 state’s crime rate nor its juvenile arrest totals have
(See Fig. 11 below.) increased since 2006. Violent juvenile felony
arrests in Texas fell by 10 percent from 2006 to
Since its youth corrections system descended into
2009, and total juvenile arrests fell by 9 percent.119
scandal in 2007, Texas has precipitously reversed
course on juvenile incarceration. The Texas These data leave little doubt. Substantially reduc-
Youth Commission’s daily confined population ing juvenile incarceration rates has not proven to
has fallen from 4,800 at the end of August 2006 be a catalyst for more youth crime.

FIGURE 11
TEXAS VS. CALIFORNIA: OPPOSITE JUVENILE INCARCERATION POLICIES, IDENTICAL RESULTS
FELONY INDEX CRIME ARRESTS PER 100,000 YOUTH AGES 10-17

3,000

PERCENT CHANGE IN JUVENILE

2,500 INCARCERATION RATES: 1995 TO 2005
TEXAS +48% CALIFORNIA -75%

2,000

1,500

CALIFORNIA TEXAS

1,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Source: Males, Stahlkapf, & Macallair, Crime Rates and Youth Incarceration in Texas and California Compared: Public Safety or Public
Waste?, Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, June 2007.
For more information, visit www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.

27
 How Should States Go About Reforming
Juvenile Corrections?

How can states and communities best go about reducing incarceration rates and closing youth correc-
tions facilities to ensure that reform efforts are safe, responsible, constructive, and cost-effective?

The case against juvenile corrections facilities is have made noteworthy progress in recent years
overwhelming. Countless studies and decades of reducing the unnecessary and inappropriate use
experience show that these institutions are both of correctional confinement. Numerous states
dangerous and ineffective. Given the limited have closed facilities or lowered correctional pop-
offending histories of most youth placed into ulations, reaping significant savings for taxpayers
custody, secure confinement is more often than without any measurable increase in youth crime.
not unnecessary. Exhaustive research shows cor- Indeed, if states adopt proven best practices for
rectional confinement is an obsolete and finan- managing juvenile offenders and then reallocate
cially wasteful model for the care and treatment funds currently spent on incarceration to more
of delinquent youth. Meanwhile, the care pro- constructive crime prevention and treatment
vided in correctional facilities is often inadequate strategies, there is every reason to believe that
to meet the extraordinary needs faced by many reducing juvenile facility populations will result
confined youth. in less crime, not more.

Over the past three decades, delinquency The final chapter of this report provides an
scholars have achieved significant advances in action agenda for states seeking to improve
determining what works in reversing delinquent outcomes in their juvenile justice systems by
behavior—including the development of several severing their long-standing fealty to the youth
interventions that yield better outcomes than incarceration model. Specifically, it identifies six
incarceration at a fraction of the cost. Mean- key priorities for action.
while, pioneering jurisdictions across the nation

1.
Limit Eligibility for Correctional Placements
PRIORITY

Commitment to a juvenile corrections facility should be reserved for youth who have
committed serious offenses and pose a clear and demonstrable risk to public safety.

The most direct strategy for reducing the popula- with auspicious results. (See Fig. 12 on p. 29.)
tions of juvenile corrections facilities is to sharply In 2007, California banned placements to state
limit, by statute, the categories of youth who are juvenile corrections facilities for all low-level and
eligible for correctional placement. Several states non-violent offenders. Texas passed a law the
have taken just this approach in recent years, same year prohibiting commitments to the Texas

28
Youth Commission except for youth adjudi- also for the signal they send to judges and other
cated for felony-level offenses. In the 1990s, juvenile justice personnel about the need to limit
North Carolina and Virginia both enacted rules reliance on incarceration. In each of the states
prohibiting commitments for lower-level offenses cited above, correctional populations have fallen
except for youth with serious histories of prior far more than required specifically to meet the
offending. In 2008, Alabama outlawed all com- stricter guidelines.
mitments for status offenses or for probation
Regardless of the specific criteria states adopt,
violations in cases where a status offense was the
what’s important is to tie placement eligibility to
underlying charge.
the crimes youth have committed and their risks
These kinds of new rules are important not just of re-offending—not to their needs for treatment
for the admissions they specifically prohibit, but or services.

FIGURE 12
WHEN STATES PLACE LIMITS ON CORRECTIONAL COMMITMENTS...JUVENILE INCARCERATION PLUMMETS

Year Change in Incarceration

State Limiting Provision Enacted Since Policy Was Enacted

AL Prohibit commitments of youth adjudicated for status 2008 –40 percent

offenses, as well as for probation violations where a status (daily population in state
offense was the underlying charge commitment programs)
CA State commitments allowed only for youth adjudicated for 2007 –40 percent
serious violent offenses (daily population in state
training schools)
NC Correctional commitments authorized only for youth 1998 –73 percent
adjudicated for violent crimes plus a moderate or extended (annual commitments to
history of prior offending, or for serious non-violent crimes state training schools)
if youth also had an extended history of prior offending
TX Correctional commitments authorized only for youth 2007 –69 percent
adjudicated for felony offenses (daily population in state
training schools)
VA Correctional commitments allowed only for youth with 1996 –52 percent
a felony adjudication or a serious misdemeanor offense if (annual admissions to
youth also has previously been adjudicated for a felony or state training schools)
four serious misdemeanor offenses

29
 2.
Invest in Promising Non-Residential Alternatives
PRIORITY

In every jurisdiction, juvenile justice leaders must erect a broad continuum of

high-quality services, supervision programs, and dispositional options to supervise
and treat youthful offenders in their home communities.

Among the most long-standing and crippling Intensive youth advocate and mentoring pro-
weaknesses in America’s juvenile justice systems is grams, which assign youth development workers
a dearth of local options. Often, judges are forced to supervise, monitor, and mentor delinquent
to make an untenable choice between probation youth in the community.
or incarceration for adolescents with moderately
Cognitive-behavioral skills training, either as a
serious offending histories who do not pose an
stand-alone treatment or in combination with
immediate or significant threat to public safety.
other programming.
To fill this void, state and local courts and correc-
Specialized mental health and substance abuse
tions systems should invest in and substantially
treatment models that have shown significant suc-
expand access to intensive and high-quality
cess in helping lower offending rates and improve
alternatives to incarceration such as:
youths’ behavior, including wraparound services,
Evidence-based family intervention models mental and behavioral health diversion projects,
like Multisystemic Therapy, Functional Family and high-quality substance abuse treatment.
Therapy, and Multidimensional Treatment Foster
These enhanced treatment programs and alterna-
Care—the three specific intervention models
tives to incarceration should be reserved for youth
that have repeatedly proven effective with serious
with significant records of delinquency. Youth
youthful offenders.
with limited offending histories—even those
Rigorous career preparation and vocational train- with severe emotional disturbances, substance
ing programs, such as YouthBuild, that combine abuse problems, or other mental health condi-
academic instruction, work experience, and tions—should be diverted from juvenile court
counseling full time over several months. entirely. Need alone should not be a pretext for
deep penetration into the juvenile justice system.

30
 3.
Change the Financial Incentives
PRIORITY

States must eliminate counterproductive financial incentives that encourage

overreliance on correctional placements.

In most states, commitments to state custody are youth placed in state facilities.122 Under Penn-
funded entirely with state funds, whereas local sylvania’s Act 148, counties receive 80 percent
jurisdictions must foot the bill for community- reimbursement for non-residential programs and
based supervision and treatment programs. services in the community, and for placement
Fortunately, several states have devised creative into non-secure community-based group homes,
approaches in recent years to revamp their fund- but they receive just 60 percent for commitments
ing mechanisms and increase the incentive for to secure institutions.123
local courts to treat delinquent youth in their
Before state officials and county leaders in Michi-
communities whenever possible.
gan’s Wayne County (in and around Detroit)
Under the RECLAIM Ohio program, coun- struck an innovative agreement in 2000, judges
ties receive a fixed budget allocation but must committed several hundred youthful offenders to
reimburse the state for each youth committed to state youth corrections facilities each year. Under
a correctional facility. The fewer youth counties the new agreement, Wayne County retains
place, the more funds they have available to sup- responsibility for all committed youth, and the
port local treatment and supervision programs. state reimburses the county for half of its costs
Statewide, RECLAIM led to a 36 percent reduc- to supervise and treat them locally. The county
tion in commitments after it was launched in the contracts with five community-based social
1990s, an early evaluation found.120 Subsequent service agencies to oversee youth offenders with
studies have shown that the community-based appropriate levels of supervision and treatment.
RECLAIM programs reduce offending by low- Nearly half of the youth assigned to these care
and moderate-risk youth participants and yield management organizations remained in their
substantial savings for taxpayers. Redeploy Illi- own homes in 2009, and most of the remaining
nois, modeled on RECLAIM Ohio, substantially youth were housed in low- or moderate-security
reduced commitments in four participating pilot group homes or residential treatment centers.124
sites from 2004 through 2007. Overall commit- Only 18 youth per day were held in state train-
ments in the pilot sites fell from 212 in 2004 to ing schools in 2009— down from 597 per day in
96 in 2007 (a 55 percent drop).121 Wisconsin’s 1999.* Few youth (less than 2 percent) commit
Youth Aids program provides $100 million per felony offenses while under the supervision of
year to counties to cover the costs of all juvenile care management organizations, and recidivism
programming, but—other than youth adjudi- rates following treatment are well below those
cated for the most serious violent crimes—the typical for youth released from juvenile correc-
counties are charged the full cost of care for all tions facilities.125

*Another 80 youth per day in 2009 were confined in a privately operated treatment facility for chronic and/or violent youth
offenders under contract with Wayne County.

31
 Before California prohibited state commitments law was enacted, counties paid just a token fee
for misdemeanors and most non-violent felony ($25 per month) for any youth in state custody.
crimes in 2007, the population in state youth Under the new rules, the counties still paid little
correctional facilities had already fallen from a ($150 per month) for the most serious offenders,
high of 10,000 in 1996 to just 2,500. Most of but they had to pay 50–100 percent of the actual
these reductions can be traced to an innovative cost for youth with less significant offending
sliding-scale fee schedule enacted in 1996 that histories.126 The state’s confined population fell
substantially increased the cost to counties for by more than half in the first seven years after the
commitments of low-level offenders. Before the sliding-scale fees were imposed.127

4.
Adopt Best Practice Reforms for Managing Youth Offenders
PRIORITY

In addition to better programmatic alternatives, every jurisdiction must adopt

complementary policies, practices, and procedures to limit unnecessary commitments
and reduce confinement populations.

Specifically, state and local juvenile justice leaders reduced school-based referrals by two-thirds since
should: 2004 by forging an agreement with the schools
to limit court referrals for minor misbehavior.129
Implement Detention Reform. Now operating in
Jefferson County (Birmingham), Alabama,
150 jurisdictions in 35 states plus the District
reduced school-based referrals by 50 percent by
of Columbia, the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s
initiating a similar agreement in 2009. As they
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI)
curtailed zero tolerance, both these counties have
has reduced the daily detention populations in
substantially reduced correctional placements.
participating sites by 41 percent. JDAI jurisdic-
tions have also reduced the number of youth- Make Better Use of Juvenile Court Diversion.
ful offenders committed to state custody by 34 Arrests for serious violent crimes have fallen by
percent.128 Because youth detained pending their one-third since their highs in the mid-1990s,
adjudication hearings are placed more frequently and serious property crime arrests have fallen by
in residential facilities than youth who remain in nearly half.130 Yet the total number of youth peti-
the community, detention reform is an essential tioned and found delinquent in juvenile courts
step for any jurisdiction seeking to reduce cor- nationwide has fallen much more modestly due
rectional confinement. to juvenile courts’ increasing propensity to pros-
ecute youth for minor offenses.131 Growing evi-
Rethink Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies.
dence suggests that involvement in juvenile court
Youth charged in court for minor misbehavior
proceedings can itself be criminogenic—reducing
under zero tolerance school discipline policies
the likelihood that young people will age out of
are often placed on probation and can easily
delinquency as they mature. Expanding diversion
end up in a detention or corrections facility if
and limiting formal court processing of non-
they violate probation rules. Innovative juvenile
serious offenses can reduce the number of youth
court leaders in Clayton County, Georgia, have

32
who penetrate into the deep end of the juvenile two-thirds from 2006 to 2009.135 In Florida,
corrections system. where several jurisdictions have adopted proba-
tion practice reforms, commitments for viola-
Enhance Legal Representation and Advocacy.
tions of probation fell 28 percent from 2005–06
Alarming numbers of youth go through the
to 2007–08.136
juvenile court process without legal representa-
tion. Even when youth are represented, caseloads Limit Lengths of Stay in Correctional Facilities
are often excessive and juvenile court culture and Other Residential Placements. Youth should
often discourages aggressive advocacy.132 This remain in confinement only for a limited period,
lack of timely, competent, and energetic repre- less than a year in most cases (and far shorter in
sentation is unjust. It also leads to unnecessary many cases). Research is clear that longer stays
commitments into correctional facilities and in correctional custody do not reduce future
other residential placements. Early appointment offending. However, long stays add substantially
of counsel, to allow time for defenders to prepare to state youth corrections budgets while harm-
for detention hearings, can reduce the number of ing youths’ prospects for success in adult life. A
youth confined pending trial—and therefore the recent analysis of confinement trends in Florida
likelihood of subsequent commitments. Funding found that the average length of stay for confined
for enhanced legal advocacy can lower placement youth rose 30 percent between 2000–01 and
rates and improve outcomes for youth while 2007–08—costing the state’s taxpayers an esti-
producing a net savings for taxpayers. In both mated $20 million per year.137 Reducing lengths
Seattle and Florida, “TeamChild” legal advocacy of stay enough to conform with best practices
projects have substantially improved outcomes could save Florida up to $49 million per year.138
for youth.133 In Ohio, youth receiving enhanced
legal advocacy proved only one-fourth as likely
as a control group to be sentenced to a youth
corrections facility, and they spent one-fourth as
many days in state facilities.134

Reduce Correctional Placements Resulting from

Violations of Probation. One of every eight youth
in secure correctional custody nationwide is com-
mitted for violating probation or aftercare rules,
not for committing new crimes. Many youth
confined on technical violations have never been
adjudicated for violent or serious offenses. By
establishing clear rules to calibrate the response
to rule violations and requiring supervisor
approval before any decision to confine youth
for those violations, many jurisdictions have
substantially lowered the number of youth
placed in or returned to custody for techni-
cal violations. Alabama reduced the number of
youth committed on probation violations by

33
 5.
Replace Large Institutions With Small, Treatment-Oriented Facilities
PRIORITY

for the Dangerous Few

The limited number of youthful offenders whose serious and chronic offending demand secure
confinement should be placed into small, humane, and treatment-oriented facilities.

The superiority of small, community-based care facilities. None of the facilities holds more
juvenile corrections facilities over larger, conven- than 50 youth, and each of the state’s six secure
tional training schools is widely recognized in the care facilities houses just 30 to 36 youth. In
juvenile justice field. The advantages of smaller every Missouri facility, youth are placed in small
facilities include: the chance to keep youth close groups that participate together in all educa-
to home and engage their families; greater oppor- tion, treatment, meals, recreation, and free time.
tunity to recruit mentors and other volunteers; Throughout their stays in DYS facilities, youth
and a more hospitable treatment environment. are challenged to discuss their feelings, gain
insights into their behaviors, and build their
The primary mission of small secure facilities,
capacity to express their thoughts and emotions
as well as group homes and other placement
clearly, calmly, and respectfully— even when
facilities, should be to help youth make lasting
they are upset or angry. DYS staff engage the
behavior changes and to build the skills and self-
families of confined youth and work with family
awareness necessary to succeed following release.
members to devise successful reentry plans. DYS
One of the most consistent findings of research
assigns a single case manager to oversee each
in juvenile corrections is that interventions aim-
youth from the time of commitment through
ing to build skills and address human needs are
release and into aftercare, and it provides youth
far more effective than those aimed at deterrence
with extensive supervision and support through-
or punishment.
out the critical reentry period.
In pursuing this mission, states will do well to
Through this approach, Missouri has achieved
follow the example of Missouri, which closed its
reoffending rates that are lower than those of
long-troubled training schools in the early 1980s.
other states. Missouri’s model has been cited as
Since then, Missouri’s Division of Youth Services
a national model by the New York Times in 2007
has divided the state into five regions and built
and earned a national “Innovations in American
a continuum of programs in each, ranging from
Government” award from Harvard University
day treatment programs and non-secure group
in 2008.139
homes, to moderately secure facilities located
in state parks and college campuses, to secure

34
 What Role for Group Homes?

If training schools and other large correctional institutions are not a suitable venue for
the care and treatment of juvenile offenders, how about group homes, residential treat-
ment centers, or wilderness programs? What role should these and other non-secure
residential programs play in a redesigned juvenile corrections system?

While available research on non-secure residential programming is limited, most studies

find that long-term outcomes are unfavorable. A recent study of 449 delinquent youth
placed into group homes in Los Angeles found a host of “negative life outcomes,” includ-
ing high rates of drug abuse, criminality, and educational failure. Seven years after being
referred to group homes, one-fourth of these youth were incarcerated, and 12 were dead—
seven of them by gunshot wounds.140 A number of studies have found that group home
placements lead to worse outcomes than evidence-based non-residential treatment or
high-quality treatment foster care.141 Wilderness programs and boot camps have also shown
little success in reducing the criminality or improving outcomes for delinquent youth, as
have residential treatment centers for youth with serious emotional disturbances.

Though group homes typically conform more closely than training schools to best prac-
tice in correctional treatment (small facilities, close to home, staffed by youth develop-
ment personnel rather than guards, oriented to positive youth development rather than
punishment), they are also susceptible to abuse and violence. Staff salaries are typically
low, turnover rates high, and state oversight via licensing and regulation and accredita-
tion often lax. Other types of group care facilities—boot camps and wilderness programs in
particular—have seen many instances of abuse and even deaths in recent years.

Despite these inauspicious research results, most juvenile justice experts believe that
group homes and other non-secure residential facilities should be part of the continuum
of available dispositions for adjudicated youth—particularly for youth from severely
troubled homes, and those for whom a parent or guardian cannot be located. Also, resi-
dential placements can provide a valuable cooling off experience for some youth who
have descended into a particularly extreme behavioral cycle. Finally, there is considerable
support for group homes as a step-down placement for youth returning home following
secure confinement. However, group homes and other non-secure facility placements
should not be widely employed as a middle option between probation supervision and
secure custody. There is simply insufficient evidence that these placements have a
positive long-term impact on the well-being of young people.

35
 6.
Use Data to Hold Systems Accountable
PRIORITY

Strong data collection must be a central pillar of efforts to reform juvenile corrections
systems and to reduce overreliance on incarceration and residential placement.

Insufficient data collection and outcomes should also be measured on how well they help
accountability is one of the pivotal weaknesses in delinquent youth achieve progress toward success
America’s juvenile justice systems, and a crucial in adulthood. How much academic progress do
factor behind the continued prevalence of incar- youth make while confined in youth facilities or
ceration and other counterproductive practices. enrolled in court-sanctioned programs? What
percentage of previously confined youth reenroll
Carefully Measure Recidivism. Given the high
in school and remain to graduation? How many
price of secure confinement and the heavy costs
are placed into jobs, and become steady workers?
to youth in liberty denied and opportunity
How much progress do youth make in overcom-
lost, rigorous recidivism data are essential. Yet,
ing behavioral health problems and reducing
serious gaps remain in states’ efforts to collect
symptoms of mental illness?
and report recidivism results: 12 states still do
not track recidivism outcomes of youth released Examine Racial Disparities. Given the pervasive
from juvenile facilities statewide in any fashion; and continuing racial disparities at all levels of
six states track only the share of youth who our nation’s juvenile justice systems, every state
return to juvenile custody; and another eight and every locality should be collecting and disag-
measure youths’ success only for 12 months or gregating data to identify policies, programs, and
less following release. Even among states that do practices that may adversely or unfairly impact
track meaningful measures of re-offending into youth based on their race, gender, or ethnicity.
early adulthood, outcome measures and method- Just as important, state and local juvenile justice
ologies vary widely—making cross-state com- leaders need to use those data to analyze their
parisons problematic. The Council of Juvenile systems to pinpoint the hidden factors that may
Correctional Administrators has recommended be perpetuating unjust disparities.
that states adhere to common definitions and
Monitor Conditions of Confinement. All youth
measures of recidivism.142 Not included in the
corrections institutions should be subject to
CJCA list, but just as important, states should
rigorous oversight with maximum transpar-
compare the recidivism outcomes of correctional
ency to detect physical abuse, sexual abuse,
facilities and other residential programs versus
and excessive use of isolation and restraints
intensive community-based interventions that
whenever and wherever they occur. At a mini-
are far cheaper and less restrictive.
mum, states should tighten rules and strengthen
Track Youths’ Success After Release. While recidi- systems to ensure accurate and timely reporting
vism is important, it should not be the only of all unusual incidents, injuries, and deaths
standard used to monitor the effectiveness of that occur in juvenile facilities. In particular,
juvenile corrections systems. These systems states and localities should encourage or require

36
their facilities to participate in the CJCA’s
Performance-based Standards initiative, which is
working in 198 facilities in 28 states to improve
conditions and upgrade services for confined
youth.143 In addition, states should follow the
lead of Maryland, Texas, and others by appoint-
ing an independent watchdog to investigate any
reported problems with conditions or safety
in juvenile facilities. Finally, all facilities must
maintain a functional grievance process to ensure
youth unfettered access to report maltreatment
and obtain a fair hearing, without fear of reprisal.

37
 Conclusion: Embracing Better Policies, Programs, and
Practices in Juvenile Corrections

The evidence presented in this report makes in correctional custody in both 1997 and
clear that, except in cases where juvenile 2007, 34 reduced their confinement rates.
offenders have committed serious crimes and Eleven states lowered their confinement rates
pose a clear and present danger to society, by 40 percent or more during this decade, and
removing troubled and delinquent young peo- another 12 states lowered confinement by 20
ple from their homes and families is expensive to 39 percent.145
and often unnecessary—with results no better
Though no nationwide figures have been
(and often far worse) on average than commu-
compiled since 2007, the pace of juvenile
nity-based supervision and treatment. Like-
de-incarceration seems only to have increased.
wise, the evidence makes clear that throwing
An informal count conducted by the Annie E.
even serious youth offenders together in large,
Casey Foundation in August 2011 identified
prison-like, and often-abusive institutions pro-
52 youth correctional facilities in 18 states,
vides no public safety benefit, wastes taxpayers’
which have closed since the beginning of 2007.
money, and reduces the odds that the young
Several other states have closed units within
people will mature out of their delinquency
facilities and reduced bed capacity without
and become productive law-abiding citizens.
closing entire facilities. A list of youth correc-
tions facilities closed since 2007 can be found
at www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.

However, while this wave of facility closures

and bed reductions is important and long-
overdue, it offers little reassurance for the
future. In many states, the primary cause for
closures has been the short-term fiscal crisis
facing state governments. In other states,
federal investigations or private class-action
lawsuits have been the driving force behind
facility closures. The common thread has been
that most decisions to shut down facilities have
Fortunately, we are seeing an encouraging been ad hoc and reactive. The closures have
shift away from juvenile incarceration in not been based on any new consensus among
many states. From 1997 to 2007, the total policy leaders or any new philosophic commit-
population of youth in correctional place- ment to reducing reliance on juvenile incar-
ments nationwide declined 24 percent, and ceration, and they have not been informed by
the total in long-term secure correctional any deep or evidence-based consideration of
facilities dropped 41 percent.144 Of the 45 how states should best pursue the path toward
states reporting data on the number of youth reduced incarceration. In short, we are seeing a

38
38
wave—a pendulum swing away from incarcer- For the first time in a generation, America
ation in juvenile justice. But this trend is not has the opportunity to redesign the deep
yet anchored in the kind of coherent, resilient, end of its juvenile justice system. The poli-
values-based, and evidence-driven movement tics of the moment have made it politically
needed to sustain progress once the crises of feasible (or financially necessary) for states to
the moment fade into history. substantially scale back their

Looking to the future, the momen-

The open ques- long-standing investment in
conventional youth corrections
tum toward closing youth facili- tion is whether
facilities. Meanwhile, a wealth
ties must be paired with a planned our society will of new research has created the
and comprehensive approach to
not only abandon knowledge base necessary to
reform. Which policies, programs,
build a fundamentally new and
and practices work best? What the long-standing
far more effective approach to
safeguards are required for states incarceration model juvenile corrections that keeps
as they depopulate correctional
but also embrace a our communities safer, makes
facilities for youth? What funding
more constructive, better use of scarce tax dollars,
and accountability mechanisms
and increases the odds that more
are most likely to ensure success? humane, and cost- young people will desist from
The goal must be broader than effective paradigm crime and succeed in the adult
ending overreliance on juvenile for how we treat, world.
incarceration. Rather, we must
educate, and The open question is whether
build a youth corrections system
our society will learn from and
for tomorrow that is rooted in punish youth who
act on this information, whether
best practice research. Not only break the law. it will not only abandon the
do state and local justice systems
long-standing incarceration
have to offer a balanced mix of
model but also embrace this
treatment and supervision programs, but they
more constructive, humane, and cost-effective
must also calibrate their systems to ensure that
paradigm for how we treat, educate, and
each individual youth is directed to the treat-
punish youth who break the law.
ments, sanctions, and services best suited to his
or her unique needs and circumstances.

39
 Endnotes

Additional resources and state-level data for many of the report’s research findings are available at
www.aecf.org/noplaceforkids.

1. Sickmund, Melissa, State Rates of Residential Placement of Juvenile Offenders by Placement Status, Facility Type, and
Facility Size: 2007, Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice.

2. Hazel, Neal, Cross-National Comparison of Youth Justice, London: Youth Justice Board, 2008.

3. Ibid.

4. Cited in Billitteri, Thomas J., “Youth Violence: Are ‘Get Tough’ Policies the Best Approach?,” CQ Researcher,
Vol. 20, No. 9, March 5, 2010.

5. Abrams, D., A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice in Missouri. Jefferson City, MO: Missouri
Juvenile Justice Association, 2003.

6. Interview with the author, June 21, 2010.

7. See, for instance, Hargrove, Mary, “’Welcome to Hell:’ Troubled Youths in State Custody Tell of Beatings, Filthy
Quarters, Cramped Cells, Unwanted Sex, and Caretakers Who Don’t Care,” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, June 14,
1998, downloaded from www.arkansasonline.com/news/1998/jun/14/welcome-hell.

8. Report of the Child Advocate and Attorney General Regarding Connecticut, Juvenile Training School, September
19, 2002, downloaded from www.ct.gov/oca/lib/oca/cjts_final__9-19-02.doc.

9. Report of the Child Advocate and Attorney General: Department of Children and Family Services Oversight of
Haddam Hills Academy, May 30, 2002, downloaded from www.ct.gov/oca/lib/oca/haddamhills.doc.

10. Mohr, Holbrook, “AP: 13K Claims of Abuse in Juvenile Detention Since ’04,” USA Today, March 2, 2008,
downloaded from www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-02-juveniledetention_N.htm.

11. Beck, A.J., P.M. Harrison, & P. Guerino, Sexual Victimization in Juvenile Facilities Reported by Youth, 2008–09,
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 2010, downloaded from http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/svjfry09.pdf.

12. Swanson, Doug J., “TYC Sex Allegations Exceed 750,” Dallas Morning News, March 7, 2007, downloaded from
www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/030707dnpronutyc.39129f4.html.

13. Cohen, Fred, S.H. v. Stickrath: Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, Second Annual Report, July 15, 2010, downloaded
from http://clcky.squarespace.com/storage/2nd%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

14. Cohen, Fred, Final Fact-Finding Report: S.H. v. Stickrath, January 2008, downloaded from
http://clcky.squarespace.com/storage/documents/FINAL%20REPORT%20-%20FACT%20FINDING.doc.

15. Krisberg, Barry, General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority, December 23, 2003, downloaded from
www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/cya_report_2003.pdf.

16. Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradley J. Schlozman to Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels Re: Investi-
gation of the Plainfield Juvenile Correctional Facility, September 9, 2005, downloaded from
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/split_indiana_plainfield_juv_findlet_9-9-05.pdf.

17. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Wan J. Kim to Texas Governor Rick Perry Re: Evins Regional Juvenile
Center, March 15, 2007, downloaded from www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/evins_findlet_3-15-07.pdf.

40
18. Krisberg, General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority, supra note 15.

19. Vivian, John P., Jennifer N. Grimes, & Stella Vasquez, “Assaults in Juvenile Correctional Facilities: An Exploration,”
Journal of Crime and Justice, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2007.

20. Stutzman, Rene, “Young Offenders at Risk: Reports of Deaths and Abuse Have Racked the State Agency for
Troubled Youth,” Orlando Sentinel, April 11, 2004.

21. Charting a Course: A Blueprint for Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State, A Report of Governor David
Paterson’s Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice, December 2009, downloaded from www.vera.org/
download?file=2944/Charting-a-new-course-A-blueprint-for-transforming-juvenile-justice-in-New-York-State.pdf.

22. Cohen, Fred, Final Fact-Finding Report, supra note 14.

23. Murray, Christopher, Chris Baird, Ned Loughran, Fred Mills, & John Platt, Safety and Welfare Plan: Implementing
Reform in California, Division of Juvenile Justice, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
March 31, 2006, downloaded from www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/DJJSafetyPlan.pdf.

24. Author’s calculations using data from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement online database, available at
www.dataxplorer.com/Project/ProjUser/AdhocTableType.aspx?reset=true&ScreenID=40.

25. Coleman, Rebecca, Do Han Kim, Susan Mitchell-Herzfeld, & Therese A. Shady, Long-Term Consequences of
Delinquency: Child Maltreatment and Crime in Early Adulthood, New York State Office of Children and Family
Services, March 31, 2009, downloaded from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226577.pdf.

26. Rivers, J., & T. Trotti, South Carolina Delinquent Males: An 11-Year Follow-Up Into Adult Probation and Prison,
Columbia, SC: South Carolina Department of Youth Services, 1995.

27. Loughran, T.A., E.P. Mulvey, C.A.Schubert, J. Fagan, A.R. Piquero, & S.H. Losoya, “Estimating a Dose-Response
Relationship Between Length of Stay and Future Recidivism in Serious Juvenile Offenders,” Criminology, Vol. 47,
No. 3, 2009.

28. Lipsey, Mark W., “The Primary Factors that Characterize Effective Interventions with Juvenile Offenders:
A Meta-Analytic Overview,” Victims & Offenders, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009.

29. Gatti, U., R.E. Tremblay, & F. Vitaro, “Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry,
Vol. 50, No. 8, 2009, downloaded from www.jdaihelpdesk.org/Docs/Documents/Gatti%20et%20al%202009_1.pdf.

30. Lowenkamp, Christopher T. & Edward J. Latessa, Evaluation of Ohio’s RECLAIM Funded Programs, Community
Corrections Facilities, and DYS Facilities, University of Cincinnati, 2005, downloaded from www.uc.edu/ccjr/
Reports/ProjectReports/Final_DYS_RECLAIM_Report_2005.pdf.

31. Baglivio, Michael T., The Prediction of Risk to Recidivate Among a Juvenile Offending Population, Doctoral
Dissertation, University of Florida, 2007, downloaded from www.djj.state.fl.us/OPA/ptassistance/documents/
Dissertation.pdf.

32. Data Resource Guide Fiscal Year 2009, Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice, December 2009, downloaded from
www.djj.virginia.gov/About_Us/Administrative_Units/Research_and_Evaluation_Unit/pdf/FY2009_DRG.pdf.

33. Sametz, Lynn & Donna Hamparian, “Reintegrating Incarcerated Youth Into the Public School System,” Juvenile &
Family Court Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3, 1987.

34. Keely, James H., “Will Adjudicated Youth Return to School After Residential Placement? The Results of a
Predictive Variable Study,” Journal of Correctional Education, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2006, downloaded from
http://wrenchproject.com/linked/will%20youth%20return%20to%20school%20after%20placement.pdf.

35. Hjalmarsson, Randi, “Criminal Justice Involvement and High School Completion,” Journal of Urban Economics,
Vol. 63, No. 2, 2008.

36. Western, Bruce & Katherine Beckett, “How Unregulated is the U.S. Labor Market? The Penal System as a Labor
Market Institution,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 4, 1999.

41
37. Puzzanchera, C. & W. Kang, “Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2007,” 2010, available online at
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs.

38. Sickmund, Melissa, Juveniles Committed to Residential Placement by General Offense Category: 2007, Pittsburgh, PA:
National Center for Juvenile Justice.

39. Ibid.

40. Charting a Course: A Blueprint for Transforming Juvenile Justice in New York State, supra note 21.

41. Getting Smart About Juvenile Justice in Florida: Report of the Blueprint Commission, Florida Department of Juvenile
Justice, January 2008, downloaded at www.djj.state.fl.us/blueprint/documents/Report_of_the_Blueprint_
Commision.pdf.

42. Arthur, Pat & Tim Roche, Juvenile Justice Reform in Arkansas: Building a Better Future for Youth, Their Families, and
the Community, Arkansas Division of Youth Services, May 2008, downloaded from www.youthlaw.org/fileadmin/
ncyl/youthlaw/juv_justice/ArkansasReportFinal__2_.pdf.

43. 2008–09 Annual Statistical Report, South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, October 2009, downloaded at
www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2008-09-Annual-Statistical-Report.pdf.

44. Cited in Juvenile Justice: Views From Both Sides of the Aisle, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1996.

45. Grisso, Thomas, Double Jeopardy: Adolescent Offenders With Mental Health Disorders, University of Chicago Press, 2004.

46. America’s Cradle to Prison Pipeline, Children’s Defense Fund, 2007, downloaded from www.childrensdefense.org/
child-research-data-publications/data/cradle-prison-pipeline-report-2007-full-highres.html.

47. Bilchik, Shay & Michael Nash, “Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin,” Juvenile and
Family Justice Today, Fall 2008, downloaded from http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pdfs/Fall%2008%20NCJFCJ%20
Today%20feature.pdf.

48. Ryan, Joseph T., Denise Herz, Pedro M. Hernandez, & Jane Marie Marshall, “Maltreatment and Delinquency:
Investigating Child Welfare Bias in Juvenile Justice Processing,” Children and Youth Services Review, Vol. 29, 2007.

49. Lin, Jeffrey, Exploring the Impact of Institutional Placement on the Recidivism of Delinquent Youth, National Institute of
Justice, 2007, downloaded at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/217590.pdf.

50. Sickmund, Melissa, Juveniles Committed to Residential Placement by General Offense Category: 2007, Pittsburgh, PA:
National Center for Juvenile Justice.

51. CJCA Yearbook: A National Perspective on Juvenile Corrections, Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators,
October 2009.

52. Loughran, et al., “Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship Between Length of Stay and Future Recidivism in
Serious Juvenile Offenders,” supra note 27.

53. Ezell, Michael E., “Examining the Overall and Offense-Specific Criminal Career Lengths of a Sample of Serious
Offenders,” Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2007.

54. Winokur, Kristin Parsons, Alisa Smith, Stephanie R. Bontrager, & Julia L. Blankenship, “Juvenile Recidivism and
Length of Stay,” Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2008.

55. Lipsey, “The Primary Factors that Characterize Effective Interventions with Juvenile Offenders,” supra note 28.

56. Dowden, Craig & D.A. Andrews, “What Works in Young Offender Treatment: A Meta-Analysis, Forum on
Corrections Research, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1999.

57. Lipsey, “The Primary Factors that Characterize Effective Interventions with Juvenile Offenders,” supra note 28.

58. A complete list of MST outcome studies is available from the Family Services Research Center at the Medical
University of South Carolina and can be downloaded at http://academicdepartments.musc.edu/psychiatry/research/
fsrc/pubs/outcome.htm.

42
59. A list of FFT outcome studies is available from FFT, Inc., and can be downloaded at
www.fftinc.com/about_effect.html.

60. A compilation of outcomes studies on Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care is available from TFC Consultants,
Inc., and can be downloaded at www.mtfc.com/journal_articles.html.

61. Redirection Saves $51.2 Million and Continues to Reduce Recidivism, Report No. 10-38, Florida Office of Program
Policy Analysis & Government Accountability, April 2010, downloaded at www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/
Reports/pdf/1038rpt.pdf.

62. Redirection Saves $36.4 Million and Avoids $5.2 Million in Recommitment and Prison Costs, Report No. 09-27,
Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis & Government Accountability, May 2009, downloaded at
www.oppaga.state.fl.us/MonitorDocs/Reports/pdf/0927rpt.pdf.

63. Henggeler, Scott & Sonja J. Schoenwald, “Evidence-Based Interventions for Juvenile Offenders and
Juvenile Justice Policies That Support Them,” Social Policy Report, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2011, downloaded from
www.mtfc.com/2011_EB_Interventions_for_Juv_Offenders.pdf.

64. For information on Wraparound Milwaukee, see Kamradt, Bruce, “Wraparound Milwaukee: Aiding Youth With
Mental Health Needs,” Juvenile Justice, Vol. 7, No. 1, April 2000, downloaded from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/178256.pdf; and Mendel, Richard A., Less Cost, More Safety: Guiding Lights for Reform in Juvenile Justice,
American Youth Policy Forum, 2001, downloaded at www.aypf.org/publications/lesscost/pages/full.pdf.

65. For an evaluation of a YouthBuild program targeted specifically to court-involved youth, see Cohen, Mark A. & Alex
R. Piquero, “An Outcome Evaluation of the YouthBuild USA Offender Project,” Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice,
Vol. 8, No. 4, 2009.

66. Cuellar, Alison E., Larkin S. McReynolds, & Gail A. Wasserman, “A Cure for Crime: Can Mental Health Treatment
Diversion Reduce Crime Among Youth?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2006.

67. Kretschmar, Jeff, Daniel J. Flannery, & Fred Butcher, An Evaluation of the Behavioral Health/Juvenile Justice
Initiative 2007–09, Kent State University Institute for the Study and Prevention of Violence, downloaded from
http://test-weirs.mh.state.oh.us/assets/children-youth-families/system-of-care/bhjj-final-report-2007-2009.pdf.

68. National Drug Court Institute, “Research Findings,” downloaded from www.ndci.org/research on February 8, 2011.

69. For a discussion on the effectiveness of juvenile drug courts, see Marlowe, Douglas B., The Facts on Juvenile
Drug Treatment Courts, National Association of Drug Court Professionals, 2010, downloaded from
www.ndcrc.org/sites/default/files/PDF/Facts%20on%20Juvenile%20Drug%20Treatment%20Courts.pdf.

70. For more information on Brief Strategic Family Therapy and Multidimensional Family Therapy, see Mendel, Dick,
“A Family Affair,” AdvoCasey, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, downloaded from www.aecf.org/upload/publicationfiles/rev.%20
advocasey.spring02.pdf,

71. Chassin, Laurie, George Knight, Delfino Vargas-Chanes, Sandra H. Losoya, & Diana Naranjo, “Substance Use
Treatment Outcomes in a Sample of Male Serious Juvenile Offenders,” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, Vol. 36,
No. 2, 2009.

72. American Correctional Association, as cited in Petteruti, Amanda, Nastassia Walsh, and Tracy Velazquez, The Costs
of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal Sense, Justice Policy Institute, 2009, downloaded
from www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/09_05_rep_costsofconfinement_jj_ps.pdf.

73. Trends in College Pricing 2010, The College Board, 2010, downloaded from http://trends.collegeboard.org/
downloads/College_Pricing_2010.pdf.

74. Public Education Finances 2008, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, downloaded from www2.census.gov/govs/
school/08f33pub.pdf.

75. Herrera, Carla, Jean Baldwin Grossman, Tina J. Kuah, Amy Feldman, and Jennifer McMaken with Linda J. Zucovy,
Making a Difference in Schools: The Big Brothers Big Sisters School-Based Mentoring Program, Philadelphia: Public
Private Ventures, 2007, downloaded from www.ppv.org/ppv/publications/assets/220_publication.pdf.

43
76. Cohen, Mark A. and Alex R. Piquero, Costs and Benefits of a Targeted Intervention Program for Youthful Offenders:
The YouthBuild USA Offender Project, YouthBuild USA, 2008, downloaded from www.youthbuild.org/atf/cf/%
7B22B5F680-2AF9-4ED2-B948-40C4B32E6198%7D/CohenYouthbuild%20Final%20Report.pdf.

77. American Correctional Association, 2008 Directory: Adult and Juvenile Correctional Departments, Institutions, Agencies,
and Probation and Parole Authorities, American Correctional Association, 2008.

78. CJCA Yearbook, supra note 51.

79. The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice will spend $241.9 million on residential programs in 2010-11 (plus
another $28.2 million on aftercare for youth returning from residential placements), compared with $115.7 million
for probation and other non-residential services/programs for delinquent youth—2010 Legislative & General Budget
Report, Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, June 2010; Maryland’s Department of Juvenile Services spent $160
million for residential placements, compared with $79 million for case management and community services.
This $160 million figure for residential confinement includes costs for both committed youth (1,300 per day)
and detained youth (385 youth per day). See Juvenile Services Budget: Funding for Current Operations But Not For
Significant Reforms, Maryland Budget & Tax Policy Center and Advocates for Youth, February 2008.

80. Lowenkamp & Latessa, Evaluation of Ohio’s RECLAIM Funded Programs, Community Correctional Facilities,
and DYS Facilities: Cost-Benefit Analysis Supplemental Report, supra note 30.

81. Barton, W. & J. Butts, “Viable Options: Intensive Supervision Programs for Juvenile Delinquents,”
Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1990.

82. Drake, Elizabeth K., Steve Aos, & Marna G. Miller, “Evidence-Based Public Policy Options to Reduce Crime
and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington State,” Victims and Offenders, Vol. 4., No. 2, 2009,
downloaded from http://education.indiana.edu/Portals/418/Chris/Evidence%20Based%20Public%20Policy%20
Options%20to%20Reduce%20Costs-Washington%20State.pdf.

83. Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities, Little Hoover Commission, 2008, downloaded from
www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/192/report192.pdf.

84. US News & World Report Best Colleges 2011, downloaded from http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-colleges/uc-berkeley-1312.

85. “Two-Words: Wasteful and Ineffective,” New York Times (editorial), October 10, 2010, downloaded from
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/opinion/11mon1.html.

86. Best rate offered for an online reservation by the hotel’s website on November 4, 2010.

87. Author’s calculations using data from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement online database, available at
https://www.dataxplorer.com/Project/ProjUser/AdhocTableType.aspx?reset=true&ScreenID=40.

88. Sedlak, Andrea J. & Karla S. McPherson, Youth’s Needs and Services: Findings from the Survey of Youth in R
esidential Placement, U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, April 2010, downloaded
from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/227660.pdf.

89. Ibid.

90. An excellent source for information on the deep racial disparities in juvenile justice is And Justice for Some:
Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System, National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
January 2007, downloaded from www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2007jan_justice_for_some.pdf.

91. Majd, Katayoon & Patricia Puritz, “The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to Pay the Price of
Failing Indigent Defense Systems,” Georgetown Journal of Poverty & Law, Vol. 16, Symposium Issue, 2009,
downloaded from www.modelsforchange.net/publications/253/The_Cost_of_Justice_How_LowIncome_Youth_
Continue_To_Pay_the_Price_of_Failing_Indigent_Defense_Systems.pdf.

92. Ibid.

93. Sedlak, et al., Youth’s Needs and Services: Findings from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, supra note 88.

44
94. Ibid.

95. Shufelt Jennie L. & Joseph J. Cocozza, Youth with Mental Health Disorders in the Juvenile Justice System: Results
from the Multi-State Prevalence Study, Research and Program Brief, National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile
Justice, June 2006, downloaded from www.ncmhjj.com/pdfs/publications/PrevalenceRPB.pdf.

96. Quinn, Mary Magee, Robert B. Rutherford, Peter E. Leone, David Osher, & Jeffrey M. Poirier, “Youth With
Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections,” Exceptional Children, Vol. 71, No. 3, 2005.

97. See for instance: Krezmien, Michael P., Candace A. Mulcahy, & Peter E. Leone, “Detained and Committed Youth:
Examining Differences in Achievement, Mental Health Needs, and Special Education Status,” Education and Treat-
ment of Children, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2008; Zagar, Rober, Jack Arbit, John R. Hughes, Robert E. Busell, & Kenneth
Busch, “Developmental and Disruptive Behavior Disorders Among Delinquents,” Journal of the American Academy of
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1989; and Wilson, Zablocki, and. Bartolotta, “Educational and Behav-
ioral Status of Females in a State Juvenile Detention and Commitment Facility.” Council for Exceptional Children
Convention and Expo, 2007, cited in Leone, Peter & Lois Weinberg, Addressing the Unmet Needs of Children and
Youth in the Juvenile Justice and Child Welfare Systems, Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, May 2010, downloaded
from http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/pdfs/ed/edpaper.pdf.

98. Author’s calculations using data from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement online database, available at
https://www.dataxplorer.com/Project/ProjUser/AdhocTableType.aspx?reset=true&ScreenID=40.

99. Kelly, John, “Psych Meds in Jails,” Youth Today, October 2010.

100. Sedlak, et al., Youth’s Needs and Services: Findings from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, supra note 88.

101. Author’s calculations using data from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement online database, available at
https://www.dataxplorer.com/Project/ProjUser/AdhocTableType.aspx?reset=true&ScreenID=40.

102. Balfanz, Robert, Kurt Spiridakis, Ruth C. Neild, & Nettie Legters, “High-Poverty Secondary School and
Juvenile Justice Systems: How Neither Helps the Other and How That Could Change,” New Directions for Youth
Development, Vol. 99, 2003.

103. Sedlak, et al., Youth’s Needs and Services: Findings from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, note 88.

104. Author’s calculations using data from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement online database, available at
https://www.dataxplorer.com/Project/ProjUser/AdhocTableType.aspx?reset=true&ScreenID=40.

105. Arthur, Pat, “Advocacy to Help Reentering Juveniles Get Back on Track,” Clearinghouse Review, Vol. 41, Nos. 3–4,
July–August 2007.

106. Gupta, Ravindra A., Kelly J. Kelleher, Kathleen Pajer, Jack Stevens and Alison Cuellar, “Delinquent Youth in
Corrections: Medicaid and Reentry Into the Community,” Pediatrics, Vol. 115, No. 4, 2005, downloaded from
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/115/4/1077; and Cuellar, Alison E., Kelly J. Kelleher, Jennifer
A. Rolls, & Kathleen Pajer, ”Medicaid Insurance Policy for Youths Involved in the Criminal Justice System,”
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 95, No. 10, 2005, downloaded from http://ajph.aphapublications.org/cgi/
reprint/95/10/1707.

107. 1997 data from Sickmund, Melissa, T.J. Sladky, & Wei Kang, “Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement
Databook,” 2008, available online at www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp; and 2007 data from Sickmund, Melissa,
State Rates of Residential Placement of Juvenile Offenders by Placement Status, Facility Type, and Facility Size: 2007,
Pittsburgh, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice.

108. Authors calculations, using data from Puzzanchera, C., Adams, B., and Kang, W. (2009). “Easy Access to FBI Arrest
Statistics 1994–2007,” available online at www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr.

109. Author’s calculations, using data from Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement (1997 and 2007), and Easy
Access of FBI Arrest Statistics (www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/asp/ucr_display.asp).

45
110. Krisberg, Barry, Linh Vong, Christopher Hartney, & Susan Marchionna, A New Era in California Juvenile Justice:
Downsizing the State’s Youth Corrections System, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 2010, downloaded
from www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/dnld/Home/A_New_Era.pdf.

111. Males, Mike & Daniel Macallair, The California Miracle: Drastically Reduced Youth Incarceration,
Drastically Reduced Youth Crime, Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, July 2010, downloaded from
www.cjcj.org/files/The_California_Miracle.pdf.

112. Data analysis by Mike Males, Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, using data from Division of Juvenile Justice,
and Demographic Research Unit, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2010.

113. Crime in California 2009, California Department of Justice, downloaded at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/

publications/candd/cd09/preface.pdf; and prior year versions of Crime in California, all downloaded from
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs.php#crime.

114. Data analysis by Mike Males, Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, using data from Division of Juvenile Justice,
and Demographic Research Unit, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2010.

115. Males & Macallair, The California Miracle, supra note 111.

116. Males, Mike, Christina Stahlkapf, & Daniel Macallair, Crime Rates and Youth Incarceration in Texas and California
Compared: Public Safety or Public Waste? Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, June 2007, downloaded from
www.cjcj.org/files/Crime_Rates_and_Youth_Incarceration_in_Texas_and_California_Compared.pdf

117. Ibid.

118. “TYC Population Trends,” Texas Youth Commission, online chart, downloaded from
www.tyc.state.tx.us/research/growth_charts.html.

119. Texas Department of Public Safety, Crime in Texas reports 2006 through 2009, downloaded from
www.txdps.state.tx.us/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.htm.

120. Latessa, Edward J., Michael G. Turner, Melissa M. Moon, & Brandon K. Applegate, A Statewide Evaluation of the
RECLAIM Ohio Initiative, University of Cincinnati, 1998, downloaded at www.uc.edu/ccjr/Reports/Project
Reports/Reclaim.PDF.

121. Redeploy Illinois Annual Report to the Governor and General Assembly—January 2010, Redeploy Illinois Oversight
Board, 2010, downloaded from www.jjustice.org/pdf/Redeploy%20Report%20Jan%202010.pdf.

122. Petteruti, Walsh, & Velazquez, The Costs of Confinement, supra note 72.

123. Ibid.

124. Comprehensive Statistical Report Through Fiscal Year 2009: Juvenile Justice Services Care Management System,
Wayne County Department of Children and Family Services, 2009, downloaded from
www.waynecounty.com/documents/cfs_docs/AnnualStatisticalReport-FY09.pdf.

125. Ibid.

126. Steinhart, David & Jeffrey A. Butts, Youth Corrections in California, Urban Institute, 2002, downloaded from
www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410529_cayouthcorrections.pdf.

127. Krisberg, et al., A New Era in California Juvenile Justice, supra note 110.

128. JDAI Annual Results Report: 2009, Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2010, downloaded from www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention%20Alternatives%20Initiative/JDAIResultsReport2009/JDAIResults2009.pdf.

129. Nelson, Douglas W., A Road Map for Juvenile Justice Reform, Essay from 2008 KIDS COUNT Data Book,
Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2008, downloaded from www.aecf.org/~/media/PublicationFiles/AEC180
essay_booklet_MECH.pdf.

46
130. Puzzanchera, C., B. Adams, & W. Kang, Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics 1994–2007, 2009, downloaded from
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr.

131. For instance, the number of youth adjudicated delinquent on disorderly conduct charges doubled from
1995 to 2007, as did the number of youth placed in residential facilities for disorderly conduct. Adjudications
for vandalism, obstruction of justice, liquor law violations, drug law violations, and simple assaults have
also risen during this period. Puzzanchera, C. & W. Kang, Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics 1985–2007,
2010, downloaded from www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs.

132. Majd & Puritz, “The Cost of Justice,” supra note 91.

133. Ezell, M., TeamChild: Evaluation of the Second Year. Seattle, WA: University of Washington, School
for Social Work, 1997, cited in Puritz, Patricia & Wendy W.L. Shang, Innovative Approaches to Juvenile
Indigent Defense, U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1998, downloaded
from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171151.pdf; and Norrbin, Stafan C. & David W. Rasmussen,
An Evaluation of Team Child in Florida, Jesse Ball DuPont Fund, 2002, downloaded from
www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1195243887.58/FL%20TeamChild%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf.

134. Mallett, Christopher A. & Linda Julian, “Alternatives for Youth’s Advocacy Program: Reducing Minority
Youth Incarceration Placements in Cleveland,” Juvenile and Family Court Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2008.

135. Unpublished data compiled by Casey Strategic Consulting Group, Annie E. Casey Foundation, March 2009.

136. Unpublished data analysis provided by Southern Poverty Law Center. 2010.

137. Fiscal Responsibility: The Key to a Safer, Smarter, and Stronger Juvenile Justice System, Southern Poverty Law
Center, December 2010, downloaded from www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/
Fiscal_Responsibility.pdf.

138. Ibid.

139. Mendel, Richard A., The Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating Youthful Offenders,
Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2010, downloaded from www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/
Juvenile%20Detention%20Alternatives%20Initiative/MOModel/MO_Fullreport_webfinal.pdf.

140. Ramchand, R., A.R. Morral, & K. Becker, “Seven Year Outcomes of Adolescent Offenders in Los Angeles,”
American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 99, No. 5, May 2009.

141. Bright, Svoboda, et al. (2009), and Barth, R.P., Institutions vs. Foster Homes: The Empirical Base for the Second
Century of Debate, Chapel Hill, NC: UNC, School of Social Work, Jordan Institute for Families, 2002.

142. Harris, Phil, Brian Lockwood, & Liz Mengers, A CJCA White Paper: Defining and Measuring Recidivism,
Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, November 2009, downloaded from
http://cjca.net/cjcaresources/15/CJCA-Recidivism-White-Paper.pdf.

143. Performance-based Standards: Safety and Accountability for Juvenile Corrections and Detention Facilities,
Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators, January 2011.

144. 1997 data from Sickmund, et al., “Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement Databook,” and 2007
data from Sickmund, Melissa, State Rates of Residential Placement of Juvenile Offenders by Placement Status,
Facility Type, and Facility Size: 2007, supra note 107.

145. Ibid.

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