Introduction

The evolution of the The International Maritime Organisation

safety culture of IMO: a (IMO) as the only international regulatory
case of organisational body for safety affairs in the maritime industry
is directly connected with the management
culture change and prevention of disaster, whether this
alludes to marine accidents or sea pollution.
Kiriaki Mitroussi Thus, it holds a great interest as the central
subject of such a research. The way the IMO
shapes, develops, and puts into practice the
notion of marine safety and environmental
protection not only reflects the organisation's
attitude towards these issues but also affects
the formulation of the international
conception of marine safety. Most of the key
The author players in shipping recognise in the
organisation the authority to set safety
Kiriaki Mitroussi is an appointed Lecturer at the
standards to be achieved and be applicable to
University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece.
all, thus ensuring not only an acceptable level
of safety but fair competition as well.
Keywords In this way, the IMO is an interesting case
Safety, Corporate culture, Organizational change, of a UN agency. It is both efficient and
Shipping effective, and in contrast with the majority of
the UN departments ± in the sense that its
Abstract own understanding of several topics, its
principles, and its practices have implications
The focus of this paper is the UN's agency for the
for the wider maritime world ± they have a
maritime affairs, the International Maritime Organisation
profound effect on international business. It
(IMO) and more precisely its approach to maritime safety.
is, in other words, an active body with powers,
Being the only international rule-maker, the sole setter of
rarely enjoyed by other UN agencies, to
maritime safety standards that apply universally, the IMO
regulate to a high degree the industry with
exhibits increased interest especially with regard to its
organisational culture, the safety culture that constitutes
which it deals. As a result, an examination of
its core mission. An examination of the evolution of IMO's
the IMO is essentially an investigation into
safety culture is in essence an examination of the
the field of disaster prevention and risk
international approach to disaster prevention and risk
management in the business of shipping
management in shipping and it is in fact the subject of our worldwide.
present study. Our investigation will reveal the various The IMO, as with any other organisation
safety issues that have been treated by IMO as high whether business, social, governmental,
agenda items in recent years, as well as the factors that intergovernmental, or political, exhibits and is
can be regarded as instrumental in cultural change and, characterised by certain organisational
thus, in the evolution of IMO's safety philosophy. features, one of which is the organisational
culture. As culture we can define a system of
values shared by all the members of an
Electronic access
organisation, by an underlying philosophy
The Emerald Research Register for this journal is that serves and reflects its core mission, its
available at ``reason to be''. In the case of the IMO this
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister culture can be described as ``safety culture''
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is since the organisation's main concern and
available at primary aim has always been the safety at sea.
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm Organisational cultures are likely to evolve in
order to adjust to developments of a dynamic
environment, that is they can be
Disaster Prevention and Management
strengthened, be reshaped, or even change. In
Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . pp. 16-23
# MCB UP Limited . ISSN 0965-3562 the same way, the IMO has responded to
DOI 10.1108/09653560310463810 different forces within and outside the
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organisation, something that has been a culture becomes weak and requires
reflected in its priorities, its content, and its enhanced strengthening or transformation,
practices and that has affected its formation leaders must recognise the problematic areas
and application of the concept of safety. The and have the ability and the commitment to
aim of the present paper is to examine the redefine or replace the already existing
changes that IMO's culture underwent during assumptions with other more appropriate
the last decade demonstrating in this way how ones.
the organisation's approach to safety, and so The term ``environment'' encompasses
effectively the international approach to everything that could be directly or indirectly
marine disaster prevention and management, relevant to the achievement of the
has evolved. organisation's goals and influence the success
or failure of its efforts to fulfill its mission. It is
not rare for a particular organisation's culture
The concept of organisational culture to prove effective for a certain time and within
a set of conditions but whose effectiveness is
The large number of definitions for seriously hindered when times and conditions
organisational culture has developed around change. On such an occasion the organisation,
the notion of a cultivated system of values, in order to survive, will have to re-evaluate,
ideology, strategy and practices. It has been reinforce or even revise some of its
described as the dominant values espoused by assumptions and practices, that is, its culture.
an organisation (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), Technological advances, changes in the social
the philosophy that guides an organisation's milieu and the political scene, new codes of
policy (Ouchi, 1981), a system of shared industrial ethics and values, economic shifts,
meaning (Robbins, 1990), or even the the sensitivity of public opinion and the rise of
organisation's personality (Robbins, 1994). public pressure groups are some of the major
Organisational culture is ``a pattern of basic factors that constitute a dynamic environment
assumptions ± invented, discovered or and can contribute to the evolution of a given
developed by a given group as it learns to cope organisational culture.
with its problems of external adaptation and
internal integration ± that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and therefore, Changing organisational cultures
to be taught to new members as the correct
way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to Culture is the outcome of group learning. The
those problems'' (Schein, 1985). process involves a shared problem definition
The major constituents of organisational and a shared recognition that something
culture are the values and mores of an invented actually works and continues to
organisation, the people who build them up work. When the established patterns no
and the environment closely connected with longer serve, at least to the required degree,
their formulation. The values are the basic the purpose of the organisation, then the
concepts and beliefs, the purpose and the latter may be facing the beginning of a
objectives according to which the organisation cultural changing process. Although changing
develops its sense of identity (Schein, 1980) organisational cultures can be difficult,
and its public image. As a result, the because once formed they tend to become
organisation's ability to live by and up to its entrenched (Robbins, 1990), there are some
established values is of major importance not conditions that have been observed to favour
only to the achievement of its aims, but and even initiate cultural change.
essentially also to its survival capabilities. A major facilitating force for cultural
The key people are the ones behind the change is a dramatic crisis, which, however, is
creation, the transmission, the sustaining and consciously perceived by the organisation's
even the changing of cultures. They are members (Harrison, 1995). When people
distinguished figures in the group who usually recognise that significant aspects of the way in
hold leading positions and have the which the organisation operates are not any
responsibility and power to communicate more effective and that the survival of the
assumptions and values to the members in a organisation is threatened, they are more
clear manner and ultimately set the cultural willing to give up old values and practices and
tone running through the organisation. When take up new ones. For instance, cultural
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change has been observed when the practices, which was the original intention
organisation experiences economic difficulty (O'Neil, 1995a). The culture of the IMO is
or inability to respond to drastic changes in identified as a safety culture with all the
the environment, which prevents it from members of the organisation sharing the same
achieving its goals and damages its public values concerning safety and being dedicated
image and reputation. Second, a change in to the aim of improving safety standards to the
the organisation's leadership has been found highest practicable levels. The concept of
to have an impact on cultural change. A new, safety culture of the IMO also includes the
respectful leadership carrying with them a notion of pollution prevention, as this is also
new, clear set of values and ideas and the an issue of safety: a safety of the environment,
ability to communicate them successfully the oceans, the wildlife and the waterfowl and
favour a shift in the existing culture. of the public health. The slogan ``Safer
It may also be that not fundamental change Shipping and Clearer Oceans'', which was
but a strengthening of the current culture is adopted by the organisation and widely used
required. This can prove very effective for especially in the 1980s and 1990s, epitomizes
organisations that have a feasible strategy and IMO's objectives and offers a successful
a solid culture but are not at the highest level representation of its culture.
of functioning that can be obtained within
their basic cultural assumptions. IMO's concerns in the 1980s
``Strengthening a culture means bringing it to On many occasions the focus of the IMO
the top of its capability without changing its changed and its objectives evolved. In the
fundamental values and beliefs'' (Harrison, early years the IMO concentrated on
1995). This can be achieved by looking developing international regulation and as a
critically into the weaknesses and deficiencies result the majority of its conventions were
of the organisation and primarily adjusting to adopted between 1969 and 1979. As most of
the dynamic environment by reorganising and the key subjects were covered and the
allocating resources to those areas which are complexity in the industry increased, the aims
crucial to success. of the organisation in the realization of its
The case of IMO comes, as we will see, safety culture began to move in different
closer to the notion of culture strengthening, directions.
rather than overall culture change. This was a The 1980s, especially the first half, were
cultural evolution that has affected deeply the distinctly marked by the focus on improving
international perception and practice of implementation of the conventions by
marine safety. In the following pages we will offering technical assistance to developing
examine this evolution by looking into IMO's countries. The change of emphasis from the
priorities, principles and objectives during the adoption of new regulations to the effective
1980s as well as the approach to safety in implementation of existing instruments
the 1990s. became an official policy of the IMO
Assembly in 1979 (Srivastava, 1984), while
the technical assistance programme, which
had begun in the 1960s expanded in the
The case of IMO
1980s and was formally recognised by the
The purpose of IMO IMO Assembly in 1981 (IMO Assembly,
IMO, which was adopted and convened in 1981). The technical cooperation activities of
1948 and entered into force in 1958, was IMO concentrated mainly on training, on
created as an answer to the need for a developing human resources within
universal permanent shipping body under developing countries and improving the
whose auspices the already adopted quality of seafarers, the highlight of these
international agreements would be kept up-to- efforts being the foundation of the World
date and further measures would be promoted Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden in
on a regular basis. In fact, the main concern of 1983. The need for global cooperation and
the organisation became the development of for success of the technical assistance
international machinery to improve safety at programme was emphasized on many
sea, which concentrated on technical issues occasions in the 1980s (Srivastava, 1981,
without ever actually tackling such sensitive 1982) but there was always a distinction
areas as discrimination and restrictive between traditional, developed maritime
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countries and emerging, developing ones and tended to treat safety issues on a fragmented
a question of lack of means and not of will basis, but now it adopted a more holistic
with regard to the issue of problematic approach to the safety concept and that was
implementation (Srivastava, 1986). clearly exhibited in the joint meetings of the
In later years when the will to implement organisation's Maritime Safety Committee
the regulations would also be questioned (MSC) and the Marine Environment
irrespective of the maritime history of the Protection Committee (MEPC), which
country a new perspective had to be adopted. started taking place in 1993.
The sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise in On top of the above, IMO started moving
1987 signified a shift of attention and, away from a mere technical domain to the
although effective implementation was still encouragement and promotion of a new, for
the issue, the emphasis was now on the maritime world, concept, that of a safety
promoting safe shipboard management and culture penetrating all the sectors and the
changing attitudes for diligent application of people in the industry. It was appreciated that
rules, thus reducing the likelihood of human regulatory activity in itself is not sufficient and
error (Srivastava, 1988). that for effective disaster prevention shipping
Generally, the increasing number of needed something it always lacked: a more
developing countries becoming IMO safety oriented attitude by all parties to make
members and ratifying its conventions, and safety an integral part of the day-to-day
their lack of maritime expertise and financial activities. The adoption of a proactive stance
and human resources made the provision of and the support and promotion of the concept
appropriate assistance to these states of safety culture marked the evolution of the
imperative (O'Neil, 1996a). On the other IMO's organisational culture over the last
hand, Mr Srivastava, the Secretary-General decade. Within the realms of that effort, IMO
during that period, played a very important became concerned with a number of safety
role. Coming from a non-maritime country ± issues.
India ± and having a past professional
experience in its public sector, he knew first- The ship-type approach
hand the requirements and problems of the Particular emphasis was given to the ship-type
development of maritime infrastructure, approach, which was used for a thorough
campaigned vigorously for the establishment review of safety legislation for both ro-ro
and expansion of the technical assistance ferries and bulk carriers, involving people
programme and of training (IMO News, from different sectors and enabling a more
1981) and managed to be convincing in what proactive activity (Pattofatto, 1996).
he proposed and represented, bringing the With the dawn of the 1990s the appallingly
IMO close to the developing world. high rate of bulk carrier losses and casualties ±
34 bulk carrier casualties in one year with 16
total losses and a cost of 250 lives (O'Neil,
A change in IMO's organisational culture 1991) ± caused the Secretary-General to
prepare a number of draft resolutions dealing
The alertness of the shipping industry with the safety of bulk carriers and submitting
following a marine disaster has been a them to the 17th Assembly (IMO News,
phenomenon ever since the sinking of the 1991). The industry was asked to put into
Titanic. On several occasions a tragic accident effect a series of interim measures (IMO
has brought to the fore a number of safety Assembly, 1991) but the increase in relevant
issues which previously had not been given accidents in 1994 ± Marika 7, Apollo Sea and
the proper attention by the maritime Iron Antonis vanished without trace together
community. From the beginning of the with another seven bulker casualties and the
1990s, however, IMO appeared determined loss of 130 lives (Lloyd's List, 1994a) ± caused
to shake off the characterization of it being the bulk carrier issue to be consistently on the
simply reactive to marine disasters and it agenda of the MSC (sessions 65th to 68th).
started talking about a philosophy of The severity of the problem was once again
``anticipating and preventing'' (O'Neil, 1990) exhibited with the loss of two more bulk
and about ``becoming proactive rather than carriers at the beginning of 1997, the Leros
reactive in improving international Strength and the Albion Two and of 47 lives,
legislation'' (O'Neil, 1991). Until then IMO despite the fact that they had both undergone
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an enhanced survey and made inevitable the arrangements ± similar to the Paris
adoption of amendments to the SOLAS memorandum of understanding in Europe ±
convention on bulk carrier safety. following a draft resolution prepared and
In the same way, ro-ros continued submitted to the Assembly by the Secretary-
attracting IMO's special attention, after the General himself. It was judged that port state
1988 and 1989 SOLAS amendments, and control is most successful when organised
this was exhibited through a number of regionally with the exchange of information
further amendments to SOLASL the May and the quick identification of sub-standard
1990, the May 1991 and the April and ships. IMO's treaties gave governments the
December 1992 amendments (Focus on IMO, authority to inspect ships visiting their ports
1997). After the fire on the ro-ro to see that they meet IMO requirements but
Scandinavian Star, which killed 158 had been limited to examining the relevant
passengers, and on the Moby Prince with the certificates and so the 1994 amendments to
loss of 141 people, many parties ± the UK for SOLAS came to extend port state's authority
example ± pressured for the adoption of more to include control of operational
stringent measures. It took, however, another requirements, that is, the ability of the crew to
tragic disaster with the loss of more than 900 carry out their duties.
lives ± the capsizing of the Estonia in In respect of the flag state, in December in
September 1994 ± to reopen the whole 1992, the MSC at its 61st session sanctioned
question of ro-ro safety. The Secretary- the creation of a new sub-committee to probe
General took the unprecedented step of flag-state implementation of international
ordering a complete review of ro-ro safety, agreed conventions on safety and pollution
establishing a panel of safety experts to prevention in an effort to limit the freedom of
recommend action (IMO News, 1994). The interpretation allowed by vague phrases such
panel's report and recommendations were as ``to the satisfaction of administration''
considered by the MSC in its 65th session in contained in its conventions (Lloyd's List,
May 1995, and in November of the same 1993). In its first meeting in April 1993 under
year, at a special conference, agreement on the title Sub-Committee on Flag State
the application of the full SOLAS 90 damage Implementation (FSI) it approved guidelines
stability standard to existing passenger ro-ro for the authorization of organisations acting
ferries was achieved. The next time the on behalf of the administration, which were
question of ro-ro safety was addressed was in adopted by the Assembly later in the year and
relation to the operation of passenger ships were made mandatory as Regulation 1 of a
and was closely intertwined with the concept new Chapter XI included in SOLAS with the
of embedding a safety culture in the industry. 1994 amendments to the Convention.
In November 1995 the Assembly adopted a Through the years the sub-committee has
draft resolution ``. . . recommending been very active, addressing many
governments and international organizations contemporary issues and exhibiting IMO's
concerned to initiate work with the aim of determination for promoting implementation
establishing a safety culture in and around matters.
passenger ships . . .'' (IMO Assembly, 1995).
A more proactive stance to the question of ro- Ship management ± the human element
ro safety was clearly adopted. The other most attended problem has been
the contribution of the human element ±
Implementation whether shipboard or shore-based personnel ±
With regard to the implementation issue, to the occurrence of marine accidents. IMO's
IMO's preoccupation in the last decade has consistent efforts to improve ship operations
been with ensuring uniform compliance of its and management and seafarers' standards led
regulations by all flag states, regardless of to the adoption of a new chapter in SOLAS ±
their maritime tradition and to develop a Chapter IX ± in May 1994 and a revised
procedure for monitoring their application STCW convention in July 1995. IMO shifted
and enforcement. The MSC agreed that there its emphasis from mainly technical aspects to
was a need to improve both port and flag state dealing with human factors (Moloney, 1993).
procedures and in November 1991 the The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster
Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the underlined the importance of management
establishment of regional port state control and ship operations in promoting safety and
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environmental protection. IMO's first Safety culture

attempt to address this problem was made at The concept of safety culture in and around
the end of 1980s with the adoption of IMO ships which came about through the
guidelines on management for the safe procedures of developing and adopting the
operation of ships and for pollution SOLAS Chapter IX and the revised STCW
prevention. At the beginning of the 1990s, has been strongly advocated by IMO,
with the high-profile marine accidents, IMO particularly during and after 1995. In March
concentrated more on the issue, replacing in 1995 the Director of the Maritime Safety
1991 the already existing guidelines with a Division stated that the underlying drive
new updated version in resolution A.680(17). within IMO at that time was to become more
However, it also took the subject even further: proactive rather than reactive in preventing
in November 1993, and with the increasing accidents (Mitropoulos, 1995), while in the
worries about poor management standards, same year Mr O'Neil advocated that IMO was
the Assembly adopted the International trying to make safety part of the culture of
Safety Management (ISM) code with a view shipping and not some sort of optional extra
to making it mandatory the following year. (O'Neil, 1995b). In a number of speeches
One of the most discussed initiatives of given by the IMO's head the need for an
IMO was the incorporation of the ISM code attitude of a safety culture was firmly
into the SOLAS as a new chapter, Chapter underlined (O'Neil, 1995c,d; O'Neil,
IX, by the 1994 amendments to the 1996b,c; O'Neil, 1997).
convention. Under the code it is clear that the Another idea closely connected with IMO's
so-called human element, which has been implementation of a more proactive stance
found to be responsible for 80 percent of the was also the adoption of formal safety
marine accidents, does not apply only to assessment (FSA) for the management of
seafarers but includes those on shore as well. safety in shipping, which essentially means
SOLAS Chapter IX introduced a more safety setting safety goals by identifying particular
oriented attitude within the industry and was hazards and risks that can be dealt with by risk
officially seen as instrumental to the concept management (Lloyd's List, 1994b).
of safety culture (IMO Assembly, 1995). On the whole, IMO's concept of safety has
The focus on operational error in the casualty evolved the past decade from a fixation on
statistics related to crew standard was first technical matters to the concentration on the
identified as a priority agenda item in May 1990 human element in ship operations and on
at the 58th session of the MSC, and in 1993 at implementation; from a reactive attitude to
the 64th session on the MSC it was agreed to accidents to the promotion of a safety culture
speed up the review process of the STCW and the adoption of formal safety assessment;
Convention by employing outside consultants and from a mere advisory role of the
and inviting international maritime training organisation to a supervisory and auditing
institutes to assist (IMO News, 1993). Through role. In this way, the evolution of its culture
1995, and as the 65th session of the MSC becomes more than evident.
adopted the STCW amendments, IMO kept
asserting that people remained the crucial
element in the management of safety (Lloyd's Factors affecting change
List, 1995). Under these amendments IMO
became the ``guarantor of the validity of a flag's IMO as any other organisation is in a constant
certificates'' and it was given the power to and active interaction with its immediate and
control and the ability to react to ineffective wider environment and is affected by it.
administrations by refusing to approve their Significant changes that have taken place in
certificates (Grey, 1995). Mr O'Neil in his the last years in the composition of the
closing remarks at the IMO conference in July maritime industry have contributed to the
1995 predicted that this could be the turning IMO's choices and the evolution of its culture.
point in IMO's history and heralds a new dawn
(O'Neil, 1995a), underlining the importance of The maritime scene
the issue of the human element which has since The unfavourable economic conditions
been repeatedly raised in connection with the prevailing for long periods in the industry have
newly evolved concept of establishing a safety been the root cause for many of the
culture in the industry. contemporary trends. Investment in new
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tonnage and proper repairs and maintenance many of IMO's activities were suspended and
have been discouraged by high building costs, much of its work slowed down. On the other
low freight rates and the 1970s massive over- hand, a number of marine disasters highly
supply of vessels and caused the world fleet to publicized, continuous pressure from
be characterised by old and badly maintained politicians and unilateral initiatives, the mass
ships. In the same way, the proliferation of media and green organisations, like the
flags of convenience designed to suit owners' Friends of the Earth and Green peace
requirements for operation of sub-standard International ± both of which have been
ships without having to face stringent admitted as non-governmental consultative
enforcement of safety measures, the weakness members to IMO ± proved on many occasions
of flag states to carry out successfully their driving forces for IMO's work.
statutory duty of surveying, and the decline of
the quality of classification society inspections, The role of the Secretary-General
as societies sought to maintain their client base Mr William O'Neil, who took over after a
under commercial pressures (Lloyd's List, 15-year leadership by Mr Shrivastava,
1993b) influenced IMO's decisions. One such managed to personally signify many times a
example would be the establishment of a new shift in the organisation's priorities and affect
flag state implementation sub-committee and the evolution of its safety culture. Bringing in a
generally IMO's attempts to ensure solid background of maritime and
implementation of its conventions through the management experience he represented ``an
flag and port state activities. efficiency and clarity of purpose'' as opposed
IMO's focus on the human element and to ``the traditional IMO well-mannered
crew standards can be seen within the context diplomacy and charm'' (BIMCO Bulletin,
of the internalization of shipping and the use 1991). Three times he dared to break from the
of multi-national crew. The increasing supply customs and practices of his predecessors and
of seafarers from non-traditional labour used his influence on the organisation as a
supply areas with insufficient training, whole in significant marine safety matters,
infrastructure and doubtful certificates of opening the bulk carrier and ro-ro safety
qualification, the questionable seafarers' debate and putting his weight behind the
commitment with the weakening of the links revision of STCW Convention by bringing it
between shipboard personnel and ownership forward from 1998 to mid-1995 without
and language and communication problems having to resort to undermining compromises.
among ratings, officers and even passengers
inhibit the safe ship operation by increasing
the risk of human error. Added to all the Conclusions
above, the fragmentation of the shipping
industry has also been a cause of concern for This paper has attempted an examination of
the IMO. The fact that so many different the evolution of the organisational culture of
companies and nationalities are involved in IMO, an investigation into its safety culture.
the operation of a single ship ± in terms of According to our findings, IMO's concept of
ownership, registration, management, safety has gone through a number of different
manning etc. ± spreads the accountability for phases responding each time to the industry's
its safety very thinly and makes IMO's work needs, aiming at resolving complicated safety
even more strenuous. matters and being reflected in the targets the
organisation set each time to eliminate or
Pressures on IMO reduce the likelihood of accidents. The focus
A number of additional factors made of interest of the IMO has shifted many times
necessary and signified a change in IMO's from the concerns about the safety
safety orientations. At the beginning of 1990s implications of particular types of ship to the
IMO faced a major survivability problem due concentration on the involvement of the
to the lack of financial support and its falling human factor in marine casualties and from
credibility, both of which are recognised as adopting regulations connected with technical
factors facilitating change in organisations. At issues to designing official instruments for safe
that time, two of its largest contributors, practices in ship operation and processes for
Liberia and Panama proved unable to fulfill risk management. The safety culture of the
their financial obligations and as a result IMO did gradually evolve during the last
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decade but whatever change has been IMO News (1994), ``Complete review of ro-ro ferry safety
observed it has been connected with the safety called for by Secretary-General'', IMO News, No. 4,
p. 2.
issues the organisation treated as high priority Lloyd's List (1993), ``IMO aims to get tough with rogue
agenda items and always with the aim of states'', Lloyd's List, 31 March.
strengthening its culture rather than changing Lloyd's List (1993b), ``Facing responsibilities for safety'',
it completely. Lloyd's List, 8 July.
Lloyd's List (1994a), ``Ageing bulkers at risk, says IMO
Our examination has also shown that the
chief'', Lloyd's List, 15 September.
organisational culture of the IMO has been Lloyd's List (1994b), ``Times are changing'', Lloyd's List,
subject to the same factors recognised as 29 March.
contributory to change in also other business, Lloyd's List (1995), ``IMO head in safety warning'', Lloyd's
List, 31 March.
political or intergovernmental organisations,
Mitropoulos, E.E. (1995), ``IMO recognises the need to be
such as a dynamic environment, a crisis and a more proactive'', Lloyd's List, 23 March.
change in leadership. IMO's priorities and Moloney, S. (1993), ``IMO told prevention is better than
course of action have clearly been affected by cure'', Lloyd's List, 15 September.
the aforementioned forces as we have already O'Neil, W.A. (1990), ``World maritime day 1990'', IMO
News, No. 3, p. 10.
seen. O'Neil, W.A. (1991), ``World maritime day 1991: a
We can, therefore, conclude that first of all message from the Secretary-General, Mr W.A.
although the core mission of the IMO has O'Neil'', IMO News, No. 3, p. 7.
remained unaltered, in the sense that its O'Neil, W.A. (1995a), ``World maritime day 1995'', IMO
News, No. 3.
culture has always been and still is a ``safety O'Neil, W.A. (1995b), ``A message from the Secretary-
culture'', the approach to achieving it has General of IMO'', Seaways, October, p. 6.
taken different forms. In this way, an O'Neil, W.A. (1995c), ``Keynote speech by Mr William
evolution in the organisational culture of O'Neil'', Training and the Human Element in
Accident Prevention Conference, 11 October,
IMO triggered by certain factors can clearly New York, NY.
be observed. However, when we talk about O'Neil, W.A. (1995d), ``Quality management and the
cultural evolution in the case of IMO we talk human factor'', Norwegian Maritime Traffic and
about the strengthening of its organisational Environment Safety Conference, 7 November,
Hausgesund.
culture and not a complete and fundamental
O'Neil, W.A. (1996a), ``World maritime day 1996'', IMO
change in its philosophy and system of shared News, No. 3, p. 4.
values. O'Neil, W.A. (1996b), ``Preventing pollution: the way
ahead'', James Callaghan Lecture, House of Lords,
1 May, Westminster.
O'Neil, W.A. (1996c), ``Speech by Mr William O'Neil'',
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