1. CF Sharp Crew vs.

Espanol
G.R. No. 155903, Sept. 14, 2004

FACTS:
While CF Sharp’s accreditation with POEA was still pending, Savva and Tjiakouris from LCL (in new
Crewing Agreement with CF Sharp) conducted interviews, allegedly in connection with seamen’s past
employment with Rizal.

Rizal filed a complaint for illegal recruitment, and for designating and/or appointing agents,
representatives and employees, without prior approval from POEA.

CF Sharp claims that there was no illegal recruitment since the interviews were not for selection and
recruitment; and that it was only upon approval of its accreditation that employment contracts were
entered into and actual deployment of seamen were made.

ISSUE:
Whether CF Sharp is liable for illegal recruitment.

HELD:
Yes. The conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.

Art. 13(b), Labor Code defines RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT as:

“any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.

The fact that CF Sharp did not receive payment during the interview is of no moment. Art. 13(b)
provides that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. Notably, it is the lack of the necessary
license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.

2. PEOPLE vs. MATEO

G.R. No. 198012, April 22, 2015

FACTS:
Five private complainants met with appellants on separate occasions to apply for overseas employment.
They were promised with employment in Japan for a fee; that they could facilitate employment as direct
hires; and assurance of departure within 3 weeks.

Private complainants paid the required fees but appellants failed to secure any overseas employment
for them. POEA issued a Certification stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for
overseas employment.

ISSUE:
Whether appellants committed illegal recruitment in large scale.

HELD:
Yes.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, Elements:

a. the person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Sec. 6, RA 8042;
 b. accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engaged in the recruitment of
workers; and
c. accused committed the same against 3 or more persons individually or as a group.

These elements are obtaining in this case.

1st: Appellants have undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised private complainants
employment in Japan for a fee.
nd
2 : Certification issued by POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a license nor
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.
3rd: There were 5 complainants.

Money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment for the law defines the same as whether
for profit or not.

Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the law may, for the same
acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Art. 315 par 2(a) of the RPC.

The elements of estafa are:

a. the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit;
b. the offended party or 3rd party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.

1st: Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit by making it appear as though they had the authority and
resources to send them to Japan for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan
for which they would be hired although in truth there were none.
2nd: That by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their
money in payment of the placement fee, documentation and hotel accommodations.

3. PEOPLE vs. DAUD

G.R. No. 197539, June 2, 2014

FACTS:
Daud and other appellants put up their own business named Green Pastures Worldwide Tours and
Consultancy Corporation. They promised the complainants that they would be able to leave as workers
in Korea upon payment of the placement fees. They were found out to be unlicensed to recruit for
overseas employment.

Gallemit denied owning the agency and undertaking any recruitment act or receiving any amounts from
the complainants considering that his name did not appear in the receipts

ISSUE:
Whether Daud is liable for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa

HELD:
Yes.

Art. 13(b), Labor Code defines RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT as

“any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers;
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not.”
RA 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment and provided stiffer penalties for those that
constitute economic sabotage: Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed
by a Syndicate.

Sec. 6(m) of RA 8042

… Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of 3 or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against 3 or more persons individually or as a group.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, Elements:

a. the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers;
b. the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement”; and
c. the offender committed the same against 3 or more persons individually or as a group.

The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are present in the case at bar.

1st: neither agency Green Pastures nor appellant himself had a valid license or authority to engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers.

License: a document issued by DOLE authorizing a person or entity to operate a private

employment agency
Authority: a document issued by DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in
recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.

It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment activity unlawful
or criminal.

2nd: despite not having such authority, appellant, along with his co-accused, nevertheless engaged in
recruitment activities, offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting from
them various amounts as placement fees.

3rd: 3 complainants testified against appellant’s acts of illegal recruitment

Gallemit conspired with the other appellants. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It
is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is
sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Gallemit was present during the
showing of job orders and paying of the fees and was the one who apprised complainant of the job
benefits and overseas employment through their agency.

It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under Art. 315, par 2(a) of the RPC. Illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum where criminal intent is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is
malum in se where criminal intent is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the LC does not
bar conviction for offenses punishable by the RPC. The same goes in case of acquittal.

Art. 315, par 2(a), RPC defines estafa as:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned…
2. By means of any of the ff false pretenses or fraudulent acts…
 (a) By using a fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.

Elements of estafa are:

a. that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
b. that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
3rd person

4. POWERHOUSE STAFF BUILDERS vs. REY

G.R. No. 190203, Nov. 7, 2016

FACTS:
Powerhouse hired respondents as operators for its foreign capital, Catcher for the duration of 2 years.
Before the said term was up, Catcher informed respondent employees that they would be reducing their
working days due to low orders and financial difficulties. The respondent employees were repatriated.

Respondent employees filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, refund of placement fees, moral
and exemplary damages against Powerhouse and Catcher. Powerhouse maintained that respondent
employees voluntarily gave up their job and received payment thru settlement before their repatriation.
It also moved to implead JEJ as respondent on account of the alleged transfer to the latter of Catcher’s
accreditation.

ISSUE:
Whether Powerhouse is liable for monetary claims of respondent employees

HELD:
Yes.

Sec. 10, RA 8042 clearly states the solidary liability of the principal and the recruitment agency to the
employees and this liability shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification for the
entire duration of the employment contract.

Even if there was transfer of accreditation by Catcher from Powerhouse to JEJ, Powerhouse’s liability to
respondent employees remained intact because respondent employees are not privy to such contract,
and in their overseas employment contract approved by POEA, Powerhouse is the recruitment agency of
Catcher.

To rule otherwise and free Powerhouse of its liability against respondent employees would go against
the rationale of RA 8042 to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of overseas Filipino workers,
and run contrary to this law’s intention to an additional layer of protection to overseas workers. This
ensures that overseas workers have the recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment.
By providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be “enforced to the full extent” against the
local agent, the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.
Corollary, the provision on joint and several liability shifts the burden of going after the foreign
employer, to the local employment agency instead.
5. MORE MARITIME AGENCIES vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 124927, May 18, 1999

FACTS:
Private respondent Homicillada entered into an overseas contract with More Maritime and was to be
employed as oiler on board MV Rhine. While working on said vessel, he started experiencing pain on his
left leg. His condition worsened but the ship Captain still required him to work.

He was repatriated and was diagnosed with a slipped-disc. The diagnostic center recommended the apt
procedure to alleviate his pain but More Maritime disregarded the recommendation and proposed
instead a less costly procedure. Homicillada’s condtion did not improve. Thus, his complaint for disability
and medical benefits.

Petitioner More Maritime counters that Homicillada is not entitled to said benefits because his illness
was pre-existing, concealed from them, and unrelated to his employment.

ISSUE:
Whether Homicillada is entitled to disability and medical benefits

HELD:
Yes.

Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whatever the injury or disease was pre-existing at the
time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It
is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect
condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman
brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the
health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened
condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person.
If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the
previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease.

The fact is before the complainant was made to sign the contract, he was required to undergo medical
examination and declared fit to work otherwise the respondent would not have accommodated him.
Being an employer, the respondent had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and choose their
applicants and whether they are medically, psychologically and mentally fit. The moment it has chosen
an applicant, it is deemed to have subjected its applicant to the required pre-qualification standard.

6. Carcedo vs. Maine Marine Phils.

G.R. No. 203804, April 15, 2015

FACTS:
Carcedo was engaged with Maine Marine as Chief Officer on board M/V Speedwell. His foot was
wounded because of his safety shoes. His foot’s condition worsened when he slid down the deck and
bumped his right foot. He was repatriated and immediately referred to the company-designated
physician, Dr. Cruz. He underwent treatment and Dr. Cruz made a report on his condition dated March
24,2009. He was again admitted due to infection of the amputated stump. He was discharged from the
hospital on June 6, 2009.
 Carcedo filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. Case pending, he consulted
another surgeon who amputated his second toe. Said doctor recommended that Carcedo is not fit to
return to his previous work duties.

Maine Marine posits that there were valid reasons to deny Carcedo’s claims:
a. they were bound by the provisions on disability compensation under the POEA SEC and CBA;
b. the disability assessment of the company-designated physician should be given utmost
credence over the other doctor who examined Carcedo; and
c. it had not acted in bad faith and dealt fairly with Carcedo.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits

HELD:
Yes.

Under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be
considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading form 2 to
14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a
period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under
legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.

The company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definitive assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to
work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s
medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Carcedo continued to require medical treatments even after the assessment of Dr. Cruz. Since he required
further medical treatments beyond the 120 day period, his total and temporary disability was extended. Dr. Cruz
failed to give Carcedo’s final disability assessment within the said period.

Here, the company-designated physician failed to give a definitive impediment rating of Carcedo’s disability
beyond the extended temporary disability period, after the 120-day period but less than 240 days. By operation
of law, therefore, Carcedo’s total and temporary disability lapsed into a total and permanent disability.

7. EYANA vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS

G.R. No. 193468, Jan. 28, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent hired petitioner as utility cleaner on board M/V Century where his tasks were
predominantly manual in nature. He felt a sudden pain in his back after lifting a 30-kl block of cheese
from the freezer shelf. He was repatriated and immediately referred to company doctor for treatment.
He was advised to undergo physical therapy. Dr. Alegre informed respondent that petitioner still
suffered from persistent back pains and restricted mobility and was given a Disability Grade of 8.

Petitioner sought the opinion of another doctor who concluded that petitioner had a Disability Grade of
1 and was unfit for sea duty. Thus petitioner’s complaint for disability benefits.

Respondents argue that petitioner is entitled to compensation for Grade 8 disability, in accordance with
POEA-SEC.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
 HELD:
Yes.

A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician
within the periods he is allowed, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment
period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.

When petitioner filed his complaint, he was still undergoing physical therapy and his injury had yet been
fully addressed, more than 120 days had gone by. The Court has ruled that TOTAL AND PERMANENT
DISABILITY refers to the seafarer’s incapacity to perform his customary sea duties for more than 120
days.

Permanent disability: the inability of the worker to perform his job for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
Respondent was unable to work for more than 120 days, due to his
medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.

Total disability: the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work
of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or
any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could
do.
It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is
not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.

The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to
perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent disability.

8. GARGALLO vs. DOHLE SEAFRONT CREWING

G.R. No. 215551, Aug. 17, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner claims for permanent total disability benefits based on the following reasons:
a. he accidentally fell on deck while lifting heavy loads of lube oil drum, with his left arm hitting
the floor first, bearing his full body weight;
b. he has remained permanently unfit for further sea service despite his major surgery and
further treatment by company-designated physicians; and
c. his permanent total unfitness to work was duly certified by his chosen physician whose
certification must prevail over the palpably self-serving and biased assessment of the
company-designated physicians.

Respondents countered that the fit-to-work findings of the physicians must prevail over that of
petitioner’s independent doctor, considering that:
a. they were the ones who continuously treated and monitored petitioner’s medical condition;
and
b. petitioner failed to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC.
They further averred that the filing of the claim was premature since petitioner was still undergoing
medical treatment within the allowable 240-day period at the time the complaint was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
 HELD:
No.

The complaint for permanent total benefits was premature, considering that:
a. petitioner was still under medical treatment of the company-designated physicians within
the allowable 240-day period;
b. the latter had not yet issued any assessment as to his fitness or disability; and
c. petitioner had not yet secured any assessment from his chosen physician, whom he
consulted only more than 2 months thereafter.

Moreover, petitioner failed to comply with the prescribed procedure under Sec. 20(A)(3) of the POEA-
SEC on the joint appointment by the parties of a 3rd doctor, in case the seafarer’s personal doctor
disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment.

“The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the
Company. If a doctor appointed by or on behalf of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a
third doctor may be nominated jointly between the Company and the Union and the decision of
this doctor shall be final and binding on both parties.”

Well-settled is the rule that the seafarer’s non-compliance with the mandated-conflict resolution
procedure under the POEA SEC and the CBA militates his claims, and results in the affirmance of the fit-
to-work certification of the company-designated physician.

9. REPUBLIC vs. HUMANLINK MANPOWER CONSULTANTS

G.R. No. 205188, April 22, 2015

FACTS:
Carlos applied at Worldview for employment to Doha, Qatar. Worldview submitted his application and
other documents to POEA under Humanlink as his recruiting agency. No receipt was issued for his
placement fee. He was made to sign an employment contract stating that he was to work another as a
duct man, instead of heavy equipment driver he applied for.

In Doha, he worked as duct man and made to sign a contract reducing his salary. He filed a complaint
with POEA Adjudication Office which found Humanlink liable for POEA Rules and Regulation. It added
that as a consequence of the cancellation of its license, its officers and directors are ordered disqualified
from participating in the overseas employment program of the government.

The CA disagreed with the consequence of the cancellation of the license and automatic disqualification
of officers and directors. It held that such penalty is violative of due process and in excess of POEA’s
supervisory power.

ISSUE:
Whether the POEA has the power to automatically disqualify officers and directors from participating in
the government’s overseas employment program upon the cancellation of a license.

HELD:
Yes.

Aware that overseas workers are vulnerable to exploitation, the State sought to protect the interests
and well-being of these workers with creation of specialized bodies such as the POEA under the direct
supervision of DOLE.
 One of the roles of POEA is the regulation and adjudication of private sector participation in the
recruitment and placement of overseas workers.

Art. 25 of the Labor Code provides:

“the private employment sector shall participate in the recruitment and placement of workers,
locally and overseas, under such guidelines, rules and regulations as may be issued by the Sec.
of Labor.”

Art. 35, Labor Code, where the legislature empowered DOLE and POEA to regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers.
“Art. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License Authority –
The Sec. of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to
recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued
by the Sec. of Labor.

Sec. 2, Rule I of POEA Rules and Regulations provides for the disqualifications for private sector
participation in the overseas employment program. It provides that persons, directors and officers of
whose licenses have been previously revoked or cancelled are disqualified from engaging in the
recruitment and placement of workers. Thus, upon the cancellation of a license, persons, officers and
directors of the concerned corporations are automatically prohibited from engaging in recruiting and
placement of land-based overseas Filipino workers.

Officers and directors of Humanlink are prohibited from engaging in the recruitment and placement of
overseas workers upon cancellation of Humanlink’s license. Based on the listed qualifications and
disqualifications of the Rules, they are not qualified to participate in the government’s overseas
employment program upon such cancellation. It was thus unnecessary for POEA or DOLE to issue a
separate decisions explicitly stating that persons, officers or directors of Humanlink are disqualified from
participating in government overseas recruitment programs.

10. SERRANO vs. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES

G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5 th par. of Sec. 10, RA No. 8042, as it is
violative of the constitutional provision on equal protection of laws.

Petitioner was a Filipino seafarer hired by Gallant Maritime as Chief Officer with a contract period of 12
months. On the date of his departure, he was constrained to accept a downgraded employment upon
the assurance that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of the following month. However,
respondents did not deliver on the said promise. Petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated. He had served only 2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9
months and 23 days.

Petitioner filed with the LA a complaint for constructive dismissal and for payment of his monetary
claims. The LA declared his dismissal illegal and awarded him monetary benefits in the amount of USD
8,770.00 representing his salary for 3 months of the unexpired portion of the contract. The LA based his
computation on the salary period of 3 months only – rather than the unexpired portion of 9 months and
23 days – applying the subject clause.
 Petitioner appealed to NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling that in case of
illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. NLRC
and CA denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether the last clause in the 5th par. of Sec. 10, RA No. 8042 infringes on OFWs’ constitutional right to
equal protection of laws.

HELD:
Yes.

The subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs.

The enactment of the subject clause in RA 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the
money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling
out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them
to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or
for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sharing the other category from
such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts falls short of one year.

Prior to RA 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged
were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of RA 8042,
specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with the unexpired portion of 1
year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money
claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with a
fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation
of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap
on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of 1 year or more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

11. PERT/CPM MANPOWER vs. VINUYA

G.R. No. 197528, Sept. 5, 2012

FACTS:

The NLRC ruled in favor of respondents in their complaint against petitioner agency. The NLRC declared
that the respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered herein petitioners to pay their monetary
claims.

Upon motion of the respondents, the NLRC modified its ruling and adjusted the respondents’ salary
entitlement, consistent with the Serrano ruling. The said ruling declared unconstitutional the clause “or
for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Sec. 10, par. 5 of RA 8042,
limiting the entitlement of illegally dismissed Filipino workers to their salaries for the unexpired term of
their contract or 3 months, whichever is less.
 Petitioner posits that the Serrano ruling does not apply since RA 10022, enacted on March 8, 2010 and
which amended RA 8042, restored the subject clause in Sec. 10 of RA 8042, declared unconstitutional by
the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Serrano ruling has been nullified by RA 10022, considering that it restored the subject
clause in the 5th par. of Sec. 10 of RA 8042.

HELD:
No.

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. By its very nature, the amendment
by RA 10022 – restoring a provision of RA 8042 declared unconstitutional – cannot be given retroactive
effect, not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but because
retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by
virtue of the Serrano ruling – entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.

All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective application, unless the purpose and
intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily
implied from the language used.

The court sees no reason to nullify the application of the Serrano ruling in the present case.

12. INT’L. MANAGEMENT SERVICES vs. LOGARTA

G.R. No. 163657, April 18, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent was employed for a period of 2 years as Piping Designer for Petrocon. Petrocon gave
respondent a written notice informing that due to lack of project works related to his expertise, he is
given a 30-day notice of termination.

Upon his return, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner as recruitment agency to recover his
unearned salaries covering the unexpired portion of his employment with Petrocon on the ground that
he was illegally dismissed.

Petitioner argues that NLRC erred in making an award under Sec. 10 of RA 8042 which is premised on a
termination of employment without just, valid or authorized cause, notwithstanding that NLRC itself
found Petrocon’s retrenchment to be justified.

ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 10 of RA 8042 applies to respondent’s separation pay claims

HELD:

No.

Said provision clearly reveals that it applies only to an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker or a
worker dismissed from overseas employment without juts, valid or authorized cause.
 In the case at bar, notwithstanding the fact that respondent’s termination from employment was
procedurally infirm, having not complied with the notice requirement, nevertheless the same remains to
be for a just, valid and authorized cause, i.e. retrenchment as a valid exercise of management
prerogative. The employer’s failure to comply with the 1-month notice to the DOLE prior to
respondent’s termination, it is only a procedural infirmity which does not render the retrenchment
illegal. The Court has ruled that when the dismissal is for a just cause, the absence of proper notice
should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectual. Instead the ER should indemnify the EE
for violation of his statutory rights.

It is Art. 283 of the Labor Code and not Sec. 10 of RA 8042 that is controlling. Thus, respondent is
entitled to payment of separation pay equivalent to 1 month pay, or at least ½ month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. Considering that respondent was employed by Petrocon for 8 months,
he is entitled to receive 1 month pay as separation pay.

13. BRIGHT MARITIME vs. FANTONIAL

G.R. No. 165935, Feb. 8, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent entered into a Contract of Employment with BMI. He shall be employed as boatswain of the
foreign vessel M/V AUK for a year. He was made to undergo a medical examination at the accredited
clinic. He was issued a Medical Cert. dated Jan. 17, 2000, which was stamped with “FIT TO WORK”.

On said date, however, he was informed by petitioner’s liaison that he cannot leave on that day due to
some defects in his medical certificate. He went back to the clinic and was informed that there nothing
irregular on the said document.

As respondent never got a call from petitioners, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of
salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract and damages.

Petitioners counter that they cannot be held for illegal dismissal as the contract of employment had not
yet commenced based on Sec. 2 of POEA Memo Circ. 055-96. With respondent’s non-departure, the
employment was not commenced, hence no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s reason for preventing respondent from leaving Manila and joining the vessel is
invalid.

HELD:
Yes.

Respondent’s Medical Certificate dated Jan. 17, 2000 and stamped with the words “FIT TO WORK”
proves that respondent was medically fit to leave Manila on Jan. 17, 2000 and to join the vessel M/V
AUK. The Medical Cert. submitted as documentary evidence is proof of its contents, including date
thereof which states that respondent was already declared fit to work on the date of his scheduled
deployment.

Even before the start of any ER-EE relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the
employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise
to a cause of action against the erring party.

In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove with substantial evidence that they had valid ground to
prevent respondent from leaving on the scheduled date of his deployment.
 Petitioner’s act of preventing respondent from leaving and complying with his contract of employment
constitutes breach of contract for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for
the loss of 1-year salary as provided in the contract.

14. SAMEER OVERSEAS vs. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139, Aug. 5, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner deployed respondent to work as quality control for a year at Wacoal in Taiwan. A certain Mr.
Hwang from Wacoal informed respondent without prior notice that she was terminated and that she
should prepare for immediate repatriation.

She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and asked for the return of her placement fee, amount for
repatriation costs, payment of 23 months salary and damages. Petitioner Sameer alleged that
respondent’s termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties and her failure to comply
with the work requirements of her foreign employer.

NLRC declared that there was illegal dismissal and granted an award of 3 months worth of salary. CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent was illegally dismissed and is entitled to an award of 3 months’ worth of salary and
reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just
causes of termination.

HELD:
Yes. Respondent was illegally dismissed and is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the
employment contract together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her
salary.

In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s
work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such allegations.
Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency standards
were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. There was no showing that
respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work efficiency and
performance were judged. The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that
there is just cause for termination.

Having been illegally dismissed, she is entitled to payment of the unexpired portion of her contract in
consonance with the ruling in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime.

In said case, the Court has ruled that the clause, “or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process. A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights,
imposes no duties, affords no protection, creates no office, is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all.

When a law or provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
be cured by reincorpoaration or re-enactment of the same or similar law or provision.
 Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling within the
same class and treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”. There is no
violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons within same class and if
there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do
not fall within the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonbale
classification.

A reasonable classification:
1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;
2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;
3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification. The classifications do
not rest on any real or substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of
computation of money claims resulting from illegal termination.

15. PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 141221-36, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
8 informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and 3 informations for estafa were filed
against accused-appellants, Sps. Reichl, together with Hernandez.

Trial court rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of 1 count of illegal recruitment in large
scale and 6 counts of estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellants of illegal recruitment in large scale by
cummulating 5 separate cases of illegal recruitment each field by a single complainant.

HELD:
No.

Accused-appellants cannot be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in large scale based on
several informations filed by only one complainant.

Citing PP vs. Reyes:

“When the LC speaks of ‘illegal recruitment committed against 3 or more persons individually or as a
group’, it must be understood as referring to the number of complainants in each case who are
complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cumulated
to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal
recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of 3 or more persons whether
individually or as a group.”

-------------------------------------------------
The charge was not only for illegal recruitment in large scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by
a syndicate. It has been shown that Sps. Reichl and Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing
private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them guarantee that they would be hired as
domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, they should be held liable for
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
 Prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the crime of estafa. A person convicted of
illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of the RPC, provided the
elements are present. Estafa under Art. 315 (2) is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damages.

16. PEOPLE vs. SAULO

G.R. No. 125903, Nov. 15, 2000

FACTS:
The accused were charged with violation of Art. 38 (b) of the LC, illegal recruitment in large scale and
estafa.

Saulo promised the petitioners that they would be able to leave for Taiwan as factory workers. They all
gave him a sum of money, however, the accused reneged on his promise to send them to Taiwan.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellants committed illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa

HELD:
Yes.

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:

a. The accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers as define in Art. 13 (b) or
in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the LC;
b. Accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Sec. of Labor and Employment
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, whether locally or overseas; and
c. Accused commits the same against 3 or more persons, individually or as a group.

Under Art. 13 (b) of the LC, recruitment and placement refers to “any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any
person r entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to 2 or more persons shall
be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”

The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised 3 complainants employment in

Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure
their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned
money to accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining
employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant Is not authorized nor licensed y DOLE to
engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders
all of accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal.

The Labor Code states that "any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."16
Corollarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not
been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor,
 or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary.17
It also bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but
whose appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term
nonlicensee or nonholder of authority. Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the
Labor Code.

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas
estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in
the former, but is required in the latter.

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the accused
has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.

17. PEOPLE vs. SAGAYDO

G.R. No. 124671-75, Sept. 29, 2000

FACTS:
Separate informations charging accused Linda Sagaydo with one (1) case of illegal recruitment in large
scale, and four (4) cases of estafa.

The trial court rendered a decision convicting her of the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant committed illegal recruitment and estafa, considering that she only processed
the travel documents of the private complainants as tourists, and that no recruitment for employment
abroad took place.

HELD:
Yes.

"Illegal recruitment has been defined to include the act of engaging in any of the activities mentioned in
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code without the required license or authority from the POEA. Under the
aforesaid provision, any of the following activities would constitute recruitment and placement:
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.

Article 13 (b) further provides that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two (2) or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group."

"This crime requires proof that the accused:

(1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the
prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and
(3) committed the infraction against three or more persons, individually or as a group."
 All the aforementioned requisites were present in this case. The accused-appellant made representations
to each of the private complainants that she could send them to Korea to work as factory workers,
constituting a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13 (b) of
the Labor Code. There is no denying that accused-appellant gave the complainants the distinct impression
that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to
part with their money in order to be employed. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the
complainants, mere denial of accused-appellant cannot prevail.

As to the license requirement, the record showed that accused-appellant did not have the authority to
recruit for employment abroad, per certification issued by the POEA Regional Extension Unit in Baguio
City, 19 stating that "...the name LINDA SAGAYDO per existing and available records from this Office is not
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or any part of
the Region." It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment unlawful or
criminal.

Anent the last requirement, accused-appellant engaged in illegal recruitment against four (4) persons.

A person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy because illegal recruitment and estafa are
distinct offenses. Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which criminal intent is not necessary,
whereas estafa is malum in se in which criminal intent is necessary.

Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds
another by using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damages.

The complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on
the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end,
complainants were neither able to leave for work abroad nor get their money back.

18. PEOPLE vs. TURDA

G.R. No. 97044-46, July 6, 1994

FACTS:
Accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial court which found him guilty of illegal recruitment and
estafa. He argues that nothing in the record shows that he and his 2 co-accused had come to an agreement
concerning the commission of illegal recruitment and/or estafa and that they agreed to commit the crime
thereafter.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellee is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa

HELD:
Yes.

Appellant, his wife and Manera were conspirators in the illegal recruitment business by conducting acts
in pursuance of the financial success of their joint venture for their mutual benefit. Appellant was always
present with the other accused. There is no doubt that the acts of appellant and his wife conclusively
 establish a common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through coordinated
moves. Such acts constitute enlisting, contracting or procuring workers and promising them overseas
employment under Art. 13(b) of the LC. Since appellant did not have the license or authority to recruit
and yet recruited at least 3 persons, he is guilty of large scale illegal recruitment under Art. 38, and
penalized under Art. 39 of the LC.

The rule is settled that the recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary
recruiting permit or authority from the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however’ where some other
crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the LC does not preclude punishment
under other statutes.

Citing PP vs. Alvarez:

“Where w different laws define 2 different crimes, the conviction of one of them is no obstacle to
that of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.”

While estafa is malum in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum.

19. PEOPLE vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 199211, June 4, 2014

FACTS:
RTC convicted appellant of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and 5 counts of estafa.

Appellant promised complainants employment abroad, represented to them that he had the power and
ability to send them in HK, and by virtue of this representation and fraud, they were convinced to part
with their money in order to be employed.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant committed illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa

HELD:
Yes.

Illegal recruitment is defined by Art. 38 of the LC as “any recruitment activities, including prohibited
practices enumerated in Art. 34, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority.” The term
recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to 2 or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement. The law imposes a higher penalty when the illegal recruitment is committed
by a syndicate or in large scale as they are considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of 3 or more persons conspiring
and confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against 3 or more persons individually or as
a group.

For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove 3 essential elements:
1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Art. 13(b) or any prohibited practice
under Art.34 of the LC;
2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers; and
 3) the accused committed such illegal activity against 3 or more persons individually or as a
group.

Appellant promised the 5 complainants that there were jobs available for them in HK; and that through
his help they could be deployed for work within a month or two. He exacted money from them for the
plane ticket, accommodation, processing of visa and placement fees. POEA Cert. showed that the
appellant had no authority or license to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. These
acts constitute illegal recruitment. When it is committed against 3 or more persons, it is qualified to illegal
recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under Art. 39 of the LC.

Conviction under the LC of illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the RPC for estafa.
Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC provides that estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using
a fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business; by imaginary transactions or similar forms of deceit executed prior to or simultaneous
with the fraud.

The appellant’s act of falsely pretending to possess power and qualifications to deploy the complainants
to HK, even if he did not have the authority or license for the purpose, undoubtedly constitutes estafa
under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC. The elements of deceit and damage are clearly present, the appellant’s
false pretenses were the very cause that induced the complainants to part with their money.

20. PEOPLE vs. ROSAL

G.R. No. 205153, Sept. 9, 2015

FACTS:
CA affirmed the lower court’s conviction of appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale and 2 counts of
estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.

HELD:
Yes.

Illegal recruitment is also committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder licensee or
holder of authority by:
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against 3 or more person individually
or as a group.

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, 3 elements must concur:

a) The offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of worker;
b) The offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” under Art. 13(b) or any of the prohibited practices under Art. 34 of the LC; and
c) The offender committed the same against 3 or more persons, individually or as a group.
 The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale were proven. One, appellant had no valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement of workers, as confirmed by POEA. Two, appellant
clearly engaged in recruitment activities and promised employment abroad to the complainants as proven
by their testimonies. Three, appellant committed illegal recruitment against 3 persons.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA 8042
in re to the LC, and estafa under Art. 315(2)(a) of the RPC.

Estafa under said article is committed by any person who shall defraud another by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the frau; by using
a fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa are:

a) That the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
b) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
3rd person

The elements are present. By means of deceit, appellant made complainants believe tat she had the
proper authority to send them to work in Australia and Korea, for which reason they gave her substantial
amounts of money. Appellant clearly misled the complainants who believed that she had said power. They
were required to submit their bi-data and passport, and were asked to give substantial amounts of money
for the processing of their visa and other documents necessary for deployment. Efforts to recover their
money after they were not deployed for the promised work abroad failed resulting to monetary damages
on their part.

21. PEOPLE vs. SALVATIERRA

G.R. No. 200884, June 4, 2014

FACTS:
Appellant Mildred M. Salvatierra was charged in an Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in
violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042.

Appellant represented herself to be capable of deploying workers for a fee to South Korea. Believing on
such representation, the victims parted with their money and waited for appellant’s instructions. Upon
receipt of the initial payments made by the victims, appellant issued either receipts or petty cash
vouchers. After which, appellant stopped seeing them and failed to deploy them. Appellant yet demanded
additional placement fee and made instructions to meet them at Greenwich Restaurant in Shaw Blvd. in
Mandaluyong City. Prior to said meeting, the victims went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to complain about appellant’s activities. They likewise informed the NBI of their scheduled meeting with
appellant, hence, the plan for entrapment operation where appellant was arrested. Upon her arrest, the
NBI agents took from her the marked money. She was, likewise, found positive for yellow fluorescent
smudges.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa

HELD:
Yes.
 Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against 3 or more persons individually
or as a group. The elements are the following:
a. The offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” under Article 13 (b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of the LC; and
b. The offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers.
c. That the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or
more persons, individually or as a group.

Appellant engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to be capable of deploying workers to
South Korea upon submission of the pertinent documents and payment of the required fees. The victims
believed that she indeed had the capability to deploy them abroad. Appellant was caught in an
entrapment operation when she received the amount demanded allegedly as additional requirement
before they can be deployed abroad. POEA certified that neither appellant nor Llanesa Consultancy
Services were licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. It is also clear from the evidence
presented that the crime of illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against five persons.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means
of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person.

Appellant defrauded the victims by making them believe that she has the capacity to deploy them to South
Korea as workers, even as she did not have the authority or license for the purpose. Because of this
enticement, the victims parted with their money in varying amounts as placement fees to appellant.
Consequently, the victims suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and
the money they parted were never recovered.

22. PEOPLE vs. MOLINA

G.R. No. 207811, June 1, 2016

FACTS:
Accused-appellant recruited and promised complainants for overseas job placement. In consideration of
said promise, said complainants paid and delivered to accused sums of money as placement/processing
fees. Accused failed to actually deploy said complainants without any valid reason and without the
complainants’ fault. Accused failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said private complainants
in connection with the documentation and processing of their papers for purposes of their deployment,
to their damage and prejudice.
Accused raises the defense that SCLMC is a recruitment agency registered with SEC and POEA. Accused-
appellant is the President of the SCLMC. SCLMC could not have conducted recruitment activities in April
and May 2006 because its license to conduct business was temporarily suspended by the POEA during
that period. The suspension was lifted on July 31, 2006.

ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant committed illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment despite
that she was a holder of a license to operate as a recruiter.

HELD:
Yes.
 Under Sec. 6 of RA 8042, illegal recruitment is defined as including any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority. Thus, the contention of accused-appellant that she was a
holder of a license to operate as a recruiter during the alleged period when the crimes were committed
does not matter because she was still performing an act considered to be an illegal recruitment by failing
to reimburse the expenses incurred by the private complainants. Under Sec. 6(m) of RA 8042, failure to
reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's
fault, is considered as performing illegal recruitment.

23. PEOPLE vs. VELASCO

G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014

FACTS:
Accused Inovero, Velasco, and Diala were convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment in large scale
and estafa. Informations from complainants revealed that accused conducted applicant briefings,
received training, placement and processing fees, and promised deployment. Deployment never
happened and the money paid were never returned. POEA Certification likewise revealed that HARVEL
nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

Inovero denied the allegations against her. She claimed that she works for her uncle Velasco (owner of
HARVEL) as an office assistant and had to go to HARVEL merely for errands. She alleged that her errands
mainly consisted of serving food and refreshments during orientations at HARVEL. She also denied
receiving any money from complainants nor issuing receipts therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether Inovero is also liable for illegal recruitment in large scale
HELD:
Yes.

As a co-conspirator, Inovero’s liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor, those who act together in
committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unit in causing a single Injury.

Under Art. 2194, NCC, tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed he wrongful act
themselves.

It would not be an excuse for any joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in the wrong
was insignificant as compared to those of the others. They are not liable pro rata. They are jointly and
severally liable for the whole amount. Hence, Inovero’s liability towards the victims of their illegal
recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid or not.

24. DAVID vs. MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017

FACTS:
Respondent Marquez stated in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she was a resident of Manila. Petitioner
approached her in Kidapawan City and represented that she could recruit her to work abroad. Petitioner
also demanded payment of placement fees and other expenses for the processing of the respondent’s
 application, to which the latter heeded. Respondent’s application was denied and the money she put out
was never returned.

2 separate Informations were filed against petitioner for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. RTC Manila found
that it had no jurisdiction to try the cases since they were not committed in its territory but in Kidapawan
City.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the instant cases of illegal recruitment and estafa

HELD:
Yes.

Sec. 9 of RA 8042 fixed an alternative venue. It provided that a criminal action arising from illegal
recruitment may also be filed where the offended party resides at the time of the commission of the
offense and that the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion
of other courts.

The express provision of the law is clear that the filing of the criminal actions arising from illegal
recruitment before the RTC of the province or city where the offended party actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense is allowed. The dismissal of the case on a wrong ground, indeed, deprived
the prosecution as well as the respondent of their day in court.

Respondent resides in Manila, hence, the filing of the case before RTC Manila was proper.

Some of the essential elements of the crime were committed in Manila, such as the payment of processing
and/or placement fees. The crime of estafa was also within the jurisdiction of RTC Manila

The trial court should have taken cognizance of the case.

25. PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 214500, June 28, 2017

FACTS:
Trial court convicted Dela Cruz for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Appellant informed
complainant that she has 12 visas and needed 2 more persons to go to South Korea. She required
complainants ti submit requirements to be sent to SoKor for authentication and asked for money as
payment for expenses needed to go to SoKor. Complainants waited for their visas but none were given to
them. They went to the South Korean Embassy but were informed that the documents given by appellant
were fake. POEA Certification revealed that appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.

Appellant testified that she was previously an OFW in SoKor and that complainants asked her for
necessary requirements to be able to work in SoKor. She averred that she merely introduced complainants
to Madam Rosa, who assisted her in going to Korea. She admitted that she assisted complainants in
preparing for the documents necessary for a tourist visa. She further averred that she merely referred
complainants to the person who faked her papers but she had no hand in the preparation of the fake
documents.

ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa

HELD:
Yes.

Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

The following elements must concur:

1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
as defined in the LC, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code; and
2) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers.

In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, as in this case, a third element is required: that the offender
commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.

Appellant gave them an impression that she is capable of sending them to South Korea as domestic
helpers. In consideration of a promise of overseas employment, appellant received monies from private
complainants. It was also established that appellant gave private complainants the impression that she
had the ability to send them to South Korea for work in such a manner that the latter were convinced to
part with their money in order to be employed.

Meanwhile, appellant's defense that she merely referred private complainants to a certain "Madam Rosa"
fails to convince as the same was unsupported by any evidence.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following:

a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was
induced to part with his money or property; and
d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Appellant defrauded private complainants by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send
them to South Korea for work as domestic helpers, even as she does not have a license or authority for
the purpose. Clearly, private complainants would not have parted with their money were it not for such
enticement by appellant. As a consequence of appellant's false pretenses, the private complainants
 suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money they paid were
never recovered. All these representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must
be made liable under par. 2 (a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

26. GENERAL MILLING CORP. vs. HON. TORRES

G.R. No. 93666, April 22, 1991

FACTS:
NCR DOLE issued Alien Employment Permit to Cone, a US citizen, as sports consultant and assistant coach
for petitioner GMC. BCAP appealed the issuance of said alien employment permit to the Sec. of Labor, who
ordered the cancellation of Cone’s permit on the ground that there was no showing that there is no person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing to perform the services required not that the hiring of Cone would
redound to the national interest.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sec. of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked Cone’s alien employment
permit.

HELD:
No.

Art. 40, of the LC provides that an ER seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment
permit from DOLE. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an alien
employment permit. Art. 40 applies only to non-resident aliens.

Sec.’s decision would not impair the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the LC and its IR requiring
alien employment permits were in existence long before petitioners entered into their contracts of employment.
It is firmly settled that provisions of applicable laws especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into contracts.

Art. 40 of the LC itself empowers the Sec. of Labor to make a determination as to the availability of the
services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform
the services for which an alien is desired.”

27. WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS vs. GALERA

G.R. No. 169207, March 25, 2010

FACTS:
Galera was an American citizen recruited from the US by private respondent Steedman. She was to work
in the Philippines for WPP, a corporation registered and operating under Philippine laws.

Her employment became effective on Sept. 1, 1999. 4 months have passed when WPP filed before the
Bureau of Immigration an application for Galera’s working visa. She was constrained to sign the
application in order for her to remain in the Philippines and retain her employment.

On Dec. 14, 2000, she was notified by Steedman of the termination of her services. Thus, Galera filed for
illegal dismissal and money claims against herein respondents.
 Respondents argue that Galera is not entitled to backwages because she is an alien and that the Bureau
of Immigration and DOLE are not guaranteed to grant her applications for visa and alien employment
permit.

ISSUE:
Whether Galera is entitled to the monetary award

HELD:
No.

The laws and rules are consistent that the employment permit must be acquired PRIOR to employment.

The LC states:
“Any alien seeking admissions to the Philippines for employment purposes and any domestic or
foreign ER who desires to engage an alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an
employment permit from DOLE.”

Galera worked in the Philippines without a proper work permit but wants to claim EE’s benefits under
Philippine laws. Galera cannot come to court with unclean hands. To grant her prayer is to sanction the
violation of the Philippine labor laws requiring aliens to secure work permits BEFORE their employment.
This, however, does not bar her from seeking relief from other jurisdiction.