Hegel 'S Encyclopedia of The Philosophical Sciences

Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
Hegel regarded his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences as the work

which most fully presented the scope of his philosophical system and its
method. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that some scholars regularly
accord it only a secondary status. This Critical Guide seeks to change that,
with sixteen newly written essays from an international group of Hegel
scholars that shed much-needed light on both the whole and the parts of
the Encyclopedia system. Topics include the structure and aim of the
Encyclopedia system as a whole, the differences between the greater and
lesser Logics, the role of nature in Hegel’s thinking, Hegel’s account of the
relationship between body and soul, theory and praxis, mind and matter,
his account of rational politics and the shapes of absolute spirit as art,
religion and philosophy. This book will be invaluable to all students and
scholars with an interest in Hegel and the history of philosophy.
sebastian stein is a Lecturer and Research Associate at Ruprecht-Karls-

Universität Heidelberg. He is co-editor of Hegel’s Political Philosophy (with
Thom Brooks, 2017) and Hegel and Contemporary Practical Philosophy
(with James Gledhill, 2019), and is the author of several journal articles
and book chapters on Aristotle, Kant and post-Kantian idealism.
joshua i. wretzel is Assistant Teaching Professor at Pennsylvania State
University. He has published numerous articles on the German philosoph-
ical tradition in journals including the European Journal of Philosophy, the
International Journal of Philosophical Studies and Hegel Bulletin.
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ca m b r i dg e cr i t i c a l g u i d e s
Titles published in this series:
Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed
edited by daniel frank and aaron segal
Fichte’s System of Ethics
edited by stefano bacin and owen ware
Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
edited by esther engels kroeker and willem lemmens
Hobbes’s On the Citizen
edited by robin douglass and ohan olsthoorn
Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit
edited by marina f. bykova
Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics
edited by courtney d. fugate
Spinoza’s Political Treatise
edited by yitzhak y. melamed and hasana sharp
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae
edited by jeffrey hause
Aristotle’s Generation of Animals
edited by andrea falcon and david lefebvre
Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right
edited by david james
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
edited by james r. o’shea
Spinoza’s Ethics
edited by yitzhak y. melamed
Plato’s Symposium
edited by pierre destrée and zina giannopoulou
Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right
edited by gabriel gottlieb
Aquinas’s Disputed Questions on Evil
edited by m. v. dougherty
Aristotle’s Politics
edited by thornton lockwood and thanassis samaras
Aristotle’s Physics
edited by mariska leunissen
Kant’s Lectures on Ethics
edited by lara denis and oliver sensen
Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
edited by daniel conway
Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology
edited by alix cohen
Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
edited by gordon michalson
Descartes’ Meditations
edited by karen detlefsen
Augustine’s City of God
edited by james wetzel
Kant’s Observations and Remarks
edited by richard velkley and susan shell
(Continued after the Index)

HEGEL’S
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences
A Critical Guide
edited by
sebastian stein
Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
joshua i. wretzel
Pennsylvania State University

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title: Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences : a critical guide / edited by
Sebastian Stein, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, GermanyJoshua Wretzel,
Pennsylvania State University.
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Contents
List of Contributors page vii
Introduction 1
sebastian stein and joshua i. wretzel
1 Logical and Natural Life: One Aspect of the Relation between
Hegel’s Science of Logic and His Encyclopedia 9
robert b. pippin
2 Hegel’s Encyclopedia as the Science of Freedom 28
sally sedgwick
3 Essence in Hegel’s Encyclopedia and Science of Logic:
The Problem of Form 46
stephen houlgate
4 The Concept’s Freedom 68
jean-françois kervégan
5 From Logic to Nature 88
christian martin
6 Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: The Expansion of Particularity
as the Filling of Space and Time 109
ralph m. kaufmann, ansgar lyssy, and christopher
yeomans
7 Hegel’s Anthropology: Transforming the Body 127
jane dryden
8 Hegel’s Critique of Materialism 148
joshua i. wretzel

vi Contents
9 Hegel’s Psychology: The Unity of Theoretical and Practical
Mind 166
dean moyar
10 Political Ontology and Rational Syllogistic in Hegel’s Objective
Spirit 185
paul redding
11 Taking the System Seriously: On the Importance of “Objective
Spirit” for Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 203
thom brooks
12 §§556–63: Art as a Form of Absolute Spirit: The Discursive,
the Non-discursive, the Religious, and the Political 216
terry pinkard
13 The Stubbornness of Nature in Art: A Reading of §§556, 558
and 560 of Hegel’s Encyclopedia 232
ioannis trisokkas
14 The Encyclopedia’s Notion of Religion 251
roberto vinco
15 Absolute Geist or Self-Loving God? Hegel and Spinoza
on Philosophy 270
sebastian stein
Bibliography 293
Index 309

Contributors
thom brooks is Professor of Law and Government at Durham University.

jane dryden is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mount Allison
University.
stephen houlgate is Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Warwick.
ralph m. kaufmann is Professor of Mathematics at Purdue University.
jean-françois kervégan is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.
ansgar lyssy is a researcher at the Universität Heidelberg.
christian martin is Senior Associate Professor of Philosophy at the
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
dean moyar is Professor of Philosophy at The Johns Hopkins University.
terry pinkard is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University.
robert b. pippin is the Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service
Professor at the University of Chicago.
paul redding is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of
Sydney.
sally sedgwick is Professor of Philosophy at Boston University.
sebastian stein is Research Fellow at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität
Heidelberg.
ioannis trisokkas is Assistant Professor of German Philosophy at the
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece.
vii

viii List of Contributors
roberto vinco is Assistant Professor at the Ruprecht-Karls-Universität
Heidelberg.
joshua i. wretzel is Assistant Teaching Professor in Philosophy at
Pennsylvania State University.
christopher yeomans is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University.

Introduction
Sebastian Stein and Joshua I. Wretzel
The prophet’s voice possessed of god

requires no ornament, no sweetening of tone,
but carries over a thousand years.
Heraclitus (535–475 bc)
In 1817, Hegel published a condensed articulation of his basic philosophical

commitments, designed to help make his notoriously difficult lectures a bit
easier to follow. He titled this compendium the Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline and, for the rest of his life, made
consistent use of it in his classes, constantly amending it until its last, more
detailed version was published in 1830. That Hegel called this text an
“encyclopedia” was as bold a choice as it was strange. For on the one
hand, it of course suggests that Hegel saw his own knowledge and system of
philosophy as encyclopedic. But on the other hand, the text also bears no
structural resemblance to any other encyclopedia.
This uniqueness is due to its method. Hegel presents his work in three
parts – Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit (or Geist) – and
argues that his Encyclopedia proceeds “according to a method that will
some day be recognized, I hope, as the only true method” (Hegel 2010a).
But what is this method and how does it define the Encyclopedia?
According to Hegel, the structuring principle (Hegel 2010a: §§17&18,
45–6) of all philosophical knowledge is ‘the concept’ (Hegel 2010a: 507).
Synonymous with reason, it defines reality and all thought about reality
and functions as the common denominator for the categories of philoso-
phy. These categories define thought and being in general, nature and all
mind-related and spiritual life, that is, Geist (Hegel 1986: 17), and their
shared origin in the concept gives definition and unity to their sequence.
The sum of philosophy’s categories and their relations thus define
philosophical knowledge. Tracking the concept’s activity, this knowledge
takes a circular form: the Encyclopedia’s categories form a “circle of circles”
(Hegel 2010a: §15, 43), where each category is justified by its predecessors
1

of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108592000.001
2 sebastian stein and joshua i. wretzel
and prepares its successors. Strictly speaking, there is thus no beginning
and no end to philosophical knowledge, as each category is defined in
relation to all other categories without there being a sequentially first or
a last point. This is true even if we, as finite thinkers, prefer to proceed from
the concept’s most abstract to its most concrete categorial determinations
(Hegel 1991c: 29–32).
Still, if read in a linear manner, the Encyclopedia presents its concept-
engendered categories as a ‘progress’ from the Logic ’s greatest possible
abstraction to the most concrete account of ‘philosophy’ as truth’s self-
comprehension. Each category addresses a contradiction in its predecessor
and provides a new question that its successor sets out to answer until the
category “philosophy” provokes the question “what does philosophical
knowledge consist in?” and thereby leads back into the Logic ’s ‘beginning’
with ‘undetermined being’.
In the Encyclopedia’s first part, the ‘Logic ’, Hegel deduces the concept
and argues that the more abstract categories that precede it already are the
concept, albeit in a self-inadequate form (Hegel 2010a: 509). Once the
‘subjective concept’ has been deduced, it is shown to turn itself into
objectivity and to then unite itself with this objectivity to become the
living and manifest ontological truth that Hegel calls “the idea” (Hegel
2010a: §18, 46). This idea has three forms and each major section of the
Encyclopedia represents one of them, thus defining the entirety of concep-
tual truth.
What kind of knowledge do the Encyclopedia’s propositions represent?
Hegel argues that there is an intellectual desire in every mind-possessing
being for the most profound kind of knowledge (Hegel 1991c: 28). Such
desire grows out of Geist ’s eternal need to know itself, its thought and the
world (Hegel 1986a: 13, 24). It reaches for answers that are deeper than
a collection or even a systematic interpretation of patterns amongst empir-
ical facts and events of the past and present or a speculation about the
future. It is a curiosity about principles that are unconditioned and
unchanging (Hegel 1986a: 14).
These principles enable empirical reality and its changes (Hegel 1986a:
14) they define the eternal ‘now’ and always have been, are and always
will be true (Hegel 1986a: 21). They constitute the origin and the final
end of all that empirically exists, function as the absolute condition of all
possibility and actuality and define the meaning of life. They even
enable the intellectual overcoming of death: to think philosophical
truth means to participate in the eternity of its content and in eternal
truth’s self-contemplation.

Introduction 3
When philosophy succeeds in satisfying the thinkers’ desire for such
ultimate principles, Hegel argues, it speaks with the voice of eternal truth
that comprehends itself (Hegel 1986a: 13). Philosophy thus empowers
thinkers to comprehend the eternity in which they always already partici-
pate and to “enjoy” their own participation in it:
[In philosophy,] the eternal Idea, the Idea that is in and for itself, eternally
remains active, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute [Geist]. (Hegel 2007c:
§577, 276)
Crucially, the knowledge that philosophy affords is also always our know-
ledge. While the truth thinks itself through us, it also needs us to think
itself. Hegel’s finite philosopher lets the truth speak for itself, and yet, it
takes the philosopher to have it spoken (Hegel 2010a: 10). Despite its
unconditionality, philosophical truth is thus available to and enabled by
us as self-determining thinkers that are confronted by specific empirical
circumstances (Hegel 2008b: 16). Philosophy thus enables the thinker to
think through an empirical context and comprehend the reality-
immanent, yet unconditioned truth (Hegel 2010a: §236, 299).
While some empirical circumstances might make it more difficult or
even impossible for some thinkers to comprehend the truth that governs
the empirical world, and while philosophical truth expresses itself through
finite means, truth’s eternity is not dependent on finitude but vice versa:
the empirical world is the ‘appearance’ of the truth that the philosophers
seek to express (Hegel 2010a: §209, 280–1).
To Hegel, philosophical comprehension is thus the closest that
a mind-equipped being can ever hope to come to freeing itself from
its own finitude as it cleanses the thinker of the influence of irrational
historical, social and cultural conditioning and sets her or him free of
prejudice, assumptions, stereotypes and dogma (Hegel 2010a: 8–9),
stripping away everything that is mere “ephemeral existence, external
contingency, opinion, unsubstantial appearance, untruth, illusion”
(Hegel 2008b: §1, 17).
Philosophical insight includes the realization that all philosophical
thought of the past, present and future is part of the articulation of the
one truth. Finite philosophers, including Hegel, thus aspire to be truth’s
messengers and to relate what they are able to grasp of it (Hegel 1986a: 20).
This requires a free act of will on the part of the thinker: one must
independently decide to keep philosophy and its truth alive. In an effort
to avoid dogmatism, the philosopher must accordingly scrutinize and test
every supposedly true statement. This requires a mental attitude that,

unlike scepticism, is consciously directed at the truth while allowing for the
falsehood as much as for the truthfulness of thought. Philosophical pro-
positions thus have to be constantly tested, potentially reformulated and
regained in order for the truth they carry to stay alive and to have actual
impact on the contemporary world (Hegel 1986: 22).
Every philosophical proposition or system might thus turn out to be
false or to be true only in part and thus stand in need of revision. This
includes Hegel’s Encyclopedia (Hegel 2010a: 33), making it a summons for
thinkers to think for themselves and to express in their own language
whatever they find to be true in Hegel’s and in their own thought.
Hegel’s readers are supposed to be humbled by and stand in the service
of truth, not of Hegel, and appropriate from the Encyclopedia only what is
true in it: they must reject or reformulate the statements they find to fail the
standard of truth.
The Encyclopedia’s standing as a most fundamental account of philo-
sophical truth also defines its relationship to Hegel’s other works. His
lectures on religion, art, history and philosophy discuss the myriad empir-
ical forms that the truth, which the Encyclopedia seeks to describe has taken
throughout history: by philosophically defining truth in all its forms, the
Encyclopedia uncovers the rational purpose of the historical manifestations
that the lectures discuss in more detail (Hegel 1986: 58).
The Encyclopedia thus not only differs from Hegel’s other works by
virtue of the unity of its presentation, its systematicity and its reach. It also
holds the key to a properly systematic comprehension of the entirety of
Hegel’s philosophical thought and, by extension, to his non-philosophical
thought as a whole.
****
The volume offers chapters on each of the Encyclopedia’s three sections.
Section 1: System and the Logic

These chapters deal with the Encyclopedia’s method and its most funda-
mental and abstract description of the categories of thought/being. They
provide contextualized discussions of the individual parts of the Logic, the
foundations of Hegel’s method and how and why everything in the
Encyclopedia hangs together in the way it does.
Robert B. Pippin’s contribution, “Logical and Natural Life: One Aspect
of the Relation between Hegel’s Science of Logic and His Encyclopedia in
His Science of Logic ”, addresses the concept of ‘life’ in Hegel’s Encyclopedia.

Introduction 5
Pippin focuses on the notion that life is a pure concept that is knowable
non-empirically. But as Hegel also offers two different accounts of life in
the Encyclopedia – in the Logic and in the Philosophy of Nature – there arises
a question of what the two different treatments say about the concept’s
purity. Pippin employs the oft-used term “relatively a priori ” to describe
this status of life and thematizes it as a means for grasping the place of the
Science of Logic within the Encyclopedia more broadly.
Sally Sedgwick’s piece, “Hegel’s Encyclopedia as the Science of
Freedom”, considers the claim made in Hegel’s Logic that philosophy as
a whole can be understood as “the science of freedom” (Hegel 2010a: §5).
Sedgwick argues that this fittingly describes his project because it relies on
free subjectivity and its feature of generating its own form.
Stephen Houlgate’s “Essence in Hegel’s Encyclopedia and Science of
Logic: The Problem of Form” addresses differences between the so-called
“greater” (The Science of Logic) and “lesser” (The Encyclopedia Logic)
logics. Houlgate focuses on the categories of form, matter and content
and shows how Hegel’s statements in both works are compatible with
the notion that he is committed to a single and consistent logical
programme.
With a related focus, “The Concept’s Freedom”, by Jean-François
Kervégan offers an “onto-logical” view of the Logic as a whole: the
Logic ’s ‘concept’ is subjectivity and thus freedom. Since objectivity and
idea are products of the concept’s activity and the Logic ends with the
absolute idea, the Logic ultimately describes (forms of) the concept’s
freedom.
Section 2: Philosophy of Nature

These contributions are meant to shed light on this relatively dark corner
of Hegel’s thought, his Philosophy of Nature. They do much to give
structure to what might seem to be an account long disproven by scientific
progress.
Christian Martin’s “From Logic to Nature” studies the crucial moments
of transition from the first to the second part of the Encyclopedia system.
He offers two general theses about them. The first is that there is
a difference between the transitional relation between a Science of Logic
and a Philosophy of Nature and between logic and nature more broadly.
Secondly, Martin shows what it means to say that “the concept” is
“immanent” within nature: nature exhibits certain regularities and forms
that allow it to be known by intellects like ours.

The section’s final chapter, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: The
Expansion of Particularity as the Filling of Space and Time”, by Ralph
Kaufmann, Ansgar Lyssy and Christopher Yeomans, defends an interpret-
ive framework for the three main parts of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature that
focuses on space, time and the differences between mechanical, physical
and organic processes, finding that mechanical processes ‘fill’ the space-
time continuum in a non-directional manner; physics displays directional
processes while organic processes are cyclical in kind.
Section 3: Philosophy of Geist

The Philosophy of Spirit consists of three parts, each of which is further divisible
into three subsections: (1) “Subjective Spirit” consists of the “Anthropology”,
“Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Psychology”; (2) “Objective Spirit” of
“Right”, “Morality” and “Ethical Life”; and (3) “Absolute Spirit” of “Art”,
“Religion” and “Philosophy”. Each of its parts has more than one chapter
dedicated to it, with a focus on the section on absolute Geist and its three
forms: art, religion and philosophy.
In “Hegel’s Anthropology: Transforming the Body”, Jane Dryden
addresses an increasingly popular section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia system
through a contemporary lens. She focuses on Hegel’s theory of the body as
“ownership” and his subsequent association between “nature” and “unfree-
dom”, and discusses the implications of these facets of Hegel’s thought for
race, gender and disability.
Joshua Wretzel’s piece, “Hegel’s Critique of Materialism”, deals with
the opening sections of the “Anthropology” and provides a means to
understanding Hegel’s metaphysics of mind within the larger context of
the Encyclopedia system. It develops a “minimalist critique of materialism”,
a “minimalist conception of immaterialism” and a “transformational con-
ception of materialism” to show how Hegel’s metaphysics provides a viable
alternative to the “disenchanted” view of materialist philosophy.
Dean Moyar’s “Hegel’s Psychology: The Unity of Theoretical and
Practical Mind” offers an inferentialist take on Hegel’s philosophy of
mind. Focusing on the theory of “free mind”, Moyar argues that this refers
to a capacity to make valid practical inferences. He shows how this notion
connects with Hegel’s accounts of theoretical and practical spirit, and also
to the logical ‘concept’ itself.
Paul Redding’s “Political Ontology and Rational Syllogistic in Hegel’s
Objective Spirit” argues that the principles of singular subjectivity that
Hegel establishes in the Logic also inform his view of political normativity:

Introduction 7
his account of modern political life is defined by freedom-informed,
critical engagement with social norms in a manner that had to escape
classical authors due to their reliance on (quasi-)Aristotelian forms of logic.
In his chapter “Taking the System Seriously: Hegel’s Objective Spirit
and Its Importance for the Philosophy of Right ”, Thom Brooks defends and
illustrates the systematic approach to Hegel’s political philosophy. He
stresses that it is only by appreciating the Encyclopedia’s account of object-
ive spirit and its relationship to the rest of the system that the content of the
Philosophy of Right can be adequately appreciated. This includes Hegel’s
accounts of the free will and of the architecture of the Philosophy of Right
and several of its key concepts.
Turning to the Encyclopedia’s final section, on “absolute spirit”, Terry
Pinkard’s “Art as a Form of Absolute Spirit” considers the development of
Hegel’s thought about art, its relationship to religion and how his state-
ments in the Encyclopedia and in the lectures on the subject attempted to
capture the rationality that inheres in these. While the development of
Hegel’s thought on the matter is found to display a consistent concern with
the importance of religious art and places religion over art with regard to its
ability to function as a stabilizing social force, Hegel’s optimism about
religion-based progress is found to have possibly been unduly informed by
the features of his historical period.
While Pinkard’s piece takes a broad view on Hegel’s encyclopedic
philosophy of art and its connections to other works, Ioannis Trisokkas
focuses on what he calls “The Stubbornness of Nature in Art”. This refers
to the way that nature resists formation by and thereby a complete unity
with thought. Trisokkas argues that this is evident in three elements of
nature that are all present in art: materiality, natural form and genius. This
“stubbornness” gives rise to Hegel’s claim that art is absolute spirit only
implicitly.
Roberto Vinco’s piece, “The Encyclopedia’s Notion of Religion”, shows
how religion is woven into the fabric of Hegel’s thought in the encyclope-
dic system. Vinco contends that Hegel’s notion of absolute idealism is,
ultimately, a philosophical articulation of a religious worldview, that the
Hegelian conception of revealed religion is a modern counterpart to
Scholastic theology and that speculative thinking can be regarded as
a cultus or, in Hegel’s terms, a “divine service”.
Finally, Sebastian Stein’s chapter “Hegel’s Concept of Philosophy:
Spinozism in Disguise?” analyses Hegel’s concept of philosophy to find
out in what sense, if any, Hegel could be called a ‘Spinozist’. Stein argues
that, despite the thinkers’ common commitment to the notion that

philosophy is “the self-comprehension of unconditioned truth”, Hegel
thinks that Spinoza’s account renders the finite philosophers dependent
on truth’s self-causing. In contrast, Hegel’s concept-metaphysics enables
him to argue that individual philosophers still exert control over their
thought and remain free in their acts of channelling truth.
This concludes the volume’s discussion of Hegel’s most systematic
work. Its authors and editors are looking forward to continued exchanges
about its content with all interested parties and hope the volume will
contribute to a wider discussion about the possibility, nature and form of
philosophical truth.

chapter 1
Logical and Natural Life

One Aspect of the Relation between Hegel’s Science of Logic
and His Encyclopedia
Robert B. Pippin
1.1 The Logical and the Extra-logical

The least ambitious way to characterize how Hegel wants us to under-
stand the relationship between the Logic and the Philosophies of Nature
and of Spirit in the Encyclopedia is that that relation itself entails that the
conceptual structure of any interrogation of nature or spirit cannot be
coherently understood as wholly empirically determined.1 Each depends
in some way on a non-derived conceptual structure manifested in its pure
form in the SL. This characterization of dependence is not incorrect, but
it does not yet distinguish how Hegel thinks of that relationship in a way
that will exclude the commonsense notion of an empty, subjective pure
form being filled in by objective empirical experience, or imposed on an
extra-logical material. This cannot be right because on Hegel’s approach
any such conceptual structure already determines the concrete possibility
of determinately intelligible empirical content. It does not determine or
derive or deduce the content itself (this is clearly denied in §250 of the
PN), but it does determine the inseparable form of any such content as
the intelligible content it is. As he says in the penultimate paragraph of
the EL:
The method is not an external form but the soul and concept of the content,
from which it is distinguished only insofar as the moments of the concept,
1
Hegel’s works are cited, insofar as it is possible, from the edition of his Gesammelte Werke (GW)
(Hegel 1968–). For the Science of Logic (SL), the volume number and page are cited. The Cambridge
translation of the Logic, by George di Giovanni (Hegel 2010b), has helpfully listed the volume and
page number of the GW in the margins, and his translation is the one used, although I have often
altered it in cases of disagreement. For the Encyclopedia Logic (EL) and the Philosophy of Nature (PN)
and Philosophy of Spirit, I have used volumes 8–10 in the Werke (Hegel 1970–1). Passages are cited by
paragraph number. The translation of the EL used is that by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and
H. S. Harris (Hegel 1991b).

10 robert b. pippin
even in themselves, in their [respective] determinacy, come to appear as the
totality of the concept.
Die Methode ist auf diese Weise nicht äußerliche Form, sondern die Seele
und der Begriff des Inhalts, von welchem sie nur unterschieden ist, insofern
die Momente des Begriffs auch an ihnen selbst in ihrer Bestimmtheit dazu
kommen, als die Totalität des Begriffs zu erscheinen. (EL §243)
Contrary to idealisms which hold that external objects depend for their
existence or their sense on the subject, Hegel’s idealism holds that there is
an identity of form between thought and being, and much interpretive
energy has been spent trying to understand such an identity.
But in the move to the Encyclopedia Philosophies of Nature and of Spirit,
this all must mean that we should also attend to logical form now
understood as in some way inflected by attention to the form of what is
wholly other than pure thought in space and time, and the form of human
action in the world, including collective human action. Said another way,
the Philosophies of Nature and of Spirit remain philosophy. The conceptual
structures laid out in both parts still aspire to a kind of conceptual or
a priori truth, even if the results of the empirical sciences are everywhere
incorporated. But, as already noted, this is not because Hegel thinks of
either part as a result of a simple application of the moments of a Seins- und
Wesenslogik to an external, indifferent, material Stoff. In these parts of the
Encyclopedia too, the method “is not an external form but the soul and
concept of the content” (ist auf diese Weise nicht äußerliche Form, sondern
die Seele und der Begriff des Inhalts). So what is the right way to understand
the bearing of the logical, as Hegel understands it, on the extra-logical? In
what way are the philosophies of nature and spirit a priori sciences?
1.2 A Transition That Is Not a Transition

Hegel cautions us that the turn to Realphilosophie should not be under-
stood as a “transition” in the sense we have become used to within the
Logic. He writes instead something somewhat mysterious. He writes that
the logical idea “freely discharges” or releases (entläßt) itself (12.253). He
means that the logician can understand this bearing of relevance of the
Logic on the extra-logical without any qualification on the self-sufficiency
and philosophical priority of the absolute idea, even with respect to the
“externality of space and time absolutely existing for itself without subject-
ivity” (die absolut für sich selbst ohne Subjectivität seyende Aeusserlichkeit des
Raums und der Zeit) (12.253). This self-sufficiency and priority is not

Logical and Natural Life 11
qualified by such a “release.” There is no deficiency that the Realphilosophie
must sublate and correct. Nothing will qualify the logical fact that every-
thing intelligible “remains in and for itself the totality of the concept”
(12.253). But he does indicate the partiality and so limitation of this
speculative truth:
Secondly this idea is still logical; it is shut up in pure thought [in den reinen
Gedanken eingeschlossen], the science only of the divine concept. Its system-
atic exposition is of course itself a realization, but one confined within the
same sphere. Because the pure idea of cognition is to this extent shut up
within subjectivity, it is the impulse [Trieb] to sublate it, and pure truth
becomes as final result also the beginning of another sphere and science.
Zweytens ist diese Idee noch logisch, sie ist in den reinen Gedanken
eingeschlossen, die Wissenschaft nur des göttlichen Begriffs. Die system-
atische Ausführung ist zwar selbst eine Realisation, aber innerhalb derselben
Sphäre gehalten. Weil die reine Idee des Erkennens insofern in die
Subjectivität eingeschlossen ist, ist sie Trieb, diese aufzuheben, und die
reine Wahrheit wird als letztes Resultat auch der Anfang einer andern
Sphäre und Wissenschaft. (12.253)
This is the problem I would like to address, and I propose to do so by
examining the differences between his treatment of the pure concept of life
in the SL and the role played by the concept in the PN. Unfortunately, that
issue is nested inside many other controversial issues that must be
addressed first. So I propose a brief summary of the project of the task of
a speculative Logic, and the way life is treated as a pure concept. I will
assume that for the most part, the SL is the best source for Hegel’s views on
the issue, although often the Encyclopedia version is illuminating.
1.3 A Science of Logic

The SL is the science of pure thinking. By thinking, the German idealists
all meant paradigmatically judging, judgments being the basic truth-
bearers. Kant had argued, and Hegel follows him, that pure thinking’s
object, that is to say, its direct object, is not the world or any “really real
world,” but itself, where that first of all means: an inquiry into what it is to
be thinking (judging to be the case) at all (what Kant called “General
Logic”), the violation of which is not thinking poorly or incorrectly, but
not thinking at all. What interested Hegel about any such delimitation is
what interested Kant too; the general idea of the suitability of such
absolutely universal forms of sense, no matter our actual theory of logic,

12 robert b. pippin
for a determination of the general features of all possible objects of veridical
thought; in Kant the relation between General and Transcendental Logic.
This involves the immediate bearing of such logical form on the question
of possible objects; the bearing, say, of the subject–predicate form on the
claim that objects must sustain a distinction between substances and
properties; the bearing of antecedent–consequence relations on there
being necessary connections among events. The very idea of such an
immediate bearing is proposed by Kant independently of any transcenden-
tal deduction, although he thought it was preliminary, what he called only
a “clue.” It could only be such a clue or potentially guiding thread (a
Leitfaden) because, for Kant, General Logic is merely formal, and “empty
of content.” A relation to all possible objects could be established only by
appeal to the pure forms of intuition, a restriction that introduced a kind of
provinciality in Kant’s results, limited as they were to human knowers.
This is why Hegel makes his famous remark:
Critical philosophy did indeed already turn metaphysics into logic but, like
the subsequent idealism, it gave to the logical determinations an essentially
subjective significance out of fear of the object . . .
Die kritische Philosophie machte zwar bereits die Metaphysik zur Logik, aber
Sie, wie der spätere Idealismus gab, wie vorhin erinnert worden, aus Angst
vor den Objekt den logischen Bestimmung eine wesentlich subjective
Bedeutung. (SL 21.35)
But Hegel was willing to claim without qualification:
Thus logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in
thoughts, which used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things.
Die Logik fällt daher mit der Metaphysik zusammen, der Wissenschaft der
Dinge in Gedanken gefaßt, welche dafür galten, die Wesenheiten der Dinge
auszudrücken. (EL §24)
And,
The objective logic thus takes the place rather of the former metaphysics
which was supposed to be the scientific edifice of the world as constructed
by thoughts alone.
Die objective Logik tritt damit viehmehr an die Stelle der vormaligen
Metaphysik, als welche das wissenschaftliche Gebäude über die Welt war,
das nur durch Gedanken ausgeführt seyn sollte. (21.48)
There is an immense complication here that would take several essays to
sort out. It concerns the notion of “logic” in Kant and then in Hegel. As is

well known, Hegel has little confidence that relying on a generally accepted
table of logical forms, supposedly handed down by the tradition, is a suitable
source for a philosophical theory of pure concepts, and so he relies neither on
the standard rules for judgment formation and inference, nor on any
modern notion of rules for well-formed formulas and truth-preserving
inferences. (His actual claim is to arrive at such judgmental and inferential
rules at the conclusion of his developmental logic, in the Concept Logic,
rather than rely on them from the start.) So Hegel’s logic is a theory of pure
concepts, “thought determinations” (Denkbestimmungen), without which
thought could not be onto objects at all, or it is from the start an “objective
logic,” which he tells us means that it could be considered (again already,
without any Leitfaden) what Kant called a transcendental logic. This can be
confusing because in later neo-Kantianism, especially its Marburg variety,
Kant’s reliance on the usual notion of logic is continued, which, together
with their common denial of reliance on a separate faculty of sensible
intuition, generated the problem of the bearing of such pure forms of
thinking on the sensible world. That is not Hegel’s problem because he
does not think that, when suitably understood, there is any gap between pure
thought and the objective world to be overcome or bridged. But in this
context, we must leave the issue at that.
Hegel himself tells us often how to begin thinking about his claim. He
does not direct us to Spinoza or neo-Platonism or Christian theology but
tells us he is following Aristotle here. The basic unit of sense-making, in
Aristotle, in Kant, and in a revised way in Hegel, is the predicative act. In
making sense of this way of sense-making, judging, its presuppositions and
implications, we are just thereby making sense of what there is, the only
sense anything could make as what it distinctly is. (A phrase of Ariyeh
Kosman’s in discussing Aristotle is relevant here: “predication is nothing
but the logical or discursive face of being.”2) What there is must be
determinate, and at the metaphysical level, its “determinations” are just
the general predicates without which any specific determination would not
be possible, the forms of any such possible specific determination.
As with Aristotle, this link between the order of thinking and the order
of being is not an inference; it does not face a gap that must be closed by an
inference, or reliance on the intellectual intuition of the rationalist trad-
ition. (His position is not Spinoza’s either, for whom there is also no gap to
be bridged because there is only one object in the universe, substance;
thought and being appear distinct only because of the limitations of
2
Kosman (2013: 127).

14 robert b. pippin
finitude.) Properly understood, as noted earlier, the relation is one of
identity, albeit an identity that does not confuse judging that Socrates is
white with Socrates being white. The identity is an identity of logical form,
and is compatible with a difference between an act of judging and a fact.
Hegel calls it a speculative identity. This strategy obviously places an
enormous amount of weight on properly determining, with necessity,
the moments necessary for thinking to be thinking of determinate objects,
and this developmental derivation is in effect the Hegelian alternative to
Kant’s Deduction. It is an argument form that establishes those and just
those determinations without which a judging could not be a judging of
objects and just thereby also establishes the determinations of objects in
their knowability. So the claim for developmental necessity is the nervus
probandi of the whole project.
It is also important to note this constant debt to Aristotle because it
helps to keep clear that the metaphysics Hegel is interested in is not
modern rationalist dogmatic metaphysics; it does not concern
a “supersensible” reality knowable only by pure reason. In many respects
it is a metaphysics of the ordinary; standard sensible objects, especially
organic living beings and artifacts. Hegel’s project has much more to do
with this neo-Aristotelian enterprise than either a neo-Platonist theory of
reality, or an attempt to determine the furniture of the universe available
only to pure reason, like a monistic substance or monads or ideas. He is
reanimating the oldest principle in Western rationalism: to be is to be
intelligible. More simply: being is to be treated in the only way it can be
treated – in its possible knowability.
But there is also a crucial difference between Hegel and Aristotle, and here
Kant re-enters the picture, a picture that then grows much more complicated
than it was in Aristotle. Thinking, for Hegel, is in no sense a kind of
perceiving. It is a productive power, what Kant called Spontaneität. This
claim has, in the first place, a logical significance. It means that to judge
something to be the case is not to assume an attitude toward a logically
structured, independent item, like a proposition. This means that a science
of logic cannot be said simply to be transparent to the noetic structure of the
world, as if read off the world by pure reason, as in the Wolffian and
medieval tradition. Thinking is exclusively discursive. There is no nous
pathetikos. The categorical structure of being is not simply noetically avail-
able to, transparent to, the light of reason. So in saying that pure thinking’s
object is pure thinking itself, we do not mean that thinking attends to
a special object or event. We have to say that it determines its own possibility,
and that possibility is a productive power. The interrogation of thinking

occurs by thinking; just as we know what we believe not by inspecting beliefs,
but by being believers. Understanding its metaphysical dimension cannot be
understanding it as mirroring the noetic structure of its “other,” the real, or
the “really real.”
1.4 Life as a Logical Concept

In the Concept Logic, Hegel treats the concept of life as a pure or logical
concept. In his account, this means that we know what it is to be alive, or
how we should think about the difference between living and non-living
beings, non-empirically. We know it as a result of a general reflection on
what is involved in self-consciously judging something to be the case, or
somewhat more broadly: in the rendering intelligible of any object or
event. This means that any account of what it is to judge self-consciously
about objects that did not make possible a priori a distinction between
living and non-living beings would be incomplete and thus inadequate.
Formulated a different way: if restricted to empirical experience alone, we
could make no categorical difference between an iron blade rusting in the
moist air and a plant dying for lack of water. Explaining the two events
empirically would have the same logical form (and, as I have noted, for
Hegel this is equivalent to saying that the events have the same form). There
clearly is a difference (iron blades don’t die), and insisting it’s all the same is
just foot-stamping dogmatism. So Hegel rejects this identification. In the
latter case, the plant is said “not to agree with its concept,” not to be
functioning as a plant should, and that involves a different logical form.
This form is not a heuristic for organizing the results of empirical observa-
tion, and not regulative in the Kantian sense and so not subjective in the
Kantian sense.
Hegel is fully aware of the skepticism that his proposal will encounter:
The idea of life has to do with a subject matter so concrete, and if you will so
real, that in dealing with it one may seem according to the common notion
of logic to have overstepped its boundaries.
Die Idee des Lebens betrifft einen so concreten und, wenn man will, reellen
Gegenstand, daß mit derselben nach der gewöhnlichen Vorstellung der
Logik ihr Gebiet überschritten zu werden scheinen kann. (12.179)
As a consequence of this exploration of logical form alone, we are
supposed to know that there must be distinct forms of thought specific
to the intelligibility of self-organized beings, of perceiving and desiring,
self-organized beings, and of self-conscious and rational, perceiving, and

16 robert b. pippin
desiring self-organized beings, or specific to plants, animals, and human
animals. We know what it is to be a living being in a way that cannot
depend on discovering this empirically. So how do we know it? This
generates a task that is more ambitious than delimiting the features of
that special logical form required for the intelligibility of living beings or
actions or human practices. This demarcation is of crucial importance to
Hegel, but he wants also to treat the question in a way that responds to the
question Kant raised in the third Critique: granted there is this logical
difference, what is its status? Does the teleological form designate a realm of
being that is explicable only by appeal to such a form? Hegel answers yes to
the last question; he claims that such distinctive conceptual forms have
a necessity that descends from his general inquiry into the intelligibility of
objects at all (by which, I should note again, I mean: the possibility of self-
consciously judging what is the case). The argument is that objects and
events would not be available to us in their full intelligibility, if the
distinction between living and non-living could not be made. This
means that accounts given of non-living beings would be insufficient on
their own terms without a distinction between living and non-living.
This desideratum is difficult to state properly, and raises a very large
issue immediately. First, just as Kant did not attempt to deduce the
necessary existence of events in causal relations, but sought to show that
any event that did exist must stand in a necessary relation to some prior
event, and just as Kant did not try to deduce the necessary existence of
living beings, but tried to show that any world that required mechanistic
explanations of what exists, or any world in which change is a matter of
efficient causation, must also allow, cannot rule out, that there are changes
like gestation, birth, growth, reproduction, disease, and death, which
cannot be properly accounted for by the logical form appropriate for non-
living beings, so Hegel is not out to deduce a priori the necessary existence
of living beings, but has an ambition similar to Kant’s (that is, such changes
cannot be properly accounted for by the logical form appropriate for non-
living beings) but much more ambitious because he denies that teleological
explanations are merely subjectively necessary.
Hegel’s objections to Kant are clear and they bear directly on Kant’s
skepticism about the objectivity of the concept of life. For Kant a living
being requires us to think something we cannot know, how the whole
causes the parts which cause it. Over and over again in the Kritik der
Urteilskraft (KU), Kant insists that it is the absence of any acceptable model
of teleological causation, and the absurdity of any backwards causation,
that makes it impossible for teleological explanation to have any objective

status. But for Hegel, this simply assumes not just the distinguishability of
whole and parts but their temporal separability, and that is Kant’s basic
confusion. However, a living being’s reproduction according to kind
makes clear that in such reproduction there is no puzzle about the produc-
tion of parts which make a whole possible, which then also makes the parts
possible by causing them. The generation of whole and parts is simultan-
eous, as in all cases of final causality. The reciprocal relation between whole
and parts exists from the moment of conception, and the only real
causation at work in the world is efficient causation, internally in the
organism’s processes and generatively. These causal series, however, cannot
explain reproduction according to kind, the unity of an organism, the
regularity of the occurrences of the series, the self-maintenance of an
organism, illness, or even the lawfulness of nature. We therefore propose
judgments about the series; we systematize the series in a way that need not
presuppose a creator or bizarre temporal relations, but must see them as
rule or norm bound to avoid unmanageable contingency.3 We have of
course a much better understanding of how the DNA “blueprint” is
actualized, but the sequences alone still require us to think of what is
happening as a defined process with a beginning and end, as the growth of
an individual of a kind. Thinking we can understand the parts causing the
whole and in a separate moment, some sort of backward causation
moment, the whole causing the parts is not the discovery of a problem
but its question-begging invention, question-begging with regard to final
cause explanation that does not rely on a designer, or on forwards and
backwards causation. It is an explanation that explains, in Hegel’s terms, by
reference to a concept. (“Because that is what leukocytes are for.”)4 Kant’s
argument is that we would not even understand what we are claiming
3
I am agreeing here with Ginsborg:
This is what I think Kant has in mind when he says that the “concept of connections and
forms of nature according to purposes” serves as a principle “for bringing nature’s appear-
ances under rules where the laws of causality according to the mere mechanism of nature do
not suffice” (§61, 5:360). It is only by interpreting organic phenomena in normative terms – as
conforming (or failing to conform) to rules of the proper functioning of organic beings – that
we can bring lawlike order to the otherwise incomprehensible diversity of the organic world.
This is why we need the concept of purpose as a heuristic principle or guiding thread for the
observation and investigation of organisms, independently of any questions that might be
asked about how organisms came to be. (Ginsborg 2001: 254)
The question for Kant remains why, if this is so, the teleological principle remains a heuristic.
4
There is a clear analysis of the importance of reproduction according to kind, and so “the intimate
relation of taken and type” in Kreines (2015: 97–100). See also Kreines (2008) on the importance of
Aristotle for Hegel’s account.

18 robert b. pippin
unless we were making appeal to an entity “as if designed,” but that
argument rests on his invocation of a form of causality we cannot under-
stand except by analogy with design according to concepts, and Hegel sees
no reason for such a commitment in understanding living beings.5 There is
a whole because of the parts by virtue of efficient causation. But there are
parts because of the whole in a different sense of “because” that is just as
objective because just as necessary for the event’s intelligibility, given the
basic premises of the Logic. The thing’s concept is necessary for its specifi-
cation as the thing-kind it is, and without this concept, we could not even
identify the parts as parts. This is not an equivocation; it is doing justice to
the two sorts of dependence in their joint realization.
But the substantive case for the necessity of the concept of life is a kind of
logical foreshadowing of the issue we are pursuing. (That is, its structure
foreshadows the structure of the PN.) It concerns the incompleteness of the
concepts of mechanism and chemism, and the attempt to show that they
require the concept of life in order to be fully coherent themselves. I turn to
a brief summary of that argument.
1.5 The Necessity of Life

The section on Objectivity in the Concept Logic raises many interpretive
questions and is embedded in the complex project we have only crudely
sketched. But it is clear that Hegel is treating each of the three main
divisions as candidates for what counts as The Concept, each as an
a priori claim about what renders the world sufficiently intelligible, counts
as the comprehensibility of the whole. Another way to put this would be to
say that mechanism and chemism are to be treated as metaphysical claims,
not merely models of explanation. Explanation is one thing; a genuine
understanding or comprehension, one that takes a stand on what there is, is
another. (In philosophy of science this is the difference between positivist
and realist philosophies of science; between being satisfied with causal laws
that support robust counterfactuals, and appealing to the fundamental
5
See Ginsborg (1997: 332–3). As Ginsborg suggests, we could invoke “conformity to normative law” as
what distinguishes teleological explanation without a commitment to an alien form of causality
(Ginsborg 1997: 339). This would still, for Kant, push the question back to a reformulation; whether
such normativities are “real.” For that, on Kantian premises, we would need to appeal to a non-
material substrate or a designing God, neither of which we will ever be entitled to. See Kreines (2015:
85–91). (I don’t see that it helps much to point out, as Kreines does (Kreines 2015: 90), that Kant’s
skepticism can be stated without a global commitment to efficient causation, because he can appeal to
a “supersensible real ground of nature” (KU 409). All that is knowable, however, is efficient
causation, and that suffices to rule out knowledge of final causality.)

forces of nature. Mechanism claims to be a full account because it assumes
that all there really is dynamical matter in motion.) The full claim in
mechanism is that, paradigmatically, Newtonian mechanics, the calcula-
tion of the effects of dynamical matter in motion, counts as such suffi-
ciency in comprehension or rendering intelligible. But Hegel points out
that these interactions are treated as “indifferent” relations of matter in
motion, and the regularity of the attractive and repulsive forces is wholly
a matter of contingency, even when such regularities are so regular that
such a claim for mere constantly repeated contingency can seem like
magical thinking and is implausible.
Some material bodies have to be understood as having “natures” of some
sort that allow and prohibit such interactions, paradigmatically the pres-
ence of chemical compounds. Appeals to such chemical natures ground
and explain such combinability in ways mechanism never could.
Yet chemism too faces a limit. Mechanical and chemical accounts
cannot sufficiently explain the workings of artifacts. Hegel appears to
think that we led to such a notion by the simple co-presence of both
mechanical and chemical explanations, the regular unity of which is as
inexplicable or as merely and implausibly contingent as in the mechanism
case. He is thinking of being led to explanations like “the gear does that
because it is a watch gear and the watch should keep correct time” and of
being unable to account for it in mechanical or chemical terms. This is the
concept of simple, “external” or designer-made purposive wholes, and he
tries to show how one would be led from such a teleology to “internal”
teleology, where the combined mechanical and chemical relations do not
sufficiently explain, say, the workings of the kidney, and where no refer-
ence to an intentional designer is possible. This introduces the concept of
life, said to be the “immediate” manifestation of the idea itself. This is
important for our purposes, since it is at the heart of Hegel’s explanation of
the difference between what he calls “logical life,” or life as it is studied by
Logic, and life as a concept in the philosophy of nature and in the
philosophy of spirit.
For life as a pure concept, what is important is that organic beings
reproduce according to kind; their life-activity in general, including repro-
duction, is “for” its concept, for its specific form of life, and such activity
can go well or poorly. This process of striving self-realization, never more
than this process, but always in the process of living, means that a being’s
life is never simply “achieved.” The life form, though, itself perdures
beyond the death of any individual, and this will be a valuable element
in understanding the absolute idea.

20 robert b. pippin
So, a living being is “for” its kind (it does what it does to realize the life
form it is), and its mere individuality is “sublated” even while still real. (No
living being can lead its life as individually determined, as if everything
about its life were “up to it.” It is the life form it is, the universal.)
In sum, life is the immediate manifestation of the Idea because its
distinctive modality of being at work, its energeia or substantial form, is
an immediate form of self-determination. A living being is, while not self-
consciously, determining for itself its life process. It leads its life we say,
seeking its food, avoiding its predators, reproducing in its way, etc. And
this is the beginning of the different treatments in the philosophy of nature
and of spirit.
That is, the SL is a theory of pure thinking, and in that context, we seek
the pure concepts, thinking’s a priori determination of its own norms,
without which any object could not be determined to be what it is,
could not be what it is. This is Hegel’s account of first philosophy. But
first philosophy does not exhaust philosophy. First philosophy distin-
guishes the first-order question “what is it?” from the question “What is
it to say what something is?” and tries to answer the latter. The former
question can be empirical (“What is electricity?”) But it need not be.
(“What is Geist?” is a philosophical question, but not a topic in a SL.)
This is his version of the distinction between general and regional ontol-
ogy. How to pose and pursue the latter sort of questions is a topic unto
itself. In first philosophy, pure thinking’s determination of itself, not just
qua the truth of objects, but as itself, represents, ultimately, Hegel’s
unconditioned; pure and absolute, self-conscious intelligibility; the intelli-
gibility of intelligibility itself, the Absolute, noesis noesios.
1.6 The Logic of a Philosophy of Nature

But what is the nature of still philosophical but not purely logical ques-
tions? By comparison, in Kant’s system, once the critical project had
delimited the subjective conditions for the possibility of experience, mor-
ality and the realm of Zweckmäßigkeit, the “transition” to a metaphysics of
nature (Die metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft) and
a metaphysics of, in effect, Geist (Die Metaphysik der Moral) is made
unsystematically. Kant needs only one material concept, matter in motion,
to achieve the former, and a concept of human finitude with two dimen-
sions (that we cannot achieve our ends without aid, and that we must
develop our talents to be able to make use of them) to achieve the latter.
Hegel of course rejects the whole model of transcendental philosophy,

subjective conditions, the unsystematic importation of an empirical con-
cept, and the application of conditions to the empirical world. (What
I want to argue, however, is that Hegel’s conception of a philosophy of
nature and of spirit is, surprisingly, as unsystematic as Kant’s but in a very
different sense.) The comparison with Kant only sharpens the question of
how Hegel thinks of his own notion of thought’s “release” from the “self-
enclosed” world of pure thinking, what he had mysteriously called the
Reich der Schatten. (He continues such characterizations in the Philosophy
of Nature, by the way, pointing out that the richness and vitality of nature
become, “in the quietude of thought” or in terms of its logical status, rather
like a “dull northern fog” (PN §246, Z) (zu gestaltlosen Allgemeinheiten, die
einem trüben nördlichen Nebel gleichen)).
In the introductory discussion of Life in the SL, he begins such
a discussion with the following offhand remark:
A comment may be in order here to differentiate the logical view of life from
any other scientific view of it, though this is not the place to concern
ourselves with how life is treated in non-philosophical sciences but only
with how to differentiate logical life as idea from natural life as treated in the
philosophy of nature, and from life insofar as it is bound to spirit.
Es kann nur etwa zu bemerken seyn, inwiefern die logische Ansicht des
Lebens von anderer wissenschaftlicher Ansicht desselben unterschieden ist;
jedoch gehört sicher nicht, wie in unphilosophischen Wissenschaften von
ihm gehandelt wird, sondern nur wie das logische Leben als reine Idee, von
dem Naturleben, das in der Naturphilosophie betrachtet wird, und von dem
Leben, insofern es mit dem Geiste in Verbindung steht, zu unterscheiden
ist. (12.180)
The distinctness of the logical treatment of life is something we have
already discussed and which he stresses here by comparison: “In the idea of
life the moments of life’s reality do not receive the shape of external
actuality but remain enveloped [eingeschlossen] in conceptual form.”
(Eben so erhalten in der Idee des Lebens die Momente seiner Realität nicht
die Gestalt äusserlicher Wirklichkeit, sondern bleiben in die Form des Begriffes
eingeschlossen.) (12.180). About life as treated by the philosophy of nature,
he says: “As treated in the philosophy of nature, as the life of nature and to
that extent exposed to the externality of existence, life is conditioned by
inorganic nature and its moments as idea are a manifold of actual shapes.”
(Das Leben, insofern es in die Äusserlichkeit des Bestehens hinausgeworfen ist,
an der unorganischen Natur seine Bedingung hat, und wie die Momente der
Idee eine Mannigfaltigkeit wirklicher Gestaltungen ist.) (12.180).

22 robert b. pippin
This difference with logical life also means that, contrary to logic as
a whole, in the philosophy of nature, its end is not its beginning, but a limit
in which it sublates itself, that is, becomes the philosophy of spirit. Finally:
“In nature life appears as the highest stage that nature’s externality can
attain by withdrawing into itself and sublating itself in subjectivity.” (In der
Natur erscheint das Leben als die höchste Stufe, welche von ihrer
Aeusserlichkeit dadurch erreicht wird, daß sie in sich gegangen ist, und sich
in der Subjectivität aufhebt.) (12.180).
These are all fragmentary hints at an explanation of the Encyclopedia’s
structure, and there is a more concrete account, although equally fragmen-
tary, in the concluding remarks of the SL, which indicates an interesting
practical motivation for what Hegel had called the “expansion”
(Erweiterung) of the Logic into these further domains. It is exactly the
purity, the strict apriority of the domain of logic that calls for such an
expansion as an impulse or Trieb:
Because the pure idea of cognition is to this extent shut up within subject-
ivity, it is the impulse to sublate it, and pure truth becomes as final result also
the beginning of another sphere and science.
Weil die reine Idee des Erkennens insofern in die Subjectivität eingeschlossen
ist, ist sie Trieb, diese aufzuheben, und die reine Wahrheit wird als letztes
Resultat auch der Anfang einer andern Sphäre und Wissenschaft. (12.253)
That is, it is precisely the absolute self-sufficiency of the realm of logic (that
thinking and only thinking can determine the Denkbestimmungen of
knowing and the knowable) and not any deficiency that propels thinking
to raise for itself the question of its shape in the domain understood
abstractly as the pure other of thinking, the non-thinking, nature. Hence
his claim that there is no real transition here. He describes what would have
been a transition as:
What is to be grasped, therefore, in the sense that the idea freely discharges
itself, absolutely certain of itself and internally at rest.
. . . ist also hier vielmehr so zu fassen, daß die Idee sich selbst frey entläßt,
ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend. (12.253)
He closes the book with a sweeping account of the completion of the
Encyclopedia, one that returns us to his early characterization of the ground
of a presuppositionless logic as a resolve:
But what is posited by this first resolve of the pure idea to determine itself as
external idea is only the mediation out of which the concept, as free concrete

existence that from externality has come to itself, raises itself up, completes
this self-liberation in the science of spirit, and in the science of logic finds the
highest concept of itself, the pure concept conceptually comprehending
itself.
Dieser nächste Entschluß der reinen Idee sich als äusserliche Idee zu bestim-
men, setzt sich aber damit nur die Vermittlung, aus welcher sich der Begriff
als freye aus der Äusserlichkeit in sich gegangene Existenz emporhebt, in der
Wissenschaft des Geistes seine Befreyung durch sich vollendet, und den
höchsten Begriff seiner selbst in der logischen Wissenschaft, als dem sich
begreifenden reinen Begriffe, findet. (12.253)
We will not be able to understand the role of such notions as resolution
and releasing or discharging itself without understand the penultimate
conclusion of the SL in the unity of the theoretical and practical idea, but
the idea is one Hegel shares with Kant, that reason is not a mere tool for
making inferences, but, as they both say, a purposeful activity (zweckmäßiges
Tun), that reason is a living activity dedicated to a final end, the uncondi-
tioned in Kant, and Absolute knowledge in Hegel. That impulse has other
dimensions too, as we have just seen. But our task now is to examine in
closing whether these rather fragmentary remarks in the SL have prepared us
for the different treatment of life in the philosophy of nature.
One aspect of it we can discuss economically, I hope. That is Hegel’s claim
that the root of all logical movement is contradiction. In this case the practical
and conative language is not metaphorical, because what Hegel is referring to
is always an essentially practical contradiction, an activity’s contradiction of its
own end, something clearer, I hope, if we recall Kant’s account of the inherent
purposiveness of reflective judgment and the hypothetical use of reason. Take,
for example, the kind of things he says about the necessity of any develop-
ment, that of the empirical sciences for example. He will often say things that
seem outrageous philosophically: that philosophy gives the form of necessity
to what would otherwise appear merely contingent (EL, §12A). This can
sound as if Hegel wants to say that the actual course of that development,
philosophy can prove, could not have happened otherwise, as if, in science as
well as philosophy (logic), there is a development over time that could not
have been otherwise. If this sort of claim is supported by a claim about a self-
transforming, underlying metaphysical entity, “cosmic spirit,” or “God,”
developing according to some necessary law of internal teleology, then the
claim seems hopeless. At a more modest level, though (and this is very much
how I think he wants to be understood), he could mean that a significant
transition in art history, or political history, or religious history, a shift in
collective ethical commitments, or a development in a speculative logic (that

24 robert b. pippin
the content of some determinate concept cannot be fixed without reliance on
a successor, more comprehensive concept) can all be rendered intelligible by
a philosophical account. This account is based on a form of practical contra-
diction that introduces a more familiar form of necessity and one different
from logical necessity or material necessity, the form appropriate to “he who
wills the end must will, or necessarily wills, the means” (otherwise we have
evidence that he has not willed the end). If a collective attempt to accomplish
some goal can be said to learn collectively that commitment to that end is
impossible without commitment to, let us say, a broader and more compre-
hensive end, then it must pursue such a new end or give up the enterprise. Or,
if it develops that the means chosen actually make achieving the end impos-
sible, then the means must be altered. They are not arbitrarily altered. They
must be altered, on pain of practical incoherence. A philosophical account,
assuming the rationality of such a teleological enterprise, can show this. It can
give the form of (practical) necessity to what would otherwise seem contingent
alterations. (So if reason can be said to have an end indispensible to its possible
realization, any means indispensable to that end are likewise indispensable,
necessary in that sense. This sort of argument plays out at the highest level of
conceptual abstraction for Hegel.)
1.7 The Theological Version

The most important result from the above account is that there is no
“transition” in the logical sense from the Logic to the PN. (This is also why
any model of application or imposition of the Logic, or it being “filled in”
by empirical details, is impossible.) This means that there is no logical or
conceptual incompleteness in the SL. It remains wholly self-determining,
autonomous and complete in itself, a perfect identity of logic and meta-
physics. There is rather some sort of existential – I don’t think there is any
other word for it – dissatisfaction with a conceptual order “shut in on
itself,” and a resolve to examine nature as it is treated by the individual
sciences in all its manifold forms. This resolve is to understand what Hegel
calls, in the Introduction of the PN, the “self-determination” of the
concept (in seiner eigenen, immanenten Notwendigkeit nach der
Selbstbestimmung des Begriffs) (PN §246) in the “thinking” relation to
nature, first of all in physics. And his descriptions of this relation are
systematically rather imprecise. He says:
Physics must therefore work together with philosophy so that the universal-
ized understanding which it provides may be translated into the concept by

showing how this universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds out
of the Concept.
. . . die Physik muß so der Philosophie in die Hände arbeiten, damit diese
das ihr überlieferte verständige Allgemeine in den Begriff übersetze, indem
sie zeigt, wie es als ein in sich selbst notwendiges Ganzes aus dem Begriff
hervorgeht. (§246A)
And,
The determination and the purpose of the philosophy of nature is therefore
that spirit should find its own essence, its counterpart, i.e. the Concept,
within nature. The study of nature is therefore the liberation of what
belongs to spirit within nature, for spirit is in nature in so far as it relates
itself not to another, but to itself. This is likewise the liberation of nature,
which in itself is reason; it is only through spirit, however, that reason as
such comes forth from nature into existence.
Dies ist nun die Bestimmung und der Zweck der Naturphilosophie, daß der
Geist sein eigenes Wesen, d. i. den Begriff in der Natur, sein Gegenbild in
ihr finde. So ist das Naturstudium die Befreiung seiner in ihr; denn er wird
darin, insofern er nicht auf ein Anderes sich bezieht, sondern auf sich selbst.
Es ist dies ebenso die Befreiung der Natur; sie ist an sich die Vernunft, aber
erst durch den Geist tritt diese als solche an ihr heraus in die Existenz.
(§246A)
Nature then is the idea in pure otherness, and what Hegel calls the
metaphysics of nature is the concept of the idea in its otherness. The
impulse to sublate this otherness by recognizing the structure of the Idea
in such otherness is largely treated by Hegel as a practical impulse. Those of
you who know paragraph §247 in the PN will know that to make clear
what he means, Hegel indulges in something like a riot of theological
metaphors. (This had begun in §246 where Hegel has called Nature the
bride of spirit and compared its relation to spirit with Adam telling Eve
that she was flesh of his flesh.)
All of this means that there is no general discussion in the Philosophy of
Nature of life as such. Life as such is a topic for the Logic, not the PN, which
treats only the variety of living beings, having assumed life as such. Rather,
such a logical structure is assumed, again as absolutely self-determining and
self-sufficient of the intelligibility of nature and Geist, and all the attention is
devoted to the empirical content of the sciences of Hegel’s day, “inter-
preted,” we might say, or as he said, “translated,” in such logical terms.
We try to understand first the model of explanation provided by mathemat-
ical mechanics, until we reach astronomy, and then shift attention to

26 robert b. pippin
metereology and topics that begin to indicate the central conceptual move of
chemism, as Hegel explores phenomena that in his day suggested the role of
non-mechanical explanations, magnetism, galvanism, fire, and then, rather
suddenly, plants and finally animals. But the conceptual relations among
these moments of what the Logic had called Objectivity are assumed rather
than demonstrated. Hegel wants only, as it were, to exfoliate what he simply
calls “wie in jeder Stufe der Natur selbst die Idee vorhanden ist.” This manner
of treatment preserves and realizes the way Hegel had introduced the project
by means of those theological images mentioned earlier. None of his
characterizations suggests that anything about the metaphysical sufficiency
of the concept as the truth of all actuality requires such a demonstration,
however.
That is, Hegel always keeps faith with the idea that the Concept, der
Begriff, is, on this account,
the true Idea, the divine idea of the universe, the sole actuality.
. . . ist sogleich die wahrhafte Idee, die göttliche Idee des Universums, die
allein das Wirkliche ist. (PN §246)
He makes clear that it is this, this philosophical point, that Plato expressed
by saying that God alone is truth. (Of course, Plato, not a Christian
monotheist, never said any such thing. Hegel means to refer imagistically
to the doctrine of ideas, and in the Republic, to the Idea of the Good.) But it
is this theological language that allows him to repeat in one final form the
question of the transition out of the Logic that we have been raising.
Namely, with the concept understood as the self-sufficient truth, that is
God, why create the other of God, nature? And he uses yet another word to
discuss this dissatisfaction with such self-sufficiency.
If God is all sufficient and lacks nothing, how does He come to release
Himself into something so clearly unequal to Him? The divine Idea is just
this self-release, the expulsion of this other out of itself, and the acceptance
of it again, in order to constitute subjectivity and spirit.
Ist Gott das Allgenügende, Unbedürftige, wie kommt er dazu, sich zu einem
schlechthin Ungleichen zu entschließen? Die göttliche Idee ist eben dies,
sich zu entschließen, dieses Andere aus sich herauszusetzen und wieder in
sich zurückzunehmen, um Subjektivität und Geist zu sein.
In the Phenomenology the term had been Luther’s for kenosis, Entäusserung,
and in the Logic it had been entlassen.
What I am suggesting is that this question, “why would God create the
natural world?,” is quite an unusual, figurative way to understand the

question “why would a wholly autonomous self-determining thought turn
to a consideration of its bearing on nature and spirit?” What is the
significance of such a set of topics? The theological interpretation usually
turns on some image of the overflow of God’s love to explain his “emptying
himself out into the world,” and Hegel makes use of this image in his own
way in the introductory material of the Concept Logic. But the explanations
we have seen in the PN all rather suggest that there is something practically
unsatisfying, painful – one is tempted to say, philosophically lonely – in
being shut up, eingeschlossen, in the Reich der Schatten or in einem trüben
nördlichen Nebel.

chapter 2
Hegel’s Encyclopedia as the Science of Freedom

Sally Sedgwick
In the Introduction to his 1817 (Heidelberg) Encyclopedia, Hegel describes

philosophy as “the science of freedom [Freiheit]” (§5).1 The remark is
curious for a variety of reasons. For one thing, Hegel’s Encyclopedia
includes among its three divisions the science of nature; and nature, on
his description, is a realm of unfreedom.2 For another, the science of logic
is a division of the Encyclopedia as well, and once again, it is hard to see
why Hegel would suggest that logic is a science of freedom. Hegel’s
Science of Logic is concerned with thought’s “determinations and laws”
rather than with action (HE §12). At least if we consider the science of
freedom to take as its object features of human action, it is not clear why
the Logic should belong within its purview. Moreover, if all of Hegel’s
system is “the science of freedom,” as he asserts, the implication would
seem to be that freedom – or the science that has freedom as its object
(namely the science of spirit [Geist]) – must be more fundamental,
somehow, than the other two sciences. But Hegel presents the three
divisions of his Encyclopedia as equal parts or determinations of the
whole; he doesn’t arrange the divisions hierarchically, at least not in
any obvious way (HE §§11, 37).3
1
Hegel (1968–: vol. 13). Hereafter I refer to this work as (“HE”). I sometimes consult and alter the
English translation, Hegel (1990a). Where necessary, and in my references to all of Hegel’s texts,
I give page or section numbers first of the German edition and then of the English translation. When
I quote from Hegel’s Additions (Zusätze), I rely on the Theorie-Werkausgabe edition of his works,
Hegel (1970–1).
2
Although Hegel is committed to the view that all organic nature possesses powers of self-motion, he
argues that only humans have the capacity of freedom. See §381 of his Enzyklopädie der philoso-
phischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Zweiter Theil: Philosophie des Geistes (1830), in Hegel (1968–:
vol. 20) (hereafter “EG”).
Even highly complex non-human animals lack the capacity for thought; they cannot bring any
content or object “to consciousness [zum Bewußtsein bringen].” See Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Erster Theil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik (1830), in
Hegel (1968–: vol. 20, §2) (hereafter “EL”).
3
Hegel explicitly notes that each part of the philosophical system is equally part of the whole also in
EL §15.
28

Hegel’s Encyclopedia as the Science of Freedom 29
In describing philosophy as “the science of freedom,” Hegel is very likely
not forgetting the aims and objects proper to his sciences of nature and of
logic. He seems to want to privilege freedom in some way, and perhaps what
he has in mind is the following: he designates each of his three sciences as
“philosophical,” and he describes philosophy as the “thinking about think-
ing [Denken des Denkens]” (HE §12).4 Thinking, on his account, is an
activity only creatures possessing freedom can perform.5 Perhaps the message
Hegel wishes to convey when he describes his system as “the science of
freedom,” then, is simply that thinking in general, and therefore also
philosophy in each of its three divisions, is an act and expression of freedom.6
This interpretation is plausible, but it risks trivializing Hegel’s thesis.
Interpreted in this way, the thesis that philosophy is “the science of
freedom” reduces to the claim that since philosophy is an activity that
can be pursued only by thinking and therefore free [geistig] natures, each
division of the encyclopedic system is an instance of the science of freedom.
My task in this chapter is to argue that Hegel’s thesis is not trivial, and
that we can discover evidence of this already in the introductory paragraphs
of the 1817 edition of the Encyclopedia. In explaining why philosophy is
a “science of freedom,” Hegel makes the following remark: philosophy is
a science of freedom, he says, “because in philosophy the heterogeneity of
topics and with it the finitude of consciousness disappear” (HE §5). Hegel
gives us little help deciphering this remark in these pages, but we can
venture some guesses about what he has in mind. He presumably means to
compare philosophy – in each of its three divisions – to a form of
consciousness or subjectivity, one that is “free,” presumably, because it
somehow overcomes finitude.7 Less obvious is the connection Hegel draws
between freedom and the disappearance, in philosophy, of a “heterogeneity
of topics.” Very likely, his point is that a heterogeneity of parts ‘disappears’
in philosophy, because philosophy on his conception is a systematic unity
rather than an aggregate of heterogeneous or contingently related parts.
Although he does not say so explicitly here, Hegel models the whole of
4
In philosophy, thought itself is made the “object of thought [Gegenstande des Denkens]” (EL §17).
5
Thinking is “my activity [Tätigkeit],” the “product of my spirit ” – of my “freedom” (EL §23).
6
In beginning our philosophy, he says in EL, all we have is the “free act of thinking . . . producing its
own object for itself . . . and giving it to itself ” (EL §17).
7
Finite consciousness, for Hegel, is excessively “subjective” and “contingent”; it lacks awareness of its
universal character. A finite or unfree consciousness is infected with bad “idealism,” he furthermore
suggests, in that it “sees itself as something particular in contrast to objects” (HE §5). By contrast, the
version of idealism Hegel prefers is one in which the “contingency” and “necessity of nature” “fall
away” (HE §5). It is a system that doesn’t consider the thought-determinations of its science as mere
representations, and hence as one-sidedly subjective, but as objective in some way.

30 sally sedgwick
philosophy on the idea of an organic totality.8 In an organism, as he
understands it, the arrangement of parts is internally generated rather
than imposed from without. An organic totality is both cause and effect
of itself; it is similar to a free nature in this respect.
My purpose in reviewing these passages is simply to provide textual
support for my suggestion that that there is more to Hegel’s remark that
philosophy is “the science of freedom” than we might initially suppose.
Superficially, his message is that philosophy is an activity in which only
thinking and therefore free natures can engage. His deeper point, I believe,
is that we can discover in each of the three divisions of his system properties
that mirror the nature of free subjectivity.
In this chapter, I confine my attention to just one division of the
Encyclopedia, namely the Science of Logic, and explore what Hegel might
mean by implying that it is a science of freedom. How can Hegelian freedom
illuminate features of the Logic, such as its structure, aims, and presupposi-
tions? Hegel describes freedom as an “achievement” that results from
a progressive development, and in his works on the philosophy of right and
of history, for instance, he has a complicated story to tell about the factors that
move the process along.9 He gives us a progressive developmental account in
the Logic as well – not of freedom but of what he refers to as the “Concept
[Begriff ].” I want to explore how Hegel’s treatment of development in the idea
of freedom can help us understand the progression, in the Logic, of the
particular determinations or specifications of the Concept. How and out of
what do the determinations get generated? Why is the direction of the
progression, in both cases, from more to less abstract; and what connection
is there, if any, between the progressive development and human freedom?
2.1 Features of Hegelian Freedom

Hegel is persuaded that there has been progress, in human history, in the
implications we associate with the idea of freedom and in our conception
8
As he writes in ¶2 of his Preface to the Phenomenology, the whole of philosophy is an “organic unity,”
where “each [form or part] is as necessary as the other, and the necessity of each alone constitutes the
life of the whole.” The parts of philosophy are not simply derived from or deduced out of the idea of
the whole (HE §8). Instead, the whole of philosophy depends upon its parts for its very possibility.
The idea of philosophy makes possible its parts or divisions; their content may be “justified” only as
“a moment of the whole” (HE §7). (See also EL §237A.)
9
In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History (Hegel 1988a) (hereafter “PH”), for example, Hegel asserts
that freedom “does not exist as an original and natural state.” It must be “achieved and won through
an endless process involving the discipline of knowledge and will” (PH 73/43). The general trajectory
of the history of the idea of freedom, he says, is from “imperfect to the more perfect” (PH 92f./60f.).

of ourselves as free; there has been progress as well in the kinds of demands
we make in the interest of sustaining and satisfying our self-conception.10
The concept “progress” implies development versus mere change – that is,
it implies necessary versus accidental connection. Only because we can
discover necessary connection in the history of the idea of freedom is it
possible for us to give an account of how the ‘higher’ versions of the idea
emerge in response to deficiencies in the ‘lower’ ones. Our commitment to
the thesis of necessary connection is what allows us to explain, for example,
how Rousseau’s treatment of the nature and demands of freedom was both
a response to and an improvement upon that of Hobbes.
The interpreter of this Hegelian progressivist story faces the special
challenge of identifying the factors that move the transitions along.
What conditions must be in place to generate the advances from lower
to higher levels? Does the fact that the advances are necessary mean, for
Hegel, that they are fated or pre-determined? Is there no place for contin-
gency in this developmental story? I am going to suggest the general shape
of Hegel’s answers to these questions by considering his description of
transitions in the earliest developmental stages of the idea of freedom. I will
be emphasizing respects in which both the idea and the experience of
freedom are for Hegel initially empty and abstract. In addition, I will try to
clarify his reasons for asserting that the movement forward is in the
direction of a richer, more perfect conception of freedom. Although
Hegel represents the movement as a development and therefore as neces-
sary, I will argue that he nonetheless grants that it depends on contingent
factors.
Just how is the idea of freedom with which Hegel’s developmental story
begins initially empty and abstract? Freedom first appears on the scene as
an object of awareness in what he describes as a natural condition,
a condition prior to the formation of a state. Freedom is an object of
awareness only for creatures like us, creatures capable of thought and
therefore also of self-consciousness. But creatures like us do not just
think; we seek to give our thoughts existence. We possess, in addition,
a will.11
10
The progress is tied to the way in which human subjectivity has gradually had success in overcoming
finitude and subjectivity in order to achieve a place where reason is “altogether by itself [durchaus bei
sich selbst]” (HE §5).
11
The will is “a particular way of thinking – thinking . . . as the drive to give itself existence.” The will is
indeed “thought translating itself into existence [das Denken als sich übersetzend ins Dasein]” (Hegel
1968–: 14:1, §4A) (hereafter “PR”). See also PR §§11, 57.

32 sally sedgwick
The freedom of which we are aware and which we exercise at this initial
stage is empty and abstract in a number of respects. In the state of nature,
the particular will is a psychological egoist, motivated above all by the
desire to satisfy its own physical and psychological needs. It becomes aware
of itself as free only when it encounters a certain kind of obstacle, only
when conditions of scarcity force it to compete for goods with creatures
significantly like itself. Confronted with other thinking animals, it dis-
covers the need to signal what it becomes aware of as its right to put its will
into things and appropriate them as its own. It becomes conscious of itself
as a bearer of right, that is, as a “person.”12
The idea of freedom at this stage is empty and abstract, Hegel argues,
because it refers to nothing more than the particular will’s right to make things
its own in pursuit of its private purposes. At this stage, the particular will’s
freedom is essentially a freedom from the interference of other persons. The
particular will in the natural condition knows that it must sometimes compete
with creatures like itself, but it isn’t yet aware that its right to things is based on
a feature of itself that it shares with other thinking natures. Because it so far
ignores what Hegel refers to as the “universal” aspect of itself, it does not
recognize or care about the rightful claims of other wills. The particular will of
abstract right does not yet “will the universal as such” (PR §103).13
The freedom experienced in the state of nature is abstract and empty for
the further reason that the natural condition, as Hegel describes it, is not
truly a state of freedom at all. Following Hobbes, Hegel portrays the state
of nature as a system of right that is more coercive than free (PR §94); it is
a state “governed by force [Zustand der Gewalt]” (PR §93). In a situation in
which particular wills are relatively equal physically and psychologically,
and in which there is no law and order (because there is no all-powerful
sovereign to keep the peace, and no system of impartial and effectively
enforced laws), what remains is a condition in which each will seeks the
satisfaction of its own ends and by any means. The result is a condition of
perpetual insecurity and fear, a Hobbesian “war of all against all.” As Hegel
puts it in the Heidelberg Encyclopedia, the natural condition is one of
“violence and injustice, of which nothing truer may be said than that one
ought to depart from it” (HE §415).
Hegel’s story of development in the idea of freedom thus begins with
creatures in a state of nature, creatures endowed with the special capacity of
12
“Personality contains in general the capacity for right” (PR §36).
13
From the particular will’s point of view, it is the bearer of right, and “someone else has the
corresponding duty” (PR §155; my emphasis).

thought as well as the drive to make thought existent. The idea of freedom –
more precisely, the thinking animal’s awareness of its right to put its will
into things – is first awakened when a particular will is forced to compete
with other creatures similarly capable of expressing their will. At this stage,
the particular will doesn’t recognize those other beings as significantly
similar to itself and therefore as likewise bearers of right. The particular
will is blind, too, to the extent to which the nature of some of its needs and
desires is intimately tied to its relations to others. Nor does it yet appreciate
that it can most effectively express and realize its freedom in a system
governed by impartial judges and laws, a system that promotes and defends
the freedom of all versus only some. The poverty or emptiness of this initial
idea of freedom is evident in the failure of this system of abstract right to
sustain itself, for on Hegel’s analysis, the state of nature is in effect a state
governed by force.
So much for the empty and abstract nature of our initial idea of freedom.
How does contingency enter this Hegelian story? It does so in at least two
respects. First, the way in which we tell the story depends on our particular
vantage point. From the vantage point of Hobbes, the story begins with
a depiction of the state of nature and ends with what he takes to be the best
remedy for the inconveniences of such a state. The Hobbesian story ends
with subjects transferring their natural right to judge and punish (that is,
their right to a system of private justice) to an absolute sovereign. From
a different vantage point, however, the story has a different plot and follows
a different trajectory. For Rousseau and Kant, for example, it begins with
the conflicts they take to result from the Hobbesian conception of sover-
eignty. Their plot is largely driven by the perception that these conflicts
must be resolved, and that what is needed is a form of state power that is
not absolute in the Hobbesian sense and thus not experienced by subjects
as external or coercive. Their story ends with the emergence of a new idea
of what counts as a legitimate source of practical law. The new idea
proposed by Rousseau and Kant is that law will be experienced by
a subject as legitimately authoritative and therefore as non-coercive only
if the subject is able to discover the source of law not in some external or
alien power, but in itself.
The point most deserving emphasis here is that our tale of the unfolding
of the idea of freedom is shaped by our particular vantage point. The
Hobbesian, the Rousseauian, the Kantian, and even the Hegelian conceive
of the overall trajectory of history – including its beginning and its end –
differently. Indeed, one of the larger messages of Hegel’s history of human
freedom is that it is a history composed of evolving conceptions of the

34 sally sedgwick
conditions and nature of freedom and right, as well as of evolving concep-
tions of who we are as free natures. Hegel wants us to appreciate that in any
historical narrative, the problems we single out as demanding a solution, as
well as the tools we have available for solving them, reflect our place in
history, a place that is not a product of choice.
The second respect in which contingency shows up in the history of
human freedom is this: not all features of the various stages in the history
are expressions of choice. Although any developmental story must for
Hegel be pieced together from connections he considers necessary, this
doesn’t imply that he must be committed to the thesis that accidents play
no role whatsoever in the historical narrative. Hegel doesn’t, for example,
hold that, in a state of nature, the situation of scarcity is one we choose.
Nor does he suggest that we ever had the option of being fashioned more as
altruists than as egoists. Although he of course defends a thesis of human
freedom, he does not hold that our freedom is wholly unlimited. Not only
do we have to contend with situations that are not of our own making, but
such situations also have the potential to shape the form our freedom takes.
The story of our freedom would surely have followed a different course, for
instance, were our natural condition a situation of plenty rather than of
scarcity.
If we take these contingencies seriously, we have to accept the implica-
tion that, on Hegel’s account, the history of human freedom could have
unfolded differently. Admittedly, he sometimes conveys the impression
that he thinks otherwise. He writes in a passage from his Lectures on the
Philosophy of History, for example, that what drives the advances in freedom
from the “imperfect to the more perfect” is the “internal impulse of
spiritual life, the drive to break through its own shell of naturalness,
sensuality, and self-estrangement” (PH 92f./60f.). The reference to the
“internal impulse of spiritual life” in this remark might tempt us to suppose
that Hegel takes the idea of freedom to be fully formed or determinate
from the start, and to rely on contingent factors merely for its awakening or
activation. But if our foregoing discussion is on target, development in the
idea of freedom is shaped by thought’s engagement with situations that are
by no means entirely within its control. When Hegel writes of the “internal
impulse” of spiritual life, what he arguably has in mind is not a pre-given
and fully determinate idea, but rather thought’s drive to give itself exist-
ence. Just how thought gives itself existence isn’t entirely left up to thought
itself. Nor does thought generate entirely out of its own resources the story
we tell about its unfolding. Hegel looks back at the course of history and
discovers that spirit has left its “shell of naturalness” behind and now

experiences itself as less self-estranged. He doesn’t generate his historical
narrative ex nihilo. His narrative reflects his unique place in history.14
2.2 Features of Hegel’s Logic

What do the features of freedom I just outlined reveal about the aims,
structure, and argumentative strategy of Hegel’s Science of Logic? In par-
ticular, how do they illuminate Hegel’s suggestion that the Logic, along
with the two other divisions of his system, is “the science of freedom”? As
we’ve seen, Hegel is committed to the view that there is development in the
idea of freedom. He likewise holds that there is development in the
concepts of the Logic. The idea of freedom on his account progresses
from abstract to concrete; the same is the case regarding the progressions
in the Logic. The idea of freedom is initially maximally empty, and this is
likewise true of the first concept of the Logic. In common with the history
of freedom, the Logic begins with a bare capacity, namely our capacity for
thought.15 The logical progression follows a path of ever greater concrete-
ness, from thoughts that are initially empty and abstract, to thoughts that
are increasingly rich and determinate, and as such increasingly adequate
categories of being and vehicles of knowledge. As developmental, the story
moreover connects concepts “not in an accidental but in a necessary way”
(HE §39/§40).
Hegel describes his Logic as the “science of thinking [Wissenschaft des
Denkens]” and as the “thinking about thinking” (HE §12).16 Its proper
object is not some specific object or class of objects (such as God or nature)
but thought itself, or more precisely, thought’s “determinations and laws”
(HE §12). The Logic concerns thoughts of concrete objects only and solely
as thoughts; in this respect, its objects are “pure abstractions” (HE §12).17
14
Philosophy is “its own time considered in thoughts” (PR 15/21). See similar remarks in PH: “each
individual is the child of his people, and likewise . . . the child of his time . . . No one is left behind his
time, nor can he overstep it” (PH 87/55). For a recent and very different (and far more Kantian)
account of Hegelian freedom, see McDowell (2017).
15
Hegel writes that “science presupposes nothing except that it is pure thought” (HE §36). This is
a point about science in general, including the Logic. Consider again his remark in EL §17: in
beginning our philosophy, all we have is the “free act of thinking . . . producing its own object for
itself . . . and giving it to itself.”
16
In EL, Hegel describes the content of the Logic as “nothing other than its own thinking” (EL §19; see
also §24A2).
17
See also Hegel (1968–: 21:13/34) (hereafter “SL”). In EL §24A2, Hegel remarks that, in the context of
the logic, thoughts are considered in this way: “they have no other content than that which belongs
to thought itself and which is generated by thought.” The objects of the Logic are the pure thought
forms considered in abstraction from their application to any particular kind of object, whether an
object of nature (of empirical intuition) or an object of geometry (of pure intuition).

36 sally sedgwick
I want to explore the idea that there is a parallel between the beginning
of the Logic and the beginning of the history of freedom. In my review of
the freedom case, I suggested that the story does not begin with a pre-
given and fully formed idea. It begins with a capacity that, in combin-
ation with contingent situational factors, results in the production of
specific concepts or ideas. I will argue in this section that the same is true
for the Logic. To make good on this claim, I need to show that the
concept with which the Logic begins is initially empty and accrues
determination only once the progression gets under way. I must also
meet the greater challenge of showing that – as in the freedom case –
accruing determination depends on factors that are contingent. I will
suggest that Hegel awards contingency a role to play, even though he
describes the progressive generation of concepts in the Logic not just as
“necessary” but as produced by “logical deduction [logische Ausführung]”
(HE §39/§40).
I turn, first, to address the following question. In what respect is the
beginning of the Logic empty? Its initial concept is that of “pure being,”
which Hegel describes as “pure thought [reiner Gedanke]” and “simple
immediacy [einfache Unmittelbare]” (HE §38/§39). The fact that the
concept “pure being” is a “simple immediacy,” he says, implies that it
“can neither be mediated nor further determined” (HE §38/§39). Hegel’s
point seems to be that the concept “pure being” possesses no mark or
attribute by means of which we can say anything more about it than that it
is “both pure thought and simple immediacy.”
It is worth considering Hegel’s reasons for beginning the Logic in this
way. In the first section of his Introduction to the Heidelberg Encyclopedia,
he notes that other sciences fail in their efforts to begin from a standpoint
of immediacy. Other sciences, he says, typically take some object or
“doctrine” or “classification” as an “immediately given” “representation
[Vorstellung]” (HE §1). They do so, because they seek to rest their science
on solid ground – on some premise or assumption that is beyond doubt
and that can serve as a foundation for further concepts and laws. These
sciences “fail” in this endeavor, on Hegel’s account, because they are
insufficiently self-critical. They take themselves to begin with immediacy
and hence with certainty (HE §1), but they do so without warrant. Even
Kant, who insisted upon the necessity of a criticism or meta-critique
supposed to occur outside the actual practice of science, failed to subject
his presuppositions to sufficient critical scrutiny. As Hegel puts it, the
“demand made fashionable by Kantian philosophy, that prior to actual
cognition the faculty of cognition should be investigated critically” at first

seems “plausible,” but Kant seems not to have appreciated that “this
investigation is itself cognitive” (HE §36; see also EL §41A1).
It is tempting to suppose that, in starting with “pure being,” Hegel’s aim
is to convince us that his effort to begin with immediacy succeeds where
others fail. According to this line of interpretation, Hegel is committed to
the thesis that the Science of Logic improves upon the efforts of other
sciences to start from scratch. For precisely this reason, it is suggested,
the Logic begins with a concept that is defined as wholly indeterminate, as
not question-begging, and as something of which we can be absolutely
certain (HE 38/§39). But on a different (and I believe more accurate)
reading, the point of Hegel’s discussion is to persuade us that any effort
to begin with simple immediacy is a false start; it is “untrue [nicht
wahrhaft],” as he sometimes says (HE §38/§39).18
“Pure being” is a false start, because “pure being” on Hegel’s description
is an “empty abstraction [leere Abstraktion]”; it is indeed “something
unsayable” (HE §39/§40).19 The fact that pure being is unsayable becomes
evident when we reflect on what it means for a concept to stand for or
represent “pure thought and simple immediacy.” There is nothing obvi-
ously unsayable about the definition of pure being as simple immediacy.
The definition conforms to the norms of intelligibility; it is grammatical,
and we know what the words composing it mean. But problems become
apparent when we consider the definition’s implications. As simple imme-
diacy, the concept of pure being can in Hegel’s words “neither be mediated
nor further determined” (HE §38/§39). Lacking all determination, “pure
being” effectively stands for nothing and can be equally well expressed as
the concept “nothing” (HE §39/§40).
This implication is paradoxical enough, but Hegel draws our attention to
further problems.20 If “pure being” is wholly indeterminate, then it gives us
grounds for asserting neither its identity nor its difference from the concept
“nothing.” For if we are to be entitled to assert that identity or difference, we
must be able to discover in “pure being” some attribute or determination that
warrants us in doing so (HE §39/§40). We cannot discover determination,
18
Truth is demonstrated not at the beginning, but only as the “result of philosophical knowledge” (HE
6/46). Hegel makes this point again in his PR where he writes that all thinking must begin “from
a point not demonstrated.” Our starting point is “immediately relative” and later recognized to be
a “result” (PR §2).
19
“On the basis of pure immediacy, [pure being] is nothingness – something unsayable” (HE §30/
§40). Pure immediacy or pure being “cannot be said ” (EL §87). Because it in fact already contains
mediation, pure being is not “truly [wahrhaft]” the first (EL §86).
20
In EL §88, Hegel writes of the ‘apparently’ “paradoxical [paradoxer]” nature of the proposition
“Being and Nothing are the same.”

38 sally sedgwick
however, in a concept that we define as simple immediacy and that, as such,
lacks all determination. In at least these respects, the concept of pure being is
unsayable. When we consider the concept’s implications, we discover its
instability and internal contradictions.
Hegel’s aim in these first paragraphs of Part One of the Logic is therefore
not to try to improve upon other efforts to begin from a standpoint of
immediacy. Instead, he seeks to convince us that such efforts are ill-fated.
He explicitly alerts us to the fact that he begins his Logic with a concept
that, on his own estimation, is “untrue.”21 If our starting point is simple
immediacy, we effectively begin with what cannot be said. We give
ourselves no way to move forward – no means of grounding our science
or generating further concepts.22
The way forward, then, requires us to negate our initial concept – or, as
Hegel puts the point more positively, it requires us to give our initial
concept “more precise specification and truer definition” (HE §39/§40).23
We move forward by acknowledging that if we are to say anything
meaningful about “being” at all – even just that it is either identical to or
different from nothing – we have to assign it some determination. Doing
so doesn’t require us to wholly dispense with the concept but rather to
understand it in a new way, in particular, as no longer “pure” being or
“simple immediacy.”24 Attributing to the concept “being” some determin-
ation is precisely what allows us to advance to the less abstract and therefore
truer concepts of “becoming,” “determinate being,” and so forth.25
The message I especially want to extract from this tale of the transition
from “pure being” to the ‘higher’ or ‘truer’ concepts is a message about how
21
We initially ‘take’ pure being as our beginning; that is, we think we can start with pure immediacy.
But we learn that, in fact, pure being “contains a mediation” (HE §38/§39). We learn that the
“truth” of being and nothing is their “unity” (HE §40/§41). As Hegel notes in PR, philosophy “must
begin somewhere”; it must begin “from a point not demonstrated.” But the starting point is
“immediately relative” and shows up later as a “result” (PR §2).
22
For a different account of the beginning of the Logic, one that persuasively emphasizes its
metaphysical implications, see Houlgate (2018).
23
The basis of all determination, for Hegel (following Spinoza), is negation (EL §91A).
24
Hegel notes that the only thing really “immediate” about the concept of pure being with which we
began is that it serves as our initial starting point (HE §3, EL §238).
25
For the sake of brevity, I have skipped any discussion of the role of the concept of “becoming” which
Hegel describes as exhibiting attributes both of being and of its opposite, namely “nothingness” (HE
§40M/§41B). “Becoming” is the unity of being and nothingness. It is “inward unrest” in that it is
“pure being,” recognized as unstable, as containing mediation or negativity (“pure being” passing
over to or becoming “determinate being” (see also EL §§88, 238)).
For a fine recent discussion of the way in which the concepts of Hegel’s Logic come to be as the
result of a “genetic” developmental process, see especially §3.2 of Heidemann (2019). Heidemann
argues that, in this and other respects, Hegel distinguishes himself from the rationalists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

the latter concepts come to be, on Hegel’s account. In the freedom case, we
begin with a capacity, namely with the will (that is, with thought’s drive to
give itself existence). A will is triggered into action in response to conflict,
and conflicts result from a constellation of various factors, some of which
are not products of choice. In the logic case, we likewise begin with
a capacity – the capacity of thought seeking to express itself in the form
of concepts and judgments.
It is tempting to suppose, however, that the analogy ends here for at least
two reasons. First, in the Logic, we’re in the realm of pure thought and our
objects are abstractions; they lack spatial as well as temporal dimension.26 It
is not obvious, then, that we can discover in the Logic anything analogous
to the contingent situational factors that partially constrain the develop-
ment of our idea of freedom. I will address this worry in my final section,
but I first want to turn my attention to a second apparent disanalogy.
Hegel writes that, in the Logic, the way forward requires us to appreciate
that our initial concept, “pure being,” contains an “implicit” content or
determination; our initial concept implicitly contains the concepts “noth-
ing,” “becoming,” “determinate being,” and so forth (HE §40/§41).27 We
might take Hegel’s reference to “implicit” determination to imply that the
concept “pure being” is fully formed from the start; it possesses pre-given
marks or subordinate concepts. The concept’s marks are “implicit” in that
they are not yet known by us; they become explicit once we subject it to
analysis. On this reading, the story of the development of concepts in the
Logic is significantly unlike Hegel’s treatment of development in the idea of
freedom, as I just presented it.
But this interpretation leaves a great deal unaccounted for. Hegel
doesn’t argue that the transitions in the Logic come to be thanks simply
to thought’s proficiency in dividing complex concepts into their constitu-
ent parts. That is, the transitions don’t just result from our quest for
clarity – from our efforts to make explicit the various marks of a complex
concept. To put the point differently, the transitions don’t derive merely
from what Hegel describes as “the drive to find a fixed significance [der
Trieb . . . eine feste Bedeutung zu finden]” (HE §39/§40; see also EL §87).
Hegel identifies as the “moving soul [bewegende Seele]” of development not
analysis but rather “dialectic” (HE §15).28 Dialectic is the moving soul of
26
Concepts are not “sensible representations”; they have neither spatial nor temporal extension
(EL §20).
27
Hegel describes a dialectical process as one of “development [Entwicklung],” “through which only
that is posited which is already implicitly present” (EL §161A).
28
Every moment in the progression is both analytic and synthetic (EL §238A).

40 sally sedgwick
“all life,” he says, as well as of all “scientific progression” (EL §§81, 81A; see
also PR §31). Dialectic directs our attention to concepts we take to have
fixed significance and ‘negates’ them. Its negation is not a mere discovery of
what is already there; it is instead an alteration or transformation of what is
already there.29 As a transformative and productive force, dialectic on
Hegel’s account generates “determinate content” (HE §16; EL §81).
Again, my aim is to challenge a certain interpretation of what Hegel has
in mind in referring to the “implicit” determination of a concept. On that
interpretation, he holds that the concept with which the Logic begins, the
concept he characterizes as the most abstract, is fully determinate at the
start. The concept is abstract and empty only insofar as its determination is
initially unknown to us. The position I am defending, in contrast, is that
conceptual determination or form is not given at the start but instead gets
generated out of a process that requires dialectic as well as analysis.
Dialectic, in Hegel’s view, produces determinations that are “implicit” in
a concept not because they are pre-given, but simply because they are
logically possible.
An Addition (Zusatz) from the 1830 Encyclopedia supports my reading of
what Hegel has in mind by “implicit” determination:
[A] plant develops from its germ: the germ already contains the whole plant
within itself, but in an ideal way, so that we must not envisage its develop-
ment as if the various parts of the plant . . . were already present in the germ
realiter, though only in very minute form. This is the so-called Chinese box
hypothesis [Einschachtelungshypothese], the defect of which is that what is
present initially only in an ideal way is regarded as already existent. What is
correct in this course of its process, however, is just that the Concept
[Begriff ] remains at home with itself in the course of its process, and that
the process does not posit anything new as regards content [Inhalt], but only
brings forth an alteration of form [Formveränderung]. This nature of the
Concept, which shows itself in its process to be a development of itself, is
what people have in view when they speak of the ideas that are innate in
man, or when they say, as Plato himself did, that all learning is merely
reminiscence [Erinnerung]; but, all the same, ‘reminiscence’ should not be
understood to mean that whatever constitutes the content of a mind that is
educated by instruction was already present in that mind previously in its
determinate unfolding. (EL §161A; my emphasis)
The main lesson I believe we should draw from this passage is that Hegel
rejects a certain version of the innate ideas hypothesis. We are warranted in
29
By means of “reflection [Nachdenken]” on what is given in “sensation, intuition, or representation,”
“something changes [etwas verändert]” (EL §22).

asserting that the germ of a plant “already contains the whole plant” only if
we do not take this to imply that all the stages and shapes of the plant’s
development are present in the plant at the start, like a plan or blueprint.
Whether in a plant or in the idea of freedom or in the “Concept,”
development describes necessarily connected stages or moments of or in
a single thing. What alters, on Hegel’s account, is “form.” Crucially,
however, we are not to suppose that new or ‘higher’ forms are “already
present” in ‘lower’ forms. That is, we are not to consider the appearance of
a new form on analogy with the recollection of a previously existing one.30
In another passage in the same text, Hegel describes the movement of
thought in the Logic as “the self-developing totality of its own peculiar
determinations and laws, that it does not already have and find given within
itself, but which it gives to itself [die es sich selbst gibt, nicht schon hat und in
sich vorfindet]” (EL §19; my emphasis). Thought performs its function not
just by analyzing what is already there; thought can also bring into being
determinations that, as Hegel says here, it “does not already have and find”
in itself. There is a lesson to be learned, from this remark, not just about
what Hegel means by the implicit determination of a concept, but also
about his claim that his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences – including
his Logic – is “the science of freedom.” Thought can be a genuinely creative
or productive power; it can generate new concepts and not just analyze
already given concepts. Likewise, a truly free subject does not on Hegel’s
account merely respond to forces that are already there; she is capable of
taking what is already there and producing something new from it.31
2.3 Freedom and Temporality in the Logic

A moment ago, I called attention to a further apparent disanalogy between
the freedom and logic cases. This disanalogy concerns the role that contin-
gent factors play in the two sciences. In section 2.1, I suggested that Hegel
grants that contingent situational factors actually shape the development of
the idea of freedom, that is, they contribute to the idea’s determination or
30
For further critical remarks on the innate ideas hypothesis, see also EL §67.
31
In an intriguing passage in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel notes that in the case of free
natures, there can be a gap between their concept or “inner determination” and its realization – between
what he refers to as “the implicitly determinate nature of the seed and the adaptation of its existence
thereto” (PH 89f./58). In virtue of their “inner determination,” free natures participate in their self-
production and are thereby capable of creating themselves. In the case of a non-human organism, by
contrast, “nothing can come between the concept and its realization.” Presumably, Hegel means to
imply that in the case of a human organism it is possible for something to “come between” its “concept
and its realization.” It is possible, precisely because human organisms are capable of freedom.

42 sally sedgwick
form. I went on to ask how there could be anything similar to this in the
Logic case. The Logic is the “science of thinking,” and its objects are “pure
abstractions” (HE §12).32 How could contingent situational factors have
a bearing, then, on the nature and development of the concepts of the
Logic? Needless to say, the answer to this question very much depends on
how we understand Hegel’s characterization of thoughts as “pure abstrac-
tions.” It could after all be the case that the thoughts or concepts of the
Logic are abstract in some respects but not others.
Hegel suggests that the concepts of the Logic are most obviously abstract
in that they are significantly different in nature from sense impressions.
Thoughts, on his account, are not “sensible representations”; they are
neither sense impressions nor empirical objects. They are unlike both,
because they are universals rather than singular representations (EL §20).33
Thoughts or concepts are in addition abstract in that they lack spatial
and temporal extension. Thoughts lack spatial extension because they are
not the kind of thing that fills space, nor do we locate one thought or
concept to the left or right of another. The non-temporal nature of thoughts
or concepts, however, is less obvious. After all, we do sometimes say (as
Hegel does) that a certain idea came into existence at a certain time and
sparked a series of subsequent ideas. Hegel is nonetheless committed to the
thesis that the concepts of the Logic lack temporality in some way. He tells
us that their “content [Inhalt]” “is not affected [behaften] by time”; their
content does not pass away or change (EL §20). Hegel surely cannot mean
by this that the thoughts or concepts of the Logic undergo no change
whatsoever. As we saw, the concept we initially understand as “pure being”
passes over into the concepts “nothing,” “becoming,” and so forth. The
entire Science of Logic is an exploration of conceptual development; and the
dialectical method that moves the progressions along is meant to reveal
what he refers to as the ‘plasticity’ of concepts.34 When Hegel claims that
32
In the context of the Logic, thoughts are considered in this way: “they [have] no other content than
that which belongs to thinking itself and which is brought into being by means of thinking” (EL
§24A2). So, the objects of the Logic are the pure thought forms considered in abstraction from their
application to any particular kind of object. Compared with the Logic, the other two divisions
“appear as applied logic.” The concern of these other two sciences “is only to [re]cognize the logical
forms in the shapes of nature and spirit, shapes that are only a particular mode of expression of the
forms of pure thinking” (EL §24A2).
33
Logic belongs to the “spiritual” or “supernatural [Übernatürliche]” world, not to nature or the realm
of the physical (SL 10/31f.). See Mure (1940: 108) on how space and time for Hegel belong to the
sphere of nature and not to the Logic.
34
See, e.g., the final paragraphs of Hegel’s Preface to the second edition of that work where he refers to
concepts as “plastisch.” What alters or develops, according to Hegel, is a concept’s “form” (he writes
here of “Formveränderung”) (EL §161A).

the “content” of ideas or concepts is fixed, he simply means to highlight
a necessary condition of our identifying development in anything at all.
Development is development of or in something – of or in some “content”
we take to be fixed. When we take some content to be fixed, we award that
content no temporal dimension in that respect.
The Logic is furthermore abstract, for Hegel, in that it does not set out to
provide a record of the chronological appearance of concepts. The Logic
does not, in other words, concern itself with mere temporal sequence. For
precisely this reason, Hegel insists that his Logic is not an instance of what
he calls “external” history. External history, in his words, “gives the form of
a contingent succession to the stages of the Idea’s development” (EL §13).35
The Logic, however, concerns itself with necessary conceptual connections
rather than with “contingent succession” or mere change.36
In at least these respects, then, the concepts of the Science of Logic are
abstract and have neither spatial nor temporal extension. Crucially, how-
ever, none of this implies that the concepts of the Logic have no temporal
dimension whatsoever. It could be that the concepts of the Logic as well as
their development are in some way indebted to temporally locatable
historical conditions. It could be the case, too, that the freedom of thought
that moves the dialectic forward originates in a temporal domain, in nature
and/or history. The view I am proposing is that the plot and trajectory of
the Logic, as well as Hegel’s choices about how the story begins and ends,
reflect his own unique place in history. In my remaining final paragraphs,
I say a few things to motivate this interpretation.
We can appreciate the point that there is a temporal or historical
dimension to the Logic if we consider why the development, as Hegel
portrays it, takes the particular shape that it does, and why he chooses to
begin and end the science just as he does. In my discussion of the freedom
case, I asserted that the shape of our historical narrative rests on the vantage
point from which we tell it. The trajectory of freedom’s course appears one
way to the Hobbesian and another way to the Kantian; each assigns the
story a different beginning and a different plot. The same is true, I am now
suggesting, in the case of the Logic. For Hegel, but not for Parmenides, the
35
Although Hegel grants that the “same development of thinking that is presented in the history of
philosophy is presented in philosophy itself,” that development is in philosophy “free [befreit]” of
any historical “externality [Äußerlichkeit]”; in philosophy, we are “purely in the element of thought”
(EL §14).
36
For a good discussion of the respect in which logical development in Hegel is not temporal, see Petry
(1970: 25). Petry challenges efforts of Darwinians to “present Hegel as the philosopher of evolution”
and argues that we should instead understand development in the context of Hegel’s Logic not as
evolution over a period of time but rather as development from what is simple to what is complex.

44 sally sedgwick
story introduces a Heraclitean perspective into our understanding of the
nature of concepts – a perspective that takes their sense or “form” to be in
flux rather than fixed. Likewise, for Hegel but not for Locke or Kant, the
story includes a chapter that lays out a radically new way of thinking about
the relation of the concept “appearance” to that of “essence,” a way of
thinking that purportedly harmonizes what the earlier philosophers took to
be a rigid opposition.37
In effect, what I am proposing is that Hegel’s Logic, like his history of
human freedom, is a story told from a point of view, one that reflects not
just the work he has already completed in the Phenomenology but also the
spirit of his age. His choice to begin the Logic as he does (with “pure
being”) isn’t arbitrary. He has an agenda; he sets out with a purpose in
mind. In undertaking to attack the thesis of simple immediacy, he is
guided by his idea of where the story must end up. His own philosophical
system, no less than other philosophical systems, is not a product of pure
spontaneity; it is, as he says, a “result [Resultat]” of previous philosophical
systems (EL §13).
No doubt, some will grant that the beginning of Hegel’s Logic is not
arbitrary but nonetheless insist that it is not historically conditioned either.
These critics will tell us that the beginning of Hegel’s story, and the shape
of its unfolding, is (on Hegel’s own account) conditioned not by his
contingent place in history but rather by the nature of thought itself.
They will remind us that the Logic deals with pure abstractions that, as
such, have no temporal dimension. They will quote passages in which
Hegel remarks that philosophical development is “free [befreit]” of “histor-
ical externality [geschichtlichen Äußerlichkeit]” (EL §14) and in which he
asserts that his science “presupposes nothing except that it is pure thought”
(HE §36). But what position is really being attributed to Hegel, here, and
in precisely what respect does his science presuppose nothing? The idea is
supposed to be that although Hegel repeatedly chastises other thinkers for
failing to make good on their claims to begin without presuppositions, he is
remarkably able to succeed. His starting point is truly self-evident and as
such worthy of immediate and universal assent.
I suspect that this kind of response rests on a confusion about the message
Hegel means to convey when he insists that his science “presupposes nothing
37
“The logical is to be sought in a system of thought-determinations in which the opposition
[Gegensatz] between the subjective and the objective (in its common meaning) falls away
[hinwegfällt]” (EL §24A1). Told through the eyes of Kant, in contrast, the story of conceptual
development does not consist in an attack on the “fixed determinations” of the logic of the
understanding.

except that it is pure thought.” When Hegel contrasts his science with other
purported sciences, his point is not that the latter begin with presuppositions
and his does not. His point is rather that his science self-consciously takes its
beginning to be, as he says, “awkward [Unbequeme]”; his beginning is in other
words a problem that derives from the fact that its object, as he puts it,
“immediately and necessarily provokes doubt and controversy [zugleich dem
Zweifel und Streite notwendig unterworfen ist]” (HE §2). All thinking has to
begin somewhere, but every beginning, Hegel says, is initially “ungrounded
[unbegründetes]” and “anticipatory [anticipirtes]” (HE §§4, 11). Truth cannot
be taken for granted at the start; it must be established or demonstrated (HE
§3). The demonstration is possible only as the “result of philosophical know-
ledge” (HE 6/47).
When Hegel writes, then, that a true science “presupposes nothing
except that it is pure thought,” his point is that a true science is self-
critical in a way that less true sciences are not. He does not commit himself
to the assumption that his starting point is self-justifying or self-evident.38
He does not assume that his thinking possesses the special power to start its
reflections from nowhere and to thus abstract all contingency away. After
all, were Hegel attributing to himself this kind of abstractive power, he
would in effect be awarding himself a form of freedom he believes none of
us possess – a freedom to transcend [überspringe] our time in thought (PR
15/21). In effect, he would be awarding himself the power to start from
a standpoint of simple immediacy, a standpoint he believes philosophy in
his time has revealed to be “untrue.”
In what respect is Hegel’s Science of Logic “the science of freedom”? I’ve
argued that, in common with the other two branches of his encyclopedic
system, the Logic shares features Hegel associates with the nature of free
subjectivity. The concepts of the Logic originate in our capacity for
thought, a capacity that seeks to express itself. Thought for Hegel is
a genuinely creative power; it expresses itself not just by analyzing what
is already there but also by transforming what is already there. Thought’s
“implicit” form isn’t given as determinate at the start. Thought generates
its determinate form, and it does so in response to factors that are not
wholly within its control.
38
When Hegel says in the 1830 Encyclopedia that all presuppositions “must . . . be given up when we
enter into the science,” his point is likewise that none of our presuppositions should be simply taken
for granted. As he puts it, “all determinations . . . must first be investigated” (EL §78).

chapter 3
Essence in Hegel’s Encyclopedia and Science

of Logic
The Problem of Form
Stephen Houlgate
Hegel concedes that his Encyclopedia contains an abbreviated version of his

philosophy.1 His Encyclopedia Logic (EL) does not, therefore, present the
detailed analysis of categories we find in the Science of Logic (SL), and some
categories derived in SL are omitted from EL altogether.2 In one part of
Hegel’s logic – the doctrine of essence – there is a further significant
difference between EL and SL: the categories of form, matter and content
are considered at different places in the two texts. In SL they are examined
in the chapter on ground (see SL 389–97). In EL, however, form and matter
are not introduced until the categories of existence and thing have been
derived from that of ground, and form and content are considered together
with the category of appearance (see EL §§127–34).3
This “relocation” of form, matter and content leads David Kolb to argue
that in EL Hegel presents a different logical sequence from the one in SL and
that this challenges one common understanding of his logic. Kolb notes that,
for many commentators, Hegel’s logic is meant to be “unique and self-
determining” (Kolb 2010: 42).4 He also maintains, however, that the two
versions of the logic of essence both make “good points” and this makes it
difficult to recognize which sets out the true derivation of the categories (Kolb
2010: 45–6). Indeed, it suggests that “there is not necessarily one best version”
1
Hegel (2010a: 5, 8, 43 [§16]) (henceforth EL). Reference is made in this chapter to the 1830 edition of
Hegel’s Encyclopedia, unless otherwise indicated.
2
Omissions include various forms of measure and the different forms of reflexion. See Burbidge
(2006: 110). Note that page references to SL are to di Giovanni’s translation of the Science of Logic
(Hegel 2010b). Note, too, that I have occasionally altered the translations of both EL and SL.
3
Note, too, that the category of condition, considered in the ground chapter in SL, is moved in EL to
the section on actuality (see EL §§146–8).
4
Kolb has several commentators in mind, including Richard Winfield and William Maker, but he
cites my views (Houlgate 2006) “as representative” of the interpretation he wishes to challenge (Kolb
2010: 41).
46

Essence in Hegel’s Encyclopedia and Science of Logic 47
(Kolb 2010: 50). This in turn undermines the idea that Hegel’s logic is
“unique and self-determining”.
There is also another problem to be considered. Kolb maintains that
form, matter and content are conceived in the same way in EL and SL, even
though they are located in different logical contexts. In “a unique self-
development of pure thought”, however, categories should “find their
identity through their location in the sequence”, and “when they are
moved they should change their nature and meaning”. The fact (as Kolb
sees it) that Hegel treats form, matter and content as “relocatable fragments”,
which preserve their meaning wherever they are inserted, suggests again,
therefore, that Hegel’s logic is not the “unique and self-determining” logic
that (on many interpretations) he claims it to be (Kolb 2010: 53).
In this chapter I will respond to Kolb’s challenge by examining the
differences between EL and SL to which he draws attention, and I will
endeavour to show that, pace Kolb, they do not undermine the idea that
Hegel’s logic is “unique and self-determining”.
3.1 Essence and Reflexion in SL

In SL essence is initially conceived not as substrate or possibility, but as
“absolute negativity” (SL 342). Such negativity can be understood, in
contrast to the immediacy of being, as sheer non-immediacy.5 In the
sphere of being, Hegel maintains, categories and things are inextricably
connected to other categories and things, but they nonetheless have their
own immediacy. Something, for example, is always other than, and
related to, something else, but it is also immediately itself, something
of its own (see SL 89–93). In the sphere of essence, by contrast, categories
and things are never simply what they are. Essence is thus the sphere of
non-immediacy or “negativity”, in which things always negate them-
selves in some way.
Yet what precisely does it mean to say that essence is negativity? Hegel
clarifies this idea in SL by drawing out its necessary consequences. First,
since essence is sheer negativity or non-immediacy, there is in essence no
immediacy. Accordingly, the immediacy of being is in essence an illusion
(Schein). Essence, therefore, does not occur on its own but is inseparable
from the illusion to which it reduces immediate being (see SL 342–5).6
5
See Rohs (1982: 57): “Nicht-Unmittelbarkeit”.
6
See Hegel (1968–: 11:246–9). Di Giovanni translates Schein as “shine” (Hegel 2010b: 341), as do
Brinkmann and Dahlstrom (Hegel 2010a: 173 [§112]).

48 stephen houlgate
Second, since essence is sheer negativity, not only must it be the thorough
negation of itself, but even the “self” it negates must be negative. Essence,
therefore, must be the process of not-just-being-negative, or the negation of
negation. In the sphere of being, being is negated by being limited or coming
to an end (see SL 98–103); in essence, by contrast, it is not being that is
negated, but the negative. Essence is thus described by Hegel as the “negation
of a nothing [Nichts]”, or “the movement from nothing to nothing and thereby
back to itself ” (SL 346) – the movement he calls “reflexion” (Reflexion).7
Third, if essence is pure reflexion, or not-just-negative, then it must be
entangled with the non-negative or immediacy. Such immediacy is not just
the illusion to which essence reduces being, but is produced or “posited” by
reflexion itself: it is the being there is because there is not just the negative
or, alternatively, because there is not just nothing. Hegel calls such being
“positedness” (Gesetztseyn) (SL 347).8 This positedness – which is important
throughout the logic of essence – is the product of negativity and so is
a mediated, dependent immediacy. It is thus not free-standing immediacy,
but is inseparable from the negativity through which it is posited.
Fourth, however, reflexion also constitutes free-standing immediacy. It
does so because in being sheer negativity, and so negating itself, it relates
solely to itself and thereby constitutes self-relating being. Such being or
immediacy is not merely dependent on reflexion, but is identical to the
latter: it is reflexion as “simple equality with itself or immediacy” and for
that reason is free-standing (SL 346). Such immediacy is certainly posited by
reflexion; yet it differs from the “positedness” mentioned above by being
co-extensive with, rather than just the product of, reflexion. It is the
immediacy exhibited by reflexion as it relates to itself in its negativity or
is “reflected” into itself – into being “itself” – and so it is what Hegel calls
“reflexion into itself” (SL 352). When reflexion is conceived explicitly and
solely as reflexion into itself, it is conceived as identity – identity that
contains the reflexion or negativity by which it is constituted immanent
within itself (see SL 356–8).
3.2 Identity and Opposition in EL

We still do not understand fully what “essence” or “absolute negativity” is,
but we see that it is connected to a series of other concepts: Schein,
7
Hegel (1968–: 11:250). I have spelt “reflexion” with an “x” (rather than “ct”) to indicate that Hegel has
in mind a logical-ontological category, rather than “reflection” as an activity of understanding (see
SL 350).
8
Hegel (1968–: 11:251).

reflexion, positedness, reflexion into itself, and identity. My account of
these concepts is highly truncated, but in EL Hegel, too, provides
a truncated account of them.9
In EL (§112) Hegel gives the following definition of essence. Essence, he
states, is “being that mediates itself with itself in virtue of its negativity” and
as such is “relation to itself only insofar as it is relation to an other that is,
however, not immediately a being, but something posited [Gesetztes] and
mediated ”.10 Hegel does not state that this other is posited by essence, but
insofar as it is, then essence is conceived here, as in SL, as negativity that
both posits something – a “positedness” – and relates to, or is reflected into,
itself. Hegel then notes that, while essence constitutes “being” through
relating to itself, it also reduces immediate being – quality and quantity –
to “something merely negative, to an illusion [Schein]”.11 Furthermore, in
the remark to §112 he names the negativity of essence “reflexion”. In these
respects, therefore, Hegel’s account of essence in EL, though truncated, is
consistent with the account in SL.12
In §113 Hegel then notes that essence, conceived simply as “reflexion-into
-itself ”, is identity. In EL as in SL, therefore, identity is not just being or
immediacy, but being that is constituted by reflexion, by negativity.
Indeed, it is just “negativity that relates itself to itself” – negativity as self-
relating being (EL §116).13 When such negativity is conceived explicitly as
negative – as negating itself, and so not being itself, and so “repelling” itself
from itself – it is conceived as difference (EL §116).14 Difference is thus not
something utterly distinct from identity but is intrinsic to the latter. It is
the movement of not-just-being-negative through which there is identity.15
In EL and SL Hegel argues that such difference develops logically into
diversity, in which two items differ simply by having separate identities. It
then turns into opposition, in which each side is “for itself”, or independ-
ent, in being the explicit negation of the other. One side of the opposition,
the positive, is “the identical relation to itself in such a way that it is not the
negative”, and the other side, the negative, is “the differentiated for itself in
such a way that it is not the positive” (EL §119). The one is thus not just
independent of the other, but each includes its negation of, and difference
from, the other within its independence: each within itself is not-the-other
9
For a more extensive examination of these categories, see Houlgate (2011).
10
Hegel (1970–1: 8:231). 11 Hegel (1970–1: 8:231).
12
Note, too, that in EL §114 Hegel contrasts “the inessential ” with essence as what is “essential ”. In SL
these categories are the first to be discussed in the doctrine of essence (see SL 341–2).
13
See also SL 356: “equal to itself in its absolute negativity”. 14 See also SL 357, 361.
15
On the difference between true and abstract identity, see Harris (1983: 161–2).

50 stephen houlgate
and so is internally opposed to the other. That other, therefore, does not
just fall outside its counterpart, but belongs to the latter such that each is
“the other’s own other”. Note, however, the ambiguity implicit in this
structure of opposition: for each is included in the other as not that other
and so as excluded from the latter. Each, within its own separate identity, is
thus bound, through negation and exclusion, to the other that lies out-
side it.
Note, too, that in opposition essence becomes explicitly what it is at the
start. Essence, for Hegel, is at first pure negativity or the negative of
a negative. In opposition, by contrast, each side has a separate, affirmative
identity. Yet each is separate and independent only through explicitly
negating its negation, that is, only as explicit negativity. Opposition is
thus simply essence or reflexion in a more developed form.16 Yet that is
not the end of the story, for opposition proves to be contradictory.
3.3 Contradiction and Ground in EL

Hegel highlights the contradiction in opposition in EL §120. The positive,
he argues, is “that diverse [jenes Verschiedene] that is supposed to be for
itself”, or independent, and indifferent to the negative. Yet it is “not indif-
ferent to its relation to its other ”, since it is positive only in excluding, and so
being the negation of, its other. The positive is thus independent in being
bound, by negation, to its other, and so is contradictory. The negative, Hegel
continues, is supposed to be “equally independent” (ebenso selbständig), but
as explicitly negative it, too, is itself only in being bound by negation to its
other – or, as Hegel puts it, it has “its relation to itself, its positive [aspect],
only in the other”.17 The negative is thus also independent in not being
independent, and so is contradictory. Note that Hegel does not use the word
“exclude” in §120 itself. In the first addition to §119, however, we read that
each side of opposition “is only to the extent that it excludes [ausschließt] the
other from itself and, precisely by this means, relates itself to the other”.18 It
is, therefore, the relation to the other, built into the exclusion of the latter,
that makes each side contradictory in its independence.
Insofar as the positive and negative are both contradictory, they are the
same, though only “in themselves” (an sich) or implicitly. This is because
they remain essentially distinct from one another. Hegel claims, however,
16
See Kang (1999: 192). 17 Hegel (1970–1: 8:247).
18
Hegel (1970–1: 8:246). Hegel is talking here about inorganic and organic nature, but his point
applies generally to the sides of an opposition.

that they are also the same “for themselves” (für sich) or explicitly, insofar as
each negates or “sublates” the other and itself, and both are thus under-
mined or fall “to the ground ” (zu Grunde) (EL §120).19 Yet Hegel does not
explain in §120 precisely how the positive and negative thereby prove to be
explicitly the same. An explanation is, however, suggested by lines from his
lectures on EL in which he states that the positive and negative sublate
themselves by turning themselves into one another. So the positive is
positive, not negative, but precisely by not being negative it turns itself
into the negative and so is the “opposite [Gegenteil ] of itself”. Conversely,
the negative is utterly negative, not positive, but by simply being itself, it
exhibits its own “identity” and so proves to be positive after all.20 The
positive and negative are thus not just implicitly, but explicitly, the same,
because each, in being itself, proves to be the other and each thereby proves
to be the same unity of both.21
Essence is negativity or “reflexion” and as such is never simply what it is.
Indeed, it proves to be not just self-negation, but self-relating being or
identity. Identity then proves to be not just itself, but difference, and
difference in turn proves to be not just difference or diversity but oppos-
ition. Now we see that opposition is not just itself either, but also entails
the explicit sameness or identity of its moments. This explicit identity is not
initially present in opposition. It emerges, however, when the positive and
negative turn themselves into one another: for at that point both prove to
be the same unity of the two. Note that the difference or opposition
between positive and negative proves to be their identity as each side of
that opposition proves to be the unity of both of them. In Hegel’s words,
“as self-relating, difference is likewise already declared to be identical with
itself, and the opposed ” – the positive or negative – “is in general what
contains the one and its other, itself and its opposite, in itself [in sich selbst]”
(EL §120).22 By contradicting and sublating themselves, therefore, the
positive and negative give rise to a new logical structure: one in which
they remain distinguished as positive and negative, but each is also the
same unity of the positive and negative.
When this logical structure is considered in its own right as a new
category, it is called the “ground” (Grund), though it is more precisely
the relation between the ground and the grounded: “it is ground only
insofar as it is ground of something, of an other” (EL §121 remark).23 In
19
Hegel (1970–1: 8:247). 20 Hegel (2008a: 139–40). See also Hegel (2001: 144).
21
For this reason, the opposition, or “essential difference” between the positive and negative, is “only
the difference of itself from itself and hence contains the identical” (EL §120).
22
Hegel (1970–1: 8:247). 23 See Hegel (1970–1: 8:247) and Lakebrink (1979: 246–7).

52 stephen houlgate
sublating themselves and falling “to the ground”, therefore, the positive
and negative also give rise to the ground relation. To put it another way,
when contradiction is developed logically, it turns into the ground relation.
This is not to say that the newly emerged ground must now be understood,
in retrospect, to be the ground of all contradiction. The ground relation is,
rather, contradiction itself in a more developed form.24
In contrast to mere contradiction, however, the ground relation con-
tains two different moments that are explicitly identical from the start. The
ground and grounded are, indeed, distinguished as positive and negative:
the ground is positively itself, whereas the grounded is posited by the
ground and dependent on the latter, and so is not simply itself, and so in
that sense is the negation of the ground. Yet the ground and grounded are
also identical in their difference. As we read in the addition to EL §121, they
are the same in having “one and the same content”, and “the difference
between the two is the mere difference of form” between the ground and
the “state of being posited”. Accordingly, when “we ask for the grounds of
things”, what we want is to see “the matter” or thing “as it were, doubled,
first in its immediacy and second in its ground”.25
As Hegel states in §121 itself, therefore, “the ground is the unity of
identity and difference”. Hegel also conceives of the ground as “the
reflexion-into-itself that is just as much reflexion-into-another and vice
versa”, and a further significant idea is implied by this expression: since the
ground – and thus correspondingly the grounded – is “reflexion-into-
itself”, each must have its own identity. This identity, however, is insepar-
able from “reflexion-into-another”, that is, from the relation to the other,
and this relation, as we have seen, is itself one of difference and identity.
The ground and grounded thus exhibit identity in two senses: they are
identical to one another, but each also has a separate identity of its own.
Why, though, must the ground ground the grounded? This is not fully
explained in §121, but we learn more in the accompanying addition when
Hegel notes that the ground is “the repelling [Abstoßen] of itself from
itself”.26 The ground grounds the grounded, therefore, because it sets itself
outside itself. This self-repulsion in turn explains why “what has emerged
from the ground is itself” and why, therefore, the ground and the grounded
are identical to one another (despite their difference in form). What is
missing from the addition (and also from §§120–1), however, is a detailed
24
See EL §121 addition: “a new contradiction”.
25
The true, rational ground of a thing will not just duplicate the latter, but will have its own
determinate content, namely the “concept” of the thing.
26
Hegel (1970–1: 8:248).

account of contradiction that explains that (and how) it, too, entails self-
repulsion or self-exclusion. Self-exclusion is implicit in the idea that the
positive and negative “sublate” themselves (§120), for in so doing each
proves to be the other and so excludes itself from itself. In EL, however,
Hegel does not locate the contradiction in the positive and negative
explicitly in their self-exclusion. He does that only in SL.
Hegel’s account of contradiction and ground in EL is also marked by
other, more striking, omissions in comparison with the account in SL, even
though it coincides in broad outline with the latter. There is no analysis of
form in relation to essence, matter and content, and the transition to
existence is not made via condition and the unconditioned but proceeds
directly from the ground.27 Form and matter are introduced in the subse-
quent discussion of the “thing” (§§127–30), and form and content arise in
“appearance” (§133), but these categories do not belong to the official logic
of the ground. As we have just seen, form and content are mentioned in the
addition to §121 on ground, but the main paragraphs and remarks on
ground (§§121–2) contain no examination of form, essence, matter and
content to match that found in SL.28
This difference between EL and SL prompts Kolb to ask how we can
know which version of the logic is correct, and at first the question seems
well-founded. Closer inspection reveals, however, that priority must be
given to the account in SL. This is because Hegel explains in painstaking
and persuasive detail in SL why contradiction must give rise not just to the
ground relation in general (as in EL), but to the specific distinction
between form and essence, and later to that between form and content.
When this explanation is set next to the account of contradiction and
ground in EL, it becomes clear that the latter is not an alternative to that in
SL, which leaves us wondering which account is correct, but merely a more
general account that abstracts from the details presented in SL. Our task
now, therefore, is to examine the transition from contradiction to ground
in SL.
3.4 Contradiction in SL
In EL the positive and negative are “the posited contradiction” because
each asserts its independence by negating, and so binding itself to, the
27
See EL §122 and Lakebrink (1979: 247–53).
28
In the remark to EL §122 Hegel describes the “determinate ground” as “something formal”, but this
does not amount to a detailed discussion of form (or the formal ground).

54 stephen houlgate
other (§120). In SL Hegel highlights the same contradiction, but he also
examines an aspect of contradiction that is not given prominence in EL,
namely self-exclusion (see SL 374–6).
Hegel argues in SL that opposed determinations necessarily exclude one
another, for being opposed consists not just in not being one another, but,
in so doing, in setting oneself apart from, and thereby shutting out, the
other (see SL 370).29 Through such exclusion the positive and negative
establish their utterly opposed, independent identities. The contradiction
in the positive, however, is that “as the positing of self-identity by the
excluding of the negative, it makes itself into a negative, hence into the other
which it excludes from itself”. This negative in turn excludes the positive,
so by excluding the negative the positive turns itself into “its other which
excludes it”. In both these respects, therefore, the positive excludes itself (SL
375).30 Hegel’s failure in EL to make explicit this aspect of the contradic-
tion in the positive (and negative) constitutes, in my view, a deficiency of
that text.
According to SL, the positive excludes itself by turning into the negative,
and the negative excludes itself by turning into the positive.31 Neither,
therefore, has a stable identity, but each proves to be “the passing over
[Uebergehen], or rather the self-transposition [sich Uebersetzen] of itself into
its opposite”. Furthermore, Hegel maintains, their “ceaseless vanishing”
into one another undermines the difference between them and establishes
their “first unity” – a unity that is itself neither positive, nor negative and so
is a mere “null ” (SL 376).32 As in EL §120, therefore, the positive and
negative undermine themselves or fall “to the ground ”.
In both SL and EL Hegel then argues that the self-sublation of the
positive and negative has a positive as well as a negative result: the result is
“not only the null” (SL 376). This positive result, in SL as in EL, is the
ground. In SL, however, the ground does not immediately give rise to
existence (as it does in EL), but takes a series of different forms, including
29
See Kang (1999: 196).
30
The positive and negative also exclude themselves in another sense: each includes the other within its
own independence, so insofar as it excludes the other, it excludes what makes it itself and thus
excludes itself (see SL 374).
31
Hegel notes, however, that the negative is more explicitly contradictory than the positive (SL 375–6).
This is because the negative immediately negates itself. It negates the negative that it is, and so is
“identical with itself ” and turns itself into the positive; yet qua negative it also negates the positive
that it is. The positive, by contrast, negates itself only insofar as it is the negative of its other, of the
negative, for only in that way does it turn itself into the negative that it negates. See Iber (1990:
460–3).
32
Hegel (1968–: 11:280).

the relations between form itself and essence, matter and content. As Hegel
demonstrates in SL, these relations are made necessary by the nature of
contradiction. To see why, we need to look more closely at the latter.
Hegel emphasises in SL that the positive and negative are both “posited-
ness” (SL 376). To be “posited” is to owe one’s identity, and so to be related,
to an other, but also to differ from the latter and so to be “the negative of an
other”. It is thus to be dependent on an other that is in some respect one’s
negation. The positive and negative are “positedness”, therefore, because
each is itself through not being the other.
Yet these two moments are also “reflected” into themselves and so inde-
pendent of one another: each has its own separate identity.33 Moreover, each
establishes its separate identity by excluding the other; that is to say, “their
excluding reflexion sublates this [their] positedness” and “turns them into
independent beings existing for themselves [fürsichseyenden Selbstständigen]”
(SL 376).34 Paradoxically, however, such exclusion also cancels their inde-
pendence because it renders the latter dependent on the negation of another –
exclusion being a negation – and so turns the positive and negative once again
into mere positedness. By excluding one another, therefore, the positive and
negative undermine their separate, exclusive identities and in that sense “they
destroy themselves” (sie richten sich zu Grunde) (SL 376). In other words, by
excluding the other, each excludes its own exclusive self.35
Yet this is not the end of the story: for the positive and negative prove
again to be posited determinations, dependent on negation, only because
they exclude one another. Their positedness does not, therefore, put an end
to their mutual exclusion, because they exhibit it only in excluding one
another – exclusion that must continue to be given its due. As “excluding
reflexion”, however, each sets itself apart from, and negates its dependence
on, the other and so “sublates” its positedness. As mutually exclusive,
therefore, they must also sublate the positedness to which they reduce
themselves by excluding one another.
33
See SL 368, 376. Note that this independence is inherited by the sides of opposition from diversity;
see EL §120: “The positive is that diverse [. . .].”
34
Hegel (1968–: 11:281).
35
Hegel (1968–: 11:281). Di Giovanni (Hegel 2010b) has “they fate themselves to founder ”. Note that the
contradiction set out in this paragraph is essentially the same as the one Hegel highlights in EL §120:
each side of the opposition negates its own independence by turning itself into a posited, dependent
determination (see this chapter, p. 50). There are, however, other ways of conceiving of such
contradiction (or other forms of it). (1) The positive and negative turn themselves into their
opposites and thereby form a “unity” with one another that is neither positive nor negative, and
so is a mere “null ” (SL 376; see also this chapter, pp. 50–1, 54). (2) Each side also excludes itself by
excluding the other that belongs to its own independent identity (see this chapter, note 30).

56 stephen houlgate
This is the deeper contradiction that besets the positive and negative:
each excludes the other and in so doing disavows, so to speak, any
connection to that other; yet, in excluding the other, each binds itself to
the other as not-that-other and so turns itself into a dependent, posited
being, or “positedness”; and yet each is bound to the other precisely by
excluding the other, so each disavows the connection between them that is
built into exclusion itself: each sublates the positedness to which it reduces
itself by excluding the other. As Hegel puts it, “the excluding reflexion of
independence [Selbstständigkeit]” – positive or negative – “makes itself
a positedness but is just as much the sublation of its positedness” (SL
376–7).36
To repeat: the positive and negative are opposed, and thus are the
negation of one another, and thus are positedness – one-sided determin-
ations that are posited by negating one another. At the same time, they
negate, or sublate, their mere positedness, and give themselves separate,
independent identities, through excluding one another. Yet, precisely
through such mutual exclusion, they turn themselves once again into mere
positedness, into determinations whose identity is established, or posited,
through negating the other. Yet, insofar as they are mutually exclusive, they
sublate this positedness too – the positedness they exhibit by excluding one
another – and so set themselves apart from one another after all.
Yet does this not simply repeat the problem? Do not the positive and
negative once again bind themselves to one another through their mutual
exclusion and so prove to be mere positedness? Hegel says no, because they
now exhibit a new logical structure we have not encountered before. At
first, the positive and negative, in excluding one another, simply sublate the
positedness, or moment of not-being-one-another, that belongs to being
opposed determinations. Now, by contrast, each, in excluding the other,
also sublates the positedness to which it reduces itself by excluding the
other; that is, each, as “excluding reflexion”, sublates the positedness and
the negative that it itself proves to be. In Hegel’s words, “the exclusive
determination is itself that other of itself of which it is the negation” (SL
377). Accordingly, the “exclusive determination” – positive or negative –
does not simply become positedness once again, but proves to be self-
sublating or self-negating, and thus self-relating, being. It negates its own
positedness and so relates to itself in negating the latter, and so, as Hegel
puts it, “goes together with itself” (ist das Zusammengehen mit sich selbst).37
36
Hegel (1968–: 11:281).
37
Hegel (1968–: 11:281). Di Giovanni (Hegel 2010b) has “is self-withdrawal”.

It proves to be wholly self-relating being, therefore – or the “positive unity
with itself” – in negating the positedness, or negative, that it itself is.
Indeed, this is the only way an “exclusive determination” – positive or
negative – can be itself and enjoy its own identity. It cannot enjoy such an
identity purely by excluding the other because that turns it into something
posited. It can do so, however, by excluding the other and also negating the
positedness, or dependence, to which it reduces itself through such exclu-
sion: for in negating itself in this way, it relates solely to itself and, as sheer
self-relation, proves to be nothing but itself. In Hegel’s words, therefore,
the exclusive determination “turns back into itself by virtue of its own
negation, for it turns into itself through the negation of its positedness”. It
is “identical with itself through the negation not of an other, but of itself”
(SL 377).
This is a hard idea to grasp, but it becomes clearer if we focus on the
positive in particular, rather than “excluding reflexion” as such. The
positive secures its independent identity by excluding the negative;
through such exclusion, however, it turns itself into that which is not-the-
negative and thus into a negative that itself excludes the positive. By being
exclusively positive, therefore, the positive turns itself into that which
excludes it, and thereby excludes itself. Yet the positive turns itself into
its opposite through excluding the negative. It must, therefore, exclude and
negate the negative that it proves to be in excluding the negative. In so
doing it negates itself, and so relates solely to itself, and so proves to be self-
relating positive being. The positive is positive, therefore, by being not just
positive but also negative, yet by not just being negative either but relating
to itself, and so being itself, in negating the negative that it proves to be. In
other words, the positive is – or becomes – positive by turning back into
itself in negating the negative that it has become.38
The positive thus undergoes a double development when it proves to be
self-contradictory. On the one hand, it undermines itself by turning into
its opposite through simply being itself, and so proves to be neither just
itself, nor just its negation. On the other hand, it turns back into itself in
negating the negative that it itself is, and so proves to be both positive and
negative together (as well as the explicit movement of negativity or
reflexion).
In EL Hegel comes to a similar understanding of the positive (and
negative). He concludes, for example, that “the opposed is in general what
38
Similarly, the negative, in negating the one-sided negative (or positedness) that it is, proves to be
explicitly (and positively) negative.

58 stephen houlgate
contains the one and its other, itself and its opposite, in itself” (EL §120).
What is missing from EL, however, is an account of self-exclusion in
contradiction, as well as a consideration of a crucial ambiguity in contra-
diction (that belongs to the ground too). The ambiguity is the following
(again taking the positive as our example).
On the one hand, the positive is not the negative, and so is in fact
negative, but this negative is simply what the positive itself proves to be (in
excluding the negative): it is the positive as negative. Furthermore, the
positive relates to itself, and so is itself, rather than just this negative, only in
negating the latter. In these respects, therefore, the positive is positive only
in being negative, in being positive-as-negative.
On the other hand, the positive is not the negative, and so is itself
negative, but – as positive – it is not this negative either. So it secures its
independence – an identity that sets it apart from the negative – by
excluding from itself, and so negating, both the negative over against it
and the negative that it itself is. In this respect, the positive proves to be
genuinely positive and self-identical through the thoroughgoing exclusion
of the negative from itself.39
These two conceptions of the positive are at odds with one another, but
they are also inseparable because they express the ambiguity in the very
nature of the positive: the latter is positive through not being negative at
all, and therefore precisely through being negative itself.40 The positive
thus enjoys its own exclusive identity, quite apart from the negative, only
insofar as it negates the negative that it itself is and so relates to itself in being
negative.
Note that this moment of self-relation distinguishes the logical structure
we are now considering from simple contradiction. In SL a determination
is contradictory because it excludes itself by proving to be its opposite, and
thereby undermines itself and its independence. Now, by contrast, the
positive and negative relate to themselves in excluding themselves and in that
sense do not just undermine themselves, but preserve, or establish, their
own identities through self-exclusion and self-negation. This new logical
structure also characterizes the ground: because the ground, too, enjoys its
identity, apart from the grounded, only insofar as it excludes itself from
itself, and so turns itself into the grounded, but relates to itself in the latter
(see SL 378).
39
See Iber (1990: 476): “it thereby lets its own being-negative fall outside it ” (my translation).
40
Similarly, the negative, as utterly negative, is positively itself.

3.5 Ground in SL
The ground is what emerges when the identity or unity that results from
contradiction is rendered fully explicit. As we have seen, each side of
opposition proves to be “identical with itself” by excluding its own one-
sidedness or “positedness” (SL 377); that is to say, each proves to be positively
itself by negating its negation of the other. In this respect, both prove to be
the same unity of the positive and negative, and when this unity is conceived
explicitly as a single identity that is constituted through the movement of self-
exclusion and self-negation, it is conceived as “ground”.41 The ground is thus
the identity that remains positively itself in excluding itself and so being the
negative of itself (namely, the grounded). Accordingly, it remains contradict-
ory, since the positive still turns into the negative (and vice versa); but it also
resolves the contradiction, since the positive and negative preserve their
identities (as ground and grounded) and also form a settled unity with one
another. As Hegel puts it, “in ground, therefore, opposition and its contra-
diction are just as much sublated [aufgehoben] as preserved” (SL 378).42
The concept of “ground” is one with which we are all familiar, but we do
not usually think of it as contradictory. Hegel, however, conceives of the
ground as a more developed form of contradiction, because he locates its
logical core in self-exclusion. “As ground”, Hegel writes, “essence excludes
itself from itself” and in so doing “posits itself ” (SL 377); furthermore, he
adds, essence thereby also “determines itself ” (SL 386). It is important to see
the close connection between these ideas. The ground excludes itself by
setting itself outside itself as the grounded; this grounded, as that which has
been excluded, and so posited, by the ground is thus characterized by
explicit positedness, in contrast to the ground itself which is the moment
that posits. The grounded, however, is not just different from the ground,
but is the ground itself as positedness, as that which it has posited itself to
be. It is also the ground, insofar as the latter has given itself determinate
form: the form of being something determined, posited and excluded by
itself.43 As such, of course, it is dependent on the ground and is also the
negative of the latter: for it is precisely the grounded, not the ground itself.
The ground itself is characterized by self-identity, and so is positively itself,
rather than negative. Indeed, it lacks all the characteristics of the grounded: it
is neither something excluded, nor positedness, nor explicitly determinate or
different-from-another. Accordingly, it is logically “indeterminate” or what
41
See this chapter, pp. 51–2, and EL §120. 42 Hegel (1968–: 11:281).
43
See Rohs (1982: 81): “The positedness that belongs to essence is the same as determinateness” (my
translation).

60 stephen houlgate
Hegel calls “non-positedness” (SL 389). Yet, as the ground posits the grounded,
it becomes positive in contrast to the grounded; that is to say, it becomes one
side of a determinate difference, the other side of which is the grounded. The
ground does not thereby just become the mirror image of its counterpart: it
remains self-identical and positive, rather than posited and negative. Yet it is
not simply indeterminate either, but it is “determined as indeterminate or as
sublated positedness” in the same act of self-exclusion that generates the
grounded; in other words, “the ground is essence posited as the non-posited
as against positedness” (SL 389).
The “determinateness of essence” here is thus twofold: that “of the ground
and of the grounded ” (SL 389). Yet the ground remains positive, rather
than explicitly determinate and negative, and so is “sublated determinate
being” or “sublated positedness”. It is distinct from and the negation of the
grounded and so is itself posited being; but it equally negates, or sublates,
its own positedness and negative character and thereby preserves its posi-
tive self-identity apart from the grounded. The ground is thus both posited
(or negative) and non-posited (or positive) at the same time. Furthermore,
the grounded is also both negative and positive: for it is that which has been
excluded, and so posited, by the ground, and thus is the negation of the
latter, yet it is also given its own positive identity by the ground, since it is,
precisely, excluded by the latter as something of its own.
The ground and grounded are not, however, simply other than one
another, but the ground remains identical with itself in the grounded, since
the latter is just the ground once again: it is the ground, insofar as it has
been excluded from itself. This is why, as Hegel notes in EL, when we ask
for the ground of a thing, what we want is to see the thing “as it were,
doubled, first in its immediacy and second in its ground” (EL §121
addition). The self-identical positive (the ground) and the self-identical
negative (the grounded) are thus in fact the same thing in two different
forms, or, as Hegel puts it, they are “one and the same identity” (SL 389).
This “identity” is, of course, simply the ground that relates to itself in the
grounded. Yet, in another respect, it is not the ground as such: for, as we
have seen, “the ground is essence posited as the non-posited as against
positedness”, whereas the identity that Hegel now brings to the fore is the
“unity of this determinate identity (the ground) and of the negative
identity (the grounded)”. In order to distinguish this “simple identity”
from the determinate identity of the ground, therefore, Hegel calls the
former the “essence as such” (Wesen überhaupt) (SL 389).44
44
Hegel (1968–: 11:294).

This “essence as such” is thus the ground insofar as it has further
sublated its determinate, posited, negative character and set itself apart
not only from the grounded, but also from the determinate difference
between ground and grounded. The grounded, we recall, is explicit posit-
edness (and thus explicitly determinate and negative), since it is posited by
the ground. The ground itself, by contrast, is “posited as the non-posited”
and “determined as indeterminate” (SL 389). The identity that continues
through both the ground and grounded, however, has cast off the last
remnant of positedness and is simple identity.45 It is the ground, insofar as it
sublates and sets itself apart from all positedness, negation and difference,
including the difference between the ground and grounded. It is the
ground, therefore, insofar as it is not the ground as such, but rather the
“substrate” (Substrat) or “simple foundation” (einfache Grundlage) that
underlies the ground relation (SL 390–1).46 Note that this identity is still
constituted by negativity, and so is still a form of essence, since it is
constituted by the sublation, or negation, of all negation; but it is the
radical sublation of negation that excludes from itself even its own sublat-
ing of negation.
The space of difference and determinacy, from which this identity sets
itself apart, Hegel calls “form”. This form, however, includes the difference
between not just ground and grounded, but also identity and difference,
and positive and negative, since these are themselves components of the
ground and grounded. Form thus comprises all the determinate differences
that belong to essence (see SL 390). Such form, of course, does not consist
just of difference, since the different “form determinations” have their own
self-identity or “subsistence” (Bestehen); indeed, without such self-identity,
there would be no “positive” opposed to a “negative”, and no “ground”
that posits a “grounded” (SL 389–90).47 Nonetheless, what distinguishes
form from the “simple identity” of the substrate is principally positedness,
negation and difference. This in turn has a further logical consequence: for
it means that form as a whole lacks a self-identity and “subsistence” of its
own, and so finds its subsistence in the identity that constitutes its substrate
(see SL 391). Form, therefore, cannot stand alone but is necessarily the form
of its substrate. Indeed, this also follows from the nature of that substrate
itself: for, although it sets itself apart from all essential differences, it is at
the same time the identity of the ground and grounded, of the positive and
45
See Rohs (1982: 139): “utterly indeterminate” (schlechthin unbestimmt).
46
Hegel (1968–: 11:295). Di Giovanni (2010b) translates both Substrat and Grundlage as “substrate”.
47
Hegel (1968–: 11:294–5).

62 stephen houlgate
negative. It is their underlying identity that gives form as a whole the self-
identity and subsistence that, as mere form, it lacks. Form, therefore, is
necessarily the form of the substrate from which it differs (see SL 390–1).
As commentators have pointed out, this distinction between form and
essence is central to Schelling’s identity philosophy.48 Yet Hegel examines
this distinction in SL, not just because it is discussed by Schelling, but
because it is made necessary logically by the nature of contradiction and
ground (and ultimately essence itself). More specifically, it is made neces-
sary by the fact that the ground is self-excluding identity. The ground first
excludes the grounded as that which is posited by it, that is, as explicit
positedness. In so doing, however, the ground turns itself into that which –
in contrast to the grounded – is determined as indeterminate and posited as
non-posited. It then performs a further act of exclusion, or sublation, and
frees itself from any explicit contrast with the grounded. In other words, it
sublates its own positedness – which consists in not being posited and not
being determinate – and sets itself, as simple identity or “essence”, quite
apart from positedness, negation and difference, including the difference
between ground and grounded.49 At the same time it underlies and sustains
all the “form determinations”, which have no “subsistence” of their own
without it.
The distinction between essence and form is thus logically necessary.
Yet, as we have noted, it is omitted (together with other related distinc-
tions) from the account of ground in EL. That account is certainly
coherent and accords in general with the one in SL (since it proceeds
from ground to existence). In comparison with the latter, however, it does
not present a full account of ground and so is not a rival that would raise
the question as to which account is correct. Pace Kolb, it is, rather,
a truncated account that omits features of the ground that SL shows to
be logically necessary.
3.6 Form, Matter and Content in EL and SL

In SL form and essence make necessary the further distinction between
form and matter, and then that between form and content. There is not
space here to consider this logical development in detail, but the argument,
briefly, is as follows.
48
See Rohs (1982: 122–9, 137, 155–6) and Schelling (1985: 2:52–4, 59 [Darstellung meines Systems der
Philosophie, §15 addition 1, §18, §30 note]).
49
See SL 390: “their foundation as an indeterminate which in its determination is indifferent to them”.

Essence is simple identity in contrast to form, which comprises “every-
thing determinate” (SL 390). Insofar as essence is distinct from form,
however, it is itself determinate and so “has a form”. Furthermore, essence
is the foundation of form (which could not subsist without it) and so is, in
an attenuated sense, the ground of form, and so is a “moment” of form (to
which the ground-relation belongs) (SL 391). It turns out, therefore, that
both essence and form are “moments of the simple form-relation
[Formbeziehung] itself”, and that form is “the completed whole” (SL
391–2).50 When this thought is rendered explicit, essence is conceived as
the “formless identity” set over against form by form; that is to say, it is
conceived as matter (SL 392).
As “simple identity” matter is explicitly distinct from form and all the
differences it encompasses (SL 392). By virtue of being explicitly distinct,
however, “it contains form locked up inside it” and so is “an absolute
receptivity for form”, which is the active pole in relation to passive matter
(SL 393). When matter has then been formed, and form rendered “mater-
ial”, both together constitute a content that is indifferent to the distinction
between form and matter (SL 395–6). Such content, as a “formed identity”
(formirte Identität), explicitly exhibits form, including the form of the
ground-relation (SL 397).51 The ground itself thus proves to be the “formal
ground” in which “a determinate content is considered from two sides, once
in so far as it is ground, then again in so far as it is grounded ” (SL 397–8).52
All these categories are shown in SL to be logically necessary, but –
together with the real ground, condition and the unconditioned – they are
omitted from the official account of ground in EL, which proceeds directly
from ground to existence.53 Form, matter and content are considered by
Hegel in later sections of EL. Yet, in Kolb’s view, this apparent relocation
of categories (compared with SL) is problematic, for it “disturbs the goal” –
to which, for many commentators, Hegel is committed in his logic – “of
purely internal self-development”. If the logic is to be such a development,
Kolb maintains, then categories “should find their identity through their
location in the sequence”, and so “Form/Matter or Form/Content should
not be standardized mediation patterns that can be inserted” – unaltered –
“in different locations” (Kolb 2010: 53). Kolb claims, however, that, in
relocating these categories, Hegel treats them precisely as such standardized
50
Hegel (1968–: 11:296–7). 51 Hegel (1968–: 11:302).
52
For helpful accounts of the development of form and its counterparts, see Rohs (1982: 122–95),
Schmidt (1997: 83–104) and Okochi (2008: 212–22).
53
The “formalism of the ground” is, however, mentioned briefly in the addition to EL §121 (Hegel
2010a: 187).

64 stephen houlgate
patterns or “relocatable fragments” and so undermines the “internal self-
development” of his logic.
Yet Hegel in truth does no such thing. This is evident from the fact that
form, matter and content, as they are set out in EL after the section on ground,
match categories in the equivalent chapters of SL, and do not coincide exactly
with form, matter and content in the ground chapter in SL, as they would
have to do if they were treated by Hegel as “relocatable fragments”.
Matter, in the ground chapter in SL, is conceived as “simple identity, void
of distinction” (SL 392) in contrast to form, which, as we have seen, comprises
the determinate differences that belong to reflexion: identity/difference, posi-
tive/negative and ground/grounded. In EL matter is also conceived as “iden-
tity”, but the “form” with which it is contrasted does not just encompass the
“determinations of reflexion” (as in SL). Form is the “external relation”
(äußerliche Beziehung) between determinations that is found specifically in
the thing (Ding) (EL §128).54 The distinction between matter and form in EL
thus coincides with that between matter and thing in SL: for, although the
thing in SL is not explicitly equated with “form”, it is conceived, as form is in
EL, as an external relation, namely “an external collection of independent
matters” (eine äusserliche Sammlung selbstständiger Materien) (SL 433; see EL
§127).55
Note, too, that in SL form as such actively determines or forms matter,
and thereby becomes “material, subsistent form”, whereas the thing just
“consists of independent matters indifferent to the relation [Beziehung]
they have in the thing” (SL 395, 432).56 In EL §130, however, the form in
which matter is “determined” (by being “relegated to properties”) is itself
equated with the thing that consists of matters.
In the case of form and matter, therefore, it is clear that, pace Kolb,
Hegel in EL does not simply relocate “fragments” from SL “that make
more or less the same points wherever they are inserted” (Kolb 2010: 53).
Rather, he highlights, through these categories, aspects of the thing that
also belong to the thing in SL but that exceed what is said there about form
and matter as such.
Hegel does something similar in the case of form and content. In SL
content as such – in the ground chapter – is “formed matter” and so unites
matter and form (SL 396). Content, however, is also distinct from form,
insofar as the latter contains the difference between form and matter.
54
Hegel (1970–1: 8:259).
55
See Hegel (1968–: 11:336). The parallel between EL and SL can also be seen from these passages: EL
§129: “The thing thus breaks down into matter and form”, and SL 432: “the matters and this thing”.
56
Hegel (1968–: 11:300, 335).

A single content, therefore, has both a form and a matter, which differ from
one another only formally.
The distinction between form and content then re-emerges in the
“appearance” (Erscheinung) that the realm of existing things proves to be
(see SL 441).57 The content of appearance is contained in the law governing
the latter, and appearance itself differs from this law principally through its
form. More specifically, “the kingdom of laws is the restful content of
appearance”, whereas “the latter is this same content but displayed in
restless flux [unruhigen Wechsel ]” (SL 442). This “restless form” (unruhige
Form), however, also confers an additional content on appearance, which is
only “externally bound up with the law” (SL 441–2).58
In EL form and content are not examined in themselves, but are con-
sidered only in the context of appearance. In §133, as in the corresponding
chapter in SL, content is thus contained in the law governing appearance,
whereas what is “alterable” in the latter – or “restless”, as Hegel puts it in SL –
is assigned to its “indifferent external form” (though, in contrast to SL, Hegel
makes no mention of any distinctive content to appearance beyond that
contained in the law).59 In the remark to §133, Hegel appears to consider
form and content in abstraction from appearance, but appearance remains
the context for these categories. This can be inferred from the fact that
content is contrasted with “external existence [Existenz], indifferent to the
content” – for, as Hegel states in §131, “existence is appearance”.60
Hegel’s account of form and content in EL coincides, therefore, with his
remarks on these categories in the chapter on appearance, not in the ground
chapter, in SL. This is evident not just from his equation of content with the
“law of appearance”, but also from the fact that he highlights something else
that does not arise in the ground chapter in SL, namely the “conversion”
(Umschlagen) of form and content into one another (EL §133 remark).61
Hegel makes no explicit mention of this conversion in the appearance
chapter in SL either, so it might seem that there is no equivalent to it in SL.
Yet the issue is not so simple. In EL Hegel notes that this conversion, which
is implicit in appearance, is made explicit, or “posited ”, in the “absolute
relationship” (which arises near the end of the logic of essence). It is made
57
Hegel (1968–: 11:344–5). The distinction between content and form also appears briefly in the
section on the thing, but there Hegel has in mind only the two aspects of “matters” (not the relation
between such matters and the thing) (see SL 433). For longer discussions of the sections on the thing
and appearance, see Schmidt (1997: 133–60) and Heidemann (2018: 335–73).
58
Hegel (1968–: 11:345–6).
59
The law containing the content of appearance also has “form within itself ”, so appearance in fact
exhibits “a doubling of the form” (EL §133 remark). See Lakebrink (1979: 294–5).
60
Hegel (1970–1: 8:262, 265). 61 Hegel (1970–1: 8:265).

66 stephen houlgate
explicit, specifically, in the logical conversion into one another of the
“form-activity” (Formtätigkeit), or “power”, of substance – which forms
its accidents by creating and destroying them – and the “wealth of all
content ” in the accidents themselves that is simply the “manifestation” of
that form-activity (EL §§150–1).62 The latter conversion is, however, indi-
cated in SL too.63 Hegel’s remarks on form and content in EL thus not only
match his remarks on appearance in SL, but also are compatible with his
conception of the absolute relation in the latter.
It is again clear, therefore, that Hegel does not simply take “fragments”
from the ground chapter in SL and reproduce them, without alteration, in
a later context in EL. Rather, his remarks about form and content in EL match
what he says about them in the corresponding contexts in SL – the accounts of
appearance and the absolute relation. The differences between EL and SL to
which Kolb draws attention do not, therefore, “disturb” the immanent
development of Hegel’s logic: for in each case form and its counterpart are
conceived as they should be in the contexts in which they are considered.64
3.7 Conclusion
Faced with the differences between the accounts of essence in SL and EL,
Kolb asks “how do you show which version is the one where Form/
Content is correctly derived?” (Kolb 2010: 46), and he suggests that,
ultimately, we cannot know. Indeed, he claims that, since each version
“offers significant insights”, “there is not necessarily one best version”
(Kolb 2010: 46, 50), so we do not actually need to decide between them.
In this essay, however, I have argued that Kolb’s suggestion is mistaken: SL
and EL do not set out two alternative logics that are equally persuasive, but
they present the same logic in different ways. Yet I have also argued that the
SL version has clear priority over the EL version, because it explains in
detail why form-and-essence and other determinations of ground, which
62
Hegel (1970–1: 8:294–5).
63
On SL 491 Hegel states that “the flux of accidents” is the “absolute form-unity of accidentality,
substance as absolute power ”. In other words, in the coming-to-be and passing-away of accidents
substance is at work changing their form (from possible to actual and from actual to possible). Yet
“these form determinations” – “possible” and “actual” – “are equally determinations of content”, so
accidents with a new content are produced as substance changes their form. Indeed, the changing of
their form by substance – which in EL Hegel calls its “form-activity” (§150) – just is the changing of
their content (and vice versa), and in that sense in SL, as in EL, form and content “convert”
themselves logically into one another in the absolute relation.
64
This is not, of course, to deny that there is some overlap between what Hegel says about form,
matter and content in the sections on the thing and appearance in EL and in the ground chapter
of SL.

are absent from the section on ground in EL, are logically necessary.
Accordingly, even though each edition of EL (1817, 1827 and 1830) was
published after SL’s logic of essence (1813), EL does not represent an
improvement in logical terms on the latter, in the way the second edition
of the logic of being in SL evidently improves on the first.65
In my judgement, therefore, the true derivation of the categories of essence
is found in SL. Yet this does not mean that the account of essence in EL is
incorrect. It is simply a condensed version of the logic set out in SL – one that
omits form, matter and content from the account of ground, perhaps for ease
of presentation, but then highlights them at later points in the argument at
which they also occur, implicitly or explicitly, in SL. By focusing on the logic
of essence, we thus learn an important lesson about EL. It often provides clear
and helpful analyses that complement those found in SL (though it can also be
more obscure, since it is so condensed).66 It is, however, no substitute for SL:
for, as Hegel reminds us in the Phenomenology, the “matter at hand” (Sache) is
exhausted only in its “elaboration” (Ausführung) (Hegel 2018b: 6), and the
concept of essence is fully elaborated only in SL.67
65
For some brief remarks on the differences between the two editions, see Houlgate (2006: 320–1).
66
See Hackenesch (2000: 132).
67
See Hegel (1968–: 9: 10). Inwood translates Sache as “thing”. Note that EL does not contain an
altogether new version of the doctrine of essence, but in certain respects reverts to a version Hegel
developed before he published Book Two of SL on essence. In the “Logic [for the Middle Class]”
(1810–11), written for use in the school in which Hegel was teaching, the account of essence proceeds
from identity, through diversity and opposition, to ground (though without mentioning contradic-
tion), and then ground leads directly to the thing and existence (Existenz). The thing is understood to
unite “matters”, but the distinction between matter and form does not arise until we reach appearance,
in which the distinction between content and form also emerges. Except for the later positioning of
matter and form, therefore, the doctrine of essence from 1810–11 is similar in structure to that contained
in the 1830 edition of EL (which has been the focus of this chapter); see Hegel (1986: 81–5 [§§33–53]). In
1813 Hegel published Book Two of SL in which, as we have seen, form, matter and content (and other
categories) are included in the chapter on ground before existence and appearance are derived. Then in
the first edition of the Encyclopedia, published in 1817, Hegel once again omits form, matter and content
from the account of ground and proceeds directly from ground to existence. In this edition, however (as
in the 1827 and 1830 editions), Hegel discusses matter and form in the context of the thing, not
appearance. Indeed, he writes that “form and matter, the thing in itself and the matters [Materien] of
which the thing consists, are one and the same antithesis of inessential and essential existence” (§79).
Form and content, by contrast, play a role in the relation between force and expression (§85 remark); see
Hegel (1968–: 13:57–60,1990b: 88–91). In the 1827 edition of EL the categories of essence are then in the
order we find in the 1830 edition – with form and matter discussed in the context of the thing, and form
and content considered in the context of appearance. Note that all these texts, apart from SL, were
conceived as “outlines” for use in teaching or lecturing. It is likely, therefore, that their accounts of
essence differ from that in SL (and from one another) for reasons of presentation, rather than logic.
Indeed, in my view, the account of essence in SL has clear priority over the other versions in terms of
logic, since it is so detailed and consistent in its argumentation. On the different versions of Hegel’s
doctrine of essence, see also Jaeschke (1999) and Okochi (2008).

chapter 4
The Concept’s Freedom

Jean-François Kervégan
Only the concept itself is free.

(Hegel 2010a: §214, 287)
In what follows, I investigate why Hegel could write that Logic is the
“science of freedom” (Hegel 1968–: 13:§5, 18). This assertion can make
sense only if we can understand exactly what “Logic” means (i.e., in my
opinion, an “onto-logic”), and what Hegel asserts that the “concept” is, i.e.
anything other than a “subjective” representation. Freedom is the predicate
of the concept as it is its own subject, that is, as “idea” in which “forms of
thought” and “forms of being” coincide.1
4.1 Encyclopedia: The Philosophical Discourse of Totality

The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences is the realization of a programme
phrased in the Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit and justified thor-
oughly in the Science of Logic. Its aim is to set out a philosophical system
expressing not a certain point of view (making it a system), but rather that
of the Absolute (conceived as a dialectical process of its production of
itself). The Introduction of the Encyclopedia describes this systematic
science as follows.
The science of [the absolute] is essentially a system, since the true insofar as it
is concrete exists only through unfolding itself in itself, collecting and
holding itself together in a unity, i.e. as a totality. Only by discerning and
determining its distinctions can it be the necessity of them and the freedom
of the whole.
A philosophizing without a system can be nothing scientific. Apart from
the fact that such philosophizing expresses by itself more of a subjective
outlook, it is also random in terms of its content. A particular content is
1
See Pippin (2019: 39ff.).
68

The Concept’s Freedom 69
justified solely as a moment of the whole. When separated from it, it
represents an unjustified presupposition or a subjective certainty. Many
philosophical writings limit themselves to expressing in this way merely
attitudes or opinions. – By a system one wrongly understands a philosophy
built on a narrowly circumscribed principle distinct from other such prin-
ciples; contrary to this, however, it is a principle of any genuine philosophy
that it contains all particular principles within itself. (Hegel 2010a: §14, 43)
Three lessons can be drawn from this paragraph. (1) Science in the fullest
sense of the word has to concern the totality of what is actual (wirklich). In
turn, only philosophy can claim to be a science in the full sense of the word;
such a philosophical science is not a philosophy concerning a particular
principle, but the combination of these many principles into the unique
system of philosophy. (2) Only such a philosophical science avoids the risk
of abstraction inherent to all conceptual process. As fructuous as they may
be, positive sciences are never sciences in the fuller sense. This is not
because they are positive (which guarantees their fertility), but because
they are organized around a regional viewpoint. This is even truer of the
different philosophies organized by a “narrowly circumscribed principle”:
they are only views on the absolute, but not the knowledge of the absolute.
(3) Systematicity concerns the knowledge stemming from a unique prin-
ciple. It appears that there is only one philosophy of which each particular
philosophy solely exposes an aspect. The Lectures on the History of
Philosophy presents the “Unique Philosophy” (die Eine Philosophie) as the
process of which the particular philosophies are the moments, both in the
logical and in the chronological sense of the word. Systematicity is the
mobile expression of the atemporal nature of the philosophical act. Hence
the seemingly dazzling thesis of a homology between philosophy and the
history of philosophy:
I argue that the succession of philosophical systems in history is the same as
the succession of the conceptual determinations of the idea in its logical
development. (Hegel 1968–: 30–1:219)
That kind of assertion raises obvious questions: is Hegel asking us to
identify his own system as this one and only, universal philosophy, of
which the other philosophies are but moments? Is Hegel’s philosophy the
philosophy? Answering this key question is complex, even from Hegel’s
point of view. On the one hand, because of his understanding of the nature
of a system, Hegel must understand his own philosophy as the science of
the absolute (meaning, in turn, that it is not his philosophy). Indeed, the
true meaning of systematicity is apparent only through the understanding

70 jean-françois kervégan
of totality. On the other hand, such a vision of the Hegelian achievement
of philosophy would arbitrarily interrupt the dynamic process of reason
exposing itself in history. Hegel’s dilemma then becomes only too appar-
ent: Hegel cannot consider his philosophy as philosophy’s final figure, but
at the same time he has to do so.
Hegel’s encyclopaedic system features an original structure, especially in
comparison with the monism of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science and with
Schelling’s methodological dualism (following Schelling, philosophy can
be displayed either from the “subjective” viewpoint of the transcendental
philosophy or from the “objective” perspective of the Naturphilosophie:
Schelling (2005: 25; 2009: 109–10)). Since the achievement of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel’s system (the “philosophical science”) con-
sists of three parts, the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the
Philosophy of Spirit. Each part is “a philosophical whole, a circle coming
to closure within itself”, revealing the “philosophical Idea [. . .] in
a particular determinacy or element” (Hegel 2010a: §15, 43): the Logic is
“the science of the idea in and for itself”, the philosophy of Nature is “the
science of the idea in its otherness”, and the philosophy of Spirit describes
“the idea returning back to itself from its otherness” (Hegel 2010a: §18, 46).
What does this original division mean, and, first of all, what is Hegel’s
understanding of Logic?
Hegel’s conception of Logic is historically unprecedented. He some-
times said Logic “coincides” with traditional metaphysics as “the science of
the being as being” (Hegel 1968–: 23-2:653–4); or, using Wolff’s termin-
ology, with ontology (or general metaphysics). But he said also that logic
“takes the place” of “the former metaphysics”, which means that it replaces
it (Hegel 2010b: 42): “Logic” does not pretend to be an onto-logy (a
discourse concerning a certain object, the being), but rather, an onto-
logic, the very logos of being.2 One could argue that Logic is the reflection
of being. Reflection is to be understood in a non-psychological way, as the
return on itself of a double process (that of the being and of thought), that
gains its fundamental unity only due to this return: the process of the
determinations of thought (concepts) is the process of the determinations
of the being. In this sense of an onto-logic, Logic is by no means an “art of
thinking” or an organon in the purpose of “thinking well”. It rather
presents in their systematic relationship all of the conditions (ontic as
2
The relationship between Hegelian Logic and metaphysics is highly controversial, because Hegel’s
own position is ambivalent: see Fulda et al. (1980), Hartmann (1999), Kreines (2015) and Pippin
(2019).

well as noetic) under which a thought of the being can exist. Thus, logic
functions as an “objective thought” that is not defined in reference to
subjective consciousness (Hegel 2010a: §§24–5, 58, 66).
Let’s briefly focus on the two other parts of the system. The Philosophy of
Nature is the doomed part of Hegel’s system. Its discredit can be explained by
general circumstances unfavourable to the very project of a philosophy of
nature (in particular by the hazardous speculations and various aberrations of
the romantic Naturphilosophie, from which Hegel distanced himself). Another
factor is Hegel’s various missteps in his doctoral dissertation De orbitis
planetarum, in which he claims to correct Newton’s mistakes by relying on
Kepler; this blunder caused historians to largely disregard his work as
a philosopher of the sciences. However, Hegel’s view of the philosophy of
nature is far from uninteresting. It is an attempt to escape from a conception
of nature as a rhapsodic collection of levels of reality between which (despite
the adage in natura non datur saltus) lay unbridgeable distances. Nature in its
entirety is, according to Hegel, “the idea in its otherness” (Hegel 2010a: §18,
46); it proceeds from the “resolve” (Entschluss) by which the logical idea “freely
discharges itself” (Hegel 2010b: 753). Most commentators perceived this “free
resolve” as an attempt of Hegel’s to escape from a trap he had set for himself by
making the absolute idea the ultimate category of the first part of the system
(the Logic) and not of the system as a whole. On the contrary, the claim can be
made that the concept’s free alienation (in a nature classically understood as
a blend of necessity and contingency: see Hegel (1968–: 20:§248, 237)) is what
allows one to understand nature not as a heterogeneous or incoherent
ensemble of phenomena, but as a field open to the concept. Paradoxically,
nature’s radical otherness (Anderssein) is what allows the idea to find itself
again inside of it. Nature is, in other words, a sign addressed to the spirit that,
from the philosopher’s point of view (“for us”), this kind of provocation
allows to become itself.
There should be no mistake about the position of the spirit as the
system’s third moment: it does not mean that the spirit definitively
“sublates” the previous spheres, in particular nature.3 Rejecting any form
of spiritualism, Hegel states that “for us, the spirit has its presupposition in
nature” (Hegel 1968–: 20:§381, 381). The first section of the philosophy of
3
It is impossible here to comment on and discuss the different English translations of the untranslat-
able word “aufheben”, which has the value for Hegel of combining opposite meanings like “to
preserve” and “to cease” (Hegel 2010b: 81–2; 2010a: Addition to §96, 153 [Hegel 1991b: 154]). The
solution chosen by most recent translators is “to sublate” (Geraets–Suchting–Harris, di Giovanni,
Brinkmann–Dahlstrom, Pinkard), but we also find “to cancel” (Wood–Nisbet), “to supersede”, “to
abolish” and/or “to nullify” (Knox–Houlgate).

the spirit (“Anthropology”) describes the ways in which spirit emerges
unconsciously from nature itself. The “soul” (that Hegel conceives in an
Aristotelian way rather than in a modern one) is “the sleep of the spirit”
(Hegel 1968–: 20:§389, 388): that from which the spirit awakens itself to
consciousness and then to rationality. Hegel writes that the spirit is “the
existing truth of matter” (Hegel 1968–: 20:§389, 389). This quasi-
materialism appears to be required in order to avoid considering the spirit
as a given thing. At the same time, according to the circular structure of
knowledge explained in the Phenomenology of Spirit ’s Preface, the spirit
posits its natural presupposition.
Another peculiarity of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit must be highlighted.
Beyond its analysis of subjective spirit (gathering together the multiple levels
of subjectivity, already analysed from another point of view in the
Phenomenology of Spirit) and of the absolute spirit (that is the spirit’s thinking
of itself), the Encyclopedia gives a large place to the legal, social and political
institutions that give freedom “the actuality of a world” (Hegel 1968–:
20:§484, 478). The historical incarnations of spirit in an “objective actual
world” (Hegel 2018a: 254) were already the subject of the Phenomenology of
Spirit ’s sixth chapter. The introduction of the term “objective spirit” in the
first edition of the Encyclopedia underlines the distance between Hegel’s
conception of spirit and any other understanding of it.
While keeping in mind that this division into three parts eludes the inner
dynamism of the system, its implications must be considered: “The represen-
tation of the division into parts is thus incorrect insofar as it sets the particular
parts or sciences alongside one another, as if they were merely static compo-
nents with substantive distinctions, similar to species” (Hegel 2010a: §18, 46).
In fact, each of the three spheres is both enclosed in itself (and may therefore
be separately exposed, as is the doctrine of the objective spirit in the Principles
of the Philosophy of Right) and a dependent moment of the united system of
the (philosophical) science. The ultimate paragraphs of the Encyclopedia
propose a solution to this paradox, through a presentation of the three
syllogisms corresponding to different possible interpretations of the system’s
internal organization. Philosophy, as the point of completion of the doctrine
of absolute spirit, that is, as “the idea that thinks itself ” (Hegel 1968–:
20:§574, 569), presents itself as the logical sequence (the system in the
etymological sense of the word) of three “syllogisms”, where each of the
three terms – Logic (L), Nature (N) and Spirit (S) – occupies in turn the
median position. In the first syllogism (L–N–S), following the presentation
order of the Encyclopedia, “the mediation of the concept has the external
shape of a transition”, in such a way that “it is only in one of the extremes [the

spirit] that the concept’s freedom is posited” (Hegel 1968–: 20:§575, 570). In
the second syllogism (N–S–L), spirit is the median term that “presupposes
nature and ties it with logic” (Hegel 1968–: 20:§576, 570); this second
syllogism describes the process by which the subjectivity can comprehend
its removal from natural necessity and its movement towards freedom. The
third syllogism (S–L–N) has logic, “the self-knowing reason”, as its middle
term “that splits up into spirit and nature” (Hegel 1968–: 20:§577, 570). This
syllogism, to the extent that it exposes the division of the logical idea into two
poles – subjective (spirit) and objective (nature) – is both the presupposition
and the result of the “self-judgment” (Sich-Urteilen) by which the idea, as
a system, decomposes itself into two “phenomena” (Erscheinungen) corres-
ponding to the two aforementioned syllogisms. Commentators are debating
on the respective position and specific meaning of each of these syllogisms.
In any case, by presenting “the idea of philosophy” as being potentially
understandable in three different ways, each of them placed under the reason
of one of the system’s moments, Hegel strikingly illustrates the circularity of
speculative knowledge. The system cannot be grasped from a single view-
point, even from that of the whole: it is the coordinated genesis of each
viewpoint through which “the nature of the matter (Sache), the concept [. . .]
pursues its movement and develops itself” (Hegel 1968–: 20:§577, 571).
4.2 Logic as a “Science of Freedom”

This is a paradox, given common representations of systematicity as well as
of liberty: the Hegelian system presents itself as the true expression of
freedom. According to Hegel, only the systematic character of philosophy,
that is, the fact that its arguments are organized and tied together by a chain
of necessity, allows it to be defined as the “science of freedom” (Hegel
1968–: 13:§5, 18). This claim needs to be understood in its complexity. Since
Hegel’s system is not a “circle, which [is] enclosed within itself” (Hegel
2018a: 20), it must leave room for contingency in its apparent irreducibility
to conceptual necessity. Nothing is falser than the myth of Hegel’s “neces-
sitarianism” that would exclude contingency or reduce it to being only the
unconscious shadow of a blind necessity. There is in Hegel a real space for
contingency: because it is rational, there must be some irrationality.
However, contingency is not freedom.4 This is why the compatibility
between necessity and freedom (and more specifically, the necessary link
4
On Hegel’s conception of contingency and its very relation to freedom, see Henrich (1971) and
Mabille (1999).

between the two terms) needs to be justified. The Logic bears this justifica-
tion in what is perceived as being “the hardest” transition to conceive
(Hegel 2010a: §159, 232), that is, the transition from the viewpoint of
“substance” (as the ultimate category of the “objective Logic”) to that of
“concept”, that is, to the “subjective Logic”:
Thus the concept is the truth of substance, and since necessity is the
determining relational mode of substance, freedom reveals itself to be the
truth of necessity and the relational mode of the concept. (Hegel 2010b: 509)
What this transition from substance to concept and from objective Logic
to subjective Logic corresponds to is the very emergence of freedom within
necessity itself, that is, what Hegel calls the Beisichsein im Anderen, the
being “near itself” or “in agreement with itself” of the concept even in
a non-conceptual background. Necessity is not abolished by this transi-
tion, but the free process of the concept reigns over it, to the extent that the
concept generates it by producing itself. However, if freedom is “the truth
of necessity” (Hegel 2010b: 509), and if necessity is the highest expression of
systematicity, then the system itself must be understood not as a finite
totality circumscribed by its “environment”, but as a dynamic process.
Hegel’s system itself is not an open system (if we understand by that an
indefinitely revisable one): there is but one system, although it is a mobile,
processual and plastic one. This is the reason why, in Hegel’s system, the
synthetic moments of totalization are also moments of “immediatization”.
The totality resulting from the process of spreading (through different
mediations) of an immediate term (or of a term seeming to be immediate)
constitutes itself as a secondary or “becoming” immediacy. This second
level of immediacy results from the process leading towards it and legitim-
ates it in return, so that the result (the second immediacy) becomes the very
ground of the mediating process it results from, and consequently of the
starting point of this process (the first immediacy). This complementarity
of what can be called (in reference to Plato) ascending and descending
dialectics is discernible in two strategic sections: (1) the transition from
Logic to Nature carried out at the end of the Science of Logic, and (2) the
return from absolute knowledge to sense certainty at the end of the
Phenomenology of Spirit.
(1) The circularity of systematic philosophical knowledge (justified in
the last chapter of both the Science of Logic and the Phenomenology of Spirit)
is the final, accomplished manifestation of its “freedom”, that is to say, of
its capacity to generate its own presuppositions and its own “otherness”.
This is why, at the end of the Science of Logic, the idea “freely discharges itself

(sich selbst frei entlässt)” to become an “external idea”, i.e. nature (Hegel
2010b: 753). This linkage between freedom and otherness, logical idea and
nature, is highlighted in the Encyclopedia (Hegel 2010a: §244, 303). In other
words, it is only due to a radical alienation that the idea receives, or better,
gives itself the proof of, its freedom. The concept, or its “adequate” form,
the idea, demonstrates its power and creativity by exposing and recognizing
itself in an environment of radical otherness. Such a process, however, can
never completely end, and this is why the truth of the system, that means
its ability to be an expression of the “absolute”, manifests itself at each of its
moments. Hegel’s “absolute” is, etymologically, utopian: it doesn’t have
any topos; it resides nowhere. This is the reason why all the determinations
of the logical process can be considered as “the definitions of the absolute”,
or as so many “metaphysical definitions of God ” (Hegel 2010a: §85, 135).
(2) Immediacy is always becoming, it is in a sense paradoxically mediate:
this final thesis of the Science of Logic (Hegel 2010b: 744) is what the
“natural consciousness” blindly experienced as “sense certainty” in the
Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 2018a: 60–8). The incapacity of this imme-
diate consciousness to grasp (in a kind of pre-predicative experience) “this”
in its absolute singularity means that it can be grasped only from the
immediate consciousness’s contrary: “absolute knowledge”. This is,
indeed, why sense certainty reappears at the end of the phenomenological
development; it is then presented as the result of a dismissing that know-
ledge gives to itself:
Science contains within itself this necessity to relinquish itself of the form of
the pure concept and to make the transition from the concept into con-
sciousness. For self-knowing spirit, just for the reason that it grasps its own
concept, is an immediate equality with itself, which in its differences is the
certainty of the immediate, or is sensuous consciousness – the beginning from
which we started. (Hegel 2018a: 466)
This release even constitutes the “highest freedom” of “absolute” know-
ledge that spirit has acquired from itself as always already mediated. The
use of the vocabulary of “release” (Entlassung) makes obvious the parallel
between the phenomenological transition from absolute knowledge to
sense consciousness and the logical transition from the absolute idea to
natural otherness. In these strategic occurrences where the system seems to
gather itself in a final concept, when we think we have reached a complete
characterization of the absolute content of knowledge, circularity as an
image of the system’s freedom destroys the illusion of an endpoint or an
ultimate truth. Furthermore, the absolute itself would only be an “an

intended thought” (Hegel 2010a: §85, 135), once cut out of the process that
the speculative process attempts to grasp; it would be merely an inchoate
idea.
4.3 Logic as Explanation of the “Speculative” Mode

of Thinking: Of the “Concept”
The Logic has a founding role within the “circle of circles” that is Hegel’s
system (Hegel 2010a: §15, 43, 2010b: 751).5 Far from the usual understand-
ing of this notion as an art of reasoning or as a “science of the rules of the
understanding” (Kant 1969: A 52/B 76), logic in Hegel’s sense is “the
science of the pure idea, i.e. the idea in the abstract element of thinking”
(Hegel 2010a: §19, 47). However, Hegel specifies in his lectures on logic
that “one can have a very low and a very high opinion of thinking” (Hegel
2010a: §19, Addition: 49); according to him, those who consider logic as
a formal discipline (including Kant) have a very low one! Hegel’s logic is
also formal, but in a very specific sense: by form one must understand, in
an Aristotelian way, the immanent dynamism that sets into motion “a
matter for which the form is nothing external, because this matter is rather
pure thought and hence the absolute form itself” (Hegel 2010b: 29).
Hegel’s Logic therefore develops a non-formalist conception of form:
logic is “of course the formal science, yet the science of absolute form
which is a totality within itself” (Hegel 2010b: 523, modified). Logic reports
the (“formal”) movement of (“material”) meanings, and thus sets out to be
a logic of truth: logic means to make explicit the configuration of the being
in its totality, and is therefore an onto-logic (but not an ontology).
This logic implements a kind of thinking that is “not just mere thought,
but rather the highest and, properly viewed, the only manner in which it is
possible to comprehend what is eternal and in and for itself” (Hegel 2010a:
§19, Addition: 49). This mode of thinking, called speculative, must be
distinguished from understanding knowledge and from non-speculative
philosophy, both of which are acts of a “finite subjectivity” facing a world
of given objects, whereas speculative thinking is driven by the “infinite
subjectivity” of the concept constituting itself as its own object:
If, by subjectivity, one understands merely the finite, immediate subjectivity
with the contingent and arbitrary content of its particular inclinations and
5
On Hegel’s conception of Logic in general, see Hartmann (1999), Henrich (1986), Houlgate (2009),
Koch and Schick (2002), Koch (2014a), Nuzzo (2018), Quante and Mooren (2018), Stekeler-
Weithofer (1992), Theunissen (1980) and Wolff (2013).

interests, in general what one calls the ‘person’ in contrast to matter (Sache)
in the emphatic sense of the word [. . .], then one cannot help but wonder at
the Ancients’ serene surrender to fate and recognize this attitude as the
higher and more dignified one than that modern attitude that selfishly
pursues its subjective purposes [. . .] the subjectivity is not merely the bad
and finite subjectivity, standing opposite the matter; instead it is, in keeping
with its truth, immanent to the matter and, accordingly as infinite subject-
ivity, is the truth of the matter itself. (Hegel 2010a: §147, Addition: 220,
modified)
The Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit distinguishes the knowledge
proprio sensu (Erkenntnis) from the representation (Vorstellung) as an
immediate relationship of the subject with a given, apparently self-
constituted object. Representation provides at best a certain familiarity
(Bekanntschaft) with the object, but not real knowledge of it; it follows that
“What is familiar and well known (bekannt) as such is not really known
(erkannt) for the very reason that it is familiar and well known” (Hegel
2018a: 20). True knowledge results from operations of discrimination and
classification led by the understanding (Verstand), which learns to start
“looking the negative in the face and lingering with it” (Hegel 2018a: 21).
To avoid simplifications, one needs to bear in mind this vibrant praise of
the “absolute power” of understanding.
However, understanding knowledge (which elevates representations to
universality, but an abstract one) must be distinguished from “pure think-
ing”, from speculative thought, that “set[s] fixed thoughts into fluid
motion” and transforms them into concepts by following the movement
of being (Hegel 2018a: 21).6 Overcoming the external relationship that
seems to exist only between the onta and the logos and elevating conscious-
ness to a speculative viewpoint (by describing the experiences that make
this elevation necessary): these are the primary goals of the Phenomenology
of Spirit, that introduces us to the logical, purely speculative knowledge.
But this presentation, as justified as it is from the propaedeutic status of the
Phenomenology, inconveniently seems to convey speculative science as the
result of a purifying process whose starting point is the sense-certainty of
the given in its immediacy. Can we understand the speculative science
(Logic) only as the retrospective key to our consciousness’s missed experi-
ences? Wouldn’t it amount to removing the logical science from its absolute
(autoreferential) position? To prevent this dubious interpretation, the
6
On the relationship between representation, understanding and thinking, see Ferrarin (2019) and
Pippin (2019).

“Preliminary conception” of the Logic in the Encyclopedia presents logical
thinking as a generative structure that is presupposed both by the simple
representation in which “the content [. . .] remains isolated” and by the
intellectual acts that give this representation the form of universality by
establishing “relations of necessity among the isolated determinations of
representation” (Hegel 2010a: §20, 52).
Thinking (das Denken) must also be distinguished from the thoughts
(die Gedanken) thought up by what Hegel names “thinking over”
(Nachdenken), that is, the operation by which a finite subject revisits its
own thoughts or acts as if it were observing things, introducing a relative
exteriority between them and itself. The thoughts through which spirit
attempts to register the truth of things are only instantaneous traces of the
true movement of thinking. As finite thoughts, they remain tied to opposi-
tions that congeal the flowing process of their shared generation: subject/
object, finite/infinite, thought/being, etc. In general, every dualist thought
structure falls under “the most ordinary metaphysics of the understanding”
(Hegel 2010a: §95, 151). The speculative philosophy dissolves these opposi-
tions that structure the ordinary representations of things as well as the
reflexive return to them and the concepts of understanding that ensue from
them, by revealing the dynamism that generates them. Speculative
thought, as well as its condensed expression, the logical idea, is “essentially
a process” (Hegel 2010a: §215, 286). And this process must be understood as
that of the “concept” in a completely new meaning of the word, as we are
about to understand.
The Encyclopedia expounds the tripartite division of the Logic as follows:
The Logic falls into three parts: 1. The doctrine of being. 2. The doctrine of
essence. 3. The doctrine of the concept and the idea.
That is, into the doctrine of thought, 1. In its immediacy – the concept-in-
itself, 2. In its reflection and mediation – the being-for-itself and the shining
[Schein] of the concept, 3. In its having returned back into itself and in its
developed being-with-itself – the concept in-and-for-itself. (Hegel 2010a:
§83, 134)
Only through the viewpoint of the concept, of which being and essence can
be seen as provisory, unaccomplished expressions, can Logic be thought of
as a whole, and not as a juxtaposition of heterogeneous units. The “whole
concept” can also be divided into the “existent concept” and the “concept ”
as such, or between the “concept in itself ” and the “concept that exists for
itself ”. Logic itself can be divided into a “logic of the concept as being” (or
objective logic) and a “logic of the concept as concept ” (or subjective logic)

(Hegel 2010b: 39). Thus, each of the logical categories (such as those of the
“logic of being”) is “only implicitly the concept” (Hegel 2010b: 531). They
are concepts because they express the self-thinking of the being itself (the
onto-logic); however, they are only partially the concept, because they are
nothing but the particular traces of its self-producing movement.
Consequently, the successive determinations of being and essence and
the forms of process that generate them (the “passing over into otherness”
and the “shining within itself”: Hegel (2010a: §§84 and 112, 135, 173 [Hegel
1991b: 135, 175])) must be understood as partial “explanations” of the
concept: “The diverse determinate concepts, rather than falling apart as
they do when counted, are only one and the same concept” (Hegel
2010b: 541).
Thus, the whole Logic is in itself a logic of the concept. However, this is
true only in itself (“for us”, to use the words of the Phenomenology of Spirit)
as long as it has not been confirmed by a re-reading of the whole logical
process, taking the concept’s viewpoint, and, more precisely, that of the
idea, as “the unity of the concept and objectivity” (Hegel 2010a: §162, 235).
But this systematic “second reading” of the Logic is made possible only by
a “first reading” that closely follows the successive partial determinations of
the being, essence and concept. The speculative insight avoids favouring
one reading over another, or the perspective of process over the perspective
of system. Rather, it seeks to consider them in their inseparability. In other
words, logic necessarily presupposes itself : as system, it presupposes its
process; as process, it makes sense only from the point of view of systematic
totality. Ultimately, it is because logic is one (as the logic of a concept
perceived “for itself” as an idea) that it can simultaneously be double
(objective and subjective logic) and triple (logic of the being, essence and
concept). Each one of these “points of view” is valuable only in its
complementarity with the others.
4.4 The Concept’s Freedom

What does Hegel precisely mean by the term “concept” (Begriff )? His
understanding of this word undergoes one of the most profound semantic
shifts he has made.7 In accordance with its etymology (con-cipere, be-
greifen: to grasp together), the concept traditionally derives from the unity
of a consciousness: following Kant, a concept is “this unique consciousness
7
On Hegel’s conception of concept and thinking as an objective process, see Ferrarin (2019), Koch
(2003, 2014a), Pippin (2019) and Stekeler-Weithofer (1992).

that brings together a manifold into one representation” (Kant 1969: A 104).
On the contrary, Hegel radically separates consciousness and concept by
turning the conceiving into the act by which thinking generates itself and
thus produces its own subject as well as its object. The concept is not the
product of a conceiving subject (of a “finite subjectivity”), it is the free
thinking of being by itself or its “reflection” in an optical sense; that’s why
logic, also “subjective” logic, is an onto-logic. The concept is not a subject’s
good, because one doesn’t own a concept as one would clothes: Hegel rejects
the view that “I have concepts, and I have the concept, just as I also have
a coat, complexion, and other external properties” (Hegel 2010b: 515). The
concept is rather the subjectivity as such, much more than a simple “gram-
matical subject” (Hegel 2010b: 525): the conceiving is the very dynamic of
the self-generating of thinking as an impersonal process.
The concept is, so to speak, the arising subject of the objective
thinking process. Therefore, it could not be considered as something
abstract (in opposition to the concrete dimension of life and things).
Even though it bears a moment of abstraction (“the abstract universal”),
the concept is “what is concrete and, indeed, the absolutely concrete, the
subject as such” (Hegel 2010a: §164, 239). Thus, the “subjective logic”
deals much more with the logical subject (the concept) than with the
anthropological subject, since the concept is “the subject” itself (Hegel
2010b: 511), that is to say, it is the immanent reason of its own develop-
ment. Hegel strongly insists on what that kind of logical subjectivity
implies in terms of spontaneity and creativity, of “free power” of think-
ing the world (Hegel 2010b: 532).
Each of the three levels of the Logic has a specific type of process: passing
over (Übergehen) for the logic of being; shining (Scheinen) for the logic of
essence; and development (Entwicklung) for the logic of the concept (in the
narrow sense). But, in contrast to the logic of being (in which each
determination results from an external limitation) and to the logic of
essence (in which each determination is relative to another, like the
“essence” is to “shine”, or the “inner” to the “outer”), the concept draws
its own determinations from itself; that is, it “develops” them from itself.
The concept displays from itself the negativity it incorporated by “assimi-
lating” or integrating all the determinations of being and essence; in other
words, it integrates the content of objective logic by “sublating” it. Organic
life is an illustration of this kind of process: a living being (as we would say
nowadays) assimilates the information transmitted by its environment and
reformulates it according to its own code. Thus, the conceiving grows in
a similar manner to a living being. However, it cannot be argued that

Hegel’s theory of the concept is a kind of vitalism or organicism. Unlike
many philosophers of the nineteenth century, Hegel does not believe that
the concept is something alive; rather, life itself is conceptual. This is why
he distinguishes “the logical life” (the life of the concept) from “natural
life” (Hegel 2010b: 677).
Furthermore, the concept is not a pure asserting of identity; the “labor
of the negative” (Hegel 2018a: 13) at work in the objective logic hasn’t
stopped operating in the subjective logic. However, in the sphere of the
concept, negativity is never given or presupposed; it is the product of the
very movement of the concept that brings to light “the development of the
negativity which, implicitly, [the concept] already is” (Hegel 2010b: 559).
I have already invoked a remarkable example of this free generating of
negativity or otherness: it is the moment when the logical idea freely
dismisses itself (sich frei entlässt) at the end of the Logic, turning itself into
natural exteriority (Hegel 2010a: §244, 303, 2010b: 753). The concept’s
freedom consists in dissolving and resolving itself (sich entschliessen) to
otherness:8 it is precisely in this sense that we can attribute to the concept
a “creative power” (Hegel 2010b: 533). The religious background behind
this topic is clear, but it cannot be understood solely in a theological
sense. Creation as seen by monotheism offers an illustration of the way in
which the concept, by developing itself, “produces” determinacies such as
universality, particularity or singularity, each of them being “as a free
being of the whole concept” (Hegel 2010a: §161, 234); but this is only an
illustration. The Logic of the concept is no more a theologism than it is
a vitalism.
The third part of the Logic is divided into three sections. These respect-
ively concern (conceptual, not finite) subjectivity, objectivity (understood
as the kind of being devolved on the concept) and the (logical) idea
understood not as a subjective representation, but as “the unity of the
concept and reality” (Hegel 2010b: 673). There is obviously something
paradoxical here: why would the logic of the concept (as a “subjective
logic”, though in a very specific sense) deal with objectivity, and not the
objective logic (that is the theory of being and essence)? This paradox, in
my opinion, can be explained by Hegel’s radicalization of the transform-
ation of the notions both of subjectivity and of objectivity undertaken by
Fichte and Schelling in their discussion on the nature of philosophical
8
The English verb “to resolve” does not accurately capture the diversity of meaning of the expression
“sich entschliessen”, used by Hegel in §244 of the Encyclopedia to designate the operation by which
the concept “abandons itself” and “gives itself up” to the Otherness.

idealism.9 Schelling establishes the terms of subjective and objective ideal-
ism in the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (Schelling 1982:
9th Letter, 100); he applies them respectively to Fichte and himself
(Schelling 2009: 110–11). Fichte, in return, argues that idealism holds
meaning only as a subjectivism (Fichte 1971b: 197–8). I cannot enter into
the detail of this controversy; let’s just say that it is an attempt at de-
substantializing subjectivity and at conceiving it not as a fact (Tatsache) but
as a “fact-action” (Tathandlung), as Fichte explains (Fichte 1971a: 459).
This allows us to understand that the logic of the concept in Hegel’s
understanding is a non-subjectivist theory of subjectivity. This is carried out
through the programme formulated in the Phenomenology’s Preface:
“grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much
as subject” (Hegel 2018a: 12).
The entire sphere of the concept is that of subjectivity, in the sense that
the concept is the subject emerging throughout the process of its explan-
ation. In this perspective, the “subject” is indeed the “truth” (understood in
the Hegelian sense of that which exceeds something, while assuming it) of
the “substance” (as the ultimate category of objective logic), just as much as
freedom is the “truth” of necessity:
Thus the concept is the truth of substance, and since necessity is the
determining relational mode of substance, freedom reveals itself to be the
truth of necessity and the relational mode of the concept. (Hegel 2010b: 509)
In a way, the concept is the substance conceived as being the production of
its attributes, its modes and its accidents; Hegel’s doctrine of the concept is
the positive counterpart of his discussion of Spinozism (the most consistent
philosophy of substantiality) throughout the third part of The Doctrine of
Essence, “Actuality” (Wirklichkeit). The concept’s transparency to itself in
each of its successive determinations (Hegel 2010b: 736) manifests itself
acutely when it transposes itself into objectivity, gaining “a reality” and “a
being” (Hegel 2010b: 624). But the meaning of “subjectivity” in the first
section of the Doctrine of the Concept has to be rendered more precisely in
order to correctly understand this passage.
Subjectivity is, generally speaking, the distinctive characteristic of the
concept as the “truth” (result and surpassing) of the objective logic. In
a narrower sense, subjectivity is still the attribute of the concept as opposed
to the objectivity facing it as “the fact (Sache) itself as it exists in-and-for
9
On Hegel’s approach to and redefinition of subjectivity, see Düsing (2016), Henrich (1986), Koch
(2003, 2014a), Ng (2019) and Schick (2018).

itself ” (Hegel 2010b: 527). The subjective concept in this narrower sense –
or in the formal sense, as opposed to the material meaning – becomes
explicit through a series of forms that have been classified by scholastic
logic, following Aristotle’s Analytics: the concept itself, including its differ-
ent species (universality, particularity, singularity), and the different types
of judgements and syllogisms, be they conclusive or inconclusive. This
formal subjective concept appears as the “sphere of mere understanding”
(Hegel 2010b: 526) because it is – according to the post-Aristotelian
medieval school – only an “exterior form” applying itself to a passive
“matter”. But Hegel decisively distances himself from the formalism of
medieval logic by restoring to the notion of form the dynamic meaning it
had for Aristotle himself10 by understanding “form” as a power of in-
formation, and thus of generating reality.
To be sure, the concept needs to be considered as form, but only as infinite,
fecund form that encompasses the fullness of all content within itself and at
the same time releases it from itself. (Hegel 2010a: §160, Addition: 233)
This rejection of formalism becomes especially apparent with regards to
Hegel’s theory of the syllogism (Schluss). This theory may, at first glance,
appear to be a tedious continuation of the scholastic tradition, but in fact
that is not the case. In Hegel’s sense, a syllogism is the act by which the
concept connects itself to itself (schliesst sich mit sich zusammen). The
syllogism is not a form of subjective reasoning (in the usual meaning). It
is rather a manifestation of the immanent dynamic of self-thinking that is
the logical “subject”, the concept:
The syllogism is what is rational and everything rational. [. . .] In a rational
syllogism [. . .] the subject joins itself together with itself by means of this
mediation. It is only a subject in this way, or the subject is only in itself the
syllogism of reason. (Hegel 2010a: §§181–2, 253, 255)
In summary, Hegel’s theory of the “subjective” concept is an attempt at
disentangling subjectivity from any and all psychological or even transcen-
dental contexts and at breaking free from the “philosophy of subjectivity”.
For Hegel, subjectivity refers to the self-engendering capacity of thinking.
The subject is the concept’s self-movement: it is the rationality of self-acting
thinking, not the presumed origin of acts of such kinds. The subjective
concept can be said to be formal, but not in the traditional sense of a set of
forms that can be applied to an independent matter. The concept – as
10
See Metaphysics H, 1042 a 24–1043 a 28, in Aristotle (1984) and Hegel’s commentary (Hegel 1968–:
30–1:104 and 344).

a self-mediation – must inform reality, it must test itself as the very
movement of the being; in that sense only can the concept be called
“formal”. Henceforth, subjectivity is but the conceptual mediation that
constitutes objectivity as such.
Objectivity (Objektivität) is the ultimate expression of immediacy in the
Logic, summarizing all of its previous displays: the being-there (Dasein),11
the existence (Existenz) and the actuality (Wirklichkeit) (Hegel 2010b: 628).
However, as with everything that seems immediate, objectivity is actually
overloaded with (conceptual) mediations. In other words, it is because the
concept is “subjective” that objectivity does not exist for a subject but
through the mediation of subjectivity (even if mediation is seemingly
abolished in its objective outcome). Objectivity – gathered within itself,
having erased its constituting conceptual mediation – “has the meaning
first of all of the being in and for itself of the concept that has sublated the
mediation posited in its self-determination, raising it to immediate self-
reference” (Hegel 2010b: 131). It is one of the remarkable peculiarities of the
logic of the concept (in comparison with that of the being and essence): the
mediation (of the subjective concept) precedes the immediate (the object),
and the object can only be thought of as a becoming immediacy. The
objective logic progressively revealed the essential mediation process at
work in what appears immediate (the “given” being or being-there). In
contrast, in the logic of the concept, the theory of objectivity allows the
conceptual (“subjective”) mediations to reveal themselves, even though the
object seems to have “forgotten” them. Through mechanism, chemism
and teleology, the theory of objectivity is an anamnesis (Er-innerung) of the
conceptual mediation of all kinds of object: a recalling of the always
mediated existence of the immediate objectivity.
As for subjectivity, Hegel distances himself from the common concep-
tion of what an object and objectivity are.12 The object must be conceived
as an object in and for itself; it does not exist first for and thanks to
a subject. Even though Gegen-stand is a morphological equivalent to ob-
jectum, a conceptual distinction needs to be made between (so to speak) the
11
This translation (Geraets–Harris) seems preferable to “existence” (Brinkmann, di Giovanni) just
because Hegel explicitly distinguishes between Dasein (as a category of the sphere of being) and
Existenz (as a category of the sphere of essence whose etymology implies a reflection): “The
expression ‘existence’ (derived from existere) points to a having-gone-forth (Hervorgegangensein)
and the concrete existence (Existenz) is the being that has gone forth from the ground, the being re-
established through the sublation (Aufhebung) of the mediation” (Hegel 2010a: §123, Addition: 191
[Hegel 1991b: 193]). Moreover, the option of translating Dasein by “existence” requires ‘overtranslat-
ing’ Existenz by “concrete existence”.
12
See Brinkmann (2011).

ob-ject that “faces” a (finite) subject (Gegenstand) and the object “in itself”
(Objekt). Only secondarily does the object (Objekt) become an ob-ject
(Gegenstand) for a subject. In this respect, common sense is right in its
opposition to the modern subjectivist philosophy.
By ‘object’, however, one tends to understand not merely an abstract
entity or concretely existing thing or something in general actual, but
instead something concretely and completely self-sufficient in itself; this
completeness is the totality of the concept. That the object is also something
standing opposite [Gegenstand ] and external to another, this will be
determined subsequently insofar as it posits itself in opposition to the
subjective. Here, as that into which the concept has passed over from its
mediation, it is at first only an immediate, neutral object, just as the
concept is determined to be the subjective only in the subsequent oppos-
ition. (Hegel 2010a: §193, 265)
Only during the presentation of teleology, when the object appears expli-
citly aimed towards subjective ends, does a “subjective” activity emerge
again within objectivity; however, it does so as what must surpass itself in
its realization: once realized, a subjective goal is no longer subjective, but
rather “the posited unity of the subjective and the objective [dimensions]”
(Hegel 2010a: §210, 281). Therefore, Hegel intends to surpass the oppos-
ition between internal and external purposiveness (Zweckmässigkeit): even
if making this distinction is “one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy”,
it is necessary to go back to what constitutes the “essential element of the
teleological”: the “form of purposiveness”, that is purely conceptual, and has
therefore freedom as its ruling principle (Hegel 2010b: 157).
Objectivity is immediately conceptual, just because it results from an
Aufhebung of the subjective concept: “objectivity is the real concept that has
emerged from its inwardness and has passed over into the being-there”
(Hegel 2010b: 527, modified). This explains Hegel’s interest in the
Anselmian or Cartesian ontological proof of the existence of God, despite
the radical criticisms Kant left it with (Kant 1969, A 592/B 620). Beyond its
theological content, Anselm’s argument is a perfect example of the con-
cept’s transition from subjectivity to objectivity and of the processual
identity of the being and concept: in both cases, “the concept posits itself
as something real, a being there” (Hegel 2010b: 626, modified). Thus
understood, the ontological proof is an illustration of the aim of the
Hegelian Logic. This is why, in his 1829 lessons on the proofs of the
existence of God, Hegel states that the Logic is the only proof of the
veracity of religious representations: it is the “metaphysical theology”
(Hegel 1968–: 17:419).

The complete revision of the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity in
the Logic of the Concept serves a single purpose: to demonstrate that
subjectivity is no separate form and that objectivity is no informal matter.
When objectivity is not considered as inherently conceptual, the concept is
doomed to be the veil of an empty subjectivity, separated from real things:
“in itself concept, or also, if one prefers, subjectivity, and the object are the
same” (Hegel 2010a: §193, 266).
The last section of the Doctrine deals with “the idea”. Here again, the usual
meaning of the term is completely changed. In Hegel’s sense, the idea is not
a subjective representation, a mental state. Rather, it is a process consisting in
the dialectical explanation of the, until then, implicit identity of objectivity
and subjectivity, of the being and concept, of actuality and rationality:
The idea is instead its own result and, as such, just as much immediate as
mediated. The stages considered so far, those of being and essence and
equally of the concept and objectivity, are not something fixed and resting
on themselves with regard to this difference among them. Instead they have
been demonstrated to be dialectical and their truth is only that of being
moments of the idea. (Hegel 2010a: §213, Addition: 284)
Thus, the idea is defined as a dynamic process, generating and abolishing
all of the categories and oppositions that emerged from the Logic as the
“Science of the pure idea” (Hegel 2010a: §19, 47). In Hegel’s view, this
conception of the idea is a shield against dualism. This is not only because
it rejects the dualities that understanding considers ultimate, but, most
importantly, because the idea serves as the immanent rule of construction
and deconstruction of these dualities.
In the same way as the concept is not the product of a subject, but the
subjectivity itself, the idea is not someone’s idea about something. The idea
is a “subject-object ” (Hegel 2010b: 673) in the sense that it is an idea of self,
an act of self : it is nothing more than the process by which thought and
reality generate themselves simultaneously, the process that establishes the
being as concept and the concept as being. Hence, the idea summarizes the
Logic’s purpose of being an onto-logic. Therefore, Hegel’s philosophy is
far from preaching what is commonly understood as “absolute” idealism;
claiming that the idea is the only reality is different from pretending that
the idea is the idea of reality. In this sense, if it is true that “every true
philosophy is [. . .] idealism” (Hegel 2010a: §95, 152), then it must be added
that it is an unprecedented idealism because it combines a radicalization
both of idealism (nothing is real but the idea) and of realism (the idea is
nothing if it isn’t).

Thus, it is important not to misinterpret the “absolute idea” (the ending
point of the Logic, but not of the system) in the same way as “absolute
knowledge” (in the Phenomenology of Spirit) often is. The absolute idea is
not the ultimate summary of all that was gathered throughout the logical
process, because the result is nothing once cut off from the process leading
up to it. The absolute idea has no other content than what can be found in
each of the moments of the whole logical process, from the simplest
categories (“pure being”, “pure nothingness”) to the most complex (like
“syllogism” or “teleology”). However, it articulates this content (named
“the very matter”, die Sache selbst) around its processual nature:
The absolute idea is comparable to the old man who says the same religious
sentences as the child does, but for the old man they have the meaning of his
entire life. Even if the child understands the religious content, what validity
that content has for him is still of the sort that lies outside his entire life and
world. (Hegel 2010a: §237, Addition: 300)
As the “old age” of thinking, the absolute idea summarizes its “life”: this life
is the work of freedom, that is of the very predicate of the concept.

chapter 5
From Logic to Nature

Christian Martin
This chapter deals with a crucial juncture in Hegel’s Encyclopedia, the

transition from its first part, the ‘science of logic’, to its second part, the
‘philosophy of nature’, which is at the same time a transition to what
Hegel calls “the real sciences of philosophy” (die realen Wissenschaften der
Philosophie1).
After laying out, in Section 5.1, Hegel’s conception of logic, I go on,
in Section 5.2, to look at §244 of the Encyclopedia. This paragraph leads
from logic to nature. Hegel’s argument has been prominently criticized
by Schelling as either question begging or involving a category mistake.
I argue that Schelling’s objections can be met, if one clearly distin-
guishes between the transition from the logic to the philosophy of nature
and the relation between the logical and nature, which does not itself
have the character of a transition. In Section 5.3 I engage with the very
first steps of Hegel’s philosophy of nature, arguing that we can know
a priori that nature is an inhomogeneous material space-time con-
tinuum. Subsequently, in Section 5.4, I address the question of what
it might mean to claim, as Hegel does, that ‘the concept’ is ‘immanent’
in nature. As I argue, it would be confused to assume that concepts or
universals are somehow ‘contained’ in the material space-time con-
tinuum. We rather need to understand nature’s ‘peculiar logicality’ in
terms of recurrent, self-preserving configurations within the inhomo-
geneous continuum that allow to be articulated and known by means of
the forms of discursive thinking. I conclude, in Section 5.5, with some
remarks on what it means to know nature and on the difference in
method between the ‘science of logic’ and the ‘real sciences of
philosophy’.
1
Science of Logic (SL): 11, in the Gesammelte Werke (GW): 21:9 (Hegel 1968–).
88

From Logic to Nature 89
5.1 The Logic as a Presuppositionless Investigation
of Pure Thought
Hegel’s Logic seeks to articulate the self-knowledge inherent to pure
thought.2 It does so by unfolding, without relying on any thematic presup-
positions, the system of concepts that have their source in thinking alone, i.e.
independently of anything that is given to it.3 The Logic cannot, however,
begin with thought as its explicit topic, for in that case it would have to
proceed from a preconceived idea of what thought is. Instead, at its very
beginning, it requires that all sorts of prejudices and contrasts in which
thinking is usually seen as entangled be eliminated or bracketed.4 Therefore
it begins with the simplest concepts of all5 – being, nothing, becoming, being
determinate, something etc. The Logic is thus at the same time an investigation
of what it means to be.6 That the Logic, in passing through a series of
conceptual determinations, deals with “nothing but one’s own thinking”7
is substantiated by the fact that each conceptual determination proves to be
unintelligible in isolation and thus points beyond itself towards further
concepts, only in connection with which can it be grasped undistortedly.
The movement of thought carried out in the Logic thus consists in thought’s
procuring a system of pure concepts all by itself. Insofar as pure thought, by
this very movement, provides what is needed to grasp itself in a fully
articulate way, pure thinking becomes thematic as what it has proven itself
to be all along, namely as unconditioned self-determination. Hegel’s Logic
thus concludes with the ‘absolute idea’, i.e. the concept of pure thought qua
self-transparent self-determination that relates to the totality of pure con-
cepts as its own manifestations8.
Conceiving of logic as “the science of pure thinking”9 presupposes
a distinction between purity and impurity. This distinction does not
coincide with that between the a priori and the a posteriori. For, in
Hegel’s encyclopedic system, even those disciplines which follow upon
the Logic and do not treat of thinking purely as such aren’t empirical in
character, even though they have to relate their concepts to relevant
findings of the empirical sciences. Hegel characterizes the distinction
2
SL: 17 (GW 21:16), see also Pippin (2019: 101–39).
3
Hegel (2010a (henceforth ENC): 1:125 (§78)). Reconstructions that take Hegel’s claim to presuppo-
sitionlessness seriously can be found in Houlgate (2006), Martin (2012) and Koch (2014a).
4
SL: 29 (GW 21:33). 5 ENC 1:47 (§19).
6
Houlgate (2006: 115–23) and Martin (2012: 1–13). 7 ENC 1:47 (§19).
8
ENC 1:299–300 (§§236–7), SL: 752 (GW 12:252–3). For an understanding of the absolute idea along
these lines see Martin (2012: 571–607).
9
SL: 38 (GW 21:45), see also ENC 1:125 (§78).

90 christian martin
between purity and impurity by setting logic apart from what he calls “the
real sciences of philosophy”, i.e. philosophy of nature and philosophy of
spirit:
The logical is the general content of everything, but it also stands as what is
general to what is specific. In this way, the Logic distinguishes itself from the
real sciences of philosophy. In one of these, namely, the Philosophy of
Nature, the idea is in the element of free self-externality and matter, in the
other, the Philosophy of Spirit, it is in the element of being-in-and-for-itself,
namely, knowledge. [. . .] Logic thus distinguishes itself from the real
sciences, where ‘real’ means ‘being determinate’.10
Provisionally, this distinction can be spelled out as follows: logic is pure
insofar as it is concerned only with concepts which have their source in
thinking alone, without invoking spatio-temporal determinacy as such.
Accordingly, the self-knowledge of thinking that the Logic articulates will
not exhibit thinking as an activity that requires spatio-temporal instanti-
ation. The subject matters of the real sciences of philosophy, on the other
hand, are dealt with as involving a moment of spatio-temporal determinacy.
Pure thinking cannot, for methodological reasons, be dealt with as
thinking in the first part of the Logic but appears as fully absorbed in quasi-
objectual determinations, for which reason Hegel refers to that part as
“objective logic”;11 and the explicit self-knowledge of thinking that is
achieved in its second part, the “subjective logic”, cannot yet be envisaged
as an activity that requires spatio-temporal instantiation. These peculiar-
ities can easily give rise to confusions of which Hegel’s own mode of
presentation is not entirely free. For, it might make it appear as if the
Logic treated of a different kind of thinking from ours, namely one that is (1)
completely absorbed in the quasi-objectual determinations it thinks and (2)
actual thinking prior to spatio-temporal instantiation and thus, as it were,
divine thinking before creation.12
The fact that Hegel sometimes expresses himself in this way should first
and foremost be understood as an attempt to bring a methodological trait of
his Logic into focus, namely that it abstracts from all real presuppositions. It
is not thereby claimed that pure thinking exists as divine activity prior to
spatio-temporal instantiation.13 Rather, the Logic deals with the thinking of
10
Hegel (1992 (henceforth V): 11:24) (my translation), see also SL: 11 (GW 21:9).
11
For Hegel’s distinction between “objective” and “subjective logic” see SL: 38–43 (GW 21:44–9).
12
SL: 29 (GW 21:34) and V 11:91.
13
Hegel stresses that “the knowing involved in the simple logical idea is just the concept of knowing as
it is thought by us, but not knowing insofar as it exists for itself, – not actual spirit but only the
possibility thereof” (Hegel 1970–1 (henceforth TW): 10:18 addition, translation modified).

us thinkers which requires spatial and temporal embodiment, but it does so
in abstraction from such embodiment. Hegel expresses this point by
stating that it is spirit, i.e. thinking insofar as it is embodied in a real world
shaped by its own activity, which is engaged, in the Logic, to “think its own
essence”.14 If it is true that “essence must appear”,15 then pure thinking as
considered in the Logic cannot be attributed an independent existence
prior to its real appearance in the workings of spirit, even while this
appearance is bracketed throughout the Logic.
The abstraction from what is real extends only to the content of the
Logic, i.e. to the pure concepts developed in it. That these are “determin-
ations of thought”16 (Denkbestimmungen) means precisely that their
content does not involve any reference to spatio-temporal reality as
such. However, as a philosophical discipline in which spirit undertakes to
recognize its own logical essence, the Logic must avail itself of what is real.
Its execution requires the use of expressions and must articulate itself in
the form of propositions. This is so precisely because the essence of
thinking is not itself actual thinking, but only amounts to the latter
insofar as it appears.
That which is not itself a content of pure thought but a necessary
prerequisite of its philosophical investigation is a topic for “external
reflection”.17 External reflection considers relevant issues that do not,
strictly speaking, belong to the subject matter of logic – at least not at
a given place. What falls within the scope of external reflection, however,
does not have to be an accidental feature of the self-knowledge of thinking
achieved in logic. For thought’s essence can only be articulated, philosoph-
ically, by availing oneself of real preconditions of thinking: spirit, when it
undertakes to articulate its logical nature in abstraction from its real
manifestation, remains spirit, i.e. requires real manifestation. The latter is
thematically external to logic’s subject matter (i.e. the logical) but is at the
same time pragmatically internal to logic, i.e. an essential aspect of this kind
of philosophical activity. In other words, the conditions of articulation of
pure thought are essentially impure or real. Without the possibility, pro-
vided by language, to distinguish that which cannot be distinguished by
recourse to determinate characteristics – e.g. ‘being’ and ‘nothing’, ‘some-
thing’ and ‘other’, etc. – and without recourse to propositional form, the
Logic could not get under way.
14
SL: 10 (GW 21:8), see also ENC 3:196 (§574).
15
ENC 1:197 (§131) and SL: 418 (GW 11:323).
16 17
SL: 13–14 (GW 21:12–13), SL: 30 (GW 21:35). See e.g. SL: 34 (GW 21:39).

92 christian martin
One might expect that everything essentially involved in pure thinking
that cannot be addressed at the beginning of the Logic or throughout its
course and thus belongs to external reflection is eventually caught up with.
For the Logic unfolds the concept of pure thinking, so that external
reflection becomes internal insofar as its contents are integrated into the
self-knowledge of pure thinking.18 This is true as far as it goes. For instance,
throughout the objective logic, concepts, judgements and inferences are
merely used to articulate the conceptual determinations at issue; but they
themselves become the subject of investigation in the subjective logic. The
Logic thus culminates in the concept of pure thinking to which its own
modus operandi is transparent.
However, even at the end of the Logic, the concept of thought’s know-
ledge of the totality of conceptual determinations as its own manifest-
ations, i.e. the absolute idea, does not coincide with the actual achievement
of such self-knowledge in a logic qua philosophical discipline. Neither is the
distinction between purity and impurity a purely logical distinction nor can
philosophical science, as an actual activity that presupposes real manifest-
ation, be sufficiently characterized by means of logical concepts. Therefore,
Hegel’s final characterization of the absolute idea as the concept of the
science of pure thinking19 belongs to external reflection. Accordingly, the
full-blown concept of logic as a philosophical science will be available only at
the very end of the philosophy of spirit.20
Precisely because the concept of pure thought’s self-knowledge in the
totality of its determinations does not coincide with the concept of philo-
sophical engagement with pure thinking, the transition from logic to the
real sciences of philosophy has two categorically distinct dimensions that
Hegel himself didn’t distinguish sufficiently clearly. This makes this tran-
sition somewhat nebulous and has shrouded it in mystery.21 Thematically,
the transition concerns the relationship between the logical 22 and the real
(nature, spirit). As such, it raises the question of why there should be
anything beyond the logical. Pragmatically, we are faced with a transition
18
ENC 1:302–3 (§§242–3).
19
According to Hegel, in the absolute idea “the science of logic has apprehended its own concept” (SL:
752 (GW 12:252)). “The science concludes in this way by grasping the concept of itself as the pure
idea, for which the idea is” (ENC 1:303 (§243)). However, while the absolute idea indeed amounts to
self-knowledge of the way in which pure thinking unfolds, namely its method, this does not yet
amount to a full-blown conception of philosophical science as such.
20
ENC 3:181–96 (§§572–4).
21
According to Wandschneider (2004: 107) this transition is “one of the darkest passages in Hegel’s
œuvre”.
22
See e.g. ENC 1:125 (§79).

from one philosophical science (logic) to another (the philosophy of nature)
and, thereby, to another type of philosophical science, namely, a real science
of philosophy. Since the concept of philosophy cannot be grasped by means
of logical concepts alone, the relevant transition between the two philo-
sophical disciplines can only be a topic for external reflection at this point.
Seen from this angle, it raises both the question of how the transition is
motivated and that of what the crucial differences between the philosoph-
ical method before the transition and that after it are.
Unconsciously blending these two dimensions can easily give rise to the
confused view that not only must the transition from logic to philosophy of
nature be rationally motivated, but that there must also be a rationally
motivated transition between the logical and nature – as if nature were
something that owed its existence to pure thought. One may then find it
a little awkward that the logical idea is supposed to ground nature or to
turn itself into it, while it remains concealed that this way of speaking does
not make sense. Disentangling the two dimensions of the transition at issue
is what we now turn to.
5.2 The Externality of the Logical Idea in Nature versus

the Transition from Logic to the Philosophy of Nature
The last sentence of the last paragraph of the Encyclopedia Logic which is
supposed to justify the transition to the philosophy of nature reads as
follows:
[T]he absolute freedom of the idea is that it [. . .], in the absolute truth of itself,
resolves to release freely from itself the moment of its particularity or the first
determining and otherness, the immediate idea, as its reflection, itself as nature.23
A tenable reconstruction of the transition from logic to the philosophy
of nature has to comply with the following adequacy requirement. Firstly,
it must clearly distinguish between two dimensions of this crucial juncture
of Hegel’s encyclopedic system, namely the thematic relationship between
the logical and nature, and the transition from one philosophical discipline,
logic, to another, the philosophy of nature. Secondly, it must not only
coherently characterize these dimensions on their own, but also do so in
such a way that their internal connection becomes clear. It must be clarified
why the philosophical investigation of nature (and of spirit) requires
a method that is different from logic and thus amounts to a real science
23
ENC 1:303 (§244).

94 christian martin
of philosophy. Moreover, it needs to be shown that philosophical thinking
does not abruptly turn to nature as a new topic, but that thinking through
the logical makes it necessary to consider nature (and spirit).
Schelling notoriously objected to Hegel’s talk of “resolve”24 (Entschluss),
“free self-release”25 (freies Sich-Entlassen) and “externalization”26 (Entäußerung)
of the logical that the latter is thereby attributed personality.27 This shows,
according to Schelling, that Hegel subscribes to a view of pure thought as
actually existing and, thus, implicitly, as already real.28 As a critique of
a dogmatic-metaphysical reading of the transition in terms of a production
or a grounding of nature on the part of the logical idea this objection is valid.
For the assumption of some such production indeed presupposes that the
absolute idea – the self-referential totality of pure thought – enjoys independ-
ent existence on the basis of which it can then somehow give rise to nature.
Since the Logic unfolds conceptual determinations that have their source in
thinking alone, and since we know by external reflection that it is spirit which
in the Logic recognizes its own essence and that essence must appear while not
existing independently of and prior to its appearance, it would amount to
a dubious metaphysical presupposition if we had to assume, at the very end of
the Logic, that the absolute idea is an independently existing being that
produces nature on its own initiative or somehow turns itself into it.
The most fundamental objection to such a dogmatic-metaphysical
reading, however, is not that it is based on an external presupposition,
but, rather, that it makes no sense. Hegel’s talk of “resolution”, “free self-
release”, “self-externalization” and even “creation”29 at least suggests that
he is referring to a process by which the logical generates nature or turns
itself into it.30 However, for there to be a process, there must be some
respect in which its starting point and its result – what grounds and what is
grounded – are continuous with each other. From this it follows that there
can be no process that leads from the realm of pure thought to nature, for
the two realms cannot be understood as continuous with each other.
24
ENC 1:303 (§244). 25 ENC 1:303 (§244), SL: 753 (GW 12:253).
26
SL: 49 (GW 21:57), ENC 3:6 (§281). 27 Schelling (1975: 135). 28 Schelling (1975: 133).
29
SL: 523 (GW 12:25).
30
Various authors have stressed that Hegel’s talk of “free resolve” should not be understood in the
sense of a voluntary decision on the part of a personal agent (Houlgate 2005: 110; Wandschneider 2016:
64). According to Houlgate “the move to nature is in fact the impersonal, logical process, whereby
the Idea determines itself to be nature” (Houlgate 2005: 110). Wandschneider talks of an “auto-
differentiation” that ought to be understood as an eternal grounding relation between the logical
idea and nature (Wandschneider 2004: 119–20). However, as I argue, the idea of a process that leads
from the logical idea to nature or of a grounding relation that obtains between them does not make
sense – irrespective of whether it is understood by recourse to a personal agent or not.

This can be seen as follows. Continuity is possible only between things
that are at least in some respects similar, so that they may border onto each
other. The logical and nature are opposed to each other insofar as thoughts
have no spatial, temporal or material properties, whereas nature does; and
nature does not in itself have logical properties such as validity or invalid-
ity, whereas thoughts do.31 The realm of pure thoughts and that of nature
cannot therefore hang together immediately amongst each other, but can
only be integrated within an overarching unity, namely in spirit qua actual
thinking that is manifest in a world.
For the logical idea to produce nature or to turn itself into it both would
have to interpenetrate each other, i.e. that which is not a thought would
also ‘somehow’ have to be a thought, and that which is a thought would
also ‘somewhere’ have to not be a thought. It is absurd, however, to assume
that nature begins ‘somewhere at the border of the logical’.
The relation of the logical to nature cannot therefore be understood as
a process by means of which one grounds the other, but needs rather to be
understood by analogy to the relation between soul and body, as a comple-
mentarity of form and matter which belong to each other, originally.
The embarrassment to which the dogmatic-metaphysical reading leads
cannot be bypassed by interpreting the transition from logic to philosophy
of nature purely epistemologically.32 According to a purely epistemological
reading, this transition simply amounts to a return to the real – to the
wealth of our everyday and scientific knowledge of nature and spirit –
which had been bracketed at the beginning of the Logic. On this interpret-
ation, once the logical categories have been systematically unfolded and
thereby cleansed of dogmatic-metaphysical distortions, the real can and
must be philosophically addressed by means of them. This is necessary
because all cognition of nature and spirit is already in itself, albeit latently
and confusedly, shaped by these categories.
Against such a reading, Schelling argued that mere recourse to
a presupposition from which the Logic had initially abstracted nevertheless
remains recourse to a presupposition that has not been philosophically
31
Denying that the logical has real properties does not imply a Cartesian conception of thought. On
Hegel’s account, thought, far from enjoying independent existence, presupposes real manifestation.
This, however, does not impart to thought properties of the sort that pertain to that in which it is
manifest, see note 37.
32
According to Plevrakis §244 treats of the relation between two philosophical disciplines – logic and
philosophy of nature – rather than between the logical idea and nature (Plevrakis 2018: 116–17).
Plevrakis does not, however, coherently stick to this reading, but falls back into talk about the
“origination” (Zustandekommen) of nature (Plevrakis 2018: 121) and about the idea of knowing as
providing “matter” (Stoff ) (Plevrakis 2018: 123).

96 christian martin
vindicated. Contrary to Hegel’s assertion, the step beyond logic would thus
be motivated only by our recollection of the real insofar as we are acquainted
with it prior to the investigation of pure thinking and by a desire to find
a way back from the logical ‘realm of shadows’ to the plenitude of what
really exists.33
However, Hegel’s own procedure deviates from the position justly
criticized by Schelling. This deviation is apparent from the fact that the
real sciences of philosophy do not, according to Hegel, content themselves
with a logical articulation of material provided by the non-philosophical
sciences. They continue the philosophical development of pure concepts by
coming up with peculiar non-logical concepts, even while these must
indeed be put into correlation with such material34 – a task which Hegel
mainly pursues in his lecture courses rather than in the Encyclopedia itself.
The transition from the Logic to the real sciences of philosophy cannot be
understood purely epistemologically as a transition to a kind of philoso-
phizing that seeks to unlock the fabric of experience by means of logical
categories, because this task, if it is to understand itself, requires an
understanding of the difference and connection between the logical and
the real, i.e. nature and spirit. Such an understanding cannot be available,
pre-philosophically, for the logical as such is brought into view only by logic;
its difference from and connection with the real can therefore only be
clarified subsequently and thus needs to be addressed at the very juncture
between logic and the real sciences of philosophy.
The epistemological transition from logic to philosophy of nature can
thus be rendered clear only if the metaphysical connection between the
logical and the real is brought into view as well, though not in the
dogmatic-metaphysical fashion discussed above. I have argued elsewhere
that insight into the complementarity between the logical and the real can
be gained by showing that logical form, i.e. the kind of unity that belongs to
thought as such, requires expression and thus presupposes the real as
a sphere from which expressions can be drawn.35 According to this line
of argumentation, by thinking through the notion of logical form we can
recognize that what the Logic is about, namely pure thoughts, cannot exist
prior to and independent of expressive activity. Accordingly, the activity of
thinking requires the guise of the real. Thoughts cannot, therefore, exist
independently of expressive activity, even while they cannot be identified
with such activity or sets of expressions either, for embodied activity in
33 34
Schelling (1975: 115) and Schick (2012). ENC 2.1:197 (§246).
35
Martin (2017a: 152–67, 2020: chapter 2).

space and time can bring thoughts into play only to the extent that its own
particularity is made irrelevant.36 The relationship between the logical and
the real is therefore a paradoxical one: the logical presupposes the real
insofar as it depends upon the active articulation, repercussion and dis-
appearance of something real, namely expressions.37 The logical thus exists
independently of the real, albeit not as something that is prior to it, but as
something emancipated from it.
While Hegel himself addresses this paradoxical tie between thought and
expression in his philosophy of spirit 38 – and most clearly in his Jena writings39
– he mentions it only in passing in connection with the ‘self-externalization’
of the absolute idea at the end of the Logic, echoing the incarnation of the
word from the prologue of St. John’s gospel.40 It seems to me, however, that
an argument along the lines indicated here, according to which logical form
essentially presupposes real manifestation, is the only way to philosophically
understand the metaphysical connection between the logical and the real
without falling into nonsense. An argument of this type thus meets Hegel’s
demand that one must not merely assume the existence of nature quasi-
empirically, but ‘prove’ philosophically that there must be nature.41
5.3 The Concept of Nature

As I shall now argue, a philosophical conception of nature can be achieved
by spelling out the insight that logical form essentially presupposes a realm
that does not itself consist of thoughts but is not simply alien to thought,
either. Rather, this realm must be tied back to the logical and, as it were,
belong to it as its other side.
As indicated, Hegel himself does not provide a detailed characterization
of the real in contrast to the logical.42 But he introduces nature as the “idea
36
Martin (2020: chapter 4).
37
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel characterizes the relation between a particular utterance and the
thought expressed by it as follows: “The ‘I’ that utters itself is heard or perceived. [. . .] That it is
perceived or heard means that its real existence dies away; this its otherness has been taken back into
itself; and its real existence is just this: that as a self-conscious Now, as a real existence, it is not a real
existence, and through this vanishing it is a real existence. This vanishing is thus itself at once its
abiding” (PS: 309 (§508)).
38
ENC 3:75–84 (§§457–60). 39 GW 8:188–201. 40 V 11:226, SL: 736 (GW 12:237).
41
At the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature Hegel refers back to §244 of the Encyclopedia as
containing a “proof that there necessarily is a nature” (ENC 2.1:192, addition).
42
See the references in note 9. Hegel uses the terms ‘real’ and ‘reality’ mostly in the logical sense of an
immediate positive determination or quality, e.g. SL: 84–8 (GW 21:98–102). It cannot, however, be just
this logical understanding which is at issue in his distinction between ‘logic’ and the ‘real sciences of
philosophy’.

98 christian martin
in the form of otherness“ (Idee in der Form des Andersseins)43 and spirit as
the “return” of the idea from this otherness.44 This allows us to gain insight
into his conception of the real, i.e. that which nature and spirit have in
common in contrast to the logical. What they have in common does not
amount to a genus that might equally well be grasped independently of its
two species, nature and spirit. What is common to nature and spirit is what
Hegel calls the “being-other” (Anderssein) or the “self-externality”
(Außersichsein) of the logical idea. With respect to nature, this amounts
to a global characterization of this sphere of the real, while also amounting
to a subordinate trait of spirit, namely as that from which the latter is said to
‘return’. Our primary concern in what follows will be to understand
Hegel’s conception of nature as the idea in the form of otherness.
That nature is said to be the logical idea that is posited in a certain form
means that nature exhibits a kind of unity that is different from the unity
pertaining to logical determinations as such. Given that form and content
are not external to each other, the assertion that nature is the logical idea in
another form cannot be understood as if nature amounted to another
‘configuration’ of thoughts. Rather, in nature, the concept – the universal,
the thought – is “immersed”, “lost” and “vanished”, as Hegel puts it.45 The
fact that nature is nevertheless said to be a guise of the logical idea, namely
its own otherness or externality, means the following: while nature does not
consist of thoughts, it is nevertheless essentially intelligible. That a realm
that doesn’t consist of thoughts must nevertheless be intelligible is an insight
that had already been vindicated in the Logic itself, in the course of the
transition from subjectivity to the object.46
Intelligibility is only the first, not particularly surprising, trait of nature
that results from its characterization as the idea in the form of otherness. It
needs to be added that the peculiar kind of unity that pertains to nature is
otherness or externality. This indicates that nature is a sphere that does not
consist of distinct constituents that are internally related (as pure concepts
indeed are) and so make up a system whose moments do not have separate
existence independently of each other. Rather, the constituents of nature
can indeed relate to each other as other, namely as external.47 According to
Hegel, the externality or otherness characteristic of nature manifests itself
both as contingency, i.e. as real independence, and as necessity,48 i.e. such
that something is not as such inscribed into the other (as pure concepts
43
ENC 2.1:205 (§247). 44 ENC 3:6 (§381). 45 Hegel (2002b: 22–3; ENC 1:276 (§203)).
46
ENC 1:265–70 (§§193–4), SL: 624–30 (12:126–32) and Martin (2012: 340–70).
47
ENC 2.1:208 (§248). 48 ENC 2.1:208 (§248).

indeed are), while bringing about the subsequent existence of something
else. Items that are necessarily coupled in this way are thus at the same time
external to each other.
The fact that the realm of nature is both essentially intelligible and such
that entities that fall within it can be external to each other does not,
however, amount to a self-sufficient conception of nature. For intelligibility
designates only the possibility of being known. We thus need to ask for the
actual constitution of nature in which its intelligibility is grounded, i.e. for
the peculiar logicality of nature (Logizität der Natur) in contrast to the
logical as such. At first sight, however, it is hard to see how to assign a sense
to the apparently contradictory phrase “peculiar logicality of nature”.
So far, the peculiar form of nature, its otherness, has only been explained
locally, namely as the possibility that entities that belong to nature can be
external to each other. Hegel’s phrase “idea in the form of otherness”,
however, primarily serves the purpose of bringing the global outlook of
nature into view. By unpacking this phrase and by thus articulating the
global outlook of nature we will put ourselves in a position to answer the
question regarding its peculiar logicality.
That otherness or externality is the basic global trait of nature means not
only that entities that fall within the realm of nature can behave towards
each other as external, but that the whole of nature must be characterized by
otherness or externality. While the constituents of nature are subject to
relative otherness, nature on the whole is characterized by absolute other-
ness, that is, by otherness-in-itself or “self-externality” (Außersichsein).49
That the first, inchoate trait of nature is self-externality means that it is
a manifold that does not leave to what it comprises any determination for
itself. What is thus comprised is accordingly such that by being what it is it
already points beyond itself. Accordingly, it lacks a proper determinacy of its
own in distinction to its surroundings. By being what it is, it is at the same
time already beyond itself, i.e. it is pure transience into an environment.
The most elementary global trait of nature is, accordingly, that it is
a continuum, namely a manifold that does not consist of a definite number
of distinct actual parts that have an independent determinacy of their own.
However, as a manifold, it must at least allow the possibility of an arbitrary
number of virtual parts being singled out.50
Even if nature qua continuum does not consist of distinct components and is
thus a whole without parts – albeit of a certain extension – it can be distin-
guished from what is absolutely simple only by recourse to virtual parts.
49 50
ENC 2.1:215 (§250), 221 (§253, addition), 223 (§254). ENC 2.1:223 (§254).

100 christian martin
Accordingly, we had to introduce the continuum by alluding to something
contained in it – points – and by thus assuming a distinction between these
points and their environment, in order to then take this distinction back by
declaring it to be virtual, stressing that what had just been distinguished has no
self-sufficient standing of its own but is pure transiency into an environment.51
To get hold of the continuum, one cannot do without distinguishing some-
thing within it that is thereby posited as relatively independent, while one must
immediately add that what is thus distinguished is not by itself distinct and is
thus absolutely dependent. To the extent that this characterization is appropri-
ate to its topic, nature qua continuum is thus in itself determined in
a contradictory manner.52
Insofar as the continuum of nature involves a real contradiction, and
insofar as a real contradiction binds together what cannot peacefully coex-
ist, the continuum of nature must come along with a dimension in which
the consequence of its essential instability or ‘decrepitude’ manifests itself.
The real manifestation of instability is decay – a passing away – and global
passing-away is nothing other than time.53
Accordingly, by thinking through Hegel‘s characterization of nature as
self-externality and, hence, as a continuum, a difference has arisen, namely
between the continuum insofar as it is merely instable and the continuum
insofar as it manifests the real consequence of its instability, i.e. as global
passing-away. The continuum of nature thus essentially involves two
dimensions or modes of occurrence: a static one corresponding to mere self-
externality – space – and an ephemeral one in which its essential instability
becomes manifest – time. Time is thus not merely a further dimension of
the real besides space, but is, so to speak, nothing but the real manifestation
of the essential instability of space.
Since it is essential to nature that its determinations can appear as
external to each other, the impression that space and time are independent,
juxtaposed dimensions does not arise by mere chance. However, the
otherness or independence of global features of nature can only be
a relative one; that is, it can obtain only against the background of
a further trait of nature in which these features concretely hang together.
51
“Although the heres are also differentiated, their being different is identical with their lack of
difference, and the difference is therefore abstract. Space is therefore punctiformity without points,
or complete continuity” (ENC 2.1:224 (§254, addition)).
52
“Space is this contradiction, to involve negation, but in such a way that this negation disintegrates
into indifferent subsistence” (ENC 2.1:229 (§257, addition)).
53
“As space is merely this inner negation of itself, its truth is the self-transcendence of its moments. It is
precisely the existence of this perpetual self-transcendence which constitutes time. In time therefore
the point has actuality” (ENC 2.1:229 (§257, addition)).

The trait of nature that counteracts the apparent independence of space
and time in the shape of their concrete unity is motion qua change of place
with time.54 Since there can only be movement in contrast to something
which is at rest, the space-time continuum must be inhomogeneous within
itself. For only on this condition does it allow contrasts between movement
and rest. Insofar as matter is that which moves in space, nature must hence
be globally characterized as an inhomogeneous material space-time
continuum.
Inhomogeneity as such by no means implies actual discretion, since
inhomogeneity requires only that the continuum’s manner of continuous
coherence varies discontinuously in places. Actual discretion requires
logical activity which singles out re-identifiable sections of the con-
tinuum, positing them as objects of a certain type.55 Accordingly, nature
is an inhomogeneous continuum that does not on its own involve actual
discreteness, but merely allows for non-arbitrary logical acts which pro-
vide for actual discreteness by singling out distinct natural objects of
various sorts.56
5.4 The Intelligibility of Nature and the ‘Internality’

of ‘the Concept’ in Nature
We have expanded Hegel’s inchoate characterization of nature as self-
externality (Außersichsein) into the insight that nature must be understood
as an inhomogeneous material space-time continuum that is essentially in
motion. We can now tackle the question of the peculiar logicality of nature.
That is, we can now ask how one should understand the actual constitution
of nature in which its intelligibility pursuant to the forms of discursive
thinking is rooted. Hegel characterizes the peculiar logicality of nature by
remarking that “the concept” occurs in nature only as “internal”57 (Inneres,
Innerliches) or as “in itself”58 (an sich). He thus distinguishes between an
inner and an outer of nature. He characterizes the latter as perceptual
content or appearance, whereas he refers to the former as the “universal” in
nature, which is said to be accessible to thinking only.
His claim that “the concept” occurs in nature only as “internal” or “in itself”
is meaningless as long as one has not resolved the apparent contradiction that
54
ENC 2.1:237–41 (§261).
55
For a systematic elaboration of this idea see Martin (2020: chapter 3).
56
For an articulation and defence of this view as a reading of Hegel’s logical concept of the ‘world’ or
‘the object’ see Martin (2012: 354–70, 2014: 230–3).
57 58
ENC 2.1:208 (§248), 212 (§249); Hegel (2002b: 7–8, 10, 22–3). ENC 2.1:207 (§247).

what Hegel calls “the concept”, i.e. self-referential self-determination,59 is essen-
tially for itself. Therefore, it is not immediately clear what it might mean to say
that the concept as it occurs in nature is “merely in itself”. It is further unclear
how the logical might count as “the inner” of nature insofar as it has no real
spatio-temporal properties, while that whose “interior” it is supposed to be is
a material space-time continuum. As long as one merely adds to the logical
understanding of the concept the alleged further property of being somehow
‘contained in nature’ rather than taking the pains of articulating a modified,
non-logical understanding of the concept that allows one to concretely grasp it
as “internal in” it, nature’s peculiar logicality remains a mystery.
Hegel himself indicates that a modification of the logical understanding
of the concept is needed in order to understand its immanence in nature
by saying that the concept is “lost” in nature or has “disappeared” in it.
Readings that take his recourse to “objective thoughts”,60 “thought in the
world”61 and the “interiority of the concept in nature” directly at face
value, instead of recognizing the task indicated by the latent contradic-
tion in such phrases, namely the need to work one’s way towards
a concrete understanding of the peculiar logicality of nature and spirit,
content themselves with a mere potpourri of the logical and the real.
Unwittingly, they thus fall back behind Hegel (and Kant) onto a form of
rationalist metaphysics that imagines logical determinations that have
their source in thinking alone as somehow equally existent on the part of
the world, making it appear as if it were a contingent fact, on Hegel’s
account, that any actual thinking is going on.62 This applies, for instance,
to the reading put forward by James Kreines, who claims:
Hegel’s Begriffe, including natural kinds governed by universal laws, are not
mind-dependent in the sense we would expect given the term ‘concept’: the
reality and the real effective impact of laws governing natural kinds does not
depend on their being represented by us. They are not mind-dependent, but
they are accessible only to thought.63
59
ENC 1:236 (§163). For a systematic elucidation of ‘the concept’ in terms of self-referential self-
determination see Martin (2012: 222–52, 2014: 224–30).
60
ENC 1:66 (§24). 61 SL: 29 (GW 21:34).
62
As Fulda has shown, such a reading of Hegel is both exegetically as well as systematically futile:
“Nowhere does Hegel in his Logic attempt to prove that the objective thoughts and conceptual
determinations it examines are thoughts and determinations of something that exists independently
of being thought. [. . .] Only insofar as it engages with its determinations in this way, rather than as
determinations of a substrate which is simply there, can Logic be first philosophy. With such
a substrate, its pretension to be scientific cognition would fall prey to its own inherent scepticism”
(Fulda 1999: 474, my translation).
63
Kreines (2007: 325).

Kreines attributes the following ‘concept thesis’ to Hegel:
The reasons that explain why things are as they are and do what they do are
always found in immanent ‘concepts’, akin to immanent universals or kinds.64
Just like the philosophical stance that Hegel calls “former metaphysics”65
(vormalige Metaphysik), Kreines’s unquestioned subscription to the ‘imma-
nence’ of the universal – of concepts, kinds, rules and laws – in the world or
in nature whose existence qua substratum he simply takes for granted, is
“unconscious of its opposition”.66 It is marked by a lack of insight into the
fact that logical determinations as such which have their source in thinking
alone, i.e. concepts, rules and laws, cannot as well be contained ‘in’ nature.
This is so, because the logical and the real are determined in a completely
different way: one is a totality of distinct internally related thoughts that
have their source in the self-determination of thinking, whereas the other is
an inhomogeneous material space-time continuum that does not in itself
involve any distinctions. Dwelling on their categorical difference does not
amount to subscribing to the view that nature is unintelligible but rather to
stressing that the actual ground of its intelligibility can be understood only
if one does not simply stipulate that logical determinations do not have
their only place in thinking but are also ‘contained’ in nature independ-
ently of any actual thinking, which is at best a somewhat misleading way of
claiming that nature is intelligible and at worst sheer nonsense.
Dogmatic-rationalist readings thus project logical determinations which
have their only source in thought and are thus essentially tied back to actual
thinking onto that which does not depend on being conceived, i.e. nature,
instead of tackling the task of articulating the peculiar logicality of nature
by virtue of which it can indeed be recognized through the logical forms of
thinking.
One might retort that Hegel himself emphasizes time and again that ‘the
concept’, or ‘the universal’, is the ‘inner’ of nature which is said to be
concealed by its ‘exterior’ – i.e. by its appearance in intuition and
perception.67 However, Hegel does not confine himself to remarks of
this sort which need to be expanded into a coherent understanding of the
64
Kreines (2015: 22). Kreines’s book is an example of a deplorable tendency in current anglophone
literature on Hegel, namely to largely ignore decades of profound Hegel research in other languages
than English. Had Kreines consulted the works of Cramer, Fulda, Henrich, Falk, Koch, Schick and
others, he might have avoided reading Hegel’s Logic in terms of a dogmatic rationalism, to the
overcoming of which that work in fact contributes.
65
ENC 1:91 (§47), SL: 42 (GW 21:48). For accounts of Hegel’s critique of dogmatic-rationalist
metaphysics see Cramer (1999), Fulda (1999) and Martin (2019).
66
ENC 1:67 (§§26–7). 67 Hegel (2002b: 7–9).

logicality of nature instead of being iterated. In any event, his position
cannot be read as if the cognition of nature were concerned with those
conceptual determinations which had already been at issue in the Logic and
which, once the veil of appearances has been lifted, can be recognized as
equally extant ‘in’ nature prior to any actual thinking. Such an assumption
would be nonsensical for the following reason. If the concept or the
universal which according to Hegel constitutes the inner kernel of nature
were simply the logical concept or, as the case may be, a mere specification
of it, then it would remain unintelligible how the ‘interior’ of nature can
come along with an ‘exterior’ that appears to the senses, while the logical as
such cannot affect them. Moreover, cognition of that interior would either
not yield knowledge of nature at all, if that interior were taken as identical
to the logical, or it would be engaged with an aggregate of the logical and
the real whose concrete unity remains aporetic.
The task of arriving at a coherent understanding of the actual outlook of
nature in which its intelligibility is rooted instead of merely projecting
logical determinations which have their only source and place in thought
onto it and thereby taking too literally Hegel‘s dictum of the ‘interiority’ of
the concept in nature can be fulfilled by recognizing an analogue of the
logical concept in the actual constitution of nature qua inhomogeneous
material space-time continuum. In Hegel’s own words, this continuum is
to be recognized as the “element”68 to which the concept, insofar as it is
found in nature, is ‘adapted’. Within nature the concept exhibits a peculiar
‘state of aggregation’, so to speak, which is different from that of the logical
concept in the “element of thinking”69 (Element des Denkens).
The logical concept is self-referential self-determination which is the
source of universality that can hold together a manifold of specific deter-
minations in such a way that their unity makes up particulars whose
internal development is essentially the object of an articulation by means
of concepts, judgements and inferences.70 An analogue of the logical
concept in the ‘element’ of the material space-time continuum will consist
precisely in the fact that the latter involves subsections whose specific traits
are held together into a unity that sets itself apart from its environment as
relatively independent by holding sway and preserving itself throughout
68
In each part of philosophy the idea “exists in a particular determinacy or element” (ENC 1:43 (§15))
according to Hegel. He refers to nature or externality as such an element of “the concept” in various
places, e.g. ENC 2.1:209 (§248, addition); V 17:17–18, 23, 46; see also SL 581 (GW 12:83).
69
Hegel characterizes logic as the “science of the pure idea, i.e. the idea in the abstract element of
thinking” (ENC 1:47 (§19)), see also V 11:3, 19; SL: 738 (GW 12:239).
70
For a comprehensive overview of the logical concept see Schick (2018).

changes of the continuum and its inhomogeneous constellations. The real
counterpart of the logical concept on the part of nature will thus consist in
self-preserving configurations of the continuum, i.e. in the formation and
preservation of inhomogeneous units within it. A paradigmatic example
would be the solar system. There, bodies revolve around a centre in such
a way that the whole forms a self-sustaining unity that is specifically
organized within itself and whose repetitive movements amount to a real
way in which the universal is actual in the element of nature.71 The peculiar
logicality of nature thus consists, paradigmatically, in actual recurrent
processes by means of which specific configurations or subsections of the
continuum hold sway and preserve themselves, thereby establishing
a contrast to their surroundings. It does not, on the other hand, consist
in the supposed fact that the laws by means of which we truthfully think
and predict such processes are somehow extant on the part of nature itself
and are, as it were, “inscribed in the sky”.72
Accordingly, in cognizing nature by articulating natural laws we do not
simply repeat something that is as such – in that very form – already extant
‘in’ nature, but rather this articulation is, as Hegel puts it in a lecture
course, a ‘translation’ of the peculiar logicality of nature into the element of
thinking.73 This means that nature can indeed be pursuant to the laws in
form of which our knowledge of nature is articulated, but this compliance
with them cannot be understood as an identity between laws that are
thought and unthought laws ‘inherent’ in nature itself.
If no real definition of truth is possible that would allow one to explain
that notion in terms that do not themselves presuppose it – this being
a Kantian insight which Hegel, on my reading, subscribes to74 – and if
propositional truth, accordingly, cannot be broken down into an external
relation between two independent factors, one on the part of the thinking
subject and one on the part of the world, it follows that laws of nature, and,
more generally, that which is thought when nature is known, have their
only place in what is irreducibly cognition of nature. Cognition of nature
involves an aspect that doesn’t have its source in thinking while being
articulated according to logical forms that have their only source in
thinking and are not as such somehow ‘contained’ in nature, even while
the latter is essentially intelligible by means of them.75
71
ENC 2:260–81 (§§269–70), see also SL: 640–4 (GW 12:143–7). 72 ENC 1:56 (§21, addition).
73
Hegel speaks of “the concept which I am; I am the activity which translates nature into the concept”
(V 17, 21, my translation). Accordingly, the logical concept does not as such exist in nature: “The
concept as concept exists only within spirit, which is its own element” (V 11:214, my translation).
74
Martin (2017b: 197–200). 75 Martin (2012: 191–201, 366–70).

Hegel expresses the fact that knowledge of nature is articulation by
means of conceptual determinations that have their only source in thinking
while providing the form of cognition of that which is not itself a thought
by referring to Hamann’s dictum that nature is like a Hebrew word:
written in consonants only, to which the intellect must add vowels.76
Discursive cognition of nature is thus not simply a repetition or mirroring
but is rather an articulation which can only do justice to what is to be
articulated by incorporating it into its own form and thus giving it a new
way of unity by virtue of which it can be pronounced, while being silent
and inarticulate in itself.77 Putting things like this in no way implies that
the logical form of knowing is arbitrary or alien to nature. Insofar as that
form can be unfolded in presuppositionless thinking it is thereby exhibited as
without alternative; and insofar as the Logic, according to its starting point,
investigates what it means to be, there cannot be something that would not
be intelligible by means of precisely those forms which are arrived at by
thinking through what it means to be. That what is essentially intelligible by
means of logical forms of thinking does not, however, imply that it would
need to ‘consist’ of these forms or to somehow ‘contain’ them.
Knowledge of nature involves, accordingly, recourse to something that
cannot itself be given by thinking even while it can be thought of truly and
while its concept can be arrived at by pure thinking insofar as it is recognized
as the necessary complement of pure thought, namely the material space-
time continuum. Empirical knowledge of nature even involves conceptual
determinations which we cannot rationally arrive at by means of thinking
alone, but can think only on condition of sensory affection.
5.5 On the Difference between Logic and the ‘Real Sciences

of Philosophy’
Insofar as cognition of nature is essentially articulation-of-nature, know-
ledge of nature cannot be adequate to its subject matter by ‘mirroring’
thoughts that lay ready in its ‘interior’, but can become so only by
‘translating’ the peculiar, unarticulated logicality of self-sustaining config-
urations within the inhomogeneous material space-time continuum into
its own element – thinking. Nature thus comes to full bloom, so to speak,
by being known, i.e. cognition of nature is an articulation-and-expansion
of the material space-time continuum. Non-arbitrary subsections of the
76
ENC 2.1:201 (§246, addition).
77
By virtue of being thought, nature and its appearance receive a new form, see V 17:12.

continuum of nature come into their own by being singled out as distinct
objects according to the forms of thinking – their objectivity is, as Hegel
puts it, following Kant in this respect, the unity of the self-consciousness of
thought into which they are incorporated.78
Insofar as thinking makes the muteness of nature speak by translating
the peculiar logicality of the continuum into its own form, cognition of
nature does not simply engage with nature-in-itself. The topic of philoso-
phy of nature is thus not just nature per se, about which nothing further is
to be said, but nature as cognized in the forms of thinking – the universality
and necessity of thought insofar as it proves its own strength by engage-
ment with what is not itself a thought but actual and real.
Since thinking requires real embodiment, our first mode of thinking is
not logical thought as such, but thinking that is engaged with phenomena
and, as it were, immersed in them. Accordingly, empirical cognition of
nature is a necessary precondition of its non-empirical cognition in phil-
osophy, even while philosophy of nature does not as such primarily deal
with nature as experienced but unfolds the pure non-logical concept of
nature as an inhomogeneous material space-time continuum. However,
since nature, qua real, does not consist of thoughts, pure concepts of traits
of nature need to be put into correspondence with aspects of nature that are
dealt with in empirical cognition. This requirement does not amount to
a conflation of philosophy of nature with the empirical sciences of nature,
but it amounts to a corroboration and concretization of the former in the
face of results achieved by the latter.
The real sciences of philosophy can now be distinguished from logic as
follows. It is logic which deals, in the element of pure thinking, with just
those concepts that have their source in thinking alone while their content
is exhausted by what thinking itself ‘gives’ on its own initiative.79 The real
sciences of philosophy, for their part, equally unfold in the ‘element of
thinking’, independently of experience. However, while their concepts
have their source in thinking alone, they refer to what is not itself
a thought and thus cannot itself be given and exhausted by thinking
alone, being situated in (or supervening on) the inhomogeneous material
space-time continuum. Envisaging the real as the necessary complement of
78
“The object has its objectivity in the concept, and the latter is the unity of self-consciousness into
which it has been incorporated; its objectivity or its concept is thus nothing but the nature of self-
consciousness” (SL: 516 (GW 12:18–19), translation modified).
79
Evidently, the fact that these forms have their source in thinking alone does not mean that they
would have merely subjective value, for it is part and parcel of logic to show that what is is as such
intelligible through these forms, see Martin (2012: 1–17, 196–201).

logical form is what renders non-empirical philosophical insight into the
real possible, at all.
Insofar as the real, notwithstanding its intelligibility, does not consist of
thoughts and can therefore appear to the senses, the real sciences of philoso-
phy have to correlate their a priori concepts of aspects of the real to what is
empirically known of the latter in order thereby to prove their worth.
Accordingly, they differ from logic in that it is part and parcel of them to
confront their non-empirical concepts with experience.80 Both the phil-
osophy of nature and that of spirit do not exclusively engage with the real as
it is in itself, but rather engage with it insofar as it is thought, while not
thereby running the risk of missing any of it. It is for this reason that they
presuppose the pure forms of thinking and can be transparently pursued
only subsequently to the Logic.
While philosophical cognition of nature articulates solely the material
space-time continuum and its inhomogeneous configurations, the philoso-
phy of the spirit forms concepts of the real insofar as it is already shaped by
accomplishments of thinking living beings and is thus transformed into
a world that supervenes on the material space-time continuum. Spirit, as
a concrete unity of the logical and the real, is actual thinking that manifests
itself in what is real and proves its power by transforming it. Insofar as the
act of thinking relates to its own real preconditions as that which makes
them irrelevant, the philosophy of spirit is the real-philosophical science of
the sublation of the real.81 It therefore culminates in the concept of that
activity which pursues the return from the exteriority of the nature to the
interiority of actual thinking most radically – philosophy.
80 81
ENC 2.1:197 (§246), see Fulda (2003: 133–55). ENC 3:6 (§381).

chapter 6
Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature

The Expansion of Particularity as the Filling of Space
and Time
Ralph M. Kaufmann, Ansgar Lyssy, and Christopher Yeomans
Of the three main parts of Hegel’s Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of Nature is

probably the most difficult to approach. It initially presents itself as a grab
bag of now-outdated details cited from early-nineteenth-century natural
science sprinkled with the occasional, seemingly arbitrary logical phrase to
act as a binding agent. However the text is remarkably structured – but that
this structure would be difficult to see is nothing less than one would
expect from Hegel’s initial definition of nature as essentially external:
natural phenomena are external not only to logic, but also to each other
(§247).1 Such phenomena do not express abstract ideas “abbildungstreu,”
i.e., as perfect illustrations, because they contain not just the merely
abstractly universal elements but also the diverse particularities by which
those elements can find an individual manifestation. Nature represents the
complete expansion of particularity into the world, and thus a kind of limit
case for rational understanding of that world (§244).
Luckily, there is a thread to follow through the details: Hegel’s Philosophy of
Nature proceeds by exploring the different forms of filling space and time that
provide the latter with their metrics and orientations. Since those metrics and
orientations are required by the Euclidean2 space and time that are, in turn,
required for the physics to which mechanist philosophies of nature have
wanted to reduce the rest of nature, Hegel offers a transcendental argument
against reductionism which threads its way through the whole Philosophy of
Nature.
1
Citations from Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature are first by section number (with ‘R’ indicating the
Remark or Anmerkung and ‘Z’ the Zusatz or Addition). Here our reference has been Hegel (1970–1:
vol. 9). For lecture notes we have cited not only the Zusatz but also the notes themselves in Hegel
(1968–: vol. 24). For English translations we have followed Hegel (2015), with some modifications.
2
Here and throughout the chapter ‘Euclidean’ is used in the contemporary mathematical sense as
referring to a measurable and orientable space rather than in the historical sense as referring to
Euclid’s own constructions. Its primary contrast is ‘affine’ space rather than ‘non-Euclidean’ space.
109

110 ralph m. kaufmann et al.
In Section 6.1, we offer a very brief overview of the development of
modern natural science up to Hegel’s time. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we go
more deeply into the structure of space and time themselves, and in Section
6.4, we treat the first form of filled space and time, namely mechanics. In
Section 6.5, we briefly sketch the remainder of the argument of the
Philosophy of Nature.
But one final caveat before we begin: though there is this essential
relation of dependence of Euclidean space on its filling, there is an equally
important relation of dependence of filled space on abstract (not-yet-
Euclidean) space as set out in the early sections of the Philosophy of
Nature. The exact analysis of space and time as a lower level is essential
for the development of the higher levels. One must first understand space
in its abstractness before one grasps it as filled with material, even though
one must be clear what one is grasping when one understands abstract
space. The primary interpretive mistake with respect to Hegel’s initial
discussion of space and time is to commit what Whitehead called the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead 1997: 51), i.e., mistaking
abstract concepts for concrete entities.
6.1 Historical Introduction

Modern conceptions of nature were informed and motivated by the great
successes of early modern science. The latter is profoundly shaped by a core
belief that was developed by Descartes and Galileo, and renewed by Newton:
that science could reduce nature to certain irreducible quantities (such as size,
mass, shape, directional velocity), ignoring all intrinsic qualities. This was
a breakthrough of unprecedented significance, as it allowed reducing some
seemingly basic and inexplicable phenomenal qualities such as heat, weight,
color, etc. to mere quantities. Philosophers hoped that thereby they would be
able to understand nature by means of mathematics, especially geometry,
independent of tedious debates concerning the nature of substances. This
rather optimistic reductionist approach was also conceived as a solid foun-
dation both for the essential uniformity of nature as well as for the applic-
ability of mathematics to nature. Newton’s groundbreaking expansion of
Galileo’s laws of falling bodies and their successful application to celestial
bodies established the fundamental homogeneity of the entire universe, big
and small, near and far. Within a relatively short time frame – between
roughly 1650 and 1770 – a great diversity of previously inexplicable phenom-
ena became explicable: from falling bodies over celestial epicycles to rain-
bows and even basic sensations – everything seemed to be explicable through

Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature 111
nothing more than the mathematics of simple, moving bodies and their
interaction.
But then things got more complicated. This belief in a comprehensive
reduction of qualities onto quantities was profoundly shaken with the
emergence of new sciences and phenomena, especially the rise of chemis-
try. Lavoisier introduced chemical elements to science, a new version of the
alchemical substances, enabling explanations of bodies and their inter-
action by irreducible qualities or by their respective chemical nature.
Physics cannot explain why and how iron turns into rust, since the core
physical concepts of mass, speed etc. are of little importance here. Suddenly
the particular identity of bodies in terms of their elemental composure did
matter again. The same holds for phenomena such as electricity and
magnetism: certain types of matter are more conductive to electricity and
more receptive to magnetism than others. Surprising discoveries made it
clear that the nature of physical bodies had not even been remotely
understood, and yet was of clear importance: Faraday had shown that
electricity can generate a magnetic field, and Galvani had surprised every-
one with the discovery that electricity apparently had something to do with
the specific nature of organic tissue, since dead frog legs started twitching
when struck by an electrical spark. Finally, even within physics itself,
phenomena such as the three-body problem, the principle of least action,
and the problem of vibrating strings could not easily be integrated into
established mechanics (or required more advanced mathematics). Thus it
had become clear that even within physics, the mechanist reductionist
approach of Galileo, Descartes, and, to a lesser degree, Newton, finally had
to be discarded.
It was clear that the diverging concepts and methods of science could no
longer be derived from a few core principles. But one cannot simply
abandon the belief in the unity of nature, as this serves as a foundation
for the applicability of general concepts. Galileo’s and Newton’s physics had
abandoned all conceptions of teleology and all elemental differences in
matter. But it had long become clear that biology was not possible without
teleological concepts, as functionality was needed to conceive of ontogen-
esis, organs, or the adaptive relation of animals to their environment.
Chemistry, then again, had reintroduced elements, and it seemed as if
bodies were, in fact, interacting with each other without movement and
external causes, just by virtue of being ‘opposed’ or ‘aligned’ elements.
Kant, in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, could still attempt
to ground natural science, broadly construed, in what amounts to essen-
tially Newtonian and Leibnizian terms. For Hegel, writing roughly thirty

years after Kant’s seminal work on the philosophy of science, this was no
longer possible. Instead, Hegel faced a heap of natural sciences that had
fallen apart into separate spheres.
One major aim of Hegel’s philosophy of nature is thus to put science back
together.3 He strives to show that many of the conceptual problems arising
from the attempt to hold science together while accommodating its new
results can be solved by carefully attending to the different concepts
involved and their relations. He suggests that nature, in the broadest
sense, can be understood as a system of different ‘levels’ (§249), i.e.,
different concepts that can be used to explain certain phenomena and
which also serve as the foundation for other concepts that deal with
a different set of phenomena or explanations. While some conceptual
problems may arise on one more abstract level, adopting the stance of
a higher, more concrete level can resolve these problems by adding the
requisite complexity. The special sciences and their paradigmatic phenom-
ena must then be placed together in a hierarchical system rather than side-
by-side in a mosaic. As the hierarchy is built in steps, this system at the
same time affords the possibility of interaction via lower levels, as these are
an integral part of any higher level.
If the task is putting science back together, what is the nature of the
argument that does so? Hegel initially focuses on the specific problem of
accounting for precisely those basic geometrical properties that are central
to the reductionist approach. More specifically, Hegel takes up two prop-
erties of space and time which are necessary conditions for the above-
mentioned reductionistic approach to natural science and which are fur-
thermore central to the contemporary mathematical concept of Euclidean
space: metric and orientation. These are the two properties needed for the
parallelogram of forces in physics, for example, where they are represented
as a magnitude and direction.4 But in Euclidean geometry itself, and the
reductionist approach to science it makes possible, these specific properties
of space are more or less presupposed without justification. The mapping
of the number line onto the time line to generate its Euclidean properties is
similarly unmotivated, and its connection to the direction of physical
transformation is equally tenuous.
At least philosophically, neither geometry nor arithmetic is a self-
sufficient account of the structure of space or time, nor is reductionism
3
Cf. Pinkard (2013: 21).
4
It behooves us to stress here that Hegel, in contrast to Newton, is against the idea of the parallelogram
of forces as an ontological principle (see Section 6.4).

well founded in the absence of an account of these Euclidean properties. It
will turn out that what is required to ground these two properties is a much
more complex set of phenomena and concepts (reflected in different types
of explanations of the natural world) than the reductionist approach is
willing to admit. This is the sense in which Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature
offers us a transcendental argument against reductionism: that more com-
plex set of phenomena and concepts is the necessary condition for the metric and
orientation which are themselves necessary conditions for the science that
motivates reductionism.
Of course, the necessity of these two properties is itself conceptually
grounded – one can find the corresponding argument in Hegel’s discus-
sions of quantity and measure in the Science of Logic (Kaufmann and
Yeomans 2017). But such logical properties are only loosely related to the
proximate function of space and time to present the basic form of nature.
After all, these logical properties have to be instantiated by anything that is
in any sense, including abstract objects such as numbers and concrete but
non-spatiotemporal objects such as historical institutions. How space and
time present the form of nature and how they provide the features neces-
sary for the scientific successes that motivate the reductionist approach
cannot be explained through either logic or mathematics alone.
The concrete spatial and temporal forms of metric and orientation
which are valid for natural objects can neither be derived from the concepts
of space and time nor be grasped as forms of sensible or receptive intuition
as Kant would have it. Hegel argues that they can be derived only from
filled spatiotemporal location (a place [Ort]), i.e., from the natural phe-
nomena themselves. In geometry, we can assign every body a certain place
by referring it to a system of coordinates, and those are assumed to be
fundamentally external both to the body and to the observer. But Hegel
argues that the simple forms of temporal and spatial intuition are insuffi-
cient to generate this coordinate system, and in nature no such coordinates
exist independently of the natural phenomena that are referred to them.
Intuitively, we find ourselves drawn toward the abstract idea that any two
places would be equal if they were equally empty – but such a consideration
has no place in our experience or conception of nature. On the contrary,
different places are fundamentally unequal: we have a conception of
a system of gravitationally interdependent bodies, such as a solar system,
and a different conception of an ecological system, in which plants and
animals are adapted to climate and geology. While we may start out with
a generic mathematical conception of geometrical relations that are sup-
posed to represent spatiotemporal relations, we can arrive at a complete

understanding of nature only after we can describe how these relations are
developed through a hierarchy of natural phenomena which define specific
places in nature precisely by giving them metric and orientation.5 The
‘filling’ of space does not consist in putting pre-conceived bodies into pre-
conceived, abstract, and uniform places, as if space were a mere container,
but rather in understanding spatiotemporal relations by means of the
specific nature of the objects of this relation.
This basic project is, of course, part of the long argument for Hegel’s
idealism.6 Before he gets to the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel already takes
himself to have shown that anything that could be living, true, or good
(i.e., anything at all) must be perspectival. In the preceding and founda-
tional Science of Logic he develops both the argument for that claim and
a specific structure of fundamental perspectives which he calls the concept
(der Begriff ) (Yeomans 2019).
Here we use ‘perspective’ to gloss Hegel’s term ‘subjectivity.’ The key to
interpreting ‘subjectivity’ is to find a way to characterize Hegel’s use of it
that does justice both to its opposition to ‘objectivity’ and to the fact that
Hegel frequently uses it in circumstances in which consciousness, percep-
tion, and mentality are not involved. Even if ‘subjectivity’ is paradigmatic-
ally self-consciousness, it is nonetheless the case that Hegel thinks that
there is a subjective logic (of the concept) and that there are forms of
subjectivity manifested by natural phenomena which clearly neither pos-
sess consciousness nor have mental states (e.g., the solar system (§269)).7
This progressive search for a natural perspective is registered in the differ-
ent extent to which subjectivity is present or existent. For example, the
solar system only manifests “subjectivity as appearing being” (§269)
whereas “The organic individual exists as subjectivity” (§350). A fuller
exploration of this theme would map the development of spatiotemporal
perspective to these levels of subjectivity, but that is beyond the scope of
this chapter.8
The development of the metric and orientation of space and time is the
search for a natural perspective, and that means a search for a form of
5
This ‘filling’ of space by dispositional powers is still a theme in recent philosophy, e.g., Blackburn
(1990).
6
In fact, in some respects longer than Kant. The structural connection between logic, geometry, and
filled space is crucial for Hegel to provide an alternative to Kant’s transcendental idealism, since Kant
takes our ability to do geometry as something best explained by the supposition of space as a form of
intuition (cf. §262R). On long and short arguments see Ameriks (1990).
7
For a more detailed discussion of this notion of perspective, see Yeomans (2019). On the way in
which Hegel takes animals to be subjects but not mental, see Pinkard (2013: 23–7).
8
The authors would like to thank Anton Friedrich Koch for pushing them to make this point clearer.

subjectivity within the natural world. Though not a developmental
account in the genetic or temporal sense, it is supposed to be about how
“ideality comes to existence”; all translations are our own). This gives Hegel
a lens through which to interpret natural phenomena, but does not either
generate or entail any specific phenomenon: “Here as everywhere, that
which is immanently philosophical is the inherent necessity of conceptual
determination, which then has to be illustrated by some natural existence or
other ” (§276R; see also GW 24:1522 (§353Z)).9
But one more feature of the argument is essential to understanding it:
Hegel also describes nature in contrast to logic as allowing the free release
of particularity (§244). Particularity is a logical determination – i.e.,
there is nothing necessarily sensible or spatiotemporal about it – but
natural, spatiotemporal phenomena exhibit a uniquely wide range and
diversity of particular characteristics. In keeping with the way that this
existence is an expansion of particularity, part of what happens is that
the three basic perspectives of the Logic (the universal, the particular,
and the individual) ramify into first four and then ultimately five
different perspectives. The key to this movement is actually relatively
simple: in this free release of particularity, we have at least two particu-
lars. (Of course, we normally have more than two; but two is enough for
Hegel’s argument.) With two particulars we first double the relation of
the particular to the universal, and then we double the relation of the
particular to the individual. This first doubling gets us to four perspec-
tives (e.g., the elements as Hegel understands them); the second doub-
ling gets us to five perspectives (e.g., the five senses possessed by
animals). The five perspectives then give us enough to find the metric
and orientation required for natural science, as we briefly indicate in our
final section.
6.2 Space
Hegel begins with a claim about space and time, namely that these are
forms of intuition (Anschauung) (EN §258R). It can be puzzling to make
9
This is why we reject aprioristic interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy of nature according to which
there is some sort of direct derivation of natural phenomena from logical bases. For a more dedicated
argument to this purpose, see Rand (2007). Though perhaps not entirely aprioristic in the deriv-
ational sense, Alison Stone’s interpretation nonetheless centers on the resolution of purely rational
tensions between the concepts relating to nature. In our view, something much more physical and
particular is at issue (Stone 2018b: chapter 7).

out what he means by this, though the explicit reference is obviously to
Kant’s thought, wherein these abstract forms enable us to conceive or
perceive any other particular spatiotemporal relation. Hegel calls the idea
of an abstract, uniform, ‘container-like’ space an “abstraction” (§254),
which means that we reach this idea only by ignoring all concrete spatio-
temporal relations, i.e., the ‘filled’ space that we encounter in the sciences.
But this passage is puzzling also because Hegel explicitly denies that the
intuitive nature of space and time primarily involves a subjective con-
sciousness confronting an object, or any particular receptive faculty or
route by which information about the world comes to us (e.g., as the shape
of the channel of that information). The usual interpretations of Kant’s
doctrine of intuition are thus ruled out as interpretations of Hegel on this
point. But Anschauung can sometimes be properly translated as
‘perspective,’10 and that is the sense in which Hegel takes space and time
to be forms of Anschauung. Within the Philosophy of Nature, they are thus
the names for the basic form of perspective in the empirical world.
Nonetheless, Hegel’s reference to Kant has the significance of announ-
cing an intervention by Hegel into the debate for which Kant took his own
doctrine of space to be a resolution, namely, the debate between
Newtonian absolute theories of space and Leibnizian relational theories
of space. Hegel argues that that the essential aspects of Euclidean space that
are supposed to be validated by these theories – its metric and orientation –
cannot be so validated. To do so, we need to relate the ‘abstract’ conception
of space back to the relations between bodies from which it is abstracted.
This involves three recursive steps: (1) beginning with a simple conception
of space and time and showing that it does not yet have the full Euclidean
features simply so considered; (2) advancing to the relations between
bodies and places that do display some of those features to some degree;
and then (10 ) working with space and time as having those newly displayed
features (and yet still not the full Euclidean features).
Hegel begins his discussion of space and time with ideas that recall Book
I of Euclid’s Elements, but he quickly argues that neither the three dimen-
sions nor the distinction between points, lines, and planes can give you the
orientation required for Euclidean space in the contemporary sense
(Step 1). In its abstract form, space is homogeneous and thus no metric
or preferred orientation is possible within it.
We should clarify that here and throughout the chapter, ‘orientation’ is
that of vectors and, more generally, fixing a choice of coordinate system
10
Cf. Heiddeger’s interpretation of Schelling’s use of the term in Heidegger (1985: 17–18).

without regarding helicity. At the level of space as such (§§254–6), no
particular orientation is privileged as everything is homogeneous. The
realization of a particular orientation and coordinate happens at the later,
higher levels. A concrete example of this lack of spatial orientation is given
by crystal growth. The more advanced the sphere of nature, the more
orientation is exhibited.
But to return to Step 2 of the initial discussion of space and time, one
can get the orientation one needs by giving the spatial point a temporal
interpretation, i.e., as the “now” which is privileged in time. But precisely
because the “now” is privileged, one cannot get a metric. A metric would
require identifying two points on the time line and taking the difference
between them, but this eliminates the privilege of the now that made it the
orientation point and returns us to the indifference of space (its
Gleichgültigkeit – literally ‘equal validity’ (of all points)). This is the first
example of the difficulty of getting metric and orientation at the same time.
The subsequent category, place (Ort) is a placeholder for the solution to
this problem (i.e., the beginnings of Step 10 ), which Hegel suggests will
ultimately be filled by subjectivity (§262R).
Let us unpack the argument regarding space. In §255 Hegel had argued
that there must be three basic perspectives in space if it is to represent the
expansion of the logical idea. But in the remark that leads into §256, Hegel
argues that the three dimensions of space that might be thought to model
these perspectives cannot yet do so because they cannot yet be distin-
guished from each other in any principled way – they are all equally
intersubstitutable. (They do reappear later – and their relationships will
be explored in some detail – in more sophisticated forms of nature that
provide bases for distinguishing between them.)
In §256 Hegel proposes that the basic geometrical elements might play
this role: points, lines, and planes. It is clear that they cannot be substituted
for one another, and we have three that seem conceptually basic. But Hegel
immediately points out that there is an ambiguity concerning the different
way that the generation of a line out of a point can be understood.11 On the
one hand, that generation could be understood as Kant and Euclid did,
namely by the following construction: given a point, I posit a second point
and then draw a line through the two points. On the other hand, that
generation could be understood as contemporary mathematicians do,
namely through the notion of the point as the germ of a line: the point
itself contains within it the potential to be moved in any direction, and
11
The authors would like to thank Luca Illeterati for helping us to make this point more clearly.

such a choice of direction will be fixed in a natural process of interaction.
The first understanding makes visible the way in which a metric is pre-
sented by the line, and the second an orientation.
There is an analogous ambiguity in the relation between the line and the
plane. On one understanding, one could take a line and a point outside of
it, then generate lines through the point that intersect the first line. The set
of lines that so intersects generates the plane (Fläche überhaupt). On
a second understanding, that first line itself could be moved relative to
the point, thus giving a family of planes that can be used to define an
enclosing surface (umschließende Oberfläche).12
We can then go to a third level of detail in unpacking this argument.
The proper composition of space is completed in three strands. The first
produces the hierarchy point–line–area (Fläche), and the second point–
line–surface–space. The last two of the latter group (i.e., surface
(Oberfläche) and space) provide then a phoenix figure (see the last para-
graph of this section), insofar as an enclosing surface can be transformed
into a closed space. The closed space is, as closed, finite, and so can be put as
the second element of the figure (∞, ¬∞)∞. (We mean by the general
schematic mode of presentation: (A, B)C to indicate that a trinity arises
through the supersession (Aufheben) of an opposition generated by
a diremption. What this example shows is that the three elements A, B,
and C can coincide. That is, the three elements can be functionally distinct
without being numerically distinct.) On the other hand, as space, even
closed space is infinite and demonstrates thereby how something finite
(like a human being) can possess an infinite spirit, which is indispensable
for Hegel’s philosophy of nature. The third strand is first of all
a bifurcation and then brings us to time.
First space (R) enters as the infinite in the formula (∞, ¬∞), where if ¬∞
is grasped as the point P (as “differenceless self-externality”) it generates the
formula (R, P). From Hegel’s perspective this is a natural formula to posit,
since space already has this externality within itself as different from it; an
explanation is, no doubt, in order. Space is characterized by Hegel as
essentially homogeneous. Since ‘homogeneity’ means ‘of the same kind,’
it presupposes the concept of a plurality of the same, which are differenti-
ated as a plurality (external to each other) but are in all other aspects the
same. And, in fact, all the points in space are both similar and diverse in
exactly this sense. Hegel’s development of space in §256 proceeds from the
12
In order to avoid misunderstanding, let us stress that the line is not composed of points nor the surface
of lines – they are rather constructed by points (as germs), from which they result.

identification of the negation of space as the point (¬R = P). If one takes
‘self-externality’ (Außersichseins) in a spatial sense as in Hegel’s usage, then
one refers to the existence of at least two points, P1 and P2. Their oppos-
ition supersedes itself into the line (L), which is defined by reference to
them: (P1, P2)L. The next step is a bifurcation which produces either a plane
(Fläche) (F) or an enclosing surface (umschließende Oberfläche) (O). Then,
in the first inference the relationship of L to its own moments is con-
sidered. Since, however, the points are homogeneous, this is at first just the
relationship (L, P). This opposition then supersedes itself as the plane:
(L, P)F. If one accepts that L has already arisen from the previous inference
(P1, P2)L, then these can be combined to generate an additional figure:
((P1, P2)L, P)O. This enclosing surface then represents the space that is
enclosed by it (§256). One can also grasp this inference symbolically insofar
as one makes the reverse substitution of P = ¬R, which generates ((¬R 1, ¬R
L O
2) , ¬R) . The last determinacy is that the O which is so derived defines
a closed space ®, which at the same time can be substituted as the finite ¬R
in (R, ®)R. Thus it can serve as a unity, but also as the entire space. (This
duality of the delimited finite is also that which underlies spirit.)
Furthermore we should also bear in mind the following: in both infer-
ences ((L, P)F and (P1, P2)L) there is first a logical process in three steps
which takes us from zero to three dimensions by taking us from points to
space. These three steps involve four elements ((0, 1, 2, 3) or (P, L, F, R)).
When the first two arguments are put together, one generates five elements
((P1, P2)L, P)O, which hangs on the way that R itself is superseded in its
generality when it is taken to arise from the specific nature of the point.
These three steps move in different directions, as it were, or are logically
grounded in different aspects of space: “. . . space may be considered as that
which is positive, the plane as the first negation of space, and the line as
the second negation, which, because it is the second, is in truth the self-
relating negation of the point. The necessity of this transition is the same as
it was in the first case” (§256R).
For Hegel these three steps moving in different directions manifest three
dimensions: “As a second negation, the plane has two dimensions; for two
belongs just as much to the second as to [the number] two” (GW 24:1200
(§256Z)). But these three dimensions take on a more complex form in the
progression to surface (Oberfläche), where the more complex logical infer-
ence generates the very important self-contained subspace. The spatial
unfolding P, L, F, R as well as the higher logical level of O is to be found
in many of the detailed analysis of the later discussions of the Philosophy of
Nature. In particular, the difference between plane (Fläche) and surface

(Oberfläche) plays a role in the complexity and liveliness of certain forms of
nature, particularly the organic (e.g., GW 24: 1312 (§310Z)). A hybrid
between plane and surface is presented by cylindrical structures, which
are linear in one dimension but closed in the other two. This makes its
appearance in Hegel’s treatment of the structure of bones in §354, for
example.
To step back again, this development of space is one example of
a general feature of Hegel’s argument which we can briefly mention here,
which is a sort of mathematical expansion that fills out the dimensions of
space and time. This expansion is intimately tied to the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5, which are first introduced in an early discussion of polarity in the
lectures (GW 24:1191 (§248Z)) and also extensively discussed later on in the
long analysis of harmonies and their relation to judgment (GW 24:
1292–1300 (§301Z)). This expansion takes place according to a few basic
processes. The first process is diremption. It produces 2, of course, and is
often used as the first step. This takes place through the multiplication of
the particular, discussed above. The paradigmatic physical case of this is
electricity and magnetism: the former gives actual point particles a polarity
that drives them apart and generates actual lines of varying direction and
magnitude (§312 and Nürnberger Propadeutik §118), while the latter is the
inherent capacity of points to move apart, manifesting itself as polarity. In
a second process, the trinity arises through the supersession of the oppos-
ition generated by the diremption. This is expressed in the following
schematic mode of presentation: (A, B)C. Because, as noted above, these
elements can play multiple functional roles within the process, we can get
a completion, capstone, or phoenix figure: the figure (A, B)A, where
A recurs in two different functional roles. This is the hallmark of the
infinite, as this figure appears when A is the infinite and B the finite, as
the negation of the infinite. The unity of both is infinity itself: (∞, ¬∞)∞.
For the philosophy of nature, spirit (G) is the infinite and nature (N) the
finite, which then in a capstone step from and in spirit is grasped as a unity
(G, N)G. The infinity of spirit is akin to the infinity of enclosed space as it is
at the same time infinite and finite as a part of nature.
6.3 Time
Now let us say just a bit about time and how it is initially presented. There
is somewhat less to say here, since on Hegel’s own account the three
dimensions of natural time are less developed than are the three dimensions
of space. In the mathematical sense of the term, the dimensions of natural

time are degenerate, by which is meant the following: they are colinear and
symmetric, and thus not distinguished in the way that the dimensions of
natural space are. Nonetheless, there is a development.
Step 1: Time (T) undergoes a similar bifurcation as space, but one which
is introduced one logical step earlier. It arises through an inference in the
form (A, A)B or more exactly as (¬R, ¬R)T. The pluralism of homogeneity
and the inherent negativity of space (¬R) are grasped as self-externality
(Außersichsein) and then time as “the negative unity of self-externality.”
The supersession into T is the supersession of the common negativity, the
¬ itself. (This figure is then equated to the “I = I of pure self-consciousness,”
at least insofar as its form is concerned.) A further consequence of this
derivation of time is the beginning of a dynamic which is the condition for
processes, whose understanding forms the foundation of the knowledge of
nature. Hegel emphasizes the “unrest (Unruhe)” of these processes (e.g.,
GW 24: 1202 (§257Z) and §258R). Formally speaking, these processes can
by understood as the oscillation between two of the same moments (A, A),
which are superseded in the process. This temporal unrest stems from
a logical imbalance which drives the processes. The supersession of the
unrest is “intuited becoming (angeschaute[s] Werden)” (§258). This is the
distinctively Hegelian sense in which time (and space) are forms of intu-
ition (Anschauung).
Just as there are three dimensions of space, three dimensions of time can
be derived through logical inference structures. These are then understood as
the moments of becoming. Becoming oscillates between being and nothing
(§258). At first only one such moment is in view: (¬R, T). But the two
moments in becoming must be differentiated through being and nothing (or
non-being). This is the quintessence of opposition. A priori, however, there
is nothing to determine which of the two sides correspond to being and non-
being – this is precisely Hegel’s point at the beginning of the Logic. At this
point in the argument of the Philosophy of Nature, time does not yet have any
directionality, despite the fact that past and future are understood as the
transition from being to non-being and from non-being to being. The
middle term of these two moments is the present (das Jetzt) (J), in which
they supersede themselves. Formally, we can put this in a way quite analo-
gous to the formula for surface as (¬R, (¬R, ¬R)T)J. The analog to enclosed
space is the now as the finite present or point in time, which delimits itself as
the affirmative concrete unity of the past and the future (Step 2). This
determination as finite point in time is a making-discrete of the previously
continuous time (§258R) and produces the transition to arithmetic (“This
dead unit, which is thought’s highest externality, is external combination;

these are the figures of arithmetic [. . .].” (§259R)). The temporal point is
discrete, but it is not a unit in the sense of an extended interval. So it gives the
figure of a granular number line but without the measurable intervals that
would be analogous to enclosed space.
When one opposes space and time to each other then there arises the
place (der Ort) (Step 10 ). One can say that through the existence of the now
there is a possibility of individual points, first in time, to be made concrete.
That would be impossible in the case of complete homogeneity.
6.4 The First Filled Space-Time: Mechanics

The filling of space-time is a core concept of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations,
as he there tries to define the concepts of body, matter, motion, and force by
reference to filling space (4:496; but cf. 2:287, 4:520, and 4:535). He even
argues that space is divisible (and infinitesimal calculus is applicable to space)
precisely because matter fills it. If the approach developed in this chapter is
plausible, Hegel’s natural philosophy can be understood as an answer to
Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations.
In Hegel’s view, the most basic filling for space and time that will give
them a metric and orientation is ordinary mechanics. Put very schematic-
ally, he investigates the idea that matter (Materie) could provide the metric,
and motion (Bewegung) could provide the orientation (§261). Mechanics is
then conceptually reconstructed as providing the details of this solution.
Bodies become the real metrics (units) (§263), and impact (Stoß) makes the
metric (weight) and the orientation (velocity) commensurable (§265).
There is still a difficulty in determining the fundamental orientation –
one gets it with falling objects, but then weight falls out of the equation and
thus the metric is lost (§268). Hegel’s diagnosis for this inability to obtain
the metric and orientation together is that the case of a falling object treats
both space and time too ideally. It develops space merely to the level of
a line (the path taken by a falling object), and it treats the mechanics of the
falling body as a two-place relation (between the falling object and the
center of the earth). But the two places are not truly two bodies, since
under this abstract perspective the earth as a concrete body drops out and
becomes merely a point. We have something we know to be a two-body
system that we treat abstractly as slightly less than two bodies. To get the
metric back, Hegel thinks we have to move to laws of the solar system (a
multi-body system) that treat the motions involved abstractly as involving
fundamentally two bodies. These are Kepler’s laws, which in the ellipse has
the sun in one focus, with the planet orbiting. We then get a real metric,

Hegel thinks, in Kepler’s third law, in the form of the relation of the semi-
major axis (the distance from the planet to the sun) to the orbital period.
The relevant background here is this: Kepler’s three laws of planetary
motion can explain the elliptical form of planetary orbits around the sun by
simple mathematical formulas that include nothing else but spatial and
temporal relations that are defined by their proportionality and powers.
Newton then democratized the two bodies by postulating two basic forces,
an inertial force related to the mass of a body (vis insita, often also called
centrifugal force) and a force acting over distance and related to the mass
and distance apart of two bodies (vis impressa, often called centrifugal
force). One scientifically important consequence of this (and an advantage
of Newton over Kepler) is that one can add other two-body interactions as
perturbations to explain the apsidal precession, that is, the observed devi-
ation from the elliptical orbits.
As Hegel sees it, however, the problem lies in Newton’s conception of
these forces as fundamental (§269R) over their systematic arrangement. In
the movement of celestial bodies, forces stand in an ‘oscillating equilib-
rium’ to each other. Within the elliptical trajectory, the relation of the two
forces involved will change between aphelion and perihelion, i.e., the
points farthest from or closest to the center: As the body moves toward
the perihelion, the (gravitational) centripetal force is greater than the
centrifugal force (derived from the body’s inertia), but it is weaker on the
direction toward the aphelion. Hegel insists that this oscillating relation
between the two forces cannot be inferred from the nature of the forces, as
they are developed by Newton (§270R). Newton has falsely postulated
a force dualism as fundamental, as he has falsely abstracted them from what
he wanted to explain in the first place, namely bodies moving on a roughly
elliptical path; the ellipsis explains the oscillation of forces rather than the
other way around.
Only if we integrate space and time as diverging determinations into the
picture, as Kepler did, can we make sense of trajectories. Because the
proportion of the distance to the sun and the time each body takes to
traverse one section of the ellipse is constant, Kepler’s third law can “easily
and immediately present the reason of the matter (einfach und unmittelbar
die Vernunft der Sache darstellt)” (§270R). Kepler’s third law holds that the
square of the orbital period (time) of a planet is directly proportional to the
cube of the semi-major axis (space) of its orbit. Here the mathematical
proportion of the powers of space and time exhibits the reciprocal deter-
mination of the bodies in relation to each other, and thus gives us a metric.
This is what Hegel seems to intend to say when he complains that some

scientists (i.e., Newton) try to analyze the entity at stake instead of its
concept (GW 24: 1237–8 (§270Z)).
This is not only a discussion of scientific methods. It is Hegel’s way to
emphasize the importance of proportions and proportionality over specu-
lations concerning forces. This proportionality is called form (§271), and it
relates ideal (and idealized) determinations of space, time, and motion to
each other. In this determining form we understand not only that matter
has its own internal or immanent center (its own mass point), but also that
it is related to an external center, which serves as the center of the system of
interacting bodies (i.e., the gravitational center of the solar system). Thus,
Hegel turns to a three-body system, exemplified by the sun–earth–moon
system in which all the possible configurations of centers are possible. The
sun has an internal center which is the external center of earth. Earth’s
internal center is the external center of the moon. Here every position is
privileged, with the earth having both an external center and an internal
center that is the external center for another body. This complexity is the
one needed to support the logical perspectives. In contrast to Newton, this
three-body system does not merely result in perturbations, but adds a new
complexity and thus a step up in the ladder.
As these two centers are conceptually interrelated by means of the
concept of form, Hegel transitions from mechanics as the science of matter
as it is in itself (determined only by its own center) to the next level, physics.
In physics, the mass point center of the system of bodies is understood as
a sun, its material identity is light. In accord with eighteenth-century usage,
Hegel conceives of physics as the science of qualified bodies, i.e., not simply
mass points, but bodies with physical qualities derived from their system-
atic relations with each other (Bonsiepen 1997: 27–9). This marks
a transition to a dynamical system. Technically Hegel does this by doub-
ling the role of the moon into two principles, the lunar and the cometary.
This transition to four perspectives is possible in and only in nature.
6.5 The General Argument

We have thus far done two things. First, we characterized the general
argument of the Philosophy of Nature: it is a regress on the conditions for
the Euclidean features of space and time – their metric and orientation – that
are essential for space and time to play the functional role of providing the
basic structure for nature. Not only the measurements constitutive of natural
science, but also the perspectival experience of natural phenomena, require
these features. Second, we reconstructed the first step in this argument

through space, time, and mechanics. In concluding, we sketch the workings
of the argument in the remainder of the text, focusing on the development of
time.
Hegel’s treatment of nature is divided into three large divisions:
Mechanics, Physics, and Organic Physics. Each is built upon the preceding
one with the foundations of space and time at the base. The conceptual
development of time doesn’t map onto those divisions as neatly as one
might like, but one can distinguish at each of the three levels between the
kinds of processes that are paradigmatic of that level.
At the level of Mechanics, there are oscillatory processes with no inherent
direction. They seem to take place in time, but they presuppose some other
process that can give time the filling it needs to have a direction (the ‘arrow
of time’). These oscillatory processes are entirely reversible, and in this
respect they model the inferential structures of the Logic. If the two end-
points can be adequately distinguished, however, such processes at least
provide a metric for time.
At the level of Physics – and particularly once we get to chemistry – we
have directional processes. That is, we have systems in which heat loss
generates an objective difference between a low-entropy past and a high-
entropy future, and which are reversible but only with the external input of
energy. The paradigmatic case here is that of a battery which can be
recharged finitely many times. This time of physics thus first provides
the orientation to time that was required. Chemism responds to mechan-
ism as the breakdown of objects into their parts is dependent on the
object’s own substantial nature, even though these objects can be divided
according to external principles and may stand externally to one another.
Here, the external relation of different types of bodies is mediated by the
spatiotemporal orientation provided by mechanics: the mechanical part–
whole relation, in which the parts maintain their identity, is thereby
transformed into the processual nature of chemical composition, in
which the independent identity of these parts is dissolved to give rise to
something else, namely, the chemical compound.
Finally, in Organic Physics we find processes which are cyclical. Life
recharges itself, but also only finitely many times. Living processes have
a direction (orientation); deciduous trees first grow leaves in the spring and
then lose them in the fall and then grow them again the following spring.
And because they have a circuit, living processes also have a temporal
metric, which is the temporal distance between sequential occupations of
the same stations in the circuit (in addition to the spatial metric of, e.g.,
their size). In the realm of biology, mechanical and chemical explanations

are incomplete insofar as they do not understand the object within its
specific horizon of possible purposes. A proper understanding of objects
would transcend mechanical and chemical reasoning and lead to an
explanation of things by invoking either internal or external purposes.
These purposes are conceived by relying on the oriented framework of
space and time filled out by mechanical and chemical objects: the wings of
a bird are for flying, which is a mechanical process; the animal eats some
fruit for the purpose of chemically digesting it. In the species-process
(Gattungsprozess) one gets even further a relation between organisms –
which is simultaneously a relation to their kind and its purposes – that
binds together the individual cycles to a directed process. When these
relational processes become transparent to themselves, nature gives rise to
consciousness or spirit.13
13
For their many helpful questions and corrections, the authors would like to thank the editors of this
volume and audiences in Heidelberg, San Diego, Parma, and Padua.

chapter 7
Hegel’s Anthropology
Transforming the Body
Jane Dryden
The trajectory of the “Anthropology” section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia brings

us from the uncultivated, natural soul which humans share with non-human
animals to its development into an individual subject, ready to become the
conscious “I” of the “Phenomenology.” Much of this entails the transform-
ation of the body from something purely determined by nature to being
a home for spirit as it freely relates itself to the world. The “Anthropology”
thus dwells on the theme of liberation from nature. Especially in the Zusätze
and in the 1827/8 Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel notes that that
cultivation is associated with minimizing the effects of natural determin-
ations on one’s body.1 Insofar as nature is associated with particularity and
reason with universality, it may seem as though idiosyncratic embodiments
are incompatible with the kind of mastery of the body Hegel envisions. At
the same time, given that the focus of the “Anthropology” is on the
development of the soul rather than the matter of the body itself, there
may be a range of compatible bodily possibilities. This raises the question of
how much the body and its comportment ought to correspond to an ideal,
and what the implications may be for those humans whose embodiment
marks them out (in Hegel’s system) as closer to nature.
One way to make sense of this is to distinguish between the imperative to
overcome nature in our development and an invitation to come to own our
natural determinations by taking them up and turning them into expressions
of our freedom. Owning our natural determinations and overcoming nature
are related, for Hegel, insofar as both involve the spirit’s development and
mastery of the body. Both involve an ensouled body becoming ready to
1
Much of the interesting discussion in the “Anthropology” is in the Zusätze of the Encyclopedia, which
is supported in many instances by the text of the 1827/8 lectures. These lectures are a transcript of
Hegel’s entire course, by his student Johann Eduard Erdman with supplemental text by Ferdinand
Walter, provided in footnotes in Williams (2007). I will refer to them in the text as the 1827/8
Lectures.
127

128 jane dryden
participate in the moral, social, cultural, and political world. Both are
certainly implied in Hegel’s text, and the difference between them is largely
one of focus; this focus, however, matters when we are considering the use of
Hegel’s account for us today. A focus on overcoming natural determinations
suggests that those perceived as closer to nature are ranked below those who
are further from nature, and thus may risk reinforcing social inequality
linked with a hierarchy of development. A focus on owning our natural
determinations, on the other hand, may allow a broader range of determin-
ations to be taken up and made over by spirit, not merely those which are
markers for a greater distance from nature.
Carefully examining the body in the “Anthropology” raises the question
of whether there are limitations to the embodiments that may be appro-
priated and claimed as our own. In addition, when considering bodily
changes over a lifetime, we realize that mastering our bodies is an ongoing
process, not something we have completed once we are adults. Despite the
location of the “Anthropology” early in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,
the relationship it depicts between soul and body remains a project for us
long after we have reached maturity. After providing a brief overview of the
“Anthropology,” I will explore the implications of interpretations focusing
on owning or ownership, within the context of Hegel’s criticisms of
excessive particularity and idiosyncrasy, his discussion of the ages of life,
and the situation of bodies marked by race, gender, and disability. Overall,
an ownership focus allows us to propose a more inclusive interpretation of
Hegel, but even this is limited by the association of nature and unfreedom.
7.1 Overview of the Anthropology

The “Anthropology” opens after the conclusion of the Philosophy of
Nature, where still-slumbering spirit had begun to be individualized in
and through the encountering of opposition.2 With the “Anthropology,”
Hegel is focused on human formation. At this stage, this developing human-
ity is still deeply embedded in the natural world,3 a world of contingency
(LPS 58) and without freedom (PM §381Z, 10).4 As Hegel writes, we begin
2
“The subjectivity of the animal contains a contradiction and the urge to preserve itself by sublating
this contradiction; this self-preservation is the privilege of the living being and, in a still greater
degree, of mind” (PM §381Z, 11).
3
“Anthropology as such considers spirit in its natural life, when spirit is still immersed in nature, and
appears as spirit in conflict and in relation to corporeality” (LPS 57).
4
Abbreviations used: EL, Hegel (1991b); LPS, Hegel (2007b); PN, Hegel (1970); and PR, Hegel
(1991a).

Hegel’s Anthropology 129
“with mind still in the grip of nature, related to its bodiliness, mind that is
not as yet together with itself, not yet free” (PM §387Z, 27).5 Humanity’s
development involves the imposition of order as well as the capacity to not
be limited by the determinations of nature. While the progression of the
“Anthropology” involves a kind of liberation from nature, this should not be
taken to be a denial of our situatedness as natural beings; “spirit’s liberation
from nature is more precisely its liberation within (and with) nature” (Nuzzo
2013: 1). The story of our liberation is a complex and ambiguous one. As is
consistent in Hegel’s methodology, the stages of the development of the
mind are just moments which need to be reconstructed in order to be
understood; as we discuss lower ones, the higher ones are already anticipated
(PM §380; PM §396Z, 61–2).6
Hegel begins with a discussion of the soul, which is described as still
abstract, and “only the sleep of mind – the passive νoûs of Aristotle, which
is potentially all things” (PM §389, 30). It is “the organizational structure
of the body that endures in its dynamism beyond any replacement of the
body’s matter” (Testa 2013: 26). The soul will be the foundation of the
particular individual we are to become, as it is shaped by various deter-
minations and moves away from abstraction and possibility and into
actuality.
In its least developed form, “in its immediate natural determinacy” (PM
§390), the soul is the natural soul. It is shaped by natural qualities, natural
alterations, and sensation. Natural qualities include climate and the sea-
sons, geography (which leads to an account of different races and ethnici-
ties, discussed below), predisposition, temperament, and character. Each of
these plays a role in forming the soul, giving its eventual subjectivity some
natural foundation, but none of them is depicted as entirely determining
on its own; upbringing and education are intended to mitigate these
particular determinations.
The natural alterations discussed by Hegel are the ages of life (from
childhood to old age), the opposition experienced in the sex relationship,
and the alternation of sleep and waking. As Murray Greene notes, this
seems to be an unexpected and disconnected triad (Greene 1972: 80). What
they have in common, however, is the presence of an ongoing subjectivity
throughout changes and oppositions (PM §396), thus anticipating the
soul’s individuation.
5
As I am using the Wallace, Miller, and Inwood translation of the Philosophie des Geistes, I will follow
their translation of Geist as spirit; and similarly will follow the usage of other sources when I quote
them. My own usage will depend on context.
6
This point is helpfully made clear by Murray Greene (1972: 70).

130 jane dryden
The final stage of the natural soul is sensation; Hegel discusses bodily
determinations such as the senses as well as determinations originating in the
mind (such as cheerfulness or grief) (PM §401R, 72). Sensation is not yet the
detailed and contextualized experience of a self-aware subjectivity, and sensa-
tions themselves are individual, contingent, and transitory. At this stage, we
are still at the mercy of the outside world, not yet capable of deciding for
ourselves how to respond; as Hegel writes, “This natural subjectivity is not yet
a self-determining subjectivity following its own law and acting in a necessary
manner, but a subjectivity determined from outside, tied to this space and to
this time, dependent on contingent circumstances” (PM §400, 71). We are
thus neither overcoming these external forces nor making them our own, but
rather are merely buffeted by them.
Hegel next discusses the feeling soul, in which “the soul is no longer merely
a natural, but an inward, individuality” (PM §403, 87). As Greene notes, this
is “the state where opposition is pre-eminent” (Greene 1972: 104). Our
response to the buffeting of external forces is to turn in on ourselves; this
turns us away from the world but is also a step toward our ability to distinguish
ourselves from our surroundings; we begin to feel ourselves as a totality.
The experiences that are part of the feeling soul “in its immediacy” (PM
§405) are dreaming, those of the child in the womb, and our relationship to
our inner life. In dreaming, the soul passively experiences a sense of itself as
a totality (PM §405Z, 92–4). The child in the womb and the mother
represent a duality between a passive individuality, which is not yet self-
reflective, and another individuality determining it. With the relationship
to our inner life, which Hegel calls genius (“the particularity of the
individual, which in all situations and relationships decides its conduct
and fate”), the duality is made one again, in that I am now a “twofold entity
within myself,” experiencing my life circumstances and my own inward
sense of particular destiny (PM §405Z, 94).
This state becomes a “disease” when it “becomes a form, a state, of the
self-conscious, educated, sober human being” (PM §406). This involves “a
surrender of his existence as mental self-possession,” to what is conveyed
through a “haze of feeling,” such as in clairvoyance (PM §406R, 95).
Through passivity, the subject also risks becoming susceptible to coming
under the power of someone or something else, as in the phenomenon of
animal magnetism (PM §406Z, 108).7
7
The full discussion of clairvoyance, animal magnetism, and divination can be found at PM §406R
and Z, 95–114, and LPS 130–9. As Robert R. Williams notes in his introduction to the 1827/8 lectures,
“Hegel does not believe that animal magnetism and hypnotism provide access to a superior epistemic

The next stage is self-feeling, in which the subject “is immersed in this
particularity of sensations, and at the same time, through the ideality of the
particular, in them it joins together with itself as a subjective unit” (PM
§407, 114). On the one hand, this continues the subject’s individuation; on
the other, it runs the risk of the subject being bound up with itself to the
exclusion of the external world. Here Hegel discusses various forms of
“derangement” (Verrücktheit),8 in which reason has closed itself off from
the outside; these are extreme forms of self-feeling in which the soul is
“divided against itself ” (PM §402Z, 87). Hegel does not suggest that every
subject must experience a period of “derangement” in order to progress,
but, “because the soul appears here at the standpoint of its rupture with
itself, we have to consider it in its diseased state” (PM §402Z, 84).
Habit is the way in which we come to move on from being caught up in
our own feeling and sensations; it involves a hardening to immediate
sensation, the dulling of urges to satisfy desires, and bodily dexterity
(PM §410R, 132). Regular and repeated sensation and activity
become second nature, thus freeing the soul from being consumed by
attention to them (PM §409). Hegel describes it as “the most essential
feature of the existence of all mental life in the individual subject, enabling
the subject to be concrete immediacy” (PM §410R, 133). A habituated body
operates at the behest of the soul, rather than being determined by its
impulses, instincts, and bodily reflexes. As McCumber writes, “when my
feelings are reduced to habits, they continue to be mine; what they cease to
be is me” (McCumber 1990: 158).
With the development of habit, the soul pervades the body, making it its
own, even though “something of bodiliness remains . . . purely organic and
consequently removed from the power of the soul” (PM §412Z, 140). At
this point, the body is not merely something experienced by the soul, or
housing the soul, but the sign of the soul’s activity and expression: “As this
identity of the inner with the outer, the outer being subjugated to the
inner, the soul is actual; in its bodiliness it has its free shape, in which it
feels itself and makes itself felt, and which, as the soul’s work of art, has
human, pathognomic and physiognomic, expression” (PM §411, 136).
The last stage of the “Anthropology” is the actual soul. Here Hegel
describes “the soul’s higher awakening to the I” (PM §412, 140), which is
position, much less reveal ‘higher truths.’ Rather such phenomena are evidence that spirit can fall
below its level and regress into quasi-natural immediacy and dependence” (Williams 2007: 15).
8
Williams translates this as “dementia” in LPS; it is translated as “madness” by Berthold-Bond, who
provides an extensive discussion of the relation of Hegel’s theory to nineteenth-century science
(Berthold-Bond 1995: 9–35).

132 jane dryden
“for itself and freed from bodiliness” (PM §412Z, 141).9 It will now be able to
interact as an individuated subject with the external world, and can begin
to move into the forms of life described in the “Phenomenology,” such as
perception, encountering others, and coming to recognize and be
recognized.
7.2 Ownership and Overcoming

What might it mean to be “freed from bodiliness,” for an embodied
subject? Freedom from bodiliness does not imply a metaphysical separ-
ation where “bodiliness is a materiality outside the soul and with its parts
external to each other” (PM §403Z, 88). Following Hegel’s logic, we can
consider the double meaning of sublation, or Aufhebung, as both “cancel-
ing” and “preserving” (EL §96Z, 154). In one sense, we can think of the
actual soul as having canceled out the effects of the external determinations
of nature and bodily limitations, through the cultivation of habit and the
awakening of its self-conscious agency. In another, we can think of it
having accepted these determinations as its own, “at home with itself [in
its externality]” (LPS 159). Both senses are present, as we would expect from
Hegel. However, interpretations which focus on one or the other can
suggest different possibilities for the lessons we might draw from Hegel
today.
I will refer to the first – canceling – as the “overcoming interpretation.”
Insofar as our bodies are the part of us most associated with nature, being
able to determine ourselves consciously and rationally involves freedom
from the limitations of the body and the immediacy of bodiliness. This is
sometimes described as overcoming:
Even in the most perfect form to which nature raises itself, in animal life, the
concept does not attain to an actuality resembling its soulful essence, to the
complete overcoming of the externality and finitude of its embodied reality.
This first happens in the mind, which, precisely by this overcoming accom-
plished in it, distinguishes itself from nature, so that this distinguishing is
not merely the doing of an external reflection on the essence of mind. (PM
§381Z, 12)
In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel writes “But the
freedom of mind is not merely an independence of the Other won outside
9
“So the soul is subject existing for itself; it is substance whose corporeity is no longer due to being, but
rather corporeity is only a moment in the soul . . . This [corporeal] externality is only a sign of the
soul, only represents the soul” (LPS 159).

the other, but won within the Other; it attains actuality not by fleeing from
the Other but by overcoming it” (PM §382Z, 16). A similar attitude is
expressed in Hegel’s characterization of the outcome of the “Anthropology”
as “the triumph of the soul over its bodiliness” (PM §387Z, 27). In this focus,
our natural determinations are something to be canceled, such that our
bodies can be brought into line with universal expectations; this is most
overt in Hegel’s criticisms of idiosyncrasies and excessive particularity. This
interpretation also accords with Hegel’s Philosophy of History, where the
movement away from nature is unambiguously presented as a mark of
greater civilization and freedom (Stone 2020: 16–18).
The interpretation connected with “preserving” will be referred to as the
“ownership interpretation,” insofar as it depicts the soul gradually taking
ownership of the body, in line with Hegel’s description of the actual soul as
“when its bodiliness has been thoroughly trained and made its own” (PM
§411). Drawing on the work of Helmuth Plessner, Karen Ng describes the
ambiguity of both “being a body” and “having a body”; with the latter, “I
can relate to my body as an instrument or means, exerting control over my
embodiment, eventually directing it to self-conscious ends” (Ng 2016: 36).
This focus on “having” or owning a body suggests a somewhat different
relationship to my natural determinations than the overcoming focus.
Simon Lumsden describes habit as “the way in which human beings can
be at home with nature,” specifying that, through habit, “the natural is
transformed into a second nature, but in so doing it does not leave the
natural behind” (Lumsden 2013: 134). As Lydia Moland writes, the
“Anthropology” “chronicles the slow process of earning and finally owning
what one has inherited; it narrates how the agent turns passively received
traits into characteristics that express her freedom” (Moland 2003: 141).
While Moland does not discuss the body specifically, her account makes
the shape of the ownership interpretation clear:
Although I begin with a vicious temper, I can come to own that temper by
transforming it into something that reflects my will. Indeed, in describing the
results of this process, Hegel often uses language of ownership, describing the
agent as “self-possessed,” coming into a character that is “his own.” Clearly,
this ownership is crucial to the idea of agency at all. If humans were nothing
but their inherited determinations, there would be no freedom, no responsi-
bility, no agency. Inherited traits that are earned and converted into owned
characteristics, however, bear the stamp of self-determination that converts
them from determined to free components of agency. (Moland 2003: 141)
This conversion means that while we are liberated from them as deter-
minations, we nonetheless preserve them as aspects of our selves, that make

134 jane dryden
us the particular individuals that we are. David Ciavatta presents a similar
account of the way we come to own our bodies in the Philosophy of Right,
noting that it allows a positive experience of an agent’s particularity as “a
constitutive feature of her very self-identity and freedom” (Ciavatta
2005: 15).
7.3 The Stakes of Ownership and Overcoming: Our

Particularities
On the trajectory of the “Anthropology,” development toward the univer-
sal is associated with greater cultivation and freedom, and development
away from the contingent and particular is associated with greater distance
from nature. Therefore, while it is our particular determinations that make
us who we are as individuals (PM §406Z, 102), Hegel cautions against
excess; these cautions are found in the Zusätze and 1827/8 lectures. We are
not supposed to be too particular. However, the forms of particularity that
are acceptable may depend on the interpretation we follow. On an owner-
ship interpretation, a particular determination can come to express my
freedom once I have made it my own. An overcoming interpretation, on
the other hand, means minimizing determinations that tie me to nature.
An example of such a caution is in his discussion of the effects of
predisposition, temperament, character, and “so-called idiosyncrasies”
(PM §395Z, 52). Hegel states:
Now first of all we must remark that it is in the individual soul that the
sphere of the contingent begins, for only the universal is the necessary.
Individual souls are distinguished from each other by an infinite number of
contingent modifications. But this infinity belongs to the bad kind of
infinite.10 One should not therefore rate the peculiarity of people too
highly. . . . The more cultivated a man is, the less his behaviour exhibits
anything peculiar only to him, anything therefore contingent. (PM §395Z,
50)11
He specifies that “In times of greater cultivation, the various contingent
mannerisms of conduct and action disappear, and with them the varieties
of temperament” (PM §395Z, 51; also LPS 94). Meanwhile, in the 1827/8
lectures, he glosses cultivation as “conduct according to a universal norm”
(LPS 95). While we are individuated by particular determinations, a core
part of our development involves minimizing or remoulding them. This is
10
For a discussion of the meaning of the “bad infinite,” refer to EL §§94–5, 149–52.
11
Compare this with PR §187R, 226.

true even of those differences that are connected to our particular commu-
nities; as Hegel notes in the 1827/8 lectures, “Cultivated men raise them-
selves above these [regional] differences, and it is difficult to recognize any
national character in them, because the distinguishing feature of educated
human beings consists in acting, existing, and being actual in accordance
with universal modes of thought” (LPS 94 n. 58).
This also applies to our bodily expression. The cultivation of our
character can be discerned in our way of holding ourselves: “above all
things, gait must be cultivated; in it the soul must betray its mastery over
the physical body” (PM §411Z, 139). In a Zusatz to §400, Hegel describes
various “embodiments of the mental,” through which our soul is exterior-
ized in ways that can be evident to others; these include weeping and
laughter (PM §400Z, 81). Noting the variety of forms laughter can take
(“from the vulgar peals of side-splitting guffaw of someone empty or coarse
to the gentle smile of the noble soul, smiling through tears”), Hegel argues
that
the various modes of laughter indicate, therefore, the cultural level of
individuals in a very characteristic manner. A man of reflection never, or
only rarely, abandons himself to peals of laughter . . . Excessive laughter is
rightly held to be evidence of dullness, of a foolish mentality that is insensi-
tive to all great, genuinely substantial interests and regards them as external
and alien to it. (PM §401Z, 82)
The minimization of particularity includes things that might aid in com-
munication and seem to have no intrinsic harm; Hegel notes approvingly
that “the cultivated man has a less animated play of looks and gestures than
the uncultivated” (PM §411Z, 139). This downplaying of expression is
connected to the valorization of articulate speech (and reason): “The
cultured individual does not need to be lavish with looks and gestures;
he possesses in talk the worthiest and most suitable means of expressing
himself; for speech is able immediately to receive and reproduce every
modification of representation” (PM §411Z, 139).
These examples lend themselves strongly to an overcoming interpret-
ation, in which the point is to move beyond the determinations of nature.
However, Hegel does not instruct us to eliminate all of our particular
determinations; after all, these make us who we are. Following his instruc-
tion to cultivate one’s gait, he notes that both vices and virtues such as
“orderliness, modesty, good sense, candour etc., . . . express themselves in
the peculiar style of walking; so that it is easy to distinguish people from
one another by their gait” (PM §411Z, 139). We are individuated by these

136 jane dryden
differences. The key thing is that we not be at the mercy of our natural
urges and inclinations.
Habit plays an important role in allowing us a more reflective stance
toward them. Lydia Moland writes, “Habit has . . . brought forth the
individual as a budding universal, a thinking self at home with itself instead
of a self ruled solely by its natural determinations” (Moland 2003: 150).
Hegel’s discussion of habit suggests an interpretation more focused on
ownership, in which what matters is less the universalized appearance of
the body, and more the soul’s relationship to that body. As he writes, the
soul “must make its identity with its body into an identity posited or
mediated by the mind, take possession of its body, form it into a pliant
and skillful instrument of its activity” (PM §410Z, 135). Dexterity is a sign of
this achievement:
If the activities of the body to be performed in the service of mind are often
repeated, they acquire an ever higher degree of adequacy, for the soul gains
an ever greater familiarity with all the circumstances to be considered, hence
becomes more and more at home in its expressions and consequently achieves
a continually growing capacity for immediately embodying its inner deter-
minations and accordingly transforms the body more and more into its own
property, into its serviceable instrument; there thus arises a magical 12 rela-
tionship, an immediate operation of mind on body. (PM §410Z, 136)
If this is what matters most, then a wide range of embodiments might be
included. Consider the virtuosity of many disabled dancers, such as Alice
Sheppard, which demonstrates the dexterity possible for bodies still
marked by particularity.13 As Moland writes, “habit gives us an idea of
how determinations can be appropriated into the subject’s freedom with-
out becoming negated. The subject need not reject her melancholy dispos-
ition but she can control and own it” (Moland 2003: 155). With this
appropriation, our determinations cease to be contingent and can acquire
rational significance in terms of our own purposes and self-understanding.
The two approaches to interpretation – overcoming and ownership –
thus have different implications for which forms of embodiment can be
intended in the spirit’s transformation of the body. The narrative of the
“Anthropology” can be further complicated through a closer examination
of the ages of life.
12
For Hegel, magic refers to interactions which appear unmediated: “A magical force is one whose
effect is not determined by the interconnection, the conditions and mediations of objective
relationships” (PM §405Z, 91). Merleau-Ponty uses magic in a similar way: “In movement, the
relations between my decision and my body are magical ones” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 97).
13
Watch, for example, her video at Sheppard (2014).

7.4 The Ages of Life and Coping with the Changing Body
Hegel’s discussion of the ages of life (PM §396Z, 54–61; LPS 96–100)
portrays the mastery of the body as an achievement of childhood. The
narrative of the baby in the womb, birth, and the initial development of
the child regularly refers to the body, including the growth of teeth,
learning to speak, and the development of an upright gait (PM §396Z,
55–6). Learning to speak is identified with the ability to pronounce “the
I” (PM §396Z, 57) and the ability to distinguish one’s self from one’s
environment. Hegel notes that “mind . . . reveals its independence of its
bodiliness in the fact that it can develop earlier than the body” (PM
§396Z, 54).
After boyhood, other than a brief mention of hypochondria as weak-
ness (PM §396Z, 60), Hegel discusses education, cultivation, and choos-
ing a vocation with no reference to the body or any embodied
constraints.14 The description of old age focuses on the mental, even
while briefly acknowledging a physical dimension: “Thus by the habit of
mental life, as well as by the dulling of the activity of his physical
organism, the man becomes an old man” (PM §396Z, 61). The old
man is characterized primarily by his abandoning of hope, living in
recollection of the past, and wisdom and knowledge of the universal
(PM §396Z, 61). The path to death similarly foregrounds the mental:
“But this wisdom, this lifeless, complete coincidence of subjective activ-
ity with its world, leads back to oppositionless childhood, in the same
way that the growth of the activity of his physical organism into a static
habit leads on to the abstract negation of the living individuality, to
death” (PM §396Z, 61).15
This fits the macro level narrative of the Philosophy of Spirit, in which,
once the soul pervades the body at the end of the “Anthropology,” it does
not re-emerge as a significant philosophical concern for us. At the level of
individual human development, it suggests that adults have largely mas-
tered their bodies. Of course, the trajectory of the “Anthropology” is not
necessarily chronological, but rather is logical. Most of the examples that
Hegel gives of various stages of soul are drawn from mature adult experi-
ence, and a more advanced form is often anticipated in the discussion of an
14
This is in contrast to the Philosophy of Right, where Hegel notes that some individuals are poor
because of “contingent physical factors” (PR §241) and “differences in the development of natural
physical and mental [geistigen] aptitudes” (PR §200).
15
The Philosophy of Nature presents much the same account: “its activity has become deadened and
ossified and the process of life has become the inertia of habit; it is in this way that the animal brings
about its own destruction” (PN §375).

138 jane dryden
earlier one.16 However, the discussion of the ages of life warrants a closer
examination, given the vulnerability of our bodies. As Wes Furlotte notes,
nature continues to pose a problem for us, and “the unruliness of nature
itself . . . operates as a necessary precondition, yet problem, for the life of
the concept and spirit” (Furlotte 2018: 246).
The Philosophy of Nature points out that disease is an inevitable part of
the life of organisms (PN §371Z, 429, §375Z, 441), and so the mastery of
our bodies must be limited. Diseases present challenges to our usual habits
and routines; they do not merely affect the biological processes but impact
our sense of self-control, as well as social, economic, and political systems
and expectations.17
The body undergoes many developments in middle and old age that
challenge our sense of control over it, such as changes in metabolism,
changes in sensitivity to foods and digestion, and menopause. In response
to these, the formation of new habits might be required, such as new diets
or new fitness regimes. New mental habits may also be formed, such as
a greater acceptance of one’s vulnerability and the need for help from
others. Adapting from a life lived in one’s home to institutional life in
a hospital or retirement home may require the formation of new social
habits and expectations. Inwood comments that certain tasks such as
“playing chess, teaching philosophy, and possibly political activity are
not easily mastered or exhausted in a single lifetime” (Inwood 2010: 345),
but the aging body itself presents a far from “oppositionless” existence.
This suggests that the soul’s achievement, described at the end of the
“Anthropology,” is not a singular event, but an ongoing process that might
ebb and flow over a lifetime. This echoes Hegel’s acknowledgment in his
discussion of derangement that “the cultivated, intellectual consciousness”
is “at the same time the natural self of self-feeling” (PM §408R, 115). The
development of our minds out of the enclosed state of the feeling soul is not
a singular achievement for those who later experience mental illness. In
that case it is treated as a disease that some, but not all, people will
experience. The embodied vicissitudes of middle and old age, however,
are close to inevitable for all humans who live long enough, even though
not everyone experiences the same changes in the same way.
For an “overcoming” interpretation, this means that liberation from the
body is something to be achieved more than once; this complicates the
16
For example, “In considering derangement we must likewise anticipate the cultivated, intellectual
consciousness, the subject which is at the same time the natural self of self-feeling” (PM §408R, 115).
17
For example, we might consider how the phenomenon of sick leave complicates Hegel’s account of
the system of needs in Objective Spirit.

story of cultivation as smoothing out idiosyncrasy, as even a highly edu-
cated individual may yet be taken by surprise by new pains or bodily
weaknesses. For an “ownership” interpretation, it means that there is an
ongoing process of appropriating our determinations; there may be chal-
lenges in doing this for those acquired later in life. In both cases, the process
of aging involves a complex and dynamic interaction between nature and
spirit, persisting into maturity. To further pick out the significance of each
interpretation, it is useful to consider their effects on bodies marked by
difference from a universalized norm.
7.5 Race, Gender, Disability in the Anthropology

As we have seen, Hegel’s philosophy largely expects that, as agents become
more cultivated, their demeanor and gait will more closely come to
resemble the universal, rather than the particular. But what does this
universal involve? Nicholas Mowad argues that, despite some of Hegel’s
comments, overall his argument challenges the dominance of any particu-
lar type of person. Insofar as Hegel conceives of both gender and race as
limitations that prevent a broader perspective, and everyone ought to
establish distance from their natural determinations, both masculinity
and whiteness are traits that ought to be stripped of their status as default
or normative (Mowad 2019: 91, 118). Mowad argues that we can interpret
insights of the “Anthropology” while rejecting the idea of a “hierarchy of
peoples” (Mowad 2019: 92).
Mowad’s interpretation, in which something taken to be an abstract and
unquestioned universal is in fact itself a particular, fits with Hegel’s
philosophy in general. The pattern of Hegel’s description of cultivated
norms and expectations, however, suggests that there is a dominant image
of a human at work. Comments throughout the “Anthropology” and the
corresponding section in the 1827/8 lectures center a European,18 non-
disabled, heterosexual man. This is apparent in how Hegel uses the term
“us,” as in the example “Orientals cover the lower half of the face with
beards; with us one can view the varied outlooks and musculature” (LPS
161). Hegel’s accounts of the senses, gait, and use of other bodily features
seem to presuppose a non-disabled subject. The sex relationship specifies
18
This includes “Europeans” living in the Americas and their descendants: “As far as the more precise
spiritual differences among races are concerned, America is a highly interesting continent, but only
by virtue of the fact that Europeans have settled there. The ones who have drawn attention to
themselves through the fact that they have made themselves independent and have given themselves
rational laws, are not the native Americans as such, but the Creoles” (LPS 90).

140 jane dryden
relating to “an individual of the opposite sex” (PM §398Z 63–4).19 The
overview of the ages of life names the young man who will enter civil
society, not the young woman, whose “highest vocation is to be the mother
of the family” (LPS 102).
On an overcoming interpretation, this implies an advantage to those
who – by virtue of their natural determinations – are already perceived as
closer to the dominant image of the universal, and farther from the
contingent particularity of nature. Since, as I will discuss below, some
kinds of bodies are more closely associated with nature, the focus on
distancing oneself from nature can create a hierarchy.
An ownership interpretation may facilitate valuing a wider range of
bodily determinations once they have been appropriated by the subject
and made over by spirit. Even on this interpretation, however, the associ-
ation of nature and unfreedom suggests limitations for how agents may be
perceived when they preserve particular traits linked with nature. To
explore this, I will discuss race, gender, and disability in turn.
There has been a fair amount of discussion of Hegel’s accounts of race,
drawing on his Philosophy of History and other texts.20 Commentators on
Hegel’s “Anthropology” generally condemn the descriptions Hegel gives of
different races and ethnicities. For example, Andreja Novakovic describes
the section in PM §412 as “notorious, because in it (or, more accurately, in
the additions) Hegel voices many cultural and racial prejudices of his age”
(Novakovic 2017: 412). She concludes: “What all of these reflections are
meant to illustrate is more generally that climate and other environmental
factors affect our personalities” (Novakovic 2017: 412). Similarly, Moland
states that the stereotypes are “unacceptable,” but that “we can salvage the
point that our ethnic identities sometimes figure in our understanding of
our own and others’ actions” (Moland 2003: 143).
For Mowad, the salvageable message from this section is that whiteness
is not taken as default, but is marked through Hegel’s discussion of the
“peculiarities of Europeans” (Mowad 2019: 91), and that members of all
races and ethnicities ought to develop beyond the particularities of their
contingent, particular origins in order to identify with the human species
more broadly. Not all particularities are portrayed equally, however.
Germans are particularized in Hegel’s descriptions of various European
peoples; he notes their inward-turning minds, their slowness to act, and
19
Kirk Pillow provides a helpful overview of the insistence on heterosexuality in Hegel’s system (Pillow
2002).
20
For example, De Laurentiis (2014), Bernasconi (1998, 2000), Parekh (2009), and Buchwalter (2009).

“inordinate desire” for official posts and titles (PM §394Z, 49). None of
these are in significant tension with the traits assigned to highly cultivated
people, unlike those of the Italians, whom Hegel considers to have “the
closest tie to nature” (Moland 2003: 142), and who accordingly are
described in terms of their “uninhibitedness” (PM §394Z, 46–7).21
Non-European races are explicitly described in terms of their lack of
development. Referring to Africans, Hegel writes that they “are to be
regarded as a nation of children,” and that so long as they remain in
Africa, “they do not attain to the feeling of man’s personality, – their
mind is entirely dormant, it remains sunk within itself, it makes no
progress” (PM §393Z, 41).22 For “the Asiatic race,” mind is “beginning to
awake, to separate itself from naturalness,” and yet “in this identity of mind
with nature true freedom is impossible” (PM §393Z, 41). Contrast this with
“the Caucasian race,” where “for the first time mind enters into complete
opposition to naturalness” (PM §393Z, 42).
While Hegel may particularize European ethnicities in one section,
European standards are employed as default and universal throughout
the rest of the text. For example, in the ages of life section, after Hegel
notes that “the child” learns the alphabet as “the most abstract thing that
the child’s mind can grasp” (PM §396Z, 58), he immediately claims that
“This presupposes an abstraction to which entire races, for example, even
the Chinese, have not attained” (PM §396Z, 58). This implies that the
supposedly universal narrative of the ages of man is one which refers only to
specific groups – that is, those which use an alphabet.
Later on, Hegel states that Europeans bow only with the upper part of
their body “since in doing it we do not wish to surrender our independ-
ence,” whereas “Orientals, by contrast, express reverence for their master
by throwing themselves on the ground before him; they may not look him
in the eye, for by doing so they would be asserting their being-for-self, and
only the master has the right freely to survey the servant and the slave” (PM
§411Z, 138). What could simply have been a note about different bodily
habits acquires a normative significance when we recall that the entire
progression of the “Anthropology” is toward bodily independence and “the
21
Compare this with the 1828/9 lectures, where he notes: “More education and less use of gestures go
together. The Italians have many antics” (LPS 161).
22
In the 1828/9 lectures, Hegel states: “The Africans retain a pure inwardness that never progresses to
development. The Africans are now as they have been for the last thousand years. They have never
gone out of themselves, but always remain within themselves in a childlike manner. They have
remained in the condition of [raw] particularity, of individuality, of desire, and have not developed
the oppositions of the understanding, of [universal] law and particular instances” (LPS 91).

142 jane dryden
soul’s higher awakening to the I” (PM §412). This example marks
Europeans as independent, and “Orientals” as slavish.
Given the pattern of Hegel’s comments, achieving distance from nature
implies behaving more similarly to “the Caucasian race.” On an overcom-
ing interpretation, the use of European standards as universal norms for
what cultivation entails creates a hierarchy in which others rank lower so
long as they preserve any lingering markers of their origins.
An ownership interpretation allows ethnic and racial determinations to
be taken up into our developed sense of ourselves, as meaningful aspects of
our identity. However, whether we have deliberately taken them up is not
necessarily visible to others. Given that Hegel’s conception of cultivation is
entwined with a hierarchical distancing from nature, appropriating racial-
ized traits can still cause someone to appear undeveloped, insofar as those
traits are associated with nature. The ownership interpretation does not
free us from worries about hierarchy, as long as closeness to nature is read as
less free, and non-Europeans are read as closer to nature.
Gender23 can likewise lead to hierarchy. There has been extensive discus-
sion of gender in Hegel’s thought, primarily based on the Phenomenology of
Spirit and the Philosophy of Right.24 The “Anthropology” contains a one-
paragraph discussion of the sexual relationship that invokes a distinction
between a sex focused primarily on sentiment and love and the other focused
on “universal purposes” (PM §397); in a Zusatz, Hegel contrasts “a subject-
ivity remaining in immediate unity with its substance and a subjectivity
entering into opposition to this substance” (PM §398Z, 64). The corres-
ponding section of the 1827/8 lectures provides more detail, emphasizing
women’s lack of development. There, Hegel notes that: “In order to make
the universal one’s end, to will the universal, the rupture [of universal and
particular] is necessary, as is deep self-absorption and the activity of labor. It
is a matter of bringing forth the unity of universal and particular. – Woman
remains in this non-disrupted unity of the heart” (LPS 101).
Echoing his argument concerning race, Mowad argues that “gender, as
Hegel understands it, is an original limitation in the individual human,
whose presence is ineradicable, and whose influence is powerful” (Mowad
2019: 109). He argues that when the “Anthropology” is read alongside the
23
The contemporary distinction between sex and gender does not have much traction for Hegel, as the
social and ethical conception of women as a gender is entirely founded on their natural determinacy
as a sex (PR §165, LPS 102). I will use both terms depending on context. For a helpful discussion of
sexual difference in Hegel, refer to Stone (2018a). Similarly, while we now acknowledge more than
two genders, in order to discuss Hegel’s account I will follow his usage.
24
For example, the essays in Mills (1996) and Hutchings and Pulkinnen (2010).

Phenomenology, a theory of gender emerges in which masculinity is marked
as one-sided, and showing that the “ever-present danger in gender identity
is that the feminine is devalued, ignored, and taken for granted” (Mowad
2019: 118). Mowad notes that Hegel criticizes the masculine perspective in
the Phenomenology, where “abstract masculinity brings about madness”
(Mowad 2019: 118).
This is a rich and provocative reading of gender in Hegel, inviting both
sides to surpass their original limitation. This might be read into an
“overcoming” interpretation. However, this overcoming is intended only
for men. The one-sidedness of masculinity is the means by which men
progress, whereas women are consistently described in terms of a lack of
development. As Hegel says:
In her development into objective existence, woman remains in the form of
subjectivity. In her being woman exhibits a development, but this occurs in
a beautiful inner peace, concord, and stability. The woman is not subject to
the one-sided extremes that man is. Through feeling she senses what is
fitting and proper. (LPS 102 n. 79)
While Hegel’s description of women here may sound positive, within the
framework of the “Anthropology” it describes a limitation to her possibility
for development. For Hegel, the development of our minds requires
precisely “the negative, contradiction, rupture” (PM §382Z, 16) which is
denied of women.
Meanwhile, the anthropology section of the 1827/8 lectures states, in its
description of sexual difference: “The matters of the understanding are the
domain of men, who thus experience alienation, whereas women enjoy
plant-like unity and harmony” (LPS 102, n. 79).25 This positions women
closest to the feeling soul, rather than the achievement of the actual soul.
There is a similar passage in the ages of life section of the “Anthropology”:
“The life of the unborn child resembles the life of a plant . . . When the
child is brought into the world out of this vegetative state in which it
resides in the womb, it passes into the animal mode of life” (PM §396Z,
56). Comparison of the two passages suggests that a plantlike existence is an
undeveloped one, but note that unlike that of the child in the womb,
women’s plantlike status is not described as a phase, but as their whole
existence.
25
Compare this with the notorious Zusatz in the Philosophy of Right, which states that “the difference
between man and woman is the difference between animal and plant; the animal is closer in
character to man, the plant to woman, for the latter is a more peaceful [process of] unfolding
whose principle is the more indeterminate unity of feeling [Empfindung]” (PR §166Z, 207).

144 jane dryden
Women are situated closer to nature than men, and thus are described as
more susceptible to natural disturbances and animal magnetism (PM
§406Z, 109) – a feature earlier ascribed to animals (PM §405Z, 91). They
are more likely to be “crazy” when living in small towns and “comfortable
in this parochialism of theirs” (PM §408Z, 124). Pregnancy and “the onset
of puberty in young women” are not framed as part of the normal human
trajectory, but particularized and named as illnesses (PM §406Z, 99).
On an overcoming interpretation, women are thus clearly limited. Even
when learned, they do not experience the kind of rupture and opposition
required for full liberation from nature. An ownership interpretation is
more likely to encourage both genders to gain a reflective perspective on
their gender identity, though it remains problematic as long as women’s
activity in the home is still perceived as closer to nature, and nature is
associated with unfreedom. A fuller exploration of an ownership account
of gender in Hegel might require rethinking that activity, and acknow-
ledging that care work done within the family does not, in fact, come
immediately but with practice, skill, and habituation.26
Less has been written on disability in Hegel’s thought than on gender or
race.27 Contemporary disability theory and activism note that non-
disabled people often assume disability is a limitation to be suffered,
fixed, or cured, rather than a bodily difference which can be acknowledged
and incorporated into one’s identity.28 The distinction between an over-
coming interpretation and an ownership interpretation is thus especially
salient here.
Hegel’s discussion of human development centers a non-disabled body.
Hegel’s descriptions of the cultivated body suggest normative expectations
for the way that this body will present itself; consider Hegel’s comment
that “man’s absolute gesture is his upright position; only man shows himself
capable of this, whereas even the orang-outang can stand upright only with
a stick” (PM §411Z, 138). In the ages of life, he associates the development
of an upright gait and the skill of walking with a “freer relationship to the
external world” (PM §396Z, 57), and does not consider the movements
possible for other kinds of bodies. As mentioned above, however, disabled
26
For a discussion of the connection between feminist ethics of care and Hegel’s philosophy, which
argues that care can be broadened out beyond its gendered associations, refer to Molas (2019). If care
is conceived of in this context, it becomes easier to perceive it as something that must be practiced
and cultivated.
27
For more general discussions of disability in Hegel, refer to Dryden (2013) and Wendte (2012).
28
For a recent exploration of this theme, which is common across Disability Studies, refer to Clare
(2017).

people can develop their own forms of embodied habits and dexterity.29
Focusing on overcoming the determinations of nature will obscure these
possibilities, failing to acknowledge the important ways in which disabled
people respond and adapt to their environments.
An ownership interpretation opens up possibilities for understanding
the embodied particularity of disability as part of our agency. Hegel notes
that “When a person is blind he knows that he cannot see, but he has no
consciousness of defect. In this diseased condition the human being is in
a rational dream – he is still outwardly directed, but in such a way that an
obstruction has arisen” (LPS 129). He assumes here that blindness must be
construed as a defect or disease which necessarily limits someone’s relation
to the world, rather than something which can present a valuable perspec-
tive on the world in its own right.30 This stands in contrast with his
observation that “Blind people are particularly attentive to the symbolism
of the human voice” (PM §401Z, 78). Expanding on this might have
opened an opportunity for Hegel to consider blindness as amongst the
natural determinations which can be appropriated by us.
While an ownership interpretation seems to offer up useful possibilities
for thinking through disability in Hegel, it will not necessarily address his
discussion of Blödsinnigkeit. This is generally translated as “imbecility,” but
also sometimes as “idiocy” (PM §408Z, 123, LPS 145).31 Berthold-Bond
summarizes Hegel’s description of it as “a more or less complete separation
from reality and depletion of the capacities of rationality and volition”
(Berthold-Bond 1995: 20). Hegel dismisses this condition entirely: “It is the
merely vegetative existence without interest. This condition is wretched
and incurable” (LPS 145). Commentators describe it as “analogous to
modern diagnostic classifications of organic brain syndromes” (Berthold-
Bond 1995: 20) and “incurable because it stems from physiological causes”
(Mowad 2019: 276 n. 41).32
In other words, Hegel assumes that since this condition is “organic” or
“physiological” it is incurable. The condition is so closely associated with
29
In addition to the example of Alice Sheppard, above, we can also consider the habits and bodily
dexterity involved in navigating chronic illness (Dryden 2016: 13–17).
30
For example, in the work of Rod Michalko, such as Michalko (1999). Tobin Siebers argues for
a theory of complex embodiment that understands disability as “a body of knowledge” (Siebers
2019: 47).
31
It corresponds to Pinel’s “idiotisme,” and Hegel refers to Pinel both in the main text (PM §408R)
and in his lectures (PM §408Z, 123, LPS 145).
32
Both Berthold-Bond and Mowad refer to Blödsinnigkeit as equivalent to “mental retardation.” This
is no longer the appropriate term, but rather either “intellectual disability” or “intellectual develop-
mental disorder.”

146 jane dryden
nature that no emergence seems possible.33 Insofar as it seems to prevent any
human development, it is hard to conceive of how it can be overcome or
owned. Given Hegel’s insistence on the importance of human community,
however, it seems a failure of imagination to discard people. Recently
a number of philosophers have explored ways to integrate people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities into our moral communities.34
Carlson (2009) challenges the frequent philosophical assumption that intel-
lectual disability is static and homogeneous, as well as its association with
animality. Both of these seem to underlie Hegel’s assessment. It would be
worthwhile to explore whether, learning from this recent work, there may be
more nuanced possibilities for intellectual disability within the scope of
Hegelian thought, in which proximity to nature is not a disqualification
from community, and in which no one’s existence is “without interest.”
In general, examining the treatment of race, gender, and disability
within the “Anthropology” shows that an interpretation which focuses
on overcoming natural limitations will largely tend to preserve hierarchy.
An interpretation that focuses on ownership has some advantages, but also
encounters the problem of the link between nature and unfreedom.35
Within Hegel’s philosophy, qualities that distinguish people from the
presumed European, male, non-disabled norm tend to be associated with
nature and a lack of cultivation. Coming to claim them as one’s own, then,
risks reinforcing this association, unless we try to widen Hegel’s conception
of the kinds of embodiment compatible with the development of spirit.
7.6 The Anthropology Today

Regardless of our focus on overcoming or ownership, the underlying
framework of a hierarchy of development away from nature determines
what Hegel recognizes as free embodiment. Bringing the strains of over-
coming and ownership back together draws our attention to this hierarchy.
Alison Stone notes the same underlying hierarchy in the Philosophy of
History and encourages us to “think carefully and critically about how far to
take these inherited ideas forward and how we might do so differently”
33
This is somewhat ironic, since the main example Hegel invokes is cretinism (PM §408Z/122, LPS
145), which we now understand to be caused by an iodine deficiency, and thus in fact curable.
34
For example, in Carlson and Kittay (2010), Kittay (1999), and Wong (2002).
35
There are also limitations of the language of ownership, where it comes to our relationship to our
bodies, if our primary model is property. With respect to Hegel’s discussion of the body in the
Philosophy of Right, Ciavatta discusses models of ownership that need not be modeled on property
rights (Ciavatta 2005: 17–18). For a more general discussion of the body as property in European
philosophy, refer also to McWhorter (1999: 141–4).

(Stone 2020: 19). As Stone writes, “through his understanding of freedom
as involving spirit extricating itself from nature, that account has sustained
links with his Eurocentrism and so his pro-colonialism” (Stone 2020: 19).
A way to theorize the development of freedom for all the world’s peoples
might be “by saying that they have several conceptions of freedom where
freedom can, but does not have to, include self-liberation from nature”
(Stone 2020: 19).
This suggestion can be applied to the “Anthropology.” It is useful to
remember that the “Anthropology,” while coming at the beginning of the
Philosophy of Spirit, continually assumes later developments. Hegel notes
that “we must not regard the distinction between subjective and objective
mind as a rigid distinction” (PM §387, 26). Andreja Novakovic writes, “As
I read this reminder, Hegel is noting that human beings become conscious
subjects, not in the midst of brute nature, but in a social world that allows
them to make the most of what nature has given them” (Novakovic 2017:
409). If we pursue a conception of freedom that allows different kinds of
relation to nature, this can be reflected in our social world. If we expand
our social imaginary around what a “cultivated” body might do, how it
might behave, and what relation to nature it might have, we can open up
possibilities for a fuller account of the embodiments that free expressions of
spirit can include.
A birds-eye view of the “Anthropology” might take it to be a linear path
by which the soul gradually transforms the body, leading from the sleep of
spirit in the Philosophy of Nature to its self-conscious self-awareness in the
“Phenomenology” section of the Philosophy of Spirit. The details of this
trajectory, however, tell a more complicated story which can be prone to
reversals. The narrative of cultivating the body toward minimal particular-
ity and a universalized vision of maturity is complicated by the consider-
ation of race, disability, gender, and the ages of life. Given Hegel’s
insistence on the importance of the concrete rather than the merely
abstract, this should not come as a surprise. However, it is important for
us, in our interpretation of the text, to make sure that we are doing justice
to this complexity. This allows us to read the “Anthropology” not as
leaving nature behind, but as giving us a framework for understanding
how we bring nature with us as we develop in freedom.

chapter 8
Hegel’s Critique of Materialism

Joshua I. Wretzel
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,

Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Shakespeare, Hamlet (1.5.167–8)
8.1 Introduction
Under the entry on Hegel in his A History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand
Russell writes
From his early interest in mysticism [Hegel] retained a belief in the
unreality of separateness: the world, in his view, was not a collection of
hard units, whether atoms or souls, each completely self-subsistent. The
apparent self-subsistence of finite things appeared to him to be an illu-
sion; nothing, he held, is ultimately and completely real except the whole.
But he differed from Parmenides and Spinoza in conceiving the whole,
not as simple substance, but as a complex system, of the sort that we
should call an organism. The apparently separate things of which the
world seems to be composed are not simply an illusion; each has a greater
or lesser degree of reality, and its reality consists in an aspect of the whole,
which is what it is seen to be when viewed truly. (Russell 1945: 701–2)1
With this view in mind, Russell joined Moore at the vanguard of a century-
long movement, in Western philosophy, against idealist metaphysics.
Central to that movement was the notion that idealists relegated material
reality to a subordinate metaphysical status, that the realm of matter was
somehow “less real” than the immaterial realm of thought. Until recently,
Hegelians had combatted such claims by arguing that Hegel was less
interested in metaphysics and more interested in epistemology: Hegel’s
claims about mindedness had less to do with the metaphysical status of
1
For an alternative interpretation of this passage, see Stern (2009).
148

Hegel’s Critique of Materialism 149
objects and more to do with their being susceptible of cognition by
intellects like ours.2 But in the past few years, a number of major works
in Hegel scholarship have contributed to the notion that Hegel actually
held fairly robust metaphysical commitments.3
These works, insightful and impactful as they have been, have yet to
address the metaphysics of matter in Hegel. They leave unanswered
questions about how to respond to the charge that Hegel is an immateri-
alist – and whatever Russell gets wrong about Hegel, he is right about
that – and whether his immaterialism confirms all the worst about his
metaphysics. My aim in this chapter is to address these worries. I clarify
the terms of Hegel’s argument in order to show that his immaterialist
metaphysics provides a viable alternative to those who may be dissatisfied
with a “disenchanted” materialist outlook. I incorporate a three-pronged
approach in order to do so. First, I introduce and defend what I call
a “minimalist critique of materialism.” I show that what Hegel criticizes
in materialism is not the reality of matter, but only its ultimate reality.
That is, Hegel thinks that there are elements of reality that are explicable
in materialist terms, but that the greatest desideratum of metaphysics –
the so-called “absolute” – is not. As we shall see, Hegel’s way of putting
this is quite Kantian: he undertakes, in several places, an examination of
the scope and bounds of the materialist outlook. He shows that certain
phenomena – for instance, those in chemistry – fit quite nicely within the
materialist framework, while the phenomena of organic nature, say, fall
outside of it. His ultimate claim about materialism is thus not that matter
is unreal, but that it only constitutes an aspect of reality as a whole.
We must thus accept, I argue, that Hegel thinks there are immaterial
phenomena. In order to show how Hegel addresses such matters, I introduce
and defend, as my second “prong,” what I call a “minimalist conception of
immateriality” in Hegel. I argue that Hegel operates with a very specific
notion of matter: it refers, as we shall see, to mutually independent entities
that are formed by means of external activities upon them. So when Hegel
makes mention of the immaterial, he is only referring to entities that are not
material, i.e., that are not mutually interrelated and/or are formed by means
of their internal activity upon themselves.
But once we admit a conception of immateriality into our metaphysics,
Hegel thinks this changes the way we look at the way things are generally.
For Hegel thought that, once we grasped the nature of the immaterial, we
2
See Findlay (1962), Hartmann (1972), Pinkard (1996), and Pippin (1989).
3
See, e.g., Bowman (2013), Kreines (2015), and Yeomans (2012).

150 joshua i. wretzel
would start to see immaterial processes at work in all things. Hegel thus
starts to speak in rather extravagant terms about how all things strive
toward some ultimate immateriality. This represents the third element of
Hegel’s critique of materialism, what I shall call the “transformational
conception of immateriality.” This, I recognize, is a feature of Hegel’s
thought that is more difficult to take on. But as I shall argue, Hegel’s
extravagances are just his uniquely bold way of incorporating an expansive,
“re-enchanted” conception of nature, one that allows material reality to
exist alongside immaterial entities as Hegel conceives them.
This chapter shall proceed as follows. After a brief overview of Hegel’s take
on materialism in Section 8.2, I examine Hegel’s minimalist critique of
materialism in Sections 8.3–8.5. Specifically, I shall address the three central
sites of Hegel’s critique of materialism in the Encyclopedia Logic: they occur in
his treatments of empiricism (Section 8.3), pure quantity (Section 8.4), and the
“thing” (Section 8.5). I show how Hegel puts his critique in Kantian terms: he
speaks, at times explicitly, of the “right” to employ materialist terminology
when we do, as if he were answering a question quid juris about materialism.
I then turn, in Sections 8.6 and 8.7, to Hegel’s minimalist and trans-
formational conceptions of immateriality. Analyzing a key passage, §389 of
the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Mind, I show how Hegel unfolds
a conception of the soul as a facet of immaterial reality. As we shall see,
Hegel’s conception of the soul has very little to do with human immortal-
ity, and much more to do with unconscious processes of the developing
mind. Hegel describes these processes in immaterialist terms, again, accord-
ing to our minimalist conception: it is a self-developmental entity that
contains its form within itself. Bringing the self-determining structure of
the soul into focus, however, allows us to see processes of self-determination
alive within all of nature: it awakens us to the aesthetic, purposive unity of
nature at work in Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. This is, again, the
“transformational conception of immateriality” we spoke of above.
Taken together, then, the minimalist critique of materialism, the min-
imalist conception of immateriality, and the transformational conception
of immateriality all tend toward Hegel’s demonstration of a nature alive
with beauty and purpose, a philosophical version of the kind of nature
spoken of in the aesthetics of Kant and other post-Kantians.
8.2 Materialism According to Hegel

For Hegel, materialism characterizes the position that “matter as such
counts as the truly objective,” or that matter constitutes the ultimate reality

of all things (Hegel 2010a: §38Z, 81/8:1114). Matter itself he characterizes
according to three features.
1. Determination by form. In Hegel’s view of materialism, objects are what
they are by means of a synthesis of form and matter. Specifically, forms
shape matter, give it its determinacy. According to this view, every-
thing is “formed matter.”
2. For Hegel, materialists characterize these forms as “external” to matter :
the features of an object that give it its determinacy do not emanate
from any of its intrinsic features, but must come from without. So, for
instance, one needs the form of threeness to be added to a surface from
without in order to make it into a triangle. The threeness is not
“contained” within the surface.5
3. Hegel’s materialists also believe in the mutual indifference of matters (a)
to one another, (b) of matter to form, and (c) of parts to the whole of the
material object. This is to say that the interaction of different deter-
minate objects does not alter the objects themselves: hydrogen remains
hydrogen whether or not it is, say, in a water molecule. Similarly, the
determination of matter by form does not fundamentally alter either
the form or the matter: the surface remains essentially a surface,
whether or not it is delimited by threeness. And threeness remains
essentially threeness, whether it is delimiting a surface or not.
Hegel will ultimately disagree with all three of these central tenets of
materialism. But it bears emphasizing that this is a disagreement in
qualified form: there is a certain context, certain circumstances of applica-
tion, in which it makes perfect sense to think of things in accordance with
these tenets. Hegel’s point, as we shall see, is that we run into trouble when
we try to universalize them or mistake them for determinations of the
absolute.
8.3 Materialism, Empiricism, and Unfreedom

In the Vorbegriff to the Logic, Hegel contends that materialism character-
izes the underlying, metaphysical presupposition of all empiricist philoso-
phy. He also conjoins materialism with unfreedom, insofar as he thinks any
4
All references to the German cite volume and page number from Hegel (1970–1).
5
In this sense, there is an analogy between the external form of determination in Hegel and analyticity
in Kant: try though I might, I will never find the concept of “threeness” within the concept of
“surface.”

materialistic metaphysics is incompatible with a metaphysics of freedom.
Concerning the former, here is a characteristic passage:
The fundamental delusion in scientific empiricism is always that it uses the
metaphysical categories of matter, force (not to mention those of the one, the
many, universality, and infinity, etc.), and proceeds to make inferences guided by
such categories, all the while presupposing and applying the forms of syllogistic
inference, ignorant that in so doing it itself contains and pursues metaphysics
and that it uses those categories and their relationships in a completely uncritical
and unconscious fashion. (Hegel 2010a: §38 Anm., 79/8:108–9)
Empiricism, he claims, fails to address the issues with the metaphysical
categories that it nevertheless employs. As a philosophical approach, empiri-
cism has not yet attained the level of a science because it has not subjected
these metaphysical claims to rigorous critique, has not yet examined the
scope and bounds of their applicability. So there is a quid juris question
about materialism that empiricism needs to answer and yet has not.
Therefore, by relying on an unjustified materialism, empiricism smug-
gles in a problematic approach to its study of experience. This is due to
a principal feature of Hegel’s empiricist’s conception of matter, that wholes
can be divided into any number of primordially unrelated or mutually
independent parts (feature 3(c) of materialism, in the list above). This
empiricist formulates his theory of experience by applying this already
unjustified presupposition about objectivity to a theory of perception. On
this view, the objects of perceptual experience are wholes constituted of
pre-perceptual bits. Our various perceptual apparatuses then synthesize,
somehow, those bits into the whole object. The thought is that one may get
at those pre-perceptual bits by analyzing the whole as product into its pre-
perceptual, antecedent parts. Hegel says:
In order to have experiences, empiricism principally utilizes the form of analysis.
In perception, one possesses something concrete in multiple ways whose
determinations one is supposed to take apart like peeling away the layers of an
onion. This process of splitting them up is therefore intended to dissolve the
determinations that have grown together . . . Analysis is, however, the progres-
sion from the immediacy of perception to thought, insofar as the determin-
ations, which the object analyzed contains amalgamated within itself, receive the
form of universality by being separated. Because empiricism analyzes objects, it
is in error if it believes that it leaves them as they are, since it in fact transforms
the concrete into something abstract. (Hegel 2010a: §38Z, 80/8:109)
For the empiricist, there is some correspondence between the metaphysical
view that the objects of a specifically material reality are made up of

concatenated parts and the epistemological view that perceptual wholes are
made up of concatenated, pre-perceptual bits. Of course, the parts concat-
enated in each case are different – chemical elements, say, versus various
perceptual qualities – but the underlying assumption remains the same
both on the objective side and on the subjective side: that the whole object
is somehow less “real” than the constituent parts, which come to light only
by means of analysis.
Hegel also frequently associates materialism with a particular kind of
“unfreedom.” Thus he writes, just below the claim about analysis, that
. . . the abstraction called matter is supposed to be the foundation of
everything sensory, i.e., the sensory as such, the absolute individuation in
itself, and thus what are outside one another. Now, insofar as this sensory
component is and remains a given for empiricism, it is a doctrine of unfree-
dom [my emphasis], for freedom consists precisely in having no absolutely
other over against me, but depending instead only on a content that I am
myself. (Hegel 2010a: §38Z, 81/8:111)
In this passage, we see Hegel defending, in part, the views on epistemic
agency that Pippin, McDowell, and others have attributed to him. On this
view, one’s epistemic holdings are the result of one’s own epistemic
activity, i.e. the result of a thorough, rational investigation of all candidate
claims to know. But empiricists, first, think claims to know depend solely
on the direct delivery of sensory contents, and second, think those contents
are fundamentally irrational; thus, according to empiricism, one finds
oneself holding claims that one both has not and cannot affirm for oneself.
The subject, in this case, thus has no agency over its epistemic holdings, it
is just a matter of rote cause and effect.
8.4 Materialism and Quantity

Hegel’s critique of materialism also overlaps with his various criticisms of
the natural sciences. There, the claim will be that the natural sciences all
depend upon underlying metaphysical claims of one sort or another, and
that the former are ultimately limited by the latter. In Kantian fashion,
Hegel’s critique involves an examination of where those metaphysical
limitations lie. Hegel begins such investigations by introducing the rele-
vant metaphysical framework and then seeking to discover whether that
framework is absolute, or can explain matters of ultimate reality.6
6
I am indebted to Kreines’s work, here as elsewhere. Where Hegel differs from Kant is in what follows
when we find the explanatory framework wanting. Kant’s critique of the faculty of reason culminates

We find Hegel undertaking a relevant form of this critique in his
discussion of Pure Quantity (Hegel 2010a: §§99–100). There, Hegel
investigates the possibility that “the absolute is pure quantity,” or that
the way things are ultimately exhibits a quantitative structure. He holds
that “the standpoint [of pure quantity] ultimately coincides with deter-
mining the absolute as matter in which the form is indeed on hand, but as
an indifferent determination.” Again, for Hegel, discussions of “matter”
always involve the external determination of matter by form. In this
instance, the claim is that all form is a quantitative determination or
magnitude shaping matter from without.
The paradigmatic expression of quantitative classification is found, of
course, in mathematics. According to the broad terms in which Hegel
couches mathematical expression, it treats these determining forms as so-
called “quantitative magnitudes”: it categorizes, according to some num-
ber, the amount of some property present within a form, e.g., mass
according to kilograms, velocity according to kilometers per second. It
then employs these quantitative measurements in equations or formulas
which allow the construction of certain laws of relation between the various
magnitudes, as, e.g., the law of falling bodies posits a relation between mass
and velocity. Hegel does not wish to deny that there is a certain “correct-
ness” that is “immediately obvious to representational consciousness”
(Hegel 2010a: §99Z, 158/8:210). But terms like “correctness,” “immediacy,”
and “representational consciousness” all possess a negative connotation in
Hegelian language and refer to various modes of limitation or distance
from the absolute. Again, the limitation typically denotes a range of
applicability of some category, mode of expression, or explanatory frame-
work, where one may not employ these outside of that realm without also
expressing something untrue.
In this instance, perhaps the most apt indication of Hegel’s thoughts
on mathematics is his use of the word “correct.” Generally, for Hegel,
“correctness” refers to some merely conditioned concordance between
propositions and states of affairs. Here, Hegel is speaking of the “cor-
rectness” of specifically mathematical formulas: that he assigns them
mere “correctness” means that they apply only in certain circumstances.
Just as Kant thinks that the categories of quantity (unity, plurality,
in a kind of “humility” (see Ameriks (2000)), a need to remain within the boundaries of that
framework. Hegel, by contrast, sees a need to transcend those boundaries, to leave them behind. If
this cannot be done, typically this is demonstrated by an examination of a transitional moment,
where the explanatory framework reaches the limits of its explanatory efficacy and what happens
when one tries to transcend that limitation.

totality) only obtain within the realm of appearance, so does Hegel hold
that quantitative claims obtain only for so-called “representational con-
sciousness.” He is thus expressing agreement with Kant about the fact
that quantitative claims are not properly applicable to matters concern-
ing the highest aims of metaphysics, and thus agreement that it is
problematic to employ quantitative claims without knowledge of the
proper limits of their applicability. This is why Hegel says that, “when
quantity is taken up directly from representation without being medi-
ated by thinking, it easily happens that quantity is overestimated with
respect to its scope and even raised to an absolute category” (Hegel
2010a: §99Z, 158/8:210).
However, Kant and Hegel disagree about the implications of this limita-
tion. For one, Kant thinks this implies something about the limitations of
intellects like ours, while Hegel sees this merely as a limitation of an
explanatory framework, the fact that matters of ultimate reality cannot be
known in this way. For another, Hegel’s worry is that the Kantian kind of
limitation, to say that things can be known only insofar as they conform to
a quantitative determination, and are unknowable otherwise, leads to an
unacceptable subjectivism about matters of ultimate reality. He writes:
Our knowing would indeed be in bad shape, if, renouncing exact know-
ledge, we generally had to be satisfied merely with a vague representation of
such objects as freedom, law, the ethical life, even God himself, merely
because they cannot be measured and calculated or expressed in
a mathematical formula; and if, when it comes to the more specific or
particular details of those matters, it would be left to each individual’s
whim to make of it what they want. (Hegel 2010a: §99Z, 158/8:210)
But despite the overlap with Kant and the reference to the subjectivism of
this view, Hegel ultimately identifies this view on the quantitative deter-
mination of reality with materialism, specifically with the philosophes of the
French Enlightenment:
Looked at more closely, the exclusively mathematical standpoint mentioned
here (for which quantity, this specific stage of the logical idea, becomes
identical with the idea itself) is none other than materialism. Indeed, this is
fully confirmed in the history of scientific consciousness, notably in France
since the middle of the last century. The abstractness of matter is precisely
this: that the form is indeed on hand in it, but merely as an indifferent and
external determination. (Hegel 2010a: §99Z, 158/8:211)
This is feature 2 of materialism that we mentioned, in the list above. For
the materialist, form represents an external determination of matter: form

shapes matter from without. Hegel’s claim is that, where it is the case that
forms stand in relation to matter in this way, quantitative materialism is
a perfectly adequate framework. This is, again, what Hegel means by
“correct”: quantitative materialism is explanatorily applicable within
these bounds. But when we turn to matters of ultimate reality, materialism
loses its efficacy. That is not because these matters are unknowable – i.e.,
because there is no explanatory system that is adequate to them – nor is it
because he thinks such matters do not exist. Rather, it is because, for Hegel,
matters of ultimate reality cannot be couched in materialist terms. To see
what Hegel means, let us consider the case of freedom, one of the main
desiderata of the metaphysics of his time. According to Hegel, an entity
counts as free only insofar as it is self-determining, i.e., becomes what it is
by means of its own activity. This means that its form must, in a sense, be
internal to it: the free entity must be able to shape itself by means of itself.
But according to materialism, all formation is the activity of an external
form impinging upon matter. It thus rules out, a priori, any possibility of
admitting the reality of freedom.
Still, Hegel does not believe that quantitative modes of explanation are
without any explanatory import at all: there are bounds within which this
form of explanation is perfectly legitimate. Again, this is just what Hegel
means when he speaks of the “correctness” of pure quantity. And he admits
that quantity plays some role even in the determination of the absolute: he
refers, as an example, to the explanation of the divine as a trinity. But he also
hastens to add that “it is immediately obvious that when we contemplate
God as a trinity the number three has a much more subordinate significance
than if we were to contemplate the three dimensions of space, not to
mention the three sides of a triangle” (Hegel 2010a: §99Z, 158–9/8:211–12).
So the issue with quantity concerns the context of its application: the
phenomena under consideration and what it is we wish to say about them.
8.5 Materialism and Quality

Hegel’s next engagement with materialism occurs in his discussion of “the
thing” (Hegel 2010a: §§125–30). He defines the thing as an “identity” or
a singular entity containing many constitutive properties.7 He claims that,
while other classifications of what is identify the singular entity with its
properties, “the thing” has an independent existence over and above them,
so that
7
Cf. in the Phenomenology of Spirit: “Perception, or the thing and deception” (Hegel 2018a).

. . . the thing, while also existing concretely only insofar as it has properties,
is nevertheless not bound to this or that determinate property and thus can
even lose that very property without ceasing for that reason to be what it is.
(Hegel 2010a: §125Z, 193/8:256)
And Hegel adds that
. . . the properties are just as much identical with themselves, self-standing,
and freed from their being bound to the thing. However, because they are
the thing’s determinacies, different from one another as reflected-in-
themselves, they are not themselves things which are concrete, but instead
concrete existences, reflected in themselves as abstract determinacies, sorts of
matter [Materien]. (Hegel 2010a: §126, 193–4/8:257)
In other words, the relationship that obtains, both between the thing and
its properties, and of the various properties with one another, is that of
mutual indifference, feature 3(c) of materiality we spoke of, in the list above.
In this case, the thing and its various constituent properties gain their
determinacy, are what they are, by virtue of their not-being other things or
properties.
Conceiving of the underlying properties in terms of matters allows
a certain dependence relation between a thing and its constituent proper-
ties to come into focus. In this case, the thing becomes identified not with
any one of its matters, but with the concatenation of them. One finds the
paradigm case of such a “thing” in chemical compounds: water is what it is
not merely because it contains hydrogen or merely because it contains
oxygen, but because it contains the concatenation of them. Hegel thus says
that this form of materialism finds its proper expression in sciences like
chemistry and geology:
This analysis into self-standing stuff has its proper place only in inorganic
nature and it is the chemist’s right to analyze cooking salts or gypsum, for
example, into the stuff they consist of and then to say that the former
consists of hydrochloric acid and sodium bicarbonate and the latter of
sulfuric acid and calcium. Similarly, it is with right that the geologist may
regard granite to be composed of quartz, feldspar, and mica. (Hegel 2010a:
§126Z, 194/8:257–8)
The key word, here, is “right” or “Recht.” It is not that the chemist or
geologist is right to conduct their analyses in the fashion they do, but rather
that they possess the right to do so. Hegel is answering a question quid juris
about the term “matter”: he is showing with what right one might apply the
term “matter” to an explanation of what is. And, according to Hegel’s
minimalist critique, it is appropriate when applied to chemicals, rock

formations, or similar elements of inorganic nature. But one lacks the right
to apply this term more generally, as if all things were explicable by means
of a reduction to material components: this would be to transcend the
limits of the explanatory range of the term. Thus, to take a favorite example
of Hegel’s, the material form of explanation transcends its range of applic-
ability if it is applied to an explanation of organic nature:
Even within nature, in the case of organic life, this category proves to be
insufficient. One says, indeed, that this animal consists of bones, muscles,
nerves, and so forth, but it is immediately apparent that the context here is
different from the piece of granite consisting of the aforementioned sorts of
matter. The sorts of matter behave in a manner utterly indifferent to their
unification and can just as well subsist without the latter. By contrast, the
diverse parts of the organic body subsist only in their unification and,
separate from one another, they cease to exist concretely as such. (Hegel
2010a: §126Z, 194/8:258)
As we said above, the parts of a compound are indifferent to the whole:
hydrogen, sulfur, and oxygen remain what they are, even outside their
relationship to sulfuric acid. There is thus a certain contingency to their
formation: they don’t need to belong to sulfuric acid in order to be what
they are. And while Hegel admits that one may certainly find the same
contingency in organic matter, one fails to achieve the same kind of
explanatory sufficiency that one attains in chemical nature. Treating, say,
a lion as matter would not help to explain what a lion is or how it differs
from other species of animal. Reducing the lion to “bones, muscles, nerves,
and so forth” does not get at the “lion-ness” of the lion; these constituents
are only fully what they are in relation to the whole (here, the lion). In this
case, then, the parts bear a necessary relation to the whole: the nerves can
only be nerves – i.e., do what nerves do – when they are inside a living
organism. Thus one lacks the right to explain organic entities in this way
because the parts lack the contingent relationship to the whole present in
other parts of nature. Organic entities are, therefore, not fully material
according to Hegel’s understanding of the term.
8.6 Materialism and Mind

Hegel addresses materialist accounts of mind in §389 of the Encyclopedia, at
the beginning of the “Anthropology” section of the Philosophy of Mind. To
be sure, he distinguishes mind from soul, which Hegel understands as
something like an animating force alive within all organic nature. Here,
he’s speaking particularly of the human soul, which he considers to be the

basis from which Geist springs, as an acorn to an oak. But even at this
embryonic stage of the mind’s development, what is distinctive about it,
for Hegel, is its immateriality. He writes: “the soul is not only immaterial
for itself. It is the universal immateriality of nature, its simple ideal life”
(Hegel 2007c: §389, 29/10:43). There is some initial unclarity at work, here,
in the relationship between immateriality and ideality. It is at least under-
standable how one might construe this in terms of a commitment to esse est
percipi idealism. To make matters worse, he follows up with the assertion
that
Soul is the substance, the absolute foundation, of all the particularizing and
individualizing of mind, so that it is in the soul that mind finds all the stuff
of its determination, and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of
this determination. (Hegel 2007c)
It is, of course, easy to be overwhelmed by the metaphysical heft of passages
like this, and it is difficult to see how one might navigate the equation
between soul, substance, and immateriality without committing Hegel
either to a substance dualism or to a problematic idealism. For their part,
non-metaphysical Hegelians have tended to interpret passages like these in
largely epistemological terms, and so to think that, by calling the soul
“substance,” he is referring to it as the object of investigation for some
observing subject. But especially here in §389, Hegel spends too much time
speaking in explicitly metaphysical terms for an epistemological interpret-
ation to do full justice to it. Hegel is concerned not only with the
immateriality of the soul, as in the above passage, but also with attempts
materialists make to treat the mind as a material entity, not to mention
concerns with the formulation and materialist solution to the mind–body
problem. There is, in other words, too much metaphysics in this passage
for one to treat it with a simply epistemological reading.
But again, this does not mean that we need to treat Hegel as an esse est
percipi idealist, either: just because Hegel has a metaphysics, it doesn’t
mean he has that kind of metaphysics. Rather, we would do well to keep in
mind the conception of materiality at work in Hegel: matter consists of
mutually independent entities that are formed by means of external activ-
ities impinging upon them. When Hegel calls the mind “immaterial,” he is
only saying that it cannot be described in those terms. Instead, mind must
be the (determinate) negation of those things: it consists of mutually
interrelated parts and determines itself by means of its own activity. This
is what I called, at the outset, the minimalist conception of immateriality.
Thus, when Hegel calls the soul “the substance . . . of mind,” he means that

mind is not to be conceived of as a material formed by the impingement of
external forces upon it, but as an organic, embryonic, self-developing
structure that contains its form within it. Indeed, in the soul, the distinc-
tion between matter and form breaks down completely, so that Hegel will
say “it is in the soul that mind finds all the stuff” – i.e., neither form nor
matter – “of its determination.”
On the other hand, even if we accept the minimalist conception of
immateriality, it is hard to see how that allows Hegel to escape the problem
of substance dualism. And of course, Hegel was no dualist. In fact, when
Hegel turns his attention to materialist accounts of mind, it is in order to
praise them for their “enthusiastic endeavor” to overcome substance dual-
ism. It is just that, as he sees it, the monism of materialism moves in the
wrong direction. For, as he says,
. . . there is nothing more unsatisfactory than the discussions conducted in
materialistic writings of the various relationships and combinations by which
a result such as thinking is to be produced. Such discussions entirely overlook
the fact that, just as the cause is sublated in the effect, and the means in the
accomplished ends, so too that from which thinking is supposed to result is
conversely sublated in thinking, and that mind as such is not produced by an
Other, but raises itself from its being-in-itself to its being-for-itself, from its
concept to actuality, and makes that by which mind is supposed to be posited
into something posited by mind. (Hegel 2007c: §389Z, 33/10:49)
In order for materialism to account for thinking, it must be capable of
showing how something that determines itself arises from out of matter,
which is always determined by another. But this is not possible. Thus either
we need to rest content with a dissatisfying substance dualism, or we need
to reconsider the place of matter in metaphysics. Hegel considers the latter
option to be the one worth pursuing. This introduces what we called, at the
outset, the “transformational conception of immateriality”: once we rec-
ognize that thinking must result from immateriality, it shifts the way we
think about materiality as well. This is because, again, Hegel thinks there is
no way for immateriality to arise from materiality. So we must conceive of
what is in terms of its immateriality. Hegel makes several claims in this
section to this effect. For instance,
Since, then, everything material is sublated by the mind that is in itself and
at work within nature, and this sublation is consummated in the substance
of soul, the soul emerges as the ideality of everything material, as all imma-
teriality, so that everything called matter, however much it simulates inde-
pendence to representation, is known to have no independence in the face of
mind. (Hegel 2007c: S389Z, 32/10:47)

Or, when speaking of the attempt to construct a dualistic opposition
between mind and body, that
. . . this way of posing it . . . must be recognized as inadmissible; for in truth
the immaterial is not related to the material as a particular is to a particular,
but as the genuine universal which overarches particularity is related to
a particular; the material in its particularizations has no truth, no independ-
ence in the face of the material. Consequently . . . the separation of the
material and the immaterial can be explained only on the basis of the
original unity of both. (Hegel 2007c: S389Z, 33/10:48)
These are strong claims that Hegel is making, and they seem to confirm
all the worst suppositions about Hegel’s idealism. But there are at least
two ways to understand them that do not seem so objectionable. For
one, these claims may be read as lending credence to the metaphysical/
epistemological claims about the knowability of a merely material
nature. What one grasps in thought is not a substance existing partes
extra partes, but a conceptual whole. This belongs to the class of what
have come to be known as “conceptual realist” interpretations of Hegel’s
thought.
For another, in the Encyclopedia, this discussion of the transformational
conception of immateriality follows on the heels of the Philosophy of
Nature, which Hegel describes in terms of another kind of transform-
ational experience. As Martin (unpublished) has recently written, Hegel
opens that text by showing how our ordinary attitudes toward nature are
underwritten by and presuppose an aesthetic attitude, which views it as
a purposive unity. One may well understand the transformational concep-
tion of immateriality in these terms: there is simply no way to understand
the fit between mind and nature without also fundamentally changing the
way we understand nature.
This means that, even in those moments where Hegel seems to think
that matter belongs in nature, i.e., when discussing matter in its qualitative
or quantitative context, the mere adequacy or mere correctness of material-
ism comes from its ultimate failure to grasp how these phenomena are part
of larger, purposive activities at work within them. He says:
The philosophy of nature teaches us how nature sublates its externality by
stages, how matter already refutes the independence of the individual, of the
many, by gravity, and how this refutation begun by gravity, and still more by
simple, indivisible light, is completed by animal life, by the sentient creature,
since this reveals to us the omnipresence of the one soul at every point of its
bodiliness, and so the sublatedness of the asunderness of matter. (Hegel
2007c: S389Z, 32/10:47)

According to the minimalist critique of immateriality, again, Hegel does
not want to deny the reality of matter or processes explained in materialis-
tic terms. But materialism fails to see these processes as part of a larger
process, unfolding in a way that eludes materialistic explanation. In order
to grasp such things as self-causation or, as he says here, a whole that
precedes and is present in each of the parts, we need to alter our conception
of what nature is and what is contained within it.
8.7 The Transformational Conception and the Immaterial Mind

These points about the transformational conception of immateriality are
not ones that we might expect to move the materialist skeptic, but they do
unite Hegel with the re-enchanted conceptions of nature alive within Kant
and the post-Kantian tradition. Kant agreed that materialist explanations
of nature are applicable only within the realm of appearance and also
thought that this conception of nature could not accommodate the exist-
ence of self-causing entities.8 But Kant thought that immaterialist elements
of nature, such as self-causing entities, were completely unknowable by
intellects like ours. Thus, Kant’s minimalist critique of materialism consists
of his saying that we have the capacity to grasp materialist elements of
nature, but that they are the only elements of nature we have the capacity to
grasp. Hegel moves beyond Kant by developing the means to grasp
immaterial nature as well.
But there remains a question about what sort of thing an immaterial
mind is: how it functions, what it does. Hegel’s view presents an intensifi-
cation of other figures in the classical German tradition: following Fichte,
Hegel sees a fundamental connection between the conception of the self
one adopts and the conception of the not-self. In this case, there is such
a connection between the manifoldness of the self and the manifoldness of
the not-self. In its initial, pre-reflective stages, then, there is a manifoldness
of the not-self corresponding to the manifoldness of the self. And, to be
sure, what separates Hegel from Fichte is the belief that the positing of the
self does not create the not-self as product: the strongest claim we could
make in this direction is to say that the positing of the self places limits on
what aspects of the not-self are open to it. Thus, if one posits oneself as
manifold, this limits one to a view of the not-self as (merely) manifold. For,
as Kant himself says, the unified object is only for a subject that is capable
of unifying it, and only a self that is constituted as a unity is capable of
8
Kant (2000: §63, 239/1968: 5:366–7 and ff.).

unifying it. Thus when speaking of sensation in the Anthropology, Hegel
says:
The subjectivity of sensation must . . . be sought . . . in the fact that he posits
something in his natural [my emphasis], immediate, individual subjectivity,
not in his free, spiritual, universal subjectivity. This natural subjectivity is
not yet a self-determining subjectivity following its own law and acting in
a necessary manner but a subjectivity determined from outside, tied to this
space and this time, dependent on contingent circumstances. (Hegel 2007c:
§400Z, 71/10:100)
The key word in this passage is “natural,” which Hegel always associates with
varying kinds of externality. The externality of nature is most present in its
mechanistic form and becomes increasingly internalized as it develops. But
even in its most sophisticated, “organic” form, nature remains external to
itself. Even though the organism consists of an internal, self-developmental
process, it remains unaware of itself as an organism. And that lacuna in
nature is what occasions the transition from Natur to Geist.9 Thus, in this
part of the text, Hegel is describing a subject still mainly immersed in nature,
still mostly unaware of itself. The description of a subject thus tied merely to
“this space and to this time” is a description of a subject with only discrete,
independent moments of self-awareness, with those moments standing in no
connection to each other: this I in this spatiotemporal location bears no
relation to this I in now this spatiotemporal location. The subject does not
yet see that both of those moments belong to it, that it is the same I in both
spatiotemporal locations. Since, according to the Kantian notion of apper-
ception, the self cannot unify the object unless it is, itself, unified, a subject
that remains external to itself can only see the world as similarly disjointed.
That is why the standpoint of sensation has the structure it does.
This is an argumentative gambit that appears throughout Hegel’s work, but
also at three different points in the Philosophy of Spirit: the “Anthropology,”
the “Phenomenology of Spirit,” and the “Psychology.” This is, itself, indica-
tive of a process of internalization occurring at a higher level, a process of
increasing self-awareness of the process of internalization: the argument
remains the same, but the context in which it appears changes in each case.
In the “Anthropology,” we read of the human as a biological kind: thus, there
is a kind of externality present here in the sense that the object of study – the
human organism – remains external to/from the internalizing/synthetic cap-
acities of the one undertaking the investigation. In the “Phenomenology of
9
See Wretzel (2020).

Spirit,” we read of the I as an abstraction: one grasps the I as subject, but only as
a theoretical construct: one does not yet see oneself reflected in the object of
investigation. That only happens, initially, in the “Psychology.” For as Hegel
there says, each stage of the process of internalization reflects on the previous
stage: thus,
as consciousness [in the “Phenomenology of Spirit”] has as its object the
preceeding stage, the natural soul [i.e., “Anthropology”], so mind [i.e.,
“Psychology”] has consciousness as its object or rather makes it its object,
i.e. whereas consciousness is only in itself the identity of the I with its other
(§415), the mind posits this identity for itself, so that mind is now aware of it,
of this concrete unity. (Hegel 2007c: §443, 169/10:236)
Because it is only in psychology that the self begins a fully explicit reflection
on oneself, it is only in the “Psychology” that the mind becomes fully
internal. Thus, what we see in each case of this progression is an increas-
ingly immaterial process according to the terms we laid out above. The
“Anthropology” considers a mind largely unaware of itself and so largely
external. The subject of study in the “Anthropology” thus represents the
subject in its most material state. By contrast, a subject that learns about
itself by means of reflection on its own conscious activity is engaged in
a form of internal determination, and so exhibits the kind of immateriality
we spoke of above.
8.8 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to reconfigure the way Hegelians ought to respond
to the materialist skepticism of early analytic philosophy. It used to be that
Hegelians did so by denying that Hegel had any robust metaphysical
commitments; but with the advent of more recent, metaphysical interpret-
ations of Hegel, there arises, also, the need to revisit Hegel’s metaphysical
language and see how it squares with these early analytic critiques. We now
need to take seriously, once again, that Hegel rejected metaphysical posi-
tions like materialism with the aim of establishing his own immaterialism
in their stead. What I hope to have shown, here, is that Hegel had good
reason for doing so, that his shift to immaterialism is not the reckless
abstraction of a dogmatic idealist, but a sober attempt to realize the highest
aims of metaphysics. His position against materialism is, for one, quite
nuanced: it is, as I have argued, a minimalist critique of materiality that
rejects only the notion that all things possess the various forms of external-
ity present in material things. This Hegel pairs with what I called his

“minimalist conception of immateriality,” the notion that some things
exhibit an “internal” structure that cannot be accounted for in materialist
terms.
Thus, the real “extravagance” of Hegel’s metaphysics concerns his
“transformational conception of immateriality,” the notion that, once we
realize the processes of immateriality at work within the mind, we realize
them at work within all things. But even this is not so extravagant as it may
seem at first glance; for all Hegel means by this is that there is more to
things than what appears to us at first glance, that there is, as Kreines (2015)
expresses it, “reason in the world.” This is what I hope to have shown.

chapter 9
Hegel’s Psychology
The Unity of Theoretical and Practical Mind
Dean Moyar
The “Psychology” section of the Encyclopedia is situated between

“Phenomenology” and “Objective Spirit,” the two parts of the Philosophy
of Spirit that Hegel published in expanded form as the Jena Phenomenology
of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right (PR).1 The “Psychology” has long been
overshadowed by its neighbors and neglected by scholars, and while the
text has recently received some much overdue attention,2 the account is
still often read as an addendum to the Phenomenology or a precursor to the
Philosophy of Right. The first main interpretive challenge is to provide
a clear account of why Hegel’s distinctive understanding of the structure
of self-consciousness, the Concept, enables him to develop a unified
account of the theoretical and practical capacities. Without such an
account, Hegel’s compressed treatment of intuition, representation, the
drives, etc., will seem like so much repackaging of familiar themes from
Kant and Fichte. In this short chapter I cannot provide a full reconstruc-
tion of Hegel’s view, or a full comparison with his predecessors. I will chart
the main stages of the account and the unity of the “Psychology” with
specific attention to the role of the Concept, Hegel’s signature structure of
self-referring negativity and self-particularizing universality.3 The goal of
Hegel’s account is the theory of free mind in which the theoretical capaci-
ties (intuition, representation, thinking) are united with the practical
1
The translation of Geist as spirit is especially unfortunate in the case of the subject matter of the
“Psychology,” since here, if anywhere, we have Hegel’s treatment of what philosophers refer to in
English as philosophy of mind. For that reason I follow Inwood’s translation in Hegel (2007c) and
Herrmann-Sinai and Zigliogli (2016) in using “mind” in my title and in the passages from the text.
I leave “spirit” for titles of Hegel’s works and elsewhere.
2
See the essays in Herrmann-Sinai and Zigliogli (2016). Herrmann-Sinai (2016) and Ikäheimo (2017)
are exemplary efforts to capture the unity of “Psychology” in a single essay. On “Theoretical Mind,”
I have been guided by DeVries (1988) and Halbig (2002).
3
The Concept is not only a structure of universality, particularity, and individuality, but also the
activity of unification of those three moments. For a discussion of why the Concept should be
equated with self-referring negativity, see Bowman (2013).
166

Hegel’s Psychology 167
capacities (choice, drive, happiness). I argue that free mind should be
conceived as the capacity to make valid practical inferences, where those
inferences have the form of the purpose that is the key to Hegelian
rationality.
The second interpretive challenge is to bring the distinctive Hegelian
method to bear in a way that makes sense of well-known phenomena and
solves well-known problems. In this chapter I read the “Psychology”
through the classic question of whether knowing the good is sufficient
for acting on the good. I call this the internalism question because it
concerns the issue of whether motivation to act on the good is internal
to knowledge of the good. The affirmative answer, usually dubbed “intel-
lectualist” and attributed to Plato, is that if one knows the good one will act
on it.4 The negative answer to the question often focuses on the issue of
weakness of will and other such counternormative phenomena in which one
acts contrary to one’s knowledge and judgment of the good. Hegel’s views
on this question have been hard to pin down, and most of the discussions
have been focused on the theory of “Objective Spirit” laid out in the
Philosophy of Right. But the structure of the “Psychology” makes it the
more obvious place to look for Hegel’s answer, for his “free mind” just is
the unity of the judging (and inferring) capacities of the intellect with the
volitional capacities of the will. I argue that while the free mind, as the
structure of the practical inference, does to a great extent identify the will
with practical reason, Hegel is also able through the Concept to make room
for the counternormative within the normative. Showing how the deriv-
ation of free mind gives us a new way to think about familiar capacities and
the internalism question also provides an indirect proof of Hegel’s Concept
itself.
9.1 The Internalism Question

Hegel’s unification of thinking and willing can seem to make him an
intellectualist who holds that one does not really will if one fails to do
what one knows to be right. Robert Pippin thus writes, “Hegel’s notion of
the will is simply practical reason, and so his position is more Socratic –
there is no weakness of the will. There is only ignorance, self-deceit and
self-discovery.”5 Pippin is denying that on Hegel’s picture one can genu-
inely will and then fail in one’s specific willing to live up to that original
willing. One’s will, as united with thinking, just is practical reason, so if
4 5
For Plato’s classic statement, see Protagoras 358b–c. Pippin (2008: 165).

168 dean moyar
you fail to act on what you claim is your purpose, that just means that you
never really willed that purpose. If you had genuinely willed the purpose,
rather than deceiving yourself that you had willed it, you would have taken
the specific means to bring it about. Though Hegel does indeed bring the
will and reason quite close, there are also grounds for thinking that Hegel
would admit counternormative action into the picture, for he discusses as
commonplace many cases in which knowing the good and willing the good
come apart.6 In his discussion of evil in PR §139, for instance, Hegel seems
to think that the self-conscious agent can very easily will an action in which
her particular motives are preferred over what she knows to be the universal
(I return to this passage at the end of the essay). I argue in this chapter that
a main attraction of Hegel’s view in the “Psychology” is that alongside
making a case for the unity of thinking and willing, and thereby arguing for
internalism, he lays out stages of theoretical and practical activity that help
explain, and thus render intelligible, cases of counternormative agency.
The internalism question turns on the issue of how closely to identify
the judgment of what action is good and the actual acting (or willing) on
that judgment. The intellectualist or Socratic position is that if one truly
judges, and thus truly knows the good, one cannot then fail to act on it.
Failure to act would instead be evidence that one did not truly judge or
truly know in the first place. Weakness of will seems to be a problem for the
intellectualist internalist because cases in which one’s will does not follow
judgment indicate that knowing and acting can easily come apart. It seems
more natural to say with the voluntarist that you really did in fact will the
good and then subsequently failed to live up to your willing. The intellec-
tualist internalist says that you never really did will the good, but only
deceived yourself into thinking you did. You discover (Pippin’s “self-
discovery”) that what you thought was a genuine act of willing (a commit-
ment) was in fact a semblance of willing – your heart was not really in it, as
we like to say. The internalist holds that a genuine act of willing just is
a robust commitment to what one has judged to be good (willing is
practical reason), so we should not countenance as genuine a judgment
of the good that does not motivate or a willing of the good that turns out to
be too weak for the agent to actually follow through.
The voluntarist position typically goes together with a certain judgment
externalism and the acceptance of weakness of will. On this view, it is
perfectly normal to think of willing something and then failing to live up to
that, without thereby saying “oh, I guess I never really did will that after
6
See Alznauer (2015: 101–2) on this point.

all.” One can simply judge the good, and even adopt its pursuit as one’s
intention, and yet not thereby be sufficiently motivated to follow through
with action on the good. It happens all the time. The voluntarist does not
see the point in reserving “willing” for “truly willing,” i.e., for the judg-
ments of the good that one succeeds in following through on. Similarly, the
voluntarist thinks that one can make valid judgments of what one is
supposed to do without thereby being motivated to action.
The best response to this voluntarist challenge is to emphasize that our
understanding of rational agency breaks down if we allow the will to come
too far apart from rational assessment (judgment). The situation that the
externalist asks us to take seriously is one in which I judge that “X is the
right (rational) thing for me to do,” thereby declaring that it ought to
govern my willing, and then I choose to do something else. In order to
make the choice against one’s judgment seem intuitive, the externalist
voluntarist relies on the lack of motivational efficacy of the judgment.
But the internalist can say that such a judgment is supposed to be practical
in a sense that already involves commitment. As Gary Watson writes, “In
weakness of will, properly so-called, one goes against the grain of one’s own
commitments, and this is an appropriate description only if practical
judgement constitutes a commitment to act. On the externalist view,
however, going against reasons must always come down to a choice
among possible commitments” (Watson 2004, 134). Being a rational
agent means governing one’s volition through one’s judgment. To think
of volition as a power of choice standing over against one’s judgment is to
threaten the very idea of rational agency. Yet internalists do have to find
a way to account for choice against the good. When I act against my
rational assessment, it cannot be that I thereby cease to be an agent at all, as
if I was simply taken over by desire. Counternormative agency has to be
preserved as intelligible within the overall account of rational agency.
The internalism question is typically thought to be a central question in
moral psychology and theories of practical reason. It can seem that debates
over the right answer inevitably end in a standoff over which cases – those
of the virtuous or those of the wayward – we take to be central. One way to
prevent such a standoff is by building up an account of the virtuous agent
from more basic human capacities of representing and choosing. The
strength of the internalist case very much turns on the link of representa-
tion and judgment, on the one hand, to the conative capacities associated
with motivation and the will, on the other. The internalist aims to
demonstrate a close connection of the cognitive and conative in the
virtuous agent, but the internalist need not allow herself to be blindsided

170 dean moyar
by tales of the wayward. She can demonstrate the willing within knowing,
and the knowing within willing, at every less than complete stage of
agency, and also show that those stages are incomplete forms of the full
agency that develops out of them. By preemptively accounting for the
powers that disrupt the link of knowing and acting, and by showing how
those should be conceived as stemming from limited but still essential
capacities of the normal agent, the internalist can defend a normative
account as more than simply a stipulation that good agency is real agency.
Hegel is in a good position to answer the internalism question because of
his interpretation of the form of conceptuality as self-referring negativity
and self-particularizing universality. Hegel’s Concept is many things, and
it makes an official appearance in “Psychology” only in the section on
“thinking,” but as the core of Hegel’s concept of mind and his method-
ology the Concept is pervasive. The derivation of content from self-
consciousness that Hegel takes over from Fichte is so much more fruitful
in Hegel’s hands because of his conception of a three-fold Concept that
internally differentiates its universality and restores that unity in a concrete
whole of “moments.” In terms of internalism, we can appreciate Hegel’s
innovation through his ability not only to derive the universality of the
capacities and norms, but also to unpack the opposition of particularity
within that universality. Every universal is tied to the particular, so every
universal norm is bound to particular modes of specification and realiza-
tion. With a picture of mind as fundamentally a power of unification,
uniting both a manifold of representation and a manifold of drives, Hegel’s
internalist account develops a harmony of knowing and acting at a very
deep level. The way to deal with the counternormative is not to disqualify
it as a non-entity but rather to identify its source and show its suspension
(Aufhebung) in the next stages. In contrast to Fichte, who endorses
a representationalist internalism that rules out counternormative
agency,7 Hegel holds that the universal is not simply a blank positive
under which individuals are subsumed. The universal itself is determinate,
and thus always related to the particular.8 Hegel thinks of the universal as
reaching its true form in the form of a purpose or end that contains the
particular means to its realization and re-unites with itself in the end’s
7
Fichte writes in his “System of Ethics,” “It is absolutely impossible and contradictory that anyone
with a clear consciousness of his duty at the moment he acts could, with good consciousness, decide
not to do his duty, that he should rebel against the law, refusing to obey it and making it his maxim not
to do his duty, because it is his duty” (Fichte 1971c (henceforth SW): IV:191–2, 1988 (henceforth SE):
181–2).
8
See PR §6, where Hegel explicitly notes this point of contrast with Fichte.

realization. In the end Hegel incorporates a voluntarist element within his
overall internalism and can thereby defend the claim that to know the good
is to be in a good position to will it even while acknowledging a genuine
power of the will to act against one’s knowledge.
9.2 Theoretical Mind

The starting point of “Psychology” is the standpoint of reason that has been
achieved by the previous “Phenomenology” section. In the
“Phenomenology” the opposition of subject and object is overcome in
the “universal self-consciousness,” the basis of the idealism that is evident in
his formulations of reason as an identity of mind and world. Though there
is a real advance in “Phenomenology,” in approaching the “Psychology”
text we must not think of Hegel’s procedure as purely linear, a view that
would lead us to think that all the progress of the “Phenomenology” is
already contained in the first level of “Psychology.” Rather, as Heikki
Ikäheimo (2017) has shown, we have instead a largely parallel structure in
which the three moments of both consciousness and self-consciousness
parallel the three moments of theoretical mind and practical mind.9 This
parallel structure allows Hegel to consider different levels of the subject–
object relation in isolation while simultaneously building them into
a picture of the whole. It is owing to this structure that practical activity
can be mentioned already within the theoretical shapes. Thus, while you
might think that his method bars him from referring in the theoretical
section to practical shapes that he has not yet introduced, these inter-
dependencies are a feature, not a bug, of the approach. They highlight the
unity presupposed at the outset of “Psychology” and achieved in explicit
form at the conclusion of the text.
In the beginning the material of knowledge is given, but it is already (by
virtue of the standpoint of psychology) given to mind, and the deficiency of the
standpoint is that the mind has not fully appropriated the material for itself.
Hegel writes, “Thus, when in its initial stages the mind is determined, this
determinacy is twofold, a determinacy of what is and a determinacy of what is
its own; by the former, the mind finds within itself something that is, by the
latter it posits it only as its own” (§443). The difference between these two
moments is the mind’s finitude. Each of the three main stages – intuition,
9
This is closely related to the distinction made by Corti (2016) between “descriptivist” and “recon-
structivist” readings of the “Psychology.” In my view the reconstructivist reading is in a better
position to capture the non-linearity of the account.

172 dean moyar
representation, thinking – itself has three moments that follow Hegel’s
usual progression of immediacy, mediation, and a return to immediacy
on the basis of rational relations. There is an initial inarticulate unity of
what is and what is my own, followed by a breaking apart of the two
moments through the activity of the subject, and then a restoration of the
unity. My argument focuses on the three “middle” stages – attention,
imagination, and judgment – for it is in these capacities that we find the
negative activity that both prepares the content for full normative unity and
leads the subject to go astray in counternormative cases. The immediate
unity is broken up in order to be re-articulated, and herein lies the dissolving
and binding power of the mind. But in failures of attention, arbitrary
imagining, and judgment that favors particularity over universality we also
have some of the basic cognitive sources of counternormative action.
In the initial account of “Intuition” the two moments – “what is” and
“what is its own” – are immediately identical. Hegel identifies “feeling” as
the first moment of intuition, a form of “contingent particularity”
(Encyclopedia [E] §447) that reappears at the outset of practical mind as
well (where he is more positive about it, as we shall see in Section 9.3). In
the second moment of “Intuition,” attention, the identity of mind and
world involves both a taking in and a casting out. The taking in is “the
moment of its own, but as the still formal self-determination of the intelli-
gence” (E §448).10 Hegel unites this with the positing of externality
through his conception of self-referring negativity:
The other moment is thus: contrary to its own inwardness, the intelligence
posits the determinacy of feeling as a being, but as a negative, as the abstract
otherness of its own self. Intelligence hereby determines the content of
sensation as a being that is outside itself, casts it out into space and time,
which are the forms in which intelligence is intuitive. According to conscious-
ness the material is only an object of consciousness, a relative other; from
mind it receives the rational determination of being the other of itself. (E §448)
There is a lot going on in this passage, touching as it does on issues central
to Kant’s transcendental aesthetic and Hegel’s differentiation of “con-
sciousness” and “intelligence.”11 The crucial point is Hegel’s distinctive
10
References to the Encyclopedia provide the section number of the 1830 edition. Translations are from
Hegel (2007c), with some emendations.
11
There is a complicated story about Hegel’s relation to Kant’s transcendental idealism. See DeVries
(1988: 111ff.), for a good account of Hegel’s treatment of space and time here. The short version of the
story is that Hegel aims to avoid Kant’s “subjective idealism” by claiming that space and time are real
determinations, while also holding that the mind takes sensation to be in space and time and thus
realizes what they already were in themselves. See also DeVries (2016).

conception of the negativity of self-conscious intelligence, which allows
Hegel to think of the external “as the abstract otherness of its own self” and
as “being the other of itself.” The negation is what determines the object as
an other (a Fichtean not-I); in its simultaneous self-reference intelligence
also identifies the object as its own. This move is an instance of Hegel
overcoming a dualism of subject (I) and object (not-I) by treating the self-
and object-reference as one and the same act. The relevance of this move to
our issue of counternormativity is not immediately apparent, but as a first
gloss we can say that the activity that generates norms is not simply and
solely universal (as Fichte’s I is abstractly universal), but rather is always
a unity of abstract universality and particularity. The normative must
include particularity, the source of the counternormative, rather than
exclude particularity by stipulation as the intellectualist is tempted to do.
The full (normative) form of intuition shows already how Hegel thinks
of the discipline of the mind in the process of moving from feeling to
thinking. While attention is an act of will as choice (Willkür), and thus
something potentially arbitrary, Hegel also takes pains in the lectures to tie
it to education and the full objectivity of developed intuition. In the
lectures we find Hegel claiming “that attention is something dependent
on my choice [Willkür], therefore, that I am only attentive when I will to be
so” (E §448Z). Yet he also writes that attention “involves the negation of
one’s own self-assertion and devoting oneself to the subject-matter [Sache]”
(E §448Z). As an example of the link of education and attention he cites
the expert botanist who “notices incomparably more in a plant” (E §448Z)
as the result of study. Intuition does not get left behind in such cognition,
but is rather enriched and expanded as the result of thinking. These
references to expert intuition are a prime example of the “top down”
reading of the stages from the endpoint of developed knowledge and
properly functioning practical reason. As Ikäheimo has emphasized, this
complements the “bottom up” approach that deduces the stages from
a more basic conception of our animal nature (Ikäheimo 2017). The stages
on the way up must be compatible with the full normative picture achieved
at the end, a point I emphasize in my discussion of “Practical Mind” below.
In the second phase of theoretical mind, “Representation,” the moment
of “my own” comes to the fore, as the power of intelligence over “what is”
expands by further internalizing the material and by developing the cap-
acity for re-externalization. The first main move of representation is to
isolate the external singular intuition from its merely external connections
by taking it up as an image, and thereby placing the content in the space
and time of intelligence, in “the universality of the I in general” (E §452).

174 dean moyar
The images are stored in the “universal pit” (E §455) of intelligence,
waiting to be called up by the reproductive imagination in what is usually
called the association of ideas. In the lectures we get a better sense of how
Hegel conceives the activity of binding the ideas together in association:
What concerns us here is only the bond, the connection between the objects. In
this connection the intelligence singles out, emphasizes, and lays hold of one
particular aspect. The intelligence is attentive to the images that are present
before it, but since it is the subject of this content, the content itself is no longer
internally connected; rather, the intelligence itself holds it together, and can
equally allow it to fall apart. The intelligence can pull apart the concrete image,
and since it thus dissolves the concrete images, it has particular determinations
before itself, and so one particular representation is singled out for emphasis,
which the intelligence makes into the connection with another representation.
(Hegel 1994 (henceforth VPG): 204, 2007b (henceforth LPS): 220–1)
This activity is itself a form of attention, but here intelligence “is the
subject of this content,” indicating the way that the content has been
more fully internalized. The intelligence can hold the intuition together,
now with itself as the unifying factor, or break it up into component
particulars that it can recombine at will. Hegel aligns this dissolving ability
of intelligence with the ability to break up the concrete material of intu-
ition into particulars. There remains at this level a certain arbitrariness in
the subjection of the images to self-consciousness.
The completion of imagination is already a move to the normative or
“substantial.” In fantasy or productive imagination the mind is able to
generate signs, language, and thus to re-externalize the content that it had
previously (in an immediate form) internalized. “The substantial [act of]
connection is productive imagination, which can be symbolizing, allegor-
izing, or poetic” (VPG 205, LPS 221). Spirit is united with the world not
simply by conforming to what is, but by making that its own and gaining
mastery over the content by drawing out its objectivity. Here we have
a clear sense in which the taking to be true has as its completion, or
realization, a making true in the objectification of representation through
language. In the final phase of representation, memory takes up the linguis-
tic sign into a new process of reproduction and solidification of meaning.12
Hegel holds that the final level of theoretical mind, thinking proper, is from
the beginning fundamentally normative. We thus find, at the opening of his
lectures on thinking, “Everything that is untrue in the world consists in the
12
For an excellent account of how language emerges as a requirement for actions, see Herrmann-Sinai
(2016).

fact that the objectivity does not correspond to the concept. A bad man can
exist, but what exists in the world does not correspond to its concept, and this
non-coincidence is its finitude” (VPG 228, LPS 240). In its first phase,
thinking is only the abstraction of the understanding. This level is nonetheless
quite important, as Hegel illustrates with the idea of acting on an essential
purpose. “Now if it separates off the contingent from the essential it is entirely
within its rights and appears as what in truth it ought to be. Therefore,
someone who pursues an essential purpose is called a man of understanding”
(E §467Z). The ability to remain focused on a purpose, to not be distracted
from the essential by contingent factors, is a mark of the understanding. Then
again, this very fixity can become “one-sided,” and thereby “become the
opposite of sound common sense” (§467Z). Think, for example, of the obsessive
quest of some parents to get their children into a top university.
Judgment, the second stage of thinking, is characterized by the power to
separate out the different aspects of a concrete whole and then to re-unite
those different aspects in a conclusive or normative judgment (what Hegel
calls the judgment of the concept). In contrast to the simple universality of
the first stage, this second stage does not refer everything to a single
universal, but rather breaks up the substantial universal into separate
predicates through which an object can be related to other objects (e.g.,
both a soccer ball and a car tire are round). In the practical domain we say
that it takes judgment, rather than the mere universality of the understand-
ing, to know how to adjust one’s actions to the various circumstances of
a given case. In Hegel’s speculative terms, it can seem that judgment most
fully captures thought as “self-explicating, self-determining, self-
specifying, positing the particularity, judging and coinciding with itself”
(VPG 229, LPS 241). But Hegel worries about the reliance on judgment as
a reliance on the particularity or contingent insight of the judging subject.
His identification of formal conscience with judgment and his critique of
its formality is a good indication of this deficiency (PR §137–8).
With the inference, thinking finally achieves the truth that theoretical
mind has been aiming for all along. This truth turns out to be a truth of
action, of something the mind does, and does in a free manner because all
givenness, or immediacy, has been overcome. In the Logic Hegel criticizes
the formal inferences (Aristotelian syllogisms) and gives six non-formal
types of inference, but the full form of the inference comes only with the
teleological or practical inference.13 In other words, thinking as inferring has
13
See Moyar (2018). The “inferences of necessity” come close, but they are not the inferences of the
Concept, which Hegel clearly identifies with the purpose.

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a purposive structure. Hegel comes close to identifying inference with
practical inference when in the lectures he takes the end or purpose as
the typical form and content of the inference: “The inference is the activity
of the rational in general. In ordinary life one designates as rational that
which is in and for itself, something firm; a self-standing essential end, an
end existing in and for itself, that which expresses an essential end. When
something is firm and secure, it is so because it is not abstract, one-sided,
but something that stands the test” (VPG 236, LPS 246). The essential end
or purpose is what remains in the process of its realization or particularizing
activity. This is the basic conception of the normative that Hegel calls the
Idea, the unity of Concept and existence, for the purpose both identifies
the good and accomplishes something in the world that is adequate to that
good.
In the relation of universal and particular in the teleological inference we
find the key to Hegel’s account of internalism and a clear way to think of
how the counternormative can appear within the normative. The intern-
alism is secured when one’s universal commitments and the specific actions
that fulfill them are closely connected in intersubjectively recognized
practices. What distinguishes the substantive inference from the formal
inference is a “negative element,” of which Hegel writes, “it posits its
modification as its own, so that it remains at home with itself in its
modification, and thus has joined and integrated with itself in its modifi-
cation” (VPG 237, LPS 246). The main point is a variant on the point
about the self-referring negativity of the Concept: in this case, the universal
negates its abstract purity, posits some particular alteration of the world,
and then relates that particular back to itself as belonging to the universal.
The practical inference thereby suspends the difference between the given
and the activity of cognition, rendering the given something posited
through the Concept. The key is the status of the minor premise, the
judgment that identifies the particular as an instance of or means to the
universal. As we shall see, willing goes awry when that power of negativity
of the individual agent comes apart from the knowledge of universality (the
major premise) that is supposed to control it.
9.3 Practical Mind

When we ask the internalist question of whether or not agency in the full-
blown sense rules out counternormativity, we are asking whether the form
of agency is fully adequate to the content of the good. That is, we are asking
whether fulfilling the formal characteristics of agency is incompatible with

acting contrary to known ethical content. I have argued that an intern-
alist should not just stipulate the conditions of agency or willing (so as to
rule out counternormativity), but rather should give an account of why
acting for reasons is genuine action that includes an explanation of
counternormativity as significant. Hegel’s development of practical mind
is especially illuminating because he does not assume a fixed model of full-
blown agency and then conceive of activity inadequate to norms as mere
non-agency. Rather, he aims to develop agency from the failures and insuffi-
ciencies of the previous stages. For this account to work, the earlier stages –
even in their failures – do have to be significant, intelligible, as genuine
activities of the subject.
In this section I exhibit the first two stages of practical spirit as stages in
which Hegel works through the basic forms of the conative. I identify in
each stage three steps that secure a limited role for the stage in the ultimate
account.
Step 1: State the identity of form and content while noting the limitation
of the form to secure universal content.
Step 2: Show that this as yet inadequate particular form is compatible
with true universal content, thereby securing its place in the overall
account. The lesson of this step is that the particularizing activity of the
subject is itself one side of the self-referring negativity that is essential to all
action.
Step 3: Show how the limitation of this shape becomes a contradiction
by showing how the universal self-reference implicit in the subject’s
thinking contradicts the particular realizations. Show that this is
a productive contradiction insofar as it leads to a more developed self-
consciousness and a richer universality in the subject’s return to itself in the
subsequent shape.
In Hegel’s view, the account of practical mind has to begin in the form
of immediacy, or the form of feeling. What this means is that feeling,
conceived as a felt affirmation of a purpose, is what guides action, both
motivating the subject and justifying the action (to the subject). Hegel’s
overall point in criticizing feeling’s immediacy is that while one can
certainly feel the correct content of duty (and religion), there is nothing
in the form of feeling itself to guarantee that one will in fact act on the right
content. Step 1 in the account should say what is good about this form
while also highlighting its limitations. On its own, feeling is a standard of
agreement between a self-determining ought of simple identity, on the one
hand, and my individual subjective nature, on the other. This standard is
no more than “the utterly subjective and superficial feeling of the pleasant or

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unpleasant” (E §472). Pleasure is clearly a part of any account of motiv-
ation, but in this first phase there is only a tenuous connection to the
rationality of content.
In Step 2, the compatibility of feeling with correct content, Hegel
emphasizes that even the best, truest content, can be felt. He aligns this
shape with the appeal to the “heart in general,” which “has (1) the correct
sense that these determinations are the subject’s own, immanent determin-
ations, (2) and then that in so far as feeling is opposed to the understanding,
feeling can be the totality, in contrast to the one-sided abstractions of the
understanding” (E §471R). The compatibility comes into view on the
parallel between practical feeling and “intuition.” The fact that we have
an intuition of a sensible object does not get in the way of representing and/
or thinking that same object. We can also represent and think without
being in the presence of the object, just as we can make ethical judgments
without the immediate feeling (though in both cases one can say that
intuition and feeling are necessary for the development and overall con-
tinued functioning of the human being). And just as the botanist has
a developed intuition of the plant, so too the ethical agent has
a developed set of ethical feelings (i.e., emotions) that she brings to bear
on ethical situations.
In Step 3 Hegel writes of the limitation as a contradiction that is
productive in spurring the development of a richer universality. The
productive difference between subject and environment comes to the
fore in cases of failure, of evil. He writes,
In regard to contingent purposes, evil [Übel ] is only the right that is
imposed on the vanity and nullity of their devising [Einbildung]. They
themselves are already what is evil. – The finitude of life and mind falls
into their judgment, in which they have the Other that is separated from
them at the same time within them as their negative, and thus they are the
contradiction called evil. (E §472R)
The judgment is the mismatch between purpose and existence in the
failure of a finite purpose. Life and spirit exhibit the structure of self-
referring negativity in their ability to be the contradiction and thereby to
learn from their pain. Such failures can be conceived as those of a merely
living organism, but they are also what allow the subject to emerge from life.
Hegel remarks, “In a dead thing there is no evil or pain, because in
inorganic nature the concept does not confront its reality [Dasein] and
does not in the distinction at the same time remain its subject. Already in
life, and still more in mind, this immanent differentiation is present and

thus an ought comes in; and this negativity, subjectivity, I, freedom are the
principles of evil and pain” (E §472R). The counternormativity here is at
first the simple failure to unite self and world in one’s purpose. It is also the
ability of the subject to act against mere life, to incur pain for the sake of
freedom, and to develop reflective self-consciousness.
The successor to practical feeling is the drive, whose greater mediation
and complexity parallels the advances made by representation over intu-
ition. Just as representation had marked a transition from the immediate
presence of singular objects to the capacity to recreate images from mem-
ory, so too the drive is a subjective capacity that relates to objectivity as
something mediated by subjective activity. The drive is a clear advance over
feeling insofar as its form is now purposive, including a negation and
thereby determinate content within its very structure. The basic dynamics
of negation and self-reference that I have stressed throughout are on display
in this passage from the lectures:
The drive is also an inner, a sense of a determination accompanied by
a feeling of the non-conformity of my existence to the inner demand. The
non-conformity is bound up with a defect, a lack, and the drive is the
demand that this negative of the positive side of my nature be suspended.
The non-conformity is necessary insofar as I am a spiritual and living nature.
What I am is supposed to be something brought about by me. Spirit must
know what it is, and it knows this only when it has posited itself as such.
(VPG 251, LPS 256)
The principal negativity of the drive is the difference of my “inner
demand” and my actual existence, but there is also a negativity in the
specificity of the drive as against other drives. The unitary I, both spiritual
and natural, is the activity through which the satisfaction of each drive, and
of the drives in relation to each other, are bound together. The drives are
individuated because they take a specific object domain through repeated
satisfaction.14 The drive “starts from the suspended opposition of the
subjective and objective, and involves a series of satisfactions, and so is
something whole, universal” (§473Z). Just as we learn to perceive the world
(as representational intelligence) through repeated exposure and by repro-
ducing the object in imagination, so too we learn to see the world practic-
ally as a function of our drives through repeated satisfaction of those drives
14
Hegel’s theory of the drives owes much to Fichte. In the Lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, Fichte
writes, “Every drive has to be awakened by experience before we can become conscious of it.
Furthermore, in order for a drive to become an inclination and in order for its satisfaction to become
a need, the drive in question has to be developed through frequently repeated experiences of the same
type” (Fichte 1971d (henceforth SW VI): 313, 2005b (henceforth EPW): 162).

180 dean moyar
in purposes imagined and then carried out in the world.15 But – and here is
the limitation – satisfying a specific drive is a rational achievement only
in the absence of other specific drives and their corresponding objects.
Given the multiplicity of drives and a variegated environment, the particu-
larity of the drives means that they cannot on their own settle the rational-
ity of action.
In Step 2 Hegel once again stresses the compatibility of the drives, and the
closely related passions and interests, with true ethical content. Hegel thinks
that an interest must be in play whenever an individual pursues an end. “An
action is both a purpose of the subject and also the subject’s activity which
carries out this purpose; it is only because the subject is in this way in even
the most unselfish action, i.e. because of its interest, that there is an action at
all” (E §475R). Every action is motivated action, where motivation expresses
the identification of the subject with the content of the purpose. His view is
that there is no way to transcend this, and no need to transcend it, for one
can act on true ethical content even while acting with passion.16 Once again,
this is an instance of the particularity of the subject being compatible with,
and even necessary for, the realization of true ethical (universal) content.
Step 3 of this stage is both an opposition of drives to each other and the
emergence of a higher-order activity, choice (Willkür), that can adjudicate
between them. I treat choice as part of a package with the drives (and not
a stage of its own), for while it is an achievement in the development of
practical subjectivity, in this argument its main role is to make explicit the
contradictory character of the satisfaction of the drives. The drives are both
multiple and indeterminate. As the solution to this multiplicity of the
drives, the power of choice (Willkür) involves both a greater separation of
the form (the subject) from the content and a greater role for thinking in
practical activity. To determine an action the subject as a whole must stand
above these drives, and the subject can do so because she is intelligence,
thinking: “The will, as thinking and implicitly free, distinguishes itself
from the particularity of the drives, and places itself as simple subjectivity of
thinking above their manifold content. It is thus reflecting will” (E §476).
The will as choice involves the subject’s opposition to her own drives, and
15
Herrmann-Sinai has helpfully contrasted drive with desire and related the drive to the linguistic
capacities developed in “Representation”: “Now we are in a position to express what we were not
able to express at the level of the Phenomenology, namely the normativity of repeatable action types
that bear a linguistic form which teleologically structures my activity and ultimately allows us to
express that you and I are doing something of the same kind” (Herrmann-Sinai 2016, 139).
16
I am in agreement with the argument by Wretzel (2020) that with the account of drives we have
a key moment of organic nature’s ineliminable role within ethical agency.

while it can seem to be the core activity of willing proper, Hegel insists that
reflective choice is not the essence of free agency. Choice is certainly
compatible with free agency, though Hegel does not think that one is free
only when one can choose between alternatives. Hegel takes pains in his
Philosophy of Right to mark out space for choice even while arguing that
ethics and the rational state are based on the rational will as opposed to the
will as choice (PR §§14–16). There is freedom in the elevation above the
drives, and this elevation is at work in choosing (counternormatively) to act
against one’s judgment of the good. But the willing that follows thinking,
that identifies with the practical inference, is rational agency proper.
The completion of Step 3, Hegel’s transition from the drives and choice to
happiness, operates by identifying a contradiction between the form and
content (universality and particularity) of the power of choice. Even con-
sidered as a purpose realized in the actual world, the content is still tied to the
subjectivity of the drive, and thus has not yet achieved the status of universal-
ity that the reflecting will has as intelligence. This means that there is still
a mismatch between the form of the choosing will and the form of the
realized content. The will as choice “is a contradiction: it actualizes itself in
a particularity, which is at the same time a nullity for it, and has a satisfaction
in the particularity which it has at the same time left behind” (E §478). As
universal, the thinking will both identifies with chosen content and knows
that such content is inadequate to it, for the content has not attained the
status of universality that the thinking will possesses. This contradiction can
be resolved if the satisfaction of the drive is not a mere particular, but rather
a part of a whole of satisfaction, or happiness, which itself is the universal.
With the power of choice as a capacity explicitly derived and subordinated on
the way to the fully normative endpoint, we have secured a place for at least
one main source of counternormativity within the normative.
9.4 Free Mind and Practical Inference

The first thing to say about the brief “Happiness” section is that it feels like
a real missed opportunity, for happiness ought to be at the level of
thinking, yet Hegel does virtually no work to show how happiness achieves
the level of rationality achieved by judgment and inference in “Theoretical
Mind.”17 Indeed, it seems that happiness does not fully emerge from the
17
Ikäheimo comments on the failure of happiness to measure up to its γ-level status, “Here Hegel’s
architectonic breaks down somewhat as happiness is – analogically to the β-level in the theoretical
side – a ‘mixture of qualitative and quantitative determinations’ (E §479)” (Ikäheimo 2017: 446).

182 dean moyar
middle level of representation (he calls it a “representation [Vorstellung]”
that is “brought forth through reflective thought” (E §479)). It seems that
only in the subsequent step, the free will itself, do we get a shape of willing
that achieves the structure of the inference. This is especially odd in light of
the obvious path available to unite happiness with thought. Hegel could
have given a roughly Aristotelian account of practical reason here, and the
Aristotelian practical syllogism could very well have served as the culmin-
ation of practical spirit. But instead of working through the inferences of
happiness and their deficiency, Hegel in essence repeats his argument
against the drives and will. He argues that the apparent satisfaction of
happiness in action is in fact a particular that falls short of happiness, and
the will thus remains mired in the bad infinity of an ongoing series. The
will that chooses to take this or that path to happiness is formally free and
universal, but this form finds no correspondingly universal content in the
drives that constitute happiness. One searches for happiness but is never
satisfied.
The move from happiness to the free will is a move to the willing of
universality as such. Hegel thinks of this move as expressing agreement
with Kant’s claim that freedom rather than happiness is the proper end of
the rational will. It can seem that Hegel’s statement that free mind unites
the theoretical and the practical is also Kantian, since we can take the
theoretical to mean the form of thinking or universality or lawfulness. But
Hegel disagrees with Kant on just this point because Hegel’s view of the
form of thought, as we have seen, is fundamentally inferential and purpos-
ive. Hegel’s move here should be read not in terms of mere lawfulness, but
rather in terms of the practical inference.18 His unification of thinking and
willing is a unity of will both with inferential form (the apex of thinking)
and with the idea of truth conditions for that willing. Such truth condi-
tions in the world are another way of giving the terms of the validity of
practical inferences. Truth and validity are theoretical concepts that bear
the universality that Hegel associates with the free will. The bite of this
position is that the practical inference cannot be true just for me, or valid
just for me, but must be true and valid for all.
One strand of Hegel’s argument for the unity of the theoretical and
practical is that the object of practical mind must be found just as much as it
is produced. Freedom must be a world of freedom, an explicit content of
freedom that can be willed as such by the individual. Hegel has in mind the
18
See Schmidt am Busch (2010) for an examination of the 1805/6 account of the will in which Hegel
explicitly treats it as a function of the inference.

world of right, the world of legal norms and social institutions. The norms
and institutions constitute objective spirit, which Hegel thinks of as a world
that is the objectification of the free will. To say that the free mind has itself
as “content and purpose” (E §482) is just to say that the individual wills
those norms that constitute right. The free will has the structure of
universality–particularity–individuality, which enables Hegel to develop
a variegated world of freedom in which the universal (which remains
dominant) is enriched through particularity and the recombination of
elements in the individual agent. So while Hegel does take the form of
lawfulness as central to “Abstract Right,” his argument for property and
contract rights depends on a conception of the person as an exclusive
individual. Hegel’s conception of “Morality” is focused on the particular
or subjective will, and includes a prominent place for individual welfare,
a close cousin of happiness. At the level of right I do not simply will my
happiness, but rather I will my welfare with the implicit requirement that
I consider the welfare of all agents, and that I take into account the fact that
my welfare depends on the welfare of others.
Another central aspect of the requirements of the free will is the mutual
recognition that is built into Hegel’s concept of right. Without thematizing
the relation in “Psychology,” Hegel has clearly carried over this intersubject-
ive relation from the “Phenomenology,” and it clearly does real work in the
conception of a free will that wills itself. Mutual recognition is rather
understated in the first two stages of objective spirit, but it comes to the
fore in the move from “Morality” to “Ethical Life,” which itself repeats the
unification of the theoretical and practical, the true and the good, at a higher
level.19 His overall point is that the free will can be fulfilled only when it acts
on the proper content, and that no formal requirement of rationality alone
will suffice to secure the content. The complete conception of rational
agency is attained only in the full-blown social world, a world that is itself
rational because it has the form of a self-maintaining, living system.
What does the free will’s reflexivity and the inseparability of form and
content tell us, finally, about the significance of counternormative conduct?
Recall that the internalist question raised the problem of how to think of cases
in which all the formal requirements of agency are met, ethical knowledge is
achieved, and yet the subject acts contrarily to the good. Many philosophers
have been tempted to deny this possibility outright, namely to say that it is
impossible to meet the formal requirements and yet not act on the good.
Hegel’s tight connection of reason and will would seem to align him with this
19
See Moyar (2007).

184 dean moyar
camp (as in Pippin’s view), yet he also holds that the formal standpoint from
which the agent is conscious of an action as meeting the requirements of
morality (conscience) is also the standpoint at which evil is a real possibility.
You can consciously choose to will the bad (though he too does not believe in
the diabolical will), and this makes just as much sense as willing the good in
the absence of a stable set of socially sanctioned norms that specify what the
good is. His claim is that “both morality and evil have their common root in
that self-certainty which has being for itself and knows and resolves for itself”
(PR §139R). When things go right, one wills “the universal in and for itself,”
whereas when things go wrong one wills “the arbitrariness of [one’s] own
particularity” (PR §139). We have now seen at length how the particularity is
compatible with universality. The point is that one normally wills as
a particular agent while giving the universal precedence, and this is just what
the institutions of ethical life are designed to make actual. The inwardness
whereby we become capable of free self-determination is destabilizing, and
can result in our opting for the particular over the universal, but it is also
essential to the freedom of the will to be able to break down and reconstitute
the manifold of duties so that we are not beset by irresolvable moral conflict.
The normative is captured by the interlocking inferences of ethical life, but in
a complex moral landscape there is always the need for judgment, and always
the possibility of going astray even when one knows the good.
The move away from the formal standpoint of “Morality” is also a move
within metaethics away from thinking that we can solve intractable issues such
as counternormative agency at the formal level of abstract rational require-
ments. Hegel’s move to “Ethical Life” can seem puzzling because the account
of agency there is not independent of a substantive account of the content of
the good. Furthermore, he lowers the bar for the formal requirements of
deliberation (one can act from habit rather than thinking each case through)
while raising the bar for the social requirements (the norms must have legal
validity). Once the subject is situated within a well-defined ethical environ-
ment, it is enough to be responsive to the reasons in play in that environment,
without thinking that only if one clears a very high formal bar (e.g., self-
legislation of norms as if for a kingdom of ends) can one act ethically. Hegel’s
point is that since no formal bar, however high, can guarantee right action, it is
counterproductive to insist on formal conditions of rationality over the
substantive ethical considerations. Satisfying the requirements of internalism
depends, in the end, just as much on the health of our form of life as it does on
the functioning of any individual’s cognitive or conative capacities.

chapter 10
Political Ontology and Rational Syllogistic

in Hegel’s Objective Spirit
Paul Redding
In the Preface to The Philosophy of Right, Hegel offers some brief suggestions
meant to help orient the reader with what they are about to find in this outline
written to accompany a course of lectures. He starts with noting that the work
provides an enlarged, more systematic exposition of what is contained in the
corresponding part of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, but notes
that it is important to recognize how the material one is about to encounter
differs from what would normally be expected in an “ordinary compendium”.
Effectively, the difference lies, he points out, in the method employed in this
work. A compendium is expected to present a comprehensive account in
which a “content which has long been familiar and accepted” is laid out in
a form “the rules and conventions [of] which have long been agreed”, but
philosophical outlines are “no longer expected to conform to this pattern”
(Hegel 1991a: 9–10). That earlier philosophical form with its logic that appeals
to rules of “definition, classification, and inference” had found itself out of step
with the modern age. It’s shortcomings for “speculative science” have been
widely recognized – or, as he corrects himself, they have been “felt”, rather
than recognized (Hegel 1991a: 10). What seems implied is that had these been
recognized one might expect some reasoned replacement of the older logic by
a more adequate one, but in the present situation it has rather been simply cast
off as some merely external constraint, unleashing “arbitrary pronouncements
of the heart, of fantasy, and of contingent intuition” (Hegel 1991a: 10).
Hegel may lament the “shameful decline” into which the logic of specu-
lative science has fallen, but it is clear that he is not advocating some simple
return to the logic of yesteryear – effectively, Aristotle’s syllogistic. The
correctness of the modern feeling that the old logic is inadequate has to be
acknowledged, but the proper attitude will be to find and give determinate
form to the truth that is buried in the feelings of those who have spontan-
eously rejected it. That is, there are reasons, not just causes, behind the
modern reader’s dissatisfaction with the older logical method, and it is clearly
185

186 paul redding
hinted that these reasons will concern its inadequacy as a source of convic-
tion for the modern intellect.
It is at this point that Hegel mentions his own “fully developed” treatise
on the nature of speculative knowledge in The Science of Logic, where
a complete account will be found of the principles that guide the presenta-
tion in this outline – a “manner of progressing from one topic to another
and of conducting a scientific proof – this entire speculative mode of
cognition [that] is essentially different from other modes of cognition”
(Hegel 1991a: 10). But the availability of The Science of Logic here serves as
little more than an excuse to pass over these important methodological
issues. Since he has already provided a systematic account there, Hegel
writes, “I have only occasionally added an explanatory comment on
procedure and method in the present outline” and have “omitted to
demonstrate and bring out the logical progression in each and every detail”
(Hegel 1991a: 10).
I suggest that Hegel has effectively left the reader in the wilderness as to
how to even start to make sense of these issues. The alternatives seem to be
either to rely on these occasional “explanatory comments” or immerse
oneself in The Science of Logic. But the former on their own can be of little
help, and as for the latter, I think it is fair to say that there is no guarantee
that, having invested the time and energy into working through that text,
the reader will be any less puzzled as to how the categories that unfold there
from “Being” to “The Idea” are meant to actually shed light on the
methodological issues found in Hegel’s political theory as set out in The
Philosophy of Right.
Here I want to suggest another way of bringing these elements together
by examining them in relation to the way issues of logic and political
ontology had come together in Plato’s thought, or at least as Hegel
understands it. In short, the inadequacy for the modern world of Plato’s
recommendations in The Republic will effectively be shown to be grounded
in the same factors that make the old logic inadequate as philosophical
method for modern political thought. Moreover, this will also enable us to
get some bearing on how Hegel employs in his entirely peculiar way the
logical notion of a “syllogism” to model social relations and institutional
structures. The old logic that has come to be out of step with modern
thought was, of course, the syllogistic logic that Aristotle had constructed
on the basis of ideas taken from Plato. But, as we have glimpsed above, for
Hegel there were good reasons why the Aristotelian syllogistic had fallen
into disrepute, and this bears directly on the question of the shortcomings
of Plato’s political ontology.

Political Ontology and Rational Syllogistic 187
As becomes more obvious as the Preface of The Philosophy of Right
progresses, the classical polis had not been able to tolerate the principle
of “subjectivity”, a principle that Hegel treats as a defining characteristic of
the modern world. The old style of presentation had essentially been
directed to giving some order to a set of publicly recognized truths accepted
as unproblematic. “The truth concerning right, ethics, and the state is at any
rate as old as its exposition and promulgation in public laws and in public
morality and religion.” But, as Hegel puts it, for the modern reader the
contents presented must “appear justified to free thinking. For such
thinking does not stop at what is given whether the latter is supported by
the external positive authority of the state or of mutual agreement among
human beings, or by the authority of inner feeling and the heart and by the
testimony of the spirit which immediately concurs with this, but starts out
from itself and thereby demands to know itself as united in its innermost
being with the truth” (Hegel 1991a: 11). We might think of Descartes’s
methodological wielding of hyperbolic doubt as typifying this attitude.
In the concluding passages of Subjective Spirit leading up to the transi-
tion to Objective Spirit in the 1817 Encyclopaedia we see how such a free
thinking has emerged as “actual free will”, which is “the unity of theoretical
and practical mind” – will which is “for itself, as free will . . . will as free
intelligence” (Hegel 1971: §481), mind “aware of itself as free” (Hegel 1971:
§482). Hegel notes there that “whole continents . . . have never had this
idea, and are without it still”, but what is especially significant for us is that
“the Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics did not have
it” (Hegel 1971: §482 remark (R)). However, the contrast between the
ancient and modern worlds cannot be as simple as this and on Hegel’s own
criteria needs qualification. For example, in the Lectures on the History of
Philosophy (Hegel 2006: 220) he notes that the principle of subjective
freedom “did enter into the Greek world too, but as the principle that
destroyed the Greek states and Greek life generally”. What he is referring to
here is, of course, the way that Socrates had embodied the principle of
subjective freedom, and Socrates qua embodiment of subjective freedom
was, after all, surely central to the development of Greek speculative
thought – the thought of Plato and Aristotle.
As Hegel puts it in the Preface to The Philosophy of Right, Plato’s
Republic was “essentially the embodiment of nothing other than the nature
of Greek Sittlichkeit ” (Hegel 1991a: 20), instantiating the more general
principle later expressed as philosophy being “its own time comprehended in
thoughts” (Hegel 1991a: 21). The thoughts of Plato and Aristotle must be
then understood as expressing this broader contradiction within the

188 paul redding
Sittlichkeit of Greek life itself, both generating subjective freedom and
refusing to accommodate it within its structures. It is against such
a background that I want to look for the origins in Greek thought of
Hegel’s “syllogism”, with its distinct inquiry-related or “inquisitorial”
dimension as well as its more “ontological” dimension. This will enable
us to get some sense of how the limits of Greek life and thought – its
inability to tolerate the principle of subjective freedom – might be reflected
in both these dimensions of syllogistic structure, and how Hegel might
envisage his way of rescuing its rational core. After that we will briefly
consider Hegel’s portrayal of the relation of formal and ontological syllo-
gisms in the Subjective Logic of The Science of Logic. Against this broad
backdrop we might then be able to get a clearer picture of how the
syllogisms of Hegel’s own rejuvenated speculative logic are meant to
guide our understanding of the political institutions of the modern state
as set out in The Philosophy of Right.
10.1 The Syllogism of Plato’s Speculative Dialectic

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, in the remark to the opening paragraph on the
syllogism – der Schluss – Hegel says of the syllogism that it “is the essential
ground of everything true; and the definition of the absolute is from now on
that it is the syllogism [dass es der Schluss ist] or, articulated in the form of
a sentence, it is the determinacy: ‘everything is a syllogism’” (Hegel 2010b:
§181R). Given that everything is a syllogism, it is remarkable how seldom
Hegel actually mentions syllogisms in The Philosophy of Right. As “the
essential ground of everything true” and thereby surely the key to under-
standing political structure, the syllogism is essentially mentioned only
once in the complete text – this is in relation to a discussion of “the Estates”
in relation to the “mediating” role they play between the government and
the people considered in their abstract individuality. Thus in the remark to
§302, Hegel notes: “It is one of the most important insights of logic that
a specific moment which, when it stands in opposition, has the position of
an extreme, loses this quality and becomes an organic moment by being
simultaneously a mean” (Hegel 1991a: §302R). This idea is expanded upon
in §304. Considered in themselves, the estates are as just as capable of
hostility to the monarch as they are of cooperation and this “abstract
position becomes a rational relation (i.e., a syllogism [zum Schlusse] . . .)
only when its mediation comes into existence” (Hegel 1991a: §304). It
would seem that it is the ubiquity of the syllogism here that leads to its
invisibility, but why is what is generally known as an inferential dynamic

among judgements a model for everything that exists? Moreover, the syllo-
gism of inquiry as presented in The Science of Logic is a formidably complex
structure. Surely more needs to be said.
There is no getting around the fact that Hegel’s “logical” approach to
the achievement of a harmonious unity among the differing parts of
a political community is idiosyncratic. To the modern mind, the way
logic features in, say, Hobbes’s approach to the role of reason in communal
life will be more familiar and immediately understandable. If creatures like
bees and ants, Hobbes asks rhetorically, can “live socially with another . . .
some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same”
(Hobbes 1994: Pt II, ch. xvii, 6). He answers that the agreement of social
non-human creatures is natural, whereas “that of men is by covenant only”,
which, being artificial requires a “common power to keep them in awe, and
to direct their actions to the common benefit” (Hobbes 1994: Pt II, ch. xvii,
12). The group of humans must, therefore, erect a “Mortal God” who “hath
the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that by terror
thereof he is enabled to conform the wills of them all to peace at home and
mutual aid against their enemies abroad” (Hobbes 1994: Pt II, ch. xvii, 13).
The “logic” operative here is that which Hegel will denounce as a type of
instrumental use of the “mere understanding” (der Verstand). Each indi-
vidual purported employs their capacity for reasoning to arrive at the
realization that a more preferable existence is to be achieved by the
surrender of their individual powers to an artificial external power capable
of controlling the disruptive effects of the passions driving human conduct.
Against this, Hegel appeals to something completely different when he
brings reason and logic into consideration. Reason cannot be reduced to
the subjective reasonings of individuals, nor is the state some external power
to be reckoned with in those reasonings. Rather, the structures and processes
that are conventionally interpreted as configurations among or movements
between subjective judgements in Aristotle’s logic – “syllogisms” – are
treated as structures or processes at work within the world itself. This
thought has something of the way in which the Stoics, say, thought of
“nous” as coursing through the world, or the Neoplatonists conceived of
a world soul. It is in this ontological sense that they are meant to provide
the model upon which the institutional structure of the political com-
munity is to be conceived.1 Exactly why Hegel has chosen not only the
general language of Aristotle’s syllogistic but even details such as the
1
Hobbes summed up his attitude to the use of Aristotelian syllogisms in verse: “I, tho’ slowly Learn,
and then dispense / With them, and prove things after my own sense” (Hobbes 1994, lv).

190 paul redding
“figures” and “modes” of such syllogisms can seem totally mysterious. In
order to better understand Hegel’s motivation here, I want to turn to
what he has to say about this notion when reflecting on the achievements
and limitations of the thought of Plato and Aristotle in the Lectures on the
History of Philosophy.
In Hegel’s discussion of Plato we find the inquisitional conception of
logic or “dialectic” as a dynamic of inquiry discussed along with the
stranger “objective” or “ontological” approach in Hegel’s accounts of two
distinctive Platonic texts: the first is the well-known discussion of the
“Divided Line” in Plato’s Republic, Book 6, and the second, the account
of the forming of the cosmos in Timaeus. In the first Hegel identifies those
rules of inquiry dealing with definition, classification and inference to
which he had refered in the Preface of The Philosophy of Right in relation
to the broader Platonic dialectic: “Plato embraced sensible consciousness
and especially sensible representations, opinions and immediate knowing,
under the term dóxa (opinion). Midway between dóxa (opinion) and
science in and for itself there lies argumentative cognition, inferential
reflection or reflective cognition which develops for itself universal categor-
ies or classes. But the highest [knowing] is noesis, thinking in and for itself”
(Hegel 2006: 188). It is significant here that, as the translator of this edition
notes, “Hegel’s account of the Divided Line here reduces Plato’s four
modes of apprehension to three . . . he combines the last two as dóxa
(opinion), which he links with what, in discussing recent philosophy, he
calls ‘immediate knowing’” (Hegel 2006: 188 n. 35). This could be read
simply as Hegel taking liberties with the text – a type of “creative misread-
ing” designed to align Plato’s views with his own dialectical triads in a style
of which Hegel is sometimes accused. I believe that there may be some-
thing deeper at issue here, however, but before we can pursue this further
we need to examine some of the details of Socrates’ strange lesson of the
Divided Line.
In this famous set piece that goes together with the discussions of the sun
and the cave, Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine a line that is divided into
two unequal parts representing the visible and intelligible realms, respect-
ively. The text does not provide a diagram, but it has generally been
represented by a vertical line with the smaller lower segment representing
the visible realm and the upper larger segment the intelligible realm.
Socrates then asks Glaucon to divide both segments “in the same ratio as
the line”. The four sections of the line will now be taken to represent
different cognitive attitudes onto the world – two to the visible world, two
to the intelligible – together with the distinct types of intentional objects

that are correlated with those attitudes. Together with this, it is clear that
the apparently increasing lengths of the segments from below upwards are
meant to be understood as proportional to the relative degrees of clarity of
those four forms of cognition. From below upwards, these segments
represent (in the words of the Grube–Reeve translation) imagination
(eikasia), belief (pistis), thought (dianoia) and understanding (noesis)
(Plato 1997: Republic VI).2 In dianoia, Socrates explains, the soul “using
as images the things that were imitated before” that is, the objects of pistis,
“is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle
but to a conclusion” (Plato 1997: Republic VI, 510b). In the following
paragraph Plato makes it clear that the “hypothetical” reasoning of dianoia
is mathematical – that is, geometry and arithmetic or “calculation” (Plato
1997: Republic VI, 510c). In contrast, noesis “makes its way to a first
principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but
without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves
and making its investigation through them” (Plato 1997: Republic VI,
510b).
What may not be apparent to the modern reader of this passage is that
when the diagram is actually constructed in the way in which Socrates
instructs Glaucon, the sections representing pistis and dianoia turn out to
be of equal length, confounding the idea that these attitudes are meant to
be contrasted as of increasing clarity (Foley 2008). The fact of this, however,
and its significance, would surely not have been lost on Plato’s colleagues in
the Academy as this type of geometric discussion of proportions was central
to the activities in which members of the Academy were major figures.
When four magnitudes (a, b, c, d) are arranged in a pair of equal propor-
tions (a/b = c/d) such that the middle magnitudes turn out to be the same
(b = c), the terms are said to be arranged in the “geometric mean” or
“continued mean”.3 So, rather than being represented with four terms
(a/b = c/d) the sequence can be represented with three, for example, a/
b = b/d. Were the Divided Line to be understood as divided according to
the geometric mean, then we can see why Hegel might indeed have
reduced its fourfold structure to a threefold one. There is good evidence,
2
A similar distinction is found in Aristotle in Topics (Aristotle 1984: Topics Bk 1, 17, 108a). Probably the
best-known version of this structure in Aristotle is in relation to justice in Nichomachean Ethics, book
V, 3.
3
Archytas, the Pythagorean mathematician and friend of Plato, had distinguished the geometric mean
from other means in a work on music (Heath 1921: 85). In relation to the treatment of justice in
Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle points out that the proportion involved there is not the geometric or
“continued” mean (Aristotle 1984: Nichomachean Ethics, Book V, 3, 1131b).

192 paul redding
I believe, that Hegel could easily have understood it in this way, and this
comes first from the second text to which we will refer, Plato’s Timaeus, in
which we find Hegel’s syllogism discussed in the ontological way.
Plato describes the dialogue Timaeus as actually taking place the day
after Socrates’ speech on the nature of the rational state in the Republic, and
the two are connected in complex and important ways.4 In fact, Timaeus’
story of the creation of the cosmos will form the backdrop to the dialogue
of the third day in which Critias will recount the actual history of ancient
Athens as he learnt it from Solon, who in turn had learnt of it from
Egyptian sources, and this sequence of abstractly normative political
theory, natural philosophy and history must surely have been significant
for Hegel. In fact, it seems to have been similarly significant for Plato, as in
the Timaeus he has Socrates expressing dissatisfaction with his story of the
previous day, that is, the account of the just state given in the Republic.5
“I’d like to go on now and tell you what I’ve come to feel about the political
structure we’ve described. My feelings are like those of a man who gazes
upon magnificent looking animals, whether they’re animals in a painting
or even actually alive but standing still, and who then finds himself longing
to look at them in motion or engaged in some struggle or conflict that
seems to show off their distinctive physical qualities. I felt the same thing
about the city we’ve described. I’d love to see our city distinguish itself in
the way it goes to war and in the way it pursues the war; that it deals with
the other cities, one after another, in ways that reflect positively on its own
education and training, both in word and deed – that is, both in how it
behaves toward them and how it negotiates with them” (Plato 1997:
Timaeus 19b–c). Here Socrates seems to be bringing into question the radical
distinction between the visible and intelligible realms given two days
earlier. He wants to bring to bear an empirically obtained account of the
actual Athens, that is, one based in pistis, to test the conceptually generated
account of the good state he had delivered two days earlier. Conveniently,
Critias is able to help out with his historical account of Athens as it had
been (9,000 years earlier!) during its war against the then island state of
Atlantis, but all agree that before he speaks it would be good to hear from
Timaeus, a natural philosopher from the Italian city of Locri, who is an
“expert in astronomy and [who] has made it his main business to know the
nature of the universe”. Timaeus will begin with “the origin of the
4
It is widely recognized, however, that the Timaeus and Critias were written during a later period than
the Republic, and may reflect changes in Plato’s earlier theory of the forms.
5
This, of course, may reflect a change in Plato’s views over the period between the writing of these
works.

universe” and end with “the nature of human beings” (Plato 1997: Timaeus
27b), and on the basis of this general account of human nature, Critias will
then be able to show such human beings, now in the form as actual
Athenian citizens (Plato 1997: Timaeus 27a–b).
In Timaeus’ speech Hegel dwells on one particular episode in some
detail, sometimes quoting, sometimes paraphrasing and sometimes com-
menting on it. Here it is worth quoting an entire paragraph from a modern
English translation:
Now that which comes to be must have bodily form, and be both visible and
tangible, but nothing could ever become visible apart from fire, nor tangible
without something solid, nor solid without earth. That is why, as he began
to put the body of the universe together, the god came to make it out of fire
and earth. But it isn’t possible to combine two things well all by themselves,
without a third; there has to be some bond between the two that unites
them. Now the best bond is one that really and truly makes a unity of itself
together with the things bonded by it, and this in the nature of things is best
accomplished by proportion. For whenever of three numbers which are
either solids or squares the middle term between any two of them is such
that what the first term is to it, it is to the last, and, conversely, what the last
term is to the middle, it is to the first, then, since the middle term turns out
to be both first and last, and the last and the first likewise both turn out to be
the middle terms, they will all of necessity turn out to have the same
relationship to each other, and, given this, will all be unified. (Plato 1997,
Timaeus 31b–32a)
Hegel makes some notable comments. After the description of “the best
bond . . . that really and truly makes a unity of itself together with the
things bonded by it” he adds: “This is profound, since it contains the
Concept, the Idea” (Hegel 1970–1: 19:89).6 Then, after the concluding
sentence, he adds: “This is excellent; we still retain this in philosophy. This
diremption which proceeds from Plato is the syllogism [der Schluss], which
is known from the realm of logic [der aus dem Logischen bekannt ist]. This
syllogism retains the form, as it appears in the familiar syllogistic
[gewöhnlichen Syllogismus], but as the rational [als das Vernünftige]”
(Hegel 1970–1: 19:90). Moreover, after quoting Plato’s account of the
relations between the three bonded numbers, Hegel inserts the equation
“a : b = b : c”, not only signalling his awareness of the geometric mean, but
also identifying it with “the syllogism” which is the genuinely dialectical or
6
I have here used the Moldenhauer and Michel edition of the Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der
Philosophie rather than the text of the 1825/6 lectures as it is more explicit as to where Hegel quotes
and where he adds a comment. The translation is my own.

194 paul redding
“rational” syllogism and which shares its form with the more familiar
formal syllogism of Aristotle. Armed with this information, let us now
return to the discussion of the Divided Line.
It is well known that there exists a type of contradiction in Plato’s
account of the Divided Line between the fourfold distinction involved
when the line was merely described and the effectively threefold structure
produced when the line was actually constructed according to Socrates’
instructions (Foley 2008). Attempts to resolve this problem have led to the
suggestion that the actual proportions produced in the Divided Line were
even more specific than the ones described in terms of the “geometric
mean”, that of “division in extreme and mean ratio”; see Brumbaugh
(1954), Gibson (1955) and, more recently, Fossa and Erickson (2005).
This division of a line (henceforth “DEMR”), appearing in Euclid’s
Elements, is what later came to be called the “golden section”, or “divine
proportion”, and identified as supposedly embodying some universal
aesthetic norm found throughout the universe.7 A type of mystically
motivated interest in the section had developed from the Middle Ages,
and enthusiastic affirmations of its properties have recurred through to the
present. In classical Greece, the DEMR does seems to have been associated
with the Pythagorean cult, especially with its concern with “harmonic”
proportions, but it was also a significant mathematical object itself and
linked to the discovery of the irrational numbers – that is, numbers like √2
that cannot be represented as a ratio of two whole natural numbers. Some
advocates of the idea that Plato had been alluding to the DEMR in the
Divided Line passage point to the role played by the academician Eudoxus
in this context (Fossa and Erickson 2005).
As we are interested in Hegel’s understanding of Plato, we can disregard
the complex interpretative questions as to what Plato himself had intended
with the Divided Line, but the juxtaposition of the passages from The
Republic and Timaeus, I think, strongly suggests that Hegel at least identi-
fied the geometric mean as at the heart of the Platonic syllogism in both of
its inquisitional and ontological dimensions. It is tempting to think that he
might easily have had the DEMR in mind as well.8 Hegel had been clearly
aware of the value placed on musical proportions by the Pythagoreans, and
7
For a comprehensive account of the DEMR free from the hyperbole that characterizes much of this
literature see especially Herz-Fischler (1998).
8
We know that he was an admirer of Kepler’s geometric approach to cosmology, which drew upon the
“Platonic solids” – the construction of which was bound up with the DEMR. Indeed, Kepler had
been explicit about his own high estimation of the properties of this division (Herz-Fischler
1998: 173).

of the way in which the harmonious idea of beautiful proportion had
become central to the “classical” aesthetics of the Greeks.9 However, there
is little to suggest from this that Hegel was an enthusiast for Pythagorean
number mysticism. Indeed, in Hegel’s account everything hangs on the
shortcomings of the Parmenidean numerical approach to the world – an
approach with which he saw Plato as breaking, although neither com-
pletely nor entirely successfully. This was part of the contradiction from
which Plato’s objective syllogism had to be rescued.
Regardless of whether Hegel had the DEMR in mind, it is significant for
his account of Plato’s movement beyond Pythagorean numerical meta-
physics. The Pythagoreans had, as Hegel points out in his discussion in the
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, a numerical ontology: “Number is the
being of things, and the organization of the universe is a system of numbers
and numerical relationships” (Hegel 2006: 38). While Plato and Aristotle
had taken much from the Pythagoreans, their “abandonment of determin-
ation by number”, says Hegel, “is the main thing” (Hegel 2006: 39), and
the DEMR was significant in this context.
Pythagoras is typically associated with Pythagoras’ Theorem, which
states that for a right-angle triangle the square of the hypotenuse is equal
to the sum of the squares of the other two sides. From this it can be shown
that the length of the hypotenuse is thereby not commensurable with the
lengths of the other sides of the triangle. For example, for a right-angle
triangle with sides of length 1 unit, the hypotenuse will equal √2 units, and
the Pythagoreans had discovered a proof showing that √2 cannot be
expressed by a ratio of two natural numbers (Heath 1921: 90–1). But this
directly refuted the Pythagorean conception of number in which all mag-
nitudes were understood as “commensurable” because generated from the
monad (or “monas”, unit) “1” by which they could be “measured”.10 The
same incommensurability of line segments is also able to be shown from the
DEMR,11 and some have linked the discovery of incommensurability to it
rather than “Pythagoras’ Theorem” itself (Herz-Fischler 1998: 70).
The discovery of the irrationals was a turning point in Greek mathem-
atics, and it was Eudoxus of Cnidus, a leading member of the Academy and
9
For example, in his discussion of Greek architecture he discusses how it was “kept to the most
beautiful proportions” and to the “beautiful mean” (Hegel 1975: II:664–5), and mentions a “secret
eurythmy discovered above all by the just sense of the Greeks” (Hegel 1975: II:663).
10
This is more usually described in terms of the discovery of the “irrational” numbers, but the problem
from the point of view of the Pythagoreans was that of commensurability – that is, that two
magnitudes could not have a common “measure”, the Pythagorean unit or monad.
11
Written out as a geometric mean (a:b :: b:c), the DEMR can be represented thus: 2:1 + √5 :: 1 + √5 :: 3
+ √5.

196 paul redding
friend of Plato, who responded to the collapse of the Pythagorean numeri-
cism by reconceptualizing the nature of number itself, defining it as the
“determinate magnitude” of “proportion”. That is, from the new point of
view, determinate magnitude or “number” could be conceived of as being
determinate without being generated from the monad, as demanded by the
Pythagoreans. The ratio of the diagonal of a square of unit sides, for
example, could be thought determinate by being defined geometrically by
the ratio existing between those actual line segments conceived as proper
mathematical objects (Heath 1921: 69). This transition from the
Pythagorean to the Eudoxean reconceptualization of number or “quantity”
is treated by Hegel in terms of the distinction between the “quantum” and
“measure” that make up the final categories of the “Logic of Being” in the
Objective Logic and effectively set up the transition from the Logic of
Being to the Logic of Essence. That is, for Hegel its significance was not
restricted to “philosophy of mathematics” in any narrow sense. To the
Pythagoreans numbers were significant because they were conceived as
composed of metaphysically ultimate monads, and so the transition from
this restricted conception of magnitude to the broader comparative deter-
mination had deep metaphysical ramifications. As the Logic of Essence
reflects more the Aristotelian metaphysics, Hegel seems to have thought of
Aristotle’s approach as being linked to Eudoxus’ criticism of the
Pythagoreans. Indeed, Aristotle had made extensive use of cross-genus
“analogies” seemingly on the basis of Eudoxus’ non-Pythagorean use of
proportion (Olshewsky 1968; Heath 1949: 43–4), and had developed his
syllogistic in an intellectual environment drenched in such geometrical
issues (e.g. Lasserre 1964: chapter 5). This move from the Pythagorean to
the Eudoxean conception of magnitude, I suggest, might be understood as
significant for Aristotle’s syllogistic as well.
10.2 From Aristotle’s Inquisitional Syllogistic to Hegel’s

Reconstruction of Logic as Rational Science
It is sometimes assumed that the formal syllogistic that Hegel presents in the
Subjective Logic of The Science of Logic is simply Aristotle’s, but it is not.
Aristotelian syllogisms are inferences from two premises to a conclusion in
which the “mean” or “middle term” of the premises (Aristotle’s word is the
same as that found in the “geometric mean”) can be thought of as binding,
into the conclusion, the subject of one premise and the predicate of the other.
The most obvious way in which Hegel’s syllogisms depart from Aristotle’s is
that the subject and predicate terms of Hegel’s judgements can be determined

as any of three “quantities”, those of universality, particularity and singularity.
But singular judgments – that is, judgements with a singular subject such as
“Socrates runs” – had no legitimate place in Aristotle’s syllogisms because the
middle term of syllogisms had to play the role of subject in one premise and
predicate in the other,12 and singular terms, according to Aristotle, could not
be predicates (Aristotle 1984: Prior Analytics Bk I, 43a). That is, the term
‘Socrates’ could not be predicated of some further term in the way that ‘runs’
can be predicated of ‘Socrates’. Thus “officially” the two premises of
Aristotelian syllogisms must have the form of either a universal judgement
(e.g. “All Greeks are mortal”) or a particular judgement (e.g. “Some Greeks
run”), because the subject terms of both contain common, and thus predic-
able, names.13 This would be seen as a limitation by subsequent logicians,
especially in the Middle Ages, and various ways of bringing reference to specific
individuals such as by the use of proper names were employed. One was to
treat such singular terms as universals, for example, treating the name
“Socrates”, as Quine would later do, as a verb, “socratizes”. Another was to
treat singular terms as particulars, “Socrates” being treated essentially as “some
Socrates” on the model of “some Greek”. But the general point is that, for
Aristotle, the term ‘Socrates’ did not fit into the dynamics of the syllogistic in
a way that recalls the fact that Socrates, qua introducer of the individualistic
principle of subjectivity, did not fit into the dynamics of Greek Sittlichkeit.14
In particular, it was Leibniz who, building on the work of the nominal-
ists, had fashioned the first “symbolic” or “mathematical” logic, reintrodu-
cing the monadic category of singularity back into the Aristotelian
syllogistic. This was the basis of Gottfried Ploucquet’s formal syllogistic
12
While this is strictly true only of Aristotle’s first figure syllogisms, because for him the proofs
of second and third figure syllogisms require reduction to syllogisms in the first figure, it is indirectly
true of all syllogisms.
13
These were later set out in the “square of opposition” based on Aristotle’s account in De
Interpretatione. Aristotle does occasionally give examples with singular judgements as appearing in
the conclusion, but these are in conflict with the general principles of the syllogistic.
14
We might see here parallels between Aristotle’s logic and Eudoxus’ transformed number system as
Aristotle was aware of the general significance of Eudoxus’ theory of proportion. Eudoxus’ solution
to the Pythagorean problem of incommensurable numbers had been to introduce a conception of
magnitude that was irreducibly comparative and that did not rely on actual numerical specification.
I suggest that in Aristotle’s formal syllogistic judgements with subject terms “all As”, “Some As” and
“No As” are to be understood as internally related as displayed by the square of opposition. Strictly
considered, such judgements cannot be thought of as “commensurable” with singular judgements –
the exclusion of singular judgements eliminating any external common measure, as it were, relating
universal and particular judgements. From this point of view, “Some Greeks are philosophers” could
not be understood as a shorthand way of expressing a conjunction such as “Thales is a philosopher,
and Socrates is a philosopher, and Plato is a philosopher . . . .” in the way this was understood by
medieval nominalist logicians, for example.

198 paul redding
taught at Tübingen when Hegel was a student there with its categories
universality, particularity and singularity (Ploucquet 2006: §§11–13, 19–21).
But in turn this effectively undermined the internal relations that allowed
the Aristotelian syllogistic to function, as Hegel made clear in his com-
ments on the “mathematical syllogism” (Hegel 2010a: 602–7, 12.104–10).
This was the lamentable situation into which logic had fallen about which
Hegel had written in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right.
These issues are too complex to try to sort out in a context such as this,
but what is important to keep in mind is that in his logic Hegel was faced
with the problem of making the different “syllogisms” – the ontological
syllogism of Plato and Aristotle’s syllogism of inquiry – relevant to the ways
of thought of a historical community in which the “principle of subjectiv-
ity”, which appealed to a type of Parmenidean monadic conception of the
individual subject, had become a basic principle. The broad question we
might consider here is how this was to affect the way in which, from
Hegel’s point of view, the inquisitional and ontological syllogisms might
be conceived and how they might be related.
10.3 Issues of Form and Content in Hegel’s Science of Logic

Commentators on Hegel’s Science of Logic standardly warn the reader that
by “logic” Hegel does not mean logic in the modern sense of a formal logic
concerning judgements capable of truth or falsity and inferences capable of
validity or non-validity. Rather, it is usually said, by ‘logic’ Hegel means
‘metaphysics’. This, however, is only partially true. We might say that it
focuses on the Platonic “ontological” side of the syllogism at the expense of
the Aristotelian inquisitional side. Analogously, many interpreters effect-
ively ignore the significance of Hegel’s treatment of formal logic in the
Subjective Logic of Volume Two of the Science of Logic.15 But ignoring the
question of the role played by any inquisitional syllogistic in Hegel’s overall
speculative logic can easily lead to misunderstandings of the implications
his logic has for his metaphysics or, in this case, political ontology.
The Science of Logic traces the fate of “thought-determinations” that start
with the most immediate and obvious – “being” – and the fate of this
category can be taken as a general model for how this series of thought-
determinations is generated. “Being” can be made determinate only by
virtue of its contrasting relation with its opposite, “nothing” (Hegel 2010a:
15
The shortcomings of approaches that ignore or misconstrue Hegel’s attitude to formal logic are
made clear by Elena Ficara in Ficara (2019).

59, 21.69), but as the most fundamental category there is nothing further
that can be said of being to separate it from nothing. The distinction
collapses but is rescued by a further third category, “becoming”, under-
stood as containing “being” and “nothing” as its “moments”. In relation to
this new starting point, “becoming” undergoes the same general fate,
leading into a series of thought-determinations in which each is replaced
by a successor, the process grinding on until it finally stops at “the Idea”,
“the adequate concept, the objectively true, or the true as such” (Hegel 2010a:
670, 12.173). From the Idea as the result of the Logic, we are now somehow
meant to understand how this dialectic progresses into those areas of
philosophy with more determinate content, first, the philosophy of nature,
and then, the philosophy of spirit, in the middle of which we find
“objective spirit”, the realm of the political thought with which we are
primarily engaged.
One question that divides Hegel interpreters is as follows: are the
thought-determinations, such as “being”, “becoming” and so on, basically
determinations of thought in the sense in which Kantian “categories” are
considered, or determinations of being, more or less in the way that
Aristotle had thought of his list of categories in Categories? Or, if they are
both, how are these structures related? Effectively, these questions are just
ways of asking how we should think of “the syllogism” considered onto-
logically and inquistionally. To answer this we should look to the relation
between what Hegel describes as the “objective” and “subjective” logics
that make up The Science of Logic’s volumes I and II, respectively. Objective
Logic, which traces the thought determinations from “being” to “actual-
ity”, clearly aligns with the project of ontological logic, and Subjective
Logic, which has Hegel’s account of concepts, judgements and syllogisms
and which starts from broadly Kantian considerations, with inquisitional
logic. But Hegel’s account of such subjective syllogisms concludes by
passing over into a new form of “objectivity”, the categories of which
then unfold until concluding with “the Idea”.
Given Hegel’s general framework in which two opposing categories are
resolved into some third, we should expect that the concluding account of
syllogistic objectivity should hold together the two earlier abstractly
opposed versions, and this, I suggest, is just the case. What we need to
grasp is exactly how Hegel thinks that an initially formal account of
judgements and syllogisms can create a content, and the general direction
of an answer here, I believe, is to be found in the role played by singular
judgements in the transformed version of the Aristotelian syllogistic found
in Hegel’s Subjective Logic.

200 paul redding
What we see then in the account of judgement and syllogism in the
Subjective Logic is a process that Hegel had initially spoken of in terms of
the capacity for thought to “determine itself, that is to give itself a content”
(Hegel 2010a: 42, 21.48). His account of judgements and syllogisms will
thus involve an account of the elaboration of objects with properties and
relations that are made determinate within those structures we call judge-
ments and syllogisms, and that will be determined in terms of the logical
forms found there. But in these accounts of judgement we will see how it is
not only determinate objects that are generated; so too will the process
described equivalently determine intentional subjects for whom those
objects are determinate. That is, while it is true that, as many interpreters
of Hegel’s logic point out, Hegel will not ultimately mean by “judgement”
and “syllogism” what these terms commonly mean in the history of logic,
but rather, something like complex worldly arrangements of things, these
complex worldly arrangements will nevertheless necessarily include
beings – judging and syllogizing agents – who must be considered as an
essential part of this objective reality and as given shape within it.
The idea that judgements might have contents that include concrete
objects can sound mysterious, and even more mysterious is the idea that
they may create those contents, but I suggest that this is not as strange to
logic, nor as counter-intuitive, as it may at first seem. It is strange only
against the background of the approach to logic which has become dom-
inant for about the last 100 years. Even Bertrand Russell, for example, in
1904, had believed that a judgement made about Mont Blanc actually
contained, as a component, Mont Blanc. This had sounded outrageous to
his correspondent, Gottlob Frege, for whom what a judgement asserted –
its “content” – had to be something abstract – a “proposition”, qua abstract
object capable of truth or falsity (Frege 1980: 163). Russell himself would
soon adopt an approach closer to Frege, establishing the modern paradigm
of formal logic, but in 1904 he didn’t think his proposal an outrage to
common-sense, regarding the content of the judgement as “a certain
complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in which Mont Blanc
is itself a component part” (Frege 1980: 169). This is something like the sense
in which, I propose, Hegel treats some judgements as having concrete
contents. But Hegel would link these concrete objects to similarly concrete
agents doing the judging, and a similar move is found more recently within
modal logic.
Again, it is useful to appeal to Russell who, by 1906, had switched to
Frege’s view and criticized the idea that objects could be components of
judgement contents. This is seen in a review of a book by the logician

Hugh MacColl, who had proposed that some judgements could be some-
times true and sometimes false. MacColl gave as an example the everyday
judgement “Mrs Brown is not at home”, but Russell objected that such
a sentence was not a proper judgement (Russell 1906: 257). It could be made
a proper judgement by treating it as a predicate that could be said of a time
x that “is true for some values of x and false for others” (Russell 1906: 257).16
Russell won this battle, but the war was resumed half a century later when
the logician Arthur Prior would argue against the elimination of “tensed”
judgements, judgements with truth-values relative to a context that
included the judge’s temporal act of judging (Prior 1957).17
Elsewhere I have argued that, in his account of judgements and syllo-
gisms, Hegel attempted to give a role to these opposed Priorian (de-re) and
Russellian (de-dicto) judgement structures (Redding 2019), and that his
accounts of judgement and inference that are woven through the
Subjective Logic show the evolution of concrete contents that we might
think of as something like those object-involving complexes alluded to by
Russell in 1904 that are understood as containing places for specifically
located “subjects”. These complexes are aspects of the objective world in
which agents and objects in that world are bound together in those
complex but determinate ways Hegel calls “judgements” and “syllogisms”.
This is the metaphysical content that has been produced by the subjective
logic and that will be made more determinate in the following parts of the
Encyclopedia.
10.4 Conclusion: Necessity and Contingency in the Institutions

of the Modern Polity
When the focus is placed unilaterally on Hegel’s “ontological” syllogisms it
is easy to think of Hegel as, like Plato, treating conceptual structures as
somehow “out there”, written into the fabric of reality and, in the context
of objective spirit, dictating the institutional structures that the evolving
forms of social life must take. On such a view, one gets the impression of
some type of eternal logical necessity lying behind the institutions which
help define us as individuals. But attention to the role of singularity both in
the ontological dimension and in the inquisitional dimension of Hegel’s
logic as well as to the relation of objective and subjective logics in his final
16
Strangely, on Russell’s translation, the judgement is no longer about Mrs Brown and her where-
abouts. It is about a point of time and whether or not it has a particular property – whether or not
Mrs Brown is home at that time.
17
On the hidden Hegelian background to Prior’s logic see Redding (2017).

202 paul redding
conception of “objectivity” shows this common picture to be very mislead-
ing. The objective “syllogisms” of modern institutional life are no longer
merely universal forces that shape the individuals existing within them as
their “particular” moments. Those institutions are also created and recre-
ated within the human community in ways that have come to rely on the
reasoned evaluations of individuals who grasp themselves not only in terms
of their institutional roles but also in their “singular” and “subjective”
existences. Thus, in modern life, the increasing tendency has been for such
individuals to challenge the normativity of given institutional arrange-
ments in which they exist in response to the inadequacies they experience
within them. Modern institutions, unlike ancient ones, are thus, in this
sense, embedded in the argumentative interactions of those shaped by
them but who can also reflect on them, call them into question, propose
alternatives and so on. This, I suggest, is not in conflict with Hegel’s
conception of the relation of logic to objective spirit, but an expression
of it.
This means that from Hegel’s own logical perspective we must regard his
concrete suggestions as to the “right” institutions for the modern state as it has
continued to take shape as no more than possible exemplifications of its logical
structure. Such possibilities are no more than indeterminate specifications
awaiting actualization and must stand the actual test of those who come to live
within them. Thus, those institutions favoured by Hegel that have come to be
challenged, such as the bourgeois family with its gendered division of labour,
for example, should not be taken as reflecting a shortcoming of his “system” or
the logic on which it is based. Here we might appeal to the type of stance taken
by Socrates the day after giving his speech on the republic. We must look to the
history of our actual institutions since Hegel’s time to test their adequacy as
instantiations of “syllogisms”.

chapter 11
Taking the System Seriously

On the Importance of “Objective Spirit” for Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right
Thom Brooks
11.1 Introduction
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing Hegel scholars is not grappling with
his complex, technical vocabulary, but rather understanding the relevance
of the systematic nature of his philosophy. With most philosophers – from
Plato to Rawls and beyond – we might find commonalities or changes in
view across texts, such as between the earlier or later Platonic writings of
the Crito versus the Laws or Rawls’s change of mind about the fact of
pluralism leading him to recast A Theory of Justice in publishing Political
Liberalism (see Plato 1997; Rawls 1971, 1993, 2001; Brooks and Nussbaum
2015). In contrast, the lecture outlines that make up Hegel’s Encyclopedia of
the Philosophical Sciences were published throughout his academic career
from beginning to end, unfolding a single presentation of his systematic
philosophy, with each part a representation of the same, mature overall
picture.
This makes the task of interpreting any part of Hegel’s philosophy differ-
ent from other non-systematic philosophers. Each of Hegel’s texts making up
his Encyclopaedia are not intended to be understood separately from this
wider philosophical system. This is no less true with Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right, which is explicitly clear from numerous reminders throughout this
work (Hegel 1991a: §§2R, 3R, 4R, 7R, 8R, 26R, 31, 31R, 33R, 34R, 48R, 57R,
78, 88, 95, 148R, 161, 163R, 181, 256R, 258R, 270R, 278, 279R, 280R, 281R,
302R, 324R).1 The frequent mentions of how the system is important for
1
I shall use the conventional abbreviations of “R” for “Remarks” and “A” for “Additions.” Remarks
refer to comments added in a later edition of both his Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of Mind.
Additions refer to the lecture notes of Hotho and Gans that were inserted by T. M. Knox into
different sections of the Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of Mind.
203

204 thom brooks
understanding the Philosophy of Right in ‘Remarks’ published in the final
edition of this text underscore Hegel’s commitment to how his views should
be comprehended. Hegel clearly intended his work – including the Philosophy
of Right – to have a systematic reading where each part took seriously its place
within the larger philosophical system (Brooks 2007, 2012a, 2013).
Yet, there has been a temptation to interpret Hegel’s work non-
systematically – in other words, reading a text independently of any
connection to Hegel’s other texts – like we might for most other philo-
sophers. These roots can be found more than half a century ago in the
highly influential work of Z. A. Pełczyński. He was central in popularizing
the study of Hegel’s political thought, and was a founder of the Hegel
Society of Great Britain, which originally met at his institutional home of
Pembroke College, Oxford. In his preface to the first collection in English
of Hegel’s political essays, Pełcyński notes that these writings “are a most
valuable supplement to the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of
History . . . being relatively free from speculative elements and philosoph-
ical jargon they provide in some ways a clearer insight into Hegel’s basic
political ideas than the major works” (Pelczynski 1964: 1). The elements
and jargon dismissively characterized refer to Hegel’s philosophical system
beyond his political treatise the Philosophy of Right. Pełcyńzski says:
“Apparently, Hegel thought that only by transposing politics to the meta-
physical plane and giving his concerns a speculative underpinning could he
establish their validity” (Pelczynski 1964: 136). This “speculative underpin-
ning” is the Encyclopaedia, including its logic, which Hegel intended to
provide a foundation for the unfolding of his philosophical system. For
Pełczyński, the Encyclopaedia system and metaphysics were essentially
synonymous and irrelevant for understanding Hegel’s political ideas:
Hegel’s political thought can be read, understood and appreciated without
having to come to terms with his metaphysics. Some of his assertions may
seem less well-grounded than they might otherwise have been; some of his
statements and beliefs may puzzle one; some intellectual curiosity may be
unsatisfied when metaphysics is left out; a solid volume of political theory
and political thinking will still remain. (Pelczynski 1964: 136–7)
The position is clear. Whatever Hegel’s self-understanding or presentation
of his project, the wider philosophical system of the Encyclopaedia is of no
more philosophical interest than “some intellectual curiosity”. To under-
stand political writings like the Philosophy of Right, we need only go to that
text itself. Doing otherwise and engaging with Hegel’s metaphysics is
unnecessary and unhelpful.

Taking the System Seriously 205
This non-metaphysical perspective has its roots in a non-systematic
reading of Hegel’s texts, where a work like the Philosophy of Right is thought
best understood separately from the Encyclopaedia system of which Hegel
claimed it was a part. The influential position of Pełczyński highlighted
above is reproduced by many of the best-known commentators that have
followed. In his Hegel’s Ethical Thought, which popularized Hegel’s work
for a new generation of scholars (including me), Allen Wood says:
By “philosophical foundations” I do not mean Hegel’s speculative
metaphysics . . . If you decide to examine those foundations more closely,
you know before long that you are in for a difficult and generally unreward-
ing time of it, at least from the standpoint of social and political theory. If
you are sensible, you will try to avoid that. If you are not so sensible, you will
humbug yourself into thinking there is some esoteric truth in Hegelian
dialectical logic, which provides a hidden key to his social thought. (Wood
1990: xii)
While he concedes that Hegel “is the most methodologically self-conscious
of all philosophers in the Western tradition”, Wood claims there is “noth-
ing” of philosophical interest for the study of his political ideas to be found in
his wider system and Hegel’s “great positive achievements as a philosopher
do not lie where he thought they did, in his system of speculative logic”
(Wood 1990: 5).
This chapter focuses on the specific link of the Philosophy of Right as an
elaboration of the “Objective Spirit” section in the final part (“Philosophy
of Spirit”) in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia philosophical system. The aim is to
make clear the place of Objective Spirit within the system and how the
Philosophy of Right further fleshes out this section of the Encyclopaedia and,
in turn, cements their relation. Moreover, in demonstrating the concrete
interconnection between Objective Spirit and the Philosophy of Right, it
will be shown how the former helps us to better understand the latter. This
will demonstrate that the study of Hegel’s system – and our approach to
a systematic reading of Hegel’s texts – is neither “some intellectual curiosity”
nor “humbug”, but rather a more accurate and insightful interpretation of
Hegel’s political and social thought.
11.2 Where to Begin?

The first place to examine is the beginning of the Philosophy of Right. Its
first section is a single sentence: “The subject-matter of the philosophical
science of right is the Idea of right – the concept of right and its actualization”

206 thom brooks
(Hegel 1991a: §1). The second section clarifies this sentence by adding that
“the science of right is a part of philosophy” where “its deduction is presup-
posed here and is to be taken as given” (Hegel 1991a: §2).
These first comments from the Philosophy of Right ’s Introduction make
clear that this text is not a stand-alone work. It should be understood in the
light of a larger body of work – the Encyclopaedia – of which it is
a component part and from which its “deduction” is presupposed. This
is explicit in the first line that opens the book’s Preface:
This textbook is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic,
exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of
philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to accom-
pany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.
(Hegel 1991a: 9)
Both the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopaedia are lecture outlines that
Hegel would flesh out live in lectures (Pinkard 2001). In short, the Philosophy
of Right is essentially a more elaborately detailed outline of a briefer outline
found in the relevant section (“Objective Spirit”) of the Encyclopaedia (see
Hegel 1971: §§483–552). Hegel notes that it is from the “point of view” of the
Encyclopaedia that he wishes the Philosophy of Right “to be understood and
judged ” (Hegel 1991a: 10). As a more elaborate outline of an outline, Hegel is
also clear that it is a sketch that could be spelled out more than he has done.
In his Science of Logic, he says: “I could not pretend that the method which
I follow in this system of logic . . . is not capable of greater completeness, of
much elaboration in detail” (Hegel 1969: 54). A more elaborate outline
should be expected to provide additional, not less, development of the briefer
outline it fleshed out – and potentially open to further specification and
“greater completeness” itself.
In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel next clarifies that the
idea of right is focused on the “Idea” of right which he explains is a “realm of
actualized freedom” (Hegel 1991a: §4). The focus for the Philosophy of Right
is in freedom in its fullest expression. The next few sections claim that
freedom is a freedom of the will developing from a “universal” and “particu-
lar” to a will that is “free in itself” (Hegel 1991a: §10). But he also makes clear
that such a progression only captures the development of freedom “in its
concept” but not in actuality (Hegel 1991a: §10). What is meant is that we
need some means of discerning where the exercise of our free will is an
expression of our freedom and not an arbitrary impulse (Hegel 1991a: §15).
So our aim is to grasp “the free will which wills the free will” (Hegel 1991a:
§27). When we can understand this, we gain an understanding of something

more concrete – and, for Hegel, more philosophically valuable – which is
“right [Recht]” (Hegel 1991a: §29).
In turning to the Philosophy of Spirit, the first point we should notice is that
while the Philosophy of Right presupposes there is a free will but seeks to
establish how it can be free in “actuality” rather than an expression of animal-
like impulse, or slave to one’s passions, the section “Subjective Spirit” imme-
diately preceding “Objective Spirit” is where Hegel establishes the arguments
for why there is a free will in concept to later be examined in actuality. Hegel
summarizes “Subjective Spirit” and its discussion of the free will both in the
introduction to the Philosophy of Right and in the introduction to “Objective
Spirit” – making explicit the systematic connections (Hegel 1971: §483, 1991a:
§§4–28, 1995a: §§3–10). To understand why Hegel sets himself the task at
hand requires coming to grips with his arguments in the Philosophy of Spirit.2
11.3 Why This Form – and Content?

After explaining that the aim of the Philosophy of Right is to understand
“the free will which wills the free will”, Hegel proceeds to outline the rest of
the Philosophy of Right in three sections – Abstract Right, Morality, Ethical
Life – saying little more in the Introduction than that this is a part of “the
development of the Idea of the will in and for itself” that is “presupposed
from speculative logic” (Hegel 1991a: §33, 33R).
Hegel presupposes a wide range of knowledge about other parts of his
philosophical system that he treats at greater length elsewhere. This is
especially the case with the content of his logic, which is the first part of
his system and elaborated substantively in the Science of Logic. One aspect
easy to overlook is that Hegel assumes his readers are already familiar with
a large range of conceptual terminology that is presented and defined before
the Philosophy of Right (and often not defined within the Philosophy of Right
either). This terminology includes: “universal” (Hegel 1991c: 600–5,
612–18, 1991b: §§163, R, A1), “particular” (Hegel 1991c: 600–1, 605–18,
1991b: §§163, R, A1), “individual” (Hegel 1991c: 600–1, 612–22, 1991b: 163,
R, A1), “actuality” (Hegel 1991c: 529–71, 1991b: §§142–59), “the Idea”
(Hegel 1991c: 755–844, 1991b: §§213–44) and what has been translated
into English as “sublation” (Aufheben) (Hegel 1991c: 106–8, 1991b:
§§96A) among very many others.
2
It should be noted that Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit did not always include discussion
of “Objective Mind” and material appearing later in that published outline, as evidenced in his
lectures of 1827/8 (Hegel 2007b).

208 thom brooks
This fact raises a crucial point. Any proper grasp of the Philosophy of
Right (or its outline in “Objective Spirit”) simply must take the wider
philosophical system seriously, if only as a philosophical dictionary pre-
senting and explaining Hegel’s technical vocabulary. If Hegel had not
intended progress in the system to have an explanatory role as it develops,
we would expect him to deduce concepts and define terms for each part of
his system. Yet, he explicitly does not and, instead, presupposes that readers
are familiar with earlier deductions and discussions which inform later
parts of his system – supported by frequent reminders across his texts like
the Philosophy of Right. To read the Philosophy of Right completely inde-
pendently of Hegel’s system and its logic leaves any interpreter having to
work with incomplete definitions and presentations of complex terms
from, in the words of Bertrand Russell, “the hardest to understand of all
the great philosophers” (Russell 1945: 730). A systematic reading of Hegel’s
work is indispensable for this reason alone.
In fact, every substantive section raises new terminology. “Objective Spirit”
(and the Philosophy of Right) is no different. This is where the concept of “right
[Recht]” is first presented, defined and explained. Later discussions about right
post-“Objective Spirit” and the Philosophy of Right, such as in the following
section on the Philosophy of History, assume the reader will be familiar with
such concepts as universal, particular, the Idea and now right among others.
And so on as we proceed to the final substantive sections of the Encyclopaedia’s
philosophical system. Each part presupposes a familiarity with the termin-
ology and claims made in every preceding part. Diving in and out of one part
to the exclusion of others risks any interpretation being mischaracterized.
Examples abound. For instance, many commentators have treated
Hegel’s sections entitled “Property”, “Punishment” or “Morality” – to
take but three – as encompassing his complete views on each. Let me
take each in turn briefly to illustrate this point.
Hegel’s section on property has been thought to show that property “is
freedom” and requires no functional justification (Berry 1980: 97). Yet,
Hegel’s discussion is notoriously unlike most other defences of a right to
property. This point is captured well by John Rawls, who notes correctly that
Hegel’s treatment is unusual as he “leaves aside any appeal to the advantages
of private property . . . Nor does he appeal to what people might want to do
with their property . . . Less obviously, Hegel doesn’t appeal to
a psychological need of persons for private property” – nor does Hegel talk
about material needs, the economy or poverty (Rawls 2000: 343).
The reason is that the section “Property” simply introduces the concept;
it does not exhaust its treatment. It is introduced as a means of showing the

first steps towards our grounding a free will in the free will of another –
through a mutual recognition of property – as an initial step towards
showing how a free will might will the free will. Later discussions about
material needs and a market economy presuppose this treatment, but they
come later and are too often overlooked (Brooks 2013: 29–38).
The section “Objective Spirit” that the Philosophy of Right elaborates
makes this point clear. It starts by noting its aim of realizing freedom “at
home with itself . . . shaped into the actuality of a world” (Hegel 1971:
§484). Hegel argues that property “is a means” to an end (Hegel 1971:
§489). In trying to grasp the existence and exercise of my freedom in the
world, my appropriation of possessions external to me is a first, basic step.
But this analysis is limited to understanding “the realization of liberty” in
the world “intrinsically” (Hegel 1971: §§496–7). The discussion remains at
too early a stage for considering issues of needs, wants and labour because
we must first develop an understanding of the individuals in their imme-
diate context as part of a family (see Hegel 1971: §322–4). The section
“Property” is fundamentally about freedom, not possessions or earning
a livelihood. A systematic reading of Hegel’s arguments makes this clear by
showing how different parts of Hegel’s texts are systematically interlinked.
Hegel’s theory of punishment is an even clearer example. The most
influential interpretation is by David Cooper, which is explicit about how
one can grasp Hegel’s theory of punishment entirely without going any
further than the section “Wrong [Unrecht]” in the Philosophy of Right ’s first
section (Cooper 1971). Much of the argument for seeing Hegel as
a traditional retributivist is for using his own words – but incorrectly
thinking that Hegel’s use of philosophical concepts and meanings is no
different from everyday commonplace usage by everybody else. For
example, Hegel does say that punishments are a “negation of a negation”
whose end is “the restoration of right” (Hegel 1991a: §§97A, 99). This
cancellation of crime is called “retribution” (Hegel 1991a: §101).
There are several reasons to believe Hegel’s use of “retribution” is not
traditional – aside from the fact his technical philosophical vocabulary is
rarely orthodox. The first reason is that retribution is traditionally about
punishing criminals for their wrongdoing to the degree it is deserved. The
more evil the act, the greater the severity of punishment (Brooks 2012b).
Yet Hegel’s discussion here (in the section “Abstract Right”) is logically
prior to the state. It is a hypothetical sphere where there are no laws, no
police, no courts and no prisons.
A second reason to doubt that Hegel’s use of the term “retribution” is
traditional is exposed by what he says of his theory that “it is not the crime

210 thom brooks
or punishments which change, but the relation between the two” (Hegel
1991a: §96A). This is an especially significant departure from mainstream
retributivism. Following Kant, most are opposed to consequentialism: the
social context is not a factor impacting on an individual’s moral responsi-
bility for what is deserved. Telling a lie is wrong whether or not it might
save an innocent man’s life.
This raises the question of how context matters. It is a point frequently
missed as so few writing about Hegel on punishment look beyond that first
section on “Wrong”; such is the lasting influence of Cooper’s essay. When
we look beyond this section, we see Hegel supporting an elaboration on
how the relation between crime and punishment might change that is
antithetical to retributivism:
The fact that an injury to one member of society is an injury to all the others
does not alter the nature of crime in terms of its concept, but in terms of its
outward existence . . . its danger to civil society is a determination of its
magnitude . . . This quality or magnitude varies, however, according to
the condition of civil society. (Hegel 1991a: §218R)
Hegel goes on to explain that whether the state is in a time of peace or civil
war matters to how crimes will be punished. A crime will receive a greater
punishment relative to civil war because the right violated by the crime
poses a more serious threat to the overall system of rights a legal order
upholds than it would during peacetime. So an offender could receive
greater or lesser punishment not according to his or her desert alone, but
depending on a social context beyond his or her control. This is not
retributivism in any conventional, or unconventional, sense.
Hegel’s system and logic help us understand this better. In “Objective
Spirit”, Hegel is clear in discussing “Wrong” that, in this hypothetical
sphere without laws, police, courts or prisons, there is no punishment
established – any action taken by a wronged individual is no more than
“revenge” (Hegel 1971: §500). The law – and setting punishments for its
violation – has its “actuality” only in “the social state” which is to be
developed later (Hegel 1971: §§502, 531). Hegel makes clear here, too, that
“the greater stability of the legal state . . . gives rise to greater and more
stable liberty” supporting more lenient punishments (Hegel 1971: §539).
But if this is no conventional retributivism, what kind of punishment
might it be? Hegel’s logic clarifies this point in a rarely cited passage:
Punishment, for instance, has a variety of determinations: that it is retribu-
tion; and also a deterrent example, a deterring threat made by the law; and
also a contribution to the self-awareness and betterment of the culprit. Each

of these different determinations has been regarded as the ground of punish-
ment, on the ground that it is the essential determination, and by default the
others, since they are different from it, have been regarded as only acciden-
tal. But the one determination which is assumed as ground does not amount
to the whole punishment. (Hegel 1969: 405–6)
These comments make clear that Hegel did not believe we must choose
between defending retributivism, deterrence or rehabilitation. Instead,
each is a part of what a full theory of punishment should be about. The
ground of punishment is retributivist insofar as an offender must deserve
punishment for it to be justified. But punishment can take different forms,
including as a deterrent or rehabilitative project, if this serves a wider aim of
protecting and maintaining the wider system of rights (Brooks 2017a: 468).
This more accurate, complex and potentially illuminating example of what
we might call a “unified theory” of punishment – and not retributivism – is
best uncovered through a systematic reading (Brooks 2012b, 2016, 2017b).
Finally, much ink is spilled trying to unpick Hegel’s theory of morality –
and, most especially, its famous (and famously brief) critique of Kant’s
theory of morality. A large part of the problem is scholars viewing Hegel’s
use of the term “morality” as if it were like that of anybody else. But this is
far from true. The key distinction is that Hegel sees “morality” as a kind of
artificial realm where we consider our relations to others abstractly and not
in their concrete reality. Morality is at risk of being “without content”
because of its nature (Hegel 1991a: §135).
In essence, his criticism – brief as it is – of Kant’s moral law as “empty”
singles Kant’s moral theory out, but he could have made this criticism
against almost anybody else – this is because Hegel does not just have
a different view of which moral theory is best, but a different conception of
what morality is about that is genuinely unique to him. And it is hardly fair
to say that, because Kant sees himself as engaged in moral theorizing,
therefore it is by nature inadequate – whereas if Kant had seen the same
principled project as a kind of theorizing about “ethical life” (where we
conceive of morality in the real world), this would somehow make it less
objectionable. And yet that Hegel’s project is different, in part, because he
understands the entire sphere of morality in a technical, unique way tied to
his philosophical system is a point that has gone missing from virtually
every scholar touching on this much discussed topic. Hegel’s understand-
ing of “the moral point of view” is unique to him (Hegel 1991a: §105;
Brooks 2013: 52–61).
“Objective Spirit” helps shed further light on this. Hegel notes there
that, in his understanding, morality is a reflection “into itself” (Hegel 1971:

212 thom brooks
§§408A, 503). Moral thinking is an individual intellectual exercise we
engage with in isolation from the world. Hegel describes the situation
like this: “the good is thus reduced to the level of a mere ‘may happen’ for
the agent, who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good,
can be wicked” (Hegel 1971: §509). Without any mention of Kant directly
or indirectly, Hegel says the “utterly abstract semblances” of morality must
pass over into a new sphere where an individual’s “identity with the
good . . . actualizes and develops it” (Hegel 1971: §512). The problem
with morality is mostly down to the very specific and unique way Hegel
characterizes it as a total intellectual endeavour apart from the world – and
as a very different enterprise from “Ethical Life”, where we weigh up what
might happen from our free choices, but in the knowledge that we do so
from within a specific context of actuality (Hegel 1971: §514). While
Hegel’s view on morality might be best known for its brief critique of
Kant’s empty formalism, it is a critique he might have essentially made of
just about any other moral theory qua moral theory – and “Objective
Spirit” helps us see this point more clearly. There is a systematic connec-
tion between logic, morality and ethical life.
All three examples have a common core. Each of them highlights
illustrations where our reading of Hegel in a traditional way – either taking
a section out of context or considering only the Philosophy of Right to the
exclusion of its place in the system – leads us to interpretations that fail to
acknowledge the meaning that Hegel gives the terms he uses, the structure
of his philosophical argumentation and the richness of his thought as he
takes concepts like “property”, “punishment”, “morality” and others,
considering and reconsidering them from new perspectives and vantage
points. Hegel is a complex philosopher, and this interlocking, dialectical
nature of his thought is everywhere acknowledged but all too rarely taken
to heart.3 Only a systematic reading of Hegel’s work can bring out the full
set of conceptions and connections that will help us properly grasp his
3
As a graduate student attending an author meets critics session at the American Philosophical
Association’s Eastern Division conference several years ago, I challenged one leading commentator
on why he had chosen to interpret Hegel’s political thought not only non-metaphysically, but non-
systematically. He replied that all we had to do was take seriously Hegel’s starting point and go from
there following a dialectical structure. I retorted that Hegel isn’t like a bus driver letting you off at
your stop to just dialectically advance, but that you start with a toolbox of terms from the system and
a compass with a map that assumes a familiarity with their use. If we did not know the terms or how
and why Hegel’s dialectic works in a particular way, then we could never move from our starting
point. To be fair to the author, whose book I hugely admire, he agreed but said to do any of this
would be to write a book about Hegel’s metaphysics or system instead of his political thought. This
was part of my inspiration for writing a book to show that this was not necessary.

arguments in their true light. Anything less does an incomplete job. A non-
systematic reading not only goes against Hegel’s self-understanding, but
also fails to grasp the substantive content – not only interpretive nuances –
of his philosophical positions.
11.4 What Must Come Next?

A significant issue remaining is what is to come afterwards. If “Objective
Spirit” (and the Philosophy of Right) are part of a wider system (and they are),
then there will be a starting point we have already considered, but they should
then also point towards the next step. And they do. This is important to
understand as well: not only the need for “Objective Spirit”, the terminology
and argumentative structure it presupposes, but what it turns our focus to next.
There is perhaps no part of Hegel’s philosophy as poorly misunderstood
as his views on history, which he believes follows “Objective Spirit”. Hegel
is widely understood to defend what Francis Fukuyama called “the end of
history” thesis that the world has reached the end of ideological evolution
(Fukuyama 1992). Hegel does give comments that appear to support such
a reading, such as “world history travels from East to West, for Europe is
absolutely the end of world history, Asia the beginning” (Hegel 1956: 103).
Scholars such as Joseph McCarney observe that, for Hegel, history reaches
a point “beyond which there can be no progress” (McCarney 2009: 192).
Some of the clues to correcting this error confront us at the start of the
Philosophy of Right. Every individual is a “child of his time” and “thus
philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts” (Hegel 1991a:
21). Philosophy looks to what has happened before and attempts to make
the best sense of its rationality. Our perspective is historicized: “it is just as
foolish to imagine that any philosophy can transcend its contemporary
world as that an individual can overleap his time” (Hegel 1991a: 21–2).
Thus, philosophy “always comes too late” and “the owl of Minerva begins
its flight only with the onset of dusk” (Hegel 1991a: 23).
The reason why philosophy always comes too late is because it is, as
Hegel conceives it, fundamentally “a thinking consideration” of that which
appears before thought (Hegel 1991b: §2). It is a “thinking-over” (Hegel
1991b: §5). We might see historical developments as leading to a final,
higher stage from our present standpoint. But we lack any philosophical
crystal ball to peer into the future – and any judgement tomorrow might
lead to very different interpretations of our past and present as time
unfolds. Of course, America is a land of the future pointing beyond the
present, as Hegel saw it in his time, which should give us reason enough to

214 thom brooks
dismiss the idea that he held to any fixed end of history view. This is further
reinforced when we consider that it runs counter to his entire project to
make future predictions, as he is limited in rational construction of the
present in the light of the past – and no more.
Besides, if Hegel believed the end of history was the epitome of civiliza-
tion, this view fails to account for the fact that the end of Hegel’s discussion
of history might end “Objective Spirit” and the Philosophy of Right.
However, the further development of his philosophical system is far from
over – including Hegel’s views on the progress of civilizations. This analysis
extends into art and music, religion and philosophy itself – all presented in
outline within the Philosophy of Spirit, as anyone reading “Objective Spirit”
or taking his system seriously would know.
To be fair, Hegel says little about the transition from politics to history
within “Objective Spirit” – and little more in the Philosophy of Right (Hegel
1971: §§548–52, 1991a: §§341–60). After completing his discussion of how
we should conceive the ideal, or “Idea”, of the state, Hegel proceeds to
consider the interrelation of states across the world and over time. This
leads Hegel to draw conclusions – given his views on how we should
understand the past – about the relative merits and demerits of different
civilizations. The discussion is key to understanding his position on war
and other matters, best understood through a systematic reading.
11.5 Conclusion
Hegel intended his Philosophy of Right to serve as an elaboration of the
outline for “Objective Spirit” within his Encyclopaedia philosophical sys-
tem. This is important because understanding the need for “Objective
Spirit” within the system helps us better grasp the starting point for the
Philosophy of Right, such as why the challenge of how the free will can will
the free will is the central question. It does not come from nowhere and it
serves a purpose. Likewise, the dialectical structure of the Philosophy of
Right is imported from the system and it is only in the latter that its full
justification can be found – in addition to key terminology used through-
out the Philosophy of Right. The core problem, the structure of the argu-
ments used to grapple with it and the language employed to make the case
are largely presupposed and imported from outside the Philosophy of Right.
Hegel offers only brief summaries with frequent reminders to look back at
the system for his complete and substantive account. The system plays an
explanatory role in understanding Hegel’s political and social ideas: it is
not mere “intellectual curiosity” or “humbug” as some have claimed.

When I first argued for a systematic reading of Hegel’s philosophy as more
accurate and illuminating nearly twenty years ago, mine was a relatively lone
voice amidst the then raging debate between the so-called metaphysical and
non-metaphysical approaches (Brooks 2004). Two decades later there is
a new orthodoxy among Hegel scholars where the system is now widely
accepted to have an explanatory importance (Brooks and Stein 2017).
Recently, Wood has made clear he too accepts this perspective:
To appropriate Hegel, you have to understand Hegel: that means, of course,
understanding the system and method through which he thought . . . There
is no choice between reading Hegel “systematically” and reading him in
response to our questions. There are only different ways of doing both at
once. (Wood 2017: 83)
This puts things right. Hegel’s philosophy is no less controversial, includ-
ing what importance the system has for our understanding any part of his
philosophy as developed in the Philosophy of Right or elsewhere. But
progress has been made in this now more firmly established position that
there is no choice but to adopt a systematic reading of Hegel’s texts even if
how such an approach might be employed will still be subject to debate.
Reading the Philosophy of Right as an elaboration of “Objective Spirit” is
both more in keeping with Hegel’s explicit intentions and also helps
explain the need for the Philosophy of Right, its unique structure of its
arguments and how it fits within Hegel’s works. A systematic reading of
these texts achieves this best – and this chapter has been an attempt to show
why and how.

chapter 12
§§556–63: Art as a Form of Absolute Spirit

The Discursive, the Non-discursive, the Religious,
and the Political
Terry Pinkard
12.1 The Background

When one turns from the collected volumes of Hegel’s lectures on the
philosophy of art to the eight (mostly one-paragraph) sections on the subject
in his final version of the Encyclopedia, the obvious difference in size and
detail of course clearly stands out. The lectures are voluminous, include
many examples, and discuss many matters not even hinted at in the
Encyclopedia. Going from the lecture transcripts that we still have, we can
see that Hegel was working out his views on the rather thin basis he had
outlined in the Encyclopedia in a way that far outstripped the latter. Whereas
in many of the other lectures (for example, on the Logic, the philosophy of
nature, or the philosophy of objective spirit), one can get a sense of the
general shape of the whole just from the outline given in the Encyclopedia,
one cannot do so with the philosophy of art. If Hegel had not given those
lectures, and all we had to go on was his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit and the
1830 Encyclopedia, it is hard to imagine that anybody with just that to go on
could have constructed the shape of his final views on the subject.
Without those lectures, what could we have thought about those para-
graphs? We know that in the Phenomenology, there is no separate entry for
the philosophy of art. Instead, art is discussed in the section on the “Art-
Religion” (Kunstreligion), where it is clearly restricted to the religion of the
ancient Greeks which he argues was left behind by the later revealed
religion (of Christianity). After the disappearance of polytheistic Greek
religion in the wake of monotheistic Christianity, it seemed from the
standpoint of the Phenomenology that art played a much lesser role in the
life of Geist than religion or philosophy. This 1807 categorization remained
intact for Hegel’s 1817 first edition of the Encyclopedia, in which the
216

§§556–63: Art as a Form of Absolute Spirit 217
categories of absolute spirit are those of “the religion of art, revealed
religion, and philosophy.” By 1827 and 1830, however, absolute spirit had
taken on its canonical form of “art, religion and philosophy.” Without the
lectures, we might have wondered why Hegel decided to give art its own
section. We would speculate: what had he changed his mind about?
We also know that Hegel obsessed about getting everything in his
system into the right order since if it were not, it would not really be
a Wissenschaft, and for it to play the social role as the modern intellectual
discipline par excellence in the modern “teaching and research” university,
it either had to be “science” or not be there at all. No doubt part of that was
Hegel’s reason for meticulously recategorizing the place of art in the
system. However, that only scratches the surface of Hegel’s worry.
What we now have as the lectures on the philosophy of art is an edited
compilation of both student lecture notes and Hegel’s own notes for his
lectures (all now lost) by H. G. Hotho, who, following the guidelines for
the compilers of Hegel’s collected works after Hegel’s death, rewrote all the
assembled material into a volume that was supposed to look as if it had
been written by Hegel himself. Later generations with different philo-
logical ethics have chafed under this ever since. (Any professor who
would be told that her reputation would rest entirely on somebody assem-
bling her views out of student notes would have reason to worry.) This way
of doing things also made it impossible to see whether Hegel was develop-
ing or changing his views on the subject matter. We do know that Hegel
was already lecturing on the philosophy of art in Heidelberg in 1818 and
then started again anew in Berlin in 1820. By the 1820 lectures, he had
adopted his new ordering system and categories for the philosophy of art
that marked the shift from the treatment in the Phenomenology and the 1817
Encyclopedia. The later published student notes from the different years the
course was offered have also shown that Hegel did indeed change his views
over the period, although how much remains a matter of scholarly debate.
In the course of his later lectures on the topic, Hegel said that for us (his
contemporaries), art was a “thing of the past,”1 a view that nicely fits with
the Phenomenology ’s restriction of art in its full sense to the life of the
ancient Greeks. Hegel’s statement can also be taken to announce – as some
have – a thesis about the coming crisis of modern art itself, something that,
so it has been argued, only really shows up in the art after Hegel’s death,
especially in the revolutionary work by Manet and Cézanne.2
1
Hegel (2004: 7); the passage appears in Hotho’s edition in Hegel (1970–1: 13:25).
2
Pippin (2014).

218 terry pinkard
It should be the case that whatever Hegel says in the Encyclopedia should
therefore be consistent with what he was saying in the lectures, and what is
in the Encyclopedia should be more or less foundational for what appears in
the lectures. But how do the paragraphs serve as the foundation? There are
three matters to consider here, and they are all interrelated. One is the
condition of the times in which Hegel was making the change, the other
had to do with how he conceived of the relation between his philosophy
and those times, and the third, of course, is what the paragraphs have to do
with the overall Hegelian project.
12.2 From the Phenomenology to the Encyclopedia: Religion

and Art
One of the things that was on Hegel’s mind when he sketched out the
initial paragraphs on the “religion of art” for the 1817 Encyclopedia was the
status of religion in his system. By the time he moved on to giving art its
own separate category in “absolute spirit” in the 1827 and 1830 versions, the
worry about religion had become even more pronounced. In the later
editions, in the last section on “objective spirit,” he launched into a long
discussion of the role of religion in the life of Geist and in particular on the
role of religion in the state. In the system, the idea is that in ascending to
the level of different “peoples” in the progression of the philosophy of
history (from one, to some, to all are free), we, the readers, are now moving
in the direction of looking at spirit itself rather than any particular
actualization of the concept, that is, thinking about the status of humanity
in general rather than about the way in which particular formations of
humanity play a role in world history. The reflection of spirit on what it
means to be spirit is just what “absolute” spirit is supposed to indicate.
More colloquially put, it is humanity’s reflection on what it is to be the
minded creature it is.
Hegel’s worries here were both systematic and bound to his own time. On
the one hand, he was concerned with elaborating the relation between art
and religion (or, more generally, between beauty and partial truth) and
concerned with what role, if any, art could play in the development of
a fully modern social and political order in which he was determined to have
his own philosophy play a leading role. These worries were coming to a head
in the years between finishing the Phenomenology and his assuming his
position, first in Heidelberg in 1816 and then finally in Berlin in 1818. In
1812, Napoleon had been defeated by the reactionary alliance and sent into
exile, but then he staged a surprising return, only to be defeated again and

exiled for good in 1815. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 threatened to turn the
clock back to pre-Revolutionary days but did not succeed, and Hegel more
or less breathed a large sigh of relief and immediately began to think through
the implications for modern life in his own thought. It was against this
background that he began to have second thoughts about the role of art in
the modern world and its relation to religion. Unlike in the Phenomenology,
he began to think about what he decided to call “Romantic” art, which was
to encompass all of art in the Christian era (or, put negatively, in the era that
succeeded classical art). This leads to the great change from the first part of
absolute spirit ceasing to be the “religion of art” and becoming simply “art”
itself. It was also, he noted in his late lectures, a “transitional phase.”
In the Phenomenology, the section right before the long chapter, “Religion,”
concerns the confession and forgiveness of two beautiful souls who have
become the “acting” and the “judging” consciousness. Each is the actualiza-
tion of a kind of Kantian and Fichtean conception of self-consciousness in
which the true motives of a moral agent must by metaphysical necessity be
invisible in the social world. Kant argued that a genuinely virtuous action had
to be carried out in light of an act of freedom that itself required a form of
causality that could have no appearance as the causality it was in the phenom-
enal world. There could be no empirical test, and thus not even an introspect-
ive one, that could determine whether the cause of the action was a freely
willed choice or some arbitrary inclination.
Hegel dramatized that into a story about the breakdown of the kind of
moralism that follows in practice from any such conception. It concerns
two agents, each of whom is obsessed with the purity of their motives and
their own unconditional freedom. One claims never to act until he has
gathered all the salient facts at that time, so even if bad things result from
his action, he is nonetheless blameless since his motive was as pure as any
motive could be: he acted fully on principle in light of all the salient facts
available. The other holds the same view but, believing that he never has all
the salient facts, never acts; and his motives are therefore as pure as any
motives could be: he acts only on principle when all the salient facts are
available. Each accuses the other of deception, of lying, of hypocrisy, and
each vehemently rejects the imputation that the other–accuser could have
the standing to know his motives. It is only on seeing the irrationality of
such a view that each shifts instead into confessing to their own stiff-necked
stance and forgiving the other for the harsh accusations that were made.
This is to make good – some several hundred pages later – the problem
posed earlier in the Phenomenology about the way in which demands for
and struggles for recognition from another agent collapse into the

220 terry pinkard
irrationality of relations of mastery and servitude. Two self-conscious agents
confront each other. In being self-conscious, they each know what they are
doing when they act, and each is capable of redeeming their act by appeal to
reasons. They are each moments of a social whole, each is an “I” that is also
a “We.” Just as we can imagine that each speaks the same language as the
other, so that the whole (the language) is given concrete form in the express
speech-acts of both of them, each also claims therefore to have a kind of
immediate knowledge of what counts as the appropriate manifestation of the
language. Each claims an immediate – a non-inferential, non-empirical –
knowledge of what it is to be a speaker of that language in a way that is
different from more external ways of identifying oneself as a “We” (such as,
for example, noting that one is carrying an umbrella just like everyone else in
line, which is an external, empirical self-observation).3 Each therefore claims
an authority to speak for the whole – this is similar to when one says, “We
English speakers say . . . ” – and each does so in what Hegel calls “self-
certainty” (again similar to when one says that “We English speakers would
never say . . . ”). Whenever there is a dispute about whether some act
corresponds to this collective authority, there is a dispute over such “self-
certainty,” over who speaks for the whole, and, when one of the agents is
willing to stake his life on possessing that authority, the relation spirals
downward into a struggle for recognition with one of them compelling the
other to submit to his authority, with the result that out of their original
unity comes disunity, and out of shared meanings comes an inegalitarian,
unjust relation. Such a compelled form of recognition is, of course, deeply
irrational: the master must demand recognition from somebody whom he
denies has the authority to bestow it since if he had the authority to bestow it,
he would also have the authority to withhold it.
As he wrote that in the Phenomenology, Hegel thought the resolution of
that contradiction lay in recognizing the rule of reason as that which binds
the two together and of submitting all such inegalitarian claims to reason’s
tribunal (where they would fail). As he wrote the book, however, he
changed his mind about the feasibility of doing that in the way he
originally intended, and he added the chapter on “Spirit” and “Religion”
to the book.4 As he brought the book to its penultimate stage in the
discussion of beautiful souls several hundred pages later, he made good
on the idea that the dead end reached in the section on mastery and
servitude was to be transcended by appeal to the idea that in a fully
individualistic, even moralistic, society, the impasse reached by the
3 4
See Haase (2016) and Fisher (2019). On the details of that change, see Förster (2012).

beautiful souls could be resolved by acts of confession and forgiveness in
which each intuits (Hegel’s word) himself in the other.
Again, the analogy of shared language as the “We” throws some light
on this. Just as one does not (normally) infer the meanings of the words
of the shared language – as if when one heard, “this is red,” one inferred
to “He probably means this is red” or anything like that – the two
beautiful souls immediately see in their own distorted self-certainty that
they are doing the same thing and that it is senseless. The medium in
which they make their accusations against each other is that of language,
which, as Hegel says (more than once in the Phenomenology), is the
existence (Dasein) of spirit. Language is a practice which shows itself in
the particular utterances of its speakers and which is real (“actual,”
wirklich in Hegel’s technical terminology) only in its being manifested
by the speakers. As a practice, language has no actuality beyond its
practitioners, and the practitioners are practitioners only in manifesting
the language.
The setting for the encounter between the beautiful souls is that of
Hegel’s own day. The kind of self-reflexiveness that he thought had come
to be the necessary form of self-conscious modernity seemed to find its
expression in an attractive but ultimately senseless conception of freedom
that made us all invisible to each other and invisible to ourselves. However,
both ideas, of the full invisibility of the inner life as well as of the full
visibility of the inner life, are each as one-sided as the other, and are as one-
sided as the idea that we are all either independent autonomous individuals
or the otherwise empty placeholders for anonymous social forces. The
modern form of life – the Geist of modernity – is reflected in the self-
certainty of the individuals who are exhibiting it in their language and
actions as well as the way in which the form of life is manifesting itself in
them. Hegel ends the section on beautiful souls in the moment of recon-
ciliation in which he says, perhaps a bit puzzlingly: “The reconciling yes, in
which both I’s let go of their opposed existence, is the existence of the
I extended into two-ness, which therein remains the same as itself and
which has the certainty of itself in its complete self-relinquishing and in its
opposite. – It is the God that appears in the midst of those who know
themselves as pure knowing.”5
This means that at that stage in the development of the Phenomenology ’s
account, one of the basic problems – maybe even the basic problem of the
whole book – which has to do with the status of self-conscious subjectivity
5
Hegel (2018a: §671, 389).

222 terry pinkard
had been resolved but only in a non-discursive way. After the completion
of his Logic, this issue of the role, if any at all, of non-discursive thought
had become critical for Hegel, since the Logic was so clearly an argument
for the absolute status of discursive, judgmental, and inferential thought.
This was, he thought, the role that religion had to play, and as Hegel
came to see sometime around 1817, one of the biggest issues concerned the
role that art was to play in the modern world and in the philosophy of
Geist in general.
12.3 Art as Absolute Spirit

The passage from objective spirit to absolute spirit has to do with the way
in which practical reason as embedded in the institutions and practices of
ethical life (Sittlichkeit, or what we might also call “moral ethos”) requires
a move that focuses not just on doing the right thing but on understand-
ing why it would matter at all. (The basic distinction between “morality”
and “ethical life” is that between the relations between and among
subjects being conceived along the lines of monadic subjects relating to
each other as mediated by a system of moral rules and that in which the
subjects are not conceived monadically but rather as essentially involved
in the relation itself, as in love and friendship and in citizenship in the
state.) Religion therefore forms the basic ethical bond among the people
of a political community in that it provides the motivation and principles
of a life that actually has a grip on the people involved. As Hegel tells his
story, religion begins as the non-discursive grasp among the people of
a given community about what holds them together, and as such, it is as
much immediate knowledge as is the knowledge of the shared language.
As religion develops, it becomes more and more discursive (especially
among the “people of the book,” for which reason Hegel assigns special
importance to Christianity). In its further development, religion (as
Christianity) develops out of itself a theology which, by submitting the
claims of religion to reflective rational inquiry, itself necessarily trans-
forms itself into philosophy, the Wissenschaft of pure reason itself. Thus,
the “Christian” form of life transforms itself into a more philosophically
inclined form of life.
In Hegel’s original formulation in the Phenomenology, the introduction
of religion showed how the inherently dyadic (and thus not monadic)
structure of two agents engaged in recognition–confession–forgiveness is
made real (and this is where Hegel’s dense phrase “the appearing god”
stages its entrance). As he moves to the “religion of art,” he is concerned to

show that the religion and ethical life of the ancient Greeks was united in
the experience of beauty. Hegel accepted what he took to be Herodotus’
claim that it was the poets (in particular, Hesiod) who gave the Greeks their
gods (in light of later philology, that claim is rather dubious). Since, on that
view, the Greek gods were essentially aesthetic creations, attending to them
tied the Greeks together into what was essentially an aesthetic unity, but
which was fated to fall apart on its own terms. The Phenomenology ’s
account (which is still the case in the 1817 Encyclopedia account) thus
argues that the deficiencies of a purely aesthetic conception of ethical life
carry within themselves a logical push to develop the more discursive
account that culminates in absolute knowing in which the possibility of
art serving any kind of ethical function is over.
By the time he began to lecture on the subject, Hegel had developed
a way of marking that division, which also appears in the 1830
Encyclopedia. Art, religion, and philosophy are now ordered in terms of
non-discursive (art), a mixture moving toward the discursive (religion
developing a theology), and fully discursive ideas (philosophy), or, as
Hegel expresses it there, in terms of intuition (Anschauung), representa-
tion (Vorstellung), and thought. In the terms of the 1830 Encyclopedia, art
is the way in which an element of sensibility is transformed into a “sign”
(Zeichen) of the Idea. In Hegel’s terminology, the Idea is what he calls the
unity of the concept and reality (or the concept and objectivity, as he also
sometimes says). In the terms in which we have interpreted him here, the
Idea is thus the term for the unity of a practice and its practitioners, that
is, the way in which a general practice (such as a language) shows itself in
the actions of the practitioners (in speech acts), who in turn exhibit the
practice in their actions. Hegel’s philosophical account is thus not that of
practices producing the practitioners (as in the various forms of accounts
of individual and collective action in terms of social forces and power),
nor of the practitioners producing the practice (as in all individualist
conventionalist or contractarian accounts), nor even that of the co-
production of practice and practitioner (which would be what he calls
Wechselwirkung in the Logic, the final stage of “Essence” and thus
inappropriate for accounts of agency that by and large are to be framed
in the teleological terms of the “Concept”).
The way that Hegel sets up his account of art therefore has to do with its
ethical and political role. After the breakdown of the “political work of art”
and the “art-religion” of ancient Greece, art would seem no longer to have
an essential role to play. This obviously posed a problem for Hegel as he
was fundamentally rethinking his philosophy of art after 1817.

224 terry pinkard
Art thus presents an intuition of the “so-called unity of nature and spirit,”6
in which the truth of spirit – that its meanings are not in fact products of
nature to be explained in terms of the categories of “force, ground and
consequence,” which for the moderns are the paradigms for explanation of
natural events7 – emerges only after the breakdown of the more intuitive,
immediate form. In its most immediate form, in this self-certainty “bur-
dened with immediacy, the freedom of the subject is only a customary ethic
(nur Sitte) without the infinite reflection into itself, without the subjective
inwardness of conscience.”8 In the cases where the particular sensuous content
is itself in its particularity a “sign of the Idea” (as might be the case with, for
example, a piece of sculpture that expressed the way a god might look), one
has the aesthetic phenomenon of beauty (which itself has only a weak
connection to the experience of natural beauty, which has to do more with
certain inbuilt dispositions and the like).9 An individual work of art is
thereby like an individual action that manifests the general practice in the
way it exemplifies the practice, as when one shows somebody, for example,
how to do a dance step or how to do it with finesse. (“This is how it’s done,”
says the dance teacher, making the move.) The individual work of art
likewise is more or less a version of “This is what it is to be a minded
creature, maybe a god, with all its ramifications, in this context.” The work
of art thus condenses a set of complex meanings into one “sign” of the Idea,
unlike a discursive judgment which breaks them up and combines them.
Since the basic determination of human agency is freedom, the true work
of art would be a “sign” of freedom, a kind of individual sign of “This is what
it means to be free” but in a condensed and non-discursive manner.
Discursively, we would say that freedom is acting without there having to
be one element in the agent as the ruler or another element as the ruled in
one’s actions (and, if one is Hegelian, to add that one is acting in terms of
a shared sense of meaning with an other so that each can, like the two beautiful
souls confessing to and forgiving each other, understand the unity of self and
other; or even more concretely, acting in terms of love or friendship, or acting
in terms of justice as constituting the virtues of citizenship). Following some of
the usage of his day, Hegel calls this the “ideal” of art: an individual work that
shows, but does not necessary discursively say, what it is to be free. If it has to
make itself discursive to do so, it ceases to be art.10
6
Hegel (1970–1: 10:367, §557) (Er enthält die sogenannte Einheit der Natur und des Geistes, – d. i. die
unmittelbare, die Form der Anschauung).
7 8 9
Hegel (2004: 27–8). Hegel (1970–1: 10:369, §557). Hegel (1970–1: 10:367, §556).
10
Hegel is particularly explicit on this point in the last series of lectures on the subject (in 1828/9). See
Hegel (2017: 27).

12.4 The Historicity of the Arts
In the lectures series from 1820 onward, Hegel made it clear that “since the
history of religions coincides with world history,”11 the progress of art in
history could itself be divided into three stages. In its earliest stage, art is at
one with religious self-consciousness, but neither art nor religious self-
consciousness could at that stage have developed any distinct theological
understanding of divinity. Instead, all of the energy for art and religion
would be absorbed into art itself. The “need for art” as he calls it would in
those cases exist since art is the “only organ in which the abstract, in itself
unclear and confused content, which is taken from natural and spiritual
elements, can strive to bring itself to consciousness.”12 He decided to call
this “symbolic” art and put just about every form of art prior to the Greeks
(and for the most part, all art outside of Western art) into this category.
This is art that does not yet determinately know what it wants to express
and manifest for the reason that, as it were, it does not know what it wants
to say, and, not knowing that, it thus can have no real sense of what would
count as the best way to say it, except to craft a work of beauty and point to
it. Art and religion at that point would have only the vaguest sense of what,
outside of the conditions of natural beauty (symmetry, harmony, and the
like) could count as an adequate expression. However, in the Encyclopedia,
the historical ordering of the progress from symbolic (pre-Greek) to
classical (Greek) to romantic art (all art after the triumph of Christianity
in the Roman empire) is only implicit, unlike in the lecture series from 1820
onward. On the whole, the Encyclopedia treats the three as three simple
possibilities for art as a mode of absolute spirit, whereas the lecture series
treats them as each flourishing in specific historical periods.
Interestingly, Hegel calls this most direct form of art the art of sublimity,
not of beauty itself. Sublimity points beyond itself to something like “the
infinite” which cannot be aesthetically grasped, and, in these earlier forms
of collective self-formation, cannot be adequately conceptualized in any
form. In the art of the sublime, the “sign” in effect says that what it is to be
a minded, geistig creature is “this,” the inexpressible. Symbolic art thus can
have no particular direction to itself, since all attempts to express the
inexpressible fail for the same obvious reason, and there can be no progress
in symbolic art other than in technique and materials. Therefore, the
failures of symbolic art cannot be written off as an indication of lack of
aptitude on the symbolic artist’s part. Its failures are instead expressions of
11 12
Hegel (1970–1: 10:371, §562). Hegel (1970–1: 10:371, §562).

226 terry pinkard
deeper conceptual impasses not so much in art as in a certain kind of
religion (and thus in a certain way of living). The sublime is not the
beautiful. It is the “other” to human life which sets human life apart by
showing its insignificance in relation to the sublime and thereby also
spurring reflection on what might be of redeeming value in human life
which otherwise might seem so insignificant. The gods of the religions and
art of sublimity inspire awe but cannot reconcile people and gods.
On the other hand, beauty, which occurs at a later stage of collective self-
formation, would be the “sign” of Geist comprehending itself in which the
collectivity takes itself to have perfectly expressed itself. In such art, there is
a standard of progress inherent to it since there can be better and worse
ways of presenting what Hegel calls “humanity’s highest vocation”13 in
beautiful form for the reason that only the most beautiful form would be
adequate to that “highest vocation.” A less beautiful presentation of the
god would be inferior to a more beautiful presentation since the latter
would be in fact a more truthful presentation. In giving this account, Hegel
seems to follow in the wake of Kant’s conception of natural beauty as the
spontaneous harmonization of intellect (“the understanding”) and imagin-
ation, when the prosaic world we grasp discursively (in the intellect)
spontaneously harmonizes with the world as we might imagine it to be
(in the imagination). Since the intellect is guided by concepts, which are
rules (for the synthesis of representations), and the imagination has no
rules, spontaneous harmony of rule-guided and non-rule-guided faculties
can itself have no rules. The Greek world was like that, so Hegel thought.
In it, the gods and men functioned together, and when everybody fulfilled
the requirements of their place in the whole, the result was a spontaneous
harmonization. (In his later lectures on the philosophy of history, he
referred to ancient Greek political life as the “political work of art.”)
In Hegel’s presentation, when the archaic Greeks thought about what
the world meant as a whole, they thought it through in aesthetic terms (by
way of statues, poems, pictures, music) and not in discursive terms.
However, that form of life was fated to break down as the contradictions
which were only implicit in the aesthetic fusion of singular lives and the
world as a whole began themselves to be aesthetically presented to the
Greek audience (paradigmatically, in the tragedies). Those contradictions
appearing in tragic plays pushed the Greeks into a more discursive,
philosophical mode (which was incompatible with the absolute claims
made by their earlier, aesthetic mode), and as that happened, the older
13
Hegel (1970–1: 10:371, §562).

classical arts began to be displaced. The older Greek temples, once the
beautiful houses of the gods, became merely beautiful buildings, items in
the future to be copied and imitated for their beauty but not, as it were, for
their truth about the relation between gods and people.
For the Greeks the whole constituted by people, gods, and earth sup-
posedly had an aesthetic unity, and as it began to unravel, so did the
unity.14 When the unity fully came apart, so did the religion and the form
of life oriented around it. Rather than returning to a religion of sublimity,
the Mediterranean world (in this case in Roman form) pushed onward to
a non-aesthetic unity based on more prosaic matters such as the power of
the legions coupled with Rome’s often deft and pragmatic diplomacy in
dealing with its conquered peoples. The non-aesthetic unity of empire
replaced the aesthetic unity of the political work of art and expanded its
scope. There were many reasons to be a Roman (wealth, power, peace,
protection, etc.), but they were not immanent to the self-certainty of the
people it ruled.
With Christianity, a new spiritual unity was established that purported to
fill in the gaps left by imperial unity but also not in any necessarily beautiful
way. With that, art also necessarily had to change. When it comes to
portraying the divine or “humanity’s highest interests,” Romantic art, as
the art following in the wake of the widespread acceptance of Christianity,
“gives up portraying it as such in an external shape and thus of showing it by
means of beauty; it exhibits the divine as only condescending to appearance.
It shows the divine as inner intimacy (Innigkeit) in externality.”15
Hegel’s changing reflections on the topic emerged gradually in the lecture
series. In 1820, in keeping with his earlier assessment in the Phenomenology
and the 1817 Encyclopedia, he told his students that “our relationship to art
indeed no longer has the high seriousness and significance that it earlier
had.”16 By 1823, he was saying that “the work of art cannot fulfill our final
absolute need, we no longer worship an art-work, and our relationship to the
art-work is of more reflectively circumspect sort.”17 By 1826, he had changed
that to “the highest vocation (Bestimmung) for art is a thing of the past,”
leaving open the idea that art might still have a role to play in modern life.18
By 1828 Hegel had sharpened his view to the claim that “we no longer bend
the knee to God the Father and Pallas (Athena) no matter how excellently
they may be presented” (i.e., neither to the sparse Enlightenment deist god
14
Hegel (1970–1: 10:32, §384). 15 Hegel (1970–1: 10:370, §362).
16
Hegel and Schneider (1995: 38). 17 Hegel, Hotho, and Gethmann-Siefert (1998: 6).
18
Hegel (2004: 7); the passage appears in Hotho’s edition in Hegel (1970–1: 13:25).

228 terry pinkard
nor to Greek religion) and, putting it even more strongly, he claimed “the
bounds of art do not lie in art but lie in us,”19 and “our time” is described as
the period “after art.”20
12.5 Art, Religion, Politics: Absorption in the Non-absorptive

In his earlier days, first in Tübingen with Schelling and Hölderlin, then
later at Frankfurt with Hölderlin, and then even later in Jena with
Schelling, Hegel was consumed with the issue about the relation between
art and philosophy. By the writing of the Phenomenology, however, Hegel
had firmly come down against the idea that the truth about Geist was in its
highest form an aesthetic, non-discursive matter. Philosophy as the “sci-
ence of reason” triumphed over the non-discursive intuition of the absolute
that Schelling had defended in his early work, and especially in The System
of Transcendental Idealism of 1800. But at least by the beginning of his stay
in Berlin in 1818, Hegel was convinced that there also had to be a place for
modern art in the world after the Congress of Vienna had not reversed the
basic gains of the Revolution. By the lectures of 1820, he thought he had
found this in Italian and Dutch painting, where the “magic of seeming-to-
be (Schein)” so perfected by Dutch painters indicated the place of art in
a world in which a certain kind of self-distancing reflection was more of
a basis for shared life and religion rather than the more immediate absorp-
tion that he thought the ancient Greek cults had practiced. This “magic of
seeming-to-be” was as it were the “music of painting,”21 and it was in this
19
Hegel (2017: 26). This is a passage that throws some doubt on Hotho’s version of the lectures. In the
Hotho edition, Hegel seems to be responding to Christian ideas in the passage about “bending the
knee,” where Hotho has him speaking of presentations of “Gottvater, Christus, Maria.” However,
the 1828 version speaks only of “Gottvater” – which Hegel characterizes as the Enlightenment’s
abstract view of God, see Hegel (1970–1: 10:31) – and “Pallas” (Athena), which he says is not yet the
“genuine God” (wahrhafte Gott). That this should also extend to Christian art is, I think, the right
inference to draw, but Hegel does not draw it in Heimann’s notes of the 1828 lectures. Hegel is also
speaking, likely, of his opposition to the worship of images in non-Protestant Christianity, when he
says in the Encyclopedia that “the reverently revered images are non-beautiful idols, (serving) as
miraculous talismans that extend into an other-worldly spiritless objectivity, and bones do the same
or even better service than such images” (Hegel (1970–1: 10:372, §562).
20
Hegel (2017: 26). The phrase “das Nach der Kunst” also appears in Hotho’s edition, Hegel 1970–1:
10:142).
21
Hegel and Schneider (1995: p. 277). It is striking that Hotho did not include any of the passages
about the magic of Scheinen in his version of the lectures on aesthetics, since it is crucial to
understanding what Hegel’s insight into the status of modern art was. Hegel repeats the 1820
theme about the magic of Scheinen in the 1828/9 lectures in even greater detail. He uses it to make the
transition into music and a discussion of its elementary power. On Hegel’s mature views on the
“elementary power” of music, see Pinkard (2011). On the discussion of the “magic of Scheinen,” see
the helpful account in Rutter (2011).

absorption in what is reflectively taken as “seeming-to-be” – an absorption
in an almost paradigmatically non-absorptive state – that the power of
modern art was to lie.
What was most striking about the art-religion of the Greeks was its
“liveliness” (Lebendigkeit), the way in which the Greeks were both self-
conscious and absorbed in the religious cults.22 At first, Hegel suspected
that the liveliness of art had to go missing in modern art, but, after his
discovery after 1818 of the way in which to understand the absorption in the
non-absorptive reflective act on absorptive action and thought – as cap-
tured in a Dutch genre painting or still life – Hegel did more or less about
an about face. By the 1828 lectures, he seemed to have found a place for
modern art as a mode of collective and personal self-reflection. The
absorption of non-absorptive reflection on the ordinary objects of life
enables a kind of intimacy (an Innigkeit) with the world that is the result
of an activity, which Hegel (adapting a Lutheran term) calls Verinnigung,
a kind of “making oneself intimate” with the object, an active losing oneself
in the world as one lets the world, as it were, roll over oneself (a Sichergehen,
as Hegel calls it), all moved by the “character of freedom and intimacy.”23
This discussion of Verinnigung does not appear in the 1827 and 1830
versions of the Encyclopedia. Instead, the discussion of art is still framed on
both sides (beginning and end) by religion and the political and social role
of religion and art. In the transition and run-up to the discussion of art
(§552), Hegel speaks in the concluding section on states and world history
about how the social and political community can be held together only by
an ethos (a Sitte), and that this ethos must be internal to the religious
consciousness of the people. He says that “the state rests on . . . ethical
dispositions, and these rest on religious dispositions,”24 and therefore, if
the religion is not true, the ethical dispositions will also be false. What he
calls the “monstrous error of our times” consists in thinking that the ethical
bond of the political community can be severed from the religious bond
even though clearly the two are to be analytically distinguished.25 He notes
that “there cannot be two kinds of conscience, one religious and another
ethical which is distinct from it in substance and content,”26 and that it is
simply useless to organize the state along ethical lines if the (religious)
dispositions of the people are at odds with it.27
22
This theme of liveliness is developed in great insight and detail in Rutter (2011), and it forms one of
the key elements in the Hegelian style account of art in Pippin (2014).
23
Hegel (2017: 127). 24 Hegel (1970–1: 10:355, §552). 25 Hegel (1970–1: 10:355, §552).
26
Hegel (1970–1: 10:355–6, §552). 27 Hegel (1970–1: 10:360, §552).

230 terry pinkard
He uses those thoughts to launch into an attack on Catholicism. Hegel
had long had an anti-Catholic edge to him, but even he had been taken
aback at the ferocity of the Church’s reaction to the Revolution in 1789 and
even more so at the full-throated attempt to undo the Revolution and wipe
out its memory after Napoleon’s defeat. He ridiculed as a farce the “Charter”
(instead of a constitution) chosen for the French after 1814 that reinstated the
Catholic church as the established religion, kept intact many of the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic reforms (such as the Napoleonic Code of
law), yet pretended that nothing had happened and Louis XVIII had been
ruling since 1789. Although the regime had the external trappings of
a constitutional monarchy, it was really an absolute monarchy since the
limits to the king’s authority could be lifted at any time, basically by the king
himself. Hegel blamed this state of affairs on the Catholic church and its
authoritarian structure distorting the religious consciousness of the people.
He in turn was shocked and disturbed by the French Revolution of 1830,
which swept that away – disturbed, if for no other reason than that it seemed
to show that the hold of the Church was not as rigid as he thought. It was
also becoming a bit more clear to him during the 1820s that the Prussian
Protestant church was actually not that much better.
His next to the last discussions of art in the Encyclopedia therefore have to
do with how the philosophy of religion needs to see how the moral ethos –
the Sittlichkeit of a people – coheres with the principles of its laws. What is
stressed in the lectures and plays an implicit role in the Encyclopedia is, as we
noted, the political role that art played in ancient Greek life and how that is
impossible for modern life. Modern art, even though it has its essential role
to play in freeing people in the otherwise alienating, “prosaic” modern
world, is very secondary to religion. Religion held things together for the
Greeks, and it has to do it also for the moderns. Art did that for the Greeks,
but it cannot do that for the moderns. Hegel’s own political philosophy
(appearing in published form in 1820 but in effect finished by 1817) laid out
the baselines of this new order as resting on the systematic combination of
the Lockean rights to life, liberty, and property, the post-Christian moral
scheme of treating people with dignity and acting only in terms of reasons
about which one could exercise one’s own insight, a “moral ethos”
(Sittlichkeit) of the bourgeois family, a civil society with a market embedded
in it (and not vice versa), and a constitutional monarchy topping it off. None
of this will work unless, or so he thought, a kind of enlightened, heavily
reinterpreted Protestant form of Christianity became the new moral ethos.
However, as the 1820s wore on, Hegel seemed to become more pessim-
istic about that possibility, although he never abandoned his faith in the

power of reason to force progress. The conclusion which Hegel did not
want to draw from his own thought would be that if in fact, and against his
own theory, Protestant Christianity failed to hold things together, then the
future might well just be an unending cycle of the search for absolute
freedom, followed by chaos and Jacobin terror, and then followed by
revanchist restoration leading to reformist politics, which then falls apart
into chaos following the demand for absolute freedom, ad infinitum. If he
had lived to see the promise followed by the collapse of 1848, he might have
been even more pessimistic.
A large strand of contemporary Hegel scholarship tends to elevate his
later philosophy of art and his philosophy in terms of its secular nature and
to ignore or denigrate the religious dimension. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel
gives little place to art but a lot to religion. In the lectures based on the
Encyclopedia, however, he went much further in developing a philosophy
of modern art as having a secular importance distinct from that of religion.
Behind it all was his attempt to make his philosophy into his own times
grasped in thought. However, his own time was at odds with itself, and
some of the strains within those times appear in his thought.

chapter 13
The Stubbornness of Nature in Art

A Reading of §§556, 558 and 560 of Hegel’s
Encyclopedia
Ioannis Trisokkas
Speight (2019: 235) has recently raised the question, which he himself leaves
unanswered, of how naturalism relates to spirit in Hegel’s philosophy of
art.1 ‘Naturalism’ denotes an explanation that invokes aspects of nature
that are (allegedly) irreducible or resistant to thought. I call nature ‘stub-
born’ insofar as it evinces resistance to its being formed by thought and
hence to its being united with it. This chapter argues that §§556, 558 and
560 of Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (hereafter
Encyclopedia) answer Speight’s question by specifying three elements of
nature that, first, are present in art and, second, are resistant to thought.
These are materiality, natural form and genius. They exhibit nature’s
stubbornness in art. This stubbornness, I argue, is what justifies Hegel’s
claim that art is absolute spirit only implicitly (§556), which leads to the
claim that art needs to be superseded by religion and philosophy. In this
way, Speight’s question receives a precise answer.
I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the merit of the Encyclopedia’s philoso-
phy of art in contradistinction to Hegel’s lectures on the same topic (Section
13.1). This discussion is propelled by the fact that the Encyclopedia’s section on
art has been largely overlooked in favour of these lectures, which, despite being
sometimes helpful in deciphering some of the concepts and claims Hegel
employs in the Encyclopedia, are not as reliable a guide to Hegel’s own
thinking about art’s place in the system as the Encyclopedia. Even Gethmann-
Siefert’s (1991, 2000, 2005) celebrated work on Hegel’s philosophy of art reads
the Encyclopedia’s section on art through the lenses furnished by the lectures.
Contra standard practice, the present chapter advances an interpretation of
Hegel’s philosophy of art based entirely on the Encyclopedia.
1
All in-text stand-alone paragraph numbers refer to Hegel (1970–1: vol. 10). Most translations are
mine; if they are taken from Hegel (2007c), I indicate it accordingly. I refer only to the paragraph
numbers (not to the pages) of the Encyclopedia.
232

The Stubbornness of Nature in Art 233
Second, since art is placed in the system and, more precisely, determined
as absolute spirit, I sketch the basic picture of the system and absolute
spirit’s status in it (Section 13.2).
Third, I interpret §556 in terms of Hegel’s understanding of intuition,
the ideal and beauty. I argue that, for Hegel, there are moments in the
reception of art when material givenness or sheer materiality (a manifest-
ation of what Hegel calls “natural immediacy”) nullifies the experience of
the unity of thought and nature or “the idea” (Section 13.3).
Fourth, I analyse §558, arguing that, for Hegel, what is received in art is
not only materiality but also a natural form which is distinct from the idea
(and hence another manifestation of “natural immediacy”). Pace Peters
(2015), I contend that this paragraph leaves the issue of whether this natural
form is exclusively the human form unsettled (Section 13.4).
Fifth, I turn to §560, and argue that, for Hegel, there are moments in the
production of art when the artist’s genius (another manifestation of “natural
immediacy”) liquidates the idea’s universality (Section 13.5).
These discussions are meant to reinforce the following two claims. First,
pace Adorno (2002: 61–78), natural immediacy or sheer nature (i.e. nature
as being resistant to thought, nature’s stubbornness) is, for Hegel, essential
to art. Second, art’s natural immediacy is the exact reason why art is not
fully or explicitly absolute spirit: art is only partially or implicitly absolute
spirit. Since nature does not yield completely to the idea (the unity of
thought and nature) in art, thought must move on to religion and philoso-
phy in order to fully become absolute spirit.
13.1 The Textual Locus of Hegel’s Philosophy of Art

Comments about art occur in the whole of the Hegel corpus, but the main
discussion transpires in two places: (a) in his various lectures on the
philosophy of art (hereafter Lectures) and (b) in the “Philosophy of
Spirit,” the Encyclopedia’s third part. Hegel delivered five lecture series
on the philosophy of art, the first in Heidelberg in 1818 and the rest in
Berlin: in 1820/1, 1823, 1826 and 1828/9. No lecture text penned by Hegel
himself has survived (save a few fragments), but lengthy student manu-
scripts (transcripts and lecture notes) are available. Depending on the
manuscript one surveys, one can enjoy detailed reflections on art’s value,
its historical development and the individual arts.
In contrast to the Lectures’ lengthy expositions, the Encyclopedia’s con-
sideration of art is only a few pages long. Hegel published the Encyclopedia
three times in his lifetime (in 1817, 1827 and 1830), and each subsequent

234 ioannis trisokkas
version contains a modification of the section on art; see Gethmann-Siefert
(2000) and Speight (2019) for details. I will concentrate on the 1830
version, which submits Hegel’s final word on the philosophy of art.
Length is not the sole difference between the Encyclopedia’s and the
Lectures’ philosophy of art. Whereas the Encyclopedia spotlights art’s sys-
tematic relation to thought, nature and spirit, the Lectures focus instead on
unsystematic questions concerning art’s value, its relation to morality, its
historical development and the individual arts. But despite these variations
there is no discrepancy between them. They are rather complementary,
each shedding light both on the same and on different aspects of art. The
Lectures can be helpful in unravelling some of the concepts and claims
Hegel utilizes in the Encyclopedia.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that we cannot fathom Hegel’s
conception of art by staying only within the Lectures, for art’s systematic
character is addressed properly only in the Encyclopedia. Thus, I find
Gethmann-Siefert’s take on the relation between the Lectures and the
Encyclopedia somewhat precarious. She advocates that each edition of the
Encyclopedia’s philosophy of art is nothing but a summary of “the essential
thoughts” of the preceding lecture series (Gethmann-Siefert 2000: 317).
She does not, however, make a compelling case for such a strong claim
(Gethmann-Siefert 2000: 322–9). In my view, the Encyclopedia’s section on
art tends towards a systematic exposition that is foreign to the Lectures.
It is true that the Encyclopedia was meant to operate as a textbook for
Hegel’s lectures, but it does not hold, as Gethmann-Siefert conjectures,
that it was meant as a textbook for his lectures on the philosophy of art.
The Encyclopedia’s goal was to give a concise presentation of Hegel’s system,
not of his philosophy of art. Because she takes the Encyclopedia’s section on
art to be a summary of Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of art,
Gethmann-Siefert makes no effort to decipher that cryptic section on its
own terms. Relying heavily on the Lectures, the early Jena writings and the
1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, she ends up paying only minimal attention to
the Encyclopedia’s passages and, especially, their own systematic intercon-
nection. She certainly does not perceive them as fundamental for under-
standing Hegel’s philosophy of art. Contra Gethmann-Siefert’s work, the
present chapter focuses exclusively on the Encyclopedia’s philosophy of art,
hence on Hegel’s concern about art’s role in the system. This is why I will
make only scarce use of the Lectures and illuminate the Encyclopedia’s section
on art by drawing heavily on preceding sections of the Encyclopedia.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the English-speaking world, the
bulk of scholarly work on Hegel’s philosophy of art is based almost

uniquely on H. G. Hotho’s posthumous three-volume edition of Hegel’s
lectures on the philosophy of art published in 1842 (i.e. Hegel 1970–1: vols.
13–15). A translation in exquisite English was published by T. M. Knox in
1975 under the title Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Aside from a few
notable exceptions (see especially James 2000; Peters 2015; and Speight
2015, 2019), the Encyclopedia’s section on art has hardly ever been given
a central place in accounts of Hegel’s philosophy of art in the English-
speaking world. As Gaiger (2006: 160) observes, Hotho’s 1842 edition and
the Knox translation have long been treated as “the standard edition” by
Pippin, Houlgate and other leading Hegel scholars.
Since well-grounded doubts about the validity of Hotho’s work were
raised by Gethmann-Siefert as early as 1991, the continued usage of
Hotho’s edition in the English-speaking world is problematic. For
instance, Hotho approached the student manuscripts of these lectures as
nothing but “sketches and observations” requiring expansion and reorgan-
ization. In his Vorrede he writes that his goal is to restore the Lectures’
“animating inner life” by “structuring the whole”, adding missing “dialect-
ical transitions”, tightening up “loose connections” and increasing the
number of examples (Gaiger 2006: 162–3; Gethmann-Siefert 1991: 93).
Hotho also augmented the text with thoughts that were meant “to dem-
onstrate the superiority of Hegel’s aesthetics in face of [. . .] rival systems”
(Gaiger 2006: 163). The outcome of this “restoration” was a massive
expansion of the student manuscripts, the most detailed of which does
not exceed 300 pages; Hotho’s edition, in contrast, runs to nearly 1,600
pages. As Gaiger (2006: 163) notes, “it is now almost impossible to work
out exactly what belongs to Hegel and what was introduced by Hotho”,
and hence Hotho’s edition belongs to the corpus of the reception history of
Hegel’s ideas rather than to the Hegel corpus itself (cf. Speight 2019:
226 n. 4). Given these reasons and that English-speaking scholarship on
Hegel’s aesthetics has in the main treated Hotho’s edition as “the standard
text”, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that this scholarship
should seek a new beginning.
13.2 The System

The Encyclopedia gives a comprehensive, but terse, presentation of Hegel’s
account of “the absolute”. The absolute is the whole of being and has three
fundamental dimensions: “thought”, “nature” and “spirit”. Thought is
studied by logic, nature by the philosophy of nature and spirit by the
philosophy of spirit. Each fundamental dimension is constituted by an

array of lesser dimensions. Specifying the relations between the various
lesser dimensions within a fundamental one, as well as between the three
fundamental dimensions themselves, is the Encyclopedia’s task.
Thought consists of categories or concepts, which are mental or “inner”
elements generating meaning. Hegel, contra Kant, believes categories
induce meaning even when they are unrelated to materiality, externality
or sensibility. Logic demonstrates how this is done. Thus, in logic thought
proves to be an immaterial structure.
Nature has two components. On the one hand, it consists of categories
and concepts (i.e. thought) as they apply, as functions of organization, to
materiality, externality or sensibility. There is, then, a facet of nature
appearing as an organized and hence meaningful structure. On the other
hand, nature consists of elements given to the categories and concepts of
nature by materiality, externality or sensibility. This second facet of nature,
which is unorganized and hence meaningless, is what I call “sheer nature”.
Although Hegel’s Naturphilosophie is interested mainly in showing how
thought shapes materiality into meaningful structures of nature, it acknow-
ledges sheer nature’s existence.
Spirit differs from both thought and nature, yet it involves them both. It
is not simply the concepts and categories organizing nature and it is not
simply organized materiality. Spirit, rather, is thought’s consciousness of its
finding or “knowing” itself in nature, or, more specifically, thought’s
consciousness of its being the organizing element in nature. Philosophy of
spirit narrates the emergence of such consciousness.
Spirit has three dimensions: subjective, objective and absolute spirit. As
subjective spirit, thought thinks of itself in nature as an organizing material
structure (either as organ(s) or as physical process(es), such as perception
and intuition). This form of thought’s self-consciousness in nature is
defective: by reducing itself to materiality, what thought encounters in
nature is only sheer nature. As objective spirit, thought posits itself in nature
and thereby becomes an object for itself. Thought’s self-positing in nature
contrasts with its already being in nature as a material thing. The problem
with objective spirit is that nature vanishes and all that appears is thought.
Finally, as absolute spirit, thought can be neither its self-positing in nature
alone nor a material structure alone. The challenge for absolute spirit is to
find a way to combine thought with nature without annihilating any one of
these at any moment.
Art is one of absolute spirit’s three dimensions, the other two being
religion and philosophy. It follows (1) that art, religion and philosophy are
modes of thought’s self-consciousness in nature that, contra objective spirit,

allow nature’s otherness. It also follows (2) that they are modes of thought’s
self-consciousness in nature that, contra subjective spirit, do not reduce
thought to a material thing. In the remainder of the chapter I focus on
§§556, 558 and 560 of the Encyclopedia, seeking to explain how exactly these
two fundamental characterizations of absolute spirit apply specifically
to art.
13.3 Intuition, Ideal and Beauty (§556)

In §556 Hegel lays out art’s minimum, most superficial structure. There is
(a) the artwork, a Dasein external to cognizing subjects and open to
common appreciation; (b) the subject producing it, the artist; and (c) the
subject(s) receiving it, the audience. As soon as this structure is laid out,
Hegel qualifies it significantly. First, he declares that the artwork’s recep-
tion has the character of intuition (Anschauung). Second, he asserts that
what is intuited is the ideal (das Ideal). Third, he maintains that what is
intuited has “the shape of beauty” (die Gestalt der Schönheit). In the present
section I unpack these three statements.
13.3.1 Intuition
In §449 Hegel defines intuition, a form of subjective spirit, as thought’s
“recollecting” itself in an externally existing material in which it remains
sunk (versenkt). Thought’s remaining sunk in externality is crucial, as
suggested by its being repeated in the Zusatz of §450.
The Zusatz of §449 clarifies this definition by differentiating intuition
from representation and sensation. On the one hand, while both in
representation and in intuition “the object is both separate from me and
simultaneously mine”, that the object is mine is explicit in representation
but only implicit in intuition. The object’s “mineness”, i.e. thought’s self-
recollection in it, is suppressed in intuition because “in intuition the object-
hood (Gegenständlichkeit) of the content predominates (überwiegt)” (Hegel
2007c). This “objecthood” is the object’s material givenness. Thus, in
intuition thought sees itself in the object but it is unaware of this because
the object’s material givenness predominates in the subject’s experience of
the object.
On the other hand, while both in sensation and in intuition a manifoldness
of individual features comes to the fore, it is only in intuition that this
manifoldness appears as “a totality, an abundance of determinations being
held together”. Sensation does not unite the determinations, intuition does. In

Hegel’s words, “in immediate intuition I do have the whole object before me”.
By uniting the determinations, intuition “grasps the solid substance of the
object”, something that sensation cannot do because it presents us only with
an aggregate, a disjointed plurality. This “solid substance” of the object is its
meaning.
By unifying an object’s manifold determinations, intuition generates
meaning in nature. This unifying function, Hegel believes, cannot belong
to material givenness, to sheer nature, but can only belong to thought. It is
the thought-in-intuition, not the nature-in-intuition, that generates mean-
ing in nature. Yet, it is intuition’s peculiarity that in it thought is unaware of
its own unifying function. The material givenness “predominating” in
intuition does not allow thought to realize that the unifying element in
nature is thought itself, an immaterial, non-natural element. Because of this
deficiency, Hegel writes that “intuition is [. . .] only the beginning of cogni-
tion” and that “it is a blatant error to believe that one has already true
knowledge of the thing when one has an immediate intuition of it”. Absolute
spirit, which sublates subjective spirit and hence intuition, cannot be “an
immediate intuition”, to wit, it cannot be just intuition. Nevertheless, insofar
as absolute spirit is intuition, thought is dominated by sheer nature and
thereby fails to behold itself as the unifying element in nature.
Since intuition characterizes art’s reception, art is located in materiality,
externality and sensibility. Art is determined fundamentally by a material
external object’s being given to the audience’s senses. Yet, given the nature
of intuition, what the audience receives is not only a manifoldness of
determinations, but also a unified manifoldness, a “totality”. The audience
thus finds meaning in the artwork. This meaning, as we know, cannot
derive from the artwork’s material givenness – it is thought’s work. Yet,
insofar as art’s reception is determined by intuition, the audience does not
recognize this: they see that the artwork has meaning, but they do not espy
thought as that meaning’s generator. They assume this meaning is in the
artwork’s material givenness, in its colours, weight, lines, texture, sounds
and so on. In art’s reception thought’s function as the unifying element in
nature remains hidden from thought.
Crucially, however, art is not “an immediate intuition”; it is absolute spirit.
Insofar as it is absolute spirit, art enables thought to recognize itself in the
artwork as the unifying element in nature. Thought does see the artwork as its
own product, as what it “has posited”. In Desmond’s words, art indeed is, for
Hegel, “a form of sensuous self-knowledge” (Desmond 1986: 2).
Since art’s reception is both intuition and absolute spirit, it is deter-
mined as a ‘conjunction’ of (a) thought’s being dominated by material

givenness (sheer nature) and hence being unaware of its presence in nature
and (b) thought’s self-recognition in nature. These two, though, cannot
exist simultaneously: they cancel each other out. Given that they both
determine art’s reception, they must exist in the latter but not simultan-
eously. Art’s reception is a structure of fluctuation, of becoming: thought
moves from self-recognition to annihilation, from recognizing itself as the
unifying function in nature to being dominated by material givenness, and
vice versa (Trisokkas 2012: 110–16). Because of this fluid structure art is not
fully absolute spirit; it is, rather, as Hegel notes in §556, absolute spirit only
implicitly, “[art] is the concrete intuition [. . .] of the implicitly absolute
spirit [. . .]” (Hegel 2007c).
This, then, is art’s implicitness as absolute spirit: in art thought finds itself
as the unifying force in nature, but not constantly. It is art’s distinctiveness
that there are moments when the artwork’s materiality or “objecthood” – its
colours, sounds, lines, texture, mass, weight and so on – “predominates” in
the audience’s experience. Being fundamentally a realm of intuition, art
constantly relapses into the dominance of nature over thought. Regardless
of how hard we try, we cannot avoid being hit by the artwork’s material
constitution. The problem is that when this happens in art’s reception,
thought loses itself in nature. So, art’s reception is determined fundamentally
by two phenomena: (a) thought “recollecting” itself in materiality, exter-
nality and sensibility as the unifying element in nature; and (b) this self-
recollection being constantly interrupted by raw materiality, by
a dominant nature that leads thought into (momentary) vanishing.
13.3.2 The Ideal

Hegel’s second statement in §556 is that what is intuited in the artwork is
absolute spirit as the ideal. Hegel there defines the ideal as “the concrete
shape born of subjective spirit” in which “natural immediacy is only a sign
of the idea” (Hegel 2007c). On the one hand, being born of subjective
spirit, the ideal is a material external shape given to the senses. On the other
hand, as a sign, this shape expresses the idea. What is intuited, then, is
a material shape that expresses the idea.
The idea is defined in §213 as “the absolute unity of concept and objectiv-
ity” (Hegel 1970–1: 8:§213). “Concept” is another name for “thought” and
“objectivity” is another name for “nature”, so the idea is the unity of thought
and nature. Hegel writes that objectivity is the idea’s “real content” and has
“the form of external Dasein” (Hegel 1970–1: 8:§213). The idea is not about
“this” or about “representations” or about “external things” (Hegel 1970–1:

8:§213). It is not an “idea of something”, a particular idea (Hegel 1970–1:
8:§213). The idea, most generally, is the presence of thought (“the concept”)
in externality, in nature.
The definition of the idea as the unity of thought and nature determines
the idea as a genus and can be qualified in many ways. The idea’s
qualification creates its species, which express it in subtly different ways
(Hegel 1970–1: 8:§214). The ideal is one of the idea’s species. As ideal, the
idea’s concreteness is specifically a material-sensory shape. Since, however,
the idea is not only concreteness but also the unity of thought and nature,
the ideal is an expression of this unity in a material-sensory shape. The unity of
thought and nature is another name for thought’s being the unifying
function in nature.
What is intuited in the artwork, therefore, is the unity of thought and
nature (the unification of nature by thought), which is the idea. Yet, in art’s
reception absolute spirit is bound to sensibility and materiality. In Hegel’s
own words, “art displays the genuine universal or the idea in the form of
sensory reality” (§456 Zusatz; Hegel 2007c). This display is the ideal.
13.3.3 Beauty
Hegel holds that what is intuited in the artwork’s reception has “the shape
of beauty”. The ideal, then, has the shape of beauty. This means that art as
absolute spirit is exclusively beautiful art. In §556 “the shape of beauty” as
the ideal’s shape has a twofold determination. On the one hand, it is “a sign
of the idea”. On the other hand, it is specified “that nothing else [other than
the idea] is shown in the shape”.
“Sign” (Zeichen) is discussed in §§457–8. In the Remark to §457 signs
are described as “unifications of what is the spirit’s own or its interior
with the intuitive” (Hegel 2007c). A sign connects material-sensory
concreteness, natural immediacy, with a meaning, an inner element.
Crucially, the meaning and the sign have a relation of otherness: the
sign does not signify itself – it is not a structure of self-signification – but,
rather, something alien to it. In Hegel’s own words, “when intelligence
has designated something [as a sign], it has finished with the content of
intuition and has given the sensory material an alien meaning as its soul”
(§457 Zusatz; Hegel 2007c).
This interpretation is confirmed by what Hegel writes next in §458:
In this unity, stemming from intelligence, of an independent representation
and an intuition, the matter of the intuition is of course initially something

received, something immediate or given (e.g. the colour of the cockade,
etc.). But in this identity the intuition does not count as positive or as
representing itself, but as representing something else. It is an image that has
received into itself as its soul an independent representation of the intelli-
gence, its meaning. This intuition is the sign. (§458; Hegel 2007c)
Sign, then, is a given material designating a meaning that is an other to it.
The meaning becomes the material’s “soul” but is “something else” other
than it. In the Remark to §458 Hegel repeats that “in the sign [. . .] the
intuition’s own content and the content of which it is a sign have nothing
to do with each other” (Hegel 2007c).
This description of “sign” is greatly illuminating regarding Hegel’s
characterization of “the shape of beauty” in §556. His statement that the
beautiful shape is “a sign of the idea” can only mean that a given sensory
material designates an element that is not such a material. This element is
the idea, the unity of thought and nature or, if you will, thought’s unifying
function in nature. So, in §556 Hegel states that the beautiful artwork is
a natural immediacy, a sensory concreteness, opening up this unity. The
artwork’s materiality, being a sign, is totally distinct from the idea. In art,
nature maintains its independence, but thought, nature’s other, is able to
encounter itself in nature as the unifying force therein. Art creates a “space”
for the idea’s “posited” appearance without losing its naturalness, its
givenness, its sensibility altogether.
In addition to describing “the shape of beauty” as “a sign of the idea”,
Hegel stipulates “that nothing else [other than the idea] is shown in the
shape”. This means that it is a peculiarity of artistic beauty that nothing
else, other than the unity of thought and nature, is brought to the
audience’s awareness. Art as absolute spirit opens up a “space” only for
the reception of such a unity. All other features of thought and nature
disappear from awareness. Thus, a beautiful artwork is able to suppress
natural elements resisting nature’s unity with thought, to wit, elements
exemplifying the dominance of material givenness.
But we must be very careful here. Given the intuitive character of art’s
reception, that suppression is only implicit or momentary. Necessarily, then,
there are moments when beautiful artworks succumb to the brutal forces of
material givenness. There are moments when the spectator of Praxiteles’s
Apollo Sauroktonos does not experience it as the presence of divinity
(thought) in an anthropomorphic body (nature) but only as a piece of
bronze. Beautiful art cannot escape from this experience. As Hegel else-
where puts it, “in beauty the natural element – its [i.e. the idea’s] sensuous
coefficient – remains” (Hegel 1956: 261, 1970–1: 12:308).

On the whole, §556 stresses the presence of two conflicting elements in
art’s reception: intuition and the ideal. As intuition, art suppresses the
idea and appears as material givenness. As the ideal, art brings to aware-
ness the idea and suppresses material givenness. The audience’s experi-
ence fluctuates from the one to the other situation. Art is essentially
a becoming (Werden). As much as we are enthralled by the idea’s presence
in the artwork, as much as we see it as a sign of thought’s being the
unifying force in nature, as much as we feel “at home” in art, we will
always be met with the harsh realization that the artwork is simply
a natural immediacy, a raw materiality, an aggregate of colours, sounds,
weight, mass, texture, hardness and so on. In the domain of art as
absolute spirit brutal naturalism will always come back to haunt spiritu-
ality. This is why thought eventually must move on to religion and
philosophy to become fully spiritual.
13.4 Art and Natural Form (§558)

We have seen that art’s reception is partially determined by material
givenness, which is a species of natural immediacy. What is received in
this way is a material (colours, texture, lines, sounds and so on) destitute of
thought and hence of meaning. Thus, insofar as art is specified as material
givenness, thought disappears from art. Hegel insists that natural immedi-
acy is present in art’s reception not only as material givenness but also as
natural form. Natural form is the theme of §558, to which I now turn.
As seen, what is received in the beautiful artwork is not only material
givenness but also a unified material givenness. It is in such a unified
structure, resulting from thought’s unifying function, that thought finds
itself in the artwork. In §558 Hegel identifies the unified material givenness
with a natural form. This means that, on the one hand, what is presented in
the artwork is thought’s work but, on the other hand, thought unifies the
material in order to present a natural immediacy. Apparently, Hegel thinks
that only by presenting (darstellen) a natural form can beautiful art bring to
awareness the unity of thought and nature.
Hegel endorses H1 (‘H’ stands for ‘Hegel’), which is a passage from §558:
H1: Art also needs, for the expression of spiritual content, the given forms of nature
together with their meaning, which art must discern and appropriate (cf. §411).
(§558; Hegel 2007c)
Immediately before H1, Hegel repeats that “art [. . .] needs, for the intu-
itions to be produced by it, an external given material” (§558; Hegel

2007c). The “also” in H1 thus specifies that, in addition to “an external
given material”, art needs “the given forms of nature”. Crucially, they are
needed “for the expression of spiritual content”, for the expression of the idea.
These Naturformen have meaning and are therefore distinct from nat-
ural immediacy as a simply “external given material”. Yet, as we have seen,
beautiful art has meaning as absolute spirit by being a sign, which is
a structure of other-signification. The beautiful artwork, then, is a natural
immediacy consisting of (a) an external given material and (b) a natural
form signifying something alien to it. This alien element is, as we already
know, the idea. But what are these Naturformen which beautiful art presents
and which function as signs of the idea?
At the end of H1, Hegel refers to §411 as a text which should illuminate
H1. §411 discusses “the actual soul”. The actual soul, he informs us, is the
soul (or thought or intelligence) permeating a body so fully that this
body’s appearance immediately shows it as having a soul, as being a body
that thinks, or, again, as being a unity of soul (thought) and body
(nature). This does not mean that the body collapses into the unity of
body and soul. Hegel writes that in actual soul the “externality [of
bodiliness] represents not itself, but the soul of which it is the sign”
(§411; Hegel 2007c). Given Hegel’s definition of “sign”, this means
there is still a distinction between the body, as the signifier, and the
unity of body and soul, as the signified.2
The body as natural immediacy remains devoid of thought. Nevertheless,
even though the body is sheer nature, it is also pervaded by the soul, an
element of thought. Our senses are affected by sheer bodiliness, but insofar as
it is part of the actual soul, the body acts as a sign, bringing forth the soul
pervading it. Given Hegel’s reference to §411 in H1, it is justifiable to
interpret “the given forms of nature” as instances of the actual soul: bodies
appearing as signs of the soul. If this holds, then, solely on the basis of H1, one
understands that beautiful art presents any body immediately expressing its
unity with soul. The presented body would be “the given form of nature”,
2
Peters (2015: 33) argues that the actual soul is a self-signifying sign: “Hegel holds that the actual soul
constitutes an identity of inner and outer; hence the actual soul as sign does not signify something
other than itself.” To square her interpretation with Hegel’s divergent account of “sign” Peters
simply discards it and suggests that regarding the actual soul Hegel has in mind “a peculiar kind of
sign”, “a special kind of sign”, a sign that “cannot be understood as a sign in the narrow sense of the
term” (Peters 2015: 32–4, 40). The problem is that Hegel never talks of kinds of sign, something that
eventually leads Peters to describe his statement that the body is a sign of the soul as “odd” (Peters
2015: 33). My interpretation saves Hegel’s account from oddity since it takes the actual soul as being
an other-signifying structure, not a self-signifying structure: the body signifies the unity of body and
soul, which is distinct from the signifying body.

that species of natural immediacy (distinct from the artwork’s material
givenness) acting as a sign of the unity of thought and nature.
In the Remark of §558 Hegel declares that H1 “takes care of the
principle of the imitation of nature in art” (Hegel 2007c), namely, that
an item is an artwork if, and only if, it imitates nature. In Hegel’s view,
this principle is not completely true because beautiful art should “imi-
tate” only that dimension of nature acting immediately as a “sign” of its
unity with thought (cf. Peters 2015: 41–42; Desmond 1986: 1–13). Nature
“taken only in its externality” (my emphasis), as an element devoid of
thought, offers nothing to art as absolute spirit. It is only when nature
becomes a “meaningful natural form signifying the spirit” that nature has
value for art as absolute spirit, for it is only in this case that thought can
find itself in nature. Beautiful art should “imitate” bodies, but only
bodies that are actual souls.
This interpretation of §411 and hence of H1 can be partially challenged.
Hegel concludes §411 by stating that the actual soul has “human [. . .] expres-
sion”. If the actual soul has only a human form, H1 must be understood as
saying that beautiful art presents – not any body, but – solely the human body.
This claim, however, does not fit with passage H2, which immediately
follows H1:
H2: Among such formations (Unter den Gestaltungen) the human is the highest
(die höchste) and truthful (wahrhafte) formation [. . .]. (§558)
If we identify “such formations” with H1’s “the given forms of nature” that
“art needs for the expression of spiritual content ”, which is the obvious option,
H2 clearly forbids the identification of the given natural forms with solely the
human form. It refers to a plurality of natural forms that express “spiritual
content” and states that the human is only one of these forms. The combin-
ation of H1 and H2 characterizes beautiful art as an activity presenting not
only the human form but also other natural forms that are actual souls
(whatever these may be).
Yet, H2 does inform us that the human form is the highest of those forms
and the “truthful” one. This creates a hierarchy of natural forms, at the top of
which sits the human form. If beautiful art covers the whole spectrum of this
hierarchy, it is divided into “the highest art,” which presents the human form,
and lower species of art, presenting non-human natural forms. In this case,
beautiful art as a whole would not be anthropocentric, but the highest beautiful
art would be.
Yet again, this interpretation is undermined by passage H3, immediately
following H2 (I repeat H2 in the brackets):

H3: [Among such formations the human is the highest and truthful formation]
because only in the human formation can spirit have its bodiliness and hence its
intuitable expression. (§558)
H3 undermines H2 because whereas H2 informs us that spiritual content is
“expressed” by both non-human natural forms and the human natural
form, H3 tells us that only the human form can express it. We have reached
an interpretative impasse that §558 leaves unresolved.
Peters (2015: 9, 17–38, 49) utilizes evidence from the Lectures and the
“Anthropology” section of the Encyclopedia in order to defend her thesis
that, for Hegel, the human form is the sole “shape of beauty”. I find Peters’s
arguments convincing, especially those based on Hotho’s 1823 text (i.e. Hegel
2003: 36, 157–8), and hence I agree with her thesis. Nevertheless, pace Peters
(2015: 41–2), §558 does not support this thesis. Since the present chapter focuses
on the Encyclopedia’s section on art, it is certainly important to know that it
allows for a (lower) beautiful art that presents non-human natural forms.
Independently of how this issue could be resolved, Peters is, in my view,
mistaken to present the human form as a self-signifying sign (Peters 2015:
40). For Hegel, the human form is a sign of the idea in the precise sense that
the human body, a natural immediacy, a natural form devoid of soul, brings
forth what is other than it, the unity of body and soul. The beautiful
artwork, by presenting the human form, allows thought (the soul) to “see”
itself in what is other than itself. In art as absolute spirit the otherness of the
presented body (sheer nature) appears equally as strongly as the idea
signified by it. Thus, nature is stubborn in art not only as material givenness
but also as a presented natural form, as a depicted sheer (human) body.
In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno criticizes Hegel for treating art in such a way
that nature loses therein all its independence. In his view, Hegel develops
a “language of art” that replaces the “language of nature” (Adorno 2002: 77).
Nature is “repressed” in art (Adorno 2002: 61), being subsumed under the
influence of the “subject”, “spirit” or “thought”. For Adorno, Hegel thinks
that in art “nothing in the world is worthy of attention except that for which
the autonomous subject has itself to thank” (Adorno 2002: 62). In this way, in
art nature is ruled by “the dark shadow of idealism” (Adorno 2002: 62). Art
has been “liberated” “from the heteronomy of the material, especially of
natural objects” and has “expunged” from itself “the rawness of what is
unmediated by spirit” (Adorno 2002: 63). Adorno’s message is clear: Hegel
treats art as a domain in which nature is completely subordinated to thought.
Our discussion has shown the mendacity of Adorno’s critique. For
Hegel, although nature is not thoroughly dominant in art, it is partially

or momentarily dominant. For him, in art nature is not fully sublated by
thought. While art is absolute spirit, it is not fully or explicitly absolute
spirit, since there are moments when thought is dominated by nature: there
are moments when thought vanishes completely in art. As Desmond
remarks, in art nature “refuses to be appropriated without residue”
(Desmond 1986: 5–6). This “residue” is nature’s material givenness, the
given natural forms and, as we shall now witness, the artist’s genius.
13.5 Beauty and Genius (§560)

In the previous two sections, I discussed the twofold manifestation of
nature’s stubbornness (“natural immediacy”) in Hegel’s conception of
art’s reception: even though the audience does experience the idea in the
artwork and thereby thought finds itself therein as the unifying function in
nature, this finding is only implicit (i.e. momentary), since there are
moments when material givenness and the presented natural form interrupt
that experience. In §560 Hegel turns his attention from art’s reception to
its production: besides being received by an audience, the artwork is
“something made by the artist” (§560; Hegel 2007c). In the present section
I argue that, analogously with art’s reception, which is determined by “the
one-sidedness of [natural] immediacy in the ideal” (§560), namely by
material givenness and natural form, art’s production is marked by
a similar stubbornness or “one-sidedness”. This “one-sidedness” is owed
to the artist’s genius.
We have seen that in art as absolute spirit, the artwork is received as “the
shape of beauty” and that an inherent determination of this shape is that it
exemplifies only the idea. It is in this way that the beautiful shape is
a perfection. It has also been ascertained that, regarding at least the highest
beautiful art, the beautiful shape is the human form. Since what the
audience must receive from the highest beautiful art is the human form
exclusively as the unity of thought and nature (the idea), the artist, who
“transfigures” the idea in the shape, must ensure “that nothing else is
shown in the shape” other than that unity (§556).
For Hegel, “thought” is a universal structure (Trisokkas 2009). For this
reason, when thought is united with nature, what is presented is universal, an
element devoid of particularities, individual feelings, eccentricities and so on.
So, in the beautiful artwork, as Wicks (1993: 367) puts it, “all contingencies in
appearance must be eliminated to the greatest extent such as to allow the
universality of this content to exhibit itself through the image”. In the
Encyclopedia Hegel relates this demand for universality in beautiful art with

the fact that it is presented and addressed to a community. Beautiful art must
be able to “speak” to all in a community, so the artist must seek to express
a universal idea, an idea that can “touch” and be significant for everyone (cf.
Hegel 1975: I:7, 11, 30). Precisely because the beautiful artwork is “a work of
external common reality” (§556; Hegel 2007c), the idea the artist “builds into”
(einbilden) it must be a universality, an idea the whole community will
recognize as the unity of thought and nature.
In the most beautiful artworks the idea is expressed through the human
form. It follows that the human form presented by the most beautiful
artworks must not include elements destroying the idea’s universality. The
artist, therefore, should not simply choose an actual human being and
present her in the artwork; she must rather purify actual beautiful human
forms, abstract from their deficiencies, and thereby present a perfect human
form as a sign of the idea (Peters 2015: 45, 48, 57; Wicks 1993: 366–8).
According to Peters (2015:44), for Hegel, such perfect human forms would
be the figures of Greek gods and Christian saints.
This is how Hegel expresses this demand for universality (or perfection)
in art in §560:
The subject is the formality of activity and the artwork is an expression of
God only when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it, and the content
of the indwelling spirit has conceived and brought itself forth into the
world, without admixture and unsullied by its contingency. (§560; Hegel
2007c, my emphasis)
The expression “the subject is the formality of activity” has a twofold sense.
On the one hand, the subject, namely the artist, is the “formal” cause of the
artwork in that she builds a natural form into a material. On the other
hand, she is a “formality” in that what is built into the material is universal,
an idea devoid of particularities and contingencies. The word “God”,
I maintain, is equivalent to the expression “the absolute”, which denotes
a structure defined by the idea. God, simply, is, for Hegel, the unity of
thought and nature. So, when he writes that “the [beautiful] artwork is an
expression of God”, he claims that the beautiful artwork expresses the unity
of thought and nature.
Since this unity is a universal structure, the beautiful artwork can express it
only if the artist can manage to remove any “sign of subjective particularity in
it”. If, contrastingly, the artwork becomes a sign of “subjective particularity”,
of peculiarities belonging to the artist who produced it, it stops being “the
shape of beauty” and expressing “God” or the idea. Nothing other than the
idea must be shown in the artwork, and the artist’s subjective particularity,

upon entering the artwork, blocks that showing. Subjective particularity
generates “contingency”, which destroys the idea’s universality, and, there-
fore, the artist must build the idea into the artwork “without admixture” and
“unsullied” by the contingency of her own subjective particularity.
In my understanding of §560, Hegel is adamant that this goal of the
creator of beautiful artworks, the creation of a perfection, never materi-
alizes. Unlike the philosopher and, to a lesser degree, the genuine
believer, the artist lacks the capacity to free herself completely from
her subjective particularities. The freedom of thinking or genuine faith
is higher than the freedom of artistic production. When Hegel writes
that “freedom only advances as far as thinking” (§560; Hegel 2007c), he
implies that freedom from subjective particularity follows a progression
from art to religion to philosophy: only in philosophy this freedom
maximizes itself and in art it remains limited by the artist’s subjective
particularity.
What is it that limits the artist’s freedom from subjective particularity?
Hegel could not be any clearer: this obstructive element is her “inspir-
ation”, which derives from her “genius”. The beautiful artwork is perme-
ated not only by the idea or the rational thinking the artist employs in order
to build the idea into the artwork, but also by “the inspiration of the artist”,
which is “an unfree passion, like an alien power within the artist” (§560;
Hegel 2007c). “Inspiration” is a source of “subjective particularity” and
hence affects the artwork as an expression of absolute spirit negatively. This
is so because it interrupts the expression of a universality (the idea) with
expressions of peculiarities belonging to the artist.
Hegel writes that inspiration is “an alien power within the artist”. By this
he means it cannot be controlled by thought: it is stubborn. While the artist
is indeed able to create an artwork that expresses an idea that “speaks” to all
in the same way, this is not always so: there are moments when her
inspiration does not succumb to thought, presenting elements that are
peculiar, emotive and contingent. Just as material givenness and natural
form undermine thought in art’s reception, so does inspiration in art’s
production.
Hegel’s aim is to make us realize the stubbornness of nature in art’s
production. It is a fundamental trait of art’s production that the artist
cannot remove her “subjective particularity”, her “inspiration”, from “the
shape of beauty” she produces. The artist’s “labour” is torn between (a) an
application of what Hegel calls “technical intelligence and mechanical
externalities” (§560; Hegel 2007c), which are rational tools enabling the
expression of a universality, and (b) an application of elements that are

peculiar to the artist’s character or craftsmanship. The inspired artist, the
creator of beautiful artworks, mixes rational thinking and skilled work-
manship with her individual passions and cosmotheory in the process of
artistic production. This becomes a problem for art as absolute spirit,
precisely because the latter discloses a universal structure, a structure that
does not permit, even momentarily, the complete annihilation of universality
by the particular, the emotive and the contingent.
Hegel concludes §560 with the following:
[T]he producing has in itself the form of natural immediacy, it belongs to the
genius as this particular subject [. . .]. The artwork therefore is just as much
a work of free arbitrariness (freien Willkür), and the artist is the master of
God. (§560; Hegel 2007c)
Hegel uses “genius” as an umbrella term incorporating subjective particu-
larity, inspiration and passion. He suggests that, when the artist produces
a beautiful artwork, she is both a genius and a skilled worker guided by her
rationality (note the “just as much” in the quotation). The crucial point is
the link between genius and natural immediacy. The artwork cannot
escape particularity and arbitrariness precisely because genius infiltrates it
with natural immediacy. Genius is the reason why art is absolute spirit only
implicitly from the side of art’s production as well.
I have claimed that genius is what interrupts the expression of the unity
of thought and nature in art’s production by allowing nature to stand alone
therein, cut off from thought (even if momentarily). This reading is ratified
by what Hegel says about “genius” in the Zusatz of §395. This Zusatz
presents genius as a “natural determinacy” of the individual soul. The latter
has a variety of natural determinacies, but genius is the lowest or most
natural. In contrast to temperament, character and idiosyncrasy, genius
involves nothing extraneous to sheer nature, nothing coming from thought:
it is a physical processing, an instance of subjective spirit. Genius, Hegel
claims, is “a determinate direction which the individual spirit has acquired
from nature.” For this reason, genius appertains wholly to “the sphere of the
accidental”. One artist differs from another precisely because each is
determined by a different genius, a peculiar element given to them at
their birth. Consequently, each beautiful artwork contains something
differentiating it from another: the accidentality of genius sires the acci-
dental diverse features of beautiful artworks.
All in all, §560 attests that art’s production is not fully absolute spirit: it is
not a perfect expression of the unity of thought and nature. It does express
absolute spirit but only implicitly. The artist, equipped with “technical

intelligence and mechanical externalities”, builds into the artwork the prin-
ciples of her community that allow its members to experience the idea. But it
is an attribute of great artists that they are geniuses. Genius functions as
a source of natural immediacy, of sheer nature: it infiltrates the artwork with
the artist’s subjective particularity, her passions, feelings and eccentricities.
This does not mean that the beautiful artwork cannot open up a “space” for
the ideal; it only means that there are moments when the audience’s experi-
ence of the idea is interrupted by impressions of the peculiarities the artist has
built into the artwork. The experience of the artwork fluctuates between the
experience of the universal idea and the experience of the artist’s subjective
particularity; it is a becoming. This is caused by the fact that the artist is both
a rational craftsman and a genius. This makes art absolute spirit only
implicitly, for there are moments when sheer nature (genius) dominates
the unity of thought and nature. Exactly in these moments, Hegel exclaims,
“the artist is the master of God”.
13.6 Conclusion
This chapter has given a precise answer to Speight’s question of how
naturalism (nature’s stubbornness) relates to spirit in Hegel’s philosophy
of art: the stubbornness of nature (a) is present in art as material givenness,
natural form and genius; and (b) is the exact reason why art is absolute
spirit only implicitly and must therefore be superseded by religion and
philosophy.

chapter 14
The Encyclopedia’s Notion of Religion

Roberto Vinco
14.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to offer an analysis of the chapter of
Hegel’s Encyclopedia on religion. This analysis will be embedded in
a broader religious-oriented presentation of the Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences. In order to introduce this topic, I shall begin with
the first paragraph of the chapter on revealed religion in which Hegel
presents the theme he intends to develop:
It lies essentially in the concept of genuine religion, i.e. the religion whose
content is absolute spirit, that it is revealed, and in fact revealed by God.
For since knowledge, the principle by which the substance is spirit, is, as
the infinite form that is for itself, self-determining knowledge, it is mani-
festation pure and simple; the spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the
spirit, and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit that no longer
manifests abstract moments of itself, but its very self. (Hegel 2007c: §564,
263)1
The fundamental idea used by Hegel to introduce the concept of religion is
that of manifestation. Because of its pre-eminence, this concept will also be
granted centre stage within this chapter.
Manifestation is crucial, on the one hand, because it is the characteristic
through which religion gains its fullest meaning, that is its being revealed. On
the other hand, manifestation also expresses the fundamental nature of Spirit
in general and of absolute Spirit in particular. For Spirit, as Hegel argues,
differentiates itself from a mere substance, because of its self-disclosing nature.
These two forms of manifestation are, however, not unrelated. On the
contrary, revealed religion is to be regarded as a climax on the Spirit’s path
towards self-disclosure.
1
I have slightly modified the translation. The German words “Geist” and “absoluter Geist” have been
translated as Spirit and absolute Spirit here and throughout.
251

252 roberto vinco
On the basis of this idea of manifestation, we can distinguish three steps,
which will constitute the three main sections of the chapter at hand:
(1) The first part, Section 14.2, will be devoted to an analysis of the
absolute Idea and absolute Spirit as self-manifestation. This section
constitutes an historic-systematic reconstruction of the metaphysical
background of the religious worldview according to Hegel.
(2) In the second part, Section 14.3, we shall analyse the sense in which the
elaborated self-manifesting nature of absolute Spirit is concretely
articulated in revealed religion.
Religion is, however, not the last word; it is not the fullest explication of
Spirit and its self-manifesting nature. The pinnacle is, on the contrary,
constituted by philosophy.
(3) In the third part, Section 14.4, we shall therefore consider in which
sense philosophy might be understood as a higher expression of self-
manifesting Spirit and thus as a sublation of religion.
From a methodological point of view, the present contribution considers
religion as a sort of “focal point” through which it is possible to develop
a general perspective of the encyclopaedic project. In other words, it is with
“religious eyes” that we should look at the Encyclopedia. At the same time,
religion and its worldview are considered philosophically. The assumption of
this viewpoint is not arbitrary. On the contrary, it aligns well with the
Hegelian approach, for Hegel assumes a fundamental content-related unity
between religion and philosophy, and argues, at the same time, for
a philosophical elaboration and transformation of the content supplied by
religion. Furthermore, a religious reading of the Hegelian text enables us to
shed some light on a dimension of Hegel’s thinking which the more recent
“secular-oriented” scholarship has often neglected.2
14.2 The Idealistic Character of the Religious Worldview
14.2.1 Some Introductory Remarks

We begin with the philosophical implication of a religious worldview.3 The
question that immediately arises is the following: what kind of philosophy
2
This “hermeneutical blind spot” has been emphasized by Beiser (2008: 5). There are, of course,
notable exceptions, for example Williams (2017).
3
The expression “religious worldview” does not refer to a particular religion, but rather denotes a very
broad outlook that reality assumes if considered with religious eyes. The two main features of this

The Encyclopedia’s Notion of Religion 253
is involved? We may summarize the answer by saying that the philosoph-
ical background of the religious Weltanschauung is an idealistic one.
Hegel writes:
The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in the recognition
that the finite is not truly an existent. Every Philosophy is essentially
idealism or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is
how far this principle is carried out. This applies to philosophy just as much as
to religion, for religion also, no less than philosophy, will not admit finitude
as a true being, an ultimate, an absolute, or as something non-posited,
uncreated, eternal. (Hegel 2010b: 124; emphasis added)4
What is the meaning of the term “idealism” in this context and to what
kind of philosophy does it refer? The first point that needs to be empha-
sized is the fact that it does not denote a particular theory, and, more
specifically, it does not refer to the conception according to which “every-
thing is my representation”.
Idealism, conceived as the fundamental link between religion and philoso-
phy, refers rather to a new way of looking at reality in its entirety (a metanoia).
This, in turn, might be summarized in the following way: sensuous experience
is not to be taken as a point of departure. On the contrary, it is something that
needs to be depotentiated and criticized in order to enter into the domain of
philosophy.5 The philosophical starting point is, in other words, the pure
object of the intellect, i.e. fundamental unity. Expressed in other terms, this
new viewpoint emphasizes the precedence of the unifying nature of the Logos6
over the manifold experience. This dimension of philosophy expresses,
according to Hegel, a central congruity with religion. For it explicates
a fundamental tenet of religious consciousness, namely, the fact that God
(unity) and not the world (plurality) is the fundamental and certain reality.
outlook (which will appear more clearly in the following) are: (1) the ontological and epistemological
priority of the divine principle and (2) its all-embracing and all-permeating nature. Now, according
to Hegel this religious approach is shared also by philosophy and constitutes the core of its idealistic
nature. Absolute idealism is, in this context, the philosophy that not only assumes the premises of this
viewpoint but also completely articulates it.
4
I chose this quote from the Greater Logic because of its incisiveness. There are, however, numerous
passages in which Hegel emphasizes the same point.
5
The same movement can be described a parte subjecti as an “elevation” of the Spirit to God. For an
interesting analysis of this concept, see Williams (2017: chapter 2).
6
The Greek term “logos” is commonly translated as speech, language and thought. It has, however,
also a more “objective” meaning that refers to the character of unity that reality assumes if it is
considered from a perspective of pure thinking. Thus, Heraclitus (DK 22B50) writes, for example,
“Listening not to me, but to the logos it is wise to agree that all things are one.” In other words, from
the non-subjective point of view of pure thinking reality manifests itself as a fundamental unity. It is
this latter meaning of logos which is intended here.

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What we have described up to this point is, however, only the negative
side of the idealistic worldview. It further entails a positive dimension, for the
primacy of the Logos and the intellect does not imply an exclusion of the
sensuous and manifold world. Idealization is not therefore a destruction of
the finite entities of sensuous experience. Idealism is rather the view that is
capable of attributing to finite entities their proper ontological status.
Expressed in more precise terms, to state that “finite entities are ideal”
means that they are sustained and governed by the absolute unity and that
they are therefore its manifestation.7 This ultimately implies that the
philosophical unity is to be conceived of not as an abstract and unarticu-
lated unity, but as a concrete one.
This, according to Hegel, also conforms to the religious mindset, for the
divine principle of religious consciousness is not just a separated entity, but
one which causes and sustains the finite world.8 In other words, the
religious God is an entity which is involved in worldly events and, more
specifically, comes into contact with religious consciousness. He is there-
fore, once again, manifest in the world.
Now, this approach entails an important hermeneutical consequence,
because the pre-eminence attributed to intellect and Logos implies that the
Hegelian philosophy is to be understood as a metaphysical one. But this
would imply, in turn, that the religious-oriented perspective excludes the
line of interpretation which tends to read the Hegelian philosophical
project in a non-metaphysical way – for example, in continuity with
a Kantian position9 – for this kind of reading attributes a fundamental
primacy to finite experience.10
7
This point has been clearly emphasized by Houlgate (2006: 428–32) and Williams (2017: 80).
8
This continuity between religion and philosophy is expressed by Hegel also in the context of
philosophy of history. According to the German philosopher, the presupposition for a philosophical
analysis of history is the basic thought that reason governs the world and, therefore, that the world is
the manifestation of the divine Idea. This principle is in turn the philosophical articulation of the
religious doctrine of ruling providence. See Hegel (1984: 27–43).
9
The term “Kantian” is not employed here in the strict sense of affiliation with Kant, but rather
refers, in accordance with the Hegelian view, to a particular position of thought towards reality.
10
Redding (2018) has distinguished three main views of Hegel’s philosophy: the traditional/meta-
physical view, the post-Kantian/non-metaphysical view and the revised metaphysical view. The
traditional metaphysical view offers an account of Hegel’s philosophy according to the line of a pre-
Kantian (dogmatic) quasi-religious perspective. The post-Kantian/non-metaphysical view interprets
Hegelian thought as a more developed and concrete form of Kantianism. Finally, the revised
metaphysical view presents the re-establishment of a metaphysical programme that is capable, at
the same time, of taking the Kantian critique into account. This “purified” metaphysics is free from
exaggerated and unwarranted dogmatic assumptions.
To which view does this interpretation incline? On the one hand, it is a post-Kantian view, for it
conceives the Hegelian position as one integrating the empiricist and Kantian critique. At the same
time, it is also a traditional view, for it maintains the religious aspect of Hegel’s thinking.

The importance of this religious outlook for the structure of Hegelian
philosophy can be better understood if we consider the preliminary
conceptions that Hegel outlines at the outset of his Encyclopedia, for
these considerations can be regarded as a sort of methodological intro-
duction to the encyclopedic project. There, he distinguishes three main
positions of thought towards reality: (1) metaphysics; (2) empiricism and
critical philosophy; and (3) immediate knowing (Hegel 2010a: §§26–78,
67–125).
Interestingly enough, metaphysics is described by Hegel not only as the
first approach, but also as the fundamental one. It is, as we mentioned
before, the necessary point of departure.11
At the same time, it must also be added that the metaphysical
approach towards reality is not the last word, for this intellectual point
of view is in itself too abstract. The other perspective, namely the one
emphasizing the existence of the manifold world of sensuous experience,
should also be taken into account. This second position is represented
primarily by empiricism and critical philosophy, inasmuch as both share
the same fundamental premise according to which sensuous experience
is the real point of departure. According to this view, the unifying
activity of the intellect is, on the contrary, something exterior and
supervening. The third position (immediate knowing) also shares the
premise of the second one, while deducing at the same time a different
consequence, namely the necessity of a completely different type of
knowing, i.e. an immediate one. We have therefore once again two
poles: one attributing pre-eminence to the primordial unity (metaphys-
ics) and the other attributing pre-eminence to the manifest manifold
reality (explicitly empiricism and critical philosophy and implicitly
immediate knowing).
These two poles are not to be considered as completely equivalent.
Metaphysics is, in the context of the Hegelian perspective, the fundamental
position of thought towards reality. The point of departure is therefore the
object of the intellect. However, the pole of experience has to be integrated.
Empiricism, and especially critical philosophy, have therefore a corrective
function. This ultimately means that Hegel develops a metaphysics which
is capable of fully including the dimension of experience, and therefore of
Furthermore, this interpretation emphasizes the difference between dogmatic metaphysics (an
abstract position that needs to be overcome) and classical metaphysics (a position that, on the
contrary, needs to be unfolded and explicated completely).
11
Hegel (2010a: §26, 67): “All philosophy in its beginnings, all the sciences, and even the daily doings
and dealings of consciousness, live in this belief.”

256 roberto vinco
grasping absolute reality (fundamental unity) as something that manifests
itself in the world (plurality).
The question remaining at this juncture is whether the Hegelian meta-
physics is a fundamentally new one, or, on the contrary, continuity with
tradition prevails. The religious-oriented approach outlined here favours
the more conservative, second reading.12 This means, as the previous quote
also suggests, that the Hegelian absolute idealism is to be understood as the
complete expression of a viewpoint that characterizes philosophy from its
very inception.13
To summarize: every philosophy is a form of idealism and this means
that every philosophy has a religious nature. However, only absolute
idealism is the complete expression of this nature, for only absolute
idealism is capable of fully articulating the all-embracing nature of the
divine principle that characterizes the religious worldview. Hegel’s absolute
Idea and absolute Spirit (the two pinnacles of the Hegelian system) are
therefore to be conceived of as the final and complete expression of the
religious dimension of philosophy.
This fundamental continuity with the metaphysical tradition needs,
however, to be further clarified.14
14.2.2 The Idea as Absolute Spirit

The metaphysical point of view considers the object of the intellect as the
starting point. The first object of the pure intellect, the primum cognitum,
is, in turn, Parmenidean being. This constitutes therefore the first expres-
sion of the Hegelian Idea (the subject matter of the Encyclopedia), and thus
also the point of departure for the system.
This Parmenidean being is, however, an abstract unity, which does not
include the phenomenal world, the world of sensuous experience. It is there-
fore an incomplete expression of the Idea.15 Hence, the dialectical development
12
In this regard the position presented in this chapter distinguishes itself from the one presented by
Williams (2017).
13
In the quote that we mentioned above Hegel explicitly observes that even Thales’ water is also
a primordial expression of the idealistic perspective.
14
In this sense, it is also important to distinguish between the metaphysical approach towards
reality presented in the introduction to the Encyclopedia Logic and epitomized by pre-Kantian
metaphysics, and the classical metaphysical enterprise represented by philosophies such as those
developed by Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza. For whereas the first is an abstract and objectifying
way of thinking, which is intrinsically unstable, the second is an expression of the concrete and
speculative manner of thinking that needs only to be fully explicated.
15
To use the expressions of the preliminary considerations discussed above: Parmenidean being is pure
abstract metaphysics (the first position) without any reference to the second position.

can be understood as a dynamic that adheres to the Parmenidean conception
and, at the same time, does not exclude the world of the doxa (the phenomenal
world).16
Parmenidean being as such is, however, a pure abstraction. It is to be
regarded therefore more as a logical vanishing point than as a concrete point
of departure. In fact, Hegel’s position at the beginning of his system consists
in showing that being itself implies a structural reference to nothing, which,
in turn, can be considered as the logical core of phenomenality. This means
that the Hegelian Idea is, from its very beginning, not only the fundamental
reality, but also a principle that is manifest in the world.17
This fundamental relation to the manifest world can be expressed by
saying that the Hegelian Idea has the nature of a substance. This prin-
ciple, in turn, is to be conceived of not simply as an abstract substratum,
but as a manifest principle. Substance is, in other words, not separated
from its accidents (or modi), but is fundamentally connected with
them.18
This explains why the point of view developed by Spinoza is regarded by
Hegel as a necessary standpoint for philosophical thinking. Spinoza’s
substantialism shares namely the aforementioned point of view according
to which finite reality is to be completely depotentiated. Spinoza’s sub-
stance is, in this respect, comparable to the being of the Eleatics. At the
same time, this position is a more developed form of Eleaticism, for it
recognizes and partially takes into account the existence of the finite entity
(Hegel 1995b: 257–8).19 Hence, Spinozism is a higher form of idealism,
because the monistic substantialism is able to secure the Parmenidean
dimension of metaphysics without excluding the manifest world.
This point of view is not, however, the final one, it is not absolute
idealism, for substance is not fully concrete; it does not include, according
to Hegel, the manifest world entirely. Substance is in fact, in spite of its
character of totality, still something “objective”. It is, in other words,
something that an exterior observer can discover and shed light on. This
element of abstractness has to be overcome in order to reach the perfect
expression of the Idea (absolute idealism).
16
Expressed in other terms: Hegel’s system is a continuation of the classical (both Platonic and
Aristotelian) project of “saving the phenomena”.
17
In Platonic terms: the world of experience is not, as in the case of Parmenides, simply pure illusion.
Rather, it is a reflection of the ideal one.
18
Ex negativo it is possible to say that the position developed by Parmenides is the reduction of
a substance to a pure substratum.
19
Interestingly enough, this element of modernity is described by Hegel as the Christian dimension of
Spinozism. In other words, Spinozism can be described as a Christianized Eleaticism.

258 roberto vinco
This dynamic of subjectification, or, to express it in Hegelian terms, the
becoming of the substance to subject, can be very broadly articulated in
three steps: Concept, Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit.
The first primordial form of subject is the Concept (Begriff ). This
fundamental category, which marks the transition from the objective to
the subjective logic, is characterized by means of a twofold dimension.
On the one hand, it is a unity in which every element is a concrete
expression of the totality. The difference between the fundament of
reality and the surface is therefore fully sublated.20 On the other hand,
this coherent totality is all-embracing. The act of discovery is an integral
part of this totality. In a few words: manifestation is self-manifestation.21
The development of the Concept culminates in the absolute Idea,
which marks the final point of the Logic and thus of the first part of
the Hegelian system. This last logical category expresses in a very clear
way the aforementioned twofold dimension, for it is presented by Hegel
both as the absolute and entire Truth (totality) and as the Idea thinking
itself (self-manifesting) (Hegel 2010a: §236, 299). This means that the
fully unfolded Idea is not a separated entity, but is an all-embracing
principle that integrates the manifest world, including its own “act of
disclosure”.
The self-manifestation of the absolute Idea is, however, only a “logical
one”. It is a phenomenon occurring within the context of pure thinking.
Or, to put it in other terms, the self-manifestation of the absolute Idea
refers to an abstract absolute subject manifesting itself at the expense of
nature and particularly of finite subjectivity.
This remaining element of abstractness is fully overcome through Spirit
and particularly through absolute Spirit. For Spirit is presented as the
return of the Idea to itself from nature. Hence, the self-manifesting divine
Logos includes, as Spirit, also the element of concrete subjectivity, i.e. the
concrete act of manifestation.
In absolute Spirit, finally, this concrete subjectivity is raised up to the
level of the Absolute and integrated into its self-manifestation. For this
reason, absolute Spirit is also presented as the real knowledge of the
absolute Idea (Hegel 2007c: §553, 257).
20
In Hegel’s words, “The concept is the free [actuality] [das Freie], as the substantial power that is for
itself, and it is the totality, since each of the moments is the whole that it is, and each is posited as an
undivided unity with it. So, in its identity with itself, it is what is determinate in and for itself ” (Hegel
2010a: §160, 233).
21
For this reason, Hegel emphasizes in the Greater Logic that the embodiment of the concept is self-
consciousness and the I.

We see, therefore, that the result of the fully unfolded Idea coincides
with the position of the idealistic and thus religious worldview, according
to which the manifestation of the divine principle is actually all-embracing.
The outcome of the “concretization” of the self-manifesting nature of the
absolute can also be described as an intersubjective dynamic in which the
divine principle (absolute subjectivity) and concrete human subjectivity exist
in a mutual relationship. Absolute Spirit is thus the complete expression of
the concept of Spirit formulated in the Phenomenology: an I that is a We and
a We that is an I.
14.3 Religion in Absolute Spirit
14.3.1 From Art to Religion

After the description of the nature of the philosophical background of
religion, we can concentrate on the internal articulation of its “systematic
place”, i.e. absolute Spirit. A first aspect that needs to be emphasized is the
fact that religion plays a fundamental role. This is not only the case because
it works as the fundamental link between the first and the third section (i.e.
Art and Philosophy), but also, and more fundamentally, because it is the
religious sphere which characterizes absolute Spirit as such and is articu-
lated in different forms. Absolute Spirit is therefore a threefold expression
of a religious worldview.22
At this juncture, in introducing this religious nature of absolute Spirit,
Hegel observes also that this topic is to be regarded from an objective point of
view (absolute Spirit) and from a subjective one (the religious consciousness).
The position under discussion can be explained in the following manner:
philosophical reflections on religion can be divided roughly into two main
orientations. On the one hand, there is an objective approach, represented by
natural theology. This discipline, epitomized by the Theologia rationalis of
pre-Kantian metaphysics, concentrates on God and His action in relation to
the world. This occurs, however, at the expense of religious subjectivity. On
the other hand, we have the subjective approach, represented by the so-called
“Philosophy of religion” (Religionsphilosophie). This discipline considers and
analyses religion primarily as an expression of human subjectivity. This line of
22
In an introductory paragraph on the absolute Spirit, Hegel writes “Religion, as this supreme sphere
can in general be designated, is to be regarded as issuing from the subject and situated in the subject,
but is equally to be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit, which as spirit is in its
community” (Hegel 2007c: §554, 257).

260 roberto vinco
thinking has its roots in the anti-metaphysical Kantian stance, and is repre-
sented by philosophies such as the one developed by Schleiermacher.
The central Hegelian point is that an isolated natural theology or an
isolated philosophy of religion is an abstraction. The genuine philosophical
expression of the religious sphere and thus of the dynamic of absolute
Spirit implies a co-presence of the two poles. Thus, natural theology and
philosophy of religion stand in a mutual relationship.
Hegel’s general systematic analysis is focused, however, on the objective
point of view and aims at reaching an expression of absolute Spirit in which
human subjectivity (and thus also the point of view of philosophy of
religion) is completely integrated into the divine nature. In other words,
the point of view of philosophy of religion emerges as an integral moment
of a completely developed rational theology. This co-presence appears,
however, because the divine, as absolute Spirit, is an all-embracing and self-
manifesting nature (and therefore the interaction of divine and human
subjectivity) and not – as in the case of the pre-Kantian Theologia rationa-
lis – a single, isolated entity.23
Before we move to Hegel’s chapter on revealed religion, some introduc-
tory words on the chapter on art are in order. This will help us to better
appreciate the structure of Hegel’s main argument.
The fact that pure considerations on aesthetics are not the only topics
discussed by Hegel is an interesting aspect of this first section. In fact, it is
the philosophical analysis of the classical conception of the divine that
constitutes a fundamental aspect of this chapter. In other words, the
worldview of the Kunstreligion is a central element of the philosophical
analysis and critique.24
The divine principle of the Kunstreligion is a beautiful one, and this implies
that being and manifestation coincide in it. This aspect is also reflected in the
fact that the God of this religion has a human form. At the same time, classical
art and its worldview include also a subjective reconciliation between the divine
and the human. The harmony generated by beauty purifies subjectivity and
also opens up a world in which it can “be at home”. Thus, Greek beauty
produces a harmonious way of living (of producing and enjoying beauty itself).
Divine principle and concrete human manifestation are therefore united.
This position is not, however, the last word:
23
The integration of the second position of thought towards reality (critical philosophy) into the first
one (metaphysics) – and thus the development of a complete metaphysics articulating the religious
worldview – is therefore relevant also in this context.
24
According to Peperzak, the theme of this section is not aesthetics, but a philosophy of Greek
religion. See Peperzak (1987: 91).

Beautiful Art (like the religion peculiar to it) has its future in genuine religion.
The restricted content of the Idea passes over in and for itself into the
universality identical with the infinite form, – intuition, immediate know-
ledge bound to sensoriness, passes over into self-mediating knowledge, into
a reality which is itself knowledge, into revelation; so that the content of the
Idea has as its principle the determination of the free intelligence, and, as
absolute spirit, is for the spirit. (Hegel 2007c: §563, 262)
On the one hand, we have a finite content. The absolute of art is not really
all-embracing, and this means, from a religious and historical viewpoint,
that the Greek God has structurally a finite and local character.
On the other hand, manifestation maintains – at least partially – an
element of exteriority. It is something that has to be activated from the
outside and therefore something remaining at the surface. It is not there-
fore completely embedded into the ground of reality. This is reflected,
from a religious point of view, in the fact that the “Apollinian” dimension
of the Olympic Gods is local and is subject to the blind necessity which is at
the same time ananke (necessity) and tyche (chance).25
The artistic worldview is therefore not the perfect expression of the
idealistic perspective. The result is a passage to a higher position (the
revealed religion), which is at the same time more general and deeper.
A last aspect needs to be mentioned. According to the previous
quotation, genuine religion is also the future of art and of its religious
perspective.
This implies from an historical-systematic perspective that Christianity
is primarily a development not of abstract monotheism, but of the classical
Greek and polytheistic perspective. Manifested religion seems therefore to
be closer to Athens than to Jerusalem. Why is this the case? Because it is
once again the character of manifestation of the divine principle and thus
the humanity of the divine principle that is central in this context.
This element characterizes, at least partially, the classical worldview, but it
is rejected by the “viewpoint of sublimity” which, on the contrary, highlights
the element of divine transcendence and separates the reality of the Absolute
from its manifestation, the divine from the human subjectivity.
Revealed religion is defined, however, as the future of art and its religion.
This implies that there is also a new element that comes into play through
revealed religion, i.e. the accentuation, both on a human and on a divine
level, of the role and the value of individual subjectivity that tend to be
neglected in the classical worldview. This new element is interpreted,
25
For an insightful reflection on these aspects, see for example Inwood (2010: 627).

262 roberto vinco
however, in line with what we said above, as an integration and complete
explication of the classical worldview.
14.3.2 Hegel’s Revealed Theology

Manifested religion is Spirit for Spirit. The divine principle is fully self-
manifesting, and this implies that it includes in itself the element of human
subjectivity, which is only superficially present in the classical conception of
the divine. In the context of religion, there are two ways of looking at this self-
manifesting divine principle: (1) on the one hand, we have the proper
perspective of religious consciousness; and (2) on the other, we have the
philosophical consideration of the religious perspective itself, which is imple-
mented in the Encyclopedia. What is the difference between these two points
of view? Religious consciousness considers the divine content according to the
mode of representation. This means, on the one hand, that the different
moments of the divine content are separate from each other. On the other, it
also implies a separation between the consciousness and the content itself.
In the philosophical consideration the element of unity prevails, and
thus also the all-encompassing and self-manifesting nature of the divine
principle. This last element emerges in its fullest form in the last chapter on
philosophy, but it is foreshadowed in the philosophical analysis developed
in the chapter on religion. Given the fact that the analysed content is divine
revelation (i.e. that which religious consciousness believes in), and that this
analysis is a rational and philosophical one, it is possible to state that
a major part of the chapter on religion pivots on a dialectical version26 of
traditional Christian revealed theology.27
Some explanatory words are required. For the traditional point of view,
the content of revelation is an object of faith. This does not mean, however,
that it is irrational. On the contrary, although this content cannot be
accounted for in a completely rational manner, it is an object of rational
analysis that aims at exposing its internal consistency.
Regarding the content itself, we may say that Christian revealed theology
strives to give a rational account of reality in the light of revelation. More
26
The systematic dimension lies at the centre of the chapter on religion in the Encyclopedia. A more
historically oriented approach is presented by Hegel in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.
Concerning the latter approach, see, for example, Stewart (2018). On Hegel’s view on Christian
theology, see, for example, Hodgson (2007).
27
With the use of this term “traditional revealed Theology”, I refer to the articulation of the Christian
faith along lines that can broadly be defined as Thomistic. For a clear presentation of Saint Thomas
Aquinas’ revealed theology in the context of the Summa theologica, see Aquinas (2006: 153–75).

specifically, it is primarily an articulation of the Christian conception of
God (Trinitarian theology). Secondly, it is an explication of the movement
of exitus of all entities from God, culminating in the creation of the human
being (theology of creation). Finally, it is an explication of the human
being’s return and with them of the entirety of creation to the divine origin
through Christ (Christology and soteriology). In a few words, the central
topic of this discipline is God, not just as a single and separated entity, but
as the cause and goal of all things. The human being plays, however,
a central role in this context. The goal of revelation is the glory of God,
but this glory is expressed in its highest form as the reconciliation between
the Trinitarian divine origin and humanity itself. Furthermore, this recon-
ciliation is attained through the Incarnation (i.e. Menschwerdung Gottes).
Turning now to the Hegelian text, we can observe a continuity both in
form and in content.
Concerning the form, according to Hegel, revelation is articulated by
a threefold syllogism. This form constitutes, in turn, the nature of rationality
itself. Revealed theology is therefore an expression of rationality. Concerning
the content, the first syllogism (syllogism of universality) is an explication of
the Christian dogma of the Trinity (God is one in nature and at the same time
three persons). In this context, the one nature of God articulates itself through
three persons. The relational dynamic is both a differentiation, because the
divine principle, as Father, generates the Son, and a unification, for Father
and Son are unified through their mutual love expressed in the Holy Spirit
(since the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son).
The second syllogism (syllogism of particularity) considers the dynamic
of creation through the Son (the element of difference). It is first the
creation of nature, and secondly the creation of the finite spirit and of its
self-assertion.
Finally, the third syllogism (syllogism of individuality) is the return of
the finite natural spirit (human being) to God. This occurs through
a mediator, i.e. the incarnate Logos, which assumes negativity upon
himself and redeems it.
We notice therefore that the philosophical articulation of the revealed
content unfolds in line with a traditional schema: a circular dynamic in
which the human subjectivity is reconducted and reconciled with its divine
origin. This continuity can also be expressed by saying that Hegel assumes
and deepens the traditional idea of theosis (deification) according to which
God became man so that man might become a god.
In spite of these central points of continuity, there is at least a basic
element of differentiation. Both the traditional and the Hegelian approach

264 roberto vinco
are in agreement on the fact that revealed theology is not the perfect
disclosure of rationality and thus not the perfect expression of the recon-
ciliation between the divine and human Spirit. However, according to the
traditional view this imperfection arises from the fact that reason operating
in revealed theology is only a reflection of the superhuman divine Logos,
which transcends our powers and is accessible only to God Himself and the
blessed in heaven.
In the case of the Hegelian approach, the reason operating in revealed
theology is imperfect because it is only an imperfect expression of specula-
tive philosophy, which is divine and human at the same time, and thus
accessible to us all. Expressed in negative terms, for Hegel, traditional
revealed theology is still too closely linked with the finite perspective of
representation, and is therefore incapable of articulating the divine con-
tent. Revealed theology is therefore not the last word. It is not the perfect
expression of idealism and therefore it is not the reconciliation between
divine and human subjectivity.
There is, however, also another form of reunification and reconciliation,
which begins this time from the interior religious perspective. Religious
consciousness is, as was pointed out above, in a situation of separation.
However, through faith and especially through the cultus, it is capable of
gaining a reconciliation and a reunification with the revealed divine content.28
Namely, faith, devotion and cultus have a twofold effect. (1) Through
cultic activity the finitude of subjectivity and its self-centredness are over-
come and purified, for the finite subject transcends itself and is integrated
into a set of norms that characterizes its community. (2) At the same time,
through faith and cultus the divine revealed content is appropriated and
interiorized by the religious subject. Divine manifestation becomes man’s
own manifestation, and this means that the Spirit is in truth for the spirit.29
In Hegel’s words:
The three syllogisms, which constitute the one syllogism of the absolute
mediation of Spirit with itself, are the revelation of Spirit, a revelation that
28
Hegel (2007c: §555, 257–8): “The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially
a process within itself, a process whose immediate and substantial unity is belief through the witness
of the spirit as certainty of the objective truth. Belief – at once this immediate unity and containing
this unity as the relationship of these different determinations – has, in devotion, in the implicit or
explicit cult, passed over into the process of sublating the contrast up to spiritual liberation, the
process of verifying that initial certainty by this mediation, and of gaining the concrete determin-
ation of this certainty, namely the reconciliation, the actuality of the spirit.” For a clear analysis of
Hegel’s conception of cultus, see, for example, Lewis (2011: 169–78).
29
Concerning this twofold dimension of Hegel’s conception of cultus, see also Williams (2017:
286–7).

explicates the life of spirit in the cycle of concrete shapes of representa-
tion. In its result, the joining of spirit together with itself, the unfolding
of the mediation pulls itself together out of its dispersal and out of its
temporal and external succession, not only to the simplicity of faith and
devotional feeling, but also to thinking. In the immanent simplicity of
thinking the unfolding likewise has its expansion, but known as an
inseparable connection of the universal, simple and eternal spirit within
itself. In this form of truth, truth is the object of philosophy. (Hegel 2007c:
§571, 265–6)
This quotation is important not only because it confirms the role of faith
and devotion, but also because it serves as a transition to the following
chapter on philosophy.
The cultic appropriation of the divine content and the reconciliation
that proceeds from it do not constitute Hegel’s final position. Rather, they
pave the way for a new and reflected form of reconciliation, i.e. the one
generated by philosophical thinking.
This passage emphasizes therefore the aforementioned basic relation
existing between religion and philosophy and simultaneously the sublation
of religion into philosophy.
14.4 From Religion to Philosophy

The transition from religion to philosophy will be articulated according to
three models.30 The first model interprets the idea of sublation as
a substitution. Philosophy is conceived of as the new, secular religion
substituting the old, representational one. The second model emphasizes
the co-presence of the two different articulations of absolute Spirit. The
third and final model conceives the sublation of religion into philosophy as
a transfiguration of the religious way of life.
14.4.1 Substitution of Religion

The first line of interpretation can be defined as broadly left-Hegelian and
can be summarized by the famous quote formulated by Ludwig Feuerbach:
“God was my first thought, reason the second, the human being my third
and last thought” (Feuerbach 1959: 388–9).31
30
For a “typological presentation” of the relationship between religion and philosophy, see
Fackenheim (1970), particularly chapter 4.
31
“Gott war mein erster Gedanke, die Vernunft mein zweiter, der Mensch mein dritter und letzter
Gedanke” (my translation).

266 roberto vinco
This passage can be read, in the light of the present analysis, as a progressive
emphasis on the immanent character of the real divine principle leading to
a divinization of humanity.
How is this movement to be explained? The meaning of cultus consists,
as already mentioned, in the reconciliation of God and human being. This
reconciliation, in turn, manifests itself through the presence of Spirit in the
community. Expressed in other terms, it is through human intersubjectiv-
ity that God is made manifest.
Now, if philosophical sublation means a negation of the elements of
transcendence connected with representation, we can conclude that the
sublation operating through philosophy implies that the real and only
Spirit keeping reality united and completely manifest is not a transcendent
one but is rather present in human Spirit.
The real intersubjective bond is not between divine and human subject-
ivity; it is the relation between human beings. It is therefore humanity that
deserves the predicate of divinity. Hence, the sublation of religion into
philosophy is to be conceived in terms of a philosophical religion of human-
ity, in which every human being is a God for the other human being.
This perspective is, however, not free of difficulties. If this religion of
humanity is the philosophical heir of revealed religion, it also inherits the
all-embracing character of revealed religion. In other words, this secular-
ized religion expressed through philosophy implies a world in which the
representational view of reality and the transcendent dimension which is
connected with it are abandoned and the “philosophical gospel of human-
ity” has become a mass phenomenon.
This result seems, however, to run contrary to the idea expressed by
Hegel in the previous citation. For the philosopher suggests a coexistence
of religious and philosophical reconciliation.
14.4.2 Co-presence of Philosophy and Religion

In order to save this co-presence, the following possible alternative might
be proposed. Hegelian philosophy – conceived once again as a religion of
humanity – is a path for those capable of elevating themselves to the
dimension of pure thinking. Traditional religion remains, on the contrary,
a path for those living in the world of representation. This standpoint can
also be articulated through a reformulation of Nietzsche’s expression that
Christianity is “Hegelianism for the masses”.
This position is, however, also problematic, because it implies an elem-
ent of “esotericism”, which does not seem to fit into the idealistic

worldview. According to this perspective, God is to be conceived of as
complete manifestation, and therefore as entirely accessible. The differen-
tiation between the esoteric and exoteric spheres fits more closely to
a Platonic mindset, in which the ground of reality is separated from the
phenomenal word and is accessible only to philosophers who are capable of
attaining the level of pure thinking.32 Furthermore, if philosophy main-
tains a religious character, it also involves a practical and existential aspect.
If this is the case, this means that it is difficult to conceive of the same
person simultaneously living both the philosophical and the religious way
of life. We know, however, that Hegel considered himself a Lutheran and
lived as one.
A possible reaction to this impasse might be the following. Human
beings (concrete subjectivities) are not constituted merely by pure think-
ing. They have also an emotional component. Hence, if they want to
develop a complete human relationship to absolute truth, it is not enough
for them to know it only philosophically. They also have to nourish
a religious sense of gratitude and trust in God (i.e. absolute Truth).33
According to this interpretation, philosophy and religion are thus con-
ceived of as two separate, but also integral, elements of a concrete relation-
ship with the Absolute.
But this position is also not without difficulties. For, in this context,
philosophy seems to lose, at least partially, its religious dimension and, more
specifically, its practical and existential character. If, however, speculative
philosophy reaches a form of reconciliation that is, mutatis mutandis, com-
parable to the one attained through cultic action, this means that it is also
a way of living. In other words, in the light of this position, philosophy can
be conceived of as the expression of the absolute, but not as the absolute
expression of the absolute, for at least an element – i.e. the emotional
dimension of concrete subjectivity – is not integrated into philosophy itself.
Finally, a viewpoint that emphasizes the difference between the religious
approach and the philosophical one, but also takes into account the practical
and existential dimension of Philosophy, is suggested by Friedrich Hermanni
(2013). Hermanni distinguishes between the theoretical and the practical side
of religion. The first side is shaped by representation and is overcome in
philosophical thinking. Concerning the practical dimension, there is, how-
ever, a sort of equivalence between the two approaches, for religion is able, to
32
This position does not seem to work even from an historical point of view, for traditional
Christianity presents itself as a position that is opposed to “Gnostic tendencies” emphasizing
a form of esotericism.
33
Concerning this position, see Houlgate (2015).

268 roberto vinco
the same extent as philosophy, to reach a reconciliation, namely through
cultus. This implies also that philosophy is a praxis and is therefore compar-
able to religion, but is superior to the latter due to its higher level of reflection.
A problematic aspect related to this point of view is, however, given by
the fact that the reconciliation obtained through philosophy consists also
in a sublation of the separation of theory and praxis. In other terms,
philosophy can be regarded as the perfect expression of free Spirit, and
therefore of the unity of theory and praxis. This ultimately means that
philosophy is the better religion also from a practical standpoint; it is the
better way of living.
14.4.3 The Philosophical Transfiguration of Religion

This position might be described as one opposed to the left-Hegelian
one, since it interprets speculative philosophy not as a sort of top-down
dynamic reducing God to humanity, but rather as a bottom-up move-
ment of purification that elevates humanity to the self-manifesting
dynamic of the divine principle. In so doing, it remains in contact with
the traditional religious point of view and is therefore closer to a right-
Hegelian position.
This element of continuity with religion is underpinned by, among
other things, the fact that philosophy is defined by Hegel explicitly as
a “divine service” (Gottesdienst) and as continual cultus. Now, the idea of
philosophy as divine service implies that God is Philosophy’s
[. . .] one and only object [. . .]. [Its concern is] to occupy itself with God, to
apprehend everything in him, to lead everything back to him, as well as to
derive everything particular from God and to justify everything only insofar
as it stems from God, is sustained through its relationship with him, lives by
his radiance and has [within itself] the mind of God. (Hegel 2007a: 84)34
In other words, the idea of philosophy as divine service entails a twofold
implication. It means, on the one hand, that philosophy has a theocentric
character, and, on the other, that the divine principle is conceived as an all-
embracing and omnipresent one.
The aforementioned continuity is related therefore to the fact that
philosophy embodies the idealistic point of view that constitutes the
background of a religious worldview. Furthermore, if philosophy is divine
34
An interpretation of this idea of Philosophy as “divine service” that emphasizes at the same time the
mutual relationship between religion and philosophy is given by Desmond (1992, 2017). On this
theme see also Vinco (2015).

service, this implies that it is not just abstract theory, but has a fundamental
practical and existential character.
In which sense is it possible, however, to say that philosophy transfigures35
religion? The service celebrated in and through philosophy is deeper and
more general than the religious one, for thinking is at the same time the most
human (and therefore the most intimate) and the most divine (and therefore
most general) activity. In other words, the omnipresence of the divine
principle that characterizes religious consciousness is perceived and expressed
in a more intense way by philosophical consciousness.
Expressed in religious vocabulary, while it is true that religious cultus
makes explicit the actual presence of God in the world, it is also true that in
the context of religion the celebration of the divine mysteries remains only
a reflection of the divine service that takes place in heaven. In other terms,
the human celebration of divine glory is only a partaking in the transcend-
ent divine Liturgy. The difference between Ecclesia militans and Ecclesia
triumphans is not completely overcome through religious cultus.
This complete sublation is, however, the result of philosophical cultus.
Philosophy is thus the real expression of the “beatific vision”, which
representational religious thinking tends to conceive of as transcendent
and separated.
The Encyclopedia system appears therefore, from this point of view, as
the real and complete manifestation of the all-embracing manifestation of
the divine principle, as an expression of the beatific vision.
This approach is not, of course, exempt from difficulty. Amongst other
problems, it seems to abuse and overstretch36 the meaning and the role of
philosophy. It is, however, the one that most clearly emphasizes the
continuity between philosophy and traditional religion and, for this rea-
son, it is also the closest to the line of interpretation assumed in this
chapter.
35
The term “transfiguration” has been used in a similar context by Fackenheim (1970: chapter 6).
36
According to this view, philosophy would seem to be not simply the highest form of life, but life
itself (“life of life”).

chapter 15
Absolute Geist or Self-Loving God?

Hegel and Spinoza on Philosophy
Sebastian Stein1
Wisdom is the oneness

of mind that guides
and permeates all things.
Heraclitus2
15.1 Introduction
Observers of recent debates about the relationship between Hegel’s and
Kant’s idealisms have witnessed the emergence of naturalist and essentialist
interpretations of Hegel.3 Some of these paint Hegel in a seemingly pre-
Kantian, rationalist or anti-individualist light.4 Meanwhile, metaphysical
Spinozism enjoys the reputation of being the most systematic, monist
rationalism and is taken as either the greatest challenge or the most
promising complement to Kant’s subjectivity-centred project. This raises
the following question: how much of a Spinozist is Hegel? The following
investigation into Hegel’s and Spinoza’s notions of philosophy attempts to
go some way towards an answer.
The resulting enquiry shows that (1) Spinoza and Hegel agree that
philosophy is best thought of as universal truth’s self-reference but that
(2) both ground their claims on diverging metaphysical foundations that
(3) enable Hegel to argue that particular philosophers are free to control
their own thought, whereas this might not be the case with Spinoza.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 15.2 analyses the similarity
between Hegel’s and Spinoza’s accounts of philosophy, finding that, in
their own way, both define philosophy as universal truth’s self-reference.
1
The author would like to express his deeply felt gratitude (in alphabetical order) to Ansgar Lyssy,
Felix Stein, Ioannis Trisokkas and Joshua Wretzel for commenting on earlier drafts of this chapter.
2
Fragment 19 in Heraclitus (2001).
3
For example Knappik (2016), McDowell (1994) and Kreines (2015). 4 Halfwassen (2006: 106).
270

Absolute Geist or Self-Loving God? 271
However, the investigation into the authors’ ontological foundations in
Section 15.3 shows that Hegel’s account is based on a kind of concept-
metaphysics that profoundly differs from Spinoza’s substance-monism.
Section 15.4 describes the consequences of this for the roles that particular
philosophers are able to play in the act of articulating unconditioned truth.
15.2 Hegel’s Account of Philosophy

How does Hegel define philosophy? In the early paragraphs of the
Encyclopedia, he states that “philosophy replaces representations [. . .]
with concepts” (Hegel 2010a: 30, 31): the philosophical thinker has intu-
ition- and cognition-based representations about finite phenomena, thinks
about these and comprehends that there are ‘eternal’ (Hegel 2010a: 299)
and unconditioned concepts at work within these phenomena (Hegel
2010a: 62). The philosophical thinker not only understands how the
world works and has valid representations about its conditioned and
temporal events and entities, but also is able to trace these to the determin-
ations of the most fundamental, unconditioned ontological principle that
‘freely causes’ – that is, ‘posits’ (Hegel 2010b: 528) – the entire finite natural
and spiritual (henceforth geistige) world, including time and space (Hegel
2010a: 46). Hegel calls this principle ‘the concept’ (Hegel 2010a: 233).5
The concept is also the principle at work within the finite subject’s and
thus the philosophical thinker’s own mind: both world and cognizing
mind originate in the concept that has taken its more concrete form as
Geist (Hegel 1986: 229). The concept-based identity between finite mind
and world explains their compatibility: the cognizing subject can learn
about the objective world because ultimately, within the concept as Geist,
they are one (Hegel 2007c: 173).
The same applies to the finite philosopher and the object of his enquiry:
his mind is just as geistig and thus concept-structured as the philosophical
truth that it comprehends (Hegel 2007c: 267). However, while the cognizing
subject learns about Geist in the form of a presupposed objective world, the
finite, geistige philosopher comprehends the concept and its categorial shapes
in its own form: as immaterial and conceptual. In doing philosophy, the
concept-posited, finite thinker thus comprehends the unconditioned con-
cept and its categorial shapes in their distinctly non-material form.
5
The concept is deduced by showing that all more abstract categories are forms of the concept, and it
thus provides the most fundamental metaphysical blueprint for all higher-order claims in Hegel’s
philosophical system.

272 sebastian stein
Philosophy is accordingly something that finite thinkers do: they compre-
hend the concept at work within themselves and reality by having an “intel-
lectual [geistige] intuition” (Hegel 2007c: 267), that is, a unified
comprehension of the concept’s unconditioned, conceptual truth (Hegel
2010a: 28, 2007c: 267).
15.2.1 Philosophy as the Idea’s Self-Thinking

However, Hegel goes on to argue that this is not the only or ultimate way
to think about philosophy (Hegel 2010a: 45, §17). In the final paragraphs of
the outline of the Encyclopedia, he provides his philosophy of philosophy,
arguing that the philosophical thinking undertaken by particular thinkers
is the unconditioned Geist ’s self-comprehension (Hegel 2007c: 267).
The finite philosopher thus comprehends that particular, finite subjects
that think philosophically are unconditioned Geist that knows itself (Hegel
2007c: 259). This makes philosophy ‘absolute Geist ’: it is Geist that is self-
comprehending (Hegel 2007c: 276). And the particular acts of philosoph-
ical thinking undertaken by finite, self-conscious subjects qualify as the
‘appearance’ (Hegel 2007c: 276) of Geist ’s absolute comprehension.6
Geist is thus the knower and the known of philosophy. However, if Geist
can only know itself, and pure logic and nature are not Geist, how is it
possible that philosophy includes knowledge about pure logic and nature
in the way the Encyclopedia states? Hegel argues that these are accessible to
philosophy because, just like Geist, they are ultimately forms of the
concept-engendered idea (Hegel 2007c: §577, 276): by uniting itself with
a self-posited objective dimension, the concept turns itself into idea and
ultimately into the Logic’s ‘absolute idea’ (Hegel 2010a: 299, §236). This
absolute idea then takes an objective form as nature and subjective form of
Geist :
The [final] syllogism [of philosophy] is the Idea of philosophy, which has
self-knowing reason [i.e. the absolute idea], the absolutely universal, for its
middle, a middle that divides into mind and nature, making mind the
presupposition, as the process of the Idea’s subjective activity, and nature
the universal extreme, as the process of the Idea that is in itself, objective.
(Hegel 2007c: 276, §577)
In philosophy, the idea as Geist thus knows itself in its forms as logical idea,
nature and Geist. The philosopher, as geistiges being, is part of the idea that
6
Cf. Hegel (2008b: §8, 33).

knows itself in its three forms (Hegel 2007c: 276, §576). So when Geist
comprehends itself, it also comprehends that it is the subjective form of the
same idea that defines nature as its objective form and that determines
(onto)logical thought and knowledge as such.
As part of Geist, the finite philosopher thus comprehends (1) that
nature is the objective form of the idea, (2) that Geist is the idea’s
subjective form and (3) that it is the logical idea that takes subjective
form in Geist and objective form in nature. Throughout, the subject of
philosophical knowledge is thus the same as the object: the idea (Hegel
2007c: 276, §577):
The eternal Idea, the Idea that is in and for itself, eternally remains active,
engenders and enjoys itself as absolute [Geist]. (Hegel 2007c: 276)
Since the idea originates in ‘the concept’,7 philosophy is ultimately the
comprehension of the unconditioned, independent and free concept and
its categorial determinations by the concept.8
15.2.2 Philosophy and Absolute Idea

Crucially, the structure of Hegel’s description of philosophical thinking is
modelled on the Logic’s account of the ‘absolute idea’ (Hegel 2010b: 735ff.).
Like the absolute idea, the structure of ‘philosophy’ as activity of absolute
Geist is ‘free’ in the sense that it is exclusively self-referential, independent
and spontaneous: philosophy’s idea as Geist knows itself as it truly is; it is
knowledge as complete congruence of subjectivity and objectivity without
external conditioning:
The idea as the unity of the subjective and the objective idea is the concept
of the idea, for which the idea as such is the object [. . .] – an object into
which all determinations have gone together. This unity is accordingly the
absolute and entire truth, the idea thinking itself, and here, indeed, as
thinking, as the logical idea. (Hegel 2010a: 299)
In absolute and thus self-referential knowledge, the knowing subject and
the known object are thus always already one and their difference is
accommodated within a unity (Hegel 2010a: 299–300, §237). The subject
can know the object because they are the same in being different. This
entails that the difference between the Logic’s absolute idea and absolute
Geist ’s definition of philosophy is merely one of concreteness: the latter
7
It is the unity of the concept’s subjective and objective forms (Hegel 2010a: 282).
8
Halfwassen (2006: 327).

274 sebastian stein
contains all the features of nature9 and Geist 10 and thus involves geistige
beings and a philosophical comprehension of the ontological structures of
nature and of Geist in its self-comprehension.
As geistige entity, the philosophical thinker thus comprehends the
structure of the logical realm, of nature and of Geist. In contrast, the logical
idea as subject and object of knowledge is purely logical without external
natural or geistige manifestation or knowledge thereof. And yet, while the
self-reference of absolute Geist in philosophy is categorically richer and
thus more concrete than that of the merely logical, absolute idea, their
structures are fundamentally the same.
The most basic reason for this congruence lies at the root of Hegel’s
description of philosophy as the self-knowing of the absolute (logical) idea
(‘the idea’) in its forms as natural and geistige idea. Since the absolute idea
defines the structure of knowledge as such, the manner in which the
unconditioned idea of philosophy knows itself as nature and as Geist is
the idea’s own form: the unity of Geist and nature within the philosophical
self-knowing of the unconditioned idea is itself ideal.11 This defines phil-
osophy as the unconditioned idea that knows itself as nature and Geist in its
own form. To Hegel, philosophy thus means that the concept-based,
unconditioned idea knows itself as Geist and nature in accordance with its
own structure (Hegel 2007c: 577, §276).
15.2.3 Spinoza’s Notion of Philosophy

How does this compare with Spinoza’s account of philosophy? A similar
sequence of the definitions of philosophy can be observed in Spinoza’s
Ethics. He there differentiates between three kinds of knowledge that
a finite thinker can have and associates philosophy with the third:
[I]t is clear that we perceive many things and form universal notions: 1. from
singular things which have been represented to us through the senses in
a way which is mutilated, confused, and without order for the intellect [. . .]
2. from signs, for example, from the fact that, having heard or read certain
words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of them, like those
through which we imagine the things [. . .] 3. finally, from the fact that we
have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things [. . .]
This I shall call reason and the second kind of knowledge. [4.] In addition to
these two kinds of knowledge, there is [. . .] another, third kind, which we
9
Mechanics, physics, organics.
10
Subjective (cognition), objective (action) and absolute (art, religion, philosophy).
11
Cf. Halfwassen (2006: 9).

shall call intuitive knowledge. And this kind of knowing proceeds from an
adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the
adequate knowledge of the [NS: formal] essence of things. (Spinoza 1994:
Ethics II, p40, schol. 2: 141)
Philosophy is thus something finite thinkers do, relying on reason and
intuition. And it provides immediate knowledge about universal truth.
However, Spinoza provides a further, seemingly more fundamental defin-
ition of philosophy. Towards the end of the Ethics and in accord with his
commitment to the notion of god’s/substance’s all-embracing, necessary
universality, Spinoza argues that the finite philosopher employs reason in
a manner reminiscent of the third kind of knowledge to see things as
necessary and thus as if from god’s own timeless, eternal perspective:
It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of
eternity. Dem.: It is of the nature of reason to regard things as necessary and
not as contingent. [. . .] But [. . .] this necessity of things is the very necessity of
God’s eternal nature. Therefore, it is of the nature of reason to regard things
[from the standpoint] of eternity. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics II p44 dem: 144)
. . . and . . .
Whatever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it conceives
under the same species of eternity, or necessity [. . .] and is affected with the
same certainty. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics IV p62 dem: 233)
It is by virtue of the eternity of our own minds that we can participate in
god/substance’s eternity (Spinoza 1994: Ethics V p30: 33). Taking the
intellectual perspective of eternity, and thus the perspective of universal
substance/god itself, amounts to participating in god’s intellectual self-
love, only from the finite point of view:
God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love. [. . .] God is absolutely infinite
[. . .] that is [. . .] the nature of God enjoys infinite perfection, accompanied
[. . .] by the idea of himself, that is [. . .], by the idea of his cause. And this is
what we said [. . .] intellectual love is. [. . .] The mind’s intellectual love of God is
the very love of God by which God loves himself, not insofar as he is infinite, but
insofar as he can be explained by the human mind’s essence, considered under
a species of eternity; that is, the mind’s intellectual love of God is part of the infinite
love by which God loves himself. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics V p36: 260)
However, since the finite philosophers and their activity of reasonable and
intuitive thought as well as their intellectual love are modes of god/
substance (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I D5: 85) and therefore are substance,
their thinking and loving of substance is substance’s thinking and loving
of itself. Philosophy is thus substance’s self-reference.

276 sebastian stein
So while Hegel’s self-referential (and subjectivity-implying) idea defines
his model of knowledge and determines philosophy as its own most
concrete instance, the structure of Spinoza’s (purely objective) substance’s
self-reference provides the framework for the philosophical thinking by the
philosophers as modes.
15.2.4 Spinoza’s Philosopher

This raises the question about the role of the particular philosopher in this
process: does Spinoza mean to say that the universal and unconditioned
substance ‘thinks’ itself? Can substance be defined as a ‘self-thinking
subject’ – as appears to be the case with Hegel’s account of absolute
Geist ? It seems not. Spinoza explicitly opposes the attribution of subject-
ivity or personhood to universal god/substance:
So in whatever way [the will] is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it
requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and produce an effect.
And so [. . .] it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
compelled one [. . .] From this it follows, first, that God does not produce
any effect by freedom of the will. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p32 cor. 1: 106)
. . . and . . .
[N]either intellect nor will pertain to God’s nature. Of course I know there
are many who think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect and a free
will pertain to God’s nature. For they say they know nothing they can
ascribe to God more perfect than what is the highest perfection in us.
(Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p17 schol: 98)
In doing philosophy, the finite thinker may thus take substance’s own
eternal and unconditioned perspective onto itself. But does the particular
thinker cause this ‘action’ or is it explicable with reference to substance’s
necessary self-causing and thus no ‘action’ after all? Bracketing this com-
plication within Spinoza’s account for now, it can be said that, despite the
substantive and methodological differences between Hegel and Spinoza,
both define philosophy as universal truth’s12 reference to itself.
15.2.5 Reasons for Defining Philosophy as Truth’s Self-Reference

What motivates the two thinkers to define philosophy in this way? Spinoza’s
account seems to follow consistently from his commitment to the priority13
12 13
That is, the idea/Geist’s or god/substance’s. Spinoza (1994: Ethics I p1: 86).

and unconditionality of universal god/substance: since substance’s self-
causing is all there is, any finite subject or object must ultimately be – and
be explicable with reference to – substance. However, Hegel’s endorsement
of the self-referentiality of the unconditioned idea in its three forms might
seem odd, given Hegel’s self-identification as part of the post-Kantian
idealist tradition that is explicitly committed to the irreducibility of individ-
ual autonomy (Hegel 2010b: 515). It might thus appear that Hegel contra-
dicts his idealist heritage and sacrifices the independence of the particular
philosophical thinker for the sake of defining philosophy as unconditioned
truth’s self-reference.
However, the two philosophers’ motives might seem less mysterious if
one considers two problems that are encountered by accounts that define
philosophy exclusively as an activity of finite thinkers. The first problem is
the metaphysical inexplicability of finite subjects. For accounts that posit
finite subjectivity as fundamental – for example Kant’s and Fichte’s – there
is no higher-order explanation of finite subjectivity’s existence. Particular
subjects and thus also the particular philosophers simply exist, and any
universal principle is explained in terms of their self-conscious thought and
activity.
For example, the universality of ‘reason’ (Kant) or ‘universal conscious-
ness’ or ‘I’ (Fichte)14 is something that presupposed individuals have or
participate in. The sequence of ontological deduction proceeds from them
to a universal principle and not from a principle to them. The finite
subjects are the irreducible condition sine qua non, they are the ground
for everything (else). While universality might be found within them with
necessity – that is, they must have universal reason to qualify as rational
individuals in the first place15 – universality remains explained in their
terms: universal reason is something they have.16 Finite subjectivity is thus
ontologically first; universal reason is a function of it and is therefore
‘second’.
This is problematic insofar as, without a universal ontological principle
that explains the existence of particular subjects, they are mere ‘givens’ and
contradict the requirement for ontological explanation: if giving a reason
amounts to identifying a universal, ontological principle for the existence
of something or someone, then mind-possessing, finite subjects are inex-
plicable for finitude-centred accounts. Instead, finite subjects’ existence
conditions the demand for explanation: an ontological explanation is
14
See Moyar (2012). 15 See Jarrett (2009).
16
See Kant (1989, 1991) and Fichte (2005a, 2005b).

278 sebastian stein
something finite mind-possessing beings think without themselves being
subjects to it.
Spinoza and Hegel consider this to be problematic. To them, any
kind of entity must be standing in some explicatory relation to
a universal principle in order to count as justified. In Spinoza’s case,
this means tracing every determination, that is, modes and attributes, to
substance’s universality.17 In Hegel’s case, it means tracing everything to
the ‘free’ (Hegel 2010a: §158, 230) self-positing of the concept that
manifests itself as logical idea and in the forms of nature and Geist
(Hegel 2010a: §18, 46). Without a universal principle, there is no
rational reason for particular subjects’ existence. According to both
thinkers, assuming finite, mind-possessing subjects at best courts the
charge of dogmatically asserting finite subjectivity and at worst entails
self-contradiction: particular thinkers are intelligible only in contrast to
the universality of the principle that posits their particularity. If particu-
lars are first, there is no sufficiently equal universality to contrast them
with or to explain them by.
The second problem concerns the status of the philosophical definition
of philosophy and its property of being a part of philosophy in general.
Both Spinoza and Hegel seem to think that in order for philosophical
statements to be true – and thus also for a philosophical account of
philosophy to be true – both the thinking subject and the thought object
must be defined as truthful; that is, they must be aspects of or participate in
the same unconditioned truth. For if the subject were merely a particular
thinker instead of the universal truth itself, the particular thinker’s state-
ments could be untrue. They might just be the particular thinker’s opinions
rather than representing universal truth and the thinker’s opinion.
Similarly, if the content of thought were defined as particular thoughts
and not as universal truth, the thoughts could be untrue. They might be
just particular thoughts without universal import rather than particular and
universal thoughts. In either case, philosophical thought would not be
universally true by definition. To both Spinoza and Hegel, if particularity is
defined as the prime feature of either the philosophical thinker or the
thought content (or both at once), philosophical thought’s claim to being
universally true is undermined.
To avoid this, they argue that the subject that thinks philosophical
knowledge must be as universal as the knowledge itself: philosophy is
17
On the relationship between attributes, finite mind-possessing beings and substance, see Trisokkas
(2017).

universal truth that is referred to by universal truth. This also reveals truth
to be its own criterion: philosophical thought is true because in it, the
truth – rather than just a particular thinker – refers to itself. Or, expressed
in the subjectivity-implying terms of Hegel’s Geist: the Geist is able to judge
the truthfulness of philosophical thought because it is the same as the truth
that is thought. The universal truth of Geist thus comprehends itself in
philosophical thought. This relieves the particular thinker of the duty of
being the criterion of truth: what is thought is not true because the
particular thinker judges and thinks it. It is true because the truth is both
judging subject and judged object.
Both Spinoza and Hegel harness these conceptual benefits when they
describe philosophy as unconditioned truth’s self-reference.
15.2.6 The Criterion of Truth

This definition of philosophy also has a self-reinforcing effect on Hegel’s
and Spinoza’s own definitions of philosophy. They can argue that,
insofar as they are successfully doing philosophy, their philosophies
report on truth’s self-reference by definition. Truthfulness is an always
already implied feature of their philosophical accounts. Crucially, this
also enables them to argue that the very claim that philosophy describes
the truth is itself true because it is part of the philosophical truth that
they report. In contrast, if philosophy were defined as particular sub-
jects’ attempts to describe truth or as their ‘striving’ for truth, the
truthfulness of their philosophical claims or of their definition of phil-
osophy would not be guaranteed: if philosophy is philosophically
defined as striving for truth rather than as reporting on truth, the
claim that philosophy is striving for truth is itself not philosophically
proven to be true: a contradiction.
And yet, while both Spinoza and Hegel lay claim to articulating the one
universal truth’s self-reference, their philosophical accounts differ. How
could their conflict be adjudicated? Who can decide which of these
thinkers does indeed articulate truth’s self-thinking properly – or at least
more properly than his rival? Both thinkers would maintain that the only
criterion that enables a decision on this matter must be the universal truth
itself: if either account is true, the truth refers to itself – and thus within the
truth-tracking, particular thinker – through Spinoza’s account or through
Hegel’s. In them as well as in their readers, it must be the truth that
recognizes its own self-articulation if their accounts are to live up to their
own definition of philosophy. The particular thinker would be able to

280 sebastian stein
recognize the truth in either account only because she or he participates in
truth’s self-comprehension.
To both, truth’s self-tracking thus takes place to a larger degree within
that particular thinker within which reason and intellectual/geistige intu-
ition are more effective. While Spinoza argues that the most developed
possible intellectual intuition and reasoning reveal that there can be no
more truthful account than his own,18 Hegel maintains that intellectual
intuition and concept-based reasoning establish that everything that is true
about Spinoza’s account is accommodated within his own.19
In either case, the question remains to what degree the finite philosoph-
ical thinker has any agency or control over her or his philosophical thought
according to either Spinoza or Hegel. Can the thinker actively and spon-
taneously decide to channel and think truth and thus to prefer a more
truthful account over a lesser one? Is the truth simply present within the
thinker’s mind by virtue of its own nature, or is it the truth that ‘decides’ to
use the thinker and comprehend itself through him or her? A clue about
answers to these questions can be found in the most basic conceptual
commitments that inform Spinoza’s and Hegel’s accounts of philosophy.
15.3 Hegel’s Concept-Metaphysics

Hegel’s fundamental ontological commitment to ‘the concept’ (Hegel
2010a: 233) implies that he differentiates himself from what he calls
‘essentialist’ (Hegel 2010a: 173ff.) thinkers, amongst whose ranks he also
places Spinoza (Hegel 2010a: 244). To Hegel, all essentialists are commit-
ted to ‘objectivist’ metaphysics and argue that mind and world are both
functions of an ultimately determined20 ontological principle, usually
labelled ‘substance’, ‘essence’ or ‘nature’.21 Since to these thinkers, every-
thing – and thus also the mind of a thinking and acting, particular subject –
is explicable with reference to an objective principle, minds are as deter-
mined as the principle itself. Hegel’s essentialists thus assume determined
objectivity and then explain particular subjective minds with reference to it.
In contrast, Hegel’s concept-metaphysics are distinctly non-objectivist.22
They are not based on a notion of essence or nature but instead are grounded
in what he calls ‘the freedom’ of ‘the concept’ (Hegel 2010b: 505). In its role
18
Spinoza (1994: 142).
19
For example, Hegel would argue that the ontological truth of his ‘concept’ has sublated the necessity
of Spinoza’s substance (Hegel 2010b: 513).
20
And thus an ‘objective’ rather than ‘subjective’ principle 21 Hegel (2010a: 223).
22
And non-necessitarian insofar as necessity is associated with substance-metaphysics.

as ultimate, ontological principle, the concept’s free – rather than necessary –
structure unites the dimensions of subjectivity and objectivity when it posits
itself as Geist (Hegel 2007c: 9, §381). The resulting unity of mind and world
within Geist is both irreducibly subjective and objective at once: while the
objective world is determined, the mind’s irreducibly undetermined subject-
ivity is always already related to it (Hegel 2007c: 165). Where essentialists
explain mind and world with reference to objective determinacy, Hegel’s
concept-metaphysics explains world and mind with reference to Geist ’s
internally differentiated unity of undetermined subjectivity and determined
objectivity (Hegel 2007c: 173).23
To Hegel, this also means that Geist ’s dimension of indeterminacy is
out of reach for all essentialists because they logically prioritize the deter-
mined principle over all particularity, including undetermined particulars
such as subjects’ minds.24 This, however, undermines the prioritized
notion of objectivity because it requires the contrast to subjectivity to be
what it is on the same ontological level: objectivity has to be ‘non-
subjectivity’ to have any conceptual determinacy itself. So if essentialism
argues that all subjectivity ultimately is determined and is thus truly
objectivity – and Hegel thinks essentialism has to argue this to be consist-
ent (Hegel 2010a: 224–5) – then this ‘ultimate objectivity’ has nothing to
contrast itself with on its own ontological level. Without subjectivity, object-
ivity cannot be what it is supposed to be (Hegel 2010b: 735).
Hegel admits that some essentialist thinkers such as Aristotle attempt to
avoid this self-undermining by trying to shield the indeterminacy of
particular subjectivity against objectivity – for example by insisting that
the soul is non-material (Hegel 1986a: 200) and thus contains an undeter-
mined dimension. However, ultimately, also the soul’s indeterminacy is
a form of substance and thus determinacy (Aristotle 1984: 900).
Alternatively, if it is to be a form of substance but is still to be undeter-
mined, its indeterminacy must come at the cost of its compatibility with
determinacy: if all substance is determined and the soul is undetermined,
how can it be part of substance? If the soul’s – and thus the mind’s –
subjectivity is irreducibly undetermined in the face of substance’s universal
determinacy, it is unintelligible how they can be compatible at all.
On Hegel’s reading, Aristotle’s at least implied insistence on the moments’
irreducible difference thus undermines their unity.25 Hegel accordingly
23
Cf. Hegel (2010a: 223ff.).
24
In Spinoza’s case, substance is prior to the modes and attributes (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p1: 86).
25
“The soul is substance” (Hegel 1970: 201).

282 sebastian stein
maintains that mostly reflection-oriented essentialists like Spinoza are more
consistent when they prioritize (substance’s) determinacy over particularity
than their speculative counterparts (Hegel 1990a: 154). Nonetheless, the former
still lose subjectivity within objectivity, with self-contradictory consequences.
15.3.1 The Unity of Hegel’s Concept

However, if both Hegel and Spinoza agree on the importance of unity,
what motivates Hegel’s reliance on ‘the concept’ and its ‘idea’ – especially
in contrast to Spinoza’s account of substance?
According to Hegel, the concept unites the dimensions of universality
and particularity within individuality in such a manner that neither
dimension is reducible to the other:
[The concept’s] universal is what is identical with itself explicitly in the sense
that at the same time the particular and the individual are contained in it.
Furthermore, the particular is what has been differentiated or the determin-
acy, but in the sense that it is universal in itself and as an individual.
Similarly, the individual has the meaning of being the subject, the founda-
tion which contains the genus and species in itself and is itself substantial.
This is the posited inseparability of the moments in their difference [. . .], the
clarity of the concept in which no difference interrupts or obscures the
concept, but in which each difference is instead equally transparent. (Hegel
2010a: 238–9)
While universality seems to take precedence by virtue of representing the
active dimension of the concept’s triad, universality’s activity is freely self-
negating:
But the “I” is in the first place purely self-referring unity, and is this not
immediately but by abstracting from all determinateness and content and
withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it
is universality, a unity that is unity with itself only by virtue of its negative
relating, which appears as abstraction, and because of it contains all deter-
minateness within itself as dissolved. (Hegel 2010b: 514)
The concept’s universality thus freely posits itself as particularity and then
negates this determination to unite particularity with universality to form
individuality:
For in its absolute negativity the universal contains determinateness in and
for itself, so that, when speaking of determinateness in connection with the
universal, the determinateness is not being imported into the latter from
outside. As negativity in general, that is, according to the first immediate

negation, the universal has determinateness in it above all as particularity; as
a second universal, as the negation of negation, it is absolute determinateness,
that is, [individuality] and concreteness. (Hegel 2010b: 532)
In positing itself as particularity and individuality, the concept’s universal-
ity thus posits itself and in so doing remains unconditioned, independent
and self-referential. Insofar as it is in the very ‘nature’ of the concept’s
universality to freely posit itself as particularity and individuality, the
concept’s universality would not exist and is neither thinkable nor explic-
able without them. It could not be undetermined and self-referential
activity (i.e. universality) because there would be no determinacy and
dependence (i.e. particularity) to contrast it with.
The concept’s undetermined universality thus ensures its independence,
self-referentiality and unconditionality. Meanwhile, particularity’s deter-
minacy enables the concept to be contentful and determined, and to relate
to other particulars and their determinacy: the concept’s particulars are
other-relational and mutually define and limit each other (Hegel 2010b: 534).
Within the concept’s individuality, particularity thus obtains univers-
ality’s feature of independence and self-positing whilst universality receives
particularity’s determinacy and relationality. Universality and particularity
are one and the same within individuality whilst retaining and bestowing
unto each other their distinct characteristics. Neither moment is priori-
tized over the respective other because they are simultaneous: universality
has always already been particularity and particularity has always already
been universality.
15.3.2 Hegel’s Spinoza

In contrast, Hegel argues that Spinoza’s essentialist substance-metaphysics
frames the relationship between extended and non-extended26 substance
and universal substance and finite, particular modes in a determined,
objectivist manner: the unity of substance and modes is itself as determined
and necessary as substance’s self-causing. This interpretation seems to be
supported by passages like these:
Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.
[. . .] Except for God, there neither is, nor can be conceived, any substance
[. . .], that is [. . .], thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But
modes [. . .] can neither be nor be conceived without substance. So they can
26
Cf. Spinoza (1994: 94).

284 sebastian stein
be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But
except for substances and modes there [. . .] is nothing [. . .]. Therefore, [NS:
everything is in God and] nothing can be or be conceived without God.
(Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p15: 94)
A substance is prior in nature to its affections. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p1: 86)
For a mode is in another, through which it must be conceived [. . .], that
is [. . .], it is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone.
(Spinoza 1994: Ethics II p47 schol: 102)
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many
things in infinitely many modes. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p16: 97)
God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of
their essence. (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p25: 102)
God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. (Spinoza
1994: Ethics I p18: 100)
A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible. (Spinoza 1994:
Ethics I p13: 93)
God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.
(Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p17: 97)
To Hegel, this entails that Spinoza is committed to the singularity and
absolute priority of substance, thus making it the all-determining principle.
Within substance’s self-causing activity, negation-defined modes27 consti-
tute its determinacy and thus particularity.28 Substance’s self-causing thus
exerts necessary causality over its particular modes, inducing the modes’
total ontological dependence (Hegel 2010b: 473).
Against Spinoza’s explicit statements to the contrary, Hegel thus argues that
the modes’ particularity disappears in substance’s necessary universality:29
since, ultimately, all modes are substance, their particularity truly is sub-
stance’s sublime and strictly ‘non-determined’ universality. So, from the
ultimately true point of view of prioritized substance, the modes’ particularity
and their contingency is but an illusion:30
Substance ought not to remain Spinoza’s substance, the sole determin-
ation of which is the negative one that everything is absorbed into it.
Differentiation occurs with Spinoza quite empirically – attributes
(thought and extension) and then modes, affects, and all the remaining.
The differentiation falls to the [finite] intellect, itself a mode; the connection
of the attributes to substance and to each other says no more than that they
express the whole of substance, that their content, the order of things as
27
Martin (2012: 76–8). 28 Bowman (2013: 221ff.).
29
Against this, see Luckner and Ostritsch (2019: 15–27).
30
Against this, see Melamed (2010: 89ff.).

extended and as thoughts, is this same substance. (Hegel 2010b: 333, first
italics added by author)
Forced to decide whether particular modes are independent from and thus
limiting to substance or whether they ultimately are aspects of and thus
‘within’ substance,31 Hegel’s Spinoza renders them substance-internal and
thus reducible to substance.32 Spinoza seems to want both: on the one
hand, substance is unconditional, independent and self-referential; on the
other hand, the modes are contingent and determinate. However, the
former requires that the modes be reducible to substance and thus identical
with it. Meanwhile, the latter requires their irreducibility to substance and
thus their difference from it. Hegel’s Spinoza suggests that both are real but
is conceptually forced to decide for the former when he declares that the
latter is merely attributable to the finite mind that is itself a mode of
substance and thus not to substance as it truly is.
In so doing, Spinoza protects substance’s eternal independence: there
is nothing on substance’s ontological level to limit it. But this also
undermines the reality of the modes and thus the determinacy of sub-
stance itself. Since substance is defined as the opposite of the determined
modes and thus as undetermined, the disappearance of modes within
substance entails the disappearance of substance’s indeterminacy: it
deprives substance of its own means of contrast on its own ontological
plane. To Hegel, substance’s universal indeterminacy can thus only be
what it is in negation of the modes’ particular determinacy: substance is
‘non-modes’. However, without modes, substance is not even this inde-
terminacy, as indeterminacy is itself a determination that requires deter-
mination through contrast.
On Hegel’s reading, Spinoza’s approach thus forces a choice: either
the modes are first or substance is. Either substance can be explained
with reference to the modes or the modes can be explained with refer-
ence to substance. Hegel’s Spinoza resolves this tension in favour of
prioritizing substance so that the differentiation of substance into par-
ticular modes comes ‘too late’: logically, modes are introduced after
substance is already established as ultimate and all-encompassing prin-
ciple so that modes must be thought of as substance’s particular form,
which in turn undermines the modes’ definition as irreducibly particu-
lar. So, while Hegel’s Spinoza states that substance is first and modes
are second but the latter are irreducible aspects of how we must think
31 32
DellaRocca (2008: 62). Against this reading, see Melamed (2012).

286 sebastian stein
and experience substance, Hegel argues that the modes’ irreducibility
cannot be justified by virtue of substance’s priority.
This helps uncover Hegel’s main reason for endorsing the meta-
physics of the concept: he thinks that the concept is able to avoid this
undermining of the determinations. When the concept speculatively
defines universality and particularity as simultaneous and as mutually
irreducible on the same logical level from the beginning, it enables
their mutual determination within individuality instead of sacrificing
one for the sake of the other. Individuality’s priority over universality
and particularity does not demand a decision in favour of one element
over the other. Instead, it accommodates the elements without redu-
cing them.
This difference between Hegel’s commitment to speculative concept-
metaphysics and Spinoza’s substance essentialism grounds a difference of
profound relevance for the roles they assign to particular thinkers in the
process of philosophizing.
15.4 The Role of the Particular Philosopher: Thinkers in Spinoza’s

Substance
Spinoza’s basic commitment to necessary substance and Hegel’s preference
for the ‘free’ concept thus also entail different definitions of the relation-
ship between universal truth and particular thinker. These two accounts
give varying answers to the question of whether the finite philosopher is
determined by the universal, self-comprehending truth in a manner that
renders him or her a passive aspect or tool of truth or whether the particular
thinker remains a spontaneous and active part of philosophical thinking.
Stated as a question, what remains of the particular thinker’s spontaneity
and control over philosophical thought in the face of philosophy’s defin-
ition as truth’s self-reference?
According to the Ethics, Spinoza seems to think of particular thinkers as
‘individual’ (Spinoza 1994: Ethics II L3 CorA3: 126) in some sense. Despite
substance’s all-embracing universality, the thinkers remain what they are:
finite, particular entities (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I D5: 85). Furthermore,
Spinoza’s twofold manner of describing philosophy as (1) an intellectual
intuition of finite thinkers and (2) universal truth’s self-reference suggests
that, to him, both substance and thinkers as modes are real: philosophy
might be universal substance referring to itself. But if it is, it must do so via
the activity of the modes that are particular thinkers. It seems that, without
particular thinkers, universal substance could not refer to itself. Substance’s

philosophical self-reference would not be intelligible without the finite
thinkers’ thinking. Substance’s self-causing might thus have to include the
modes’ finitude so that universal substance can be what it is: substance’s
self-reference might have to imply the thinking undertaken by finite
philosophers.
And yet, the inclusion of the modes would have to work in such a
manner that substance’s unconditionality remains untouched: its univer-
sality must not depend on the particular modes as this would undermine its
independence (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I D7: 86).
To Hegel the subordination of the modes to substance’s universality
includes the subordination of the particular philosophical thinkers since
these are equally modes of substance. If, ultimately, everything that deter-
minately exists is within the parameters of universal substance’s eternal self-
causing, then all particular modes and their activities are reducible to
substance. This includes the activity of philosophical thinking by particu-
lar thinkers.
This would mean that the only ‘freedom’ (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I D7:
85) that Spinoza allows to exist is substance’s unconditional, independ-
ent self-causing (Spinoza 1994: Ethics I p17 cor2: 97–8). And because of
the priority of substance over the modes, this freedom exists at the
expense of the particular thinkers’ freedom.33 This would explain
Spinoza’s adamant rejection of Cartesian freedom of the will34 and
thus individual agents’ and thinkers’ autonomy: by virtue of being
aspects of substance, they are reduced to it. Their self-determination
is surrendered to substance’s self-causing. Hegel’s Spinoza thus realizes
that he cannot have both (1) substance’s priority and thus self-
sufficiency and (2) modes’ independence. Forced to choose, he opts
for the former.
Since the identity of substance (from here on just ‘substance’) and
modes logically precedes their difference in the sense that substance causes
itself and the modes are a part of this self-causation before the modes are
defined as ‘non-substance’, the differentiation of the mental activities of
particular philosophers is parasitical on their identity with substance.35 If
substance did not have priority over all modes and thus the particular
philosophers, the thinkers as particular modes could engage in activity
33
See Spinoza (1994: Ethics II p35 schol: 137) and Melamed (2017).
34
Cf. Spinoza (1994: Ethics I p32).
35
Hegel disqualifies the third option of the modes’ priority over substance on the grounds of Spinoza’s
commitment to substance’s unifying universality and independence.

288 sebastian stein
independently from the universality of substance’s self-causing. The
modes and their thinking of substance could be used to explain substance
while substance would be used to explain them. However, this would
undermine substance’s unconditionality:36 substance could be explained
with reference to something else and thus depend on and be limited by
this ‘other’.
In order to make good on his insistence on substance’s independence,
self-sufficiency and self-referential causality,37 Hegel’s Spinoza thus has to
reduce the modes – and therefore also the finite thinkers’ philosophical
activity – to substance’s self-causing:38 ultimately and truly, there are no
independently active, self-deciding particular philosophical thinkers.
Instead, there is only universal substance causing itself in both material
and non-material form. And in so doing, it causes particular thinkers’
intellectual ‘activity’, undermining them in their reality as agents, thinkers
and even particular entities. According to Hegel’s Spinoza, whether we
reason and intuit truthfully, whether we intellectually love god or not, is
not up to us but is up to god, since all we are is god.39
15.4.1 Spinoza’s Reply to Hegel

However, from Spinoza’s perspective, Hegel’s account of the logical sim-
ultaneity of universality and particularity within Geist ’s individuality
discloses a self-undermining weakness within Hegel’s account: the univer-
sality of Hegel’s Geist is limited by its contrast with particularity. Hegel’s
universality is thus dependent on particularity and vice versa.
To Spinoza, such a universality is no true universality at all because it loses
its properties of independence, unconditionality and pure self-reference.
Hegel’s individuality might assume these. But since it is ‘contaminated’ by
36
Cf. “This is why substance is eternally present in its affections and cannot be thought outside of
them, no more than they can be thought without it” (Macherey 2011: 210).
37
“We have before us two determinations, the universal or what has being in and for itself, and
secondly the determination of the particular and singular [or individual], that is, individuality. Now
it is not hard to demonstrate that the particular or the singular is something altogether limited, that
its concept altogether depends upon an other, that it is dependent, does not truly exist for itself, and
so is not truly actual. With regard to the determinate, Spinoza established this thesis: omnis
determinatio, est negatio [all determination is negation]. Hence only the nonparticularized or the
universal is. It alone is what is substantial and therefore truly actual. As a singular thing, the soul or
the mind is something limited. It is by negation that – a singular thing is. – . . . Therefore – it [the
singular thing] does not have genuine actuality” (Hegel 1990a: 154).
38
“The substance of this system is one substance, one indivisible totality; there is no determinateness
which would not be contained in this absolute and be dissolved into it” (Hegel 2010b: 472 remark).
39
Cf. Nadler (2018: 305).

particularity, it is no proper universality at all. Insofar as Spinoza identifies
substance with non-particularity and thus with pure universality, Hegel’s
transfer of universality’s properties onto individuality with the simultaneous
accommodation of particularity within individuality reduces universality to
being an abstract moment of individuality instead of defining it as the
ultimate truth itself.
Hegel would reply to this charge that Spinoza’s insistence on the priority
of strictly non-particular substance/universality is self-undermining
because its absorption of particularity deprives it of determination by
contrast. To retain substance’s unconditionality, self-referentiality and
independence, it has to be comprehended as individuality. In this form,
it is ‘true’ (Hegel 2010b: 569) or ‘concrete’ (Hegel 2010b: 656) universality,
that is, a universality informed by particularity that is unconditioned, self-
referential and, in contrast to Spinoza’s substance, contains the particular-
ity that is required for determinacy and for defining universality on the
same logical plane whilst retaining its properties.40
15.4.2 Hegel: Particular Thinkers and Absolute Geist

Hegel’s concept-based and philosophy-defining category of absolute Geist
is supposed to avoid this: Geist ’s universality is part of the same individu-
ality that also accommodates the philosophical thinkers’ particularity.
Since universality is particularity within Geist ’s individuality, universality’s
properties of unconditionality, self-determination and independence are
transferred from universality onto particularity. Meanwhile, particularity’s
determinateness is transferred onto universality. Since the particular philo-
sophers participate in Geist ’s universality-informed individuality, they are
independent and spontaneous. Meanwhile, Geist ’s individuality is irredu-
cibly determined because of the philosophers’ particularity.
Since the particular philosopher is able to self-determine thanks to her
or his participation in universality-informed individuality, universality
provides a reason for her and his thought: Hegel’s particular philo-
sophers comprehend the philosophical truth because they freely decide
to do so and they can do so because they participate in universality.
Meanwhile, universality is real because it manifests in form of the
thinkers’ particularity: without the thinkers, Geist would be merely
abstractly universal.
40
While I will not try to comment on this dispute here, an answer might lie in a reading of both
accounts that disregards the letter of their writings in favour of their conceptual essence.

290 sebastian stein
The finite philosophers’ particular decisions to think philosophically
can thus be explained with reference to Geist ’s universality: they think
because Geist thinks. At the same time, Geist ’s universality can be
explained only with reference to the thinkers’ particularity: Geist thinks
because the finite philosophers think. Both express the same: since they are
Geist and Geist is them, its self-determination is theirs and theirs is its. In
being different, they are one and the same. Individual Geist ’s decisions are
the choice of one and the choices of many.
So when Hegel talks of Geist in singular fashion, for example in the
lectures on the philosophy of history,41 he implies that Geist ’s individuality
means that particular thinkers’ actions and thoughts determine its content
just as much as its universality determines them:
This vast conglomeration of volition, interests, and activities is the sum total
of instruments and means which the world spirit (Welstgeist) employs to
accomplish its end, to make this end conscious and to give it reality; and its
end is simply that of finding itself, of coming to terms with itself, and of
contemplating its own actuality. All these expressions of individual and
national life, in seeking and fulfilling their own ends, are at the same time the
means and instruments of a higher purpose and wider enterprise of which
they are themselves ignorant and which they nevertheless unconsciously
carry out. (Hegel 1984: 74, author’s italics)
Talking of individual Geist as if it is something different from the particular
agents is thus at best metaphorical. Individual Geist differs from the
primarily particular agent only insofar as individual Geist is also universal.
However, the particular agent participates in the same universality as Geist
since the agent is a part of Geist ’s individuality.
Instead of misleadingly juxtaposing, for example, individual Weltgeist
with a particular agent, arguing that Weltgeist uses him/her as a means, one
should say: ‘individual Geist ’s particular agent x does y’. Since the particu-
lar agent is able to self-determine by virtue of participating in Geist ’s
universality and Geist is determined only by virtue of the particular
individuals, Geist cannot use the particular agent as if it were something
different from itself.
What does this mean for the difference between Hegel’s account of
philosophy and Spinoza’s? Since Geist contains and preserves the dimen-
sions of universality and particularity, the definition of philosophy as
Geist ’s absolute and thus self-referential activity entails that Geist ’s
41
“The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it reveals itself through the human consciousness; the
relationship of men to it is that of single parts to the whole which is their substance” (Hegel 1984: 52).

individuality expresses itself in the particular thoughts of finite thinkers
whilst these retain universality’s ability to self-determine. Through the
thoughts of finite philosophers, absolute Geist is determined and the finite
philosophers are self-determining by virtue of Geist ’s universality. So,
within Geist ’s individuality, the particular philosophers are ‘universalized’
and are therefore as self-causing and independent as Geist ’s universality.
The philosophers’ decision to replace representations with concepts, to
have an intellectual intuition and thus to open themselves to philosophical
truth is thus not determined by a prioritized universal Geist that differs
from them. Instead, their thinking is the universal, albeit in particular
form. They are authors and owners of the decision to think philosophically
and thus to comprehend truth because they participate in Geist ’s univer-
sality. Their ability to author philosophical thought is rooted in the same
universality as that to which their particularity gives concrete content
within individuality’s unity.
In potential contrast to Spinoza’s particular, mode-like and substance-
accommodated thinkers, Hegel’s particular philosophers thus determine
Geist ’s universality while this universality’s self-positing is articulated in
their particular existence and activity: “The end of the [Weltgeist] is
realised in substance through the freedom of each individual” (Hegel
1984: 55).
15.5 Conclusion
Despite their common rejection of individuality-based accounts of
philosophy and what they perceive as their self-contradictory destabil-
ization of philosophical truth, Spinoza and Hegel profoundly differ on
the form that the ontological foundation of philosophy should take.
While Spinoza focuses on the pure universality, independence and
unconditionality of substance, Hegel speculatively unites universal-
ity’s indeterminacy with particularity’s determinacy within the con-
cept’s individuality. In contrast to Spinoza, who rejects the notion of
modes’ and thus particular thinkers’ causal powers on the most pro-
found possible level, Hegel argues that the particular philosopher does
have a universality-informed say in the form and content of his
thoughts.
Whether Hegel succeeds in his attempt to unite Kantian/Fichtean indi-
vidual autonomy with the overarching universal dimension of Geist or
whether Spinoza’s monist naturalism is ultimately preferable might depend
on whether one primarily subscribes to the thinking-method of reflection or

292 sebastian stein
speculation.42 In either case, these two philosophers’ commitment to
a unified, universality-based philosophical science that is able to self-justify
and to provide an all-the-way-down explanation of all reality might be one of
the most meaningful commonality two metaphysical thinkers could possibly
share.
42
Cf. Hegel (1991b: §§79–82, 125ff.).

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Index
Note: Main headings capitalized and in quotation marks may refer to parts of the Encyclopedia.
Absolute, the, 68, 74–75, 149, 235–236, 247, 267 intuition (Anschauung) and, 238
“concretization” of self-manifesting nature materiality and, 240
of, 259 philosophy and, 233
dimensions of, 235–236 religion and, 233, 259–265
limit or distance from, 154 religious nature of, 259–260
nature and, 235–236 self-manifestation and, 252
philosophy as expression of, 267 sensibility and, 240
as pure quantity, 154 thinkers and, 289–291
quantity and, 156 thought and, 236, 238
Spirit (Geist) and, 235–236 absolute subjectivity, concrete human
thought and, 235–236 subjectivity and, 259. See also subjectivity
absolute Idea, 5, 86–87, 89, 94, 256, 258, 273–274 absorption, 228–231
Concept (Begriff ) and, 258, 272 abstract, the, vs. the concrete, 147
as concept of science of pure thinking, 92 abstraction(s), 44, 69, 90–92, 95–96, 115–116, 141,
life and, 19–20 163–164, 257–258
philosophical priority of, 10–11 abstract purity, the universal and, 176
philosophy and, 273–274 “Abstract Right” (Encyclopedia part), 182–183
“self-externalization” of, 97 abstract right, 32–33
self-manifestation and, 252, 258 acting/action, 144
self-sufficiency of, 10–11 knowing and, 167, 169–171
Spirit as real knowledge of, 258–259 motivation and, 180
absolute idealism, 7, 256, 257–258 actuality (Wirklichkeit), 84, 199, 207, 221
absolute knowing, 222–223 actual souls, 243–244
absolute knowledge, 23, 75–76, 86–87 human form and, 244
absolute reality, 255–256 natural form and, 243–244
“Absolute Spirit” (Encyclopedia part), 6 Adorno, Theodor, 233, 245–246
“Art”, 6, 7 aesthetics, 222–223, 241, 260–261. See also art
“Philosophy”, 6, 7–8 aesthetic norms, 194
“Religion”, 6, 7 classical, 194–195, 260–261
absolute Spirit (Geist), 72–73, 218, 236–237, 238, ethical life and, 222–223
251, 256–265, 270–292 Greeks and, 227
art and, 216–231, 232, 233, 236–237, 238–239, polis and, 227
240, 241, 244, 245–246, 248–250 truth and, 228–229
beauty and, 240 Africans, 141
categories of, 216–217 agency
co-presence of two articulations of, 266–268 counternormativity and, 176–177
in Hegel’s system, 233 disability and, 145
the Idea and, 256–259 epistemic, 153
as the ideal, 239 ageing. See ages of life
309

310 Index
ages of life, 137–140, 141, 147 history and, 225–228
alienation, 74–75 human form and, 245
analysis, empiricism and, 152 the Idea and, 233, 243, 247
ananke (necessity), 261 the ideal and, 242
animal magnetism, 130–131, 144 idealism and, 245
annihilation, thought and, 238–239 “ideal of”, 224
Anselm, 85–86 imitation of nature in, 244
Anthropology, 6, 127–147, 158–159, 162–164, 245 individual arts, 234
disability in, 139–146 intuition (Anschauung) and, 237, 240, 242–243
gender in, 139–146 language of art, 245
overview of, 128–132 material givenness and, 238, 241–243, 250
race in, 139–146 materiality and, 7, 233, 238
today, 146–147 meaning and, 238, 243
appearance (Erscheinung), 65–66, 72–73 modern, 217–218, 229
category of, 46 morality and, 234
content of, 65 natural form and, 7, 233, 242–246, 250
essence and, 91 natural immediacy and, 242
form of, 65 nature and, 7, 232–250
the law of, 65 non-discursive, 223
apperception, Kantian notion of, 163 non-human forms and, 245
arbitrary will, 203 one-sideness and, 246
Aristotle, 13–15, 76, 129, 185–186, 187–188, political role of, 223–224, 230
189–190, 195–196, 281–282 production of, 233, 246
Analytics, 82 reception of, 233, 238–239, 240, 241–242, 246
categories and, 199 religion and, 216–231, 232, 259–262
debt to, 14 role in modern world, 221–222
formal syllogism and, 193–194 Romantic, 224, 227
inquisitional syllogistic of, 196–198 self-consciousness and, 224
Pythagoreans and, 195 shared language and, 222
syllogism of inquiry and, 198–199 as sign, 243
syllogisms and, 186–187, 189–190, 193–194, Spirit (Geist) and, 216–231, 234, 236–237,
196–199 238–239
“Art” (Encyclopedia part), 7 structure of, 237
art, 6, 7, 216–222, 228–231, 232–233, 242. See also syllogisms, 225–226
artwork symbolic, 224
absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 7, 222–224, 232, as “thing of the past”, 217–218
233, 238–239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245–246, thought and, 234, 236–237, 238, 239, 242,
248–250 245–246
beauty and, 240, 247 three elements of, 7
as becoming (Werden), 242 two conflicting elements in reception of, 242
becoming and, 238–239 unity of nature and spirit and, 224
Christianity and, 218–219 universality and, 247
classical, 224 value of, 234
community and, 246–247 artistic production, 248–250
discursive, 223 freedom of, 248
ethical role of, 223–224 inspiration and, 248
externality and, 238 stubbornness of nature and, 248–249
fluid structure of, 238–239 artistic world view, vs. idealistic perspective,
as form of self-knowledge, 238 261
genius and, 7, 233, 250 artists, 237, 245–246
Greeks and, 226–227, 230 as becoming (Werden), 249–250
in Hegel’s lectures, 245 as both craftsman and genius, 249–250
Hegel’s philosophy of, 233–235 goal of, 248
in Hegel’s system, 232–233, 234, 235–237 subjective particularity and, 248, 249–250
historical development of, 234 “Art-Religion” (Kunstreligion), 216–217, 229

Index 311
arts being, self-relating, 48, 56–57. See also Being; pure
historicity of, 225–228 being
individual, 234 being determinate, 89
artwork, 224, 227–228, 237 being “near itself” (Beisichsein im Anderen), 74
beauty and, 241 being-other (Anderssein), 97–98
elimination of contingencies in, 246–247 being-there (Dasein), 84
expressing unity of thought and nature, 247 belief (pistis), 190–192
freedom and, 224 Berthold-Bond, D., 145
human form and, 247 biology, teleology and, 111–112
the Idea and, 224, 242 Blödsinnigkeit (imbecility), 145
“ideal of”, 224 bodies as metrics, 122–123
as individual action, 224 coping with changing, 137–139
intuition (Anschauung) and, 240 cultivation and, 147
material givenness and, 243–244 dexterity and, 136
materiality and, 239, 241, 242 ensouled, 127–128
as natural immediacy, 241, 242, 243 Hegel’s theory of, 6
objecthood of, 239 liberation from, 138–139
reception of, 237, 240 mastery of, 127, 128, 137–138
as “shape of beauty”, 246 as natural immediacy, 243–244
unity of thought and nature intuited in, 240 otherness and, 245
universality and, 246–247 as ownership, 6
association of ideas, 173–174 as sign, 243–244
Athens, 192–193 as signifier, 243
attention, 171–172, 173, 174 as sign of soul, 243–244
audience, 237, 241, 246, 249–250 soul and, 128, 129, 131, 137–138, 147, 243
Spirit (Geist) and, 127
beautiful shape, 246 thought and, 243–244
beautiful souls, 220–221, 224 transforming, 127–147
beauty, 224, 225–226, 233, 237–242, bodiliness, 131–132, 134–136, 243. See also
260–261 embodiment
absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 240 bodily determinations, 130 (see also natural
art and, 240, 241, 247 determinations)
audience and, 241 bodily dexterity, 131
experience of, 222–223 bodily expression, 135
genius and, 246–250 freedom from limitations of, 127–129,
as harmonization of intellect and 132–134, 135
imagination, 226 senses and, 243–244
harmony and, 260 body, the, 128. See also bodiliness; embodiment
human form and, 247 boyhood, 137
Kant’s conception of natural, 226
natural, 224, 226 cancelling, 132
shape of (die Gestalt der Schönheit), 237, categories, 47, 86, 199
240, 241 Aristotle and, 199
Spirit (Geist) and, 226 concept-engendered, 1–2
becoming (Werden), 38, 39, 42–43, 89, 198–199, meaning and, 236
238–239, 242, 249–250 nature and, 236
Being, 78–79, 89, 186, 198–199, 260 pure thought and, 47
determinate, 38, 39 relocation of, 63–64
doctrine of, 78–79 of thought/being, 4
essence and, 49 Catholic church, 230
immediacy of, 47–48 Catholicism, Hegel’s attack on, 230
intelligibility and, 14 Caucasians, 141, 142
limitation of, 48 causation, 16–18, 219
logic of, 80–81 Cézanne, Paul, 217–218
thinking/thought and, 10, 13–14 change, 2–3

312 Index
character, 134–135 individuality and, 283, 291
chemism, 18–19, 84, 111–112, 125 as “internal” (Inneres) in nature, 101–106
chemistry, 111, 125, 157–158 in-and-for itself, 78–79
childhood, 137 logic and, 76–79, 80–82, 84
choice (Willkür), 173, 180–181 logic of, 79
free agency and, 180–181 modified, non-logical understanding of,
power of, 181 101–102
will as, 180–181 nature and, 101–102, 103–104
choosing, 169–170 objectivity and, 239–240
Christianity, 216–217, 222, 224, 227, 230–231, 261 particularity and, 282–283, 286
art and, 218–219 radical otherness and, 74–75
as “Hegelianism for the masses”, 266 vs. representation, 271
revealed theology and, 262–263 as self-mediation, 83–84
Ciavatta, David, 133–134 as self-referential self-determination, 101–102,
“circle of circles”, 1–2 104–105
circularity, as image of system’s freedom, 75–76 self-referring negativity of, 176
civilization, nature and, 132–133 as self-sufficient truth, 26
clairvoyance, 130–131 shining (Schein) of, 78–79
classical worldview, 261–262. See also Greeks “state of aggregation” of, 104
cognition as structuring principle of philosophical
argumentative, 190 knowledge, 1
clarity and, 190–192 subjective, 2, 83–84
intuition (Anschauung) and, 238 subjectivity and, 79–80, 81–82, 83–84, 86–87
reflective, 190 substance and, 73–74, 82
colonialism, 146–147 syllogisms and, 83
cometary, the, 124 thought and, 239–240
commitment, 169, 176 transition from subjectivity to objectivity,
communal life, 189–190 85–86
community, art and, 246–247 transparency to itself, 82
compendia, 185 truth and, 82, 272
completion, 120 unity of, 175–176, 282–283
conceiving, 79–81 universality and, 282–283, 286
Concept, the (Begriff ), 1–2, 6, 18–19, 26, 78–79, Concept Logic, 15, 26–27
80–82, 102–103, 114, 166–167, 170–171, concept-metaphysics, 7–8, 270–271, 280–286
193–194, 258, 271, 280, 282, 286 concepts, 42–43, 45
absolute Idea and, 258, 272 abstract, 41–43
as arising subject of objective thinking process, appearance vs. essence of, 43–44
79–80 fixed content of, 42–43
being-for-itself, 78–79 form in flux, 43–44
categorical shapes of, 271–272 “implicit” determination of, 40
conceptuality of, 271–272 nature and, 236
vs. consciousness, 79–80 negation of, 39–40
definition of, 68, 79–80 non-logical, 96
determinations and, 30, 80–81 non-spatial nature of, 42–43
doctrine of, 78–79, 82 non-temporal nature of, 42–43
formal, 83–84 plasticity of, 42–43
free alienation of, 71 pure, 12–13, 20, 91, 96, 107
freedom of, 5, 68–87 pure thinking and, 107–108
as free thinking of being by itself, 79–80 vs. sense impressions, 42
Hegel’s theory of, 80–81 conceptual determinations, 106, 114–115
as idea, 272 conceptuality, as self-referring negativity, 170–171
the Idea and, 273 conceptual processes, abstraction and, 69
as immanent in nature, 5–6, 88 conceptual realism, 160–161
immateriality of, 271–272 concrete, the, vs. the abstract, 147
implicit determination of, 41 conflict, will and, 38–39

Index 313
Congress of Vienna, 218–219, 228–229 of character, 135
consciousness, 125–126, 163–164, 171, 219. See also as “conduct according to a universal norm”,
religious consciousness; self-consciousness 134–135, 142
acting, 219 cultus, 264, 265, 266, 267–268
vs. concept, 79–80 God and, 269
finite, 29–30 philosophical, 269
vs. intelligence, 172–173 religious, 269
judging, 219 cyclical processes, organic physics and, 125–126
natural, 75
philosophy and, 29–30 dancers, disabled, 136
unique, 79–80 De orbitis planetarum, 71
unity of, 79–80 death, intellectual overcoming of, 2–3
consequentialism, 209–210 degeneration, 120
content, 46–47, 53, 62–66, 198–201 DEMR (division in extreme mean ratio), 194–195
of appearance (Erscheinung), 65 Descartes, René, 85–86, 110–111, 187
category of, 5 desires, 131
concrete, 200, 201 Desmond, W., 238, 245–246
conversion into form, 65–66 determinacy, 61–62, 188–189
in Encyclopedia Logic, 46–47, 62–66 mind and, 171–172
form and, 64–67, 98, 180–181, 183–184, 263 the “thing” and, 156–157
as formed matter, 64–65 determinate characteristics, 91–92
of freedom, 182–183 determinate content, generated by dialectic,
relocation of, 46–47 39–40
context, 210–211, 212–213 determinate magnitudes, 195–196
contingency, 41–42, 73–74, 174 determination(s), 13–14, 237–238. See also natural
freedom and, 33–35, 36 determinations
in institutions of modern polity, 201–202 appropriation of, 138–139
nature and, 98–99 contradictory, 58
contingent, the, 134–135 determinations of thought
continuity, 95 (Denkbestimmungen), 12–13, 91, 198–199
contract rights, 182–183 exclusive, 56–57
contradiction, 50–54, 62, 194 by form, 151
the ground (Grund) as, 59 freedom and, 136
identity resulting from, 59 generated by dialectic, 40
logical movement and, 23–24 implicit, 40–41
nature and, 100–101 internal, 164
in opposition, 50 quantitative, 155–156
practical, 23–24 thought and, 41
self-exclusion and, 52–54, 55–56, 57–58, 59 determined indeterminacy, 62
self-repulsion and, 52–53 development (Entwicklung), 40–41, 42–43,
contranormative conduct, 183–184 80–81
Cooper, David, 209, 210 developmental necessity, claim for, 13–14
correctness, 154–156 devotion, 264, 265
of materialism, 161 dexterity, 136
of pure quantity, 156 dialectics, 39–40, 42–43, 86
counternormative agency, 167–168, 169, ascending, 74
170–172, 184 descending, 74
counternormativity, 172–173, 176–177, 178–179 in Plato, 190
creation, 94–95 difference, 61–62
creative power, 81 diversity and, 49–50
creativity, 79–80 identity and, 49–50, 52, 64
crime, 210–211 opposition and, 49–50
critical philosophy, 255–256 differentiation, 262–263
cultivation, 127, 134–135, 137, 138–140 directional processes, physics and, 125
the body and, 147 diremption, 120

314 Index
disability, 6, 139–146, 147 empiricism, 150, 255–256
agency and, 145 analysis and, 152
hierarchy and, 144–146 materialism and, 151–153
“ownership interpretation” and, 145 objects and, 152–153
virtuosity and, 136 unfreedom and, 151–153
disability theory, 144 empiricist philosophy, 151–152
discretion, 101 Encyclopedia Logic, 5, 93–94, 188–189
discursive, the, 216–231 content in, 46–47, 62–66
disease, 138 contradiction in, 50–53
disposition. See temperament form in, 46–47, 62–66
diversity, 49–50 ground in, 46, 50–53
“Divided Line”, in Plato, 190–192 identity in, 48–50
divine, the, 260 matter in, 46–47, 62–66
the human and, 260, 261 opposition in, 48–50
divine principle, 259 Science of Logic and, 47, 53, 54–55, 57–58, 62,
as all-embracing and omnipresent, 268–269 63–64, 65–67
human manifestation and, 260, 261, 262 Encyclopedia of Mind, 150
human subjectivity and, 262, 263–265, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic
266, 268 Outline, 46–67, 174, 204. See also specific
philosophical consciousness and, 269 parts
religious consciousness and, 269 1817 edition, 36–37, 187, 216–217, 227–228,
self-manifesting, 262, 268 233–234
divine proportion, 194 1827 edition, 233–234
divinity, 224, 227 1830 edition, 40–41, 216, 223, 233–234, 245
dogmatism, avoidance of, 3–4 account of completion of, 22
doubt, 187 categories of, 1–2
dóxa (opinion), 190, 256–257 definition of, 1
drives, 166–167, 170–171, 179–182 division into three parts, 72–73
compatibility of, 180 essence in, 46–67
purposive, 179–180 genesis of, 68
dualism, 78, 86, 160–161, 172–173 method of, 4, 185
force dualism, 123 objective Spirit in, 203
substance dualism, 159, 160 as philosophical discourse of totality, 68–73
Dutch painting, 228–229 philosophy of art in, 232–233
duty, 177–178 philosophy of philosophy in final pages of
outline, 272
early analytic philosophy, materialist scepticism Philosophy of Right and, 206
of, 164–165 preliminary conceptions outlined at beginning
education, 137, 138–139, 173 of, 255
efficient, 16–18 reach of, 4
electricity, 111, 120 relationship to Hegel’s other works, 4
embodiment, 96–97, 127, 128–129, 131. See also religion in, 218–222, 251–269
ages of life as “science of freedom”, 41
ambiguity of, 133 Science of Logic and, 9–27
free, 146 sections of, 1, 2
of the mental, 135 standing as account of philosophical truth, 4
nature and, 127, 140 structure of, 22
“overcoming interpretation” and, 134–136, systematicity and, 4, 203–204, 205
138–139, 140, 146 testing and reformulation of, 4
“ownership interpretation” and, 134–136, transition from logic to nature in, 88
146 tripartite division of Logic in, 78–79
spatio-temporal, 90–91 unity of presentation of, 4
thinking and, 107 viewing with “religious eyes”, 252
empire, non-aesthetic unity of, 227 Encyclopedia system. See system, the
empirical reality, 2–3 “end of history” thesis, 213–214

Index 315
Entäusserung. See externalization (Entäusserung) Eudoxus of Cnidus, 195–196
entities, 2–3 Eurocentrism, 146–147
entlassen (to release). See release (entlassen) existence (Existenz), 46, 84
epistemology, 148–149. See also knowledge exoteric, the, 266–267
esotericism, 266–267 experience
essence, 5, 46–67, 78–79 finite, 254–256
as absolute negativity, 47–49 metaphysics and, 255–256
appearance and, 91 sensuous, 253–254, 255
being and, 49 study of, 152
definition of, 49 transformational, 161
determinateness of, 60 explanation, quantitative modes of, 155–156
differing accounts of, 66–67 expression(s), 91
doctrine of, 46, 78–79, 262 bodily, 135
vs. form, 61–63 thought and, 96–97
as foundation of form, 63 exteriority, 261
as identity, 49, 51 external, the, as abstract otherness of itself,
illusion of immediate being and, 47–48 172–173
immediacy and, 48 externalism, 168–169
logic of, 46–47, 80–81 externality, 163–164, 172, 236, 243, 248–249
as matter, 63 art and, 238
as negation of a nothing, 48 nature and, 98–99, 109, 163
as negation of itself, 48 space and, 118–119
as negation of negation, 48 thought and, 239–240
as the negative, 48 externalization (Entäusserung), 26, 94–95,
negativity and, 49, 50, 51 173–174
the non-negative and, 48 extra-logical, the, 9–10
opposition and, 50
positedness (Gesetzseyn) and, 49 facts, 13–14
as pure negativity, 50 faith, 262, 264, 265
reflexion and, 47–48, 49, 51 Faraday, Michael, 111
as reflexion-into-itself, 49 feeling, 131, 172, 173, 177–178
in Science of Logic, 5, 46–67 feeling soul, 130–131, 143–144
as self-relating being, 51 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 265–266
as sphere of non-immediacy, 47–48 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 162–163, 166–167
Spirit (Geist) and, 90–91 Doctrine of Science, 70
thought and, 91–92 individual autonomy and, 291–292
essence as such (Wesen überhaupt), 60–61 on philosophical idealism, 81–82
essential, the, 174 subjectivity in, 277–278
essentialism, 270, 280, 281, 283–284, 286 threefold Concept of, 170–171
the Estates, 188–189 universality and, 277–278
eternal truth finite, the, 120
self-comprehending, 3 finite experience, 254–256
self-contemplation of, 2–3 finite mind, world and, 271
eternity, comprehension of, 3 finite philosopher, 272, 274–276
“Ethical Life” (Encyclopedia part), 6, 184 freedom and, 7–8
ethical life (Sittlichkeit), 187–188, 196–197, free in acts of channelling truth, 7–8
222, 230 knowledge and, 3–4
ethical philosophy, 203 philosophical truth and, 271–272
ethos (Sitte), 229–230 Spirit (Geist) and, 273
Euclid, 117–118 truth and, 7–8
Elements, 116, 194 finitude, transcendence of, 3
Euclidean geometry, 112–113 first philosophy, 20
Euclidean space, 109–110, 112–113, 116, 117–118, first syllogism (L–N–S), 72–73
124–125 forces, 124
Euclidean time, 109–110, 112–113, 116, 124–125 form, 40–41, 53, 61–62, 82, 124

316 Index
form (cont.) nature and, 28–29, 147
of appearance (Erscheinung), 65 necessity and, 73–74
category of, 5 as object of awareness, 31–32
content and, 64–67, 98, 180–181, 183–184, otherness and, 74–75
263 philosophy and, 29
determinations by, 151 philosophy as science of, 28–30
development of, 40–41 as predicate of concept as its own subject, 68
in Encyclopedia Logic, 46–47, 62–66 property and, 208, 209
essence and, 5, 61–63 Rousseauian perspective, 33–34
external, 151 science and, 29, 35, 41, 45, 73–76
external determination of matter by, 154, Science of Logic and, 28–29, 41–45
155–156 self-consciousness and, 31–32
as external relation, 64 Spinoza on, 287
as form of substrate from which it differs, Spirit (Geist) and, 146–147
61–62 state of nature and, 32–33
logical form, 96–97 subjective, 187–188
matter and, 62–63, 64–65, 151, 154, 155–156, subjectivity and, 5
159–160 thinking and, 29, 43, 248
natural form, 242–246 to transcend, 45
non-formalist conception of, 76 will and, 31–32, 38–39, 180–181, 206–207
problem of, 5, 46–67 work of art and, 224
as qualitative determination, 154, 155–156 free mind, 6, 132–133, 166–167, 182–183
relocation of, 46–47 free self-release (freies Sich-Entlassen), 94–95
in Science of Logic, 46–47, 62–66, 198–201 free spirit, 181–184
formalism, rejection of, 83 free thinking, 187
formality, 83–84, 247 free will, 7, 182, 183, 203, 206–207, 214–215
form determinations, 62 free thinking and, 187
former metaphysics (vormalige Metaphysik), objectification of, 182–183
102–103 property and, 208–209
form-relation (Formbeziehung), 63 reflexivity of, 183–184
forms, 83–84 Spinoza’s rejection of, 287
free agency, choice and, 180–181 Frege, Gottlob, 200–201
freedom, 5, 7–8, 43–44, 68, 72, 73–74, French Enlightenment, 155
133–134, 155–156, 178–179, 182–183, 219, French Revolution, 230
221, 229 Furlotte, Wes, 137–138
absolute freedom of idea, 93–94 Fukuyama, Francis, 213
of absolute knowledge, 75–76
of artistic production, 248 Gaiger, J., 234–235
beginning of history of, 36 Galileo Galilei, 110–112
from bodiliness, 132–134 Galvani, Luigi, 111
of the Concept, 68–87 Geist. See Spirit (Geist)
content of, 182–183 gender, 6, 139–146, 147
contingency and, 33–35, 36 hierarchy and, 142–144, 146
determinations and, 136 nature and, 144
development of idea of, 30–35, 38–39, 41–42, “overcoming interpretation” and, 143, 144
44, 146–147 soul and, 143–144
development of the universal and, 134 general logic, 11–12
features of Hegelian, 30–35 genius, 130, 245–246, 248, 249–250
finite philosopher and, 7–8 accidentality of, 249
fullest expression of, 206–207 art and, 7, 233, 250
from historical contingency, 45 beauty and, 246–250
Hobbesian perspective, 33–34, 43–44 natural immediacy and, 249–250
the Idea and, 74–75 nature and, 7, 232
Kantian perspective, 33–34, 43–44 geology, 157–158
logic and, 28–29, 41–42, 73–76 geometric mean, 191–192, 193–195

Index 317
geometry, 110–111, 112–114, 117–118, 195–196 essentialist interpretations of, 270
Euclidean, 112–113 idealism of, 270
reductionism and, 112 Jena writing, 97, 234
Gethmann-Siefert, A., 232–233, 234, 235 Lutheranism and, 266–267
Ginsborg, H., 16–18 metaphysical commitments of, 148–149
Glaucon, 190–191 metaphysical interpretations of, 164–165
global passing-away, 100 metaphysical language of, 164–165
God, 26–27, 247, 260, 266–267, 268–269, 276. method of, 4
See also divine principle naturalist interpretations of, 270
cultus and, 269 non-systematic readings of, 204–205, 212–213
as fundamental and certain reality, 253, 254 ontological foundations of, 270–271
as manifestation, 266–267 philosophers’ control of thought and, 270
manifestation of in the world, 254 on philosophy, 270–292
natural theology and, 259–260 revealed theology of, 262–265
vs. nature, 26 Spinoza and, 283–286, 288–289
ontological proofs of, 85–86 technical vocabulary of, 207, 208, 209–210,
revealed theology and, 262–263 214–215
self-loving, 270–292 on universal truth, 270
“golden section”, 194 Hegelians, 148–149
the good Hegel Society of Great Britain, 204
judgement of, 168 Heraclitus, 43–44
knowledge of and action on, 167, 170–171, Hermanni, Friedrich, 267–268
183–184 Herodotus, 222–223
Greek gods, 260–261 heterogeneity, disappearance of, 29–30
Greeks, 187–188 hierarchy
aesthetics and, 227 of development away from nature, 146–147
art-religion of, 216–218, 223–224, 226–227, “hierarchy of peoples”, 139–146
229, 230 nature and, 140
beauty and, 222–223 historical contingency, freedom from, 45
Greek thought, syllogisms and, 187–188 historical externality, 43, 44
Greene, Murray, 129–130 historical narrative, perspective and, 43–44
ground (Grund), the, 51–53, 54–55, 60, 61–62, history, 192–193, 229–230
63–64 art and, 225–228
characterized by self-identity, 59–60 external, 43, 44
as contradiction, 59 politics and, 214
in Encyclopedia Logic, 46, 50–53 Science of Logic and, 43–44
the grounded and, 60, 61 history of philosophy, 69–70
identity and, 60–61 Hobbes, Thomas, 32, 33, 43–44, 189–190
as “reflexion-into-itself”, 52 Hölderlin, Friedrich, 228–229
in Science of Logic, 46, 59–62 homogeneity, 118–119, 121, 122
as self-excluding identity, 62 Hotho, H. G., 217, 234–235, 245
as unity of identity and difference, 52 Houlgate, Stephen, 234–235
grounded, the, 51–52, 59, 60, 61–62, 64 human, the, 260, 261
ground relation, 51–53, 61–62, 63 human form, 233
actual souls and, 244
habit, 131, 133, 136, 138, 141–142 art and, 245
Hamann, dictum of, 106 artwork and, 247
happiness, 181–182 as beautiful shape, 246
harmonies, 120 beauty and, 247
harmony, beauty and, 260 as highest of natural forms, 244
Hegel, G. W. F. See also specific works the Idea and, 247
account of philosophy, 271–280 natural form and, 244, 245
anti-Catholicism and, 230 as natural immediacy, 245
charged with immaterialism, 149 representation of perfect, 247
concept-metaphysics of, 270–271, 280–286 as self-signifying sign, 245

318 Index
human form (cont.) thought and, 240
as sign of the idea, 245 three forms of, 2
as sole “shape of beauty”, 245 as unity of concept and reality, 81–82
human formation, 128–129 unity of practice and, 223
humanity as unity of thought and nature, 239–240, 241,
philosophical religion of, 266 246, 249–250
Trinitarian divine origin and, 262–263 universality and, 233, 247
human manifestation, divine principle and, work of art and, 224
260, 261 ideal (das Ideal), the, 233, 237–242, 249–250
hypochondria, 137 absolute Spirit (Geist) as, 239
art and, 242
Idea, the, 2, 3, 5, 86, 175–176, 186, 193–194, 199, as “the concrete shape born of objective
207, 233, 247, 256, 260–261, 282 spirit”, 239
absolute (see absolute Idea) definition of, 239
absolute freedom of, 93–94 as expression of unity in material-sensory
as absolute Spirit (Geist), 256–259 shape, 240
alienation and, 74–75 intuition (Anschauung) and, 237
art and, 233, 242, 243, 247 as material external shape given to senses, 239
the Concept and, 272, 273 shape of (die Gestalt der Schönheit) and, 240
conception of idea as shield against dualism, as species of the idea, 240
86 unity and, 240
concreteness of, 240 idealism, 10, 114, 158–159, 171, 254, 257
definition of, 239–240 absolute, 257–258
division into subjective and objective poles, absolute idealism, 256
72–73 art and, 245
doctrine of, 78–79 German, 11–12
as dynamic process, 86 Hegel vs. Kant, 270
freedom and, 74–75 as link between religion and philosophy,
has nature of a substance, 257 253–254
human form and, 247 nature of, 81–82
idea in the form of otherness (Idee in der Form objective, 81–82
des Andersseins), 97–99 philosophy and, 86–87, 252–253, 256,
as idea of self, 86–87 268–269
life as manifestation of, 20 problematic idealism, 159–161
logical, 81–82 realism and, 86–87
logic as science of, 76 subjective, 81–82
manifestation of in the world, 257 as subjectivism, 81–82
as manifest principle, 257 idealistic perspective, vs. artistic world view, 261
nature and, 72–73, 233, 240, 258 idealist metaphysics, movement against, 148–149
Parmenidean being and, 256–257 idealists, 148–149
perfect expression of, 257–258 ideality, 114–115, 158–159
of philosophy, 272 ideas
philosophy as self-thinking of, 272–273 abstract, 109
as the presence of thought, 239–240 association of, 173–174
religious worldview and, 259 fixed content of, 42–43
self-disclosure and, 258 identity, 48–49, 60, 61–62
self-externality (Außersichsein) of, 97–99 difference and, 49–50, 52, 64
self-knowing of, 274 diversity and, 49–50
self-manifestation and, 258 in Encyclopedia Logic, 48–50
shape of (die Gestalt der Schönheit) as sign essence as, 49, 51
of, 241 the ground (Grund) and, 60–61
shape of beauty and, 246 opposition and, 50
Spirit (Geist) and, 72–73, 273 reflexion as, 48
as subject-object, 86–87 reflexion-into-another and, 52
thinking itself, 258 resulting from contradiction, 59

Index 319
simple vs. determinate, 60–61 teleological, 176
speculative, 13–14 thinking and, 175–176
identity philosophy, 62 inferences, 6, 104–105
idiosyncrasies, 134–135, 138–139 infinite, the, 120
Ikäheimo, Heikki, 171, 173 infinity, 120
illusion (Schein), 48–49 innate ideals hypothesis, 40–41
illusion of immediate being, essence and, 47–48 inner life, relationship to, 130
images, 173–174, 179 inquisitional syllogistic of Aristotle,
imagination, 171–172, 173–174, 179–180, 196–198
190–191, 226 inspiration, 248
immaterial, the, 149 institutions, 187–188, 201–202
immaterialism, 149, 164–165 intellect, 255–256
immaterialist metaphysics, 149–150 imagination and, 226
immateriality, 149–150, 159 limitations of, 155
Hegel’s minimalist and transformational object of, 256
conceptions of, 150 primacy of, 253, 254–255
ideality and, 158–159 pure, 256
mind and, 159–160, 162–163, 164, 165 unifying activity of, 255
minimalist conception of, 149, 150, 159–160, intellectualism, 168, 172–173
164–165 intellectualist internalism, 168
minimalist critique of, 162 intelligence, 172–174, 240
striving of all things towards, 149–150 vs. consciousness, 172–173
thinking and, 160 dissolving ability of, 174
transformational conception of, 149–150, 160, technical, 248–249
161, 162, 165 will and, 187
immediacy, 38, 74, 75, 78–79, 154, 171–172, intelligibility, 98, 155–156
177–178. See also natural immediacy being and, 14
essence and, 48 of intelligibility, 20
Hegel’s rejection of, 44, 45 limitations of, 155
mediation and, 84 materialism and, 164–165
natural, 233 of nature, 98–99, 101–108, 162
natural immediacy, 233, 240, 241, 242, norms of, 37
243–244 of objects, 15–16
objectivity (Objektivität) and, 84 of the real, 108
pure being and, 36, 37–39, 44 internalism, 170–171, 176
reflexion and, 48 internalism question, 167–171, 176–177, 183–184
return to, 171–172 representationalist, 170–171
sciences and, 36–37 internalization, process of, 163–164, 173–174
immediacy of being, as an illusion, 47–48 intersubjective bond, 266
immediate knowing, 255–256 intuition (Anschauung), 103–104, 113–114, 121,
immediatization, 74 166–167, 171–173, 178, 179, 223, 233, 237–242.
impurity, purity and, 89–90 See also perspectives
Incarnation, 262–263 absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 238
individual, the, 115, 207 art and, 237, 240, 242–243
particularity of, 130 cognition and, 238
individual autonomy, Geist and, 291–292 definition of, 237
individuality, 182–183, 188–189, 282–283 geistig, 272
the concept and, 291 the ideal (das Ideal) and, 237
particularity and, 134–136 Kant’s doctrine of, 115–116
passive, 130 meaning and, 238
Spirit (Geist) and, 288, 289–291 nature and, 238
substance and, 289 reception of art and, 237, 238–239, 241–242
individuation, 131 vs. representation, 237
inference, 121–122, 166–167, 181–182, 190, 201 vs. sensation, 237–238
practical, 181–184 as sign, 240, 241

320 Index
intuition (cont.) on space, 117–118
space as form of, 115–116 Spinozism as greatest challenge to, 270
thought and, 237 subjectivity in, 277–278
time as form of, 115–116 theory of morality, 211–212
irrationality, 73 transcendental aesthetic of, 172–173
irrational numbers, 194, 195–196 unity of nature in, 150
Italian painting, 228–229 universality and, 277–278
kenosis, 26
judgement(s), 104–105, 120, 168, 171–172, Kepler, Johannes, 71, 123–124
178–179, 183–184, 199–200, 201 three laws of planetary motion and, 122–124
of the Concept, 175 knowability, 13–14, 22, 155–156
conclusive vs. normative, 175 knowing
contents of, 200, 201 acting and, 169–171
favouring particularity over universality, Denkbestimmungen of, 22
171–172 immediate, 255–256
formation of, 12–13 pure, 221
judgement structures, 201 knowledge, 69. See also philosophical knowledge
particular, 196–197 absolute, 75–76
singular, 196–197, 199–200 vs. action, 167
“tensed”, 200–201 desire for, 2
universal, 196–197 development of, 173
judging, 11–12, 200 finite philosopher and, 3–4
act of, 13–14 material of, 171
self-consciously, 15 mind and, 171–172
temporal act of, 200–201 of nature, 106–108
proprio sensu (Erkenntnis) vs. representation
Kant, Immanuel, 11–12, 14–15, 16–18, 33, 43–44, (Vorstellung), 77
79–80, 85–86, 102, 105–107, 113–114, 149, self-determining, 251
150, 153–154, 166–167, 209–210, 236, speculative, 72–73, 77–78, 186
259–260 Spinoza’s three kinds of, 274–276
on abstract forms, 115–116 understanding (Verstand) and, 77
aesthetics of, 150 Knox, T. M., 234–235
on categories of quantity, 154–155 Kolb, David, 46–47, 53, 62, 63–64, 66–67
conception of natural beauty, 226 Kosman, Ariyeh, 13
Deduction, 13–14 Kreines, James, 102–103, 165
doctrine of intuition, 115–116 Kunstreligion, 260
doctrine of space, 116
failure of self-scrutiny, 36–37 language, shared, 221, 222, 224
freedom and, 43–44 language of art, 245
on “General Logic” and “Transcendental language of nature, 245
Logic”, 11–12 laughter, 135
idealism of, 270 Lavoisier, Antoine, 111
individual autonomy and, 291–292 the law, of appearance (Erscheinung), 65
Kritik der Urteilskraft, 15–18 law, legitimate source of, 33
logic in, 11–13 lawfulness, 182–183
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, laws, 102–103
111–112, 122 Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 69, 187
philosophy of nature and, 20–21 Lectures on the Philosophy of History, 34–35,
on purposiveness of reflective judgement, 189–190, 195
23–24 Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 127, 134–135,
on reason as purposeful activity, 23 139–140, 142
re-enchanted conceptions of nature and, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 111–112, 116, 197–198
162 life
scepticism of objectivity of concept of life, absolute idea and, 19–20
16–18 accounts of, 4–5

Index 321
ages of, 137–139 political ontology and, 186–187, 198–199
in Logic, 4–5 presupposes itself as system, 79
logical and natural, 9–27 purity of, 90
a logical concept, 15–18 purpose as onto-logic, 86–87
logical life, 19 “real sciences of philosophy” and, 89–90,
logical treatment of, 21–22 92–93, 96, 106–108
as manifestation of Idea, 20 as reflection of being, 70–71
necessity of concept of, 18–20 science of, 29, 88 (see also Science of Logic)
objectivity of concept of, 16–18 as science of absolute form, 76
in Philosophy of Nature, 4–5, 25–26 as science of freedom, 68, 73–76
philosophy of nature and, 21–22, 23 as science of pure thinking, 11–15, 89–90
philosophy of Spirit and, 22 as science of the pure idea, 76, 86
as pure concept knowable non- as “science of the idea in and for itself”, 70
empirically, 4–5 second reading of, 79
pure concept of, 11, 19–20 self-sufficiency of, 22
as “relatively a priori”, 4–5 spatio-temporal determinacy and, 90
reproduction of, 19–20 speculative, 11, 77–78, 187–188
in Science of Logic, 11, 25–26 subjective, 79–80, 90, 199, 201–202, 258
self-determination and, 20 symbolic, 197–198
self-realization of, 19–20 thought and, 236
limitation, as contradiction, 178–179 three levels of, 80–81
lines, 117–118 transition from logic to nature, 93–97
Locke, John, 43–44, 230 transition to Nature, 74
logic, 72–73, 189–190, 258 tripartite division of Logic in, 78–79
absolute position of, 77–78 triple, 79
Aristotelian forms of, 6–7 of truth, 76
the Concept and, 76–79 usual notion of, 12–13
content of, 207 logical, the, 9–10
double, 79 nature and, 93–97, 104
as explanation of “speculative” mode of the real and, 92–93, 96–98, 102–103
thinking, 76–79 logical concept, the, as self-referential
features of Hegelian, 35–41 self-determination, 104–105
formal, 198–199, 200 logical determinations, nature and, 102–103, 104
formality of, 76 logical form
freedom and, 28–29, 41–42, 73–76 expression of, 96–97
Hegel’s conception of, 88 the real and, 107–108
Hegel’s reconstruction of as rational science, logical idea, externality of, 93–97
196–198 logicality of nature (Logizität der Natur), 99
Hegel’s unprecedented conception of, 70–71 logical life, 19
inquisitional dimension of, 201–202 logical movement, contradiction and, 23–24
in Kant, 11–13 logical properties, 113
mathematical logic, 197–198 logical subjectivity, 79–80
as metaphysical theology, 85–86 logical thinking, as generative structure, 77–78
metaphysics and, 24–27, 70–71, 198–199 “Logic of Being”, 195–196
modal, 200 Logic. See Encyclopedia Logic
nature and, 5–6, 88–108, 109, 115 logic of being, 80–81
objective, 90, 199, 201–202, 258 logic of concept, 80–81
objective Spirit and, 201–202 Logic of Essence, the, 80–81, 195–196
one, 79 logics, greater vs. lesser, 5
as onto-logic, 76, 79–80 logos, 70–71, 263–264
ontological dimension of, 201–202 incarnate, 263
ontological proofs and, 85–86 primacy of, 253, 254–255
ontology and, 70–71, 85–86 self-manifestation and, 258
philosophy of nature and, 93–97 unifying nature of, 253
in Plato, 190 Louis XVIII, 230

322 Index
Lumsden, Simon, 133 art and, 7, 233, 238, 241, 242
lunar, the, 124 Hegel’s conception of, 159–160
Luther, Martin, 26 minimalist critique of, 164–165
Lutheranism, 266–267 nature and, 7, 232
organized, 236
MacColl, Hugh, 200–201 thought and, 236–237, 239
magnetism, 111, 120 material reality, 148–149
magnitudes, 195–196 material-sensory concreteness, meaning and, 240
Manet, Édouard, 217–218 mathematics, 110–111, 112–113, 120, 121–122, 154
manifestation, 251, 252, 254, 255–256, 257, Greek, 195–196 (see also Pythagoreans)
258–259, 260, 261, 262–265, 268 mathematical logic, 197–198
of absolute unity via finite entities, 254 matter, 53, 122–123, 149, 151, 157–158
divine principle and, 262 as aspect of reality as a whole, 149
God as, 266–267 category of, 5
self-manifestation of, 258 determinations by form, 151
Spirit (Geist) and, 262 in Encyclopedia Logic, 46–47, 62–66
two forms of, 251–252 essence as, 63
manifoldness, 237–238 form and, 62–63, 64–65, 151, 154, 155–156,
Martin, C., 161 159–160
masculinity, 139–146 Hegel’s empiricist conception of, 152
Hegel’s privileging of, 139–140 metaphysics of, 149
mastery, 219–221 nature and, 161
material, the, 247 relocation of, 46–47
material givenness, 243, 246 in Science of Logic, 46–47, 62–66
art and, 241–244, 250 as “simple identity”, 63, 64
natural form and, 242 vs. thing, 64
nature and, 245–246 three features of, 150–151
thought and, 238–239 matters, 157
unified, 242 McCarney, Joseph, 213
materialism, 150, 151–152, 162, 164–165 McCumber, J., 131
correctness of, 161 McDowell, 153
critique of, 6 meaning, 236
empiricism and, 151–153 art and, 238, 243
Hegel’s critique of, 148–165 categories and, 236
Hegel’s definition of, 150–151 intuition (Anschauung) and, 238
intelligibility and, 164–165 material-sensory concreteness and, 240
Kant’s minimalist critique of, 162 natural form and, 243
as matter’s ultimate reality, 149 natural immediacy and, 240
mind and, 158–162 nature and, 236, 238
minimalist critique of, 149, 150 objects and, 237–238
monism of, 160 otherness and, 240
natural sciences and, 153–154, 157–158 sign and, 241
nature and, 162 thought and, 238
organic nature and, 157–158 measure, 113, 195–196
quality and, 156–158 mechanics, 6, 122–125
quantitative determination and, 155–156 mechanism, 18–19, 84, 109–110, 122
quantitative, 155–156 mediation(s), 78–79, 84, 171–172, 188–189
quantity and, 153–156 memory, 179
scope and bounds of, 149 mental, the, 135, 137. See also mind
thinking and, 160 mental illness, 138
unfreedom and, 151–153 metaphysical language, 164–165
materialist scepticism, 164–165 metaphysics, 70–71, 148–149, 254–256
materialist terminology, 150 continuity with tradition and, 256
materiality, 236 experience and, 255–256
absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 240 logic and, 24–27

Index 323
of matter, 149 Napoleon Bonaparte, 218–219, 230
“objectivist”, 280 natural alterations, 129–130
pre-Kantian, 259–260 natural consciousness, sense certainty and, 75
rationalist, 102 natural determinations, 127, 129, 133–134
method, 185, 186 establishing distance from, 139–146
metrics, 112–115, 116, 117–118, 122–123, freedom from limitations of, 128–129
124–126 overcoming vs. owning of, 127–128, 132–133,
middle age, 138 134–136, 140, 140–145
middle terms, 196–197 natural form, 7, 232, 242, 243, 246, 247
mind, 166–184 actual soul and, 243–244
practical, 176–181 art and, 7, 233, 242–246, 250
mind, the hierarchy of, 244
determinacy and, 171–172 human form and, 244, 245
immateriality and, 158–160, 162–164, 165 meaning and, 243
knowledge and, 171–172 natural immediacy and, 243
materialism and, 158–162 unified material givenness and, 242
metaphysics of, 6 natural immediacy, 233, 243–244, 246
nature and, 160–161 art and, 241, 242, 243
as power of unification, 170–171 body as, 243–244
practical, 6, 166–184 genius and, 249
soul and, 158–159 human form as, 245
stages of development of, 128–129 immediacy, 242
theoretical, 6, 166–184 meaning and, 240
unity of presentation of, 6 natural form and, 243
unity of theoretical and practical, 166–184 reception of art and, 242
mind–body problem, 159 as sign of unity of thought and nature, 243–244
mindedness, 148–149 subjective spirit and, 239
modern art naturalism, 232, 242, 250, 270, 291–292
crisis of, 217–218 natural laws, 105–106
as mode of collective and personal self- natural phenomena, perspectival experience of,
reflection, 229 124–125
modernity, 221 natural philosophy, 192–193, 260
modern polity, necessity and contingency in natural science(s), 109, 124–125
institutions of, 201–202 development of, 110
modern state, political institutions of, Hegel’s criticisms of, 153–154
187–188, 202 historical introduction, 110–115
modes, 287–288, 291 materialism and, 153–154, 157–158
Moland, Lydia, 133, 136, 140 reductionism and, 110–111
monism, 291–292 natural soul, 127, 130
moon, the, 124 natural theology, 259–260
Moore, G. E., 148–149 nature, 34, 72–73, 125, 149
moralism, 219 the absolute and, 235–236
“Morality” (Encyclopedia part), 6 absolute otherness of, 99
morality, 182–184, 222 aesthetic attitude towards, 161
art and, 234 alive with beauty and purpose, 150
Hegel’s view of, 211–212 art and, 7, 232–250
Kant’s theory of, 211–212 articulation of, 106–108
as reflection “into itself”, 211–212 belief in unity of, 111–112
theory of, 211–213 categories and, 236
moral psychology, 169–170 civilization and, 132–133
motion, 122–123 cognition of, 105–108
motivation, 169–170, 177–178, 180 the Concept and, 5–6, 88, 101–102, 103–104
movement, vs. rest, 100–101 concepts and, 97–101, 236
Mowad, Nicholas, 139–146 conceptual determinations and, 106
musical proportions, 194–195 contingency and, 98–99

324 Index
nature (cont.) otherness and, 25, 71, 97–99, 100–101
as continuum, 99–100 peculiar logicality of, 88, 99, 101, 102, 103,
contradiction and, 100–101 104–105, 106–107
contradictory determination of, 99–101 philosophy and, 93–97, 109–126, 161–162,
cyclical processes and, 125–126 198–199, 274 (see also philosophy of nature)
determinations of, 99–101 pure concepts and, 107
development away from, 134, 146 real independence of, 98–99
division into three parts, 125 as realm of unfreedom, 28–29
dominance of, 245–246 re-enchanted conceptions of, 149–150, 162
embodiment and, 127, 140 resistance to formation by and complete unity
empirical vs. non-empirical cognition of, 107 with thought, 7
as expansion of particularity into the world, science of, 29
109–126 self-externality (Außersichsein) of, 99, 100, 101
externality and, 98–99, 109, 163 sheer, 236, 238–239, 243–244
as the finite, 120 space and, 113
freedom and, 28–29, 32–33, 132–133, as space-time continuum in motion, 101
146–147 Spirit (Geist) and, 71–72, 96, 97–98, 146–147,
free release of particularity allowed by, 115 163, 224, 236, 274
gender and, 144 static vs. ephemeral modes of occurrence
genius and, 7, 232 and, 100
global outlook of, 99 stubbornness of, 232–250
vs. God, 26 subjectivity and, 260
hierarchy and, 140 thinking and, 22, 24–25, 103
the Idea and, 71, 72–73, 233, 240, 258 thought and, 26–27, 98, 236–237, 238–240,
imitation of in art, 244 241, 242, 245–247, 249–250
independence of, 245 three elements of, 7, 232
as inhomogeneous material space-time time and, 113
continuum, 88, 101–103, 104–105, 106–108 two components and, 236
inner vs. outer, 101–102, 103–104 two manifestations of its stubbornness,
instability of, 100 246–250
intelligibility of, 98–99, 101–108, 162 unfreedom and, 6
interiority of concept of, 104 unity of, 150, 233
internality of the concept in, 101–106 the universal and, 101, 102–104
intuition (Anschauung) and, 238 will and, 32–33
knowledge of, 106–108 Naturphilosophie, 71. See also philosophy of
language of nature, 245 nature
liberation from, 127, 128–129 necessitarianism, 73
logical determinations and, 102–103 necessity, 73
as logical idea posited in a certain form, 97–99 freedom and, 73–74
logic and, 5–6, 88–108, 109, 115 in institutions of modern polity, 201–202
Logic’s transition to, 74 nature and, 98–99
material givenness of, 245–246 practical contradiction and, 23–24
materialism and, 157–158, 162 systematicity and, 74
materiality and, 7, 232 of thought, 107
matter and, 161 negation, 48, 50, 55–56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61–62,
meaning and, 236, 238 172–173
as meaningful structure, 236 negative, the, 50–51, 52–58, 59, 60, 61–62, 64
metaphysics of, 20, 25 negativity, 47–48, 57, 61, 81
mind and, 160–161 development of, 81
movement away from, 132–133 as difference, 49
natural form and, 7, 232 essence and, 49, 50, 51
necessity and, 98–99 as non-immediacy, 47
as objective form of the Idea, 273 opposition and, 49–50
objectivity and, 239–240 reflexion and, 48, 49
organization and, 236 of self-conscious intelligence, 172–173

Index 325
self-referring, 166–167, 170–171, 172, 176, objects, 125
178–180 determinate, 200
as self-relating being, 49 empiricism and, 152–153
of space, 121 intelligibility of, 15–16
neo-Kantianism, 12–13 knowability of, 13–14
Neoplatonists, 189–190 manifold determinations of, 237–238
Newton, Isaac, 71, 110–112, 123, 124 meaning and, 237–238
Newtonianism, 116 mutual indifference of matter to form, 156–157
Newtonian mechanics, 18–19 old age, 137, 138
Ng, Karen, 133 olympic Gods, 261
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 266 one-sideness, art and, 246
noesis, 190–191 ontological syllogisms, 198–199, 201–202
nominalists, 197–198 ontology, 70–71
non-conformity, 179–180 general vs. regional, 20
non-disabled bodies, Hegel’s privileging of, Logic and, 70–71
139–140 political, 6–7, 185–202
non-discursive, the, 216–231 opposition(s), 54, 56, 57–58, 78, 86
non-Europeans, particularities of, 141 ambiguity in structure of, 49–50
non-human forms, art and, 245 contradiction in, 50
non-immediacy, 47–48 difference and, 49–50
non-logical concepts, 96 in Encyclopedia Logic, 48–50
non-positedness, 59–61, 62 essence and, 50
normative, the, 175–176 identity and, 50
norms, 139–140, 170–171 negativity and, 49–50
nothing, 39, 42–43, 89 positivity and, 49–50
not-self, self and, 162–163 reflexion and, 50
nous, 189–190 organicism, 80–81
Novakovic, Andreja, 140, 147 organic processes, cyclical nature of, 6
“now”, 117 organization, nature and, 236
number, Pythagorean conception of, 195 orientation(s), 112–115, 116–118, 122–123,
124–126
object (Objekt), 84–85 oscillatory processes, mechanics and, 125
objecthood, 237 the Other, 132–133
objective Logic, 73–74, 81, 84, 90, 195–196, otherness, 75–76, 81
199, 258 the body and, 245
Objective Spirit, 6, 166–167, 203–215 freedom and, 74–75
Right, 6, 7 meaning and, 240
objective Spirit, 72–73, 81–82, 185–202, 203, 218, natural, 75–76
222, 236–237 nature and, 97–99, 100–101
account of, 7 nature as idea in form of, 97–99
logic and, 201–202 signs and, 240
relationship to Hegel’s system, 7 “overcoming interpretation”, 132
objective thoughts, 102 disability and, 144, 145–146
objectivity 5, 18–19, 84, 152, 179–180, 199 embodiment and, 134–136, 138–139, 140, 146
concept, 239–240 gender and, 143, 144, 146
conceptual, 85–86 ownership and, 132–136
conceptual mediations and, 84 race and, 146
immediacy and, 84 stakes of, 134–136
immediate, 84 “ownership interpretation”, 132–133
nature and, 239–240 disability and, 144, 145–146
spirit and, 236 embodiment and, 134–136, 146
subjectivity and, 76, 84–86, 114, 147, 262, gender and, 146
263–265, 266, 268, 273–274, 280–281 overcoming and, 132–136
syllogistic, 199–200 race and, 142, 146
theory of, 84 stakes of, 134–136

326 Index
parallelogram of forces, 112 finitude and, 3
Parmenidean being, 256–257 freedom of, 74–75
Parmenidean numerical metaphysics, “Philosophy” (Encyclopedia part), 6, 7–8
194–195 philosophy, 6, 10, 216–217, 250, 274, 276. See also
Parmenides, 43–44 specific kinds of philosophy
particularity, 115, 134–136, 182–183, 196–198, absolute idea and, 273–274
201–202, 207, 282–283, 286 absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 233
development away from, 134 art and, 217, 232–233
expansion of, 109–126 belatedness of, 213–214
free release of, 115 as better way of living than religion, 268
individual, 133–134 consciousness and, 29–30
individuality and, 134–136 as continual cultus, 268–269
minimizing of, 135, 147 co-presence/continuity with religion, 266–269
Spirit (Geist) and, 288, 289–291 critical, 255–256
universality and, 170–173, 176, 181, 183–184, defined as “divine service”, 268–269
288–291 definition of, 268–269, 276, 278, 279–280
passing over (Übergehen), 80–81 disappearance of heterogeneity from, 29–30
passivity, 130–131 as encyclopedic, 1
Pełczyński, Z. A., 204, 205 as expression of the absolute, 267
Pembroke College, Oxford, 204 finite thinkers and, 272
perception, 103–104, 152, 179–180. See also senses freedom and, 29
perfection, 246, 248 Hegel’s definition/account of, 7–8, 270–292
perspective(s), 114–116, 124–125 as higher expression of self-manifesting
historicized, 213 spirit, 252
of space, 117 history of philosophy and, 69–70
structure of, 114 idealism and, 86–87, 252–253, 256, 268–269
subjectivity and, 114 Idea of, 272
Peters, J., 233, 245 as the Idea’s self-thinking, 272–273
Phenomenology of Spirit, 6, 26, 67, 68, 70, 71–72, as logic sequence of three syllogisms, 72–73
74, 75, 77, 79, 81–82, 142–143, 163–164, as manifestation of Geist’s self-
166–167, 171, 216–217, 218–223, 227–229, comprehension, 272
234, 259 as movement of purification elevating
art in, 217–222 humanity, 268
gender in, 142 nature and, 198–199, 274
“I” of, 127 as organic totality, 29–30
primary goals of, 77–78 of philosophy, 272
philosophes, 155 as pursuit of return from exteriority of nature
philosophical consciousness to interiority of actual thinking, 108
divine principle and, 269 as real expression of “beatific vision”, 269
philosophical, 269 religion and, 252–254, 256, 259–269
philosophical development, free of historical as science of freedom, 5, 28–30, 73
externality, 44 as science of reason, 228–229
philosophical idealism, nature of, 81–82 as science of the absolute, 69–70
philosophical science, 69, 92–93 as self-knowing of the absolute, 274
philosophical systems, as product of previous speculative, 264
systems, 44. See also system, the Spinoza on, 270–292
philosophical thinkers, 271–272, 280 of Spirit (Geist), 198–199
philosophical thought subjectivity and, 29–30
articulation of one truth, 3–4 sublation of religion into, 252, 265–266,
testing and reformulation of, 3–4 268–269
philosophical truth, 2–4, 271–272 as substance’s self-reference, 274–276
philosophic knowledge as systematic unity, 29–30
capacity to generate its own “otherness”, 74–75 theocentric character of, 268–269
circularity of, 74–75 as thinking about thinking, 29
concept as structuring principle of, 1 thought and, 236–237

Index 327
transition of religion to, 265 philosophy of Spirit (Geist), 71–72, 89–90, 97,
as truth’s self-reference, 276–279 100, 233–234, 236
as unconditioned idea, 274 life and, 22
as unconditioned truth’s self-reference, 279 philosophy of nature and, 108
universal, 69–70 as real-philosophical science of sublation of the
as universal truth’s self-reference, 270–271, real, 108
278–279 Philosophy of Spirit (Geist), 1, 6–7, 44, 70, 128,
philosophy of art 137–138, 147, 163–164, 166–167
in 1830 Encyclopedia, 245 “Absolute Spirit”, 6, 7–8
in Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in on freedom of mind, 132–133
Basic Outline, 232–233 “Objective Spirit”, 6–7
in Hegel’s lectures, 232–233, 245 Philosophy of Right and, 207
textual locus of Hegel’s, 233–235 Science of Logic and, 9–10
Philosophy of History, 132–133, 140, 146–147, 208 “Subjective Spirit”, 6
philosophy of mind, inferentialist take on, 6 phoenix figure, 120
Philosophy of Mind, 158–159 physical processes, 6
philosophy of nature, 89–90, 109–126, 236 physics, 109–110, 111–112, 116, 124, 125. See also
as doomed part of Hegel’s system, 71 organic physics
first steps of, 88 directional processes and, 6, 125
historical introduction, 110–115 as science of qualified bodies, 124
Kant and, 20–21 Pippin, Robert, 153, 167–168, 234–235
life and, 21–22, 23 place (Ort), 117, 122
logic and, 20–24, 93–97 planes, 117–118, 119–120
nature as cognized in the forms of Plato, 26, 74, 167, 187, 189–190, 195–196,
thinking, 107 201–202, 203
philosophy of Spirit (Geist) and, 108 Critias, 192–193
as “science of the idea in its otherness”, 70 Crito, 203
Philosophy of Nature, 1, 5–6, 70, 109–126, 138, 147 dialectic in, 190
account of life in, 4–5 “Divided Line” in, 190–192, 193–195
general argument, 124–126 Laws, 203
general argument of, 124–125 logic and political ontology in, 186–187
goal of putting science back together, 112 logic in, 190
historical introduction, 110–115 ontological syllogism of, 198–199
interpretative framework for, 6 political ontology of, 186–187
life in, 25–26 Pythagoreans and, 195
Science of Logic and, 5–6, 9–10, 24–27, 88–108 The Republic, 186–188, 190–191, 192–193,
structure of, 109 194–195
philosophy of religion, 230, 259–260 speculative dialectic of, 188–196
natural philosophy and, 260 syllogisms in, 194–195
rational theology and, 260 Timaeus, 190, 191–195
philosophy of right, 203–215 Platonism, 266–267
Philosophy of Right, 7, 72–73, 133–134, 166–167, pleasure, 177–178
180–181, 203, 206 Plessner, Helmuth, 133
architecture of, 7 Ploucquet, Gottfried, 197–198
beginning of, 205–207, 214–215 point–line–area space, 118
dialectical structure of, 214–215 point–line–surface space, 118
gender in, 142 points, 117–118
key concepts, 7 polarity, 120
method of, 185 polis
non-metaphysical perspective on, 204–205 aesthetics and, 227
outline of, 207 subjectivity and, 187
Philosophy of Spirit (Geist) and, 207 political institutions, of modern state,
Preface to, 185, 187–188, 197–198 187–188, 202
syllogisms in, 188–189 political life, modern, account of, 6–7
systematicity and, 203–204 political normativity, 6–7

328 Index
political ontology, 6–7, 185–202 subordinate concepts of, 39
logic and, 186–187, 198–199 as unsayable, 37–38
of Plato, 186–187 pure concepts, 20, 96
political philosophy, 7, 203 nature and, 107
political structure, 188–189 in Science of Logic, 91
political theory, 186, 192–193 theory of, 12–13
politics, 214, 216–231 thinking and, 20
polities, institutions of, 201–202 pure intellect, object of, 256
polytheism, 261 pure knowing, 221
positedness (Gesetzseyn), 48–49, 55–57, 59–62 pure quantity, 150, 154, 156
positive, the, 50–51, 52–58, 59, 60, 61–62, 64 pure reason, 222
ambiguity in nature of, 58 pure thinking/thought, 14–15, 36, 90–91,
two conceptions of, 58 107–108, 258, 266–267
positive sciences, 69 categories and, 47
positivity, opposition and, 49–50 concepts and, 107–108
practical contradiction, necessity and, 23–24 conditions of articulation of, 91–92
practice, 223 vs. representation, 266
practitioners, 223 Science of Logic and, 20, 44–45, 89–93
praxis, theory and, 268 self-development of, 47
Praxiteles, Apollo Sauroktonos, 241–242 self-knowledge and, 89, 90, 92–93
predication, 13 thought and, 21
predictive acts, 13 vs. understanding knowledge, 77–78
predisposition, 134–135 purity, vs. impurity, 89–90
present, the (das Jetzt), 121–122 purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit), 20, 85
primum cognitum, 256 Pythagoras, 195
principles Pythagoras’ Theorem, 195
desire for, 2, 3 Pythagorean numericism, 195–196
unconditioned and unchanged, 2–3 Pythagoreans, 194–196
Principles of the Philosophy of Right. See Philosophy
of Right quality, materialism and, 156–158
Prior, Arthur, 200–201 quantitative classification, 154
progress, 7, 30–31 quantitative determination, 155–156
property, 182–183, 208–209, 212–213 quantitative magnitudes, 154
proportionality, 124 quantitative materialism, 155–156
proportions, 124, 194, 195–196 quantitative modes of explanation,
geometric discussion of, 191–192 155–156
“harmonic”, 194 quantity, 113, 153–156, 195–196
musical, 194–195
propositional truth, 105–106 race, 6, 139–146, 147
propositions, 91 hierarchy and, 140–142, 146
Protestant church, 230 “ownership interpretation” and, 142
Protestantism, 230–231 Philosophy of History and, 140
prudence, 181–182 racial prejudice, 140
“Psychology” (Encyclopedia part), 6 radical otherness, 74–75
psychology, 6, 166–184 rationalism, 14, 102, 270
Psychology (section of Philosophy of Spirit), rationality, 7, 73, 249, 263–264
163–164 rational syllogistic, 6–7, 185–202
punishment, theory of, 209–211, 212–213 rational theology, 260
pure abstractions, 44 Rawls, John, 203, 208
pure being, 42–43, 44 real, the
as false start, 37–39 intelligibility of, 108
immediacy and, 44 vs. the logical, 92–93, 96–98, 102–103
“implicit” content or determination in, 39 logical form and, 107–108
as indeterminate, 37–38 recollection of, 95–96
as simple immediacy, 36, 37–39 thinking and, 96–97

Index 329
realism, 86–87 absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 233, 259–265
reality, 149 art and, 216–231, 232, 259–262
empirical approach to, 255 co-presence of philosophy and religion,
immediate knowing of, 255 266–268
of matter, 149 in Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in
metaphysical approach to, 254–255 Basic Outline, 251–269
three positions of thought toward, 255 in encyclopedic system, 7
realization, 170–171 as expression of human subjectivity, 259–260
“real sciences of philosophy” (reale Wissenschaften as focal point for perspective on encyclopedic
der Philosophie), 10–11, 88, 89–90, 93–94, 96 project, 252
logic and, 89–90, 92–93, 96, 106–108 fundamental role of, 259
method of, 88 in Hegel’s system, 218
spatio-temporal determinacy and, 90 idealistic character of religious worldview,
reason, 1, 171, 189–190, 263–264 252–259
absolute knowledge and, 23 manifested, 260–261
as identity of mind and world, 171 objective approach, 259–260
as living activity, 23 in Phenomenology of Spirit (Geist), 218–222
practical, 169–170, 173 philosophy and, 252–254, 256, 259–269
pure, 222 practical vs. theoretical sides of, 267–268
as purposeful activity, 23 revealed, 216–217, 251–252, 261–265 (see also
revealed theology and, 263–264 manifestation)
rule of, 220–221 as stabilizing social force, 7
universal, 277 subjective approach, 259–260
will and, 167–168, 169, 183–184 sublation into philosophy, 265–266, 268–269
recognition, 219–220 substitution of, 265–266
reconciliation, of divine and human, 263, thought and, 236–237
264–265, 266, 268 religious, the, 216–231
reductionism, 112–113 religious art, 7
geometry and, 112 religious consciousness, 254, 259–260
Hegel’s transcendental argument against, divine content and, 262
109–110 divine principle and, 269
natural science and, 110–111 vs. religious perspective, 262
transcendental argument against, 112–113 separation and, 264
reflection, 70–71, 78–79, 190, 218–219, religious perspective, vs. religious
228–229 consciousness, 262
of being, 70–71 religious self-consciousness, art and, 224
external, 91–92 religious worldview, 256
vs. speculation, 291–292 absolute Spirit as threefold expression of, 259
reflexion, 47–49, 57 the Idea and, 259
essence and, 47–48, 49, 51 philosophical implication of, 252–253, 255
excluding, 55–57 “Representation” (Encyclopedia part), 173–174
as free-standing immediacy, 48 representation (Vorstellung), 77, 166–167,
as identity, 48 169–172, 178, 179, 223, 240, 267–268
immediacy and, 48 vs. the concept, 271
“into itself”, 48–49 vs. intuition (Anschauung), 237
negativity and, 48, 49 vs. pure thinking, 266
opposition and, 50 revealed theology and, 264
self-relating being and, 48 transcendence and, 266
reflexion-into-another, identity and, 52 representational consciousness, 154–155
reflexion-into-itself, essence as, 49 representational, 154–155
reflexivity, of free will, 183–184 representations, sensible, 42
Reich der Schatten, 21, 26–27 “resolve” (Entschluss), 94–95
release (Entlassung), 26, 75–76 rest, vs. movement, 100–101
“Religion” (Encyclopedia part), 6, 7 retribution, 209–210
religion, 6, 7, 177–178, 216–231, 250 retributivism, 209–211

330 Index
reunification, of divine and human, 263, development of, 35, 39, 43–44
264–265, 266, 268 Encyclopedia Logic and, 46–67
revealed religion, 216–217, 251–252, 266. See also end of, 43–44, 92
revealed theology; reconciliation essence in, 5, 46–67
as future of art and its religion, 260–262 expansion of, 22
revealed theology as exploration of conceptual development,
Christianity and, 262 42–43
God and, 262–263 final thesis of, 75
rationality and, 263–264 form in, 46–47, 62–66, 198–201
reason and, 263–264 “founding role” of, 76
representation and, 264 freedom and, 5, 28–29, 41–45
revelation, 260–261 free subjectivity and, 45
articulated by threefold syllogism, 263, ground in, 46, 59–62
264–265 history and, 43–44
faith and, 262 as investigation of what it means to be, 89
Revolution of 1789, 230 life in, 25–26
Right, 6, 7 materialism in, 151–152
right(s), 33–34, 208, 230. See also absolute right matter in, 46–47, 62–66
concept of, 205–206 measure in, 113
idea of, 206–207 methodology of, 90–91, 186
philosophy of right, 203–215 “onto-logical” view of, 5
science of, 205–206 perspective informing development of, 44
Romans, 187 as philosophical discipline, 91
Romantic art, 218–219, 227 Philosophy of Nature and, 5–6, 9–10, 24–27,
Rome, 227 88–108
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 33 Philosophy of Spirit (Geist) and, 9–10
rules, 102–103 place in Encyclopedia, 4–5
Russell, Bertrand, 148–149, 200–201, 208 as presuppositionless investigation of pure
thought, 89–93
sameness, 51. See also identity priority over Encyclopedia Logic, 53, 66–67
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 228–229 pure abstractions and, 44
criticism of Hegel, 88, 94–96 pure concepts in, 11, 91
identity philosophy of, 62 pure thinking and, 90
methodological dualism of, 70 pure thought and, 44–45
on philosophical idealism, 81–82 quantity in, 113
Philosophical Letters on Dogmaticism and reflects Hegel’s own place in history, 43
Criticism, 81–82 reflexion in, 47–48
The System of Transcendental Idealism, 228–229 relationship to Hegel’s Encyclopedia, 9–27
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 259–260 as science of freedom, 45
Scholastic theology, 7 as science of thinking, 35–36
Science of Logic, 2, 4, 5, 11–15, 30, 68, 70, 73–75, singular subjectivity in, 6–7
199, 206, 207, 221–222 speculative knowledge in, 186
absolute Idea in, 273 structure of, 35
as abstract, 42–43 Subjective Logic of, 187–188, 196–197, 198–199
account of life in, 4–5 subjectivity and, 5
argumentative strategy of, 35 syllogisms in, 188–189
as articulation of self-knowledge inherent to temporality in, 41–45
pure thought, 89 of theory of pure thinking, 20
beginning of, 36–37, 38, 43–45, 121–122 thought and, 45
beginning of history of, 40 three basic perspectives of, 115
concept of, 5 three sections of third part, 81–82
concepts in, 35, 39, 42–43, 45 transition from Logic to Nature at end of, 74
content in, 46–47, 62–66, 198–201 without presuppositions, 44–45
contingency and, 41–42 Zeitgeist and, 44
definition of, 68 science of nature, 29

Index 331
science of spirit (Geist), 28–29 sensibility, 236
science(s), 69, 190. See also Wissenschaft (science) absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 240
freedom and, 29 thought and, 239
goal of putting back together, 112 servitude, 219–221
hierarchy of, 112 shape of beauty, the (die Gestalt der Schönheit),
immediacy and, 36–37 240, 241, 246, 248–249
as pure thought, 45 shared language, art and, 222
scientific methods, 124 Sheppard, Alice, 136
second syllogism (N–S–L), 72–73 shining (Scheinen), 80–81
self, 162–164 signs (Zeichen), 240, 241, 243, 245
self-awareness, 163–164 art as sign, 243
self-causation, 162, 287–288 body as sign, 243–244
self-conscious intelligence, negativity of, 172–173 intuition (Anschauung) as sign, 240, 241
self-consciousness, 166–167, 171, 174, 178–179, meaning and, 241
219–220, 221–222 otherness and, 240
art and, 224 singularity, 196–198, 201–202
freedom and, 31–32 Sittlichkeit. See ethical life (Sittlichkeit)
religious, 224 situatedness, 128–129
subjectivity and, 114 social norms, 6–7
thought and, 236–237 Socrates, 187, 190–191, 192–193, 194, 202
universal, 171 solar system, 104–105, 114, 123–124
self-contemplation, of eternal truth, 2–3 Solon, 192–193
self-deceit, 167–168 soul, the, 129, 130, 133, 159, 245, 281. See also ages
self-determination, 20, 89, 150, 155–156, 172 of life
self-discovery, 167–168 actual souls, 243–244
self-exclusion, 52–54, 55–56, 57–58, 59 awakening to the “I”, 131
self-externality (Außersichsein), 121 Beautiful souls, 220–221
of the logical idea, 97–99 the body and, 128, 129, 131, 137–138, 147,
of nature, 100, 101 243–244
space and, 118–119 development of, 127
self-feeling, 131, 138 as facet of immaterial reality, 150
self-identity, 133–134 feeling souls, 130–131
self-judgement, 72–73 formation of, 129
self-knowledge gender and, 143–144
art as, 238 immateriality of, 158–159
inherent to pure thought, 89, 90 vs. mind, 158–159
pure thinking/thought and, 92–93 natural, 127, 129, 130
thinking and, 91–92 natural alterations and, 129–130
self-negation, 58, 59 stages of development of, 129, 130, 137–138
self-particularizing universality, 166–167, 170–171 as substance of mind, 159–160
self-recognition, 238–239 sovereignty, Hobbesian concept of, 33
self-reference, 172–173, 274–276, 279–280 space, 113–114, 115–120, 122, 125. See also space-
self-referring negativity, 166–167, 172, 176, time continuum
178–180 abstract, 110, 116
self-reflexiveness, 221 apparent independence of, 100–101
self-relating being, 48, 56–57 bifurcation of, 121
self-repulsion, 52–53 closed, 118
self-thinking, 83 composed in three strands, 118–119
sensation, 130, 131, 162–163 dimensions of, 120
vs. intuition (Anschauung), 237–238 as essentially homogeneous, 118–119
subjectivity of, 163 Euclidean, 109–110, 112–113, 116, 117–118,
sense-certainty, 75, 77–78 124–125
sense consciousness, 75–76 expansion of particularity and, 109–126
sense impressions, 42 externality and, 118–119
senses, bodiliness and, 243–244 filling of, 109–126

332 Index
space (cont.) substantialism of, 257
as form of intuition (Anschauung), universal truth and, 270
115–116 Spinozism, 7–8, 82, 257, 270
indifference of, 117 Spirit (Geist), 1, 6, 72–73, 90–91, 125–126, 158–159,
instability of, 100 216–217, 218, 245, 258, 271, 272–273,
Kant’s doctrine of, 116 278–279, 280–281. See also absolute Spirit
Leibnizian relational theories of, 116 (Geist); objective Spirit; subjective Spirit
metrics and orientations of, 109–110, 112, the absolute and, 235–236
114–115, 116–118, 124–126 abstraction and, 91–92
nature and, 113 art and, 6, 221–222, 234
negativity of, 121 beauty, 226
Newtonian absolute theories of, 116 body and, 127
in Philosophy of Nature, 6 concept formulated in Phenomenology of
self-externality (Außersichsein) and, 118–119 Spirit, 259
structure of, 110 as concrete unity of the logical and the real, 108
temporal interpretation of, 117 definition of, 90–91
third strand as bifurcation of, 118 desire to know itself, 2
three aspects of, 119–120 essence and, 90–91
three basic perspectives of, 117 existence (Dasein) of, 221
three dimensions of, 117, 119–120, 121–122 finite philosopher and, 273
space-time continuum, 6, 106 freedom and, 146–147
filling of, 109–126 free spirit, 181–184
inhomogeneity within, 100–101 the Idea and, 72–73, 273
metrics and orientations of, 122–123 indeterminacy of, 281
spatio-temporal determinacy, 90–91 individual autonomy and, 291–292
logic and, 90 individuality and, 288, 289–291
“real sciences of philosophy” and, 90 as the infinite, 120
thought and, 96–97 as logical idea, 272–273
thoughts and, 96–97 manifestation and, 91–92, 262
spatio-temporal reality, 91 metaphysics of, 20
spatio-temporal relations, 115–116 of modernity, 221
specification, 170–171 naturalism and, 232
speculation, vs. reflection, 291–292 nature and, 71–72, 96, 97–98, 146–147, 163,
speculative dialectic, 188–196 224, 236, 272–273, 274
speculative identity, 13–14 objective Spirit, 185–202
speculative knowledge, 72–73, 77–78, 186 objectivity and, 236
speculative logic, 187–188, 198–199 particularity and, 288, 289–291
speculative philosophy, 264, 267, 268 “peculiar logicality” of, 102
speculative science, 185–186 philosophical thinking as manifestation of self-
speculative thinking/thought, 7, 76, 78, 187 comprehension of, 272
speech, 135 philosophy and, 6, 198–199, 272
Speight, A., 232, 250 practical, 6, 171
Spinoza, Baruch, 13–14, 280, 282. See also as real knowledge of absolute Idea, 258–259
Spinozism religion and, 6
Doctrine of Essence, 82, 86 as return of Idea to itself from nature, 258
Ethics, 274–276, 286–287 as return of Idea from otherness, 97–99
finite philosopher dependent on truth’s self- science of, 28–29
causing, 7–8 as self-comprehending, 272–274, 290
on freedom, 287 self-disclosure and, 251–252
Hegel and, 283–286, 288–289 self-manifestation and, 252, 258–259
notion of philosophy, 274–276 subjectivity and, 236
ontological foundations of, 270–271 as system’s third moment, 71–72
on philosophy, 270–292 theoretical, 6, 171–176
substance-metaphysics of, 283–284 thinking and, 91–92, 108
substance-monism of, 270–271 thought and, 26–27, 236

Index 333
three dimensions of, 236 objectivity and, 84–86, 114, 147, 273–274,
three forms of, 6 280–281
universality and, 288, 289–291 perspectives and, 114
spirituality, 242 philosophy and, 29–30
spiritual life, 34–35 philosophy of nature and, 83–84
spontaneity, 79–80 polis and, 187
state, the, 187–188, 202 principle of, 198
state of nature, 34 purified through harmony generated by
freedom and, 32–33 beauty, 260
will and, 32–33 religion as expression of, 259–260
states, 229–230 religious, 259–260
interrelation of, 214 self-consciousness and, 114
stereotypes, 140 of sensation, 163
St. John’s gospel, prologue of, 97 singular, 6–7
Stoff, 10 Spirit (Geist) and, 236
Stoics, 187, 189–190 universality and, 291
Stone, Alison, 146–147 subject–object relation, 171, 172–173
stubbornness of nature, artistic production and, subjects, intentional, 200
248–249 sublation (Aufheben), 132, 160–162, 170–171, 207,
subject, 84–85, 245 238, 258
Concept (Begriff ) and, 258 sublimity, 225–226, 227, 261
as concept’s self-movement, 83–84 substance, 159, 257–258, 276, 281, 286
individual, 127 concept and, 82
subjectification, substance and, 258 eternal independence of, 285
subjective concept, 2 individuality and, 289, 291
subjective consciousness, 115–116 philosophy as self-reference of, 274–276
subjective, 115–116 Spinoza’s account of, 282, 283–284, 285
subjective freedom, 187–188 subjectification and, 258
subjective Logic, 73–74, 79–80, 81, 90, 114, transition to concept, 73–74
187–188, 196–197, 198–200, 201, 258 universal indeterminacy of, 285
subjective particularity, 248–250 universality and, 284–285, 289
“Subjective Spirit”, 207 substance dualism, 160
“Anthropology”, 6 substance-metaphysics, 283–284
“Phenomenology of Spirit”, 6 substance-monism, of Spinoza, 270–271
“Psychology”, 6 substantialism, 257
subjective Spirit, 187, 236–237, 239, 249 surfaces, 119–120
subjectivism, 84–85, 155 syllogism of individuality, 263
subjectivity, 5, 81–82, 114–115, 117, 129–130, 131, syllogism of inquiry, Aristotle and, 198–199
163–164, 179–180, 196–197, 221–222, 259, syllogism of particularity, 263
277–278 syllogism of universality, 263
absolute vs. concrete, 259 syllogisms (Schlüsse), 72–73, 188–189, 191–194,
Concept and, 79–80, 81–82, 83–84, 200, 201, 202, 272
86–87 as act by which concept connects itself to
as conceptual mediation constituting itself, 83
objectivity, 83–84 Aristotle and, 186–187, 189–190, 193–194,
concrete, 258–259 198–199
emotional dimension of, 267 articulating revelation, 263, 264–265
free, 5 concept and, 83
freed, 45 definition of, 83
freedom and, 5, 291 first syllogism (L–N–S), 72–73
individual, 261–262 formal, 187–188
internal determination and, 164 Greek thought and, 186–196, 198–199
nature and, 260 inquisitional, 198–199, 201–202
nature of, 30 mathematical, 197–198
non-subjectivity theory of, 81–82 of modern institutional life, 201–202

334 Index
syllogisms (cont.) thinkers
ontological, 187–188, 198–199, 201–202 absolute spirit (Geist) and, 289–291
in Philosophy of Right, 188–189 spatio-temporal determinacy and, 90–91
in Plato, 188–196 in Spinoza’s substance, 286–291
second syllogism (N–S–L), 72–73 thinking/thought (Denken), 11–12, 107, 170–172,
syllogism of individuality, 263 173, 178, 236, 245. See also pure thinking/
syllogism of inquiry, 198–199 thought
syllogism of particularity, 263 about thinking, 29, 35–36
syllogism of universality, 263 the absolute and, 235–236
syllogistic, 185–186 absolute Spirit and, 236, 238
syllogistic logic, 186–187 abstract, 41–42
syllogistic objectivity, 199–200 as abstraction of understanding, 174
theory of the syllogism (Schluss), 83 annihilation and, 238–239
third syllogism (S–L–N), 72–73 art and, 234, 236–237, 238, 239, 242, 245–246
symbolic logic, 197–198 being and, 10, 13–14
system, the, 235–237 body and, 243–244
absolute Spirit (Geist) and, 233 capacity for, 35
art in, 232–233 the Concept and, 239–240
division into three parts, 72–73 as creative power, 45
as expression of freedom, 73 determinations and, 35–36, 41
internal organization of, 72–73 determinative form generated by, 45
as manifestation of divine principle, 269 doctrine of, 78–79
systematicity, 69–70, 73 embodiment and, 107
circularity of, 74–76 essence and, 91–92
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in expression and, 96–97
Basic Outline and, 203–204 externality and, 239–240
explanatory role of, 214–215 freedom and, 29, 43, 248
of Hegel’s philosophy, 203–205, 208, 209, as fundamentally normative, 174
210–211, 212–213, 214–215, 217, 218–219 happiness and, 181–182
necessity and, 74 as human and divine, 269
Philosophy of Right and, 203–204 the Idea and, 240
immateriality and, 160
teleology, 16–18, 84, 85, 111–112 as immaterial structure, 236
temperament, 134–135, 136 inference and, 175–176
temporality. See also space-time continuum inspiration and, 248
in Science of Logic, 41–45 “internal impulse” of, 34–35
temporal point, 121–122 interrogation by thinking, 14–15
temporal unrest, 121 intuition (Anschauung) and, 237
Theologia rationalis, 259–260 logic and, 236
theological metaphors, 25, 26–27 material givenness and, 238–239
theology, revealed theology, 262–265 materialism and, 160
“Theoretical Mind” (Encyclopedia part), materiality and, 236–237, 239
181–182 meaning and, 238
theoretical mind, 166–184 nature and, 22, 24–25, 26–27, 103, 236–237,
theory, praxis and, 268 238–240, 241, 242, 245–247, 249–250
theory of concept, as vitalism or organicism, nature’s resistance to formation by and
80–81 complete unity with, 7
theory of the syllogism, 83 objecthood and, 237
theosis (deification), 263 “objective thoughts”, 102
thing, the, 64, 150, 156–157 as organizing element in nature, 236
category of, 46 as organizing material structure, 236
constituent properties of, 157 philosophy and, 236–237
determinacy and, 156–157 as productive power (Spontaneität), 14–15
vs. matter, 64 as “pure abstraction”, 41–42
things, 47, 53, 64 pure concepts and, 20

Index 335
pure forms of, 12–13 in Philosophy of Nature, 6
as purely discursive, 14–15 structure of, 110
pure thinking and, 21 three dimensions of, 120, 121–122
the real and, 96–97 totality, 74, 258
religion and, 236–237 all-embracing, 258
Science of Logic and, 45 Encyclopedia as discourse of, 68–73
self-consciousness and, 236–237 systemic, 79
self-determination of, 102–103 transformational conception, immaterial mind
self-developing movement of, 41 and, 162–164
self-knowledge and, 91–92 transcendence, representation and, 266
self-positing of in nature, 236 transcendental aesthetic, 172–173
self-recognition and, 238–239 Transcendental Logic, 11–12
self-recollection of, 239 transcendental philosophy, Hegel’s rejection of,
sensibility and, 239 20–21
spatio-temporal determinacy and, 96–97 transition, 39–40
“speculative” mode of, 76–79 Trinitarian divine origin, humanity and,
speculative thinking, 76 262–263
Spirit (Geist) and, 26–27, 236 trinity, 120
spirit and, 91–92 Trinity, Christian dogma of, 262–263
“thinking over” (Nachdenken), 78 truth, 258, 279–280
thought (dianoia), 190–192 aesthetics and, 228–229
“thought determinations” criterion of, 279–280
(Denkbestimmungen), 12–13, 91, 198–199 definition of, 105–106
thoughts (Gedanken) and, 78 eternal, 2–3
unifying function of, 242 finite philosopher and, 7–8
unity of, 233 necessity of demonstrating, 44–45
the “universal” in nature and, 101 philosophical, 2–4, 271–272
as universal structure, 246–247 philosophy as self-reference of, 276–279
will and, 38–39, 180–181 a priori, 10
willing and, 167–168 propositional, 105–106
thoughts (Gedanken) universal, 270–271, 279–280, 286–291
abstract, 42–43 tyche (chance), 261
finite, 78
nature and, 98 understanding (Verstand/noesis), 190–191
non-spatial nature of, 42–43 “absolute power” of, 77
non-temporal nature of, 42–43 knowledge and, 77
vs. “sensible representations”, 42 understanding knowledge, 77–78
thinking (Denken) and, 78 unfreedom, 6, 151–153
as traces of thinking, 78 unification, 262–263
three-body problem, 111 unique consciousness, 79–80
three-body system, 124 “Unique Philosophy”, 69
three laws of planetary motion (Kepler), 122–124 unity, 104–105, 171–172, 247–248, 258, 262
time, 113–114, 115–120, 122, 125. See also space-time of body and soul, 243
continuum; temporality failures of, 178–179
analysis of, 110 as fundamental and certain reality, 253, 254,
apparent independence of, 100–101 255–256
bifurcation of, 121 Hegel’s “logical” approach to, 189–190
dimensions of, 120 the ideal and, 240
Euclidean, 109–110, 112–113, 116, 124–125 resulting from contradiction, 59
expansion of particularity and, 109–126 universal, the, 115, 140, 170–171, 207, 247,
filling of, 109–126 249–250
as form of intuition (Anschauung), 115–116 abstract purity and, 176
metrics and orientations of, 109–110, 112, determinateness of, 170–171
114–115, 117, 124–126 development towards, 134, 139, 147
nature and, 113 divergence from, 139–146

336 Index
universal, the (cont.) volition. See will
nature and, 102–104 voluntarism, 168–169, 170–171
the particular and, 170–171, 176 volutarism, 168
universality, 104–105, 107, 182–183, 196–198, voûs, 129
247, 248–249, 274–276, 277–278,
282–283, 286 Watson, Gary, 169
art and, 246–247 weeping, 135
the Idea and, 233, 247 Weltgeist (world-Spirit), 290, 291
limitation as spurring development of, Whitehead, Alfred North, 110
178–179 whiteness, 139–146
particularity and, 170–173, 181, 183–184, Wicks, R., 246–247
288–291 will, the, 31–32, 169–170, 173, 180–183
self-particularizing, 166–167, 170–171 of abstract right, 32
Spirit (Geist) and, 288, 289–291 as choice, 180–181
substance and, 284–285, 289 conflict and, 38–39
universal philosophy, 69–70 freedom and, 31–32, 38–39, 180–181, 206–207
universal reason, 277 free vs. arbitrary, 203
universals, 196–197 free will, 182, 183
universal truth intelligence and, 187
Hegel on, 270 reason and, 167–168, 169, 183–184
particular thinkers and, 286–291 state of nature and, 32–33
philosophy as self-reference of, 270–271 thinking/thought and, 180–181
self-reference of, 279–280 thought and, 38–39
Spinoza and, 270 weakness of, 167, 168–169
unrest, temporal, 121 willing, thinking/thought and, 167–168
Wissenschaft (science), 217, 222
validity, 182 Wolff, M., 70–71
Verinnigung (contemplation), 229–230 Wood, Allen, 205, 215
virtuosity, disability and, 136 world, finite mind and, 271
vitalism, 80–81 world history, 229–230
vocation, choice of, 137 “Wrong”, 210


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What is the structure and aim of Hegel's Encyclopedia system?

What is the structure and aim of Hegel's Encyclopedia system?

What are some of the main topics covered in the essays in this book?

What are some of the main topics covered in the essays in this book?

Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences

Hegel regarded his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences as the work

sebastian stein is a Lecturer and Research Associate at Ruprecht-Karls-

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(Continued after the Index)

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Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

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List of Contributors page vii

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thom brooks is Professor of Law and Government at Durham University.

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The prophet’s voice possessed of god

In 1817, Hegel published a condensed articulation of his basic philosophical

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Section 1: System and the Logic

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Section 2: Philosophy of Nature

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Section 3: Philosophy of Geist

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Logical and Natural Life

1.1 The Logical and the Extra-logical

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1.2 A Transition That Is Not a Transition

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1.3 A Science of Logic

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1.4 Life as a Logical Concept

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1.5 The Necessity of Life

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1.6 The Logic of a Philosophy of Nature

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1.7 The Theological Version

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