Ching v Cheng, 737 SCRA 610, October, 08 2014

FACTS:
It is alleged that Antonio Ching owned several businesses and properties, among which was Po
Wing Properties, Incorporated (Po Wing Properties). It is also alleged that while he was unmarried, he
had children from two women.
Ramon Ching alleged that he was the only child of Antonio Ching with his common-law wife,
Lucina Santos. She, however, disputed this. She maintains that even if Ramon Ching's birth certificate
indicates that he was Antonio Ching's illegitimate child, she and Antonio Ching merely adopted him and
treated him like their own
Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, on the other hand, claim to be Antonio Ching's illegitimate
children with his housemaid, Mercedes Igne. While Ramon Ching disputed this, both Mercedes and
Lucina have not.
On July 18, .1996, Antonio Ching was murdered. Ramon Ching allegedly induced Mercedes Igne
and her children, Joseph Cheng and Jaime Cheng, to sign an agreement and waiver to Antonio Ching's
estate in consideration of P22.5 million. Mercedes Igne's children alleged that Ramon Ching never paid
them. On October 29, 1996, Ramon Ching allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of estate,
naming himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon himself the entirety of Antonio Ching's estate.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the Chengs) filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91046 (the first case).
On March 22, 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead additional
defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary stockholder. The
amended complaint was for "Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction." Sometime after, Lucina Santos filed a motion for intervention
and was allowed to intervene.
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. On November 13, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 6, granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
On April 19, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of Agreement,
Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said
Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against
Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties.
On November 11, 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their complaint in
the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice. On November 22, 2002, Branch 6
issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the basis that the summons had not yet been served
on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The
dismissal of the second case was made without prejudice.
On December 9, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dated November 22, 2002. They argue that the dismissal should have been with prejudice
under the "two-dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the
previous dismissal of the first case.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a
complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties.
On December 10, 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed their comment/opposition to
the application for temporary restraining order in the third case. They also filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of res jiidicata, litis pendencia, forum-shopping, and failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action.
 RTC, Manila. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss,
holding that the dismissal of the second case was without prejudice and, hence, would not bar the filing
of the third case.
CA. While their motion for reconsideration in the third case was pending, Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties filed a petition for certiorari (the first certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals, which
upheld the dismissal of the second case.
RTC, Manila, CA. The trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration in the third
case. The denial prompted Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties to file a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (the second certiorari case) with the Court of Appeals.
CA. Court of Appeals rendered the decision in the first certiorari case dismissing the petition. The
appellate court ruled that Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties' reliance on the "two-dismissal rule"
was misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it
found that the dismissal of the first case was upon the motion of the defendants (Ching), while the
dismissal of the second case was at the instance of the plaintiffs (Cheng).

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court's dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case,
as per the "two-dismissal rule"; and
Whether respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the third case while the motion
for reconsideration of the second case was still pending.

RULING:
No. Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In all
instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals
upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to
dismiss.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the
second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an
adjudication upon the merits, i.e., with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the
ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
The purpose of the “two-dismissal rule” is “to avoid vexatious litigation.” When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
Here, the first case was filed as an ordinary civil action. It was later amended to include not only
new defendants but new causes of action that should have been adjudicated in a special proceeding. A
motion to dismiss was inevitably filed by the defendants on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely refiling the same claim that had
been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second
case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiffs instance. Petitioners
do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the service of any
responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of right that is not subject to
the trial court's discretion.
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one prior
dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the defendants. While
it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does not necessarily follow that
the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to determine before the rule may
apply, as in this case.
Blay v Baña, 858 SCRA 137, March 07, 2018

FACTS:
On September 17, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, seeking that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent filed her
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated December 5, 2014.
However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his
petition. In her comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court, and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent
adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply averring that respondent's counterclaims are barred from
being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a manifestation therefor within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw, which - according to petitioner - was required under the
same Rules of Court provision. In particular, petitioner alleged that respondent filed the required
manifestation only on March 30, 2015. However, respondent's counsel received a copy of petitioner's
Motion to Withdraw on March 11, 2015; hence, respondent had only until March 26, 2015 to manifest
before the trial court her desire to prosecute her counterclaims in the same action.
RTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw petition. Further, it declared respondent's
counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
to file his answer thereto.
CA, in a petition for certiorari, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC, holding that under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a
counterclaim has been filed by the defendant before the service upon him of the petitioner’s motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for
independent adjudication before the same trial court.

RULING:
Yes. CA erred in upholding the respondent’s counterclaim be adjudicated in the same action.
Section 2 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provide that: If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be
limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion
he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action.
In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its second
sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint." Evidently, the CA ignored
the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the alternatives available to the defendant who
interposes a counterclaim prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be
clearly inferred therefrom, should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to
manifest his preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to
obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the required manifestation within the aforesaid
period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.
Lui Enterprises Inc. v Zuellig Pharma Corporation, 719 SCRA 88, March12, 2014

FACTS:
On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year
contract of lease4 over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City.
On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter6 from the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma
to pay rent directly to it.
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’
claim. On January 28, 2003, Lui Enterprises wrote to Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect
the leased property’srent.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications over
the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati.
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did not
have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending
with the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case. In the nullification of
deed of dation in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which corporation had the better
right over the rental payments. Lui Enterprises argued that the same issue was involved in the
interpleader case. To avoid possible conflicting decisions of the Davao trial court and the Makati trial
court on the same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be
dismissed.
Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss
should be denied for having been filed late. A motion to dismiss should be filed within the required time
given to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15 days from service of summons on the defendant

ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the motions to dismiss and set aside order of default could
still be allowed and admitted after the lapse of the period?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that Lui’s failure to answer within the required period is
inexcusable. It has sufficient time or has 15 days to file its Motion to Dismiss (or Answer) but failed to
do so and filed the same 4 days later. Lui conveniently blamed its counsel for the late filing without
offering any excuse for the late filing of the answer. This is not excusable negligence under
Rule 9 Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.