People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5

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People v. Lingad, 98 Phil.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-6989. November 29, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AGAPITO LINGAD Y


SANTOS, LEOCADIO CARREON Y CELSO, AMADO MAMUCOD Y CORTES and
CONRADO GRAHAM Y ALEGRIA, Defendants-Appellants.

Antonio K. Aranda for appellants, Agapito Lingad and Leocadio Carreon.

Felino G. Ampil for appellants Amado Mamucod and Conrado Graham.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for
Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY; CONSPIRACY; HOMICIDE COMMITTED AS


CONSEQUENCE OR ON THE OCCASION THEREOF; ALL ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE
KILLING. — Where the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was
conclusively shown by the common concurrence and coordinate acts of the
accused and homicide was committed as a consequence or on the occasion of
the robbery, all of the accused are guilty of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, whether they have actually participated in the killing or not.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED WHO DID NOT CONSPIRE BUT WAS AWARE
OF THE CRIMINAL DESIGN, IS AN ACCOMPLICE. — It appearing that the
accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not
actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only
furnished the means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with
knowledge of the said criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime
of robbery with homicide but is an accomplice therein. (article 18, Revised
Penal Code; People v. Ubiña, Et Al., Phil. 515.)

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

Between 9:00 and 9:30 in the evening of July 18, 1952, two persons appeared
in the store of Vicente Go at Sulucan Street, Sampaloc, Manila, in order to
purchase coca cola and cigarettes. Soon after they had gone away one of them
appeared again with two others. Two went directly to the counter facing the
Sulucan Street, while the third went to the alley beside the store, where the
store owner Vicente Go was standing, waiting for a garbage truck. There were
two attendants in the store at the time, namely, Carlos Go and Amparo Go, son
and daughter, respectively, of the owner. One of those that appeared before
the counter had a .45 caliber automatic pistol, which he directed at the two
occupants; the third at the alley also had a .45-caliber pistol. As he pointed his
pistol at the two storekeepers, the gunwielder also went over the counter and
opened the drawer thereof and took all the money therein and put it on the
counter before his companion, who immediately grabbed it. At the same
moment, the Chinaman in the alley was pushed and shot. The bullet entered
the victim’s back coming out of the front chest. The three robbers thereupon
immediately ran away to a taxi which had parked far away ahead of the store.

The police learned that the taxi used by the robbers was a Villacorta taxicab
bearing number 6 and that the driver who drove the car on the occasion of the
robbery was Amado Mamucod. He was investigated by the police and he took
no time in admitting having driven the car and in identifying the ones who had
used the taxi on the night in question. With this information, the police
proceeded to investigate the persons pointed out and secured confessions
from the driver Amado Mamucod, Leocadio Carreon, Conrado Graham and
Agapito Lingad, all accused in the case. Upon securing the above confessions,
the Fiscal filed the information for robbery with homicide against them and
against Estanislao Real who is still at large. The accused were informed of the
charge and tried and found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
Vicente Go in the sum of P10,000 and the sum of P110, the value of the stolen
money, and each to pay one-fourth of the costs.

The keepers of the store on the night in question namely, Carlos Go and
Amparo Go, identified the accused appellant Leocadio Carreon as the person
who first came with another to purchase coca cola and cigarettes, and as the
one who later came together with accused- appellants Conrado Graham and
Agapito Lingad. They also identified him as the one who pointed the automatic
pistol at them, opened the drawer of the counter, and took out the money
therein. The accused-appellant Conrado Graham was pointed out as the
companion of Leocadio Carreon and who was the one who took away the
money. They further testified that the money amounted to around P110.

They also pointed out to the accused Agapito Lingad as the one who pointed
his automatic pistol at their father Vicente Go and later fired at the latter
killing him. Together with the above testimonies, the prosecution also
introduced the confessions of the four accused, which the police testified to as
having been executed by the latter freely and voluntarily.

The accused denied having participated in the commission of the crime and
alleged the defense of alibi. They further claimed that their confessions were
secured from them by force, the police delivering blows at their bodies before
they agreed to make the declarations. The trial court, however, refused to
believe these exculpatory statements in the face of the positive identification
of them by Carlos Go and Amparo Go, the facility with which alibis are
fabricated, and the improbability of their claim that their confessions have
been secured by violence. We have carefully read the evidence and we find
that the findings of the trial court are amply supported thereby. It may be
added that the details given by each of the accused in his confession, as to the
part played by each and every one of them from the time the crime was
decided upon to its final consummation, fit into those given by the others so
well as to refute or negate the probability of their having been forced upon the
Accused-Appellants.

But while we are satisfied that the accused-appellants Leocadio Carreon and
Conrado Graham were the ones who entered the store and grabbed the money
from the drawer of the counter therein at the point of a gun, as testified to by
Carlos Go and Amparo Go and disclosed in the confessions of the
accused-appellants, we are not convinced that it was Agapito Lingad who had
assaulted the deceased Vicente Go and fired the shot which killed him. Under
the circumstances in which the assault was committed, with the victim in the
alley, south of the store, at a time when it was raining and therefore dark, and
with a pistol directed against the witnesses by the other two robbers, it was
difficult for the former (witnesses) to have been able to recognize the person
who made the assault and fired the gun. The assailant was not face to face
with them, as he was facing towards their right side; he was not a person
familiar to the witnesses, and perhaps their interest could not have been
concentrated in him because they were eagerly and fearfully watching the
movements of the other two robbers. Besides these circumstances, we have
facts contained in the confessions of the appellants that Estanislao Real, not
Agapito Lingad, was the one who had assaulted the deceased. All these create
a reasonable doubt in an impartial mind as to the correctness of the
identification made by the two witnesses for the prosecution. We are,
therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the trial court that it was
Agapito Lingad who assaulted Vicente Go and fired the shot that killed him.

The above circumstances do not, however, affect the responsibility of the


accused Agapito Lingad. The confession submitted by the prosecution prove
that on the evening in question, before 9:00 o’clock, Estanislao Real and
Agapito Lingad had been conversing about perpetrating a hold-up and that
upon hearing the same Conrado Graham offered to join them; that thereupon
it was agreed that Graham contact Leocadio Carreon, who was going to get a
taxi for them; that evening, Leocadio Carreon saw the taxi driven by the
accused Amado Mamucod on Tayabas and Ipil streets, where Conrado Graham
came down with Agapito Lingad and Estanislao Real, and that all four
embarked in the taxi driven by the said Amado Mamucod; that they went
around in the taxi, passing in front of Aviles chapel, thru San Rafael Street,
Governor Forbes Street and later Sulucan Street, where they saw the store in
question; that as two persons were then in the store, they let the time pass by
for said two persons to go away by going around and then coming back to the
store; that the second time that they passed the store the two persons in the
store had already gone away, and so they parked the taxi around two posts
(electric) from the store to prevent suspicion; that Leocadio Carreon and
another first came to the store to buy cigarettes and coca cola, to determine
where the storekeepers kept the money; and that three of them went back,
namely, Leocadio Carreon, Conrado Graham and a third, who is either
Estanislao Real or Agapito Lingad. Under these circumstances, it is evident
that all the three accused, namely, Agapito Lingad, Leocadio Carreon and
Conrado Graham, irrespective of their respective participations in the hold-up,
are guilty of the offense committed; it is immaterial which of the two, Lingad
or Real, shot the deceased Vicente Go, because the conspiracy is conclusively
shown by their common concurrence and their coordinate acts. All of the
accused, whether they have actually participated in the killing or not, are
guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

In this connection, our attention has been called to the case of People v.
Basisten, 47 Phil. 493, wherein this Court has held that where only one of the
defendants committed the homicide at the time of commission of the robbery,
said homicide not having been the subject of the conspiracy, nor the others
having had any intervention therein, only the one who actually committed it
may be held responsible for the complex crime of robbery with homicide, the
others being responsible only for the robbery in band. This decision seems to
be at variance with the first case on the point, decided in this jurisdiction,
which is that of U. S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1, wherein this Court stated:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The Supreme Court of Spain, interpreting the provisions of the Penal Code
touching the complex crime of robo con homicidio, has frequently decided
that, where the complex crime has been committed, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the robbery are guilty as principals in the
commission of the crime of robo con homicidio, unless it appears that they
endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. (Decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872, and June 19, 1890. See also Viada, Vol.
3, pp. 347, 354, and 356.)"

The above decision was followed by us in the case of People v. De la Cruz, Et


Al., G. R. No. L-4532, promulgated on May 26, 1952, in which we said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the


occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission
of the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide.’ (People v. Bautista, 49 Phil., 389, 396, citing U. S. v. Macalalad, 9
Phil., 1.)"

These two rulings are in accord with the decisions of the supreme court of
Spain of February 23, 1872 and January 18, 1898. In the first, it was held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . — El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que siendo ambos procesados


autores del robo, lo son igualmente del homicidio que ocurrio en el mismo
acto, al tiempo de ser perseguidos por el interfecto; porque este ultimo delito
esta de tal manera enlazado con el de robo, que a no haber mediado este, ni
los robados hubieran pedido auxilio, ni al prestarselo el tercero hubiese sido
muerto como lo fue; y que por consiguiente, habiendo tomado parte directa en
la ejecucion del robo ambos procesados, son autores uno y otro, segun el
articulo 13 del Codigo Penal, y por lo mismo responsables los dos de todas las
consecuencias de su accion. (S. de 30 de abril de 1872, Gaceta de 1. de julio.)"

"El propio Tribunal Supremo ha resuelto: ’que si resulta probado la


delincuencia del procesado en el hecho generador, que es el robo, con ocasion
del que se cometio un homicidio, basta esto, en conformidad a lo dispuesto en
el numero 1 del articulo 516, para considerarle tambien responsable del
homicidio; resolucion cuya justicia evidencia aun mas el parrafo segundo del
518, en el que se declara quo los malhechores presentes a la ejecucion de un
robo en despoblado y en cuadrilla son autores de cualquiera de los atentados
que esta cometa si no constare que procuraron impedirlos (S. de 23 de febrero
de 1872, Gaceta de 11 de mayo.)" (Viada, Codigo Penal Comentado, Volumen
6, paginas 126-127.)

In the second decision, it was also held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . —El Tribunal Supremo ha resuelto la afirmativa; ’Considerando tocante


al recurso de Eusebio Perez, que, habiendose cometedo el homicidio de Julian
Mas con motivo u ocasion del robo realizado en su casa, todos los procesados,
autores de este, cuyo caracter no niega al recurrente su defensa, son
responsables de todas sus consecuencias, y por lo tanto del homicidio, que la
ley pena como una mera resultancia del robo, sean o no todos los procesados
ejecutores de aquel, y aun cuando no lo fuese ninguno directamente, segun asi
se desprende del texto del numero 1, articulo 516 del Codigo Penal, y lo tiene
declarado tambien este Tribunal Supremo en repetidas decisiones, etc.’ (S. de
18 enero de 1898, Gaceta de 11 de febrero.)" (Viada, supra, paginas 128-129.)

In accordance with the above authorities, we hold that as Agapito Lingad was
in conspiracy with his other co-accused, he is also guilty as principal of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide, whether he was the person who fired
the shot that killed Vicente Go or not; and all the accused are also guilty of
said complex crime irrespective of the fact that two of them had limited
themselves to the actual act of robbery, and even if the third actually stayed
inside the taxicab without having actually participated in the act of robbery or
in the act of homicide.

One further point needs consideration, and that is the criminal responsibility
of the accused-appellant Amado Mamucod, who drove the taxicab in which the
other accused-appellants rode. From the confessions of the
accused-appellants, we find that the conspiracy to make a hold-up or to
commit the crime of robbery was decided upon between Agapito Lingad,
Estanislao Real, Conrado Graham and Leocadio Carreon; that Leocadio Carreon
was asked to look for a taxi in which they could ride to look for a victim; that
Leocadio Carreon saw the taxicab driven by appellant Mamucod and that he
rode in it and, thereafter, the other three accused-appellants also rode in it.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Amado Mamucod actually
took part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery. However, he was
aware thereof, as he admitted that he knew that his co-accused were going to
make a hold-up. The taxi driver by him was necessary to the commission of
the crime because it was through its use that they could find a store that could
be the object of their criminal design. As Mamucod did not take part in the
original conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery, but only furnished the
means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the
said criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with
homicide, but is an accomplice therein (Article 18, Revised Penal Code; People
v. Ubiña, Et Al., 97 Phil., 515.)

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby


affirmed as to the accused-appellants Agapito Lingad, Leocadio Carreon and
Conrado Graham, but modified as to the accused-appellant Amado Mamucod,
who is hereby found guilty as an accomplice in the crime of robbery with
homicide, and sentenced to a minimum of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor
and a maximum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and
Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

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