SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-26699. March 16, 1976.]

BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO;

ALMARIO ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and
ANITA ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are represented
by guardian ad litem, ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO,
Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now
MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA
SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, RESTITUTO P.
SALAO, ISABEL SALAO DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as
successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S. SALAO, together
with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.

Eusebio V. Navarro and Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.

Nicolas Belmonte and Benjamin T. de Peralta for defendants-appellants.

SYNOPSIS

The question of ownership over the Calunuran fishpond, with an area of 47

hectares, located in that part of Lubao which later became a part of Bataan, and one
of the several properties left by the parties predecessors, has given rise to the
present controversy. Plaintiffs' version is that Juan Y. Salao, Jr., his sister Alejandra
and Ambrosia and their nephew Valentin Salao were engaged by joint venture in
the fishpond business; that the funds used by them were earnings of the properties
supposedly inherited from their father, and that these earnings were used in the
acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. On the other hand, the defendants contend
that the fishpond in question consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr., and
Ambrosia Salao who had secured a Torrens Title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911
and who exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew Valentin
Salao.

The property was sold a retro and later redeemed. Since then, several of the parties
have died and their estates partitioned and thereafter, interest over the fishpond
has been the bone of contention — whether or not the same was held in trust for
Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao and whether the property
can still be subject to an action for reconveyance.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in the CFI of Bataan against defendants,
asking for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao of a share in the fishpond
and for reconveyance to them of the property as Valentin Salao's supposed 1/3
share in the 145 hectares of the fishpond registered in the name of Juan Y. Salao,
Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr., in his answer with counterclaim, pleaded as a defense the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked
the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. Upon his death, he was substituted
by his widow, children and the administrator of his estate, the now defendants.

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Salao,
Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran lands were acquired;
that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her
heirs after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia
Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918, when her estate was partitioned among her
3 children and grandson, Valentin Salao. If further held that the donation was
validly executed.

Both parties appealed, the plaintiffs, because their action for reconveyance was
dismissed, and the defendants, because their counterclaim for damages was
likewise dismissed. The Court of Appeals elevated the case to the Supreme Court as
the amount involved exceeded P200,000.00.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, ruling
that there was no resulting trust over the questioned property as the plaintiffs failed
to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence and even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs'
action for reconveyance is barred by prescription or laches, as a result of which, they
have no right and personality to question the validity of the donation made to Juan
S. Salao, Jr. The Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of defendants' claim for
damages since the circumstances of the case do not show that plaintiffs' action was
manisfestly frivolous or primarily intended to harass the defendants.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; FORMAL REQUISITES; RULE 46, RULES OF COURT. — An appellant's

brief should contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the
argument and page reference" to the contents of the brief. Lawyers for appellants,
when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read Sec. 16 of Rule
46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed therein, they
might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and
lighten the burden of the Court.

2. PLEADINGS; ANSWER; CONTENTS. — Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940

Rules of Court the answer should "contain either a specific denial or a statement of
matters in avoidance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint."
Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specifically with each
material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial." Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the
amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied" (Sec.
8). "The defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he
may have. All such grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon
the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

3. ID.; ID.; AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE DEFENSES DISTINGUISHED. — A

negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the
complaint essential to the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. On the other hand, an
affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the
material allegations of the complaint, expressly or implied, would nevertheless
prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff. It includes all matters set up "by way of
confession and avoidance." (Sec. 5, Rules 6, Rules of Court).

4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL DENIAL, EFFECT OF. — An answer containing the

statement that it denied "generally and specifically each and every paragraph of the
complaint" is really a general denial which is tantamount to an admission of the
allegations of the complaint and which justifies judgment on the pleadings.

5. ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS; INSTANT CASE.

— Where the answer setting forth defendant's positive defenses contained matters
in avoidance of plaintiff's cause of action which supported his denials thereof, the
contention that there was in effect an admission of plaintiff's allegation that there
was co-ownership cover the questioned property is unfounded. The answer
substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court where obviously
defendant did so because he found it impracticable to state piecemeal his open
version as to the acquisition of the questioned properties or to make a tedious and
repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting the allegations of the plaintiff's
cause of action.

6. TRUST; DEFINITION. — In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the

right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal
title to which is vested in another. A person who establishes a trust is called the
trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards the property for the benefit of
the another person is know as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the
trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary. There is a fiduciary relation
between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real,
personal, money or chooses in action.

7. ID.; KINDS OF; EXPRESS AND IMPLIED TRUSTS, DISTINGUISHED. — "Trusts

are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trust
or or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law." (Art. 1441,
Civil Code). "No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may
be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence"
(Arts. 1443 and 1457). "No particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Art. 1444).
"Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722). "Implied trusts are those
which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law
as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89
C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89
C.J.S. 722).

8. ID.; ID.; RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST DISTINGUISHED. — A

resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or
construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication
of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not
expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89 C. J. S.725). On the other
hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by
operation of law." I n a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a
resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the
constructions of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise
"by agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

9. ID.; PROOF OF; PAROL EVIDENCE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO PROVE AN

EXPRESS TRUST CONCERNING REALTY; CASE AT BAR. — Not a scintilla of
documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an
express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol
evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral
partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to
Valentin Salao is legally untenable. It is legally indefensible because the terms of
Art. 1443 of the Civil Code are peremptory and unmistakable; parol evidence cannot
be used to prove an express trust concerning realty. Plaintiffs utterly failed to
measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose,
equivocal or indefinite declarations.

10. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED TRUST MAY BE PROVEN BY ORAL EVIDENCE. — Article
1457 of the Civil Code allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence.
Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because oral
evidence can be easily fabricated.

11. ID.; NO TRUST CREATED OVER QUESTIONED PROPERTY. — There was no

resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of
Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was
no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of
Juan and Ambrosia was vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to
satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond as
being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

12. ID.; RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST; PLAINTIFFS ACTION

BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES. — Under Act No. 190, whose statute of
limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case, the longest period
of extinctive prescription was only ten years. The Calunuran fishpond was registered
in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was made by the
plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than
forty bears from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predessor-in-
interest, Valentin Salao slept on their rights, if they had any rigths at all.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF DONATION UNNECESSARY. —

Where the Court has reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to
the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer necessary to pass upon
the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her half-
share in the two fishponds. Plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that
donation.

14. ACTIONS; PARTIES; GOOD FAITH IN FILING SUIT SHOWN. — The record
shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of
the case and that they fought tenaciously, incurring considerable expenses therefor.
Their causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor
with which they pressed their claim were considered to indicate their sincerity and
good faith.

15. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF NOT JUST AND PROPER IN
INSTANT CASE. — Where it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action
was manisfestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants does
not appear to be just and proper. The worries and anxiety of a defendants an award
for moral damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper. The
worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted
are not the moral damages contemplated in the law.

16. ATTORNEYS' FEES; AWARD THEREOF NOT JUST AND PROPER IN INSTANT
CASE. — Where it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their
action, there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. It is not sound public policy to set a
premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the
award of attorney's fees to the winning party.

DECISION

AQUINO, J :p

This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,

Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts are as
follows:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel
Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child,
Valentin Salao.

There is no documentary evidence as to what properties formed part of Manuel

Salao's estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate
was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.

It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized
on May 22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely,
her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao,
in representation of his deceased father, Patricio.

The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit, were as follows: prcd

Nature of Land Area in square meters

(1) One-half interest in a fishpond
which she had inherited from her parents,
Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza,
and the other half of which was owned by
her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana 21,700
(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents 7,418
(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents 6,989
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt 50,469
(5) Fishpond with an area of one
hectare, 12 acres and 5 centares purchased
from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by
Valentina Ignacio on November 9, 1895
with a bodega for salt 11,205
(6) Fishpond 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with
a total area of 10,424 square meters, the
other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo 5,217
(8) Riceland 50,454
(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina
Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January
27, 1890 with a house and two camarins
thereon 8,065
(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia
Salao, with an area of 11,678 square
meters, of which 2,173 square meters
were sold to Justa Yongco 9,505
TOTAL 179,022 square
meters

To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share
valued at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao (who
was then already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area
of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters
and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had
an aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive
share. So in the deed of partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of
P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was obviously intended to avoid the
fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.

In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina
Ignacio y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao"
"cuya administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por
designacion los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not
obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al
resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagadas por ella las
contribuciones" pages 2 and 11, Exh. 21).

By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueños absolutos de sus respectivas
propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes, en la forma
como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina
Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens
title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-
seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is
also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later
became a part of Bataan.

The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in
the fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any
documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao
were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the
properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were
used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary
evidence to support that theory.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted
of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907
and 1908 as shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by
the plaintiffs.

However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they
exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.

Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the
Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In
the deed of sale (Exh. 19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were
the dueños proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the
vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an
annual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).

After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and
Juan sold it under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of
redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and
Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated October 5, 1916
(Exh. 20-a).llcd

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals
that the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was
claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinañganacan fishpond
(subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square
meters (Exh. 22).

Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia
Salao bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of
swampland planted to bakawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and
73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinañganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-
d).

The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No.
12144, Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan
Salao filed an application for the registration of that land in their names on January
15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno por partes
iguales y por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-
a).

At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified
for the applicants. On that same day Judge Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter
alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and
Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a
nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de s esposa Diega
Santiago y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones
iguales" (Exh. 17-e).

On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said
land. The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original
Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the
names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.

That Pinañganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the
Hermosa cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His
nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years
according to the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he
was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years old in 1933).

The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December

28, 1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-
Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited
in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.
If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds
with a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his
aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that
no mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in
1934.

It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her

grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total
area of 5,832 square meters (Exh. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of
donation.

On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the
children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was
held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death
that she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond
which was allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan
Salao y Santiago (Juani).

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before
Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly
eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso share in
the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani). At that time
she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the other half of the
said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli). The
deed of donation included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She
reserved for herself the usufruct over the said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2
or M).

The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39,
Defendants' Record on Appeal).

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated
January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in
the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused
to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which
allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that
Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole
owners thereof were his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the
Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he (Juani) was the donee of
Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan
S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36).
They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment
of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the
Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145
hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia
Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the
Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds,
prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting
to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and
reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the
lifting of the receivership. Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one.
He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual, and his six children and by the
administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in
question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition
that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this
case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

After trial the lower court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages
dismissed the amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed
pages it made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses,
Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali, Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio
Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies, Basilio Atienza, Benita
Salao, Emilio Cagui, Damaso de la Peña, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso,
and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia,
Tiburcio Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao.
(Plaintiffs presented Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao,
Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinañganacan
(Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of
Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after her death in 1914; that the co-
ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918
when her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson,
Valentin Salao.

The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918
misled the plaintiffs and their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously
that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated
that if Valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and
Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit-sharing basis. It conjectured
that Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion
of the earnings of the fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's
affection for her grandnieces.

The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the
Torrens titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the
fishponds. It did not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because
their memories could not be trusted and because no strong documentary evidence
supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust were
already dead.

It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void
Juan S. Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor,
Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him. LexLib

Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance
was dismissed. The defendants appealed because their counterclaim for damages
was dismissed.

The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of
Appeals. However, as the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos,
the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of October 3,
1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).

Plaintiffs' appeal. — An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index of the
matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references" to the
contents of the brief (Sec. 16[a] Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48,
1940 Rules of Court).

The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with
that requirement. Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page
references to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly
section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court.

Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and
re-read section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements
prescribed in section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation
of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court.

What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this
Court is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake to make an
examination of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this
case, twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to
make such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and
brief it in accordance with our rules" (Palarca vs. Baguisi, 38 Phil. 177, 181), As
noted in an old case, this Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition
resolves in minute orders an exceptionally considerable number of petitions,
motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308,
395; See In re Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).

Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of

their first cause of action they made certain averments to establish their theory that
Valentin Salao had a one-third interest in the two-fishponds which were registered
in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied "each and all the
allegations" in paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the
qualification that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more
than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the
circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the
circumstances stated in the amended complaint".

The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect an
admission of the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-
ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, Alejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao,
regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common funds
were invested in the acquisition of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare
Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the 1919 partition
and that there was a verbal stipulation to register "said lands in the name only of
Juan Y. Salao".

That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court
the answer should "contain either a specific denial or a statement of matters in
avoidance of the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of
the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specifically with each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his
denial". "Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of
damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The
defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as he may have.
All such grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the
preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive
defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which
supported his denials of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action.
Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state piecemeal his own
version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and
repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting the allegations of the first
cause of action.

We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of
Court. It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is
the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to
the plaintiff's cause or causes of action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense
is an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of
the complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery
by the plaintiff". Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by way of
confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6, Rules of Court).

The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases is
distinguishable from the instant case. In the El Hogar case the defendant filed a
laconic answer containing the statement that it denied "generally and specifically
each and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint".
It did not set forth in its answer any matter by way of confession and avoidance. It
did not interpose any affirmative defenses.

Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a
general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the
complaint and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation
in this case.

The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive
issue of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of
whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed.

The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan
S. Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in
plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their
appellants' brief.

To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it
is necessary to make some exegesis on the nature of trusts ( fideicomisos). Trusts in
Anglo-American jurisprudence were derived from the fideicommissa of the Roman
law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646).

"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in
equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another, but the word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations,
and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712)."A person
who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as
regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the
person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary"
(Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the
cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or choses in
action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of
the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law"
(Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral
evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs.
Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543,
546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the
nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into
resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or
construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication
of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the
intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not
expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of
resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs.
Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs.
Graño, 42 Phil. 35).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or

arising by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words,
either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice". It does not arise
"by agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).

Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of

equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the
defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense.
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244). LibLex

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that
there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao.
Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim
that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was
assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable.

It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already
in force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable:
parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.

Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or

constructive, regarding the two fishponds?

Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust.
The trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of property during
the lifetime of Valentina Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants'
documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands
supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention
that the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao.

But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite
improbable because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not
satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was
a co-ownership over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their amended
complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds
located in Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the
fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area
of twenty-eight hectares, of which sixteen hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio
and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate.

They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay
the very root, of the property now in litigation" (page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief).
But the eleven hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita
Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin
partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible.
As noted by the defendants, Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs'
complaints.

The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares
of fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was made there
were eleven hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who
died in 1885, those eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the
case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.

It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be

adjudicated to Valentin Salao merely by word of mouth. Incredible because for the
partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate
"Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the
four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of
fishponds among three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have
sufficed.

The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is
borne in mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of
registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act
No. 496). That means that any transaction affecting the registered land should be
evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-
interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure
any documentary evidence to establish his supposed interest or participation in the
two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence of such interest.

The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of
partition for Valentina Ignacio's estate was notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The
plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and
that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share.
Now, in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate Valentin was obligated to pay
P3,355.25 to ambrosia Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered
the two fishponds and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been
easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount
due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the
earnings of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a shred of
documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation in the two fishponds.

The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be
proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and
uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs.
Molo-Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273).

"Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of

proof . — Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony
supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged
beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were
shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens
title, upon vague and inconclusive proof ." (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo,
59 Phil. 303).

"Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony . — In order

to establish a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as
fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by
an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon testimony
consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay."
(Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario, 50 Phil. 110).

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as
already noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy
oral evidence is required to prove an implied trust because oral evidence can be
easily fabricated.

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the

ownership of the land referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption
exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to
maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties
must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land. "Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of
losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on
the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust.
There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the
names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case
where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran
fishpond as being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of
Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly
barred by prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61
SCRA 284; Quiñiano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221;
Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs.
Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil 377).

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied
trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years
(Sec 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand
for its reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in
1952 or after the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The
plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights, if
they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is
watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).

"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit

in the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights more strongly
when they are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of
a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but
may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."
(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the
reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the
validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half
share in the two fishponds. The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that
donation.

Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any
successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her
nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if
living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together
with his first cousin, Juan Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could
not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral
line; representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the full or half blood (Art. 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes
a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-grandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza
(Pavia vs. Iturralde, 5 Phil. 176).

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants' appeal. — The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the
plaintiffs filed their action in good faith. The defendants contend that they are
entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing
them. They ask for P25,000 attorney's fees and litigation expenses and, in addition,
moral damages.

We hold that defendants' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the
plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which
lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred
considerable expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action
turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed
their claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.

There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common
ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs'
action was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition
of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from
Manuel Salao.

Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that

plaintiffs' action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the
defendants. An award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and
proper.

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously
instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos
vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra).

The instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as
analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles.

"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious that moral
damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously." (Barreto
vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779).

The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that
attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in
any other case where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees
should be awarded.

But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action
there would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's
fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).

It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse
decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party
(Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61
O.G. 6959).

The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando (Chairman, of the Second Division), J., took no part.

Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.