SECOND DIVISION request, however, was to merely send a letter reiterating to the

respondent that under the set of facts, management has the option to
G.R. No. 195297, December 05, 2018 schedule work on Saturday on the basis of operational
necessity.13 Further letters on the part of the respondent were
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, responded to in the same way by CCBPI.
INC., Petitioner, v. ILOILO COCA-COLA PLANT
EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (ICCPELU), AS Respondent thus brought its grievances to the office of the NCMB,
REPRESENTED BY WILFREDO L. AGUIRRE, Respondent. and on June 9, 2006, the parties pursuant to the provisions of their
CBA submitted the case for voluntary arbitration.14 The panel
comprised of three (3) voluntary arbitrators (the Panel of Arbitrators),
DECISION was charged with resolving two issues: First, whether or not members
of the respondent were entitled to receive their basic pay during
A. REYES, JR., J.: Saturdays under the CBA even if they would not report for work, and
second, whether or not CCBPI could be compelled by the respondent
Challenged before this Court via this Petition for Review to provide work to its members during Saturdays under the CBA.15
on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision2 dated June 23, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its After the presentation of evidence and the subsequent deliberations,
Resolution3 dated October 19, 2010 which reversed the the Panel of Arbitrators ruled in favor of CCBPI, the dispositive part
Decision4 dated September 7, 2006 of the National Conciliation and of the decision reading:
Mediation Board (NCMB), Regional Branch No.6, Iloilo City, in IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Panel of Arbitrators, rules on
Case No. PAC-613-RB6-02-01-06-2006. the first issue, that the Complainant's Union members are nary
entitled to receive their Basic Pay during Saturdays under the CBA if
The Antecedent Facts they are not reporting for work, under Section I Article 10, and
Sections 1(c) and 3(c) Article II of the CBA.
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling of On the second issue, the PANEL, rules that [CCBPI] cannot be
leading non-alcoholic products and other beverages. 5 It operates a compelled by the Complainant Union to provide works to its
manufacturing plant in Ungka, Pavia, Iloilo City, where the aggrieved members during Saturdays under the CBA, for lack of legal and
former employees herein, as represented by respondent Iloilo Coca- factual basis.
Cola Plant Employees Labor Union (respondent), worked as regular
route drivers and helpers.6 SO ORDERED.16
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration to the Panel of Arbitrators'
The conflict arose due to the CCBPI's policy involving Saturday ruling was denied for lack of merit on October 24, 2006. 17
work. In the said policy, several of CCBPI's employees were required
to report for work on certain Saturdays to perform a host of activities, Unwilling to accept the findings of the Panel of Arbitrators, the
usually involving maintenance of the facilities. This prerogative was respondent elevated its case to the CA via a Petition for Review under
supposedly consistent with the pertinent provisions7 in the Collective Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. After a review of the same, the CA
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between CCBPI and its employees, subsequently rendered a Decision18 dated June 23, 2010 granting the
which stated that management had the sole option to schedule, work respondent's Petition for Review and reversing the decision of the
on Saturdays on the basis of operational necessity.8 Panel of Arbitrators. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads, to wit:
CCBPI later on informed the respondent that, starting July 2, 2005, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Saturday work would no longer be scheduled, with CCBPI citing assailed Decision, dated 07 September 2006, and, Order, dated 24
operational necessity as the reason for the decision.9 Specifically, the October 2006, respectively, by the panel of voluntary arbitrators,
discontinuance was done with the purpose of saving on operating namely: Atty. Mateo A. Valenzuela, Atty. Inocencio Fener, Jr., and
expenses and compensating for the anticipated decreased revenues. Gloria Aniola, of the NCMB. Regional Branch No. 6, Iloilo City, are
As Saturday work involved maintenance-related activities, CCBPI REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A NEW judgment is rendered
would then only schedule the day's work as the need arose for these ORDERING CCBPI to:
particular undertakings, particularly on some Saturdays from
September to December 2005.10 1. COMPLY with the CBA provisions respecting its normal work
week, that is, from Monday to Friday for eight (8) hours a day and on
On July 1, 2005, the parties met, with CCBPI's Manufacturing Saturdays for four (4) hours;
Manager setting forth the official proposal to stop the work schedule
during Saturdays.11 This proposal was opposed and rejected by the 2. ALLOW the concerned union members to render work for four (4)
officers and members of the respondent who were present at the hours on Saturdays; and
meeting. Despite this opposition, CCBPI pushed through with the
non-scheduling of work on the following Saturday, July 2, 2005. 3. PAY the corresponding wage for the Saturdays work which were
not performed pursuant to its order to do so commencing on 02 July
As a result of the foregoing, the respondent submitted to CCBPI its 2005, the date when it actually refused the concerned union members
written grievance, stating therein that CCBPI's act of disallowing its to report tor work, until the finality of this decision. The rate for work
employees to report during Saturday is a violation of the CBA rendered on a Saturday is composed of the whole daily rate (not the
provisions, specifically Section 1, Article 10 thereof.12 Along with the amount equivalent to one-half day rate) plus the corresponding
submission of the written grievance, the respondent also requested a premium.
meeting with CCBPI to discuss the issue. CCBPI response to the
No Costs.
Aside front the clear and unambiguous provisions of the CBA,
SO ORDERED.19 CCBPI states that the evidence on record negates the finding that
Saturday work is mandatory.29 The evidence shows that only some,
CCBPI's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in a
and not all the same daily-paid employees reported for work on a
Resolution20 dated October 19, 2010 received on January 28, 2011.
Saturday, and the number of the daily-paid employees who reported
On appeal to this Court, on February 11, 2011, CCBPI filed Motion
for work on a Saturday always depended on the CCBPI's operational
for Extension and requested for an additional period of 30 days from
necessity.30 The optional nature of the work on the Saturday is also
February 12, 2011, or until March 14, 2014, within which to file its
highlighted by the fact that, subject to the fulfillment of certain
Petition for Certiorari, which was granted by this Court in a
conditions, the employees who were permitted to suffer work on such
Resolution21 dated February 21, 2011.
day are compensated with a premium pay.31 This means that work on
a Saturday is part of the normal work week, as there would be no
Hence, this Petition, to which the respondent filed a Comment22 to on
reason why employees who reported for work on such date should be
June 11, 2011, the latter pleading responded to by
given additional compensation or premium pay.
CCBPI via Reply23 on September 6, 2011.
CCBPI also disagrees with the CA that the scheduling of work on a
The Issues of the Case
Saturday had ripened into a company practice and that the withdrawal
of Saturday work constitutes a prohibited diminution of
A perusal of the parties' pleadings will show the following issues and
wages.32 CCBPI maintains that work on a Saturday does not amount
points of contention:
to a benefit as a result of a long-established practice. CCBPI states
that in several analogous cases involving overtime work, Manila
First, whether or not the CA erred in ruling that under the CBA
Jockey Club Employees Labor-Union-PTGWO v. Manila Jockey
between the parties, scheduling Saturday work for CCBPI's
Club, Inc.33 and San Miguel Corporation v. Layoc, Jr.,34 the Court has
employees is mandatory on the part of the Company.
already ruled that the work given in excess of the regular work hours
is not a "benefit" and the previous grant thereof cannot amount to a
Second, whether scheduling Saturday work has ripened into a
"company practice." CCBPI particularly cites the Layoc case which
company practice, the removal of which constituted a diminution of
held that there is no violation of the rule on non-diminution of
benefits, to which CCBPI is likewise liable to the affected employees
benefits as.the nature of overtime work of the supervisory employees
for, including the corresponding wage for the Saturday work which
would show that these are not freely given by the employer, and that
was not performed pursuant to the policy of the Company to remove
on the contrary, the payment of overtime pay is made as a means of
Saturday work based on operational necessity.
compensation for services rendered in addition to the regular hours of
work.35
The Arguments of the Parties
CCBPI likewise cites several cases involving overtime work, there
It is the contention of CCBPI that the CA erred in reversing the
the Court ruled that the work given in excess of the regular work
decision of the Panel of Arbitrators and finding that the CBA gave the
hours is not a "benefit" and the previous grant thereof cannot amount
employees the right to compel CCBPI to give work on Saturdays, that
to a "company practice."36 As a premium day, that Saturday would
the scheduling of work on a Saturday had ripened into a company
have the effect of being a holiday wherein the employees are entitled
practice, and that the subsequent withdrawal of Saturday work
to receive their pay whether they reported for work or not.37
constituted a prohibited diminution of wages. CCBPI states that this
ruling is contrary to fact and law and unduly prejudiced CCBPI as the
For CCBPI, the previous grant of Saturday work cannot amount to a
company was ordered to allow the affected employees to render work
benefit that cannot be withdrawn by the Company. Contrary to the
for four hours on Saturdays. CCBPI was also ordered to pay the
nature of "benefits" under the law, CCBPI did not freely give
corresponding wage for the Saturday work which were not performed
payment for Saturday work, instead paying the employees the
pursuant to its order to do so, the said amount corresponding to the
corresponding wage and premium pay as compensation for services
date when the company actually refused the affected employees to
rendered in addition to the regular work of eight (8) hours per day
report for work, until the finality of this decision.24
from Mondays to Fridays.38
CCBPI argues that based on the provisions of its CBA, specifically
On the other hand, the respondents argue that CCBPI failed to regard
Article 10, Section 1, in relation with, Article 11, Section 1 (c) and
the express provision of the CBA which delineates CCBPI's normal
Section 2(c), it is clear that work on a Saturday is optional on the part
work-week which consists of five (5) consecutive days (Monday to
of management,25 and constitutes a legitimate management
Friday) or eight (8) hours each and one (1) day (Saturday) of four (4)
prerogative that is entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest
hours.39 The highlighted provision reads as follows:
of simple fair play.26 CCBPI likewise posits that the option to
ARTICLE 10
schedule work necessarily includes the prerogative not to schedule it.
HOURS OF WORK
And, as the provisions in the CBA are unmistakable and
unambiguous, the terms therein are to be understood literary just as
SECTION 1. Work Week. For daily paid workers the nom1al work
they appear on the face of the contract.27
week shall consist of five (5) consecutive days (Monday to Friday) of
eight (8) hours each find one (1) day (Saturday) of four (4) hours.
For CCBPI, permitting the workers to suffer work on a Saturday
Provided, however, that any worker required to work on Saturday
would render the phrase "required to work'' in Article 10, Section 1
must complete the scheduled shift tor the day and shall be entitled to
and Article II, Section 2(c) meaningless and superfluous, as while the
the premium pay provided in Article IX hereof.
scheduling of Saturday work would be optional on the pat1of
management, the workers would still be required to render service As such, the respondent advocates that the various stipulations of a
even if no Saturday work was scheduled.28 contract shall be interpreted together, and that assuming there is any
ambiruity in the CBA, this ambiguity should not prejudice Consequently, in this case, recourse to the CBA between CCBPI and
respondents under the principle that any doubt in all labor legislation the respondent as regards the hours of work is essential. In Article 10
and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and of the CBA, the company work week is elaborated while also
decent living for the laborer.40 According to the respondent, Article defining how a Saturday is treated and in fact delineating the same
11, Section 1(c) merely grants to CCBPI the option to schedule work from the other days of the work week:
on Saturdays on the basis of operational necessity, and by contrast ARTICLE 10
nothing in the CBA allegedly allows or grants CCBPI the right or Hours of Work
prerogative to unilaterally amend the duly established work week by
eliminating Saturday work.41 SECTION 1. Work Week. For daily paid workers, the normal work
week shall consist of five (5) consecutive days (Monday to Friday) of
Respondent also alleges that CCBPI was obliged to provide work on eight (8) hours and each and one (1) day (Saturday) of four (4) hours,
Saturday, not only due to the apparent .mandate in the CBA, but also provided, however, that any worker required to work on Saturday
as the same ripened into an established company practice, as CCBPI's must complete the scheduled shift for the day and shall be entitled to
practice of providing Saturday work had been observed for several the premium pay provided in Article IX hereof.
years.42 Respondent thus contends that the unilateral abrogation of the
same would squarely tantamount to diminution of benefits, especially x x x x
as the CBA itself expressly provides that Saturday is part of CCBPI's
normal work week, hence the same cannot be unilaterally eliminated (c) Saturdays. Saturday is a premium day but shall not be considered
by CCBPI,43 and that the option granted by the CBA to CCBPI is as a rest day or equivalent to a Sunday. It is further agreed that
merely to schedule Saturday work, not eliminate it entirely. Thus, to management has the option to schedule work on Saturdays on the
eliminate the Saturday work allegedly would amount to diminution of basis of operational necessity.
benefits because the affected employees are ultimately deprived of Section 5 of Article 9 of the CBA, explicitly referred to in Article 10
their supposed salaries or income for that day.44 states:
SECTION 5. Special Bonus. When a regular employee goes out on
In its Reply45 to the counter-arguments posited by the respondent in his route on a Saturday, Sunday, or Legal Holiday, either because he
its Comment, CCBPI alleges that if indeed Saturday work is is so required by District Sale Supervisor or because, after securing
mandatory under the CBA and all the workers are obliged to render approval from the District Sales Supervisor. he voluntarily chooses to
work on a Saturday, then the phrase "required to work" under Article do so. he shall be entitled to a special bonus of P280.00.
10, Section 1 and Article 11, Section 2(c) would be meaningless and
superfluous.46 Also, CCBPI takes stock in the fact that the In making its decision, the CA reasoned that had it really been the
compensation for work on Saturday is not freely given. Under the intention that Saturday work, by itself, is optional on CCBPI's part,
scheme followed by the parties under the CBA, i.e., if the daily-paid then there would have been no need to state under the CBA that
employees were permitted to suffer work on a Saturday, they are Saturday is part of the, normal work week together with the Monday
given additional compensation or premium pay amounting to 50% of to Friday schedule, and that if Saturday work is indeed optional, then
their hourly rate for the first eight (8) hours, and 75% of their hourly it would have expressly stipulated the same.53 According to the CA's
rate for the work rendered in excess thereof under Article 11, Section interpretation, the provision wherein CCBPI had the option to
2(c) of the CBA.47 schedule work on Saturdays on the basis of operational necessity,
simply meant that CCBPI could schedule the mandated four (4) hours
Ruling of the Court work any time within the 24-hour period on that day, but not remove
the hours entirely.54
The petition is impressed with merit..
For the CA, to interpret the phrase "option to schedule'' as limited
As to whether or not the CBA between the parties mandates that merely to scheduling the time of work on Saturdays and not the
CCBII schedule Saturday work for its employees. option to allow or disallow or to grant or not to grant the Saturday
work itself, is more consistent with the idea candidly stated in the
A CBA is the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor CBA regarding the work week which is comprised of five (5)
organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work, and consecutive days (Monday to Friday) of eight (8) hours each and one
all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. 48 It (1) day (Saturday) of four (4) hours. The foregoing interpretation, as
incorporates the agreement reached after negotiations between the held by the CA, is in harmony with the context and the established
employer and the bargaining agent with respect to terms and practice in which the CBA is negotiated,55 and that, based on the
conditions of employment.49 foregoing, CCBPI should comply with the provisions respecting its
normal work week, that is, from Monday to Friday of eight (8) hours
It is axiomatic that the CBA comprises the law between the a day and on Saturdays for four (4) hours. CCBPI thus should allow
contracting parties, and compliance therewith is mandated by the the concerned union members to render work for four (4) hours on
express policy of the law.50 The literal meaning of the stipulations of Saturday.56
the CBA, as with every other contract, control if they are clear and
leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. Thus, The Court disagrees with the interpretation of the CA. In the perusal
where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it, becomes the law of the same, the Court finds that a more logical and harmonious
between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the interpretation of the CBA provisions wherein Saturday work is
express policy of the law.51 Moreover, it is a familiar rule in optional and not mandatory keeps more with the agreement between
interpretation of contracts that the various stipulations of a contract the parties.
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.52 To note, the CBA under Article 11, Section 1(c), clearly provides that
CCBPI has the option to schedule work on Saturdays based on
operational necessity. There is no ambiguity to the provision, and no and the reasons for their absence, whether legitimate or not. 58 This
other interpretation of the word "work" other than the work itself and understanding is bolstered by the fact that not all daily-paid workers
not the working hours. If the parties had truly intended that the option were required to report for work, which and if indeed Saturday was to
would be to change only the working hours, then it would have so be considered a regular work day, all the3e employees should have
specified that whole term "working hours" be used, as was done in been required to report for work.59
other provisions of the CBA. By comparison, there is a provision in
Article 10 that states: In sum, by not taking these provisions into account, the CA ignored
SECTION 2. Changes in Work Schedule. The present regular the well-settled rule that the various stipulations of a contract must be
working hours shall be maintained for the duration of this Agreement. interpreted together. The Court finds that relying on the interpretation
However, it is hereby agreed that the COMPANY may change the of the CA would result in the patent absurdity that the company
prevailing working hours, if in its judgment, it shall find such change would have to look for work for the employees to do even if there is
or changes advisable or necessary either as a permanent or temporary none, on the Saturday as stated. Even if one were to downplay the
measure, provided at least twelve (12) hours notice in advance is lack of logic with this assertion, as mentioned the CBA provisions are
given of such change or changes, and provided, further, that they are clear and unambiguous, leaving no need for a separate interpretation
in accordance with law. of the same.
Here, hours are specified as that which can be changed regarding the
As to whether scheduling Saturday work has ripened into a company
work schedule. The Court compares this to Article 11, where it is
practice, the removal of which constituted a diminution of benefits.
expressly stated' that management has the option to schedule work on
Saturdays on the basis of operational necessity. To emphasize, if it is
In the decision of the CA, it was held that the fact that CCBPI had
only the hours that management may amend, then it would have been
been providing work to its employees every Saturday for several
so stated, with that specific term used instead of just merely "work," a
years, a circumstance that proved Saturday was part of the regular
more general term.
work week, made the grant of Saturday work ripen into company
Also, as correctly pointed out by CCBPI, if Saturday work is indeed practice.
mandatory under the CBA, the phrase "required to work on a
Saturday" in Article 10, Section 1 would be superfluous. The same In asking the Court to reverse the ruling of the CA, CCBPI argues
phrase is also found in Article 11, Section 2(c) which provides that "a that work on a Saturday is akin to overtime work because employees
worker paid on daily basis required to work on a Saturday shall be who are required to perform such work60 are given additional 61
paid his basic hourly rate plus fifty (50%) percent thereof." compensation or premium in the CBA.  Citing Layoc,  CCBPI
stresses that since overtime work does not fall within the definition of
For the Court, the phrase "schedule work on Saturdays based on benefits, the same is not protected by Article 100 of the Labor Code
operational necessity," by itself, is union recognition that there are which proscribes the diminution of benefits. To wit:
times when exigencies of the business will arise requiring a manning First. respondents assert that Article 100 of the Labor Code prohibits
complement to suffer work for four additional hours per week. the elimination or diminution of benefits. However, contrary to the
Necessarily, when no such exigencies exist, the additional hours of nature of benefits, petitioners did not freely give the payment for
work need not be rendered. overtime work to respondents. Petitioners paid respondents overtime
pay as compensation for services rendered in addition to the regular
As such, the provisions' tenor and plain meaning give company work hours. Respondents rendered overtime work only when their
management the right to compel its employees to suffer work on services were needed after their regular working hours and only upon
Saturdays. This necessarily includes the prerogative not to schedule the instructions of their superiors. Respondents even differ as to the
work. Whether or not work will be scheduled on a given Saturday is amount of overtime pay received on account of the difference in the
made to depend on operational necessity. The CBA therefore gives additional hours of services rendered.
CCBPI the management prerogative to provide its employees with
Saturday work depending on the exigencies of the business. x x x x

Aside from their allegations, respondents were not able to present

This reading of the CBA is made even more apparent by the fact that
anything to prove that petitioners were obliged to permit respondents
workers who are required to work on Saturdays are paid a premium
to render overtime work and give them the corresponding overtime
for such work. Notably, in the section on Premium Pay, it is stated:
pay. Even if petitioners did not institute a "no time card policy,"
(c) Saturdays. Even though Saturday is not his rest day - A worker
respondents could not demand overtime pay from petitioners if
paid on daily basis required to work on a Saturday shall be paid his
respondents did not render overtime work. The requirement of
basic hourly rate plus fifty (50%) percent thereof for each hour
rendering additional service differentiates overtime pay from benefits
worked not in excess of eight hours; if he is required to work more
such as thirteenth month pay or yearly merit increase. These benefits
than eight (8) hours, he shall be paid his basic hourly rate plus
do not require any additional service from their beneficiaries. Thus,
seventy-five (75%) thereof for each hour worked in excess of eight
overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under
(8) hours.
Article 100 of the Labor Code.62
If Saturday was part of the regular work week and not dependent on
The Court does not agree with the argument of CCBPI. CCBPI
management's decision to schedule work, there would be no need to
overlooks the fact that the term overtime work has an established and
give additional compensation to employees who report to work on
technical meaning under our labor laws, to wit:
that day. The CA erred in taking into account that employees required
Article 87. Overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight (8)
to work on that day but who would fai1 to report, would be marked
hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime work,
down as having gone on leave.57 The Court agrees with CCBPI that
an additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at
such conclusion is non sequitur and that the markings merely
least twenty-five percent (25%) thereof. Work performed beyond
indicated the fact that they did not report for work (even if required)
eight hours on a holiday or rest day shall be paid an additional
compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight hours on a constitute a violation of the diminution of benefits rule.
holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent (30%) thereof.
It can be deduced from the foregoing provision that overtime work is Also, even assuming arguendo that the Saturday work involved in
work exceeding eight hours within the worker's 24-hour this case falls within the definition of a "benefit" protected by law, the
workday.63 What is involved in this case is work undertaken within fact that it was made subject to a condition (i.e., the existence of
the normal hours of work on Saturdays and not work performed operational necessity) negates the application of Article 100 pursuant
to the established doctrine that when the grant of a benefit is made
beyond eight hours in one day. Under Article 83 of the Labor Code:
Article. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any subject to a condition and such condition prevails, the rule on non-
diminution finds no application. Otherwise stated, if Saturday work
employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.
and its corresponding premium pay were granted to CCBPI's
Despite the mistaken notion of CCBPI that Saturday work is employees without qualification, then the company's policy of
synonymous to overtime work, the Court still disagrees with the CA permitting its employees to suffer work on Saturdays could have
ruling that the previous practice of instituting Saturday work by perhaps ripened into company practice protected by the non-
CCBPI had ripened into a company practice covered by Article 100 diminution rule.
of the Labor Code.
Lastly, the Court agrees with the assertion of CCBPI that since the
To note, it is not Saturday work per se which constitutes a benefit to affected employees are daily-paid employees, they should be given
the company's employees. Rather, the benefit involved in this case is their wages and corresponding premiums for Saturday work only if
the premium which the company pays its employees above and they are permitted to suffer work. Invoking the time-honored rule of
beyond the minimum requirements set by law. The CBA between "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay," the CCBPI argues that the
CCBPI and the respondent guarantees the employees that they will be CA's ruling that such unworked Saturdays should be compensated is
paid their regular wage plus an additional 50% thereof for the first contrary to law and the evidence on record.
eight (8) hours of work performed on Saturdays. Therefore, the
benefit, if ever there is one, is the premium pay given by reason of The CA, for its part, ruled that the principle of "a fair day's work for a
Saturday work, and not the grant of Saturday work itself. fair day's pay" was irrelevant to the instant case. According to the
appellate court, since CCBPI's employees are daily-paid workers,
In Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, they should be paid their whole daily rate plus the corresponding
Inc.-Cebu Plant,64 the Court had the occasion to rule that the term premium pay in the absence of a specific CBA provision that directed
"benefits" mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary wages to be paid on a different rate on Saturdays. This was
benefits or privileges given to the employee with monetary notwithstanding the fact that the duration of Saturday work lasted
equivalents. Stated otherwise, the employee benefits contemplated by only for four hours or half the time spent on other workdays.
Article 100 are those which are capable of being measured in terms of
money. Thus, it can be readily concluded from past jurisprudential The CA erred in this pronouncement. The age-old rule governing the
pronouncements that these privileges constituted money in relation between labor and capital, or management and employee, of
themselves or were convertible into monetary equivalents.65 a "fair day's,wage for a fair day's labor" remains the basic factor in
determining employees' wages.67 If there is no work performed by the
In order for there to be proscribed diminution of benefits that employee, there can be no wage.68 In cases where the employee's
prejudiced the affected employees, CCBPI should have unilaterally failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by
withdrawn the 50% premium pay without abolishing Saturday work. termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to
These are not the facts of the case at bar. CCBPI withdrew the the employer; each party must bear his own loss. 69 In other words,
Saturday work itself, pursuant, as already held, to its management where the employee is willing and able to work and is not illegally
prerogative. In fact, this management prerogative highlights the fact prevented from doing so, no wage is due to him. To hold otherwise
that the scheduling of the Saturday work was actually made subject to would be to grant to the employee that which he did not earn at the
a condition, i.e., the prerogative to provide the company's employees prejudice of the employer.
with Saturday work based on the existence of operational necessity.
In the case at bar, CCBPI's employees were not illegally prevented
In Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Eastern Telecoms from working on Saturdays. The company was simply exercising its
Employees Union,66 the company therein allegedly postponed the option not to schedule work pursuant to the CBA provision which
payment of the 14th , 15th , and 16th month bonuses contained in the gave it the prerogative to do so. It therefore follows that the principle
CBA, and unilaterally made the payment subject to availability of of "no work, no pay" finds application in the instant case.
funds. Because of its severe financial condition, the company refused
to pay the subject bonuses. The Court, in holding that such act Having disposed of the issue on wages for unworked Saturdays in
violated the proscription against diminution of benefits, observed that consonance with the well-settled rule of "no work, no pay," this Court
the CBA provided for the subject bonuses without qualification-their deems it unnecessary to belabor on the CA ruling that the concerned
grant was not made to depend on the existence o,f profits. Since no employees should be paid their whole daily rate, and not the amount
conditions were specified in the CBA for the grant of the subject equivalent to one-half day's wage, plus corresponding premium.
benefits, the company could not use its dire financial straits to justify
the omission. On a final note, the Court cannot emphasize enough that its primary
role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties charges it with the
As compared to the factual milieu in the Eastern solemn duty of affording full protection to labor. 70 It is, in fact, well-
Telecommunications case, the CBA between CCBPI and the entrenched in the deluge of our jurisprudence on labor law and social
respondent has no analogous provision which grants that the 50% legislation that the scales of justice usually tilt in favor of the
premium pay would have to be paid regardless of the occurrence of workingman.71 Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to
Saturday work. Thus, the non-payment of the same would not the rule that justice is, in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed
in the light of the established facts and applicable law and
doctrine.72 The law does not authorize the oppression or self-
destruction of the employer.73 Management also has its own rights,
which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest
of simple fair play.74 After all, social justice is, in the eloquent words
of Associate Justice Jose P. Laurel, "the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice
in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated."75

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 23,

2010, and the Resolution dated October 19, 2010
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board, Regional Branch No. 6, Iloilo City
dated September 7, 2006, in Case No. PAC-613-RB6-02-01-06-2006
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 90273-75 November 15, 1989

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner,

vs.
WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES,
THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.

David I. Unay, Jr. for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan Pacific") is a

private, fee-charging, recruitment and employment agency. T in
accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific posted a surety bond issued by
petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and
was granted a license to operate by the POEA.
Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto Palero, Jr., Edwin upheld the POEA Order appealed from and denied the appeal for lack
Cardones and one Edwin Hernandez filed with the POEA separate of merit.
complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a)
of the Labor Code, as amended and for refund of placement fees paid Petitioner Finman now comes before this Court on a Petition for
to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged that Pan Pacific charged and certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary
collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for restraining order, raising much the same issues it had already
them. ventilated before the POEA and the Secretary of Labor. It is
contended once again by petitioner Finman that the POEA had no
Acting on the complaints, the POEA Administrator motu authority to implead petitioner in the proceedings commenced by
proprio impleaded petitioner Finman as party respondent in its private respondents: and that the POEA was not authorized to require,
capacity as surety for Pan Pacific. Separate summonses were served in those same proceedings, petitioner to pay private respondents'
upon Finman and Pan Pacific. The return of the summons served on claims for refund against Pan Pacific on the basis of the surety bond
Pan Pacific at its official address registered in the POEA records, issued by petitioner.
showed that Pan Pacific had moved out therefrom; no prior notice of
transfer or change of address was furnished by Pan Pacific to the Petitioner's contentions are interrelated and will be dealt with
POEA as required under POEA rules. The POEA considered that together. They are, however, quite bereft of merit and must be
constructive service of the complaints had been effected upon Pan rejected.
Pacific and proceeded accordingly.
Petitioner cannot seriously dispute the direct and solidary nature of its
For its part, petitioner Finman filed an answer denying liability and obligations under its own surety bond. Under Section 176 of the
pleading, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (1) the Insurance Code, as amended, the liability of a surety in a surety bond
POEA had no "jurisdiction over surety bonds," that jurisdiction being is joint and several with the principal obligor. Petitioner's bond was
vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular courts; (2) it posted by Pan Pacific in compliance with the requirements of Article
(Finman) had not violated Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code 31 of the Labor Code, which states that —
and complainants' claims had accrued during the suspension of the
principal obligor, Pan Pacific; (3) complainants had no cause of Art. 31. Bonds. — All applicants for license or authority shall post
action against Finman, since it was not privy to the transactions such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of
between them and Pan Pacific and had not received any moneys from Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment
them; and (4) the amounts claimed by complainants had been paid by procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of
them as deposits and not as placement fees. employment as appropriate.

A hearing was held by the POEA on 14 April 1988, at which time The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to
complainants presented their evidence. Petitioner Finman, though determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of,
notified of this hearing, did not appear. the cash and surety bond for any claim or injury covered and
guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied).
On 30 May 1989, the POEA Administrator issued an Order which, in
its dispositive portion, said: The tenor and scope of petitioner Finman's obligations under the bond
it issued are set out in broad ranging terms by Section 4, Rule II,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations:
ordered to pay jointly and severally complainants' claims as
follows: Section 4. Payment of Fees and Posting of Bonds. — Upon
approval of the application by the Minister, the applicant shall pay
1. William Inocencio P6,000 .00 an annual license fee of P6,000.00. It shall also post a cash bond
2. Perfecto Palero, Sr. P5,500 .00 of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P150,000.00 from a bonding
3. Edwin Cardones P2,000 .00 company acceptable to the Administration duly accredited by the
Office of the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer
Respondent agency is ordered to release Cardones' passport, the for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
expenses or obtaining the same of which (sic) shall be deducted conditions for the grant and use of the license or authority and
from the amount of P2,000.00 as it appears that it was respondent contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee
agency who applied for the processing thereof. The claim of compliance with the provisions of the Labor Code and its
Edwin Hernandez is dismissed without prejudice. implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and
placement, the rules of the Administration and relevant issuances
For the established violations respondent agency is hereby of the Ministry and all liabilities which the Administration may
imposed a penalty fine in the amount of P60,000.00. Further, the impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that notice of
ban earlier imposed upon it is herein reiterated. SO ORDERED. garnishment to the principal is notice to the surety. 1 (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioner Finman went on appeal to the Secretary of Labor insisting
that: (1) the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner as party While petitioner Finman has refrained from attaching a copy of the
respondent in the proceedings before the POEA; and that (2) the bond it had issued to its Petition for Certiorari, there can be no
POEA had no authority to enforce directly the surety bond against question that the conditions of the Finman surety bond Pan Pacific
petitioner. In an Order dated 3 August 1989, the Secretary of Labor had posted with the POEA include the italicized portions of Section
4, Rule 11, Book I quoted above. It is settled doctrine that the
conditions of a bond specified and required in the provisions of the
statute or regulation providing for the submission of the bond, are indepensable or merely a proper party to the proceedings, we believe
incorporated or built into all bonds tendered under that statute or and so hold that the POEA could properly implead it as party
regulation, even though not there set out in printer's ink. 2 respondent either upon the request of the private respondents or, as it
happened, motu propio. Such is the situation under the Revised Rules
5
In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary of Labor of Court   and the application thereof, directly or by analogy, by the
affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated Article 32 of the Labor Code, POEA can certainly not be regarded as arbitrary, oppressive or
as amended capricious.

Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. — Any person applying The fundamental argument of Finman is that its liability under its
with a private fee charging employment agency for employment own bond must be determined and enforced, not by the POEA or the
assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained Secretary of Labor, but rather by the Insurance Commission or by the
employment through its efforts or has actually commenced regular courts. Once more, we are not moved by petitioner's
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved argument.
receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor
shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (Emphasis There appears nothing so special or unique about the determination of
supplied). a surety's liability under its bond as to restrict that determination to
the Office of the Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of
as well as Article 34 (a) of the same Code: justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly stressed by the
second paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code:
Article 34. Prohibited practices. — It shall be unlawful for any
individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority: Art. 31. Bonds. — ... ...

(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount than The secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to
that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application
Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater of, the cash or surety bond for any claim or injury covered and
than actually received by him as a loan or advance. (Emphasis guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied)
supplied)
We believe and so hold that to compel the POEA and private
3
There is, hence, no question that, both under the Labor Code   and the respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's bond-to go to the Insurance
POEA Rules and Regulations, 4 Pan Pacific had violated at least one Commissioner or to a regular court of law to enforce that bond, would
of the conditions for the grant and continued use of the recruitment be to collide with the public policy which requires prompt resolution
license granted to it. There can, similarly, be no question that the of claims against private recruitment and placement agencies. The
POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor are authorized to Court will take judicial notice of the appealing frequency with which
require Pan Pacific to refund the placement fees it had charged some, perhaps many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid for
private respondents without securing employment for them and to overseas employment by, e.g., collecting placement fees without
impose the fine of P60,000.00 upon Pan Pacific. Article 36 of the securing employment for them at all, extracting exorbitant fees or
Labor Code authorizes the Secretary of Labor "to restrict and "kickbacks" from those for whom employment is actually obtained,
regulate" the recruitment and placement activities of agencies like abandoning hapless and unlettered workers to exploitative foreign
Pan Pacific and "to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations principals, and so on. Cash and surety bonds are required by the
to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of [Title I on POEA and its predecessor agencies from recruitment and
"Recruitment and Placement of Workers]," including of course, employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and
Article 32 on "Fees to be paid by workers," quoted earlier. Upon the effective recourse against such companies when held liable for
other hand, Section 13 of Rule VI, Book I of the POEA Rules and applicants or workers' claims. Clearly that public policy will be
Regulations expressly authorize the POEA Administrator or the effectively negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and
Secretary of Labor to impose fines "in addition to or in lieu of the Employment were held powerless to compel a surety company to
penalties of suspension or cancellation" of the violator recruitment make good on its solidary undertaking in the same quasi-judicial
agency's license. proceeding where the liability of the principal obligor, the recruitment
or employment agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety
If Pan Pacific is liable to private respondents for the refunds claimed is given reasonable opportunity to present any defenses it or the
by them and to the POEA for the fine of P60,000.00, and if petitioner principal obligor may be entitled to set up. Petitioner surety whose
Finman is solidarily liable with Pan Pacific under the operative terms liability to private respondents and the POEA is neither more nor less
of the bond, it must follow that Finman is liable both to the private than that of Pan Pacific, is not entitled to another or different
respondents and to the POEA. Petitioner Finman asserts, however, procedure for determination or fixing of that liability than that which
that the POEA had no authority to implead it in the proceedings Pan Pacific is entitled and subject to.
against Pan Pacific.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
We are not persuaded by this assertion. Clearly, petitioner Finman is injunction or temporary restraining order is hereby DISMISSED for
a party-in-interest in, certainly a proper party to, the proceedings lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. This Resolution is immediately
private respondents had initiated against Pan Pacific the principal executory.
obligor. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying
the POEA of its new address and from responding to the complaints, Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
petitioner Finman may well I be regarded as an indispensable party to
the proceedings before the POEA. Whether Finman was an
SECOND DIVISION

August 9, 2017

G.R. No. 187160

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ERLINDA A. SISON@ "MARGARITA S. AGUILAR,",
Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal by Erlinda A. Sison (Sison) from the 6

November 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals irtcA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02833. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 8 May 2007 Joint
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
211 (RTC) finding Sison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1)
violation of Section 6, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No.
8042 (RA 8042), or illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage,
and (2) estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Sometime in November or December 1999, Darvy3 M. Castuera

(Castuera) was introduced to Sison by her husband, a certain Col.
Alex Sison (Col. Sison), a police officer assigned at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Castuera's aunt, Edna Magalona, was then teaching
police officers at Camp Crame and Col. Sison was one of her
students. Col. Sison happened to mention that his wife can facilitate
papers for workers in Australia. Castuera and Magalona then Upon returning to the Philippines, Castuera filed a complaint against
proceeded to Col. Sison's home in Las Piñas. There, they met Sison Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo at the Philippine Overseas Employment
and she briefed Castuera on the requirements for working as a fruit Administration (POEA). The agency verified that Sison, Dedales, and
picker in Australia.4 Bacomo did not have any license or permit to hire and recruit for
overseas employment.15
During that meeting, Sison introduced Castuera to another man who
related that he was able to go to Australia with Sison's help. She also
During the trial, Sison denied that she recruited Castuera for
showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped employment. She maintained she was also a victim of illegal
recruitment by Dedales.16 She claimed that it was Dedales, then
to get employment in Australia. Sison further narrated that a couple
she had helped had given her their car as payment. Because of Sison's
working for a travel agency, who was processing her visa and ticket
representations, Castuera believed in her promise that she could send
to Australia. She further claimed that she accepted the down payment
him to Australia.5 money from Castuera because Dedales was already in Malaysia at
that time. When she and Castuera arrived in Malaysia, she gave the
Sison asked Castuera for ₱180,000 for processing his papers. After money to Dedales. Like Castuera, she found out when they arrived in
some negotiations, Sison agreed to lower the fee to ₱160,000. Malaysia that her Australian visa application had been denied. She
Castuera was to pay half before he leaves the Philippines and the also said that Dedales asked her for an additional US$ l,000, which
other half will be taken from his salary in Australia.6 she gave.

On 16 June 2000, Castuera met Sison at McDonald's in SM However, upon learning that it was difficult to get an Australian visa,
Megamall to give the ₱80,000 down payment. Sison issued a signed Sison opted to go back to the Philippines. When Dedales and Bacomo
document as proof of payment. Castuera's companions, his aunt Edna informed her that Castuera had been issued a U.S. visa, Sison
Magalona and cousin Mark Magalona, also signed the document as supposedly told them to apply the US$1,000 she paid to Castuera's
witnesses. Sison promised Castuera that she would personally process payment.
his visa application.7
The RTC's Joint Decision
Sison, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. She
told him that it was difficult to get an Australian visa in the In its 8 May 2007 Joint Decision, the RTC found Sison guilty of
Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia to get one. She also said illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage and estafa:
that Castuera's Australian visa was already in Malaysia and his
personal appearance was required there.8 WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused ERLINDA SISON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and hereby
On 28 June 2008, Sison and Castuera left Manila for Zamboanga City sentences her, thus:
by plane and from there, rode a boat to Sandakan, Malaysia. Sison
told Castuera that he only needed to stay in Malaysia for a week then 1) In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4035-H for Violation of
he would proceed to Australia.9 Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8042 (Illegal
Recruitment-Economic Sabotage) to suffer the penalty of
Twice, they nearly overstayed in Malaysia. Each time, Sison and life imprisonment pursuant to Section 6 (m) of R.A. 8042 in
Castuera would leave for Brunei, stay there for three days, and then relation to Section 7 (b) thereof and to pay a fine of One
go back to Malaysia. The second time they returned to Malaysia, they Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00) as the illegal recruitment
met several of Sison's other recruits - other Filipinos who have come constitutes economic sabotage;
in through Thailandas well as Sison' s co-accused, Rea Dedales
(Dedales) and Leonardo Bacomo (Bacomo). Castuera was told that 2) In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4036 for Estafa under
the group would be proceeding to Indonesia to process their Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to
Australian visas there. The group then left for Indonesia.However, the suffer the penalty of four years, two (2) months of prision
day after arriving in Indonesia, Sison went back to the Philippines, correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor
leaving Castuera and the other recruits with Dedales and Bacomo.10 as maximum.

Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim, Darby Castuera, the
Indonesia was denied.11 Dedales said it was harder to get an sum of Php160,000.00 as actual damages.
Australian visa from Indonesia and told Castuera to apply for a U.S.
visa instead. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his In so far as accused Rea Dedales and Leonardo Bacomo are
U.S. visa, which he paid.12 However, when his U.S. visa came, concerned, who have been fugitives from justice and are not yet
Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian passport bearing an arraigned, let bench warrants issue against them. Accordingly, the
Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return to cases against them are ordered archived until such time that they shall
the Philippines. He asked for his US$1,000 back but Dedales would have been arrested and arraigned.
not return it. His Philippine passport was also not returned
immediately causing him to overstay in Indonesia. He found out then
that the extension papers that Dedales and Bacomo procured for him SO ORDERED.17
were fake.13
The RTC stated it was clear that Sison convinced Castuera to apply
Castuera sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in Indonesia and for employment as fruit picker in Australia
18
and induced him to pay
was able to return to the Philippines using his own funds. 14 the fees needed for overseas employment.
The RTC also held that Castuera was indeed "a victim of illegal Second, the Court of Appeals held that even if Sison did not directly
recruitment committed by a syndicate"19 since it was committed by a recruit Castuera, her actions led him to believe that she was engaged
group of three persons acting "in conspiracy" with one another.20 in the recruitment business.32 Castuera was able to prove that it was
Sison who promised him a job as fruit picker in Australia and even
According to the RTC, the conduct of Sison and her co-accused accompanied him to Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia in the guise of
showed that they acted "in concert towards the accomplishment of a processing his visa application. However, the Court of Appeals noted
common felonious purpose which was to recruit [Castuera] for that this process was actually part of "defrauding [Castuera] and
overseas employment even though they had no license to do so."21 inveigling him with false or fraudulent promises of employment in a
foreign land."33
As to the estafa charge, the RTC held that Sison and her co-accused
were also guilty of the same. The RTC pointed out that the element of Further, the Court of Appeals found that Sison made representations
deceit was evident in the "false pretenses by which accused deluded about her purported power and authority to recruit for employment in
[Castuera] into believing that they ha[ve] the power and qualifications Australia and, in the process, collected various. amounts of money
to send people abroad for employment" and which induced him to from Castuera as placement and processing fees. 34 The Court of
pay them Pll0,000 and us$1,000.22 Appeals stated that it was "enough that these recruiters give the
impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job
The RTC also rejected Sison's claim that she was also a victim like placement 35
abroad in order to induce the latter to tender payment of
Castuera. The RTC stated that if that were true, then Sison should fees."
have filed a case against the illegal recruiter, but she did not. It also
held that Castuera's positive and categorical testimony prevailed over The Court of Appeals further held that the illegal recruitment
Sison's mere denials.23 activities of Sison and her co-accused constituted economic sabotage.
It underscored that "active participation of each [accused] in the
The Decision of the Court of Appeals various phases of the recruitment scam formed part of a series of
machinations" which lured Castuera to part with his hard earned
money in exchange for guaranteed employment in Australia. 36 The
Sison appealed the joint decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals noted that Castuera would not have gone along with
traveling to Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia and complying with
She maintained that she was also a victim of her co-accused Sison's further demands without the repeated assurances of the
Dedales24 and that there was "no material and concrete proof that latter.37
indeed [she] offered or promised for a fee employment abroad to two
(2) or more persons."25 According to Sison, Castuera merely sought The Court of Appeals also affirmed Sison's conviction for estafa. It
her out to "enable him to transact with accused Dedales"26 who would held that the two elements of estafa were proven in the case. The
facilitate his application for an Australian visa. She claimed that there Court of Appeals found that Sison's misrepresentations facilitated the
was no proof beyond reasonable doubt that her transaction with commission of the crime. Sison deliberately misrepresented that she
Castuera was for recruitment or deployment to Australia.27 had the power, capacity, or means to send Castuera to Australia. The
Court of Appeals concluded that Sison defrauded Castuera through
Sison did not dispute her lack of license or authority to conduct deceit.38
recruitment activities. However, she maintained that the transaction
she facilitated between Castuera and Dedales was "only for the Sison appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to this Court via a
former to secure a visa, not a working visa." Further, she argued that Notice of Appeal dated 25 November 2008.39
the procurement of a visa did not qualify as a "recruitment activity."28
The Issue
Sison also contested the ruling that she was guilty of estafa, claiming
that she "did not fraudulently or falsely [represent] herself to possess
the power, capacity or authority to recruit and deploy [Castuera] for The lone issue in this case is whether the guilt of Sison was
overseas employment."29 established beyond reasonable doubt.

In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's joint The Court's Ruling
decision:
The appeal has no merit. The assailed decision of the Court of
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Appeals is affirmed, with modification as to the penalty imposed in
The decision of the court a quo dated May 8, 2007 is AFFIRMED. the estafa case.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate - Economic Sabotage
30
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals held that all the elements of illegal recruitment
were sufficiently proven in the case.

First, Sison herself did not dispute that she is not licensed or
authorized to engage in recruitment or placement activities. This fact
was unknown to Castuera at the time of their transaction.31
Under Article 13(b) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, also (e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, recruitment and not to employ any worker who has not applied for
placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, employment through his agency;
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for employment, (f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any jobs harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee Republic of the Philippines;
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement." (g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly
Illegal recruitment, on the other hand, is defined in Article 38: authorized representative;

Article 38. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT. - (a) Any recruitment (h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment,
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange
34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of matters or information as may be required by the Secretary
this Code. The Department of Labor and Employment or any law of Labor and Employment;
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker,
xxxx employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor and Employment from the time of
RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the
1995, approved on 7 June 1995, further strengthened the protection period of the expiration of the same without the approval of
extended to those seeking overseas employment. Section 6, in the Department of Labor and Employment;
particular, extended the activities covered under the term illegal
recruitment: (j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement
agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any
II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged
directly on indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment
shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, (k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant
utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contact workers before departure for monetary or financial
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether considerations other than those authorized under the Labor
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the (1) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as
Philippines. Provided, that such non-license or non-holder, who, in determined by the Department of Labor and Employment;
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to and
two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any persons, (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority. connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to scale shall be considered as offense involving economic
make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually sabotage.
received by him as a loan or advance;
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
document in relation to recruitment or employment; confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or a group.
document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the
purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
Code; principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons,
the officers having control, management or direction of their business
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already shall be liable. (Emphasis supplied)
employed to quit his employment in order to offer him
another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker Simply put, illegal recruitment is "committed by persons who,
from oppressive terms and conditions of employment; without authority from the government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes."40
Illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either non-license or license but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two
holders. Non-license holders are liable by the simple act of engaging hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than five hundred
in recruitment and placement activities, while license holders may thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
also be held liable for committing the acts prohibited under Section 6
of RA 8042. (b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than one
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
illegal recruitment for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, Provided, however, that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or
or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. (Emphasis
Section 6 of RA 8042.41 supplied)

In this case, Sison herself admits that she has no license or authority The RTC rejected Sison's claim that she was also a victim of illegal
to undertake recruitment and placement activities'. The Court has held recruitment. The courts do not look favorably at denial as a defense
in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he or since "[d]enial, same as an alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
she could send workers abroad for employment, even without the convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
authority or license to do so, commits illegal recruitment.42 undeserving of weight in law. It is considered with suspicion and
always received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
It is the absence of the necessary license or authority to recruit and and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated and
deploy workers that renders the recruitment activity unlawful. To concocted."46 Denial "does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of
prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that "the accused gave the the fact."47
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability
to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they were Sison's defense of denial is merely an atte.mpt to avoid liability. The
convinced to part with their money for that end."43 Court agrees with the RTC's assessment that Sison's claim that she is
also a victim of illegal recruitment has no credence.
On the other hand, illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, as in
the present case, has the following elements: (a) the offender does not It is hard to believe that Castuera would deal with Sison in the
have the valid license or authority required by law to engage in manner that he had if he believed that she was also a mere recruit like
recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes himself. For one thing, there is no proof of Sison' s transactions with
any of the "recruitment and placement" activities defined in Article Dedales, except for a handwritten acknowledgment receipt, 48 which is
13(b) of the Labor Code, or engages in any of the prohibited practices only backed up by her own testimony.
enumerated under now Section 6 of RA 8042; and (c) the illegal
recruitment is "carried out by a group of three or more persons Also, if she were a victim, she would have taken action against
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any Dedales and Bacomo herself. Her husband was a member of the
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme." 44 In the third Philippine National Police. It would have been easy to seek help in
element, it "is not essential that there be actual proof that all the apprehending the illegal recruiters. Sison also failed to explain why
conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they she took no action to recover the ₱100,000 she allegedly paid for her
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective."45 Australian visa, as well as the money to travel and stay in Malaysia,
Brunei, and Indonesia. >>
The acts of Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo show a common purpose and
and each undertook a part to reach their objective. Their concerted Lastly, why would she have allowed, as she claims, the US$1,000 she
action is evident in that either Sison or Dedales was receiving allegedly paid to be applied to the U.S. visa application of Castuera,
payments from the recruits; that Dedales signed the acknowledgment someone she says she hardly knows, instead of trying to recover the
receipt from Sison; and that the three accompanied their recruits same, considering that Dedales failed to procure the visa for which
together in seeking out their visas in Malaysia and Indonesia. Further, she ·paid? All these cast doubt on her claim of being only a victim of
the impression given to Castuera and other recruits was that the three Dedales.
were indeed working together.
At the very least, Sison gave the impression that she had some sort of
Since it was proven that the three accused were acting in concert and authority, whether or not Dedales is indeed the principal, which is
conspired with one another, their illegal recruitment activity is enough to amount to illegal recruitment. In any case, the
considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal acknowledgment
recruitment involving economic sabotage.
receipts49 only serve to strengthen the case of conspiracy among Sison
Section 7 of RA 8042 sets out the penalty for illegal recruitment and her coaccused.
involving economic sabotage:
Estafa
SEC. 7. PENALTIES -
We affirm Sison's conviction for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042 and estafa under
Article 315(2) (a) of the RPC. In People v. Daud, the Court processing fee, but the purpose for which it was paid never
explained: materialized. Likewise, said amount was never reimbursed to
Castuera despite his demands for its return.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal Penalty
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment The penalty for illegal recruitment is correct based on Section 7 of
is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not RA 8042. Since the illegal recruitment was committed by a non-
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the licensee or non- holder of authority, the RTC may rightfully mete out
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for the maximum penalty. Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC stands.
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. The penalty for estafa, however, needs to be modified. Article 315 of
2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction the RPC provides:
for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one's
acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud another
versa.50 (Citations omitted) by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
the RPC are: to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the of this Code, the penalty shall be tenned prision mayor or reclusion
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or temporal, as the case may be.
fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.51
The Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in determining the
penalty for estafa. Under this law, the maximum term is "that which,
All these elements are present in this case. in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under [the RPC]" and the minimum shall be "within the range of the
First, Sison misrepresented her qualifications and authority to send penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [RPC] for the offense."54
Castuera to work in Australia. She actively made Castuera believe
that she had the ability to do so - she showed pictures of her Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, "the minimum term is
"recruits," had one of them give a testimonial, and told him stories to taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere within prision
convince him of such ability. It did not matter that "they had no correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to
agreement"52 that their transaction was for recruitment or deployment. 4 years and 2 months). On the other hand, the maximum term is taken
All her acts were calculated to convince Castuera that Sison was from the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum
qualified to send him abroad for employment. It is enough that she to prision mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year of
"gave the impression that [she] had the power to send workers abroad imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 in excess of ₱22,000.00,
for employment purposes."53 provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years."55

Second, Sison's false representation was made prior to or In People v. Tolentino, the Court further explained:
simultaneous to the commission of the fraud. Sison used these false
representations to convince Castuera that he would be able to go to
Australia and be a fruit picker, just like her other recruits. These The range of penalty under Article 315 is composed of only two
representations were clearly mere devices to convince Castuera, periods. To compute the maximum period of the indeterminate
whom she only met at that time, that she was a legitimate recruiter. sentence, the total number of years included in the two periods should
be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a
period. Following this computation, the minimum, medium, and
Third, Castuera relied on Sison's representations. He believed that she maximum periods of the prescribed penalty are:
could send him to Australia because of the pictures and testimonials
she showed him. He also relied on the fact that his aunt knew Sison's
husband, a police officer, adding to her trustworthiness. Sison banked 1. Minimum Period - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years,
on that trust to convince Castuera to part with his money and be 5 months and 10 days;
"recruited" into overseas employment. Castuera believed that Sison
had the same ability to send him to Australia. He did not even ask for 2. Medium Period - 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6
her authority or check for himself with the POEA, relying instead on years, 8 months and 20 days;
her word. This tells us that he was fully convinced based on Sison's
representations. 3. Maximum Period - 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years.
Fourth, Sison' s misrepresentation resulted in damage to Castuera. He
paid the ₱80,000 down payment that Sison required of him as
Any incremental penalty, i.e. one year for every P10,000 in excess of
₱22,000, shall be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years, at the court's discretion, provided the total penalty
does not exceed 20 years.56

To arrive at the correct penalty, the Court must determine the actual
amount defrauded from the victim.

Actual damages must be proven, not presumed.57 It should be

"actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable."58

Based on the evidence and testimony of Castuera, he only paid

₱80,000 as down payment because, under their agreement, the
balance of the placement fee was to be deducted from his salary when
he starts working in Australia. Thus, there is no basis for the
₱160,000. awarded by the RTC.

Based on the foregoing, the minimum penalty should be anywhere

from 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional in its minimum
period to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium
period. Thus, the R TC was correct in imposing the minimum penalty
of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.

However, the maximum period should be computed as the maximum

period that could be properly imposed under the RPC, plus the
incremental penalty resulting from each additional ₱10,000 in
excess of ₱22,000 that was defrauded from the victim.

In this case, the amount is ₱80,000, which means that there must be
five more years of imprisonment added to the maximum period
imposed by the RPC.1âwphi1 Thus, the maximum period should
be 13 years of reclusion temporal.

Lastly, Sison is ordered to pay legal interest of 6% per annum on the

amount adjudicated, to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision
until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02833 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. MCOl-4036 for
Estafa under A1iicle 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, appellant
Erlinda A. Sison is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to thirteen
(13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Sison is
also ORDERED to pay Darvy M. Castuera the amount of ₱80,000 as
actual damages, with legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the finality of this Decision until the amount is fully paid.

SO ORDERED.