KINNAIRD COLLEGE FOR WOMEN, LAHORE

TOPIC: BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE OF CHINA,

INDIA AND US CRITISISM ON BRI

PRE-MID ASSIGNMENT 1

SUBMITTED BY: Eimman Fatima

ROLL NO: F20BENG006
SEMESTER: 3

SUBMITTED TO: Dr. Qudsia Akram

GENERAL: Current Affairs

Date of submission:17-9-2021
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE OF
CHINA
Introduction:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a strategy initiated
by the People’s Republic of China that seeks to
connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and
maritime networks with the aim of improving regional integration, increasing trade, and increasing
economic growth.
The name was devised in 2013 by China’s President Xi Jinping, who drew inspiration from the concept
of the Silk Road established during the Han Dynasty 2,000 years ago – an ancient network of trade
routes that connected China to the Mediterranean via Eurasia for centuries. The BRI has also been
referred to in the past as 'One Belt One Road'.
The BRI comprises a Silk Road Economic Belt – a trans-continental passage that links China with
southeast Asia, south Asia, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe by land and a 21st century Maritime Silk
Road, a sea route connecting China’s coastal regions with southeast and south Asia, the South Pacific,
the Middle East, and Eastern Africa, all the way to Europe.
Known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's efforts are expected to enhance inter-regional
connectivity by focusing on five areas of cooperation: infrastructure, trade, policy, finance, and people.

China’s regional and global importance:

China’s transformation from a regional economic power to a global powerhouse, its efforts in human
development, and its strong economic performance are much known in the international commination.
Additionally, the major geopolitical transition and dramatic changes in the Western political landscape
have also encouraged China to initiate an alternative model of human development, as the balance of
economic and political powers is shifting from the West to the East. BRI is often labeled as Beijing’s
strategic effort to boost its soft image as a constructive actor in its neighborhood through a shared model
of economic and social success that respects the sovereignty of and the equality among.

Goals of the Belt and Road Initiative

According to the official outline, BRI aims to “promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African
continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the
Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize
diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries.”
BRI is a global initiative but by its nature of building on the historic Silk Road puts a major focus on
countries in Asia, Eastern Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, a region mainly composed of
emerging markets. According to the Belt and Road Portal, currently 71 countries are taking part in the
Initiative, together representing more than a third of the world`s GDP and two thirds of the world`s
population.

Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative:

According to official information, in
March 2020, 138 countries and 29
international organizations had signed
cooperation agreements for the BRI. For
countries and organizations to “join” the
BRI, China and the respective country
or organization sign a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU). There are several
countries listed in official Chinese
media (yidaiyilu.gov.cn), which did not
confirm having signed a full MoU for
cooperating under the Belt and Road Initiative framework. These include for example Russia, Austria,
Congo D.R., Dominica, Niger, and Benin.
The Belt and Road Initiative combines two initiatives
1. The (land based) Silk Road Economic Belt, comprising six development corridors
2. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
The Silk Road Economic Belt
The Silk Road Economic Belt is a long-term vision for the infrastructural development, connectivity and
economic cooperation of Eurasia and is spanning six development “corridors”, namely:
1. New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELBEC)
2. China – Mongolia – Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC)
3. China – Central Asia – West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC)
4. China – Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC)
5. Bangladesh – China – India – Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC)
6. China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road connects
China to Southeast Asia, Indonesia, India, the
Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, Egypt, and
Europe, encompassing the South China Sea, Strait
of Malacca, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Bengal, Arabian
Sea, Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.
The Polar Silk Road
On January 26, 2018, the State Council
Information Office of the People`s Republic of
China published a white paper, titled “China`s Arctic Policy”, vowing to actively participating in Arctic
affairs. The document is a blueprint for China`s Arctic strategy and its ambition to develop a “Polar Silk
Road” under the “Belt and Road Initiative”.
Cooperation Priorities
The official Belt and Road Initiative outline promotes the joint formulation of development plans and
measures for advancing cross-national or regional cooperation between countries involved in BRI. This
includes intergovernmental cooperation and multi-level macro policy exchange, communication
mechanisms and policy support for the implementation of large-scale projects and the coordination in
monetary policy.
According to the outline, the Belt and Road Initiative is based on five cooperation priorities:
1. Policy coordination (Promotion of intergovernmental cooperation, multi-level intergovernmental
macro policy exchange and communication mechanism)
2. Facilities connectivity (Improvement of connectivity of infrastructure construction plans and
technical standards systems)
3. Unimpeded trade (Reduction of investment and trade barriers, promotion of regional economic
integration)
4. Financial integration (Coordination and cooperation in monetary policy, set-up of financing
institutions)
5. People-to-people bonds (Cultural and academic exchange and dialogue, media cooperation)
Funding of the Initiative
The funding of the Belt and Road Initiative will be secured by various institutional mechanisms such as:
1. Policy Banks
Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), Export-Import
Bank of China (CHEXIM)
2. State Owned Banks
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
3. State Owned Funds (selection)
China Investment Corporation (CIC), Silk Road Fund (SRF)
4. International Financing Institutions (selection)
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development
Bank (NDB)
To fully fund the total BRI project volume of estimated USD 4 to 8 trillion, diverse funding channels
such as BRI bonds, private capital investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) but also State-
Owned Enterprise (SOE) investment will be crucial for the success of the Initiative.

Conclusion
In the Political Report at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping set a
new target for China to become “great modern socialist country” by the middle of the twenty-first
century and proposed to promote the building of a “community of shared future for mankind.” In this
context, the BRI is regarded as a practice to build a community of shared future for mankind.
In major multilateral relations, at present, China is likely to be reform oriented by taking a leadership
position within the regime rather than challenging the existing international regime. The relationship
between China and the BRI countries is also a place for an experimentation toward the formation of an
economic area led by China. In fact, however, along with the progress of the BRI projects, a sense of
disappointment is also spreading among some of the BRI countries with China-led project delays and
huge debts to China.
The impression that China poses a “threat” is on the rise around the globe. It is a threat that China as an
economic superpower would form an exclusive economic area based on the BRI and become a new
global rule maker instead of G7. By pursuing the opening-up policy, China has benefited from trade and
FDI by taking an almost “free ride” on the global free trade system. China is likely to enjoy these
benefits in future with burdening minimum costs of becoming a rule maker. Ironically, current trends of
undermining free trade system with rising protectionism are not necessarily favorable for China. It is the
most favorable scenario for China to continue reaping the fruits of free trade system, while forming a
China-led economic area with the BRI countries in the backyard.

INDIAN AND US CRITICISM ON BRI

The MSRI is the sea route corridor component of the BRI and is the ‘belt’ of the BRI. Complimenting
the Silk Road Economic Belt in the maritime domain, its intentions are aimed at investing in Southeast
Asia, Oceania, and Africa through the South Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea (Liu
2014). The MSRI is easily overlayed onto Chinese defense policy—with countries like the United
States, Australia, and academics accusing China of offering overly favorable loans to developing nations
with the intention of indebting them to China. As a result, the MSRI is the more contentious than the
Silk Road Economic Belt.

Indian Criticism on BRI:

Since the mid-2000s the Indian government has rejected its traditional non-alignment in support of
malalignment as a means of helping their own national interests. Originated under Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and continued under Narendra Modi, essential to this policy is the support of
multilateral institutions, ‘normative hedging’ (pursuing relationships with multiple states in multiple
issues) and strategic partnerships. Under those principles a strong relationship with China and
investment into the BRI should be obvious, however Indian national security concerns have prevented
any serious investment into the infrastructure programs. Despite this, India has an 8.3% voting share in
the AIIB (as compared to China’s 28.7%), making it the second-largest member state after China and
contributing US$8.4 billion. It is also an enthusiastic partner in the NDB with the other BRICS member
countries. Their willingness to engage in the BRI-linked financial institutions demonstrates their desire
to participate in the initiative where it is truly multilateral and not, as New Delhi views it, a unilateral
foreign policy initiative. Their commitment to multilateralism is a pillar of their malalignment strategy
because it allows them to engage with multiple partners at the same time. Indeed, their approach to
China is increasingly multilateral as it provides a ‘neutral playground’ with which they can better
understand competing security interests. India looks favorably upon financial institutions like the NDB
and AIIB because they are truly multilateral without any overt Chinese political motif, and they are the
largest recipient of AIIB loans.
New Delhi views some BRI initiatives as counter to their security interests. China is a major trading
partner with Pakistan, generating US$9.2 billion in reciprocal trade in 2012-13. This expanding
economic partnership is prompted by CPEC, the construction of an economic corridor aimed at
connecting Xinjiang with Gwadar Port. Gwadar was transferred to the Chinese-state run China Overseas
Port Holdings in February 2013, and the Chinese government claims that the port will serve as the
‘primary gateway’ for trade between China and the Middle East and Africa. India holds many
reservations about this project. First, the corridor will run through disputed territory in Kashmir. The
Kashmir region claimed by Pakistan, India, and China is of vital importance to Indian policymakers in
New Delhi. Moves by China to construct an economic corridor through Kashmir to Gwadar can be seen
as the Chinese recognizing Pakistani claims over Kashmir, despite Chinese claims that the Indians
should not be over concerned about that. Territorial disputes fuel Indian dissatisfaction with Pakistan,
and have sparked conflict as recently as 2019, so any move by China seen in New Delhi as recognizing
the legitimacy of Islamabad’s claims over Kashmir would do serious damage to the China-India bilateral
relationship. Former ambassador Vishnu Prakash noted that the SCO meeting was held at a time when
India is decoupling from China, and it was “no longer business as usual” between the two countries.
There is also an “unholy alliance” between China and Pakistan that will thwart India’s initiatives, he
said.
Indian grievances with CPEC do not end there, however. Because Gwadar is a deep-water port, it
arguably gives Islamabad and Beijing a strategic advantage in the IOR over India’s role as the regional
power. There are concerns in New Delhi that the port, which is owned by a Chinese state-owned
enterprise, can be turned into a permanent military facility which could threaten Indian naval forces
operating out of bases from the subcontinent. Chinese priorities in the IOR are the protection of their sea
lines of communication, particularly as it relates to the transport of liquified natural gas. The
development of anti-access area denial weapons such as the anti-ship ballistic missile, when
compounded with the construction of ports in the IOR, poses a strategic challenge to Indian naval
hegemony. Indian concerns with the broader MSRI stem from the construction of nearby ports such as
Hambantota, Sri Lanka, Sittwe, Myanmar, and Chittagong, Bangladesh. In the case of Hambantota,
China gave loans for the construction of a deep-water port knowing that Sri Lanka was not going to be
able to pay it off with the 6.3% interest rate as opposed to IMF and AIIB loans which have 0.25% to
0.3% interest rates. Sri Lanka was forced to convert debt to equity and give a Chinese SOE an 80%
share and a 99-year lease over the port. India wishes to preserve her status as regional maritime
hegemon and Chinese infrastructure spending is seen as a means by which Beijing can encroach on that
position.

US criticism on BRI:
The United States’ response to a rising China has largely focused on strengthening military capabilities,
doctrines, and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. To maintain its dominant position globally in the long-
term, the United States must think with the elaborate geoeconomics effort Beijing has launched to
project strategic influence across the Eurasian continent, which holds most of the world’s economic
centers and natural resources.
The US has been extremely critical of the BRI. The Trump administration has recently stepped up
criticism against the mega initiative, cautioning countries around the world about the "predatory
financing" of the project aimed at enhancing China's global influence by financing and building huge
infrastructure projects.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has made scathing criticism of the BRI during his recent tours to
the UK and Finland. During his visit to Britain, he reportedly said the BRI had undermined sovereignty
of the countries and asked the UK government to be vigilant about it.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) demonstrates the transformative geopolitical effects of China’s rise.
The BRI aims to stabilize China’s western borders, revive its economy, push non-Western international
economic institutions, gain influence in other countries, and diversify trade routes while bypassing the
U.S. pivot to Asia.
First, U.S. leaders have focused on Beijing’s maritime buildup in East Asia, and while most analyses
have ridiculed its massive investments in poor and unstable parts of continental Eurasia, those initiatives
are mutually reinforcing, part of the same grand project, which is to push the U.S. toward the edge of the
Eurasian rimland, thereby downgrading its geostrategic influence.
Second, Beijing seeks to offset the United States’ military primacy. Its buildup in maritime East Asia
and the South China sea is worthy of attention but it is also designed in response to the U.S. naval
presence and to the alliances that American leaders have nurtured along China’s southern side since the
early years of the Cold War.
Third, Chinese leaders have long aimed to freeride on U.S. Middle Eastern security architecture while
preparing for its supposedly inevitable decline. Beijing has capitalized on Washington’s heavy lifting to
ensure stable energy supplies and has exploited the widespread discontent resulting from U.S. military
interventionism and regime change campaigns to befriend all the countries of the region.
China has nurtured bilateral relations with Tehran for decades, leveraging a common bitterness toward
Western dominance. Most important, it now seeks to use Iran’s potential as trade crossroads and as the
cheapest route to export Caucasian and Central Asian natural resources with potentially significant
consequences for Europe without intruding U.S. and Russian spheres of influence.
Beijing also made breakthroughs in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The war on terror initially
increased U.S. hegemony over the region. Washington went to considerable lengths to build a strategic
partnership with India and initiated a thaw with Myanmar, along China’s southern border, and tried to
launch a New Silk Road between Afghanistan, Central Asia, and South Asia to marginalize Beijing and
other regional competitors. It invested heavily in infrastructures and other strategic domains in Indian
Ocean coastal states. It started the building of major overland routes through Myanmar and Pakistan to
connect its mainland to local seas. The newly-created China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) might
even be extended to Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.
The Trump Administration’s recent National Security Strategy endeavored to “help South Asian nations
maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.” Among other initiatives,
Washington upgraded the profile of the Quad, a partnership that includes the United States, India,
Australia, and Japan.
Conclusion:
In the long run, China’s geoeconomics offensive across the Eurasian continent could threaten the
foundations of the United States’ post-WWII hegemony. Because of its narrow focus on the military
balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, the United States has not yet developed the tools necessary to
address that challenge. Adjusting to pursue a more realistic grand strategy would account for these
realities and redirect resources to the appropriate means — a true “pivot to Asia.” This grand strategy
would yield substantial short- and long-term benefits for the American people and the West. U.S. leaders
should engage Beijing to try to shape the BRI’s contours to their advantage, minimize the risk of war,
and encourage cooperation in domains such as counter-terrorism and global environmental reforms.
As for India should Join OBOR with China it will further promote Sino-India relations and contribute to
peace and stability in the region. This Era we live currently in is based on economy. Nations of Europe
which fought for centuries have forged peace and collaboration among themselves. India and China had
decades of good relationships which went sour after unclear partition lines sent up by the British due to
which shift changed in South Asia and resulted in Indo China War in 1962. China is currently sitting at
the top of the world economy. India needs to realize its past mistakes and mend ties for future of both
nations.
India also needs to solve its decade old disputes with Sri Lanka, Nepal and especially with Pakistan on
Kashmir issue. Solution of Kashmir issue is key to India’s Future. Solution would mean ending of poor
relations with Pakistan, lesser defense expenses and more to spent on the people. Good relations with
Pakistan mean open land route to East for trade in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asian
Countries. It’s never too late India needs to realize this sooner than later. Peace in South Asia means
better economy in the region and a day might come we may surpass European Union.