252 CONSTITUTION �� �I

S S
TEXT AND CA E

-o Oo-

RIGHT TO PROPERTY
The Bill of Rights, Section 1 pro
vides that no person may be
depri· ve d of property wit
· hout due pr
ocess o f 1aw. Th1 ·
' s raises two
-
CHAPTER 2 253
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

questions, the answers to which depend upon the nature of the

particular case:
1. What is property? This is the "property" question.
2. What is a deprivation? This is the "taking" question.
There is an important distinction between liberty and property
as fundamental rights. The "liberty'' concept cannot be invoked
by corporations, because they are not natural persons, but the
"property'' concept can be invoked by such corporations.
The right of property is fundamental, natural, inherent, and
inalienable, meaning that it existed before the constitutions which
protect it. "It is not ex gratia from the legislature, but ex delicto
from the Constitution." 163 Like the other fundamental rights of life
and liberty, the right of property is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable regulation by law. Private property is subject to the
limitations expressed in the maxim "sic utere tuo ut non alienum
laedas."
Private property is subject to the three rights of government:
• Right of eminent domain
• Right of taxation
• Right of the police power
In the context of the three fundamental rights of life, liberty,
and property, the term property is defined as any valuable interest
which a person may possess outside of his life and liberty. The right
of property is "the right to acquire, possess, and enjoy'' particular
things and objects in any way consistent with the equal rights of
others and the just exactions and demands of the state. 154
The concept of "property'' denotes a broad range of interests:
• The right to acquire and possess the absolute and
unqualified title to every species of property recognized
by law, with all incidental rights. 166
Not only tangible things, but also anything with an
exchangeable value. 166

163Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance (FCC Pa) 2 U.S. 304 (1795).

IMJves v. South B.R. Co., 201 NY 271 (1911).
156 Ex parte Quarg, 149 Cal. 79 (1976).
166 Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441 (1895).
 254
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
TEXTANDCASESVOL.II

Not on1y th e rig • ht s of undisputed ownership,

. d' but also
1
any significant property intere st , me u mg st atutory
entitlements. 167
A property interest necessarily implies a legitima_teclaim
of entitlement, not a mere abstract need or desire, or a
' 168
mere unilateral expectat10n.
The right of dominion or indefinite ri~ht of use and dis.
position which one may lawfully exercise over particular
things or subjects.
Right to acquire, hold, enjoy, possess, manage, insure,
and improve property.
Right to devote property to any legitimate use.
Right to buy, sell, barter, and exchange.
Right to enter into contracts in relation to property.
Right to fix the price at which property shall be sold.
Conversely, the "property" concept does not include:
• Public office
Reputation alone, apart from some, more tangible inter-
ests such as employment.
The Constitution does not contain any definition of the
word "deprived." A "deprivation" includes any attempt to confiscate,
extinguish, or destroy. A "deprivation" is any significant taking of
property by the state; 159 the property deprivation should not be de
minimis. 160 The following are examples of deprivation of property: 161
Deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes
Destroys or impairs its value
Restricts or interrupts its common, necessary, or profitable
use

167
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
168
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
169
North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
I 60Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
161
Indian Refining Co. v. Ambraw River Drainage Dist. (DC Ill) 1 F Supp 937
(1913).
 CHAPTER 2 255
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

Hampers the owner in its application to the purposes of

trade, or imposes conditions upon the right to hold or use
it and thereby seriously impairs its value.
Under the police power, the government may order the de-
struction of private property, in a proper case. 162But public neces-
sity is the limit of the right to destroy property which is a menace
to public safety or health and the property cannot be destroyed if
the conditions which make it a menace can be abated in any other
recognized way. 163
Summary destruction of property may be authorized when
property has become dangerous to the health or safety of the com-
munity.164But when property is inoffensive and harmless, it can be
condemned or destroyed only by legal proceedings with due notice
to the owner. 165When property is used for an unlawful purpose, a
distinction must be drawn. 166

RIGHTTO BUSINESSOR OCCUPATION

The concept of "property" includes a person's business,
occupation, calling, or other means of livelihood. As a fundamental
right, it has been described not only as natural, inherent, and
inalienable, but also one of the most sacred rights of a citizen. 167
It has even been said that the preservation of the right to earn a
livelihood is the principal purpose of the Constitution itself. 168
The right to livelihood is protected from confiscation by
legislative edicts, 169and from any unjustifiable impairment or
abridgment. 170 Any person is at liberty to pursue any lawful calling, 171
under such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of the same
condition. 172The granting of monopolies or exclusive privileges to
corporations or persons is an invasion of the rights of others to follow
a lawful calling and an infringement of personal liberty.

162
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
163
Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391 (1949).
164
Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
165
Id.
166
State v. Robbins, 124 Ind. 308 (1890).
167
Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 293 (1935).
168
Ex parte Dickey, 76 W Va. 576 (1915).
169
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
170
Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1 (1938).
171
Toney v. State, 144 Ala. 120 (1904).
172
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
 10NALLAW
256 CONSTITUTASES VOL. II
TEXTANDC

. . ht to livelihood is that it must not

The main limitation to th e rig b 8 tantial group. 173 It should not
8
injure the public at large or any_ ~t r those brought in direct con.
1 1 0
affect injuriously those engaged 1:1 benefit generally the peopl
tact with it, even though its pursu_it does not protect a busines:
174
of the state at large. The Co~s~itu 175 C nsequently the state ma
· h h d
against t e azar s o com .f petition
. · °gage in a business comY,
sti
in the public interest, con tution~ y tn
11 a tax to support it a d
monly carried on by private enterprised, _evy l'ke activity.11s ' n
1
compete with private interests engage in a

Callanta v. Carnation Philippines

145 SCRA 268 (1986)
. was a pe t·t·
[Th 1s 1 10n1or cert i·orari to review the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Court granted the petition. It is a. prin?iple _in-~e~c~n juris-
prudence which, undoubtedly, is well-rec~gn1~ed ,!n this JU~sdic!ion that
one's employment, profession, trade or callmg 1s a property nght, and the
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.]

Fernan, J.:
Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was employed by private respondent
Carnation Philippines, Inc. [Carnation, for brevity] in January 1974 as a
salesman in the Agusan del Sur area. Five years later or on 1 June 1979,
respondent Carnation filed with the Regional Office No. 10 of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment [MOLE], an application for clearance to terminate
the employment of Virgilio Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious
misconduct and misappropriation of company funds amounting to Pl2,000,
more or less.
On 5 July 1982, Virgilio Callanta filed with the MOLE, Regional Office
No. 10, a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement,
backwages, and damages against respondent Carnation.
. . : ... [The NLRC] declared the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
Virgilio Callanta to have already prescribed ....
We find for petitioner.

Indee~ t:tiere is_,merit in the contention of petitioner that the four·

year prescr1pti~e per1?d under the Civil Code, Article 1146 applies by waY
of supplement, m the mstant case, to wit:

173
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
1
::chicago v. R & X Restaurant, Inc., 3 69111_ 65 ( )_
1 1938
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin 2 93 U
176 ' ·8 · 163 (1934)
Seattle Gas Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 638 ). ·
0934
 CHAPTER 2 257
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within

four years.
[1] Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. ...

As this Court stated in Bondoc v. People's Bank and Trust Co.,177 when
a person has no property, his job may possibly be his only possession or
means of livelihood, hence, he should be protected against any arbitrary
and unjust deprivation of his job. Unemployment, said the Court in Almira
s. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, 178 brings "untold hardships and sorrows on
those dependent on the wage earners. The misery and pain attendant on
the loss of jobs thus could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that
under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived
of their means of livelihood."
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is
well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade
or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith
is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within
the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law, Clearly
then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of
livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal
from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under the Civil Code,
1146, which must be brought within four years.
In the instant case, the action for illegal dismissal was filed by
petitioners on 5 July 1982, or three years, one month and five days after the
alleged effectivity date of his dismissal on 1 June 1979 which is well within
the four-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code, Article 1146.

-oOo-

EMINENTDOMAIN
The Constitution, Article 3 provides:

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for

public use without just compensation.

Proceeding from the principle of )us regalia, the right to

eminent domain has always been considered as a fundamental
state power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is described as
the State's inherent power that need not be granted even by the

177
103 SCRA 599 (1981).
178
58 SCRA 120 (1947)
258 CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
TEXTANDCASESVOL.II

Constitution and as the government's right to appropriate, in the

nature of co~pulsory sale to the State, private property for Public
use or purpose.119
Expropriation, or the exercise of the State's ~ight to eminent
domain, is proscribed by the restraints of pubhc use and just
compensation. It is governed by the Rules of Court, Rule 67, which
presents procedural guidelines for the court to e?sure that due
process is observed and just compensation rightly paid to the private
owners. 180
The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. The
1987 Constitution Article 3 Section 9 sets down the essential
' inherent' right of the State to take private
limitations upon this
property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose;
and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The
State must first establish that the exercise of eminent domain is
for a public purpose. What remains to be determined is the just
compensation. In Apo Fruits Corporationv. Land Bank, 181it was
held that compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of
property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment,
considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the
loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in
addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the
taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the
owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he
was in before the taking occurred. 182
Expropriation is the inherent right of the State and of those
entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn
private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
Governed by the Rules of Court, Rule 67, the proceedings therefor
consist of two stages: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public
use; and, (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for
the taking of private property to be made by the court with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners. 183The nature of
these two stages was discussed in Municipality of Bifian v. Garcia:134

179Republic of the Philippines v. Samson-Tatad, 696 SCRA 809 (2013).

IBO]d.
18 1632 SCRA 727 (2010).
182
Export Processing Zone Authority v. Pulido, 656 SCRA 315 (2011).
183
Republic of the Philippines v. Legaspi, 670 SCRA 110 (2012).
1iw259Phil. 1058 (1989).
p

CHAPTER 2 259
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

There are two stages in every action for expropriation.

The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if
not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be
ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done
by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court,
no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation
(or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the Court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken."
This is done by the Court with the assistance of not
more than three commissioners. The order fixing the
just compensation on the basis of the evidence before,
and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too.
It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit,
and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding
the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may
believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the
evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too,
such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order
by taking an appeal therefrom.

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Henson, 185 the

parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle,
undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement.
Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were
admittedly farmer beneficiaries under Operation Land Transfer of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been

186
300 SCRA 751 (1998).
260 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TEXT AND CASES VOL. II

reclassified as residential. The nature an~ ch~racter of th e _land at

the time of its taking is the principal cr1ter1on to determine just
compensation to the landowner.
The expropriation of real property does n~t i n clude m_ere physi.
cal entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain u~ually
involves taking of title, there may also be : 0 mpensable taking of
only some, not all, of the property interests 1n the bundle of rights
that constitute ownership. 186
Mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of
the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may b~ exercised
by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which
renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include
its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did
not attend its initial physical possession of the property because
the lease, which had authorized said possession, lapsed. In short,
petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de
jure as well. 187
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the state that need not
be granted even by the fundamental law. The Constitution, Article
3, Section 9, in mandating that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation," merely imposes a limit on
the government's exercise of this power and provides a measure of
protection to the individual's right to property. Thus in J.M. Tuason
& Co. 188 and Cuatico, 189 the Court merely enforced the constitutional
limitation regarding the payment of just compensation. Clearly, an
ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the state's power of
eminent domain. 190
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of government, which may delegate its exercise to local government
units, other public entities and public utilities. A local government
unit may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private propertY
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control
and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or
in other legislation." In this case, R.A. No. 7160, Section 19, which

186
Republic v. Tagle, 299 SCRA 549 (1998).
1s11d.
188
J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961).
189
Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 595 (1962).
100
Republic v. Tagle, 299 SCRA 549 (1998).
 CHAPTER 2 261
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

delegates to local government units the power of eminent domain,

also lays down the parameters for its exercise. 191

Requisitesfor Local Government Units

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before a
local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1)An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit,
to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings; 2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare; 3) There is payment of just compensation;
4) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted. 192
In the case at bar, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized by a local ordinance. The
present Local Government Code, which was already in force when
the complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an
ordinance for that purpose. 193
The Court is not convinced by petitioner's insistence that
the term "resolution" and "ordinance" are one and the same. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a
law. A resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses
a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary
in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. 194
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited
to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other
persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When
a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the owner of the fee
is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation.
In the American jurisprudence, the term "owner" when employed

191Municipality of Paraftaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 678

(1998).
1s21d.
1sald.
10•Jd.
 262 CONS'l'ITUTIONAL LAW
TEXT AND CASES VOL. II

in statutes relating to eminent domain to d_esignate th e P~rsons

who are to be made parties to the proceedi?g, refers, as is the
rule in respect of those entitled to compensatwn, to all_ those Who
have lawful interest in the property to be c? nd emned, mcluding a
mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possesswn u nd er an executory
contract. 195
Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in
the land taken is entitled to share in the award. _Ifa person claiming
an interest in the land sought to be condemned IS not made a party,
he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation.196
The Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that
urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the
accurate shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly
in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious
dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled
authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit
of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be
followed, which are as follows: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws (1987 Constitution,
Article 3, Section 1); private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation (1987 Constitution, Article 3, Section
9)." Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not without limitations. 197
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the
use must be public, compensation must be made and due process
of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of
such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking
and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled
that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine
and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose
what private property should be taken. 1sa
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bu·
nawan exercised in the case of Moday v. Court of Appeals,1 99 is a

195
De Knecht v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 223 (1998).
196/d.
197
Filstream International Incorporated v. Court of A eals 284 scRA716
(1998). pp '
198
Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586 (1997).
1ss1d.
264 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TEXT AND CASES VOL. II

Definition of 11public use"

°
The term "public use," not having been th erwise defined by the
Constitution, must be considered in its general conce?t of meeting
a public need or a public exigency. For cond emnahon purposes
"public use" is one which confers some benefit or _adva~tage to th~
public; it is not confined to actual use by the pubhc._ I_t_is measured
in terms of the right of the public to use propo_sed facihtie_s for which
condemnation is sought, and, as long as pubhc has the _right to use,
whether exercised by one or many members. of public, a :'public
advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a
public use. 203
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain
for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be
said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear
cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. 204
It has been explained as early as Sena v. Manila Railroad
Co., 42 Phil. 102 (1921), that: "A historical research discloses the
meaning of the term 'public use' to be one of constant growth. As
society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and each
demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be
devoted. For 'whatever is beneficially employed for the community
is a public use'." 205
Petitioners in the case of Manosca v. Court of Appeals 206
contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the
provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be
reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be
heard; contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are
replete with pleadings that could have dealt, directly or indirectly,
with the provisional value of the property.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "juSt
compensation" (Article 3, Section 9). And apparently the necessi~Y
of paying comp~nsation for "Comelec space" is precisely what 15
sought to be avoided by respondent Commission whether Section 2
'
203/d.
204/d.
206/d.
206
252 SCRA 412 (1996).
 CHAPTER 2 267
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal

issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the
Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present
evidence on the issue of just compensation. 217
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of
the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where
the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either
grossly inadequate or excessive.218
The determination of just compensation for a condemned
property is basically a judicial function. As the court is not bound by
the commissioners' report, it may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to
the exercise of its right of condemnation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property expropriated. For that matter, this
Court may even substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered
from the record. 219
While the court may accept the commissioners' report and
render judgment in accordance therewith, it may not do so without
considering whether the report is supported by evidence. The court
is also duty-bound to determine whether the commissioners had
discharged the trust reposed in them according to well-established
rules and formed their judgment upon correct legal principles for
they are not supposed to act ad libitum. 220

Mannerof Taking
In the context of the state's inherent power of eminent
domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction
or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he
is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a "taking" in this
sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for
a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the

217
Manila Electric Company v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992).
21sJd.
21
9Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185 SCRA 572 (1990).
22old.
268 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TEXT AND CASES VOL. II

purpose of devoting the property to a public use in s':1ch a manner

as to oust the owner and deprive him 0 ~ all b~neficial en) 0 Yrnent
thereof. For ownership, after all, is nothJng wi th0 ut the inherent
rights of possession, control and enjoyment. ~ere th e owner is
deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of ~Is pr~perty_ or of its
value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
Constitutional sense. 221
As stated in Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 222 when
plaintiff takes possession before the institution °~
the condem~ation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of
said possession, not of filing of the complaint and the latter should
be the basis for the determination of the value, when the taking
of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the
commencement of the proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the provision
of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that compensation be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint would never be operative. 223
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, 224
was that where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by
the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there
may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from
the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. 225
The owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual
value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way
that compensation to be paid can be truly just i.e., "just; not only to
the individual whose property is taken but, to the public, which is
to pay for it." 226

Prompt payment
The Supreme Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal
to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings

221
Ansaldo v. Tantuico, 188 SCRA 300 (1990).
222
1 SCRA 957 (1961).
223
Ansaldo v. Tantuico.
224
96 Phil. 170 (1954).
226
Ansaldo v. Tantuico.
226/d.
 CHAPTER 2 269
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

it had in fact initiated. It cannot be overemphasized that within

the context of the State's inherent power of eminent dom~in ....
fj]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of
the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for
a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss (Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
164 SCRA 393, 400 [1988]). See also Provincial Government of
Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291 [1987]).
The state's power of eminent domain should be exercised within
the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering
that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid
fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the
property for public purpose, for three years, the Court finds that
the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full
compensation. 227
The Supreme Court, considering the findings of fact of the trial
court, held that the acquisition of the right-of-way easement in this
case falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such
conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way
where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation
for private property condemned for public use (See National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665 [1984]; Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597 [19811).228
The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines v. PLDT, 229
thus held that:

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain

results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned prop-
erty, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestion-

227
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206 (1990).
228National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 192 SCRA 1 (1990).
229
136 Phil. 20 (1969).
270 CONS'TITU'T'lONAL LAW
'TEXT AND CASES VOL. II

able that real property may, through expropriation, be

th
subjected to an easement of right-~f-way. ~n e case_ at
bar, the easement of right-of-wa~ i: definitely a taking
30
under the power of eminent domain.

Considering the nature and effect of in~tal~ation of the 23o

KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the ~imitat_ion imp~sed by NPc
against the use of the land for an indefinite perwd deprives Private
respondents of its ordinary use. For the~e reasons, the_ owner of
the property expropriated is entitled to a J~S~ comp_ensat10n, Which
should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of sai"d proper t Y-231
Even were there no organic or constitutional provision in force
requiring compensation to be paid, the seizure of one's property
without payment, even though intended for a public use, would
undoubtedly be held to be a taking without due process of law and a
denial of the equal protection of the laws.' That aspect of the matter
was stressed in a recent case of J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970). 232
Conformable to such a fundamental principle then, in
accordance with a constitutional mandate, this Court has never
hesitated to assure that there be just compensation. If it were
otherwise, the element of arbitrariness certainly would enter. It is
bad enough that an owner of a property, in the event of the exercise
of this sovereign prerogative, has no choice but to yield to such a
taking. It is infinitely worse if thereafter, he is denied all these years
the payment to which he is entitled. This is one of the instances
where law and morals speak to the same effect. 2 33
The Supreme Court held in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals 234 that even if the lands in question were predominantly
agricultural and cogonal as evidenced by the tax declarations of the
respondents and by the testimony of Lino Oconer the then Acting
City Assessor of Butuan City, the presence of certain establishments
within the vicinity, the Sultan Hotel, the Sugeco, the PhilippineArrnY
Barracks, and the Free Methodist Church as earlier mentioned rnaY

z30Nat10na
. l p ower C orporat1on
. v. Gutierrez, supra.
231 Id.
232
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393 (1988).
233 Id.
234
154 SCRA 428 (1987).
272 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
TEXT AND CASES VOL. II

. A · t noted the constitution in at least

comes into p 1ay. s JUS ' • h t ·
two cases, to remove any doubt, determines w a 18 ~~blic
use. One is the expropriation of land~ ~o be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to in?iVIdual~. The other
is in the transfer through the exercise of th1 s power, of
utilities and othe~ private enterprise to the government.
It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use.

Just compensation means the value of t~e property at the

time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered .... Various factors can come into play in the valuation
of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given
by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire total with the exception of
the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. 238
The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible
cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often
land described as directional has been cultivated for generations.
Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of
building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate
than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation. 239
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations
made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illu-
sory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept unquestioningly
what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or
municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at much less ana·
' never occurs
lyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply
until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to
do so. 240
241
In the case of Zaballero u. National Housing AuthoritJ,
the Supreme Court said that in arriving at the P7. 75 per square

:::1d., citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)-
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987).
2•01d.
241 155 SCRA 224 (1987).
 CHAPTER2 275
FUNDAMENTALRIGHTS: LIFE, LIBERTY,AND PROPERTY

basis ?fjudi~ial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and 3) the

deposit reqmrement under the Rules of Court Rule 67 Section 2
must be complied with. 248 ' '

Powerof EminentDomain:

Manapat v. Court of Appeals

536 SCRA 32 (2007)
[These were consolidated petitions for review under the Rules of
Court, Rule 45 challenging the rulings of the Court of Appeals.
The Court partially granted the petitions. All the requirements for the
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain have been complied with.]

Nachura, J.:
Sometime in the 1960s, [the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
(RCAM)]allowed a number of individuals to occupythe Grace Park property
.... [T]he occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later,
as they could not afford RCAM's proposed price, the occupants, organizing
themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez Jr. Tenants
Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said
property, its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots
to them at a low price .
. . . . But because of the high asking price of RCAM and the
budgetary constraints of the Government, the latter's effort to purchase
and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM then decided
to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the
individual subdivided lots to the public. Petitioners Manapat and Lim and
respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado
in these consolidated cases were among those who purchased individual
subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM and/or [the Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC)].
A significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1072,
appropriating Pl.2M out of the President's Special Operations Funds to
cover the additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park.
The National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC's successor, then filed
several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the
purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and resale at a low
cost to the residents of the area ....

2,8Jd.