MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian 

ad litem, and The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of
MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs,  tuberculosis in January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in
vs. his house to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant. became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he
could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Duenas,
Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants. his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until
Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees. the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and
treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano died without
the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Maria Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
Under these facts, can the child be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.
Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of
the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
and Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano presumed to be legitimate.
Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his
mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the
latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically
from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first
situation then prevailing, entered the land in question. one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next preceding the birth
of the child.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano
Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1,
question; (b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he
defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case to this Court upon the having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the
plea that only question of law are involved. marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to was physically impossible for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that
her son Emiliano Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that he could hardly move and
his favor on the occasion of his marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If
otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin
entitled to succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined Manresa on this point says:
hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano
Andal is concerned. The determination of this issue much depends upon the Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence
relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period during the initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown
the alleged father Emiliano Andal. that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his
book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)."
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, costs.
1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next
preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were
still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same
house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that
does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. We admit that
Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so
serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his
voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse.
There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act
even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse.
As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculosis towards eroticism (sexual
propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the
consequences of the disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol.
3, p.2202). There is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from
impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was
imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the
child has not, therefore, been overcome.

We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule
123, of the Rules of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son
d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section provides:

The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate, if not born within one hundred
eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the expiration
of three hundred days following its dissolution.

We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had
access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born
within three (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts
no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is legitimate. We have also
seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically
or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE
no such proof. The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also S. SALGADO, petitioner, 
overcome this presumption (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. vs.
92). THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not PADILLA, J.:
err in declaring Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal
and Maria Dueñas.
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. ARLENE must have conceived JANICE on or about the first week of
51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether
and support against private respondent, and from the respondent Court"s resolution, on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse and were
dated 11 October 1978, denying petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said already living with one another as husband and wife.
decision.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin,
mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him
support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent at her house at 30 Long beach, Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening
Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping of November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her dwelling
test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro
(NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held 21 Island.
January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of
Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1 On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the
Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon December 14, 1967 because the day following, he and his guests:
plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to
on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He
his monthly support. remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January
18, 1968, because that was a week after his birthday and it was only in
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to May, 1968 that he started cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments
appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing on Roxas Boulevard.
whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao
argued that the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the
evidence of his non-paternity. paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the
NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union with
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage
JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court ... where the
Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted blood grouping tests of the NBI were admitted; especially where, in the
ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the test and it
subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife. ... appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings
and report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme
Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct
ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the 1950"s.
confinement was with JAO"s consent. JAO paid the rentals where they
lived, the salaries of the maids, and other household expenses. ...
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16,
1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it
 can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of in subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the negative or
the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the in the affirmative. ...
father of a particular child, but at least can show only a
possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner"s
others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount
tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive to recognition. Said the respondent appellate court:
presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made
in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his
the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation,
finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with
results of the test. ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy and the
financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the
blood grouping test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the the unborn JANICE as his own as the possession of such status cannot be
fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged founded on conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have
father or any one of many others with the same blood type may earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act
recognizes that the tests may have some probative value to
establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of
the child is shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which
discretion to let it in (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194). provides: "When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child
of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter.
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific
opinion is now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said
causative relation between the trait of the progenitor and the trait article which states:
of the progeny. In other words, the blood composition of a child
may be some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But thus far (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as generally mother cohabited with the supposed father;
accepted) can be used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a
particular man F is not the father of a particular child C. (I (4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-611). the defendant is his father.

In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been
test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed,
cases where they tended to establish paternity; and that there has been no ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on
case where the blood test was invoked to establish non-paternity, thereby November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week after January
implying that blood tests have probative value only when the result is a 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must
possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention is have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one
fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started
be recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood only after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was
grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test is regarded not conceived during this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie.
worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted test, it is admissible
 Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to
no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity. prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v.
Gilpin5 the positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" recognized as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-
Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a
considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who introduced ARLENE to JAO at finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of
the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly
reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to
plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight- rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated, should apply the results of science
forward and candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
movie actress may have been overlooked so that not even the trial court was to deny progress.7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph,8 a filiation
could detect, by her acts, whether she was lying or not. proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding
paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood
tests is also in force in several states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new proof of non-paternity, thus —
one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which
can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten by
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity. the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot
paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a
filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-
tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a paternity. 12
possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant contended that the
child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious Moreover,
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of
the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a
definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel." 3 ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have
produced the conception of the child. This would be the case, for instance,
if the cohabitation took place outside of the period of conception of the
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and the
to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself
the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal
scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity,
although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed
prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard,
the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father appear to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is
are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.4 also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area for several years. The
blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized
blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under witness and
supervision.15

Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper
subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood
test, she, represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to
prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test
again.16 1avvphi1

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that
the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and
conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No
evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result
of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, 
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted, vs.
which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH
issue of recognition raised by petitioner. MEJIAS, respondents.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 54618-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch IX dismissing the action for recognition and support filed by
respondent Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang, and which
found minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give
a monthly support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of majority (p.
47, rec.; p. 10, ROA).

The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her
husband being Crispin Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief
for Respondent [P. 198, rec.]) She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7, 1972 in CC No. 109).
She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63,
t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the
illicit encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24,1967 (Annex "A", List of
Exhibits).
The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a 1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed
complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil Case Anahaw; and
No. 263 (p. 1, ROA).
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would
Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972, bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally
opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA). presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from the
formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties very beginning is the fact that respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner
agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA). Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an occurred sometime in March, 1967 and that by reason thereof, she and her husband
amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on October 17, 1972 (pp. 7,8 and 9, ROA). separated. This fact surfaced from the testimony of respondent herself in the hearing
of September 21, 1972 when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent
In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the portions of her testimony are thus quoted:
complaint,. The decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of
Court and authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA). By Atty. Fernandez:

On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals (p. Q — What did you feel as a result of the incident
59, In her appeal, appellant assigned these errors: where Antonio Macadangdang used pill and took
advantage of your womanhood?
1. The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant
case the provisions of Arts. 255 and 256 of the Civil Code and A — I felt worried, mentally shocked and
Secs. 4[a], 4[b] and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of humiliated.
Court (p. 18, rec.);
Q — If these feelings: worries, mental shock and
2. The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff- humiliation, if estimated in monetary figures, how
appellant cannot validly question the legitimacy of her son, much win be the amount?
Rolando Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without joining
her legal husband as a party in the instant case (p. 18, rec.). A — Ten thousand pesos, sir.

In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the Q — And because of the incidental what
lower court's decision (p. 47, and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate happened to your with Crispin Anahaw.
son of Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, rec.).
xxx xxx xxx
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit. (p. 56, rec.).
WITNESS:
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979.
A — We separate, sir. (pp. 61-63, T.s.n., Civil Case
No. 263, Sept. 21, 1972; emphasis supplied).
The issues boil down to:
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that respondent's ... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike
answers were given with spontaneity and with a clear understanding of the questions is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact" described
posed. There cannot be any other meaning or interpretation of the word "incident" as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or
other than that of the initial contact between petitioner and respondent. Even a those which are based upon substantial evidence. The general
layman would understand the clear sense of the question posed before respondent rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the
and her categorical and spontaneous answer which does not leave any room for absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court
interpretation. It must be noted that the very question of her counsel conveys the of Appeals. There are exceptions to the general rule, where we
assumption of an existing between respondent and her husband. have reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals ...
(emphasis supplied).
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated
in 1965 cannot therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne
based solely on the testimony of respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the in mind:
records shows that her statement was confirmed or corroborated by another witness
and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that which is based on Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
impleaded. hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court
restated that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other
parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee;
(6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial This physical impossibility may be caused:
court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the (1) By the impotence of the husband;
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when
the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in
and is contradicted by evidence on record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety such a way that access was not possible;
Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, 21
SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, L-
225533, 19 SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied]. (3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the
adding four more exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same ruling mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
in the previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra. been sentenced as an adulteress.

In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L- Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time
46430-31, July 30, 1979), which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus of the conception of the child, but there was no physical
emphasized: impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth
in article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons,
 that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was
article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her
spouse. From her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was
xxx xxx xxx bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four children by her
husband in her mother's house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband
also lived in her mother's place (p. 73, pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972).
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy — It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her
delivery, respondent went to her mother's house in Samal for treatment. Thus, in the
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the direct examination of Patrocinia Avila (the boy's yaya), the following came out:
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be Q — Why were you taking care of the child
presumed legitimate. Rolando, where was Elizabeth Mejias?

Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of A — Because Elizabeth went to her parents in Same
the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his Davao del Norte for treatment because she had a
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three relapse (p. 13, t.s.n., of Sept. 21, 1972).
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in the
This physical impossibility may be caused: same province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to
each other. As has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements
[1] By the impotence of the husband were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence, more particularly that
of her husband.
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living
separately, in such a way that access was not possible; The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven
(7) months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between
[3] By the serious illness of the husband; respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation
(if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967,
respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother married years before such date (t.s.n., pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of
sentenced as an adulteress. the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between
aforenamed spouses.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the
conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is
of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.
child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears highly
improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the
husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual
be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court). contact between petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was
not of petitioner since, from indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.

Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to
the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate of Baptism
fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which (attached in the List of Exhibits) which was prepared in the absence of the alleged
father [petitioner]. Note again that he was born on October 30, 1967. Between 2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible
March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The and
baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case.
Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Respondent herself and 3. Serious illness of the husband.
the yaya, Patrocinia Avila, declared that the baby was born in the rented house at
Carpenter Street, which birth was obvisouly normal; that he was such a healthy baby
that barely 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for by said yaya when This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union
respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972); and that when he in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the
was between 15 days and 2 months of age, respondent left him to the care of physical impossibility of such sexual union prevents the application of the
the yaya when the former left for Samal for treatment and returned only in February, presumption (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1,
1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). From the aforestated facts, it can be p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
indubitably said that the child was a full-term baby at birth, normally delivered, and
raised normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he were born prematurely, he The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must
would have needed special care like being placed in an incubator in a clinic or be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled
hospital and attended to by a physician, not just a mere yaya. These all point to the the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
fact that the baby who was born on October 30, 1967 or 7 months from the first personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to
sexual encounter between petitioner and respondent was conceived as early as the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be
January, 1967. How then could he be the child of petitioner? taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic
Relations, pp. 340-341).
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the
value of baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception.
the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the The law expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which
veracity of the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but
citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. it may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical impossibility of
Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal access (Tolentino, citing Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who
baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its
statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person proper function (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case
baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical inability to have
must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability
to procreate, whereas, impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her sexual intercourse. In respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a
spouse. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was child, to overcome the presumption of legitimacy on conception or birth in wedlock
physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or recognized that the evidence or proof
which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually quasi-conclusive must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing, irresistible or
and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of positive (S.C. — Tarleton vs. Thompson, 118 S.E. 421, 125 SC 182, cited in 10
access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which C.J.S. 50).
preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused
by any of these: The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access
impossible. This may take place when they reside in different countries or provinces,
1. Impotence of the husband; and they have never been together during the period of conception (Estate of Benito
Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442). Or, the husband may be in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through corrupt violation the passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if offended, that is, being
of or allowed by prison regulations (1 Manresa 492-500). aware of his wife's adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by means of
coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which may really be only a
The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may declare the as
his having sexual intercourse with his wife; such as, when because of a injury, he not her husband's although the statement be false. But there is another reason which
was placed in a plaster cast, and it was inconceivable to have sexual intercourse is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it
without the most severe pain (Tolentino, citing Commissioner vs. Hotel 256 App. is, that at the moment of conception, it cannot be determined when a woman
Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp. p. 515); or the illness produced temporary or permanent cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it
impotence, making copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352). being possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).

Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be
because tuberculosis is advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain
incapable of sexual intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from some benefit for herself (N.Y. — Flint vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10
tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health because C.J.S. 77).
then they seemed to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife
had illicit intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and
does not preclude cohabitation between said husband and wife. purposes of either parent, nor Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual
intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife became
Significantly American courts have made definite pronouncements or rulings on the pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the
issues under consideration. The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon child was still presumed legitimate (Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158,191 N.E.
children born in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of conception was 100).
not impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290 N.Y. S. 863, 160 Misc. 830) and there
is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and is legitimate With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the
even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child,
conception (N.Y. Dieterich vs. Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited in because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband (Tolentino, citing 1
10 C.J.S., pp. 18,19 & 20). Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24).

So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless the husband It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point
was incapable of procreation or was absent beyond the four seas, that is, absent from would be unseemly and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on
the realm, during the whole period of the wife's pregnancy (10 C.J.S. p. 20). her part, but also because of the effect it may have on the child, who is in no fault,
but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby (7 Am. Jur. Sec. 21, pp. 641-
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains, 642).
notwithstanding the husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart, unless the
contrary is shown (Ala. Franks vs. State, 161 So. 549, 26 . App. 430) and this In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the infidelity or
includes children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24; emphasis adultery of the wife and mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no
supplied]. proof of the husband's impotency or non-access to his wife (Iowa — Craven vs.
Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36).
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is
presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the
First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
this declaration (Power vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic
a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua, Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs immoral and hedonistic. Although her husband was a very potent man, she readily
only to the alleged father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised indulged in an instant illicit relationship with a married man she had never known
only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a before.
direct suit brought for the purpose (La — Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La.
731; Saloy's Succ. 10 So. 872, 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; emphasis Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando) for,
supplied). even after birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for several months. This is not the
normal instinct and behavior of a mother who has the safety and welfare of her child
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never foremost in her mind. The filing of this case itself shows how she is capable of
uncertain; she can only contest the Identity of the child (La — Eloi vs. Mader, 1 sacrificing the psycho-social future (reputation) of the child in exchange for some
Rollo. 581, 38 Am. D. 192). monetary consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.

Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the
wedlock were held to be admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her
they are inadmissible to bastardize the child, regardless of statutory provisions husband, her illicit lover and above all — her own son. For this Court to allow,
obviating incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact that the conception was much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to
antenuptial. The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public policy serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate
(Wallace vs. Wallace 137 Iowa 37,114 N.W. 527,14 L.R.A. [N.S.] 544,126 Am. St. scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and
Rep. 253,15 Ann. Cas. 761, Am. Jur. 26). then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect
from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of
From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her witnesses, this two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
Court has every reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was not actually separated
from Elizabeth Mejias; that he was a very potent man, having had four children with And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all
his wife; that even if he and were even separately (which the latter failed to prove the circumstances being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence, the
anyway) and assuming, for argument's sake, that they were really separated, there child is thus given the benefit of legitimacy.
was the possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity to
each other and considering further that respondent still visited and recuperated in her Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it
mother's house in Samal where her spouse resided with her children. Moreover, provides thus:
Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious illness or any illness whatsoever which
would have rendered him incapable of having sexual act with his wife. No
substantial evidence whatsoever was brought out to negate the aforestated facts. Art. 220. In case of doubt, an presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent's reckless and immoral pursuits the legitimacy of children the community of property during
or a "buffer" after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
husband in this case because she could not risk her scheme. She had to be certain validity of defense for any member of the family in case of
that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish motives would not be unlawful aggression.
thwarted.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE
This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent's claim to declare her 2, 1978, AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY
son Rolando the illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications, respondent has REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
paraded herself as a woman of highly questionable character. A married woman
who, on first meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married towards nightfall,
sleeps in his house in the presence of his children, then lives with him after their SO ORDERED.
initial sexual contact — the atmosphere for which she herself provided — is patently
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, CRUZ, J.:
JJ., concur.
We are faced once again with still another bid by petitioner for the status of a
legitimate heir. He has failed before, and he will fail again.

In this case, the petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and that it
was error for the respondent court to reject his claim. He also says his motion for
reconsideration should not have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed
on time under the Habaluyas ruling. 1

This case arose when Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City.
The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the
petitioner's capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared
as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q-12592, for
the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had
long become final and executory.2

The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked
decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner. 3 Holding that this was
mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for
certiorari filed by the private respondent.4 The motion for reconsideration was
denied for late filing.5 The petitioner then came to this Court to challenge these
rulings.

The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in a motion to dismiss
based on lack of a cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegation itself and not
whether these allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. 6 That is correct. He also submits that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore reversible not in a petition
for certiorari but on appeal.7 That is also correct Even so, the petition must be and is
hereby denied.

The petitioner is beating a dead horse. The issue of his claimed filiation has long
been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be
CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner,  resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of
vs. Appeals, 8 decided on September 28, 1984. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.
KING respondents.
The Court observed through Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
 Petitioner Sy Kao denies that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son?
son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner's More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say — as indeed she has said
opposition filed on December 19, 1968, is based principally on these many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and
the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife Tan WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
Kuy. ordered.

After hearing on the merits which lasted for ten years, the court Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
dismissed the respondent's petition on March 2, 1979 on a
finding that he is not a son of petitioner Sy Kao and the
deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of  REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings. vs.
GLADYS C. LABRADOR, respondent.
The respondent tried to appeal the court's resolution but his
appeal was denied by the lower court for having been filed out  
of time. He then filed a mandamus case with the Court of
appeals but the same was dismissed. Respondent, therefore, PANGANIBAN, J.:
sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari, G.R. No. 54992,
before this Court but his petition was likewise dismissed on Summary proceedings provided under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article
January 30, 1982, for lack of merit. His subsequent motions for 412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical
reconsideration met a similar fate. and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. Substantial or contentions alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
xxx xxx xxx impleaded and due process is observed.

To allow the parties to go on with the trial on the merits would The Case
not only subject the petitioners to the expense and ordeal of
obligation which might take them another ten years, only to Before us is a Petition for Review on certiorari seeking to set aside the March 5,
prove a point already decided in Special Proceeding No. Q- 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Special Proceedings No.
12592, but more importantly, such would violate the doctrine 6861-CEB. 1 The assailed Decision 2 ordered the civil registrar of Cebu City to make
of res judicata which is expressly provided for in Section 49, the necessary corrections in the birth certificate of Sarah Zita Cañon Erasmo in the
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. local civil registry, viz.:

There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an examination of the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
procedural objections to the grant of the motion to dismiss. In the end, assuming petition. Accordingly, the erroneous entry with respect to the
denial of the motion, the resolution of the merits would have to be the same anyway name of [the] child appearing in the birth certificate of Sarah
as in the aforesaid case. The petitioner's claim of filiation would still have to be Zita Cañon Erasmo is hereby ordered SARAH ZITA CAÑON
rejected. ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAÑON and the erroneous entry in
said birth certificate with respect to the name of [the] mother is
Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for reconsideration is also likewise hereby ordered corrected from ROSEMARIE B.
unnecessary as the motion would have been validly denied just the same even if CAÑON to MARIA ROSARIO CAÑON.
filed on time.
 The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is hereby ordered to 6. However; herein respondent erroneously entered the name of
make the foregoing corrections in the birth records of SARAH Sarah Zita in her birth record as SARAH ZITA C. ERASMO,
ZITA CAÑON ERASMO and to issue a birth certificate instead of SARAH ZITA CAÑON. Not only that, the name of
reflecting said corrections. petitioner's sister, being the mother, was also erroneously
written by the herein respondent as Rosemarie Cañon, instead of
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the petitioner, her counsel, the Maria Rosario Cañon;
Solicitor General, Asst. City Prosecutor Generosa C. Labra and
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City. 7. In order to straighten the record of birth of SARAH ZITA
ERASMO and pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code
Disagreeing with the above disposition, the solicitor general brought this Petition which provides:
directly to this Court on a pure question of law. 3
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
The Facts under the parental authority of the mother . . .

Respondent Gladys C. Labrador filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on [t]here is a need to correct the entry in the record of birth of
September 26, 1997, a Petition for the correction of entries in the record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAÑON and to
Sarah Zita Erasmo, her niece. In her Petition, respondent alleged the following: correct the name of her mother as appearing in her birth
certificate from ROSEMARIE CAÑON to MARIA ROSARIO
CAÑON.
1. Petitioner is of legal age, married, a resident of 493-17,
Archbishop Reyes Ave., Barrio Luz, Cebu City, where she can
be served with the processes of this Honorable Court; x x x           x x x          x x x

2. Respondent Local Civil, Registrar of Cebu City is impleaded On September 17, 1997, the trial court set the case for hearing on October 29, 1997.
herein in his official capacity; he can be served with summons It also directed the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
and other processes of this Honorable Court in his office at the circulation in Cebu City once a week for three consecutive weeks. 5
City Health Department, Cebu City;
On October 29, 1997, evidence was presented to establish the jurisdiction of the trial
3. Petitioner is the sister of Maria Rosario Cañon who is court to hear the petition. 6Respondent Labrador was represented by Atty.
presently residing in .the United States of America; Bienvenido V. Baring; the Republic, by Assistant City Prosecutor Generosa C.
Labra.
4. Sometime in 1986, petitioner's sister, Maria Rosario Cañon,
had a common law relationship with a certain Degoberto When Respondent Labrador testified on January 8, 1998, she repeated the
Erasmo, and during such cohabitation, petitioner's sister begot allegations in her Petition. She stated that Sarah Zita Erasmo was her niece because
two (2) illegitimate children, one of which is SARAH ZITA B. Maria Rosario Cañon, the mother of the child, was her (respondent's) sister. On
ERASMO, who was born on April 27, 1988, as shown in her cross-examination, respondent explained that she was the one who had reported the
birth certificate, a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX birth of Sarah to the local civil registrar, to whom she had erroneously given
"A"; "Rosemarie" as the first name of the child's mother, instead of the real one, "Maria
Rosario." Labrador explained that her sister was more familiarly known as
Rosemarie; thus, the error. Respondent likewise averred that Rosemarie and Maria
5. During the registration of the birth of SARAH ZITA, Rosario were one and the same person, and that she had no other sister named
petitioner's sister told the respondent Local Civil Registrar that Rosemarie. She added that Maria Rosario was abroad where she lived with her
she was not legally married to the father of SARAH ZITA; foreigner husband. 7
Labrador then formally offered her evidence which included Maria Rosario's birth Main Issue:
certificate 8 and a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it had no
record of marriage between Maria Rosario Cañon and Degoberto Rule 108 Inapplicable
Erasmo. 9 Prosecutor Labra, who conducted the cross-examination, did not object to
the evidence offered.
Petitioner contends at the summary proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court and Article 412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change
The Trial Courts Ruling clerical or innocuous errors. It argues that Rule 108 "cannot be used to modify, alter
or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy
The trial court granted Respondent Labrador's Petition, ratiocinating as follows: of the child, which respondent desires to do. The change sought will result not only
in substantial correction in the child's record of birth but also in the child's rights
From the evidence adduced, the Court is convinced that the which cannot be effected in a summary action." 10 We agree.
allegations in the petition have been satisfactorily substantiated,
the requisites for the publication have been complied with, and This issue has been resolved in Leonor v. Court of Appeals. 11 In that case,
there is a need for the correction of the erroneous entries in the Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the
birth certificate of Sara Zita Cañon Erasmo. The entry in said cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He
birth certificate with respect to the name of the child should be alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the "non-
corrected from SARAH ZITA CAÑON ERASMO to SARAH observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking the trial
ZITA CAÑON and the entry with respect to the name of the court's ruling granting such petition, the Court held, as follows:
mother should be corrected from ROSEMARIE B. CAÑON to
MARIA ROSARIO CAÑON. On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation
of any entry regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for any
The Issues reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose.
However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, only errors
Petitioner posits the following issues: that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones
like the validity of a marriage. A clerical error is one which is
(a) Whether or not a change in the record of visible to obvious to the understanding; error made by a
birth in a civil registry, which affects the transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic,
civil status of a person, from "legitimate" to L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous
"illegitimate" may be granted in a summary change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or
proceeding; of a mis-statement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs.
Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).
(b) Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the proper action to Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change
impugn the legitimacy of a child. the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to
illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an
The main issue is whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be used to change the adversarial proceeding. . . .
entry in a birth certificate regarding the filiation of a child.
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule
The Court's Ruling 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code
cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil
The petition is meritorious. The lower court erred in ordering the corrections. status from married to single and of their three children from
legitimate to illegitimate. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the changed from "Sarah Zita Erasmo" to "Sarah Zita Cañon," thereby transforming the
status of a person from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the filiation of the child from legitimate to illegitimate. Second, she likewise sought to
same cannot be granted in summary proceedings. have the name of Sarah Zita's mother, which appeared as "Rosemarie" in the child'
birth record, changed to "Maria Rosario." Pursuant to Valencia, an adversarial
In Republic v. Valencia, 12 we likewise held that corrections involving the nationality proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in respondent's
or citizenship of a person were substantial could not be effected except in petition.
adversarial proceedings.
Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is After all, it would affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional and other rights.
not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and In fact, the change may also embarrass her because of the social stigma that
innocuous nature, but one involving the nationality or illegitimacy may bring. The rights of her parents over her and over each other would
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as also be affected. Furthermore, a change of name would affect not only the mother
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a but possibly creditors, if any. Finally, no sufficient legal explanation has been given
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a why an aunt, who had no appointment as guardian of the minor, was the party-
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as petitioner.
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be True, it would seem that an adversarial proceeding was conducted — the trial court
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties set the case for hearing and had the notice of hearing published in a newspaper of
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate general circulation in Cebu City once a week for three consecutive weeks; a hearing
adversary proceeding. was actually conducted, during which the resepondent and the petitioner were
represented; the respondent was able to testify and be cross-examined by the
xxx xxx xxx petitioner's representative.

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's But such proceeding does not suffice. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 14 Emperatriz
Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows: Labayo-Rowe filed a petition seeking to change an entry in her child Victoria
Miclat's birth certificate. Alleging that she had never been married to her daughter's
father, she wanted to have her civil status appearing on the certificate changed from
One having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished from "married" to "single." This Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting Labayo-
an ex parte application, one [in] which the party seeking relief Rowe's petition, because the proper parties had not been impleaded; nor had the
has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter proceedings been sufficiently adversarial, viz.:
an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.
(Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718, 110 Was, 39)
In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor
General was notified through, the Office of the Provincial
xxx xxx xxx13 Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only
respondent, the proceedings taken, which [are] summary in
Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for a substantial correction or change of nature, are short of what is required in cases where substantial
entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
all other person who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing, not merely a summary proceeding, respondents. They include not only the declared father of the
be conducted. child but the child as well, together with the paternal
grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be
In the present case, the changes sought by Respondent Labrador were undoubtedly adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be
substantial: first, she sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate
 affected by the change should be notified or represented. The Let a copy of this Decision be served upon the local civil registrar of Cebu City.
truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
SO ORDERED.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from Romero, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
"legitimate" to "illegitimate". Moreover, she would be exposed
to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of
an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that
the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a
newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken. Rule 108, like all other provisions of the Rules of Court,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish,
increase or modify, substantive rights." Said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.

xxx xxx xxx 15

Even granting that the proceedings held to hear and resolve the petition before the
lower court were "adversarial," it must be noted that the evidence presented by the
respondent was not enough to fully substantiate her claim that Sarah Zita was
illegitimate. Her evidence consisted mainly of her testimony and a certification from
the civil registry of Cebu City that such office had no record of a marriage between
Rosemarie/Maria Rosario Cañon and Degoberto Erasmo. Unlike in other cases
where Valencia was applied 16 Respondent Labrador was not able to prove the
allegations in her petition.

Indeed, respondent correctly cites Article 176 of the Family Code, which states that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname[s] . . . of their mothers." But to enforce
such provision, the proper recourse is an adversarial contest. It must be stressed that
Rule 108 does not contemplate an ordinary civil action but a special proceeding. By
its nature, this recourse seeks merely to correct clerical errors, and nor to grant or
deny substantial rights. To hold otherwise is tantamount to a denial of due process to
third parties and the whole world.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 6861-CEB is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
 mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable
of giving rational and legal consent. 1

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and
due trial ensued.

The facts as established by evidence are as follows:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and
daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-
year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was
limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.

Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four
security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel
Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Camp
Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. house was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had
two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant. Alexander Salcedo and his wife.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo

then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given
to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody.
She felt sick and unhappy.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old
Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother, Mrs.
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina
Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but still remained
moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings from her
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.
the first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac,
Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol,
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, wilfully,
the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist,
unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with
conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs.
Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a woman who is a
Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was pregnant and so she brought
Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-
GYNE Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was
examination. The results were positive. The fetus' gestational age was equivalent to impossible for them to have committed the crime of rape.
17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination at the United Doctors Medical
Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed that she was After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime
indeed pregnant. 5 charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating
that he "has a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob blood is "A", while that of child Jacob Salcedo is 
Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo. type "O".

During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
persons were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her
assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of the investigation room to a police line-up accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond reasonable
of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and
point to her assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Ruel Prieto.8 Code, as amended, there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, said
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the
Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended
molested her. 9 girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to suffer
the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. the costs of the proceedings.
Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped
her. Sandra demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were touched, then On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared
she was hugged and her panty was taken off. A push and pull movement ACQUITTED from the charge.
followed. 10Celsa testified that she was present when the victim demonstrated how
she was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples were SO ORDERED. 13
touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to emphasize. She likewise
went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering at the same time "hubad
panty." Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:

Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the 1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of
persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to committing the offense charged without detection.
her. 11 She once again demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held her two
thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed 2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant
her hand on her breast and gestured as if she were sucking. She also touched her base on major blood grouping test known as ABO and RHS test,
private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12 not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping The appeal is devoid of merit.
Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child
Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the
Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", crime of rape because most of the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were
accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O".
together with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours while the victim was always in the Q Where did they play usually take place?
company of her mother. He further contends that it was likewise impossible for
Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a A Living room. 15
virgin. As if adding insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's
brother, Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her.
xxx xxx xxx
We are not convinced.
Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a
while ago when you were at the
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but headquarters you were able to do your
sometimes they were left behind and would play pingpong or card games with choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in the second
Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While Sandra was always with her mother, storey of your house. Do you know where is
there were times when she was left alone in the house with the accused. 14 your daughter Sandra at that time?

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified: A Yes, she spent her time at the second
floor.
Q How many security men remain if you
can recall when your husband reported for Q What part of the ground floor she used
work? (sic) to stay?

A Two (2). A Because she is found (sic) of music she

stay in the living room.
Q Who were these security men who
remained? Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?

A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. A Moreno and Prieto.

Q How about the 2 other security men Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused
Tanggan and Colaljo? playing with your daughter?

A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand A Yes, playing pingpong and playing
and sometime they used to go with my cards. 16
husband to the office.
The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno
Q Every time when your husband is out Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation
what they do while they were (sic) at the conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his co-accused from
headquarter? among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to her. Second, at the
police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they unerringly pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped her.
were playing at the porch with my daughter Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the
Sandra playing pingpong and sometime they perpetrator of the crime.
were listening music.
The following is the victim's own testimony: Q When this push and pull movement was
being made, did you see a man's organ?
PROS. RAMOS:
A Yes sir.
Will you please demonstrate before this
Honorable Court what Moreno and Ruel did Q Where did you see this male organ?
to you?
A Witness touching her private part.
RECORD:
Q Who did this to you, who removed your
The witness when she stood up held both her panty?
thighs (sic) with her two hand (sic) down to
her sexual organ saying a word "panty" and A Moreno and Ruel.
she placed her hand on her breast and did
something as if sucking and held her private
part (sic) and did a push and pull movement Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?
and she cried.
A Yes.
Q When you said that there was a push and
pull movement of the body and when this Q Did you see his sex organ?
was being done did you feel pain?
A The witness touching her private parts.
A Yes pain.
Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he
Q What part of your body is painful? taken (sic) off his pants?

RECORD: A Yes.

The witness touching her private parts. Q Did you see his sex organ?

Q Did you also see blood on your sexual A Yes, witness again touching her private
organ? part.

A Yes. Q Both of them?

Q Where did you see these blood? A Yes.

RECORD: Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed

(sic) your panty?
The witness touching her private parts.
A Moreno. A Moreno.

Q In your house? RECORD:

A Yes. The witness pointing to a certain person who

is standing and when asked what is his
Q What part of your house did Moreno and name, he readily answered that he is Moreno
Ruel remove your panty? Tumimpad.

A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove PROS. RAMOS:

panty.
Who is that person standing besides
Q What part of the ground floor, was it Moreno?
outside or inside the room?
A Joel.
A In the room.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside
the courtroom now, can you point to them? If your honor please, she could not
pronounced (sic) well the word Ruel but the
A Yes. way she called this name is Joel which refers
to the same person who is one of the
accused in this case. 17
Q Will you please point to them?
Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to
PROS. RAMOS: her how she was ravished by the two accused, thus:

May we request the accused to stand up your Q Now, will you please tell us what did
honor? Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to how she
was abused?
RECORD:
A By what she had stated there were also
Both accused stood up from where they actions that she made.
were sitting inside the courtroom.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this
PROS. RAMOS: Honorable Court how did Sandra Salcedo
was abused as narrated or demonstrated to
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point you by Sandra Salcedo?
to accused Moreno Tumimpad)?
A According to her she was held in her thigh Q And what was the answer of Sandra
and then she was hugged and then the panty Salcedo?
was taken off and making a push and pull
movement (witness demonstration by A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.
holding her thigh)?
Q And what was the answer of Sandra
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and Salcedo as related by her to Celsa through
demonstrated to you how she was abused. words and action?
What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she
had told you any more matter?
RECORD:
A She did not say anything more.
The witness demonstrated by holding his
(sic) nipple going down to her thigh.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk
or say anything else. What happened next?
Q What else had transpired next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
A No more.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked
Sandra Salcedo? Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo
mentioned the names of accused Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you
A I was just beside her. observed whose names was usually
mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo
refused to talk, Celsa did the questioning, A She mentioned first the name of Moreno
did you hear the question being asked by Tumimpad and Ruel.
Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
Q And what happened after that?
A Yes.
A I informed my mother-in-law of what
Q And what was the question being asked Sandra Salcedo had told us.
by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
Q When did you tell your mother-in- law
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what about what Sandra Salcedo told you and
other things that these two had done to her? Celsa?

Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell A That very evening sir. 18
you as to what was done to her?

A By way of talking and action.

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction
was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type
"O".

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence

given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as
evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same
blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this Court in Janice
Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:

Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of

blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it
can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of
a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a
possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in
others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such
tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made
in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of
the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the
finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not
admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a
possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with
the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven

beyond reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

 so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who
pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled
extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised
and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . .
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 .

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,  On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the
vs. sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his estate.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
AGUILAR, respondents.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner. estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only legitimate child
of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership
with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
(4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared an
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private
PUNO, J.: respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses
failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36)
years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of
gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992.1
sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner
was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned procreate.
various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente
followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed
the private respondents petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of
San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992
of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They
by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the
alleged, inter alia, viz.:
Decision of the appellate court states:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is
REVERSED and another one entered declaring that appellee
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and,
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez.
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an
 administrator of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the proceedings parents are legitimate.
already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower court is
directed to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding No. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the
SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the Rules. wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
Costs against appellee. provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
SO ORDERED. them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of
the child.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions, 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family because of:
Code in this case and in adopting and upholding private
respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child; a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or
impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, b) the fact that the husband and wife were
still the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of living separately in such a way that sexual
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence intercourse was not possible; or
of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and
demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and c) serious illness of the husband, which
sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a the child could not have been that of the husband except in the
way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
We find no merit to the petition. insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the intimidation, or undue influence.
Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or
its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
 case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
where the birth took place or was recorded. Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
of said birth, which ever is earlier. legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of
the child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the
only in the following case: biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as
follows:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's
evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on
having desisted therefrom; or record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said
couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere
while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a herself had believed that she was really their daughter and
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, entitled to inherit from them as such.
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth
of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she has
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and
these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother and
the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their wife, who treated his sister for a number of years. There is
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher,
impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the
children of their widowed mother) through law school, and rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when
whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and consulted on appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure
family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel that she is not the true mother of that baby.
being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and
when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente
that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable
as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already
and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl and told his 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly
elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth
wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old and certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital
too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's
the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge of the lower obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since
court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque, MM. delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been
Considering, her advanced age and weak physical condition at difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come,
the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa
testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one who was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal,
may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife
interested in material things anymore and can be expected not to attending?
lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were also
several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a
Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the
this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the
everyday especially as she had drugstore in the ground floor of child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty.
her house, but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1954 Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid
(the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa
according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his
and that it is also true with the rest of their townmates. wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she
who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, grew a little older but did not come around doing so either
likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become because he was too busy or for some other reason. But
pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
asked the latter where the baby came from, and "she told me that child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of
the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth
about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990). certificate, which is a public document.

The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr.
woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in
delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole
 heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write
without descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since
a witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in- Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law.
law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her
that he signed the same only because the latter told him to do so husband to give appellee although without any legal papers her
(p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make properties when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give
such a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Marissa the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel),
Benitez is not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and
and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr. could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes
Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document her so.
without understanding completely the meaning of the words
"descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria
cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the
who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, date
1990). Obviously,  December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's) mother.
appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother- It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and
in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives. the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday
unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they
Benitez is really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before
her death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record.
that: The weight of these findings was not negated by documentary evidence presented by
the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
even without any legal papers, I wish that purportedly showing that her parents were the late
my husband and my child or only daughter Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28,
will inherit what is legally my own property, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article
in case I die without a will, 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and
all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband — be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of
contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the
truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting
that any inheritance due him from my evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
property — when he die — to make our own the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente
daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not Benitez, and
mean what he legally owns or his inherited Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they stated
property. I leave him to decide for himself that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died
regarding those. without descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B") that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he
signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., is on leave.

CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, Accompanied by her husband

BENITO APARICIO, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J:

Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a priest,
Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she was almost four
(4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace from the public she decided
to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father Lumain solemnized their marriage on March (e) Sentencing plaintiff to pay the Court the docketing fees and
4, 1924. 1 They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 all other legal expenses.
days after the marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by
her birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. 2 On October The present judgment is rendered without special
31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament wherein he pronouncement as to costs.5
acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her as the sole and
universal heir of all his property rights and interests. 3 This was duly probated in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938 and on appeal it was affirmed by Not satisfied therewith, the defendant now interposed this appeal to the Court of
the Court of Appeals. 4 Appeals alleging the trial court committed the following errors:

Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the Court of I
First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery of certain parcels
of land she claims to have inherited from her father Fr. Lumain and for damages. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
After trial on the merits a decision was rendered on July 6, 1962, the dispositive part PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO THE
of which reads as follows: POSSESSION OF PORTION G OF THE SKETCH EXHIBIT
"E-I," WITH ALL THE IMPROVEMENTS.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment:
II
(a) Declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the
third parcel of land described in the 6th amended complaint, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
with all the improvements. If defendant Hipolito Paraguya is PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE IS A NATURAL CHILD OF THE
possessing this property, he is hereby ordered to vacate it and LATE REV. FR. FELIPE LUMAIN.
deliver its possession to plaintiff;
III
(b) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of the second
parcel of land described in the 6th amended complaint, with all THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
the improvements. If plaintiff is possessing this land or any THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS LIABLE TO PAY
portion thereof, she is hereby ordered to vacate said property THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FOR MORAL DAMAGES
and to deliver its possession to defendant Paraguya; AS ALLEGED IN THE COUNTER-CLAIM. 6

(c) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of Portions B In a resolution of September 27, 1968, the Court of Appeals forwarded the records
and A of the sketch Exhibit E-1, with all the improvements. If of this case to this Court as appellant does not question the findings of facts of the
plaintiff is possessing these portions or any part thereof, she is court a quo but only the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom. 7
hereby ordered to vacate the same and to deliver its possession
to defendant Hipolito Paraguya;
The undisputed findings of facts of the trial court are:
(d) Declaring that plaintiff shall be entitled to the possession of
Portions H, F and G, of Sketch Exhibit E-1, with all the It is a fact admitted in the evidence of both parties that the
improvements. If defendant is possessing these portions or any spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare were the owners
part thereof, he is hereby ordered to vacate them and to deliver of the parcels of land Identified as first, second and third parcels
the possession thereto plaintiff Consolacion Lumain Aparicio; in the sixth amended complaint.
and
The testimonial evidence has established the following facts. Defendant claims right over the second parcel of land described
in the 6th amended complaint, alleging that he had bought it
The spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare and their from the late Roman Lumain, the admitted original owner. In
children Rev. Fr. Felix Lumain and Macario Lumain are dead. support of his contention, defendant offered in evidence Exhibit
This fact is corroborated by the following death certificates: 7 which is a deed of pacto de retro sale for the sum of P l 70.
The parcel of land sold in this document is described as follows:
(a) Exhibit I — death certificate showing that on August 20,
1929 Roman Lumain, husband of Filomena Cosare, was buried Por el Noreste linda con el terreno del
in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol; vendedor, por el Sureste con el de Macario
Lumain, por Suroeste con el del vendedor y
por el Noroeste con el del mismo vendedor y
(b) Exhibit J — death certificate showing that Filomena Cosare, con el rio Bateria.
wife of Roman Lumain, was buried on October 6, 1934 in the
Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol;
If the boundaries of the land mentioned in Exhibit 7 were
compared with the boundaries of the second parcel of land
(c) Exhibit K — death certificate showing that Rev. Fr. Felipe described in the 6th amended complaint, one would not hesitate
Lumain, son of Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare, was to conclude that this parcel of land described in the complaint is
buried on November 3, 1936 in the Catholic Cemetery of the same property sold to defendant Hipolito Paraguya on
Tubigon, Bohol; August 1, 1928, for the sum of Pl70.00, by means of Exhibit 7.

(d) Exhibit L — death certificate showing that Macario Lumain, It is true that vendor Roman Lumain reserved the right to
husband of Ceferina Falcon and son of the spouses Roman repurchase the property at any time, but in the light of the
Lumain and Filomena Cosare, was buried on May 20, 1941 in provisions of Article 1508 of the old Civil Code which is the law
the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol. applicable to the case, it is obvious that Roman Lumain and his
heirs have lost the right to redeem the property. Article 1508 of
It appears proven at the same time that Ceferina Falcon de the old Civil Code provides:
Lumain died on June 29, 1953, as shown by Exhibit M.
The right referred to in the next preceding
Several witnesses had declared that the spouses Roman Lumain article, in default of an express agreement
and Filomena Cosare were possessing as owners and enjoying shall endure four years, counted from the
the products of the three parcels of land described in the date of the contract.
complaint; that after their death, it was their two children Rev.
Fr. Felipe Lumain and Macario Lumain who succeeded them in Should there be an agreement, the period
the possession of the same property. shall not exceed ten years.

Defendant Paraguya disclaims no right over the third parcel of Although the area of the land mentioned in Exhibit 7 is 13,000
land described in the 6th amended complaint. As a matter of square meters, while the area of the land described as Parcel 2 is
fact, in the course of the trial the Court rendered judgment 14 ares and 64 centares or 1,464 square meters, we think that
declaring plaintiff Consolacion Lumain Aparicio owner of said this discrepancy is just a result of mistake. Our Supreme Court
property. This judgment, however, was set aside because ruled that the correct boundaries of a land prevail over the
plaintiff's counsel manifested that he would present evidence for discrepancy as regards its area.
damages, in connection with this property which, according to
plaintiff, had been possessed by defendant Paraguya.
 We, therefore, conclude that the property described as second WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the above enumerated proposals be
parcel of land in the 6th amended complaint belongs to granted by the Court and a Commissioner duly appointed to carry out.
defendant Hipolito Paraguya.
Tagbilaran, Bohol, August 7,1952.
Although Exhibit 7 is a private document we entertain no doubt
as to its authenticity established by testimonial evidence of (Sgd.) DIOSDADO REYES DELIMA
defendant. Moreover, Macario Lumain, son of Roman Lumain,
had signed as instrumental witness to this document and if we
compared his signature on Exhibit 7 with his signatures on the Attorney for the Plai
documents Exhibits C- 1, C-2, C-3, C-4 and C-5 offered in
evidence by plaintiff, there would be no doubt that the signature I AGREE:
affixed on Exhibit 7 is the authentic signature of Macario
Lumain. (Sgd.) CONRADO MARAPAO

In connection with this case, the Court issued on August 7, 1952 Attorney for the Defendants
the following order (Exh. D):

Ceferina Falcon and Hipolito

When this case was called today, Atty. Diosdado R. Delima and Conrado D.
Marapao, counsel for the
Paraguya
parties, submitted the following agreement:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the court hereby appoints Mr. Genaro
Galon as Commissioner in charge to localize the properties in
Comes the undersigned attorney and respectfully proposes for an appointment of a accordance with the foregoing agreement. Mr. Galon shall
Commissioner of the Court for the following purposes: submit his report within the period of fifteen days. Before
making this localization, Mr. Galon shall notify the attorneys of
1. To localize Parcel II of the Second Amended Complaint under Tax No. 6862 both parties two weeks in advance.
superseded by Tax No. 20836 in the name of Roman Lumain;
By agreement of the parties, the trial of this case is hereby
2. To localize all the portions in the said parcel which are claimed by Hipolito postponed until further assignment.
Paraguya and to make a sketch of the portions showing its relative positions with
one another, showing its dimensions in meters, and showing its relative position in SO ORDERED.
relation to the whole parcel;

Given in open Court, Tagbilaran, Bohol, August 7, 1952.

3. To localize the portion in same parcel which are claimed by Ceferina Falcon and
to make a sketch of the said portion showing its dimensions in meters and showing
further its relative position in relation to the whole parcel. (Sgd.) HIPOLITO A

The expenses of the Commission of the court to be shared pro rata by Consolacion Judge, 14th Judicial
Lumain Vallesteros, Ceferina Falcon and Hipolito Paraguya.
District
In compliance with this order, the appointed commissioner Genaro Galon submitted The includible conclusion, therefore, is that Portion A of the
his report (Exhibit E); and attached thereto is the sketch marked Exhibit E-1. sketch Exhibit E-1 was bought by defendant Hipolito Paraguya
from Macario Lumain. Let us not lose sight of the fact that the
According to the report (Exhibit E), the land covered by tax land described in Exhibit 5 and Portion A of the sketch Exhibit
declaration No. 20836-which is the first parcel of land described E-I have Identical descriptions: On the NE is bounded by the
in the 6th amended complaint is represented in the sketch land of Macario Lumain which was inherited by him from his
Exhibit E-1 by the space enclosed within the black lines. For father; on the SE by the same vendor Macario Lumain and
clarification purposes the Court had marked with letters H, B, A, provincial road; and on the NW by the same vendor. Macario
G and F the portions enclosed within the black lines.The space Lumain has also lost the right to repurchase.
marked letter C, outside the black lines, represents the land of
Macario Lumain, acquired later by defendant Hipolito Paraguya. The report of the commissioner Exhibit E also states that
defendant Hipolito Paraguya claimed to be the owner of Portion
Defendant Paraguya offered in evidence Exhibit 5, a deed of B of the sketch Exhibit E-1. During the trial, Hipolito Paraguya
pacto de retro sale executed in his favor by the late Macario maintained that on August 28, 1948 he bought from Raymundo
Lumain on December 6, 1937. This document describes the Garduque a parcel of land by means of Exhibit 6- A. This
following parcel of land: document describes the property as follows:

El citado terreno es parte de la Declaracion Este terreno es parte de la Declaracion No.

No. 20836 a nombre de mi difunto padre 20836 a nombre del difunto Roman Lumain.
Roman Lumain y linda por el Noreste con el Y linda por el Norte, con el del difunto
del vendedor y mide 39.30 metros; por el Macario Lumain; por el Este con el del
Sureste finda con el del mismo vendedor y difunto Roman Lumain; por el Sur, con la
mide 67.90 metros; por el Suroeste linda con Carretero Provincial; y por el Oeste, con el
la carretera provincial y mide 27.00 metros y del mismo difunto Roman Lumain.
por el Noroeste que tiene cinco lados linda
con el del mismo vendedor y mide por Defendant Paraguya further maintains that Raymundo Garduque
dichos cinco lados 81-60 metros. had bought this property from Roman Lumain by means of
Exhibit 6 which is translated into English in Exhibit 6-1. Exhibit
If we linked the land described in Exhibit 5 with Portion A of 6-1 describes the property sold by Roman Lumain to Raymundo
the sketch Exhibit E-1, which portion, according to the report of Garduque as follows:
Commissioner Galon, was indicated by defendant Paraguya as
property belonging to him, we would find that the land On the North, it is bounded by the rice field
described in Exhibit 5 is the same Portion A of the sketch of Macario Lumain which adjoins the parcel
Exhibit E-1, taking into account the length of the sides of of rice field of the vendor; on the East, land
Portion A and the length of the sides of the land sold under of vendor; on the South, is Provincial Road;
Exhibit 5. Portion A is precisely the portion claimed by and on the West, it is bounded by the land of
defendant, according to Commissioner's report. the vendor.

The authenticity of the signature of Macario Lumain on Exhibit If we link the description of Exhibit 6-1 with the description of
5 has been established by witnesses, and corroborated by Portion B of the sketch Exhibit E-I, there would be no doubt that
documents Exhibits C- 1, C- 2, C-3, C-4 and C-5 offered in this Portion B is the same land sold by Roman Lumain to
evidenced by plaintiff. Raymundo Garduque, by means of Exhibit 6, bearing in mind
that the boundaries of Portion B tally with the boundaries of the
land described in Exhibit 6. We, therefore, conclude that Portion 5. Que la porcion comprendida entre lineas
B also belongs to defendant Hipolito Paraguya. de tinta negra angulos, A, B y C,
representation el terreno descrito en la
The report of the commissioner Exhibit E reads as follows: declaracion Tax No. 6862 en nombre de
Roman Lumain de Acuerdo con su croquis
correspondiente.
En complimiento a la orden de este Juzgado
de fecha 7 de Agosto, 1952 en la causa
arriba titulada el que subscribe como Es todo lo que al que subscribe puede
commissionado en dicho asunto, previa informar a Su Senoria para su consideracion
notificacion por escrito a ambas partes y a y efectos procedentes.
sus respectivos Abogados, se contituyo al
barrio de Tangnan, Tubigon, Bohol para Respetuosamente sometido.
localizar el terreno bajo declaracion Tax No.
20836 a nombre de Roman Lumain y de las Tagbilaran, Bohol. 22 de Septiembre, 1952.
porciones reclamadas por Hipolito Paraguya
y Ceferina Falcon Vda. de Lumain, y con
asistencia de las partes se prodedio la (Fdo.) GENARO GA
localizacion de los mismos, de cuyo
resultado, tiene la honra de someter a Su Commisionado'
Senoria el adjurito croquis con los
siguientes: Defendant Hipolito Paraguya claims right over portion G of the Sketch Exhibit E-1,
which portion is within the space enclosed within the black lines of the sketch
1. que la porcion limitada con lineas de tinta Exhibit E-1.
negra representa el terreno indicado por la
demandante Consolacion M. Vallesteros, Hipolito Paraguya maintains that he had bought this Portion G
como terreno de Roman Lumain, bajo from Pelagio Torrefranca by means of a document which was
declaracion Tax No. 20836. lost. He offered, however, in evidence Exhibits 8 and 9,
statements of the sister and brother of the deceased Pelagio
2. Que la pintada con lapiz encarnado Torrefranca to the effect that the latter had sold a parcel of land
representa la reclamada por Hipolito to Hipolito Paraguya.
Paraguya bajo declaraciones Tax Nos.
13497 y 13919 de Hipolito Paraguya. But if we examine the sketch Exhibit E-1 we will find that the
land of Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman
3. Que la pintada con lapiz azul, Lumain enclosed within the black lines. The land of Pelagio
representation el terreno reclamado por Torrefranca is even intercepted by other lands belonging to Juan
Ceferino Falcon Vda. de Lumain. Acidillo and Valerio Roba. If we also examine the plan Exhibit
1 1 of the land of Roman Lumain sureyed by a survevor, we will
4. Que la manchada con puntitos de lapiz find that the land of Roman Lumain is bounded on the North by
azul, representa la porcion reclamada por Valerio Roba and Jorge Acidillo. The land of Pelagio
Hipolito Paraguya, que segun el lo adquirio Torrefranca is not mentioned and possibly it is on the North of
de Pelagio Torrefranca. the lands of Valerio Roba and Jorge Acidillo.
Consequently, the land bought by defendant Hipolito Paraguya declared that she had never lived together with her husband and
from Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman Lumain at present the latter is living with another woman.
described in the plan Exhibit 11. It must not be forgotten that
this plan was offered in evidence by defendant. Bearing in mind the date of the birth of plaintiff, it is evident
that her mother Trinidad Montilde was still single at the time she
In the light of the foregoing, we conclude that out of the first was conceived. It is a legal presumption that plaintiff is the
parcel of land described in the 6th amended complaint defendant daughter of the spouses Anastacio Mamburao and Trinidad
had only acquired Portions A and B described in the plan Montilde, but bearing in mind that this presumption is disputable
Exhibit E-1. and was successfully overcome by Trinidad Montilde, plaintiff's
mother, we find no other avenue than to declare that plaintiff is a
We do not overlook the fact that Macario Lumain, as co-owner natural child of the late Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain. Consequently,
of the first parcel of land described in the 6th amended she can be acknowledged by the latter as his own child.
complaint could not select any portion thereof as his own, as
long, as there was no actual partition of the property. We But in the remote possibility that plaintiff is not a natural child
believe, however, that it would be more advantageous to the of the deceased Fr. Felipe Lumain, we still maintain that, under
plaintiff to disregard this procedure, since a partition would be the latter's will (Exhibit A-1), she is entitled to claim the
more costly for her, for in such case defendant would claim disputed property, she having been instituted in the will as
reimbursements for necessary and useful expenses. Moreover, universal heir. This document contains the following provisions:
the sales took place almost 10 years before the filing of the
complaint, and it would be unjust for defendant Paraguya to 4. — Dono tambien a la mencionada nina,
suffer the adverse effects of the laches committed by plaintiff. Consolacion M. Lumain, mi homestead
consistentente en una parcela de terreno de
Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to inherit the property of 24 hect. situada en el barrio de Calatrava,
the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain on the ground that she had Carmen, Bohol, con todas sus mejoras; todas
been recognized as daughter of the latter in his testament Exhibit Acciones e interesesen la JAGNA
A-1 which has been duly probated by this Court and the Court of ELECTRIC SERVICE CO., Jagna Bohol;
Appeals, as shown from Exhibit A- 2. todos los bienes muebles e inmuebles que
me corespondan de la herencia de mis
Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that plaintiff is not padres; y todoes los bienes e intereses que
entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe yo consiga en lo futuro (The following
Lumain for the reason that she is an adulterous child. He further words are written in pencil without initial of
maintains that the acknowledgment of plaintiff by the late Fr. the testator: Estoy asegurado por la Insular
Felipe Lumain is null and void she being not a natural child of Life Assurance Co. en la cantidad de Dos
the latter. In support of this contention, defendant offered in Mil Pesos, y la beneficiaria de mi Poliza es
evidence Exhibit 2 which is the marriage certificate of Anastacio la misma consolacion.)
Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde, mother of plaintiff.
According to this certificate, the marriage of both spouses took Is plaintiff entitled to claim the entire first parcel of land
place on March 4, 1924. Defendant also offered in evidence described in the 6th amended complaint? Let us not forget that
Exhibit I showing that plaintiff was born on September 12, the spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare died leaving
1924. Taking into account both documents, it can be said that two legitimate children: Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and Macario
plaintiff was born six months after her mother's marriage to Lumain. Let us not either forget that Fr. Lumain died ahead of
Anastacio Mamburao. During the trial Trinidad Montilde Macario Lumain. Under the circumstances, therefore, Fr.
Lumain did not become the owner of the share of Macario
Lumain, he having died ahead of the latter. Macario Lumain determine what property shall be the basis of damages and who
could not either inherit the share of his brother, because the are the persons liable. 8
latter had instituted the plaintiff as his legal heir. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, cannot inherit the property of the deceased Macario Under the first assigned error appellant contends that portion G of the sketch Exhibit
Lumain in view of the following provisions of Article 943 of the E-1 with all the improvements belongs to him and that he is entitled to its
old Civil Code: possession. In support thereof appellant argues —

A natural or a legitimated child has no right This particular portion of land known as portion G of the sketch
to succeed ab intestate the legitimate Exhibit 'E-1' declared in the name of the real owner of the
children and relatives of the father or mother defendant-appellant herein under Tax Dec. No. R-13497,
who has acknowledged it; nor shall such (Exhibit '9-b') formerly under Tax Dec. No. 23216 (Exhibit '9-a')
children or relatives so inherit from the in the name of the former owner Rev. Father Pelagio
natural or legitimated child. Torrefranca is outside the land in question. (See IV last
paragraph of p. 23 & 24; letter B last paragraph of p. 31 and
In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that, after the death of letter C lst paragraph of p. 32, Record on Appeal; (See also IV
Fr. Felipe Lumain, plaintiff and Macario Lumain became co- 2nd paragraph of p. 41, Record on Appeal).
owners of all the properties left by their deceased parents.
Consequently, plaintiff is only an owner of one-half (1/2) We find support in this contention from the report of the
undivided share of said properties and the remaining undivided Commissioner (Exhibit "E") in paragraph 2 and 4 of said report:
half belongs to the heirs of the late Macario Lumain who took (See Record on Appeal, pp. 59-60).
no intervention in this case. And because of this fact, the Court
can not render a judgment determining the ownership of the
property in question, on account of the fact that the heirs of the Par. 2 of the Commissioner's Report (Exhibit "E") states:
deceased Macario Lumain are not parties to this case.
Que la pintada con lapiz encarnado,
Considering, nevertheless, that a co-owner can file an action to representa la reclamada por Hipolito
recover the possession of a property from any stranger, the Paraguya bajo declaraciones Tax Nos.
Court believes that this aspect can be determined by the Court in 13497 y 13919 de Hipolito.' (p. 60, Record
its judgment. on Appeal)

It appears from the record that plaintiff was exempted from Par. 4 of the said Commissioner's Report (Exhibit'E') states:
payment of legal fees on account of her alleged poverty. But it
appears from the evidence that she is not a pauper, she having Que la manchada con puntitos de lapiz azul,
several properties not involved in the present action. She shall representa la porcion reclamada por Hipolito
therefore, be sentenced to pay the Court the docketing fees and Paraguya, que segun el lo adquirio de
all other legal expenses. Pelagio Torrefranca (P. 60, Record on
Appeal)
Plaintiff's evidence regarding damages is insufficient, for the
reason that this court can not determine exactly the source of The name of Pelagio Torrefranca or the land of Pelagio
those damages. As may be seen from this decision, plaintiff had Torrefranca is not mentioned because the Blueprint (Exh.: "11")
filed six complaints and had been changing the lands she was was made long time ago in 1910 before Pelagio Torrefranca
claiming, as well as the defendants, thus showing that she had bought the land from Valerio Roba. (the former owner).
filed at random her actions. Because of this, the Court cannot
Exh.: "11" is offered in evidence by the defendant Hipolito outside the land in question. The Court has no jurisdiction over
Paraguya to show to the Court that the land of Pelagio this land Portion G as shown in Exhibit "E- l" for it is not a part
Torrefranca, Identified as G (in Exh. "E-l") is outside the land of of the land of Roman Lumain whose properties are the ones in
Roman Lumain as can be seen by comparing the blueprint (Exh. question (See Exhibits "11" and "E-1" — These two Exhibits
"11") and the sketch (Exh. "E-l"). "11" and "E-1" should be compared as they are closely
connected to each other.)
If the land of Pelagio Torrefranca which is now owned by the
defendant Hipolito Paraguya (Letter G in Exh. "E-l") is outside This is supported by the findings of the Lower Court found on
the land of Roman Lumain (outside of heavy lines of Blueprint page 61, lst Sentence of the 3rd Paragraph of the Decision, (p.
Exh. "11" and sketch of Galon Exh. "E-l") then the plaintiff can 61 Record on Appeal) which states: 'But if we examine the
not be given such land for she is only claiming interest in and to sketch Exhibit 'E-l' we will find the land of Pelagio Torrefranca
that parcel of land of Roman Lumain bearing Tax No. 20836. In is outside the land of Roman Lumain enclosed within the black
the original complaint as well as the several amended lines.' And on page 62, 1st Sentence of the 1st Paragraph of the
complaints, the six amended complaint and supplemental Decision (p. 62, Record on Appeal) which states: 'Consequently,
complaint Tax Dec. No. 23216 of the late Rev. Father Pelagio the land bought by defendant Hipolito Paraguya from Pelagio
Torrefranca (now owned by defendant-appellant Paraguya, Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman Lumain described in
Letter G in Exh. "E-l") is not included. Tax No. 23216 has been the plan Exhibit 11. 9
revised to R-13497 in defendant-appellant's name. Still this land
Identified as Letter G in Exh. "E-1" now under Tax Dec. No. R- We find the contention to be well-taken. Appellees confirmed that said portion G of
13497 is not included in all the plaintiffs' complaint (see Exhibit E-1 which appellant bought from Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of
Exhibits "9-a" and "9-b," 10 and 10-a to 10-g). Roman Lumain enclosed with black lines of Exhibit E- I, and thus is outside the land
of Roman Lumain as described in Exhibit 11. 10
In the Blueprint (Exh. "11") the name of Valerio Roba appeared
as the owner of that parcel known as Portion G (as shown in Under the second assigned error appellant points out that appellee Consolacion
Exh. "E-1") for at that time in 1910 Valerio Roba was still the Lumain is the legitimate child of spouses Anastacio Mamburao and Trinidad
owner. The blueprint (Exh. "11") was made and surveyed in Montilde as she was born on September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage of
1910. But after 1910 Pelagio Torrefranca acquired this land said spouses citing the provision of Article 255 of the Civil Code (then Article 108
(Portion G) from Valerio Roba. This particular Portion G is now of the Spanish Civil Code) —
declared under Tax Dec. No. R- 13497 in the name of
defendant-appellant Hipolito Paraguya and formerly declared
under Tax Dec. No. 23216 in the name of the former owner ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
Pelagio Torrefranca (See Exhibits "9-a", "9-b", "l0" and "10-a" following the celebration of the marriage and before three
to "10-g" and Exhibits "8" and "9"). hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
The Court should take notice that the land in the name of former
owner Valerio Roba (known as Portion G in Exhibit "E-l") is the Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
land acquired and owned by Rev. Father Pelagio Torrefranca than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
and later sold by Rev. Father Pelagio Torrefranca to the access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
defendant-appellant Hipolito Paraguya is outside the land of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
(outside the Black Lines of Exhibits "11" and "E-1") of the late
Roman Lumain as shown in the blue print (Exhibit "ll") a map This physical impossibility may be caused:
of the land of the late Roman Lumain made and surveyed in
1910. There is no question therefore that this Portion G (shown (1) By the impotence of the husband;
in Exh. "E-l") is not the land of the late Roman Lumain, hence
 (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately SO ORDERED.
in such a way that access was not possible;
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Feliciano, J., is on leave
Appellant further argues there is no evidence of physical impossibility on the part of
husband Anastacio to have access to his wife Trinidad in the first 120 days of the
300 days which preceded the birth of the child. Under Article 115 of the Spanish
Civil Code, now Article 265 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:

The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of

birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment. (Italics supplied.)

Appellant concludes appellee Consolacion is the legitimate child of said Mamburao

spouses as shown by the birth certificate. 11

Appellant also avers that the declarations of Trinidad Montilde against the
legitimacy of appellee Consolacion cannot prevail over the presumption of
legitimacy under the provisions of Article 109 of the Spanish Civil Code, now
Article 256 of the Civil Code.

However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of appellee

Consolacion in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr. Lumain he not only
acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated her as
his only heir. Said will was duly probated in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any
compulsory heir, appellee Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted
in his will. 12 One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate
or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.13

The third assigned error wherein appellant contends appellee should pay him moral
damages is obviously without merit. Appellee merely pursued an honest claim to the
property in question. No bad faith had been imputed nor had the alleged damages
suffered been established. The essential ingredient of moral damages is proof of bad
faith and the fact that moral damages was suffered as shock, mental anguish, or
anxiety although the amount of damages suffered need not be shown. 14

WHEREFORE, with the only modification that portion G of sketch Exhibit E-1 and
its improvement of the questioned property is hereby declared to be owned by
appellant who is entitled to its possession, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects without pronouncement as to costs.
 First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of
its decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to
acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a
monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay complainant Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to pay
attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.

It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an

action for acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan
Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and
docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges,
among others, that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at
Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that
the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel
Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted
Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about
11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the
latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside
his hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita
that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of
September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which
Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that
Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of
the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her
pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000.
represented herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,  As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of
vs. actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners. Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of
counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.
litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.

On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on
BIDIN, J.: August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the
amended complaint.
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision1 dated April 30,
1981 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's
complaint and set aside the resolution2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint SO ORDERED.
reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate
son. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and
the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive
portion of which reads, viz: Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby and in dismissing the complaint.
rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against
defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral of the trial and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out
damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's that the appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that
fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit. Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of
November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.
SO ORDERED.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its
Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual
supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as may have been
recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of properly assigned and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence
Ivan Mendez. on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial
court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition
Constantino's motion for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors
decision dated June 21, 1976 to read as follows, viz: of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-
examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties
unless the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby on record or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe,
rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and plaintiff- et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97
minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez [1987]).
ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of
P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and the sum of
P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that
bills incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that
Constantino; to recognize as his own illegitimate child the Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on
plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on this Court as the same is
the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially entertained such
status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only
Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21,
P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross-
pay the costs of this suit. examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second
week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her
response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976. November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or
second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with
Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.

Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that

as correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science
(Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of
actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be close to 267 days",
the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before
August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita
testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said
testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11,
1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own
counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant
circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that
Amelita is four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of
actual pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.

Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8,
1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where
she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not
possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a quarrel with her
boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family
or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to
establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently,
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation,
the complaint must be dismissed.

As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214 of the
Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered
her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual
intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if
sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time
she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she
admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her
attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been
induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately
severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact
sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the
months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was
the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
 Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs
allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.

Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her
that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother
because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she
married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to
drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son,
Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her
own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a
joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate,
Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it
returned to her after admonishing Margarita.1

Lolito Tufiacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner, 
grandfather because Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw
vs.
each other and Casimiro would give him money. Casimiro used to invite him to his
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, respondents.
house and give him jackfruits. when his grandfather learned that he was living on a
rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former's land. 2
Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr. for petitioner.
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac
Domingo Antigua & Associates for private respondent. Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she
used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his
sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which
eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to
CRUZ, J.:
Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism.
Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida. 3
The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father
court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The
Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed
appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue
him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he
is before us on certiorari.
would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to
Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu Teopista.4
City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was
born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring
Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that
took the stand to resist Teopista's claim.
Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who
later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to or
build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro was
hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father. 5
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano,
Casimiro's niece, who also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
Casimiro's boat. She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
husband, who was a mechanic.6
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the
which has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family. His Honor declared:
children.7 The said article provides:
In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize continuously lived with her mother, together with her sister Paulina.
the child as his natural child: Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had come to live with the defendant.
At most, only their son, Lolito Tufiacao was allowed to construct a small
house in the land of the defendant, either by the defendant himself, as
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente Toring, as claimed by the witnesses
coincides more or less with that of the conception; of the defendant. The defendant never spent for the support and education
of the plaintiff. He did not allow the plaintiff to carry his surname. The
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the instances when the defendant gave money to the plaintiff were, more or
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; less, off-and-on or rather isolatedly periodic. They were made at
considerable intervals and were not given directly to the plaintiff but
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother through a third person. Thus, while it may be conceded that: a) the
cohabited with the supposed father. defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself told Gaudencio
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the daughter of the
defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as "Papa Miroy"; c) that
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the Teopista would kiss defendant's hand when she met him; d) that the
defendant is his father. defendant gave to her and her husband the income of the passenger truck
as well as the proceeds of the sale thereof, all these acts, taken altogether,
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows: are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had possessed continuously the
status of a recognized illegitimate child.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following: On appeal, however, the respondent courts8 disagreed and arrived at its own
conclusion as follows:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has
sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status. Although the
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the various witnesses
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. presented, We consider the witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and
 unbiased. No proof was shown to render them otherwise. There is no administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
showing that Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely. They were heirs.
disinterested parties with no axe to grind against the appellee or the people
actively acting in his behalf. In fact even the court a quo conceded to the In the early case of Masecampo vs. Masecampo,9 it was settled that:
truthfulness of some of their testimonies.
The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was claiming during Ms lifetime by one who pretended to be his natural son. It may
to be the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose much survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal
inheritance if Teopista's claim were recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges representative of the testate or intestate succession.
against his own sister and libel charges against her husband. As for Julieta Ouano,
the respondent court found it difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista
although both of them have been living in the same barangay since birth. Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution of
Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears
to be the former's illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent's
The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11, 1988. A contention that the lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and
motion for reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the opposition thereto of that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.
the private respondent that Casimiro's counsel learned that his client had died on
May 1986. He immediately informed the respondent court build the motion for
reconsideration was denied without any substitution of parties having been effected. Now to the merits.
The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute
the latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition. We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their
respective conclusions, focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in
The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro
reading as follows: Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based
her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of
the Civil Code.
Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party.
— Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or
incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
and residence of his executor, guardian or other legal representative. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. 10 The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own,
Sec. 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). 11 There must be a showing of
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. 12
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time the
court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. Family Code.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were
both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court
observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife. The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely
However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to accurate. To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza
live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His
case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's
Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's
latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this illegitimate daughter.15
is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of
defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are
concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent. apprehended from the rejection of such proof than from its
Indeed, the plaintiff s testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath she said admission.16 Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence, there
that her mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco
supporting her.13 enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or
declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has 1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
nevertheless established that status by another method.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by 3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the issue.
Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation 4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14 5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration. 17
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff
himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the
daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida
130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows: Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony.
The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro,
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs. 18
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by
history intimately connected with pedigree. deposition if he was too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent
and her witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring,
the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later
sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the
permission he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his land after he found that
the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less remarkably, the joint savings
account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other
circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such.
In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to
liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children,
without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with
his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of
modern medicine and technology

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered

DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late
Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-25715 January 3, 1985 Bibiano Bañas lived with Raymundo and his mother. At any rate, the records show
that by the year 1922, Raymundo Bañas used to go to the place of Bibiano Bañas
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO C. BAÑAS, namely, TRINIDAD VECINO VDA. DE once or twice a week, and it was in one of his visits, sometime between 1922 and
BAÑAS, LUIS V. BAÑAS JOSE V. BAÑAS, CONRADO V. BAÑAS ESTER V. 1923, that he met Trinidad Vecino, a niece of Faustina Vecino Bañas the wife of
BAÑAS CELIA V. BAÑAS, and ANTONIO DE GUZMAN, plaintiffs-appellants  Bibiano Bañas (pp. 379-381, CFI rec.). Trinidad Vecino lived with the family of
vs. Bibiano Bañas and took care of his children ever since she was a young girl,
HEIRS OF BIBIANO BARAS, namely, FAUSTINA VECINO VDA. DE BAÑAS sometime in 1909 (p. 391, CFI rec.).
ANTONIO V. BAÑAS BIBIANO V. BAÑAS JR., ROSITA V. BAÑAS, ANGEL
V. BAÑAS, MIGUEL DIVINO JACINTO DE DIOS and BAÑAS & SONS, On October 9,1926, Raymundo married Trinidad Vecino. In their marriage
INC., defendants-appellees. certificate (Exh. "H"), the name of the father of Raymundo was stated to be Bibiano
Bañas Pedro Bañas' name appeared in the marriage certificate as one of the sponsors
(p. 66, CFI rec.).

After their marriage, Raymundo and Trinidad resided at Gastambide St., Sampaloc,
Manila. Dolores Castillo, mother of Raymundo, lived with the couple until she died
MAKASIAR, J.: no December 27, 1940 (p. 363, CFI rec.). From Gastambide St., they transferred to
Sigay St., Quiapo, Manila, where they were sometimes visited by Bibiano Bañas and
This is an appeal from the decision dated January 5, 1966 of the then Court of First his wife Faustina (pp. 373 & 358, CFI rec.).
Instance of Manila, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 59859, which dismiss plaintiffs-
appellants' complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share, fruits and On December 1, 1928, Raymundo Bañas and Pedro Bañas executed sworn
damages. statements before Atty. Andres Faustino wherein Raymundo Bañas declared that he
was the natural son of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father as it appeared in
Plaintiffs-appellants, in their complaint filed no February 12, 1965, alleged that the his baptismal certificate; that in due time, he came to know that his natural father
late Raymundo Bañas their predecess-or-in-interest, was the acknowledged natural was Pedro Bañas that he had realized that in his marriage certificate, dated October
son of the late Bibiano Bañas defendants-appellees' predecessor- in-interest; that 9, 1926, an error had been committed in that the name of his father stated therein
therefore, they are, by descent, entitled to a share in the estate of the late Bibiano was Bibiano Bañas brother of his said father Pedro Bañas and that he is executing
Bañas. that sworn statement to put things in their proper place. This was recorded in the
notarial book of Notary Public Andres R. Faustino as Document No. 153, series of
Defendants-appellees, in answer to the complaint, denied that Raymundo Bañas was 1928 (p. 103, CFI rec.).
the natural son of the late Bibiano Bañas nor was he ever acknowledged by the latter
and his family as such; and by way of special and/or affirmative defenses alleged Pedro Bañas in his sworn statement, declared that he has a natural son named
that the use of the surname Bañas by Raymundo was justified on an alleged kinship Raymundo Bañas whom he had with Dolores Castillo, and whom he recognized as
of Raymundo Bañas with Pedro Bañas brother of Bibiano Bañas. such; that he came to know that in the marriage certificate of his aforesaid son an
error had been committed in that the name of the father of Raymundo Bañas
The following antecedent facts culled from the records are not disputed, to wit: appeared therein to be Bibiano Bañas instead of Pedro Bañas that he was executing
that document to put things in the right place, and also to ask for the correction from
the Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Pasay, Rizal, of the aforesaid error
The late Raymundo Bañas was a natural child being born out of wedlock on March committed in the marriage certificate of his son Raymundo Bañas and Trinidad
15, 1894, in Sampaloc, Manila, of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father (p. Vecino. This was recorded in the notarial book of Notary Public Andres R. Faustino
103, CFI rec.). During this time, Bibiano Bañas was still single (pp. 38-39, CFI rec.). as Document No. 154, series of 1928 (p. 113, CFI rec.).
When Raymundo was of school age, he studied at the Colegio de San Beda It was
Bibiano Bañas who shouldered Raymundo's school expenses. Raymundo pursued
his studies until he became a public school teacher (pp. 70-88, CFI rec.). At this These sworn statements of Raymundo Bañas and Pedro Bañas were filed with the
juncture, the records are completely bereft of any evidence to show whether or not Office of Justice of the Peace Ed. Aenlle of Pasay, Rizal before whom the marriage
of Raymundo Bañas and Trinidad Vecino was solemnized. Accordingly, justice of and baptized on March 25, 1984 as Raymundo Castillo; that according to the
the Peace Ed. Aenlle issued the following constancia: medical certificate issued by Dr. M. Mallare Dolores

En esta fecha se han presentado en esta Oficina una declaracion Castillo suffers from mental deficiency; that he was submitting therewith copies of
suscrita y jurada ante el Notario Publico de Manila, Andres R. the declaraciones juradas executed by him and his aforesaid son no December 1,
Faustino, el dia 1.0 del actual, por Raymundo Bañas que 1928 before Notary Public Andres R. Faustino; and that he was requesting that the
contrajo matrimonio con Trinidad Vecino, segun el presente necessary correction in the certificate of baptism of Raymundo Bañas as well as
certificado de matrimonio haciendo constar que el verdadero those of the latter's children, Luis and Jose, be made by indicating that the father of
nombre de su padre es PEDRO BARAS, y no BIBIANO Bañas said Raymundo, and the paternal grandfather of said Luis and Jose, is Pedro Bañas
como erroneamente se puso en dicho certificado; y otra and not Bibiano Bañas (p. 116, CFI rec.; Exh. "9").
declaracion suscrita y jurada en dicha fecha y ante el mismo
Notario Publico, por Pedro Bañas haciendo constar que el es el On July 1, 1930, Bibiano Bañas executed a sworn statement stating therein that
padre de dicho contrayente Raymundo Bañas y no Bibiano Pedro Bañas had a child, Raymundo Bañas with Dolores Castillo. This was recorded
Bañas como equivocadamente se consigno en dicho certificado; in the notarial book of Notary Public Vicente Larna as Document No. 1078, series of
uedando archivadas y unidas dichas declaracion juradas al 1930 (p. 115, CFI rec.).
referido certificado para los efectos consiguientes las cuales se
han transferido al Secretario Municipal de este Municipio
juntamente con esta constancia. Y para que conste extiendo la Sometime in January, 1931, Raymundo and his family moved to 1444 Kalimbas St.,
presente corstancia en Pasay, Rizal hoy a 7 de Diciembre de Santa Cruz, Manila. The property in Kalimbas St. belonged to Bibiano Bañas and
1928, was transferred to Raymundo's name on August 4, 1936 by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed by Bibiano Bañas in favor of Raymundo Bañas for the sum of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) [Exhs. "11" & "l 1-a"; p. 120; CFI rec.].
Ed. Aenlle,
On April 25, 1954, Bibiano Bañas died survived by his wife and children, the
Juez de Paz
defendants-appellees herein (p. 105, CFI rec.).

(Exh. "2", In
P. May,
104, CFI rec.).
1955, Raymundo Bañas wrote two letters (Exhs. "J" & "J-1") to Atty.
Andres Faustino in which he complained bitterly about the alleged injustices done to
At the bottom of this constancia there appears a handwritten notation marked him by Faustina Vecino vda. de Bañas at the same time stating that he would know
Exhibit " 2-a ", which reads as follows: what to do at the proper time. Pertinent portions of said letters read as follows:

El original de esta timbre del juzgado se llevo Trinidad Vecino. Upang makapanloko, ginawa ni Gg. Bañas ang lahat ng kanyang
abilidad o paraan [metodo o sistema] upang sa huling panahon
Consequently, in the certified copy of the marriage contract of Raymundo Bañas and ako isang maliit na inapi at dinaya—ay mawalan ng lakas o
Trinidad Vecino, Exhibit "H", the following remark appears: katibayan na makapaghabol [sa mana] Subali't ang Diyos po ay
marunong. Tinutulungan Niya ang isang taong inaapi. Ako po
ay mayroong KATIBAYAN [BUHAY] (pp. 68- 69, CFI rec.).
Segun declaracion adjunta en el certificado de matrimonio de
Raymundo Bañas el padre de este es Pedro Bañas y no Bibiano
Bañas (Exh. "4", p. 66, CFI rec.). On June 24, 1955, more than a year after the death of Bibiano Bañas his heirs, the
defendants-appellees herein, extra-judicially settled his estate by means of a deed of
extra-judicial settlement among themselves. The deed of extra-judicial settlement
On June 30, 1930, Pedro Bañas wrote to M.R.P. Juez del Arzobispado de Manila" was notarized by Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of Trinidad Vecino (pp. 105-111, CFI
wherein he reiterated that he had recognized his natural son born of Dolores Castillo rec.).
On November 7, 1955, the spouses Raymundo Bañas and Trinidad Vecino executed (3) Exhibits "C" & "C1" two original copies of receipts of
a mortgage over their house and lot in 1444 Kalimbas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in payments for matriculation, dated June 13, and November I of
favor of herein defendant-appellee Angel V. Bañas for the sum of seventeen the year 1905 (p. 64, CFI Rec.).
thousand pesos (P17,000.00). The mortgage contract was also prepared by Atty.
Angel Vecino (p. 423, CFI rec.). After the spouses had paid more or less, twelve (4) Exhibits "D" & "E"—the 1904 and 1905 matriculation
thousand pesos (Pl2,000.00), the mortgage was cancelled by Angel V. Bañas (pp. certificates of Raymundo Bañas in San Beda College wherein it
425,432, CFI rec.). is stated that Raymundo Bañas is "hijo de Bibiano Bañas (p. 63,
CFI rec.).
On February 25, 1962, Raymundo C. Bañas died survived his wife and children, the
plaintiffs-appellants herein (p. 93, CFI rec.; Exh. "N"). (5) Exhibits "F", "F-1", "G" and "G-1"—the 1910 and 1911
report cards of Raymundo Bañas for the fifth and sixth grades of
On February 12, 1965, almost three years after the death of Raymundo Bañas his the Sampaloc Intermediate School. Exhibit "F-1" is the space at
heirs, the plaintiffs-appellants herein, filed the instant complaint for partition or the back of the report card for the signatures of the parent or
recovery of hereditary share, fruits and damages against the heirs of the late Bibiano guardian. The signatures in this space had been erased, although
Bañas Sr., herein defendants-appellees. not thoroughly, so that it can still be seen at close examination
that the signatures appear to be that of Bibiano Bañas Plaintiff-
In support of their claim, plaintiffs-appellants presented Trinidad Vecino vda. de appellants have not offered any explanation for these erasures.
Bañas who testified that after the death of her husband in 1962, she discovered Exhibit "G-1" contains the following entries:
certain documents in his aparador which established his filiation. Plaintiffs-
appellants presented these documents as evidence of their contention that the late B. of E. Form No, 137
Raymundo Bañas was the acknowledged natural son of the late Bibiano Bañas to
wit: PUPIL'S RECORD CARD

(1) Exhibit "A"—a handwritten note preserved in a glass frame Name Bañas Raymundo
which reads:
Age 17 on March 15, 1911.
Mundo hoy a las 10 y 45. Tu no estas en casa. No requieres tu
obedecer lo que te dije que en estas horas estudiar, descansar y
ayudar con su madre. Que no veo mas otraves asi. Home Address 62 Progreso

23/5/7 Province Manila Int. Quiapo

Su Padre Parentor-Guardian BibianoBañas Occupatio
n Reg. Practitioner (p. 65, CFI rec.).
(Sgd.) B. Bañas.
(6) Exhibit "I"—a type-written statement of Raymundo Bañas
dated Oct. 6, 1958 setting forth his alleged personal
(2) Exhibit "B"—a directory and homecoming souvenir program circumstances (p. 67, CFI rec.).
of the San Beda Alumni Association dated 1956 wherein
thisentry is found: Bañas R.—CS'06" (p. 202, CFI rec.).
(7) Exhibits "J", "J-1" and "J-2"—the carbon copies of the
typewritten letters sent by Raymundo Bañas to Atty. Andres
Faustino (pp. 68-69, CFI rec.).
 (8) Exhibits "K" & "L"—the autobiographies of Raymundo UN APUNTED DE Resumen de Raymundo
Bañas Exhibit "L" is typewritten and contains intercalations, que hasindio un total de TRESMIL SEIS
alterations and spoliations (pp. 70 & 123, CFI rec.). CIENTOS UNO PESOS toniados a mi
estudio con mis firmas las fechas de tomas 8
Plaintiffs-appellants also presented the marriage certificate of Raymundo Bañas and de Enero de 1922" (p. 119, CFI rec.; Exhs.
Trinidad Vecino as evidence and was marked as Exhibit "H". "10" & "10-a").

Defendants-appellees, no the other hand, presented defendant-appellee Bibiano It is not disputed that Raymundo Bañas had the status of a natural child. What is
Bañas Jr., who testified that after the death of Bibiano Bañas Sr. in 1954, the being disputed is whether or not he was an acknowledged natural son of Bibiano
following documents were found in the latter's safe: Bañas.

(1) Duplicate original copies of the "Declaracion Jurada of The case was tried and no January 5, 1966, the trial court rendered a decision
Raymundo Bañas and Pedro Bañas executed no December 1, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint mainly no the following grounds:
1928, before Notary Public Andres R. Faustino (pp. 103 & 114,
CFI rec.; Exhs. " I " & " 7 "). (1) that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-appellants were
not sufficient to prove their claim that Raymundo Bañas was the
(2) Duplicate original copy of the "Declaracion Jurada of acknowledged natural child of the late Bibiano Bañas
Bibiano Bañas dated July 1, 1930, executed before Notary
Public Vicente Larna (p. 115, CFI rec.; Exh. "8"). (2) that "considering the lack of express recognition, the sworn
declaration of Pedro Bañas Exhibit 7, that Raymundo Bañas was
(3) Duplicate original copy of the letter of Pedro Bañas dated his son, together with the express acknowledgment made by
June 30, 1930, to the M.R.P. Juez Provisor del Arzobispado de Raymundo Bañas in the sworn statement, Exhibit 1, that his
Manila (pp. 116-118, CFI rec.; Exh. "9"). father was Pedro Baiffas and not Bibiano Bañas entirely negates
the Idea that Raymundo was the son of Bibiano Bañas;
(4) The envelope wherein the aforesaid
documents were contained when found in (3) that since the note (Exh. "a") addressed to Mundo with the
the safe of Bibiano Bañas Sr., no which complimentary ending "Su Padre, B. Bañas invoked by the
there appears a typewritten annotation no its plaintiffs-appellants as their principal evidence was executed in
face which reads: 1907, under the regime of the Spanish Civil Code, therefore the
question of whether or not Exhibit "A" is a valid form of
voluntary recognition should be decided according to the old
Asunto Civil de Raymundo No. 10953 en Civil Code; and in accordance with Art. 131 thereof such
Diciembre de 1913, en contra mia document does not constitute a valid voluntary recognition;
Sobresaido
(4) that "Raymundo Bañas was the son of Pedro Bañas Bibiano
2 Copias para el Sr. Arsobispo de Manila Bañas brother but since the evidence shows that Pedro Bañas
reconosiendo que Pedro Bañas es padre de was unable to support himself and his wife, it could very well be
Raymundo a Dolores Castillo 30 de Junio de that Bibiano Bañas had sort of adopted or considered
1930. Aprobado. Raymundo, the son of his brother, to be his own son and had
taken paternal solicitude for him",
Afidavit de D. Pedro Bañas Bibiano y
Reymundo a 1 de Julio de 1930.
 (5) that "(T)he failure of Raymundo Bañas to take any legal IV. That trial court erred in not holding that the entry in 1926
action to enforce his alleged rights, or to make any written marriage certificate of Raymundo C. Bañas and Trinidad Vecino
demand upon the defendants herein, are all confirmatory of the (EXIL H), that Bibiano Bañas was the father of Raymundo,
sworn statement, Exhibit 1, in which he declared that his father cannot be corrected nor nullified by the 1928 affidavits, Exhibits
was Pedro Bañas", 1 and 7, which state that Pedro Bañas was Raymundo's father,
nor can such entry be the subject matter of the constancia of
(6) that "his failure to enforce his rights for a period of over Justice of the Peace Ed. Aenlle of Pasay (Exh. 2), a document
eight years is indicative of the lack of merit of plaintiffs' claim" which was erroneously admitted as evidence by the trial court.
(pp45-54, CFI rec.).
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the affidavits,
Plaintiffs-appellants now come before this Court with the following assignment of Exhibits 1 and 7, stating that Raymundo C. Bañas was the
errors: natural son of Pedro Bañas were part and parcel of an illegal and
fraudulent compromise no the civil status of Raymundo C.
Bañas whose principal objective was to induce him to make a
I. The trial court erred in not holding that the fifty-nine (59) year void renunciation of his hereditary rights in the estate of Ms
old note of Doctor Bibiano Bañas to his natural child, natural father, Bibiano Bañas.
Raymundo C. Bañas (Exh. "A", page 25, Record no Appeal),
being an authentic writing, is a sufficient form of voluntary
recognition under articles 278 and 2260 of the New Civil Code, VI. The trial court erred in assuming that Raymundo C. Bañas
which entitle the plaintiffs, as heirs of Raymundo C. Bañas to consulted his insane mother with respect to the execution of
claim successional rights in the estate of Doctor Bañas who died Exhibits 1 and 7.
in 1954.
VII. The trial court erred in surmising that Bibiano Bañas had
II. The trial court erred in not finding that Raymundo C. Bañas sort of adopted or considered Raymundo, the son of his brother,
was the voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Doctor to be his own and had taken paternal solicitude in him.
Bibiano Bañas as proven not only by Exhibit "A", but also by
the records of San Beda College (Exh. B to E) and by the VIII. The trial court erred in holding that the failure of
records of the Sampaloc Intermediate School (Exh. F and G) and Raymundo C. Bañas to enforce his claim within the eight-year
the marriage certificate (Exh. H). period from 1954, when Bibiano Bañas died, to 1962, when
Raymundo died, shows that his claim had no merit.
III. The trial court erred (a) in giving probative value to the
affidavits, Exhibits 1 and 7 both dated December 1, 1928, IX. The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint and in not
executed by Raymundo C. Bañas and Pedro Bañas and stating ordering the defendants, as successors-in-interest of Doctor
that Raymundo was the natural son of Pedro Bañas (b) in not Bañas to deliver to the plaintiffs the hereditary share in the
holding that said affidavits were nullified by the subsequent properties in litigation of Raymundo C. Bañas as a voluntarily
documents, namely, the 1930 "Genealo"gy in the handwriting of acknowledged natural child of Doctor Bañas plus his share of
Raymundo C. Bañas (Exh. K), and his typewritten the fruits thereof and damages" (pp. a-d, Brief for the Plaintiffs-
autobiography (Exh. L), wherein Raymundo clarified that his Appellants, p. 19; rec.).
father was Bibiano Bañas and (c) in not holding that said
affidavits could not revoke nor affect the status of Raymundo as I
a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Bibiano Bañas by
virtue of Exhibit "A".
The decisive issue to be resolved herein is whether or not Bibiano Bañas had
voluntarily acknowledged Raymundo Bañas as his natural son.
WE hold that there was no voluntary recognition in the instant case. Nevertheless, Exhibit "A" was admitted by the trial court no the ground that it is an
ancient document, the authenticity of which need not be proven.
Plaintiffs-appellants rest their claim no Article 278 of the New Civil Code which
provides: Assuming that plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibit "A" is authentic document as
contemplated by Article 278 of the New Civil Code, We find that the same does not
(7) Art. 278—Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a constitute a sufficient proof of a valid voluntary recognition.
wilt a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. Voluntary recognition of a natural child to be effective under the
law (Art. 278), must be made expressly by the recognizing
WE have ruled that Article 278 should be given retroactive effect (Moscoso vs. CA, parent, either in the record of birth, in a will in a statement
et all L-46439, April 24, 1984). before a court of record, or in any authentic writing" (Vol. 1-A
Padilla, Civil Law, 1975 ed., p. 83).
Plaintiffs-appellants admit that the main basis of their action is Exhibit "A" (Brief
for the Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 2; p. 19, rec.). Exhibit "A" is again quoted The formalities of voluntary recognition under Article 278 of the New Civil Code is
hereunder: that recognition shall be express and made either in the record of birth, in a will, in a
statement in a court of record, or in any authentic writing (Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
Civil Law, Vol. 1, p. 262).
Mundo hoy a las 10 y 45. Tu no estas en casa no requieres tu
obedecer loque te dije, que en estas horas estudiar, descansar y
ayudar con su madre. Que no veo mas otraves asi. In the case of Intestate Estate of Pareja vs. Pareja (95 Phil. 171, 172), Justice
Labrador quoted Sanchez Roman who said that recognition of natural children must
be precise, express, and solemn, thus:
23/5/7
54. En cuanto a los elementos formales del reconocimiento de
Su padre hijos naturales, o sean las formas legales de llevarlo a cabo, las
establecidas por el Codigo son de caracter taxativo, expreso y
23/5/7 B. Bañas solemne.

(p. 170, CFI rec.). Lo primero, porque, segun el art. 131 y sus complementarios,
132, 133, solo puede las tener lugar dicho reconocimiento en el
Trinidad Vecino vda. de Bañas widow of the late Raymundo Bañas and plaintiff- acta de nacimiento, en testamento o en otro documento publico,
appellant herein, testified that this note is in the handwriting of Bibiano Bañas In its y en este ultimo caso, cuando el reconocimiento, sea de un
regard, the observation of the trial court should be noted, and WE quote: menor, con la aprobacion judicial y audiencia del Ministerio
fiscal, asi como cuando es de un mayor, siempre con su
consentimiemto, segun ya se ha dicho (1).
She said that she is familiar with the handwriting of Bibiano
Bañas since she had often seen him write. This testimony,
however, must be considered as very much strained for Exhibit Lo segundo, porque de este mismo criterio legal taxativo y de
"A" is dated "23/5/7"or 23 May 1907. While according to los medios unicos que establece el articulo 131, se deduce una
Trinidad Vecino, she saw Bibiano Bañas write only as early as vez mas, que el Codigo, apartandose del sentido declarado por la
1917. Considering the long lapse of time, which was around 10 jurisprudencia del Derecho anterior, no acepta la doctrina del
years, any testimony that the writing is the handwriting of a reconocimiento tacito, ni siquira la de la libertad para acreditario
person no the ground that the witness is familiar with the por cualquiera de los medios de prueba establecidos en Derecho,
handwriting must be considered unreliable (p. 49, CFI rec.). cuando del reconocimiento voluntario propiamente tal se trate,
 siendo, a lo sumo, aquellos medios, elementos para fundar la xxx xxx xxx
demanda del llmado reconocimiento forzoso, a que se refieren
los articulos 135 y 136 (2), siempre que concurran las There is nothing in Exhibit "A", outside of the complimentary
circunstancias especificas, en cuanto a la prueba de la filiacion ending, that Raymundo Bañas is the son of Bibiano Bañas (p.
natural, que los mismos enumeran. 50, CFI rec.; emphasis supplied).

Lo tercerro, porque todas las formas de llevar a cabo el The complimentary ending, Su padre," taking into consideration the context of the
reconocimiento, taxativamente expresadas en el articulo 131 y entire letter (EXIL "A"), is not an indubitable acknowledgment of paternity. It is a
complementadas para algun caso en el segundo parrafo del 133, mere indication of paternal solicitude.
son de caracter solemne, segun lo revelan sus distintas especies,
y hasta la mas generica que expresa de documento publico, curo
valor legal se establece por el articulo 1.216 (3) del Codigo; y The Filipinos are known for having very close family ties. Extended families are a
para este efecto, como tal, debe considerarse el acta de common set-up among them, sometimes to the extent that strangers are also
conciliacion, calificada de documento publico y solemne por la considered as part of the family. In addition, Filipinos are generally fond of children,
ley de Enjuiciamiento civil (4). Tampoco cabe nagar tal caracter so that children of relatives or even of strangers are supported if their parents are not
a la forma especial del testamento olografo, no obstante la capable to do so. This is a manifestation of the fact that Filipinos are stin living in a
condicion privada de su otorgamiento, puesto que la cualidad de patriarchal society (see opinion of then C.A. Justice Castro quoted by Chief Justice
documento publico la adquiere desde el momento en que es Bengzon in Gustilo vs. Gustilo, 14 SCRA 154).
protocolado (5) [Tomo 5, Vol. 2, Sanchez Roman, p. 1043]
(Emphasis supplied). Thus, in the case of Gustilo vs. Gustilo, supra, penned by Chief Justice Bengzon,
analogous to the case at bar, wherein the evidence submitted as proof of voluntary
The same concept still holds under the new law since Article 278 of the New Civil recognition does not only include a letter written by the alleged father to the natural
Code was taken from Article 131 of the Old Civil Code, except that the present child which also ends with the complimentary ending" ... tu padre," but other
Code adds "statement before a court of record" as a new means of recognition and stronger evidence tending to show voluntary recognition, this Court held that such
changes "public document" in the old Code to "authentic writing. " evidence does not prove express recognition. Pertinent portions of the decision reads
as follows:
Consequently, the trial court was correct when it said:
The pertinent facts of the case were accurately described in the
decision of Mr. Justice Castro of the Court of Appeals:
The question to determine is whether Exbibit "A" is a document
sufficient to constitute a recognition of Raymundo Bañas by
Bibiano Bañas The note is addressed to Mundo and ends with At the trial she (Rosa) was allowed, over the objection of the
the complimentary with the endingSu padre, B. BañasAre the defendants to introduce evidence tending to show that she was
words Su padre, B. Bañasa sufficient recognition of Raymundo begotten in 1898, out of wedlock by Calixto Gustilo and
by Bibiano? This question must be decided no the strength of Teodora Soqueño (both deceased) who, at the time of her
Exhibit "A" alone and not by the other evidence submitted by conception, could marry each other without legal impediment;
the plaintiff. If the Court had allowed the submission of that from her birth until the age of 7, she was under the custody
evidence to show that Raymundo Bañas was the son of Bibiano of her mother who was supported by Calixto Gustilo; that in
Bañas it was only for the purpose of showing that Mundo, the 1902, Calixto Gustilo married Martina Poblador; and that at the
person addressed to in Exhibit "A", was Raymundo Bañas. The age of seven she was taken into the custody of the said spouses
words Su Padre considering the evidence for the defendants are with whom she lived for almost fifteen years. The evidence for
in the opinion of the Court not sufficient to constitute an intent the plaintiff further shows that in the year 1902, she studied at
to recognize. the Zarraga public school while she was staying with the mother
of Martina at the poblacion of Zarraga; that she later enrolled at
the Colegio de San Jose and at the Colegio de Santa Ana
together with her sister Josefa, and all her expenses were borne (6) Exh. F—a deed of donation executed by Calixto Gustilo
by Calixto; that all along she was considered as a member of the himself in favor of Rosa in a public document, duly accepted by
family and addressed by her father as "Inday" and at nines the latter in the same document, which states in substance that in
"Rosa," and was introduced in pubic gatherings by Calixto as his consideration of the donation the donee will renounce her
daughter; and that she received the same treatment from her participation in his estate after his death.
brothers and sisters and her foster mother Martina Poblador.
Under the facts set out in the first paragraph above quoted, Rosa
xxx xxx xxx Gustilo could conceivably have filed an action for compulsory
recognition under Art. 283 of the New Civil Code alleging
The items of documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff continuous possession of the status of a natural child of Calixto
are the following Gustilo by direct acts of the latter or of his family; but as she did
not file such action before his death, she is now precluded from
bringing it, inasmuch as she was already mature (64) when
(1) Exh. A—a marriage certificate which states that no the 8th Calixto died; and as she did not claim (nor prove) to have
day of October, 1922, Juan Sumagaysay, 26 years of age, the discovered after his death some document actually recognizing
son of Rufino Sumagaysay and Gregoria Sebusa resident of her.
Leganes Iloilo, was married to Rosa Gustilo, 23 years of age, the
daughter of Calixto Gustilo and Teodora Soqueño.
Therefore, this action may not be entertained as an action to
compel recognition It must be regarded as an action by a
(2) Exh. B—a letter of Calixto Gustilo addressed to Rosa, and recognized natural child to enforce her rights as such. As the
dated February 12, 1917, pertinent part of which reads: 'Señorita Court of Ap has stated, the only provision of law upon which
Rosa Gustilo y su hermana Josefa, Queridas hija: ... Rosa may now rest her claim is Art. 278 of the New Civil Code,
Conservamas buenas que es siempre el desee de tu padre (Fdo.) which reads as follows:
CALIXTO GUSTILO.
Art. ...
(3) Exh. C—a letter of Augusta Gustilo to Rosa Gustilo dated
September 5, 1918 which in part says: "Senorita Rosa Gustilo,
Colegio Santa Ana, Molo, Iloilo Islas Filipinos, Mis muy Admittedly, plaintiff has not been recognized in a record of
queridas Hermanas: ...Vuestro hermano que es requiere (Fdo.) birth, nor in a will but she rests her claim to filiation no the
AUGUSTO GUSTILO. strength of either a statement before a court of record or
statements in an authentic writing. It must be obvious that such
statement, to be effective, must be one made by Calixto himself;
(4) Exh. D—a letter of August Gustilo to Rosa dated February 1, and that the writing must be the writing of Calixto.
1920, which in part says: 'Senorita Rosa Gustilo, Zarraga, Iloilo,
Islas Filipinos, Mis querida hermana: ... Tu hermano que te
requiere. (Fdo.) AUGUSTO GUSTILO. Let us now examine the documents presented.

(5) Exh. E—a motion filed by Augusta Gustilo with the Court in Exh. A—the certificate of marriage of Rosa Gustilo with Juan
behalf of Rosa dated December 10, 1945, which in part reads: Sumagaysay, stating she was the daughter of Calixto Gustilo and
'Rosa Gustilo, my sister, is the registered owner of Lot 9500 of Teodora Soqueño.
the Cadastral Survey of Santa Barbara, now Zarraga. ... (fdo.)
AUGUSTO GUSTILO. As it does not appear that this has been signed by Calixto—it is
enough.
On the same ground, the other papers, Exhs. C, D and E all (Pareja v. Pareja, L-6823, May 31, 1954). For as Gitt v.
signed by Augusto Gustilo must be discarded. Gitt exemplifies, there may be direct acts of the father which
though not constituting voluntary acknowledgment of a natural
Exh. B—is a letter signed by Calixto addressed to "Rosa Gustilo child, may be used to "compel" recognition as such (emphasis
y su hermana Josefa." It says: "Queridas hijas: ... Conservanmas supplied).
buenas que es siempre el desee de tu padre."
A FORTIORI plaintiffs-appellants' argument that Exhibit As
The Court of Appeals deemed this letter to be insufficient for it complimentary clause "su padre," is a categorical admission by
contends no unequivocal avowal that Rosa was Calixto's child. Bibiano Bañas that he was the father of "Mundo" or Raymundo
Indeed, it was addressed also to Josefa who was admittedly his Bañas must necessarily fail.
own child. It should specially be noted that the letter spoke of tu
padre' referring to his wife Martina who was the mother of II
Josefa not of Rosa. At any rate there is much sense in Justice
Castro's observation that 'it is not uncommon in many Filipino Plaintiffs-appellants argued that under the rule of incidental acknowledgment,
homes that a child who is a perfect stranger to the family but Exhibit "A" is a sufficient form of recognition (p. 19, rec., Brief for the Plaintiffs-
who was taken under similar circumstances, is regarded as a appellants, p. 40). To support their contention, plaintiffs-appellants cited the case
member of the family and called "hija" or "hijo " by the head of Donado vs. Menendez Donado (55 Phil. 861, 872), and quoted therefrom the
thereof.' This view follows and coincides with the line of following:
thought expressed by Manresa in that portion of his
commentaries, quoted with approval in Joaquin v. Joaquin, 60
PhiL 399 wherein adverting to written acknowledgments of xxx xxx xxx
paternity of a natural child, he explained:
The terms in which the acknowledgment is made are immaterial
En cuanto al otro requisito de ser expreso el reconocimiento ... el and Goyena's opinion is admissible that, with reference to article
excrito, aunque contenga otros particulares, como sucede en los 124 of the bill of 1851, the law inclines favorably to an
testamentos, ha de tener por objeto el reconocimiento deliverado acknowledgment made incidentally or in any terms, so long as
y expreso del hijo natural. No ulna, pues, ese objeto la the intention to acknowledge sufficiently appears. "It is enough,"
manifestation que incidentalmente haga el padre de ser hijo he adds, "that the testator mention the legatee as his natural
natural suyo la persona a quien se refiera, y mucho mas el dar a child," who may thenceforth demand his rights as a natural
una persona el titulo y tratemiento de hijo en certas familiares child, even if the will is revoked.
(Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil, Tomo 1, pag. 580, 3a
ed.) According to the cases cited above and Manresa's opinion,
acknowledgment made in a public or private document need not
Needless to add, Manresa's above opinion was written as a be direct, but may even incidentally admit that the person whose
comment to Art. 131 of the Spanish Civil Code which is exactly name appears in the document in question is the subscriber's
the same as Art. 278 of the New Civil Code, except that 'in some child (p. 19, rec., p. 41, Brief for the Plaintiffs-appellants,
other public document' has been substituted with 'in any emphasis supplied).
authentic writing.
Plaintiffs-appellants went no further to cite the cases of Javelona vs. Monteclaro (74
This letter—to recall our previous indications—could probably Phil. 393), Apacible vs. Castillo (74 PhiL 589), and Cosio vs. Pili (10 PhiL 72).
be material evidence in a suit to compel recognition. However, it They alleged that based no the above-mentioned quotation and cited cases, the rule
is not by itself a voluntary act of recognition, such as is of incidental acknowledgment applies to Exhibit "A" which, therefore, constitutes a
contemplated in Art. 278, which act must be precise and express sufficient and valid voluntary recognition of Raymundo Bañas by Bibiano Bañas.
WE do not agree. Plaintiffs-appellants have erroneously applied the rule of document (Manresa, vol 1, p. 579). The father would ordinarily
incidental acknowledgment. They have completely failed to note that all of the be more careful about what he says in a public document than
authorities they cited endorse incidental acknowledgment, in cases of voluntary in a private writing, so that even an incidental mention of the
recognition, if the alleged voluntary recognition were made in a public document. child as his in a public document deserves full faith and
The reason for this is quite simple. Nowhere in these cited cases can be found any credit ...
statement that incidental voluntary acknowledgment may be made in a private
writing, simply because all of these cited cases were decided long before the In the second place, in an action no Article 131 (voluntary
adoption of the New Civil Code. Under the regime of the Old Civil Code, a recognition) the natural child merely asks for a share in the
voluntary recognition can only be made in a record of birth, will or other public inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such,
document (Art. 131). A private writing or document, under the Old Civil Code, may and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the
be considered as an "indubitable writing" which is a ground for compulsory acknowledgment whereas the action based no Article 135 is to
recognition according to Art. 135 thereof. compel the father or his heirs to recognize the child. In the
former case, acknowledgment has been formally and legally
Justice Villa-Real in the case of Donado vs. Menendez Donado (55 Phil. 861), cited accomplished because the public character of the
by the plaintiffs-appellants, was referring to both Articles 131 and 135 of the document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary, while in
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, or the Old Civil Code, when he said that, an the latter case, recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts
"acknowledgment made in a public or private document need not be direct, but may because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty and
even incidentally admit that the person whose name appears in the document in higher authenticity of a public document, is not self-executory...
question is the subscriber's child." This statement of Justice Villa-Real was clarified (lbid, pp. 398, 400, emphasis supplied).
by Justice Bocobo in the case of Javelona, et all vs. Monteclaro, et al. (74 Phil. 393,
398; 400)-also cited by the plaintiffs-appellants when he clearly laid down the ratio It is therefore clear that the rule of incidental acknowledgment does not apply to
legis of the doctrine of incidental acknowledgment under Article 131 of the Old plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibit "A" since it is not a public document where a father
Civil Code, thus: would ordinarily be more careful about what he says. In fact, Exhibit "A" is merely a
short note whereby a 13-year old boy is being admonished for staying out late and
Upon the second point, whether a voluntary acknowledgment not staying at home studying his school lessons or helping his mother.
may be done incidentally in a public document, a distinction
must be made between the two kinds of acknowledgment: (1) Moreover, in Manresa's opinion invoked by the plaintiffs-appellants, it is
voluntary, and (2) compulsory. In the former, recognition may emphasized therein that while the terminology in which the acknowledgment is
be incidental but in the latter, it must be direct and express. made is immaterial, the sine qua non is that the act of recognition must be "con tal
que de ellos aparezra suficientemente la intencion de hacerlo". In other words, the
xxx xxx xxx intent to recognize must be sufficiently apparent in the document. And, as WE have
earlier indicated, the complimentary ending Su padre," taking into consideration the
We adopted the same rule as to article 131 in the case context of the entire letter (Exh. "A"), is not an indubitable acknowledgment of
of Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 PhiL 861, 872, when we paternity, but merely an indication of the paternal concern of one for the well-being
held that an acknowledgment in a document need not be direct, of the natural son of his brother who could not support or rear the boy. The intent to
but may even incidentally admit that the person whose name recognize, therefore, is not apparent in Exhibit "A".
appears in the document is the subscriber's child.
III
The reasons for the above distinction between express
recognition in article 135 and incidental acknowledgment Plaintiffs-appellants also presented the school records (Exhs. "B" to "F") of
according to article 131 are not far to seek. In the first place, a Raymundo Bañas and a certified copy of his marriage certificate (Exh. "H"), to
voluntary recognition is made in a public document (Art. 131) further support their claim. However, these school records could not be said to be
whereas the indubitable writing under article 135 is a private confirmative of any intention no the part of Bibiano Bañas to recognize Raymundo
as his natural son since school records are prepared, not by Bibiano, but by the whatsoever to recognize Raymundo as his natural son, nor had he ever treated
school authorities concerned. The same can also be said of the marriage certificate Raymundo as such.
of Raymundo Bañas and Trinidad Vecino which was prepared by the church
authorities concerned. In addition to this, the records in the case at bar are Consequently, even if the evidence presented by the plaintiffs- appellants constitute
completely bereft of any evidence to show that Bibiano Bañas furnished the a sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition, still their complaint will not prosper
statements therein or that he had any participation in securing the enrollment and the since it is evident that if there was acknowledgment no the part of Bibiano, he had
marriage certificate of Raymundo nor made representations in connection therewith. rectified or repudiated the same by his sworn statement (Exh. "8").

This Court held that the authentic writing upon which the claim to filiation rests Accordingly, "(T)he recognition of a child as a natural child by any means required
must, to be effective, be one made by the putative father himself and that the writing by law may be subsequently corrected by the person who made the
must be the writing of the said alleged father (Gustilo vs. Gustilo, 14 SCRA 149; acknowledgment. There is no provision in any of the laws now in force which
Malonda vs. Malonda, 81 PhiL 149; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350). prohibits the father or the mother who recognized a person as their natural or their
legitimate child, to make, by any of the means prescribed or recognized by law, such
Likewise, in the case of Cid vs. Brunaman (24 SCRA 439), this Court held that a a rectification that is, to deny to said person the previously acknowledged status of
birth certificate does "not constitute a sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the the child. Neither is it necessary in order that a rectification of this nature be made,
latter must be executed by the child's father or mother, and the parish priest can not that there be a legal provision to authorize it, for the reason that the law cannot
acknowledge in their stead (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6)." foresee the cases where, by reason of the ineluctable dictates of conscience of the
necessity of safeguarding some right, such a rectification may be necessary and just.
In the case of Exhibit "F", although Bibiano Bañas signatures appeared at the back Nevertheless, such rectification must not be arbitrary and its purpose must be to
of the report card of Raymundo Bañas no the space provided for the signatures of show that the acknowledged child does not have the conditions that the law requires
the parent or guardian, still it does not constitute a sufficient act of recognition for it in order that he may be so acknowledged, or that he has not the absolute condition
could very well be that Bibiano Bañas affixed his signatures no the report card of of being the child of the person who acknowledged him, or that such person could
Raymundo as a guardian and not as parent of the latter. As pointed out by the trial not have begotten him, or that the child is the child of a third person (Francisco,
court: The evidence shows that Pedro Bañas even during his marriage, had always Civil Law, Bk. I, pp. 734, 735, citing the case of Remigio v. Ortiga 33 Phil. 614,
lived with the spouses Bibiano Bañas and Faustina Vecino. It would appear, emphasis supplied).
therefore, that Pedro Bañas was unable to support himself and his wife, and it could
very well be that Bibiano Bañas had sort of adopted de facto—not—legally or Corollary to this, Raymundo and Pedro Bañas had acknowledged the paternal
considered Raymundo, the son of his brother, to be his own "ampon" in Tagalog or relationship between them when they executed sworn statements (Exhs. 1 and 7, pp.
Filipino, and had taken paternal solicitude for him (p. 50, CFI rec.). Furthermore, 103, 113, CFI rec.) no December 1, 1928, before Atty. Andres Faustino, whereby
since the signatures of Bibiano Bañas appearing in Raymundo's report MM may be Raymundo declared that he was the natural son of Dolores Castillo and of an
construed as the signature of a mere guardian, the recognition, if there is any, cannot unknown father as it appeared in his baptismal certificate; that Id due time, he came
be said to be precise and express as required by Article 278. WE must not also fail to to know that his natural father was Pedro Bañas. Pedro Bañas in his sworn
mention the fact that Exhibit "F" contains erasures for which plaintiffs-appellants statement, declared that he has a natural son named Raymundo Bañas whom he
have not offered any explanation. The signatures of Bibiano Bañas appearing therein begot with Dolores Castillo, and whom he recognized as such.
can hardly be read except no close examination.
The reason given by the affiants Raymundo and Pedro Bañas why they were
IV executing their sworn statements, is to put no record the true state of things; because
they had realized that in the marriage certificate of Raymundo and Trinidad Vecino,
Plaintiffs-appellants' claim of voluntary recognition no the part of Bibiano Bañas dated October 9,1926, an error had been committed in that the name of Raymundo's
runs counter to the established facts of the case. The sworn statement—a public father stated therein was Bibiano Bañas brother of his father, Pedro Bañas And that,
document—(Exh "8", p. 115, CFI rec.), executed by Bibiano Bañas no July 1, 1930, therefore, they are asking for the correction of the aforesaid error in the marriage
before Notary Public Vicente Larna wherein Bibiano declared that Raymundo was certificate from the Justice of the Peace Ed Aenlle of Pasay, Rizal before whom the
the son of his brother, Pedro Bañas clearly shows that he had no intention marriage of Raymundo and Trinidad was solemnized. To OUR mind, this is a valid
and sufficient reason for Raymundo and Pedro Bañas to execute their sworn ... Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and
statements. explaining the evidence adduced against him, f it does not tend
to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference
Plaintiff-appellant Trinidad Vecino Vda. de Bañas claims that the sworn statement against him (Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Ed. by R. H. Kersley
of Raymundo was allegedly executed by the latter in consideration of Bibiano Bañas p. 638).
promise to give them an additional lot. But, as the trial court correctly observed,
"(T)rue, Trinidad Vecino vaguely declared that the sworn statement was executed by V
Raymundo Bañas because of the promise to give them another lot in addition to the
Kalimbas lot. But this testimony must fail in the face of her insistent testimony that The records show that Raymundo Bañas obviously bitter and discontended because
she came to know of the sworn statement, Exhibit 1, only after the death of he was not given a share in the estate of Bibiano Bañas failed to file a formal claim
Raymundo Bañas in 1962" (p. 49, CFI rec.). In other words, how can Trinidad or demand during the eight-year period between the death of Bibiano Bañas in 1954
Vecino Vda. de Bañas be believed in her testimony that Exhibit I was executed in and his own in 1962.
consideration of said promise, since Exhibit 1 was executed without her knowledge
way back in 1928.
Human nature normally dictates that Raymundo should establish his filiation to
Bibiano, especially if such action can benefit him and his family. The urgency of
Moreover, the sworn statement of Raymundo Bañas was executed no December 1, such action is heightened in the case of Raymundo since it can be deduced that they
1928, or almost two years before Raymundo and his family moved to the Kalimbas were having financial difficulties from the mortgage executed by the spouses
lot, and more than six years before the said property was transferred to Raymundo's Raymundo and Trinidad over their own house and lot in favor of Angel V. Bañas a
name. Under these premises, how can plaintiff-appellant Trinidad Vecino Vda. de legitimate son of Bibiano Bañas and defendant-appellee herein, no November 7,
Bañas now validly claim that Raymundo executed that sworn statement in 1955, a few months after the settlement of Bibiano's estate. As correctly observed by
consideration of Bibiano Bañas 'promise of an additional lot when in fact Raymundo the trial court, "his (Raymundo's) failure to enforce Ws rights for a period of over
had not received any lot from Bibiano Bañas when he executed such sworn eight years is indicative of the lack of merit of plaintiffs' claim (p. 52, CFI rec.).
statement. On the other hand, as it appears in the records, the Kalimbas property was
sold and not given or donated by Bibiano Bañas to Raymundo Bañas Obviously,
plaintiffs-appellants' arguments no this point are completely unfounded. VI

It is evident from the records that Raymundo Bañas had recognized the truth of his Finally, that Raymundo Bañas was not an acknowledged natural son of Bibiano
declaration in Exhibit "1". As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the Bañas is further shown by the fact that plaintiffs-appellants' allegation that the
defendants- appellees, "Raymundo had all the opportunity to nullify or to formally documents tending to prove Raymundo's filiation were only discovered after the
declare as untrue his aforesaid sworn statement. The fact that he never did, is cogent latter's death defies belief.
proof of his own acknowledgment of the truth of the contents of the same" (p. 22,
rec., Brief for the defendants-appellees, p. 50). Included in those documents allegedly discovered were the letters of Raymundo to
Atty. Andres Faustino wherein he complained bitterly about the alleged injustices
Raymundo's recognition of the truth of his statement in Exhibit " 1 " is reflected in done to him by Faustina Vecino vda. de Bañas He even adverted in the said letters
the alleged copies of his letter (Exhs. till and "J-2"), to Atty. Andres Faustino. that he had in his possession proofs of his claim and that he would know what to do
Nowhere in the said letters bristling with unconcealed bitterness, did he say that he when the proper time comes. These letters, to Our mind, could not have been written
had a claim against the estate of Bibiano Bañas as the latter's acknowledged natural without the knowledge of Trinidad since it is only natural for Raymundo, as a
son. Not only did Raymundo fail to categorically state that he is Bibiano's husband, to share his sentiments with Trinidad, his wife. Raymundo was naturally
acknowledged natural son, he also did not make any reference to Exhibit "1" which expected to share with his wife Trinidad his bitterness, more especially since
he executed before Atty. Andres Faustino. Trinidad is definitely not a stranger to the family of Bibiano Bañas It must be noted
that Trinidad once stayed with and served the family of Bibiano Bañas aside from
being the niece of Faustina, Bibiano's wife. Thus, it is highly improbable that
Thus: Raymundo will hide from his wife whatever proofs he has in his possession to
support his claim to a share in the estate of Bibiano Bañas
Furthermore, anything of sentimental value, such as old school records, discussing the death of your claim against
autobiographies, letters, etc., is normally shared between husband and wife. Hence, the estate and that he had a feeling that he
it is likewise not normal for Trinidad not to have seen before Raymundo's death was going to be defrauded. Is that not
mementos which tend to establish his filiation to Bibiano. correct?

The conflicting testimonies of Trinidad Vecino vda. de Bañas no this point lend A. We were waiting for their willingness or
credence to Our view that the documents presented as evidence by the plaintiffs- voluntariness in giving whatever share we
appellants to support their claim, were already known to the plaintiffs-appellants would be given.
long before Raymundo's death.
Q. But my question, Mrs. Bañas was during
When asked, no cross-examination, whether she and her husband, Raymundo, that period—8-year period, after the death of
discussed matters pertaining to Raymundo's claim in the estate of Bibiano Bañas your husband from the years from 1954 to
after the latter's death in 1954, she answered in the negative (p. 426, CFI rec.). 1962, you were actually discussing with
However, upon re-cross-examination, she answered in the following manner: your husband the matter of making a claim
against the estate of Dr. Bañas and you were
ATTY. REGALADO fearing that you might be defrauded from
your due participation Is that not true?
Q. Testifying no Exhibit "J", do you happen
to know, Mrs. Bañas whether the original of A. Yes, sir. One time I visited my aunt, Mrs.
this letter allegedly prepared by Raymundo Faustina Bañas and I asked her how she was
Bañas address to Atty. Andres Faustino was and I reminded her about the promise to give
ever sent to Atty. Faustino? us one more lot and she said, 'I am not
greedy; I win take care of you.
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. And no that occasion did you tell her that
you were asking for the share of Raymundo
Q. And after you read this paragraph here specifically as the son of Dr. Bañas or as a
which had been marked Exhibit 'J-l,' you matter of gratification by reason of the
state that what you understood therefrom services that you tendered to the children of
was the fact that he was not given the Dr. Bañas by rearing them in their
additional lot allegedly promised by Dr. childhood?
Bibiano Bañas How did you come to that
conclusion? Was it because during the
period of his lifetime or after the death of A. What pertains to Raymundo Bañas would
Bibiano Bañas you discussed with your pertain to hint What is mine is different.
husband the matter of your claim against
his estate? COURT.

A. Yes sir. Q. So in this occasion when you were asking

the widow about that one lot were you
Q. In other words, after the death of Dr. asking her as gratification or compensation
Bibiano Bañas and before the death of for your services?
Raymundo Bañas you were already
A. As far as I am concerned, what they Q. You said so to your aunt, Faustina. And
would give me. you made it plain to them that you were
claiming the property of Raymundo as the
Q. But did you ask for the share they would son of Dr. Bibiano Bañas ?
give you.
A. Yes, sir.
A. Yes, sir. That was what I told them—
what they were giving to Raymundo. Q. You said so to your aunt, Faustina vda.
de Bañas ?
ATTY. REGALADO
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You told Mrs. Faustina Bañas that you
are there claiming in behalf of Raymundo Q. And what did she say, if she said
Bañas as the son of Bibiano Bañas and, anything?
therefore, you wanted the share of
Raymundo Bañas is that what you told your A. She said, 'Yes, you just wait later on.
aunt?
Q. On that occasion you did not hesitate nor
A. Yes, sir. were you embarrassed to make that demand
even if you believed that in Cavite you are
Q. Why did you go there by yourself? Why not supposed to "mangamangalawa" in the
did you not ask Raymundo Bañas himself to matter of claims to inheritance?
go there and claim since he was the son?
A. Yes, sir.
A. Before that, both of us went to see my
aunt but later no I went by myself because Q. And that was long before you even
my husband was in class. discovered these alleged documents,
Exhibits "A" to "L"?
Q. When did you go there together with
your husband to demand the matter of his A. Yes, sir, because these documents were
participation as the alleged son of Dr. discovered in 1962 (pp. 439-441, CFI rec.;
Bibiano Bañas ? emphasis supplied).

A. More or less in 1955. It is patent from the above that the testimony given by Trinidad Vecino vda. de
Bañas cannot be considered reliable. Inasmuch as she is the plaintiffs-appellants'
Q. After the death of Bibiano Bañas? principal witness, their claim is rendered groundless.

A. Yes, sir. Moreover, this casts doubt no the other evidence presented by the plaintiffs-
appellants, such as Exhibit "I", the alleged typewritten statement of Raymundo
Bañas dated October 6, 1958, setting forth his personal circumstances. This
statement was made at a time when Raymundo had already made known through his
letters to Atty. Andres Faustino of his discontent over the settlement of the estate of 3. When the child was conceived during the time when the
the late Bibiano Bañas Therefore, the possibility that Raymundo might have some mother cohabited with the supposed father;
hidden motives, aside from merely establishing his filiation, cannot be ignored. The
same can also be said of Exhibits "K" and "L", the alleged autobiographies of 4. When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
Raymundo Bañas This is especially true of Exhibit "L", which not only is defendant is his father (emphasis supplied).
typewritten, but also contains intercalation's and spoliation's.
Raymundo's failure to institute an action for compulsory recognition during
VII Bibiano's lifetime under either of the above cited law, militates against plaintiffs-
appellants' complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share, fruits and
Raymundo should and could have filed an action for compulsory recognition during damages.
Bibiano's lifetime, alleging continuous possession of the status of a natural child by
direct acts of Bibiano or of his family, and that he has in his favor proof that Bibiano Article 137 of the Old Civil Code and Article 285 of the New Civil Code provide
is his father. that the action of the natural child for compulsory recognition prescribes, if not
taken during the lifetime of the alleged parents, unless the case falls within the
Considering that Raymundo was born in 1894, and was already of majority age in exceptions which allow the filing of such action even after the death of the alleged
1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954, he should and could have filed such parents, thus:
action either under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or Article 283 of the New
Civil Code. Article 135 of the Old Civil Code and Article 283 of the New Civil Art. 137. Actions for the acknowledgment of natural children
Code read as follows: may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative
parents except in the following cases:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his
natural child in the following cases: 1. If the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may commence the action within the four
1. When an indubitable writing of his exists in which he years next following the attainment of its majority;
expressly acknowledges his paternity;
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some document,
2. When the child is in the uninterrupted possession of the status before unknown should be discovered in which the child is
of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the expressly acknowledged;
conduct of the father himself or that of his family; ... (emphasis
supplied). In this case the action must be commenced within six months
next following the discovery of such document (Old Civil
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to Code).
recognize the child as his natural child:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
xxx xxx xxx be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
2. When the child is in continuous possession of the status of a
child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his 1. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
family; which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority;
 2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a document No legal provision exists to sustain such pretention, nor can an
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which argument of presumption be based no the lesser claim when
either or both parents recognize the child. there is no basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as
an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing the heirs of the
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years natural child no a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate
from the finding of the document" (New Civil Code; emphasis one, when, as a matter of fact, the position of natural child is not
supplied). better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child (p. 256).

It is obvious that under the above-cited law, after the death of As earlier indicated, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-appellants does not
Bibiano Bañas Raymundo was precluded from filing an action constitute a sufficient act of voluntary recognition, but, may be a ground for
for compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs, compulsory recognition under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or Article 283 of
the New Civil Code. And since, as discussed above, the right to compel
acknowledgment solely belongs to the natural child and cannot be inherited and
Raymundo was already 60 years old when Bibiano died in 1954. This rules out the exercised by his heirs, plaintiffs-appellants have no personality to file such action, it
first exception. The alleged documents which established Raymundo's filiation to follows that their complaint is totally baseless.
Bibiano were not unknown to Raymundo during tile latter's lifetime. And, as We
have pointed out, these documents could not even have been unknown to his wife,
Trinidad Vecino. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM BEING IN CONFORMITY
WITH THE FACTS AND THE LAW, THE SAME IS HEREBY AFFIRMED.
COSTS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.
Furthermore, in the second exception, the document discovered after the death of the
alleged parents, should be one in which the natural child is expressly acknowledged
by either or both parents. In the documents presented and relied no by the plaintiffs- SO ORDERED.
appellants, there is no express acknowledgment by Bibiano Bañas of Raymundo as
his natural child. Concepcion Jr., Escolin and de la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Granting that, after the death of Bibiano Bañas Raymundo could file an action for Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Abad Santos, Plana and Relova, JJ., concur in the result.
compulsory recognition against Bibiano's heirs, still plaintiffs-appellants cannot
invoke Raymundo's right to file such action, because it is not transmissible to the Aquino, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., took no part.
natural child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one to the natural child (Paras,
Civil Code Annotated, 1971 ed., p. 654). As held by this Court in the case of Conde
vs. Abaya (13 Phil. 249), 14 such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child Fernando, C.J., is on leave.
can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his
ascendants." The reason advanced by this Court, through Chief Justice Arellano, is
as follows:

It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct

interpretation that the right of action to secure acknowledgment
by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted,
independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right to claim
legitimacy from his predecessor is not, as a rule, conceded to the
heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an
exception. Consequently, the pretention that the right of action
no the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his
natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether
G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989

DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all

surnamed UYGUANGCO, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents.

Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioners.

Anthony Santos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been
excluded from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to
decide is whether he should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his
claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence
required by the Civil Code.

The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of
Appeals.1 The latter court held that the trial judge had not committed any grave
abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in allowing the private respondent
to prove his filiation. Moreover, the proper remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a
petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these rulings on the
ground that they are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four
legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which
they divided among themselves.2 Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased
Apolinario, and having been left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was denied, prompting the petitioners to
Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the seek relief in vain from the respondent court. In the case now before us, the
petitioners. 3 petitioners reiterate and emphasize their position that allowing the trial to proceed
would only be a waste of time and effort. They argue that the complaint for partition
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia is actually an action for recognition as an illegitimate child, which, being already
Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said provisions. The private respondent
Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in
Here he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts
School, where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father, without of the latter or of his family."
objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in
Mananom from 1967 to 1973.4 We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of
rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase.
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified,
admission from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article by the corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on August
278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. 5 These are 3,1988.
"the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or (in) any authentic
writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the Under the Family Code, it is provided that:
ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under
the applicable provisions of the Civil Code.6 Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 children.
to prove the private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had
admitted. Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in
was already an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did not proving his illegitimate filiation:
come under the exceptions. The said article provides as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children any of the following:
may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration
of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document concerned.
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years
from the finding of the document.
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's
Court and special laws. illegitimate filiation.

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy
mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically the same documents explains the rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike legitimate children
mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the "private handwritten who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in
instrument signed by the parent himself'''), he insists that he has nevertheless been secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then
"in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is can be sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child
now also admissible as evidence of filiation. claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the
latter? The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead." 9
from him during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without
objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the parties are among
special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another those affected by the following articles in the Family Code:
one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra business of
the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book
with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code
corporation; and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17,18,19, 27, 28,
concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate. 7 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are
laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his hereby repealed.
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
130 of the Rules of Court.8 does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his
filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of
now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of Apolinario Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this
this Article 175 reads as follows: claim can no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should
it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano's filiation is being
The action must be brought within the same period specified in raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172,
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second which allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation under the second paragraph
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics
supplied.) Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least prima
facie proof of his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be
It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to barred under the said article. But that is the law and we have no choice but to apply
introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an it. Even so, the Court expresses the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of
illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the
the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco law, that will allow the private respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate.
Blood should tell.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and Civil Case No. 9067 in the Regional MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, 
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is hereby DISMISSED. It is so ordered. vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea JJ., concur. MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.

Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del
Rosario Mariategui.

Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al.
v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo,
pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages.
With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot
four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo.
Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and
left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p.
36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in
1930. They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born
on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired
when he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These
properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim
Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39). were dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment
namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui or recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of
and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to
Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be
themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act
No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial
the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above- court committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo
mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they
said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them
title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid). of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the
(Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian
claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate
by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real
163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute
respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said
2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and
Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net
as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and
status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as outstanding legal obligations.
well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the
Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds court on December 7, 1981.
of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not
which reads: prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of
Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed
the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the
of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.
erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is
therefore denied for lack of merit.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37). lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as
his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their
birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in
accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139
shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and
adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on
(Ibid, p. 10). the following rationale:

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact
granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' married. The reason is that such is the common order of society
action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 and of 
Phil. 120). law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922]
quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the 230 [1985]).
estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private
respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo
Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be
able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines,
Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules
and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase
certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children — legitimate and
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have
(People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]). been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no
Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the
lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina,
they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands,
172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to
same manner as their brother Jacinto. acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on
Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who
these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's
and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962,
together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents)
mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter
Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of
Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa  fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66). No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA
time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-
for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-
the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
117 SCRA 532 [1982]). owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4)
he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive,
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other and notorious possession of the property for the period required
co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the by law.
other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an
action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del xxx xxx xxx
Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition
may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for It is true that registration under the Torrens system is
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]). that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is
therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates
properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid as a universal notice of title.
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents.
Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-
repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private
respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
SCRA 552 [1990]). Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners
because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of
learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved. the MTC Brooke's Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as
husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke's Point, Palawan as a result of which a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to
Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed. the letter-complaint was the girl's Baptismal Certificate 2 reflecting the names of
respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the letter-complaint
was a copy of a marriage contract 3 showing that complainant and Dedje Irader
SO ORDERED. contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an
answer to the complaint.4

By his Answer5 of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of

immorality, claiming that it is "just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of
complainant's hatred and extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife." 6 Attached to the answer
were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance7 executed by complainant in
favor of his wife with respect to an administrative complaint he had much earlier
filed against her, and complainant's sworn statement8 dated September 13, 1994
acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents,
respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint filed against him is but
a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise

instituted a criminal complaint against him for "adultery" which was, however,
dismissed after preliminary investigation.

Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with
another woman.

By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive
Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan
for investigation, report and recommendation.9 Judge Vergara having retired during
the pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y.
Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court to (1)
verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and baptismal certificate submitted
by complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as to the information contained in the
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, Petitioner, vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, Respondent.
said baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such
other verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report and
CARPIO MORALES, J.: recommendation thereon.10

By letter-complaint1 dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that
Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke's Point, the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that
Palawan for immorality.
respondent is guilty of the charge.11 The report focuses on the non-appearance of an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other
complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly: than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would want to apply the
principle of in pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent would have it appear that
xxx - xxx - xxx a married man with an extra-marital relation and an illegitimate child is precluded
from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another man.
Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per
reliable information cannot be notified for reason that subject persons are no longer Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein
residing in their given address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the complainant. However, a cursory reading of said document reveals that it favors
return of the subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of the only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said
baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the affidavit is 2 September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as evidence
respondent herein, and for the reason that the same had not been testified to by in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed sometime in 1994.
Dedje Irader who is the informant of the entries contained therein, this Court had not
received adequate proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondent Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the
herein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him, hence, he should be baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and ex-
absolved from any liability. intimate friend, he answered, "I did not. I'm not sure the child is mine". From his
answer, we could infer that respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility
xxx - xxx - xxx12 (Quoted verbatim). that said child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her paternity.

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the xxx - xxx - xxx14 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
While the complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the case, the same does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges
recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed, have been filed, this Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and
recommends that respondent be held guilty of immorality and that he be suspended ascertain the truth thereof.15 For it has an interest in the conduct of those in the
from office for a period of one (1) year without pay. 13 Thus the OCA ratiocinates: service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its
efforts in the direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance from
prosecuting the case he initiated.16
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single
man maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant,
attended with "sexual union" (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on On the merits of the case, the entry of respondent's name as father in the baptismal
his testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove for her filiation and,
Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a "Kasunduan" or therefore, cannot be availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations
agreement entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the
freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the
court employee respondent should have known that said agreement was void despite priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations
it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from and statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person
her husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous baptized.17 It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date
agreement and enter an immoral relationship with a very much married woman and thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but
a co-court employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code of Conduct not the truth of the statement therein as to the percentage of the child baptized. 18
and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees which provides that public
employees of which respondent is one, . . . "shall at all times (sic) respect the rights By respondent's own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with
of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good complainant's wife:
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Moreover,
respondent cannot seek refuge and "sling mud" at complainant for having executed
Q:         During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the Code provides that marriage is "an inviolable social institution whose nature,
Court by your counsel, did the Court get it correct that there has been a short lived consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." It is
relation between you and Dedgie Irader, am I correct in my impression? an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which
cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties. 21
A:         During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways
already, I joking informed her that she is now being separated, she is now single and Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
is free to have some commitment. So, I courted her and she accepted me, so we have for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the State's policy of promoting a
a short lived relation and after that we parted ways. high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 22

Q:         For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago? Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts
a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in
A:         May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months. the judiciary.23 That is why this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards
morality and decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary. 24 Their
conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
Q:         When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9 responsibility,25 characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as
months, you mean to tell the Court that you have (sic) a sexual union with this to earn and keep the public's respect and confidence in the judicial service. 26 It must
woman? be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the
judicial branch but also to their behaviour outside the court as private
A:         Yes ma'am.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). individuals.27 There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by
their private morals.28
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainant's wife with the
spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which Respondent's act of having illicit relations with complainant's wife is, within the
was embodied in a "Kasunduan", the pertinent portions of which are reproduced purview of Section 46(5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
hereunder: otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may
sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Under Rule IV, Section 52A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Poblacion, Broke's (sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which
sumusunod: calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable
lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first
bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na offense, his suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.
bilang mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng
kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
sa alin pa mang hukuman; Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for
which he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay
xxx - xxx - xxx20 (Italics supplied) with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with severely.
Respondent's justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent
ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family
SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., concur.