1. What is vested right?

Can a new law or constitution affect the person who has already
acquired vested right? Why?

ANSWER:

(a) A right is vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. It is some right or interest in
property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy

(b) No.

(c) A State may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal o f a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State,
except in a legitimate exercise of the police power. The due process clause prohibits the
annihilation of vested rights. The Court emphatically stated that even the Constitution or
subsequent law cannot impair vested rights.

When the Supreme Court declared that the purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of a subsequent law which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into
effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. The Court emphatically stated
that even the Constitution or subsequent law cannot impair vested rights.

2. Supposing a previous law allowed XYZ corp to own land of the public domain subject to
compliance as provided for by such law. When XYZ Corp complied with all the
requirements, it registered the land but pending issuance of the title, a new law was
passed prohibiting XYZ corp to own land of the public domain. The RD refused to accept
the registration on the basis of the new law. Is the action of the RD proper? Why?

ANSWER:

(a) No.

(b) Applying the Doctrine of Vested Right which pertains to the privilege by which entity or
person to enjoy his right or interest in property which has become fixed and established. Hence,
the RD cannot refused to accept the registration on the basis of the new law because XYZ corp
vested right must be respected that even the judiciary emphatically stated that even the
Constitution cannot impair vested right.

3. Supposing, A was given a lease agreement by government to occupy a forestland for a

period of 25 years and was renewed for another 25 years. On the 40 th year, A registered
the land using as basis the 40 years uninterrupted open continuous and exclusive
possession of the land and claiming further that a vested right on the land was already
acquired him (A). discuss briefly.

ANSWER:
No. Since forestland cannot be ripen into ownership under the Regalian Doctrine and he
cannot hold any title or vested right over the said land even if he possessed the land more than
30 years. Material, occupation, cultivation of certain parts, and using others for pasture, are all
acts of possession. The law does not require that the entire land be cultivated, but that the
 possession be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership since July 26, 1894.

Open, exclusive, and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. Such open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the
disputed properties for more than 30 years must, however, be conclusively established.

This quantum of proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of actually fictitious
claims of possession over the property in dispute. Tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. Tax declarations
only become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription, a mode of
acquisition of ownership relied upon by most applicants when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.

4. Case to digest: Ayog v. Cusi and Sta. Monica Industrial and development corp. v. CA

a) Ayog v. Cusi, GR No. L-46729, Nov. 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 492

FACTS:
During the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution which expressly allowed private
juridical entities to acquire alienable lands of the public domain not exceeding 1,024
hectares, respondent Biñan Development Co., Inc., a private corporation, purchased from
the Bureau of Lands a parcel of public agricultural land with an area of 250 hectares and
obtained favorable judgment from a civil court to evict the occupants thereof.

However, it was only when the 1973 Constitution took effect that the sales patent and
the Torrens title of the subject land were issued and the judgment of the lower court became
final and executory after its affirmance on appeal. Petitioners brought an action for
prohibition when respondent corporation moved for execution of the judgment evicting them
from the premises. Petitioners contended that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution
disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public lands was a supervening fact
which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court’s judgment.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the vested right of Biñan Development Co. must be respected.

RULING:
Yes.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition holding that the prohibition under Section
11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution has no retroactive application to the sales application
of Biñan Development Co. because the latter had already acquired a vested right to the land
applied for at the time the new Constitution took effect.

The rule then is that where the applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully
complied with the construction and cultivation requirements and has fully paid the purchase
 price, he should be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and to
him the area limitation in the new Constitution would not apply.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to
purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioners’ prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

b) Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals GR No.

83290, Sept. 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 762

FACTS:
The case of Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals44 gives emphatic deference to private rights. The case arose from proceedings
initiated by the government to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court, as well as
the decree and title issued to Justo de Perio, and the certificates of title issued to subsequent
transferees, including that of petitioner Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation.
The government alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within
the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be
the subject of disposition or alienation as private property.

Petitioner intervened and filed a motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense of res judicata, which the Court of Appeals denied, holding that res judicata cannot
be invoked as a bar to an action for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent CA committed reversible error of law in denying
petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata.

RULING:
Yes. A land classified as agricultural cannot be forest land.—If the land is agricultural
as defined by law, and as confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not have been forest land as
claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land classification map notwithstanding. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the two (2) parcels of land were in the Olongapo
townsite and were bounded by privately-owned land . If De Perio had title to the land in
1904, although still imperfect, then it could not have been prejudiced by the proclamation of
Governor-General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval purposes land in Subic,
Zambales.

The Supreme Court held that the proclamation reserving the area as a naval
reservation cannot prejudice the title of Justo de Perio, although still imperfect, which was
confirmed in 1912.

Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October
7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio’s petition
for confirmation of his title to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided: SEC. 54. The following-
described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine
 Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such
lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine
Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit:
xxx 6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public
lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a
bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure,
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

5. Supposing A has been occupying a forest land for more than 30 years in open
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession. On the basis of this possession, A was
able to secure a title over the land. A then sold the property to B, an innocent purchaser
in good faith. Can the Government still cancel the title of B? why?

ANSWER:

Yes. A reversion proceeding.

Under Section 14(1) of the Property. Registration Decree that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property. In addition, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.

In this case, there is no indication that the State have the intention to renounce its right over
the property which means. Hence, the Government have the right to cancel the title over B since
there is no valid vested right. If the State has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith.

The only remedy of B is to be reimburse or to filed recovery and damages since he is

innocent purchaser in good faith.

6. Distinguish Prescription from Laches

ANSWER:

(a) Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of
delay.

(b) Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a

claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the
property or the relation of the parties.

(c) Prescription is statutory; laches is not.

 (d) Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.

(e) Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.

7. Distinguish Accession from Accretion

ANSWER:

By law on accession – fruits of the thing or additions to or improvements upon the principal
those which are naturally or artificially attached to the thing. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but a mere attribute or incident of ownership. By accession is meant that ownership of
property gives to the owner the right to everything which is produced thereby or incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water — belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it
forms.120 The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to
the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.

8. Supposing A and B each owns land on opposite sides of the river. The river changed its
course, passing through the land of C. Who owns the abandoned river bed? Supposing
C’s land is adjacent to a foreshore land. The river changed its course and portion of C’s
property was added to the foreshore land. Can C claim ownership of the added portion of
the foreshore land, why?

ANSWER:

(a) C since the river change its course which passes to his land in order to compensate him for
his loss pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code, river beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which
value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

(b) No.

The term “foreshore land” has been invariably defined as “that strip of land that lies between
the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide”
or “that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered by the ordinary flow of
the tides.” Foreshore lands and submerged lands (which may be the subject of reclamation) are
inalienable unless declared by law to be alienable and disposable portions of the public domain.

“Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the
control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the ‘leasing’ of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919
and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be
‘disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise.’ Before leasing, however, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
 Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public
service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then,
the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The
disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land remained property of the State.”
Hence, C cannot claim ownership since it is considered as public dominion unless declared
officially by the state as Alienable and Disposable.

9. Supposing XYZ corp was granted a timber license Agreement by Government allowing
the former to establish tree plantation. Later on, the government withdrew the TLA issued
and granted full ownership of the land to A University to serve as its experimental station,
where the same would conduct its research and development functions. XYZ questioned
the grant arguing that XYZ corp has vested right over the land. Discuss briefly.

ANSWER:

A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.

In addition, the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted.

Hence, when the Government ceded and transferred the property to A University, the State
completely removed it from the public domain and more specifically, in respect to the areas
covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it
divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the A
University; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner.
All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be
affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected.

10. Cases to digest: International hardwood and veneer corp V. UP; Mindanao Medical Center
v. CA; Republic v. Doldol

(a) International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. University of the Philippines, GR No.
521518, Aug. 13, 1991, 200 SCRA 554

FA CTS:
The President issued Proclamation No. 791 withdrawing from sale or settlement, and
reserving for the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines, a parcel of land of
the public domain for its experiment station. The reservation is within the area covered by
petitioner’s timber license agreement. Meantime, RA No. 3990 established a central
experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and extension
functions, and the “reserved” area was “ceded and transferred in full ownership to the
University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any.”
 Petitioner thereafter filed suit to declare UP as without right to supervise the cutting
and removal of timber and other forest products in the area covered by its subsisting license
agreement, and to collect the corresponding forest charges. UP, however, alleged that as
grantee, it has acquired full control of the timber and other resources within the area.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the University of the Philippines is entitled to supervise the logging,
telling and removal of timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in
Republic Act No. 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut.

RULING:
No.

the Supreme Court ruled that when RA No. 3990 “ceded and transferred (the
disputed area) in full ownership” to the UP, the Republic completely removed it from the
public domain and made UP the absolute owner thereof.

“When RA No. 3990 declared the Government ceded and transferred the property to
UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and
segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner
thereof, subject only to the existing concession. x x x The proviso regarding existing
concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the
right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must
be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as
grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a
consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. x x x Having been effectively
segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect,
converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry over it were likewise terminated. x x x However, (petitioner) has the correlative duty
and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same
rate as provided for in the Agreement.”

The clear implication is that a land grant having been made by a Presidential
proclamation and by legislative act, the grantee may apply for the registration of the land and
bring it under the operation of the Torrens system.

(b) The Mindanao Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-40912, Sept. 30, 1976, 73
SCRA 146.

FACTS:
Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the
Bureau of Lands for Salon Patent of a 33-hectare land in Davao. Being awarded in a bidding,
he deposited P221.00, representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
However, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment on the Sales Application since a
 portion of the land was needed by the Philippine Army for its military camp site purpose. The
area excluded lot was for the purpose of a medical site.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full
12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for
medical center site purposes.

RULING:
Yes.

The Supreme Court held that, by virtue of Proclamation No. 350 legally effected a
land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center validly sufficient for initial registration under the
Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree). Such grant is constitutive of a “fee
simple” title or absolute title in favor of petitioner.

Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act or Land Registration Act 496 and shall become registered lands." It
would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical
Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and
the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the
proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.

Hence, petition dismissed.

(c) Republic v. Doldol, GR No. 132963, Sept. 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 608.

FACTS:
Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land which he filed an application for saltwork
purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development, but rejected the same.
Subsequently, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution indicating the
Opol Cadastre as a school site which the reserved lot includes the occupied lot of Doldol.

In accordance with said resolution, the President issued Proclamation No. 180
reserving a parcel of land for the Opol National School. Needing the area which was then
occupied by Nicanor Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several demands for
him to vacate said portion, but he refused. Consequently, the school filed a complaint
against him for accion possessoria. The trial court ordered Doldol to vacate. On appeal, the
appellate court ruled that Doldol was entitled to the portion in question, having possessed
the same for thirty-two years from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC in favor of the Opol National Secondary
Technical School. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Doldol has the vested right over the occupied portion of land.

RULING:
No.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, stating that the law,
as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from
June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his
occupation thereof started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied
with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in
question as to segregate it the mass of the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a
right superior to the school, given that the President had reserved the lot for the school.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can
be acquired.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:

The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no

contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for
public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even
though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation
are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.

In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in
dispute.