Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21484          November 29, 1969

THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT and COOPERATIVE FINANCING

ADMINISTRATION (ACCFA), petitioner,
vs.
ACCFA SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, ACCFA WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, and
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Deogracias E. Lerma and Esmeraldo U. Guloy for petitioner Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration.
Office of the Agrarian Counsel, Department of Justice for petitioner Agricultural Credit
Administration
J. C. Espinas and Associates for respendents Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations Offices, et al. Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

These are two separate appeals by certiorari from the decision dated March 25, 1963 (G.R. No.
L-21484) and the order dated May 21, 1964 (G.R. No. L-23605) as affirmed by the resolutions
en banc, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in Cases Nos. 3450-ULP and 1327-MC,
respectively. The parties, except the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and
Offices (CUGCO), being practically the same and the principal issues involved related, only one
decision is now rendered in these two cases.

The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a government
agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was
reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association
(ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), hereinafter referred to as the Unions, are
labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively,
in the ACCFA (now ACA).

G.R. No. L-21484

On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement, which was to be effective for a period
of one (1) year from July 1, 1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the ACCFA.
A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-
implementation of said agreement. Finally, on October 25, 1962 the Unions declared a strike,
which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on November 26, 1962.

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial
Relations against the ACCFA (Case No. 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of
unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to
discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The
ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of
jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of said
contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for
therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated March 25, 1963
ordered the ACCFA:

1. To cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of
complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization;

2. To comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract
executed on September 4, 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living
allowance;

3. To bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants.

The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of
the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought this appeal by certiorari.

The ACCFA raises the following issues in its petition, to wit:

1. Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn
depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions.

2. Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the
respondent union is valid; if valid, whether or not it has already lapsed; and if not,
whether or not its (sic) fringe benefits are already enforceable.

3. Whether or not there is a legal and/or factual basis for the finding of the respondent
court that the petitioner had committed acts of unfair labor practice.

4. Whether or not it is within the competence of the court to enforce the collective
bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the respondent unions, the same having
already expired.

G.R. No. L-23605

During the pendency of the above mentioned case (G.R. No. L-21484), specifically on August 8,
1963, the President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844), which among other things required the reorganization of the
administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
(ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On March 17,
1964 the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition
for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1327-MC) praying that
they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file
employees, respectively, in the ACA. The trial Court in its order dated March 30, 1964 directed
the Manager or Officer-in-Charge of the ACA to allow the posting of said order "for the
information of all employees and workers thereof," and to answer the petition. In compliance
therewith, the ACA, while admitting most of the allegations in the petition, denied that the
Unions represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-and-file workers, respectively, in the
ACA. It further alleged that the petition was premature, that the ACA was not the proper party to
be notified and to answer the petition, and that the employees and supervisors could not lawfully
become members of the Unions, nor be represented by them. However, in a joint manifestation
of the Unions dated May 7, 1964, with the conformity of the ACA Administrator and of the
Agrarian Counsel in his capacity as such and as counsel for the National Land Reform Council,
it was agreed "that the union petitioners in this case represent the majority of the employees in
their respective bargaining units" and that only the legal issues raised would be submitted for the
resolution of the trial Court.

Finding the remaining grounds for ACA's opposition to the petition to be without merit, the trial
Court in its order dated May 21, 1964 certified "the ACCFA Workers' Association and the
ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the
rank-and-file employees and supervisors, respectively, of the Agricultural Credit
Administration." Said order was affirmed by the CIR en banc in its resolution dated August 24,
1964.

On October 2, 1964 the ACA filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with urgent motion to
stay the CIR order of May 21, 1964. In a resolution dated October 6, 1964, this Court dismissed
the petition for "lack of adequate allegations," but the dismissal was later reconsidered when the
ACA complied with the formal requirement stated in said resolution. As prayed for, this Court
ordered the CIR to stay the execution of its order of May 21, 1964.

In this appeal, the ACA in effect challenges the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain the petition of
the Unions for certification election on the ground that it (ACA) is engaged in governmental
functions. The Unions join the issue on this single point, contending that the ACA forms
proprietary functions.

Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other
governmental agencies,1 to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture, in pursuance of the
policy enunciated in Section 2 as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State:

 (1) To establish owner-cultivatorships and the economic family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development;

(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious
institutional restraints and practices;

(3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to
greater productivity and higher farm incomes;

(4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and
agricultural wage earners;

(5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land
distribution; and

(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens,
and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

The implementation of the policy thus enunciated, insofar as the role of the ACA therein is
concerned, is spelled out in Sections 110 to 118, inclusive, of the Land Reform Code. Section
110 provides that "the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it
to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the
Agricultural Credit Administration." Under Section 112 the sum of P150,000,000 was
appropriated out of national funds to finance the additional credit functions of the ACA as a
result of the land reform program laid down in the Code. Section 103 grants the ACA the
privilege of rediscounting with the Central Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Bank. Section 105 directs the loaning activities of the ACA "to stimulate
the development of farmers' cooperatives," including those "relating to the production and
marketing of agricultural products and those formed to manage and/or own, on a cooperative
basis, services and facilities, such as irrigation and transport systems, established to support
production and/or marketing of agricultural products." Section 106 deals with the extension by
ACA of credit to small farmers in order to stimulate agricultural production. Sections 107 to 112
lay down certain guidelines to be followed in connection with the granting of loans, such as
security, interest and supervision of credit. Sections 113 to 118, inclusive, invest the ACA with
certain rights and powers not accorded to non-governmental entities, thus:

SEC. 113. Auditing of Operations. — For the effective supervision of farmers'

cooperatives, the head of the Agricultural Credit Administration shall have the power to
audit their operations, records and books of account and to issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books,
documents and records in the conduct of such audit or of any inquiry into their affairs.
Any person who, without lawful cause, fails to obey such subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum shall, upon application of the head of Agricultural Credit Administration with the
proper court, be liable to punishment for contempt in the manner provided by law and if
he is an officer of the Association, to suspension or removal from office.
 SEC. 114. Prosecution of officials. — The Agricultural Credit Administration, through
the appropriate provincial or city fiscal, shall have the power to file and prosecute any
and all actions which it may have against any and all officials or employees of farmers'
cooperatives arising from misfeasance or malfeasance in office.

SEC. 115. Free Notarial Service. — Any justice of the peace, in his capacity as notary
ex-officio, shall render service free of charge to any person applying for a loan under this
Code either in administering the oath or in the acknowledgment of instruments relating to
such loan.

SEC. 116. Free Registration of Deeds. — Any register of deeds shall accept for
registration, free of charge any instrument relative to a loan made under this Code.

SEC. 117. Writing-off Unsecured and Outstanding Loans. — Subject to the approval of
the President upon recommendation of the Auditor General, the Agricultural Credit
Administration may write-off from its books, unsecured and outstanding loans and
accounts receivable which may become uncollectible by reason of the death or
disappearance of the debtor, should there be no visible means of collecting the same in
the foreseeable future, or where the debtor has been verified to have no income or
property whatsoever with which to effect payment. In all cases, the writing-off shall be
after five years from the date the debtor defaults.

SEC. 118. Exemption from Duties, Taxes and Levies. — The Agricultural Credit
Administration is hereby exempted from the payment of all duties, taxes, levies, and fees,
including docket and sheriff's fees, of whatever nature or kind, in the performance of its
functions and in the exercise of its powers hereunder.

The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their
affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which
only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise.

On March 19, 1964 Executive Order No. 75 was promulgated. It is entitled: "Rendering in Full
Force and Effect the Plan of Reorganization Proposed by the Special Committee on
Reorganization of Agencies for Land Reform for the Administrative Machinery of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code," and contains the following pertinent provisions:

Section 3. The Land Reform Project Administration2 shall be considered a single

organization and the personnel complement of the member agencies including the legal
officers of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel which shall provide legal services to the
LRPA shall be regarded as one personnel pool from which the requirements of the
operations shall be drawn and subject only to the civil service laws, rules and regulations,
persons from one agency may be freely assigned to positions in another agency within the
LRPA when the interest of the service so demands.

Section 4. The Land Reform Project Administration shall be considered as one

organization with respect to the standardization of job descriptions position classification
 and wage and salary structures to the end that positions involving the same or equivalent
qualifications and equal responsibilities and effort shall have the same remuneration.

Section 5. The Civil Service laws, rules and regulations with respect to promotions,
particularly in the consideration of person next in rank, shall be made applicable to the
Land Reform Project Administration as a single agency so that qualified individuals in
one member agency must be considered in considering promotion to higher positions in
another member agency.

The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act
No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose
Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration
together with the other member agencies, the personnel complement of all of which are placed in
one single pool and made available for assignment from one agency to another, subject only to
Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position classification and wage structures.

The appointing authority in respect of the officials and employees of the ACA is the President of
the Philippines, as stated in a 1st indorsement by his office to the Chairman of the National
Reform Council dated May 22, 1964, as follows:

Appointments of officials and employees of the National Land Reform Council and its
agencies may be made only by the President, pursuant to the provisions of Section 79(D)
of the Revised Administrative Code. In accordance with the policy and practice, such
appointments should be prepared for the signature of the Executive Secretary, "By
Authority ofthe President".3

When the Agricultural Reform Code was being considered by the Congress, the nature of the
ACA was the subject of the following exposition on the Senate floor:

Senator Tolentino: . . . . "The ACA is not going to be a profit making institution. It is

supposed to be a public service of the government to the lessees and farmer-owners of the
lands that may be bought after expropriation from owners. It is the government here that
is the lender. The government should not exact a higher interest than what we are telling
a private landowner now in his relation to his tenants if we give to their farmers a higher
rate of interest . . . ." (pp. 17 & 18, Senate Journal No. 16, July 3, 1963)

The reason is obvious, to pinpoint responsibility for many losses in the government, in order to
avoid irresponsible lending of government money — to pinpoint responsibility for many
losses . . . .

Senator Manglapus: ". . . But assuming that hypothesis, that is the reason why we are
appropriating P150,000,000.00 for the Agricultural Credit Administration which will go
to intensified credit operations on the barrio level . . ." (p. 3, Senate Journal No. 7).

That it is the reason why we are providing for the expansion of the ACCFA and the weeding out
of the cooperative activity of the ACCFA and turning this over to the Agricultural Productivity
Commission, so that the Agricultural Credit Administration will concentrate entirely on the
facilitation of credit on the barrio level with the massive support of 150 million provided by the
government. . . . (pp. 4 & 5 of Senate Journal No. 7, July 3, 1963)

. . . But by releasing them from this situation, we feel that we are putting them in a much better
condition than that in which they are found by providing them with a business-like way of
obtaining credit, not depending on a paternalistic system but one which is business-like — that is
to say, a government office, which on the barrio level will provide them that credit directly . . . .
(p. 40, Senate Journal No. 7, July 3, 1963) (emphasis supplied).

The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of collective
bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of Republic Act No. 875, and
hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as proper bargaining units.
The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions.
These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as
distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to
national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these letter functions being ministrant he
exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas
which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various
agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as
to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities
of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less
than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when,
aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of
the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office,
with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors,
as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the
governmental character of its functions disappears.
In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent Unions are not entitled to the
certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of
bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike
in 1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L-21824).6 This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 875, which provides:

SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees
therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in their terms
and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization
which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However,
that this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the
Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.7

With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform
Code and in view of our ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the
decision of the respondent Court dated March 25, 1963, and the resolution en banc affirming it,
in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present
review in G. R. No. L-21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to
bargain collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned.

What remains to be resolved is the question of fringe benefits provided for in the collective
bargaining contract of September 4, 1961. The position of the ACCFA in this regard is that the
said fringe benefits have not become enforceable because the condition that they should first be
approved by the Office of the President has not been complied with. The Unions, on the other
hand, contend that no such condition existed in the bargaining contract, and the respondent Court
upheld this contention in its decision.

It is to be listed that under Section 3, Article XIV, of the agreement, the same "shall not become
effective unless and until the same is duly ratified by the Board of Governors of the
Administration." Such approval was given even before the formal execution of the agreement, by
virtue of "Resolution No. 67, Regular Meeting No. 7, FY 1960-61, held on August 17, 1961,"
but with the proviso that "the fringe benefits contained therein shall take effect only if approved
by the office of the President." The condition is, therefore, deemed to be incorporated into the
agreement by reference.

On October 23, 1962 the Office of the President, in a letter signed by the Executive Secretary,
expressed its approval of the bargaining contract "provided the salaries and benefits therein fixed
are not in conflict with applicable laws and regulations, are believed to be reasonable considering
the exigencies of the service and the welfare of the employees, and are well within the financial
ability of the particular corporation to bear."

On July 1, 1963 the ACCFA management and the Unions entered into an agreement for the
implementation of the decision of the respondent Court concerning the fringe benefits, thus:
 In the meantime, only Cost of Living Adjustment, Longevity Pay, and Night Differential
Benefits accruing from July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1963 shall be paid to all employees
entitled thereto, in the following manner:

A) The sum of P180,000 shall be set aside for the payment of:

1) Night differential benefits for Security Guards.

2) Cost of Living Adjustment and Longevity Pay.

3) The unpaid balance due employees on Item A (1) and (2) this paragraph shall be paid
in monthly installments as finances permit but not beyond December 20, 1963.

3. All benefits accruing after July 1, 1963, shall be allowed to accumulate but payable
only after all benefits accruing up to June 30, 1963, as per CIR decision hereinabove
referred to shall have been settled in full; provided, however, that commencing July 1,
1963 and for a period of only two (2) months thereafter (during which period the ACCFA
and the Unions shall negotiate a new Collective Bargaining Agreement) the provisions of
the September 4, 1961 Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be temporarily suspended,
except as to Cost of Living Adjustment and "political" or non-economic privileges and
benefits thereunder.

On July 24, 1963 the ACCFA Board of Governors ratified the agreement thus entered into,
pursuant to the provision thereof requiring such ratification, but with the express qualification
that the same was "without prejudice to the pending appeal in the Supreme Court . . . in Case No.
3450-ULP." The payment of the fringe benefits agreed upon, to our mind, shows that the same
were within the financial capability of the ACCFA then, and hence justifies the conclusion that
this particular condition imposed by the Office of the President in its approval of the bargaining
contract was satisfied.

We hold, therefore, that insofar as the fringe benefits already paid are concerned, there is no
reason to set aside the decision of the respondent Court, but that since the respondent Unions
have no right to the certification election sought by them nor, consequently, to bargain
collectively with the petitioner, no further fringe benefits may be demanded on the basis of any
collective bargaining agreement.

The decisions and orders appealed from are set aside and/or modified in accordance with the
foregoing pronouncements. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The decision reached by this Court so ably given expression in the opinion of Justice Makalintal,
characterized with vigor, clarity and precision, represents what for me is a clear tendency not to
be necessarily bound by our previous pronouncements on what activities partake of a nature that
is governmental.1 Of even greater significance, there is a definite rejection of the "constituent-
ministrant" criterion of governmental functions, followed in Bacani v. National Coconut
Corporation.2 That indeed is cause for gratification. For me at least, there is again full adherence
to the basic philosophy of the Constitution as to the extensive and vast power lodged in our
government to cope with the social and economic problems that even now sorely beset us. There
is therefore full concurrence on my part to the opinion of the Court, distinguished by its high
quality of juristic craftsmanship. I feel however that the matter is of such vital importance that a
separate concurring opinion is not inappropriate. It will also serve to give expression to my view,
which is that of the Court likewise, that our decision today does not pass upon the rights of labor
employed in instrumentalities of the state discharging governmental functions.

1. In the above Bacani decision, governmental functions are classified into constituent and
ministrant. "The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory
in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests
of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as
follows: '(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children. (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. (4) The determination of
contract rights between individuals. (5) The definition and punishment of crime. (6) The
administration of justice in civil cases. (7) The determination of the political duties, privileges,
and relations of citizens. (8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the
state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.' "3

The ministrant functions were then enumerated, followed by a statement of the basis that would
justify engaging in such activities. Thus: "The most important of the ministrant functions are:
public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of
trade and industry. The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain
of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do
these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than is any private individual or group of individuals."4

Reference is made in the Bacani decision to the first of the many publications of Justice Malcolm
on the Philippine government, which appeared in 1916,5 adopting the formulation of the then
Professor, later President, Woodrow Wilson of the United States, in a textbook on political
science the first edition of which was published in 1898. The Wilson classification reflected the
primacy of the dominant laissez-faire concept carried into the sphere of government.

A most spirited defense of such a view was given by former President Hadley of Yale in a series
of three lectures delivered at Oxford University in 1914. According to President Hadley: "I shall
begin with a proposition which may sound somewhat startling, but which I believe to be literally
true. The whole American political and social system is based on industrial property right, far
more completely than has ever been the case in any European country. In every nation of Europe
there has been a certain amount of traditional opposition between the government and the
industrial classes. In the United States no such tradition exists. In the public law of European
communities industrial freeholding is a comparatively recent development. In the United States,
on the contrary, industrial freeholding is the foundation on which the whole social order has been
established and built up."6

The view is widely accepted that such a fundamental postulate did influence American court
decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo, speaking of that era:
"Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which statesmen would do well to heed. It was a
categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges, must obey."7 For a long time,
legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process
clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract. To cite only one instance, the limitation of
employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day under a New York statute was
stricken down for being tainted with a due process objection in Lochner v. New York.8 It
provoked one of the most vigorous dissents of Justice Holmes, who was opposed to the view that
the United States Constitution did embody laissez-faire. Thus: "General propositions do not
decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise. But I think that the proposition just stated, if it is accepted, will carry us
far toward the end. Every opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word 'liberty,' in the
14th Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law. It does not need research to show that no such sweeping
condemnation can be passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might think it a proper
measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would
uphold it as a first installment of a general regulation of the hours of work. Whether in the latter
aspect it would be open to the charge of inequality I think it unnecessary to discuss." It was not
until 1908, in Muller v. Oregon,9 that the American Supreme Court held valid a ten-hour
maximum for women workers in laundries and not until 1917 in Bunting v. Oregon10 that such a
regulatory ten-hour law applied to men and women passed the constitutional test.

Similarly, state legislation fixing minimum wages was deemed offensive to the due process
clause in a 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.11 Only in 1937, in the leading case of
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,12 was the Adkins case overruled and a minimum wage law New
York statute upheld. The same unsympathetic attitude arising from the laissez-faire concept was
manifest in decisions during such period, there being the finely-spun distinctions in the Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations13 decision, as to when certain businesses could be
classified as affected with public interest to justify state regulation as to prices. After eleven
years, in 1934, in Nebbia v. New York,14 the air of unreality was swept away by this explicit
pronouncement from the United States Supreme Court: "The phrase 'affected with a public
interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is
subject to control for the public good."
It is thus apparent that until the administration of President Roosevelt, the laissez-faire principle
resulted in the contraction of the sphere where governmental entry was permissible. The object
was to protect property even if thereby the needs of the general public would be left unsatisfied.
This was emphatically put forth in a work of former Attorney General, later Justice, Jackson,
citing an opinion of Judge Van Orsdel. Thus: "It should be remembered that of the three
fundamental principles which underlie government, and for which government exists, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, the chief of these is property . . . ."15 The above excerpt
from Judge Van Orsdel forms part of his opinion in Children's Hospital v. Adkins, when decided
by the Circuit Court of Appeals.16

Nonetheless, the social and economic forces at work in the United States to which the new deal
administration of President Roosevelt was most responsive did occasion, as of 1937, greater
receptivity by the American Supreme Court to a philosophy less rigid in its obeisance to property
rights. Earlier legislation deemed offensive to the laissez-faire concept had met a dismal fate.
Their nullity during his first term could, more often than not, be expected.17

As a matter of fact, even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could
already discern a contrary drift. Even then he could assert that the range of governmental activity
in the United States had indeed expanded. According to him: "Thus both liberals and
conservatives approve wide and varied governmental intervention; the latter condemning it, it is
true, when the former propose it, but endorsing it, after it has become a fixed part of the status
quo, as so beneficial in its effects that no more of it is needed. Our history for the last half-
century shows that each important governmental intervention we have adopted has been called
socialistic or communistic by contemporary conservatives, and has later been approved by
equally conservative men who now accept it both for its proved benefits and for the worthy
traditions it has come to represent. Both liberal and conservative supporters of our large-scale
business under private ownership advocate or concede the amounts and kinds of governmental
limitation and aid which they regard as necessary to make the system work efficiently and
humanely. Sooner or later, they are willing to have government intervene for the purpose of
preventing the system from being too oppressive to the masses of the people, protecting it from
its self-destructive errors, and coming to its help in other ways when it appears not to be able to
take care of itself."18

At any rate, by 1943, the United States was reconciled to laissez-faire having lost its dominance.
In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette:19 "We must transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or
principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through
expanded and strengthened governmental controls."

2. The influence exerted by American constitutional doctrines unavoidable when the Philippines
was still under American rule notwithstanding, an influence that has not altogether vanished even
after independence, the laissez-faire principle never found full acceptance in this jurisdiction,
even during the period of its full flowering in the United States. Moreover, to erase any doubts,
the Constitutional Convention saw to it that our fundamental law embodies a policy of the
responsibility thrust on government to cope with social and economic problems and an earnest
and sincere commitment to the promotion of the general welfare through state action. It would
thus follow that the force of any legal objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting
property rights or to statutes organizing public corporations that may engage in competition with
private enterprise has been blunted. Unless there be a clear showing of any invasion of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, their validity is a foregone conclusion. No fear need be
entertained that thereby spheres hitherto deemed outside government domain have been
enchroached upon. With our explicit disavowal of the "constituent-ministrant" test, the ghost of
the laissez-faire concept no longer stalks the juridical stage.

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi V. Provincial Board of Mindoro,20 Justice Malcolm
already had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the
individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The
Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the
Government in this progressive march."

It was to be expected then that when he spoke for the Court in Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Springer,21 a 1927 decision, he found nothing objectionable in the government itself
organizing and investing public funds in such corporations as the National Coal Co., the Phil.
National Bank, the National Petroleum Co., the National Development Co., the National Cement
Co. and the National Iron Co. There was not even a hint that thereby the laissez-faire concept
was not honored at all. It is true that Justice Malcolm concurred with the majority in People v.
Pomar,22 a 1924 opinion, which held invalid under the due process clause a provision providing
for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement. It could be that
he had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the
year before, the above-cited case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital,23 in line with the laissez-faire
principle, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm on the
same ground.

Our constitution which took effect in 1935, upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is antithetical to
the laissez-faire concept. Delegate, later President, Manuel Roxas, one of the leading members
of the Constitutional Convention, in answer precisely to an objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of
Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the
"almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to
compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current
tendencies" in other jurisdictions,24 spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has a definite
and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and economic. A constitution that in
1776 or in 1789 was sufficient in the United States, considering the problems they had at that
time, may not now be sufficient with the growing and ever-widening complexities of social and
economic problems and relations. If the United States of America were to call a constitutional
convention today to draft a constitution for the United States, does any one doubt that in the
provisions of that constitution there will be found definite declarations of policy as to economic
tendencies; that there will be matters which are necessary in accordance with the experience of
the American people during these years when vast organizations of capital and trade have
succeeded to a certain degree to control the life and destiny of the American people? If in this
constitution the gentleman will find declarations of economic policy, they are there because they
are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe
that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those
safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and
national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional
provision automatically imposes."25

Delegate Roxas continued further: "The government is the creature of the people and the
government exercises its powers and functions in accordance with the will and purposes of the
people. That is the first principle, the most important one underlying this document. Second, the
government established in this document is, in its form, in our opinion, the most adapted to
prevailing conditions, circumstances and the political outlook of the Filipino people. Rizal said,
'Every people has the kind of government that they deserve.' That is just another form of
expressing the principle in politics enunciated by the French philosophers when they said: 'Every
people has the right to establish the form of government which they believe is most conducive to
their welfare and their liberty.' Why have we preferred the government that is established in this
draft? Because it is the government with which we are familiar. It is the form of government
fundamentally such as it exists today; because it is the only kind of government that our people
understand; it is the kind of government we have found to be in consonance with our experience,
with the necessary modification, capable of permitting a fair play of social forces and allowing
the people to conduct the affairs of that government."26

One of the most prominent delegates, a leading intellectual, former President Rafael Palma of the
University of the Philippines, stressed as a fundamental principle in the draft of the Constitution
the limitation on the right to property. He pointed out that the then prevailing view allowed the
accumulation of wealth in one family down to the last remote descendant, resulting in a grave
disequilibrium and bringing in its wake extreme misery side by side with conspicuous luxury. He
did invite attention to the few millionaires at one extreme with the vast masses of Filipinos
deprived of the necessities of life at the other. He asked the Convention whether the Filipino
people could long remain indifferent to such a deplorable situation. For him to speak of a
democracy under such circumstances would be nothing but an illusion. He would thus emphasize
the urgent need to remedy the grave social injustice that had produced such widespread
impoverishment, thus recognizing the vital role of government in this sphere.27

Another delegate, Tomas Confesor of Iloilo, was quite emphatic in his assertion for the need of a
social justice provision which is a departure from the laissez-faire principle. Thus: "Take the
case of the tenancy system in the Philippines. You have a tenant. There are hundreds of
thousands of tenants working day in and day out, cultivating the fields of their landlords. He puts
all his time, all his energy, the labor and the assistance of his wife and children, in cultivating a
piece of ground for his landlord but when the time comes for the partition of the products of his
toil what happens? If he produces 25 cavanes of rice, he gets only perhaps five and the twenty
goes to the landlord. Now can he go to court? Has he a chance to go to court in order to secure
his just share of the products of his toil? No. Under our present regime of law, under our present
regime of justice, you do not give that to the poor tenant. Gentlemen, you go to the Cagayan
Valley and see the condition under which those poor farmers are being exploited day in and day
out. Can they go to court under our present regime of justice, of liberty, or democracy? The other
day, workmen were shot by the police just because they wanted to increase or they desired that
their wages be increased from thirty centavos a day to forty or fifty centavos. Is it necessary to
spill human blood just to secure an increase of ten centavos in the daily wages of an ordinary
laborer? And yet under our present regime of social justice, liberty and democracy, these things
are happening; these things, I say, are happening. Are those people getting any justice? No. They
cannot get justice now from our courts. For this reason, I say it is necessary that we insert 'social
justice' here and that social justice must be established by law. Proper legal provisions, proper
legal facilities must be provided in order that there be a regime not of justice alone, because we
have that now and we are seeing the oppression arising from such a regime. Consequently, we
must emphasize the term 'social justice'."28

Delegate Ventenilla of Pangasinan reflected the attitude of the Convention as to why laissez-
faire was no longer acceptable. After speaking of times having changed, he proceeded: "Since
then new problems have arisen. The spiritual mission of government has descended to the level
of the material. Then its function was primarily to soothe the aching spirit. Now, it appears, it
must also appease hunger. Now that we may read history backwards, we know for instance, that
the old theory of 'laissez-faire' has degenerated into 'big business affairs' which are gradually
devouring the rights of the people — the same rights intended to be guarded and protected by the
system of constitutional guaranties. Oh, if the Fathers were now alive to see the changes that the
centuries have wrought in our life! They might contemplate the sad spectacle of organized
exploitation greedily devouring the previous rights of the individual. They might also behold the
gradual disintegration of society, the fast disappearance of the bourgeois — the middle class, the
backbone of the nation — and the consequent drifting of the classes toward the opposite
extremes — the very rich and the very poor."29

Shortly after the establishment of the Commonwealth, the then Justice Jose P. Laurel, himself
one of the foremost delegates of the Constitutional Convention, in a concurring opinion, later
quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations,30 decided in 1940, explained clearly the need for the repudiation of the
laissez-faire doctrine. Thus: "It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was
adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social
distress which was threatening the stability of governments the world over. Alive to the social
and economic forces at work, the framers of our Constitution boldly met the problems and
difficulties which faced them and endeavored to crystallize, with more or less fidelity, the
political, social and economic propositions of their age, and this they did, with the consciousness
that the political and philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a great
jurist, 'be doubted by the next and perhaps entirely discarded by the third.' . . . Embodying the
spirit of the present epoch, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution which are
intended to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between component
elements of society through the application of what may be termed as the justitia communis
advocated by Grotius and Leibnits many years ago to be secured through the counterbalancing of
economic and social forces and opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the
State or placed, as it were, in custodia societatis. 'The promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people' was thus inserted as vital principle in our
Constitution. ... ."31 In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that
have taken place stressing that the policy of laissez-faire had indeed given way to the assumption
by the government of the right to intervene although qualified by the phrase "to some extent", he
made clear that the doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retain, "its virtuality as a living
principle."32

3. It must be made clear that the objection to the "constituent-ministrant" classification of

governmental functions is not to its formulation as such. From the standpoint of law as logic, it is
not without merit. It has neatness and symmetry. There are hardly any loose ends. It has the
virtue of clarity. It may be said in its favor likewise that it reflects all-too-faithfully the laissez-
faire notion that government cannot extend its operation outside the maintenance of peace and
order, protection against external security, and the administration of justice, with private rights,
especially so in the case of property, being safeguarded and a hint that the general welfare is not
to be entirely ignored.

It must not be lost sight of though that logic and jural symmetry while undoubtedly desirable are
not the prime consideration. This is especially so in the field of public law. What was said by
Holmes, almost nine decades ago, carry greater conviction now. "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed."33 Then too, there was the warning of Geny cited by
Cardozo that undue stress or logic may result in confining the entire system of positive law,
"within a limited number of logical categories, predetermined in essence, immovable in basis,
governed by inflexible dogmas," thus rendering it incapable of responding to the ever varied and
changing exigencies of life.34,

It is cause enough for concern if the objection to the Bacani decision were to be premised on the
score alone that perhaps there was fidelity to the requirements of logic and jural symmetry
carried to excess. What appears to me much more deplorable is that it did fail to recognize that
there was a repudiation of the laissez-faire concept in the Constitution. As was set forth in the
preceding pages, the Constitution is distinguished precisely by a contrary philosophy. The
regime of liberty if provided for, with the realization that under the then prevalent social and
economic conditions, it may be attained only through a government with its sphere of activity
ranging far and wide, not excluding matters hitherto left to the operation of free enterprise. As
rightfully stressed in our decision today in line with what was earlier expressed by Justice Laurel,
the government that we have established has as a fundamental principle the promotion of social
justice.35 The same jurist gave it a comprehensive and enduring definition as the "promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments in the time honored
principle of salus populi estsuprema lex."36

There is thus from the same distinguished pen, this time writing for the Court, a reiteration of the
view of the laissez-faire doctrine being repugnant to the fundamental law. It must be added
though that the reference to extra-constitutional measures being allowable must be understood in
the sense that there is no infringement of specific constitutional guarantees. Otherwise, the
judiciary will be hard put to sustain their validity if challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.

The regime of liberty contemplated in the Constitution with social justice as a fundamental
principle to reinforce the pledge in the preamble of promoting the general welfare reflects
traditional concepts of a democratic policy infused with an awareness of the vital and pressing
need for the government to assume a much more active and vigorous role in the conduct of
public affairs. The framers of our fundamental law were as one in their strongly-held belief that
thereby the grave and serious infirmity then confronting our body-politic, on the whole still with
us now, of great inequality of wealth and mass poverty, with the great bulk of our people ill-clad,
ill-housed, ill-fed, could be remedied. Nothing else than communal effort, massive in extent and
earnestly engaged in, would suffice.

To paraphrase Laski, with the necessary modification in line with such worthy constitutional
ends, we look upon the state as an organization to promote the happiness of individuals, its
authority as a power bound by subordination to that purpose, liberty while to be viewed
negatively as absence of restraint impressed with a positive aspect as well to assure individual
self-fulfillment in the attainment of which greater responsibility is thrust on government; and
rights as boundary marks defining areas outside its domain.37 From which it would follow as
Laski so aptly stated that it is the individual's "happiness and not its well-being [that is] the
criterion by which its behavior [is] to be judged. His interests, and not its power, set the limits to
the authority it [is] entitled to exercise."38 We have under such a test enlarged its field of
competence. 4. With the decision reached by us today, the government is freed from the
compulsion exerted by the Bacani doctrine of the "constituent-ministrant" test as a criterion for
the type of activity in which it may engage. Its constricting effect is consigned to oblivion. No
doubts or misgivings need assail us that governmental efforts to promote the public weal,
whether through regulatory legislation of vast scope and amplitude or through the undertaking of
business activities, would have to face a searching and rigorous scrutiny. It is clear that their
legitimacy cannot be challenged on the ground alone of their being offensive to the implications
of the laissez-faire concept. Unless there be a repugnancy then to the limitations expressly set
forth in the Constitution to protect individual rights, the government enjoys a much wider
latitude of action as to the means it chooses to cope with grave social and economic problems
that urgently press for solution. For me, at least, that is to manifest deference to the philosophy of
our fundamental law. Hence my full concurrence, as announced at the outset.

5. The opinion of Justice Makalintal contains this footnote: "It must be stated, however, that we
do not here decide the question — not at issue in this case — of whether or not a labor
organization composed employees discharging governmental functions, which is allowed under
the legal provision just quoted, provided such organization does not impose the obligation to
strike or to join in strike, may petition for a certification election and compel the employer to
bargain collectively with it for purposes other than to secure changes or conditions in the terms
and conditions of employment."

With such an affirmation as to the scope of our decision there being no holding on the vexing
question of the effects on the rights of labor in view of the conclusion reached that the function
engaged in is governmental in character, I am in full agreement. The answer to such a vital query
must await another day.

Footnotes
1
Land Authority, Land Bank, Agricultural Productivity Commission; Office of the
Agrarian Counsel.
2
The Land Reform Project Administration is the organization through which the field
operations of member agencies (of which the ACA is one) shall be undertaken by their
respective personnel under a unified administration. (Section 2 of Article 1, Executive
Order No. 75)
3
Section 79 (D) of the Revised Administrative Code provides in part: "The Department
Head, upon the recommendation of the Chief of bureaus or office concerned, shall
appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly
vested by law in the President of the Philippines. . . . ."
4
Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation, G.R. No. L-9657, Nov. 29, 1956, 53 O.G. p.
2800.
5
Malcolm, The Government of the Philippines, pp. 19-20; Bacani vs. National Coconut
Corporation, supra.
6
It must be stated, however, that we do not here decide the question — not at issue in this
case — of whether or not a labor organization composed of employees discharging
governmental functions, which is allowed under the legal provision just quoted provided
such organization does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike, may
petition for a certification election and compel the employer to bargain collectively with
it for purposes other than to secure changes or modifications in the terms and conditions
of their employment. Withal, it may not be amiss to observe, albeit obiter, that the right to
organize thus allowed would be meaningless unless there is a correlative right on the part
of the organization to be recognized as the proper representative of the employees and to
bargain in their behalf in relation to matters outside the limitations imposed by the
statute, such as those provided for in Section 28 (b) of Republic Act No. 2260,
concerning complaints and grievances of the employees.
7
Reenacted in Sec. 28 (c) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, R.A. No. 2260.

FERNANDO, J., CONCURRING:

1
National Coal Co. v. Collector, 46 Phil. 583 (1924); Gov't. of P.I. v. Springer, 50 Phil.
259 (1927); Govt. of P.I. v. China Banking Corp., 54 Phil. 845 (1930); Association
Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de Miagao v. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 281 (1943); Abad
Santos v. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 190 (1947); National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91
Phil. 203 (1952); GSIS v. Castillo, 98 Phil. 876 (1956); Price Stabilization Corp., 102
Phil. 515 (1957); Boy Scouts of Phil. v. Araos, 102 Phil. 1080 (1958); Naric Worker's
Union v. Alvendia, 107 Phil. 404 (1960); GSIS Employees Asso. v. Alvendia, L-15614,
May 30, 1960; National Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 7 SCRA 692 (1963); SSS Employees Asso.
v. Soriano, 7 SCRA 1016 (1963); PAL Employees' Asso. v. Phil. Airlines, Inc., 11 SCRA
387 (1964); Nawasa v. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766 (1964); Phil. Mfg.
Co. v. Manila Port Service, 16 SCRA 95 (1966) and Phil. Postal Savings Bank v. Court,
21 SCRA 1330 (1967).
2
100 Phil. 468 (1956).
3
Ibid., p. 472.
4
Ibid.
5
Malcolm, The Government of Philippine Islands.
6
The Constitutional Position of the Property Owner in 2 Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law, p. 2 (1938).
7
Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, p. 77 (1921).
8
198 US 45 (1905).
9
208 US 412.
10
243 US 426.
11
261 Us 525. Again there was a vigorous dissent from Holmes.
12
300 US 379.
13
262 US 522.
14
291 US 502.
15
Jackson, Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, p. 74, (1941).
16
284 Fed. 613 (1922).
17
As was stated in the above work of Jackson: "But in just three years, beginning with the
October 1933 term, the Court refused to recognize the power of Congress in twelve cases.
Five of these twelve decisions occurred during a single year: that is, the October 1935
term; four of the five, by a sharply divided court." Jackson, op. cit. p. 41..
18
2 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, op, cit., p. 27.
19
319 US 624.
20
39 Phil. 660, 717-718.
21
50 Phil. 259.
22
46 Phil. 440.
23
261 US 525.
24
III Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel ed., pp. 173-174
(1966).
25
Ibid., pp. 177-178.
26
Ibid., p. 178.
27
Cf. Ibid., pp. 227-228. To quote from Delegate Palma: "Uno de los principios
constitucionales es el referente a la limitacion de la propiedad individual. Por que se va a
limitar la adquisicion de la propiedad. Ese es otro de los prejuicios y preocupaciones que
tenemos nosotros, cuando en realidad el mundo esta sufiendo actualmente por causa de
las teorias antiguas sobre la propiedad. Ya he dicho aqui, o no se si en otra parte, que la
nocion actual sobre propiedad es la vinculacion perpetua de todos los bienes que se
pueden acumular por una familia, hasta el ultimo de sus mas remotos descendientes, ha
producido ese enorme desnivel de riqueza que se nota en todas partes del mundo, la
extrema miseria al lado del extremo lujo. Una docena de enormes millonarios, al lado de
millones y millones de seres desprovistos de lo mas elemental y rudimentario, para
satisfacer las necesidades ordinarias. Y que? Vamos a permanecer indiferentes antes que
ante nuestra propia situacion? Hablamos tanto de democracia, de prosperidad para el gran
numero hacemos algo a favor de ese gran numero que constituye la fuerza de la nacion?
No vamos siquiera a dedicar un momento de nuestra atencion a la gran injusticia social
que supone el resultado de una extrema miseria y de un lujo extremo? Fue Henry George
el primero que llamo la atencion del mundo sobre este problema. Toda la bendicion de
nuestra civilizacion, las enormes conquistas que el mundo ha realizado en el orden
cientifico, han tendido solamente a producir la felicidad de unos pocos y la miseria de las
grandes muchedumbres. Creo que este problema es digno de atencion en todas partes del
mundo, y a menos que nosotros pongamos las medidas que han de atajar los peligros de
futuro, nuestra sociedad estara siempre sujeta a las alarmas que puedan producir las
muchedumbres hambrientas y deseosas de su propio bienestar."
28
Ibid., pp. 293-294.
29
Ibid., I, Laurel ed., pp. 471-472.
30
70 Phil. 340.
31
Ibid., pp. 356-357.
32
Ibid., p. 360.
33
Holmes, The Common Law, p. 1 (1881).
34
Cardozo, op. cit., p. 47.
35
Art. II, Sec. 5, Constitution.
36
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 734-735 (1940).
37
Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, p. 35 (1935).
38
Ibid., at p. 36.