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Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)

This document contains seven perspectives on Middle East peace priorities in the US from various authors. Eqbal Ahmad argues that recent events have shifted the burden of rejectionism to Israel but that key issues around land, water, and control of territories remain. Jeanne Butterfield discusses the historic nature of recent developments and their significance for peace work in the US. Noam Chomsky places recent US diplomatic moves in historical context regarding US policy to maintain Israel as a "strategic asset" and exclude Egypt from the conflict.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
103 views7 pages

Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)

This document contains seven perspectives on Middle East peace priorities in the US from various authors. Eqbal Ahmad argues that recent events have shifted the burden of rejectionism to Israel but that key issues around land, water, and control of territories remain. Jeanne Butterfield discusses the historic nature of recent developments and their significance for peace work in the US. Noam Chomsky places recent US diplomatic moves in historical context regarding US policy to maintain Israel as a "strategic asset" and exclude Egypt from the conflict.

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Middle East Peace Priorities in the US: Seven Perspectives

Author(s): Eqbal Ahmad, Jeanne Butterfield, Noam Chomsky, Denis F. Doyon, Deena Hurwitz,
Sheila Ryan and James Zogby
Source: Middle East Report, No. 158, Palestine and Israel in the US Arena (May - Jun., 1989),
pp. 6-11
Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)
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FORUM

Middle East Peace Priorities in the US: Seven

Perspectives

Eqbal Ahmad

The PNC resolution, the Stockholm privately described the October 1988 I am also concerned that more should
communique, Arafat's speech to the events in Algiers as an Algerian be done to prevent increased repression
UN in Geneva and finally the start of intifadah. They fear that the intifadah in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead of
US PLO talks?these constitute a ma? may have a demonstration or contagion concentrating on an international con?
jor step forward, but in only one of effect in the rest of the Arab world. The ference as the condition for negotia?
several parts of the Palestinian-Israeli intifadah is an expression of Palestin? tions to begin, it would be better to
strategic equation. Zionist leaders have ian nationalism, but it is also an expres? concentrate on the end of settlements
always assumed that to succeed in their sion of Arab nationalism. There is no and the withdrawal of Israeli armed
goal of colonizing Palestine they must Arab today, anywhere in the world, who forces as a major Palestinian condition
have the support of Western public is not proud of being an Arab because of for anything further. Finally, the PLO
opinion generally and the paramount the intifadah. So there is a desire in must address the question of Jewish
Western power particularly. It is in
maintaining the support of interna?
tional public opinion, primarily its link? "The other issues remain:
ages to the US, that the recent events who controls the who
land,
have potentially made a big difference.
controls the water, and
At least they have removed the burden
of rejectionism from Palestinian shoul? who is gaining
ders and shifted that burden to the organizational hegemony
Israelis. This is, given the history of this in the contested
struggle, a major advance. territories."
The other issues remain: who con?
trols the land, who controls the water,
and who is gaining organizational hege?
mony in the contested territories. The editorofthismaga?
EqbalAhmadis a contributing
intifadah has asserted that the Pal? CollegeinMassachu?
zine,andteachesatHampshire
setts.
estinians have not been defeated after
20 years of occupation. But it has not
asserted clearly the defeat of the Israe? Washington to contain it. immigration, especially the Russian-
lis. The outcome on these levels will There is also an immediate material Jewish immigration, and de-legitimize
depend on what the PLO does to insure interest. In 1990, the Saudis will be Israel's claims to it.
economic activity, organizational back again in the world arms market. We should do more in the area of
strength and an infrastructure within The Americans would be very unhappy public education, more than organizing
the occupied territories. For this, some to lose six to ten billion dollars worth of teach-ins at the universities. No spuri?
continuation of the relationship be? arms sales to the Europeans?as might ous media report or newspaper column
tween the PLO and Jordan will remain happen if the Israeli lobby again cam? should go unanswered. I have generally
quite crucial. Both have an abiding in? paigned against such sales. For all those opposed taking out newspaper ads, but
terest in economically sustaining and reasons I think the Americans are inter? we have reached a situation where I
demographically consolidating the Pal? ested in defusing the situation. think it would be useful. They ought to
estinians in the occupied territories. They are not interested in a Palestin? be provocative, including critiques of
Displacement or even significant emi? ian state. They will continue the dia? journalists and columnists who are do?
gration would be a national disaster for logue with the PLO and try to extract ing a horrible job. More importantly,
the Palestinians and a dynastic disaster more concessions from its leaders. The they should concentrate on develop?
for King Hussein. PLO, like the Arabs generally, has a ments in the occupied territories and
What has stimulated US interest in a tendency to confuse tactics with strat? progressive Jewish Israeli and Jewish
settlement of some sort is that they see egy. PLO leaders may respond to pres? American circles. In other words, we
it as necessary to achieve stability. sures to do this and that in order to have to work in civil society: teach-ins,
More than one American official has maintain this dialogue. op-eds, letters, delegations to Con-

Middle East Report ? May-June1989

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gress?these work more effectivelythan rights abuses against Palestinians in Noam Chomsky
we often think. ? the West Bank and Gaza. The report is
now officially part of the Congressional To be properly understood, recent US
debate on US aid. US law prohibits the diplomatic moves in the Middle East
Jeanne Butterfield granting of aid "to any country the should be placed in historical context.
government of which engages in a con? In February 1971, Egypt's Anwar Sa?
The intifadah, the Palestinian peace sistent pattern of gross violations of dat offered Israel a peace treaty in ac?
initiative and Washington's decision to internationally recognized human cord with official US policy, offering
talk with the PLO are historic develop? rights." US aid to Israel is clearly illegal nothing to the Palestinians. Israel re?
ments with significance not only for the under this standard. Perhaps more sig? jected it with US backing, based on the
peace process in the Middle East but for nificantly, US aid provides important idea of a powerful Israel as a "strategic
our peace and solidarity work in the leverage in pressuring Israel to negoti? asset" in the region and as a mercenary
United States as well. Polls now indi? ate. We must mobilize public opinion in state elsewhere.
cate that 70 percent of the American the coming months to push the Bush Unexpected Egyptian and Syrian
public supports the US-PLO dialogue. administration and Congress to apply success in the October 1973 war led to a
During the first year of the intifadah, that pressure. NGOs are calling on Con? policy reassessment culminating in the
the debate over Palestinian rights and gress to convene public hearings on the Camp David agreements. Their effect
statehood reached trade unions, ballot human rights situation in the West was to exclude Egypt, the major Arab
initiatives, and even the Democratic Bank and Gaza. Such hearings can set power, from the conflict so that Israel,
National Convention. the stage for a fuller campaign around with expanding US support, would be
Several pressing tasks lie ahead. the aid question in the coming year. "free to sustain military operations
against the PLO in Lebanon as well as
settlement activity on the West Bank,"
"Public sentiment in favor in the words of Israeli strategic analyst
of a Palestinian state Avner Yaniv. Sadat could now be pre?
sented as a "man of peace." His 1971
needs to be expressed in a
offer,by contrast, disappeared from his?
focussed and dramatic
tory, because the US rejected it.
way, so that the Israel's failures in Lebanon also led to
administration and a US reassessment of its policy of sup?
Congress can no longer port for Israeli aggression in the region.
ignore it." Washington still assumed, though, that
Israel could control the occupied terri?
tories by repression and violence. The
JeanneButterfieldis NationalChairperson
of the
PalestineSolidarityCommittee,and Chairof the intifadah has challenged this assump?
NorthAmericanCoordinating CommitteeofNGOs tion. US analysts can see as well as
on theQuestionofPalestine.
Israeli military historian Martin van
Creveld that "what used to be one of the
First, public sentiment in favor of a Finally, we need to target Israeli pol? world's finest fighting forces is rapidly
Palestinian state needs to be expressed icy as never before. Now that the PLO degenerating into a fourth-class police
in a focussed and dramatic way, so that has made important commitments and organization."
the administration and Congress can no concessions, Edward Said's question is States respond to the efficacy of
longer ignore it. To this end, the non? particularly apt: "Why is Israel not force: humanitarian sentiments can be
governmental organizations (NGOs) asked whether it is willing to coexist invoked as needed to disguise policy
which collaborate with the United Na? with a Palestinian state, or negotiate, or choices made on other grounds. With
tions on the question of Palestine have accept 242, or renounce violence, or Israel's ability to serve as a strategic
taken steps to launch a major, national recognize the PLO, or accept de? asset in doubt, Washington is reassess?
petition campaign entitled "Peace for militarization, or allay Palestinian ing its position, with articulate opinion
Palestine and Israel in 1989." The cam? fears, or stop killing civilians, or end the again following along.
paign will culminate in presentations of occupation, or answer any questions at There has long been general agree?
signatures to the White House and all?" We must pose precisely these ment on how the Arab-Israeli conflict
Capitol Hill next November, the anni? questions to the Israeli government and might be settled. The basic terms were
versary of the Palestinian Declaration its supporters in the US. expressed in a UN Security Council
of Independence, along with media ads It is time to step up our own dialogue resolution of January 1976 calling for a
and visits to Congress. with our government, to make our Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Secondly, the State Department's voices heard, to ensure that the first Gaza with "appropriate arrangements
1989 human rights report has for the tentative gestures toward peace become ... to guarantee ... the sovereignty, ter?
first time highlighted Israeli human a bold and decisive initiative. ? ritorial integrity and political indepen-

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work for negotiations and the principles
"The US reverted to a for a just and lasting settlement.
Organizations addressing Middle
standard diplomatic
East issues in the US can help build
maneuver: claim that the
public support and political pressure for
adversary has capitulated such changes in US policy. Over the
to your demands and past few years, a number of these groups
count on the media to have begun to share information and
adopt the official version plan strategy. A "Middle East peace
of reality/' movement" has emerged, including
Arab-American and Jewish-American
organizations, peace and human rights
NoamChomsky is a contributing
editorofthismaga? groups and religious denominations.
zine and teacheslinguisticsat MIT. For a more
extensive
consideration The points of unity for this movement
ofthesequestions,
see "The
Ploy,"in Z magazine.
Trollope (March1989). have become quite clear: while main?
taining its support for the existence and
dence of all states in the area and their to accept Israel's abstract "right to ex? security of Israel, the US government
right to live in peace within secure and ist." And the PLO made clear that it should recognize the PLO as the repre?
recognized boundaries"?the crucial would not forego the right to struggle sentative of the Palestinian people, en?
wording of UN 242. The resolution was for self-determination. courage a negotiated settlement be?
introduced by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, The sole effect of the US move in tween Israel and the PLO, and support
and "prepared" by the PLO, according December is that Washington extended a "two-state solution" to the conflict.
to Israel. It was vetoed by the US. its diplomatic options by asserting Despite this political unity, the vari?
Since that time, there have been nu? falsely that the PLO had accepted its ous Middle East peace groups use very
merous proposals by the PLO and ma? demands. It can now use this fabrica? different strategies, in part because the
jor Arab states calling for a political tion as a weapon, if needed, against the groups themselves are so different.
settlement in similar terms. Arafat has Palestinians. The same device, with the Some are Palestinian solidarity groups,
repeatedly called for negotiations with same media support, enabled the US to while others support the Israeli peace
Israel leading to mutual recognition in undermine the Vietnam peace treaty of movement; some focus on immediate
the framework of UN 242, extended to January 1973 and the Esquipulas Ac? human rights issues, and others on dip?
include the Palestinians. Israel and the cords signed by the five Central Ameri? lomatic maneuvers. There is no simple
US have barred all such moves, while can presidents in August 1987, to men? political demand, no common strategy.
the unacceptable proposals have been tion two relevant examples. We have no functional equivalent of
removed from the historical record. As in these cases, however, there are "No Contra Aid!," no single objective
By the end of 1988, it was becoming factors that even a superpower cannot that is at once central to the issue, easily
difficult to evade the facts. At a press control. The intifadah continues, with grasped and politically winnable.
conference on December 14, Arafat re? remarkable courage and determination. Until December 15, 1988, "Talk to
peated the familiar positions, which US public opinion might become a force the PLO!" was an effective common
had been clearly articulated by the PNC that must be weighed in the balance. demand. Now that the diplomatic dia?
in November. In a last-ditch effort to Every effortwill be made to construct a logue has begun, a new organizing focus
block a political settlement, the US re? version of reality that serves the needs must be developed. Otherwise, the tre?
verted to a standard diplomatic maneu? of state power, but it remains possible mendous growth in public interest and
ver: claim that the adversary has capit? to resist. ? participation since the beginning of the
ulated to your demands and count on intifadah will be dispersed among com?
the media to adopt the official version peting strategies, and divisions so re?
of reality; then insist that the adversary Denis F. Doyon cently bridged will reemerge.
keep to promises invented for him?in A new call might be for "Middle East
this case, abandonment of all Palestin? We should not be complacent now that Peace Talks Now!" A broadly-based
ian rights. And so the press applauded the US government is talking to the campaign seeking to change US policy
Washington's "diplomatic coup" in PLO. After all, a "substantive dialogue" toward peace negotiations could be an
forcing the evasive Arafat to succumb cannot alone bring about a peace settle? effective rallying point for the Middle
by repeating the magic words. ment. What's needed are substantive East peace movement, and could help
This was the opposite of the truth, as peace negotiations, involving all parties push the US government into taking
a moment's inquiry reveals. At the press to the conflict. The task before us, then, the next essential step. Such a cam?
conference, Arafat repeated his accep? is to push US policy further in the paign would make clear at least four
tance of UN 242 with the usual "quali? somewhat encouraging direction it has points. The United States should:
fication" that it must be extended to lately taken, to bring the US into the ? Work with the United Nations, the
include a Palestinian state. He refused international consensus on the frame- Soviet Union, European states and oth-

8 Middle East Report ? May-June1989

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Conditions Report, we can draw atten?
"A 'substantive tion to the untenable conditions of the
dialogue'
Israeli occupation. An important lobby?
cannot alone bring about a
ing effort is underway to get key Con?
peace settlement. What's
gressional subcommittees to hold open
needed are substantive
hearings and to see that important tes?
peace negotiations, timony gets heard there.
involving all parties to the We still have to work on legitimizing
conflict." the PLO. It is vital that we continue to
expose the American people to PLO
diplomats and spokespeople, correctly
interpret their peace initiatives and po?
litical processes, and vigilantly counter
DenisE Doyonis coordinator
of theMiddleEast
PeaceEducationProgram anti-Arab racism. Support for normal
oftheAmericanFriends
ServiceCommittee. relations and meetings between Israelis
and PLO representatives goes a long
ers to bring about negotiations under The new situation affords us great way to challenge both legal and psycho?
international auspices. opportunities. We have scored at least logical barriers.
? Use its "special relationship" with one significant victory: US recognition A priority now is to insist upon an
Israel to urge political leaders there to of the PLO. But we can't afford to be international conference involving all
participate in these negotiations. idealistic. Riyad Mansour, deputy of parties to the conflict as the only viable
? Accept the participation of the PLO the UN Palestine "embassy," put it peace formula. Israeli Prime Minister
(or the provisional government of Pal? well. "Before, we were illegitimate ene? Yitzhak Shamir has no intention of
estine) in peace negotiations. mies," he said. "Now we are legitimate involving the PLO, and we can explain
? Accept the participation of all rele? enemies. Things are actually tighter un? why this dooms his proposals.
vant Arab countries in the peace pro? der Bush, as we are forced to function Ultimately, we must generate a thor?
cess. within the negotiator mold, and being ough reassessment of US foreign policy
pressured to stop the intifadah as proof in the region. The same three condi?
All segments of the Middle East of our good intentions." tions put to the PLO must be answered
peace movement could stand behind Our priorities remain the same: end? by both the US and Israel: Do these
these demands. They unite those con? ing the occupation; recognition of the governments recognize the national
cerned about the US-Israeli relation? Palestinians' right to national self- rights of both the Israeli and Palestin?
ship with those addressing the US-Pal? determination; and an international ian peoples? Do they accept UN resolu?
estinian relationship within a frame? peace process involving all parties to tions 242 and 338. Do they agree to
work that keeps the attention focused the conflict. Now the intifadah, Israel's renounce terror?
on US policy. They address the central "iron fist" response and the PLO's Examining US priorities in the re?
issue?a negotiated settlement?in a peace initiatives make it possible to gion inevitably raises the controversial
way that can be easily understood. And mobilize public opinion and focus Con? issue of economic and military aid to
it is not unreasonable to think that we gressional strategies. Israel. Minimally, Israel must be held to
could win. ? Using the State Department's sur? the same standards and certification
prisingly fair Human Rights/Country processes set for other aid recipients.

Deena Hurwitz
"We must generate a
Political opportunity is rarely made-to- thorough reassessment of
order for progressives, but in the case of US foreign policy in the
the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, region. The same three
the series of events beginning last No? conditions put to the PLO
vember with the PLO peace initiative must be answered by both
and leading most recently to the US
the US and Israel."
State Department's Human Rights Re?
port are almost too good to be true. The
17 months of the intifadah have indeed
produced real political pressure on the
United States, Israel and the PLO. DeenaHurwitzis MiddleEast ProgramStaffofthe
A lesson of the intifadah is the power ResourceCenter in Santa Cruzand
forNonviolence
Co-ChairofNewJewishAgenda'sNationalMiddle
of popular movements to change public East TaskForce.
opinion and even government policy.

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This means a thorough review of the mined by the intifadah and the Pal? to risk such a change.
civil, political and human rights of its estinian political initiatives taken at We need to build a broad movement
citizens?and, by virtue of the Geneva Algiers. The pro-Israel lobby in the US to push for such a shift?a movement
Conventions, of those citizens under and its friends in Congress caused the similar to those which played a part in
Israeli occupation as well. Represen? whole wall to totter by attempting to securing US withdrawal from Indo?
tative David Obey and Senator Patrick extend it to absurd heights?by the so- china, an end to aid to the Pinochet
Leahy have already indicated that hu? called Anti-Terrorism Law which government, sanctions against the
man rights might factor into future for? closed the Palestine Information Office South African regime and limits on the
eign aid decisions (although Leahy sub? in Washington and by the successful Reagan administration's ability to in?
sequently modified his remarks). petition to Secretary of State Shultz to tervene in Central America. At least 94
But the aid question runs the risk of deny a visa to Yasir Arafat. percent of the population of the United
polarizing our limited forces. We can be These efforts to isolate the PLO had States is neither Arab nor Jewish. A
more effective if we find a strategy that the paradoxical effect of isolating clear plurality, according to poll after
unites us while addressing the essential Washington internationally. The deci? poll, favor establishment of a Palestin?
issues. In framing the problem, an im? sion to make an overture toward the ian state in the West Bank and Gaza
portant question is whether aid restric? PLO was largely an effort at damage Strip, alongside Israel. Public opinion is
tions are intended to be punitive or re- control, to pull the US back from an much closer to the position of Jesse
directive. The debate usually focuses on untenable international position. Jackson?who was viciously attacked
levels of aid. A more constructive strat? A substantial, constructive change in for his allegedly "marginal" position on
egy should have us pressing Congress to US policy must include a shift from the issue?than to that of George Bush.
evaluate what would best serve Israel's support of the occupation to support for The problem is that the opinion of
real security, forcing into the open the a Palestinian state alongside Israel. If this plurality is a passive sentiment. It
question which Israel holds as its bot? this is to be more than a change in is not mobilized, so it cannot recognize
tom line. Constructive aid to Israel rhetoric, it means serious pressure on its own strength. It is not organized, so
would not underwrite its occupation, Israeli decision makers. No verbal pres? elected officials need not respect it. The
settlements or militarization?all of sure can be convincing while present formula to activate this favorable opin?
which threaten not only the peace pro? aid levels are held sacrosanct. It is nec? ion and expand it from a plurality to a
cess but Israeli domestic stability and essary to drive a wedge between the US large majority is not a secret one. The
ultimate security as well. Economic and and Israeli governments. route is already well-trod: from church
social justice programs for both Israel The potential for such a wedge must basement to campus lecture hall, from
and the new state of Palestine would alarm US strategists. It would open fis? polling place to congressional office,
ensure a genuine regional security. sures in the Israeli polity, "destabiliz? from occasional demonstrations to the
We have benefitted greatly from the ing" the arrangements of the political pursuit of media opportunities, gaining
atmosphere of optimism, but it essen? elite. It is not at all clear that a success? and retaining the leading edge in intel?
tially means more work than ever be? ful "peace process" would leave in place lectual discourse. The crucial step now
fore. Our task now lies in working an Israeli government politically, finan? is to identify how to effect change on
closely together to mobilize and nurture cially and militarily dependent on the Middle East policy through the demo?
the growing national consensus, so that United States. Such a change could cratic process. ?
politicians and policy makers get the shake US strategic structures in the
clear and consistent message that we region, which accounts for four-fifthsof James Zogby
will settle for nothing less than a just US security assistance and arms sales.
peace for both Palestine and Israel. ? The Bush administration is not likely The US decision to open a "substantive

Sheila Ryan "The problem is that the


opinion of this plurality is
The decision of the Reagan administra? a passive sentiment. It is
tion, in its final days, to "open a dia? not mobilized, so it cannot
logue" with the PLO was a significant its own
recognize
but, I fear, insubstantial change in US
strength. It is not
policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli
organized, so elected
conflict.
It is significant because it signals rec? officials need not respect
ognition of a thick crack along the wall it."
which Henry Kissinger had erected in
the early 1970s to isolate the PLO. The
theilaRyanis a contributing
editorofthismagazine
plausibility of the premises underlying ndcoordinator oftheMiddleEastPeaceNetwork in
that policy have been visibly under- fewYorkCity.

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dialogue" with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) is not in itself a
fundamental change in US policy to?
wards the Middle East. The State De?
partment has gone to great lengths to
emphasize that the dialogue does not
imply recognition of the PLO, nor of
the legitimate national rights of the
Palestinians. Rather, what we are see?
ing is Washington, in response to
mounting international and domestic
pressure, making certain accommoda?
tions to changing political realities.
Yet even as an "accommodation" the
US move should not be dismissed, for it
is an opening that we can use to achieve
real change. The dialogue is stirring accommodations?themselves the re? use of the PLO representatives and
internal Israeli debate. It is accelerating sult of pressures from Europe, the So? PNC members who are here and able to
the effort among European states to viet Union and not least from the upris? travel. Meetings with these PLO repre?
convene an international peace confer? ing itself?in turn strengthen and sentatives should be organized nation?
ence. And, by more formally acknowl? reinforce those same pressures. wide with religious leaders, union lead?
edging the role of the PLO, the US adds To make the most of this new open? ers, leaders from ethnic constituencies,
to the legitimization of that organiza? ing, we need to popularize the US-Pal? academics and peace activists.
tion in the US. The dialogue also rein? estinian dialogue through citizen ac? At the same time, we should antici?
forces the Soviet drive to extend tion. This means broadening the pate the campaign by the opponents of
glasnost to include the resolution of support base here in the US for those the "dialogue" by pressing for a clear
regional conflicts. Finally, it lends international and regional pro-peace, definition of terms. What will be the
greater legitimacy to our work here in pro-human rights forces that do sup? substance of the US discussion with the
the United States, increasing support port a change in US policy. PLO? Rather than allow the other side
for Palestinian rights while at the same We must institutionalize this open? to create the "terms of debate," we must
time deepening the debate within the ing and thereby make it more difficult move into the public arena and define
American Jewish community over Is? for the administration to retreat from forthrightlysuch terms as "substantive
raeli policy. this step. We should demand visas for dialogue" and "terrorism." ?
So while there is no fundamental PLO representatives to visit the US
change in policy, these US gestures and while at the same time making better

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