Cross v. Loudoun County School Board Complaint 8-16-21

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF LOUDOUN
BYRON TANNER CROSS, MONICA Case No. CL21-3254

GILL, and KIMBERLY WRIGHT,
Plaintiffs,
v. FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED

COMPLAINT FOR
LOUDOUN COUNTY SCHOOL DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE
BOARD, SCOTT A. ZIEGLER, AND ADDITIONAL RELIEF
Superintendent, in his official and
personal capacity; and LUCIA VILLA
SEBASTIAN, Interim Assistant
Superintendent for Human Resources
and Talent Development, in her official
and personal capacity,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Byron Tanner Cross, Monica Gill, and Kimberly Wright state as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This action challenges the content- and viewpoint-based actions and policies
of Defendants against Plaintiffs related to their speech on an issue that is the subject
of vigorous debate at the local, state, and national levels: How should our public
schools address the many issues and the divergent and often-conflicting interests
among students, parents, and educators when a student struggles with gender
identity?
2. Defendants solicited public comment to assist them in evaluating a policy
addressing these matters that was under consideration at a Loudoun County School
Board Meeting on May 25.
3. Mr. Cross, a teacher in Loudoun County Public Schools, spoke at the meeting
to offer comments based on his expertise and experience with the hope of informing
the public and assisting the Board’s evaluation of the proposed policy.
Verified Complaint, p. 1

4. Mr. Cross expressed concern with the proposed policy based on his sincerely
held philosophical and religious beliefs and years of experience as an educator.
5. Mr. Cross spoke on his own time in his personal capacity.
6. Mr. Cross’s speech did not impact his ability to carry out his duties as a
teacher.
7. Yet less than 48 hours later, in response to public criticism of Mr. Cross’s
speech, Defendants swiftly retaliated against Mr. Cross by placing him on
administrative leave and banning him from School property and attending any School
District functions, including attending future Loudoun County School Board
meetings.
8. Defendants placed Mr. Cross on administrative leave and threatened
termination of his employment for simply expressing speech that the Virginia
Constitution protects.
9. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cross filed this action against Defendants alleging
that they violated his rights of speech and religion under Virginia law by retaliating
against him for engaging in protected speech.
10. After a hearing, this court granted Mr. Cross’s motion for preliminary
injunction and ordered Defendants to reinstate Mr. Cross to his position while the
lawsuit proceeds.
11. As a result, Mr. Cross was able to return to his role as PE teacher for the last
five days of school for the Spring 2021 semester.
12. Regrettably, Defendants failed to heed Mr. Cross’s plea to adopt a policy that
respects the rights of all students and staff at Loudoun County Public Schools.
13. Instead, on August 11, Defendant Loudoun County School Board adopted a
policy that forces its students and staff, including Plaintiffs, to refer to “gender-
expansive or transgender” students using whatever gender pronoun is chosen by the

student, regardless of whether the pronoun is consistent with the student’s biological
sex.
14. This case is about far more than pronouns. It raises the question whether
public schools can punish a teacher for objecting, as a private citizen during the public
comment portion of a board meeting, to a proposed policy that would force him to
express ideas about human nature, unrelated to the school’s curriculum, that he
believes are false.
15. Additionally, it is about whether the government may force Plaintiffs to
express ideas about human nature, unrelated to the school’s curriculum, that they
believe are false and that are the subject of ongoing scientific debate. If Plaintiffs
were to comply with Defendants’ demands, they would be forced to communicate a
message they believe is false—that gender identity, rather than biological reality,
fundamentally shapes and defines who we truly are as humans, that our sex can
change, and that a woman who identifies as a man really is a man, and vice versa.
But if they refer to students based on their biological sex, they communicate the views
they actually believe—that our sex shapes who we are as humans, that this sex is
fixed in each person, and that it cannot be changed, regardless of our feelings or
desires.
16. Whether the topic is immigration, healthcare, welfare, or no-cost higher
education, our society debates important issues every day. It is not disruptive to
civilly disagree about these issues or to peacefully voice that disagreement in a public
school board meeting. A truly tolerant society can permit such differences and
accommodate all views, and so can a school district. But here, Defendants have
refused to find middle ground. They have made this case about far more than titles
or pronouns; they have taken a side in a national debate over competing views of
human nature and compelled conformity to, and support for, only one view. Under

the timeless free speech principles enshrined in the Virginia Constitution and laws,
Defendants cannot compel one side to voice the other’s beliefs.
17. Public school teachers must be free to engage in important debates related to
school policies just like everybody else. Teachers have unique insight about the
practical implementation of policy in the classroom that Board members, school
administrators, and parents do not possess. Teachers, therefore, make an invaluable
contribution to the Board’s policy formation process. Enriching that process by
offering testimony at public meetings opened for the purpose of considering new
policies on their personal time as private citizens should not cost teachers their jobs.
18. By punishing Mr. Cross for his contribution to the Board’s policy formation
process, the Defendants sent a message to all District teachers that they testify at
Board meetings at the risk of suspension, depriving the District of their unique
insight and invaluable contribution to the policy formation process. And by enacting
Policy 8040, Defendants are attempting to compel Plaintiffs to speak messages that
violate their conscience.
19. A temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief are necessary to immediately (i) stop Defendants’ retaliation against Mr. Cross
for expressing his viewpoints as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and
(ii) stop Defendants from requiring Plaintiffs to speak messages that violate their
consciences.
20. This is a civil rights action under the Constitution and laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. Defendants violated the Virginia Constitution and laws
of the Commonwealth by (i) suspending Mr. Cross for exercising his rights to free
speech and free exercise, and (ii) enacting Policy 8040 which violates the free speech
and free exercise rights of all Plaintiffs.

PARTIES
21. Byron Tanner Cross is a resident of Hamilton, Virginia, and a physical
education teacher at Leesburg Elementary, part of Loudoun County Public Schools.
22. Monica Gill is a resident of Hillsboro, Virginia and a high school History
teacher at Loudoun County High School, part of Loudoun County Public Schools.
23. Kimberly Wright is a resident of Leesburg, Virginia and a middle school
English teacher at Smart’s Mill Middle School, part of Loudoun County Public
Schools.
24. Defendant Loudoun County School Board (the “School Board” or “Board”) is
the public body that governs Loudoun County Public Schools (the “School District” or
“District”) and is located in Loudoun County, Virginia.
25. The School Board derives its authority from the Commonwealth of Virginia
and acts under the authority of the Commonwealth of Viriginia.
26. The School Board has final policymaking and decision-making authority for
rules, regulations, and decisions that govern school division personnel, including the
Policy and actions challenged herein.
27. The School Board exercised its authority to suspend Mr. Cross for exercising
his rights protected under the Viriginia Constitution and statutes.
28. The School Board has acquiesced in, sanctioned, and supported, and
continues to acquiesce in, sanction, and support, the actions of the other Defendants
in enforcing the policies and procedures governing District employees, specifically in
the suspension of Mr. Cross.
29. The School Board has refused to instruct District personnel, including other
Defendants, to reinstate Mr. Cross or otherwise to modify school policies to comply
with constitutional mandates or to change the way that those policies have been and
are being applied to District employees, including Mr. Cross.

30. The School Board exercised its policy making authority by adopting Policy
8040.
31. At all relevant times, Defendant Scott Ziegler is and was the superintendent
of the School District.
32. As superintendent, Defendant Ziegler is the chief executive officer of
Loudoun County Public Schools.
33. Defendant Ziegler’s authority and powers include oversight and control of the
District.
34. Defendant Ziegler’s duties include, among others, authorizing, executing,
enforcing, and implementing District and School Board policies governing District
employees and overseeing the operation and management of the District, including
enforcement of Policy 8040.
35. As superintendent, Defendant Ziegler is and was aware of the retaliatory and
unconstitutional actions taken against Mr. Cross and has refused to instruct District
personnel, including the other Defendants, to change or alter those actions to comply
with constitutional mandates.
36. As superintendent, Defendant Ziegler has the authority to review, approve,
or reject the decisions of other School District officials regarding personnel decisions.
37. Defendant Ziegler has the authority to authorize, approve, and implement
the policies that were and are being used to restrict Plaintiffs’ expression, including
Policy 8040.
38. Defendant Ziegler has confirmed, sanctioned, and ratified District officials’
application of the policies to suspend Mr. Cross in a discriminatory and retaliatory
fashion.
39. As superintendent, Defendant Ziegler directly supervises Defendant
Sebastian.

40. Defendant Sebastian is, and was at all times relevant to this Complaint, the
Interim Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources and Talent Development.
41. Defendant Sebastian possesses the authority and responsibility for governing
and regulating District employees at Loudoun County Public Schools, including
enforcement of Policy 8040.
42. Defendant Sebastian exercised her authority to suspend Mr. Cross for
exercising his rights under the Virginia Constitution and statutes.
43. Plaintiffs are suing each natural-person Defendant in his or her official and
personal capacities.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ Experience in Education
44. Plaintiffs each have extensive experience as educators and working with
students. They entered the education field because of their commitment to educate
children and serve them as they develop mentally, physically, and emotionally.
45. Mr. Cross received his bachelor’s degree in secondary education from
Shepherd University and has worked in the education field for fifteen years.
46. For the past three years, Mr. Cross has been a Health and Physical Education
Teacher at Leesburg Elementary.
47. Prior to that, Mr. Cross served for four years as a Health and Physical
Education Teacher at Rolling Ridge Elementary, which is also part of the School
District.
48. In addition to his teaching duties, Mr. Cross has also served as Head
Freshman Football Coach at Loudoun County High School.
49. Before Defendants placed him on administrative leave in May 2021, Mr.
Cross was never the subject of any School District disciplinary action.
50. Mr. Cross consistently receives good reviews. In his most recent review, Vice
Principal Nikole Mullen described Mr. Cross as “extremely professional,” an

“excellent role model,” and said he was a “mentor” to students. Vice Principal Mullen
concluded her review with these remarks:
Mr. Cross is an important and valuable member of our Leesburg

Elementary community. He works well with our colleagues and is an active
participant in school meetings. The lessons that are planned make students
want to be involved and participate in P.E. and keeping themselves healthy.
Our students look forward to going to P.E. each week and this is due to the
hard work of Mr. Cross. Thank you for all your contributions to Leesburg
Elementary Mr. Cross.
51. In fact, several months ago, Defendants renewed Mr. Cross’s contract for the
2021–22 school year.
52. Ms. Gill received her bachelor’s degree in Education and Social Studies from
University of Maryland College Park and has been a teacher for twenty-six years.
53. For the past sixteen years, Ms. Gill has been a History Teacher at Loudoun
County High School. Ms. Gill has taught AP U.S. History, AP U.S. Government, AP
Comparative Government, World History, Philosophy, International Relations,
Sociology, and Journalism.
54. In addition to her teaching duties, Ms. Gill was the History Department
Chair for 2 years.
55. Ms. Gill has never been the subject of any School District disciplinary action.
56. Ms. Gill consistently receives positive reviews. In her most recent review, Ms.
Gill was described as “a highly effective teacher who engages her students with her
instruction.” A previous year’s review said, “You provide a very safe environment in
which students can express their opinions and engage in debates, and this is managed
extremely well.”
57. Ms. Wright received her bachelor’s degree in education from Virginia Tech
University and has been a teacher for twenty-two years.

58. For the past seventeen years, Ms. Wright has been a teacher at Smart’s Mill
Middle School. Ms. Wright has taught Communications 7, English 6, 7, and 8, and
Computer Application 6.
59. Ms. Wright has never been the subject of any School District disciplinary
action.
60. Ms. Wright consistently receives positive reviews. In her most recent review,
6th Grade Dean Sarah Letina described Ms. Wright as a “lighthouse of positivity in
a time of extreme negativity” and “a shining example of what it means to be a
professional educator.” Ms. Letina concluded her review with these remarks:
This year we have asked you to do more and learn more in a shorter time than
we have ever requested. You have shown your dedication by bringing your "A
Game" each day. You have routinely provided the best you can give all while being
stretched in many different directions. While everyone is at their own point in
their journey to provide exceptional education in our new normal. The growth
that you have shown to get to this point has been EXEMPLARY. I look forward
to the next academic year and the work that we will do together to continue your
growth as an educator and as an integral member of the Smart's Mill staff.
Proposed Policy 8040
61. In May 2021, the Defendant School Board was considering adopting Policy
8040 entitled “Rights of Transgender Students and Gender-Expansive Students.” A
true and accurate copy of Policy 8040 as proposed is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
62. On information and belief, the Board drafted the Policy based on the
recommendations in the Virginia Department of Education’s Model Policies for the
Treatment of Transgender Students in Virginia Public Schools (hereinafter “Model
Policies”).1 See Exhibit A at 1.

1The Model Policies are available at https://townhall.virginia.gov/l/GetFile.cfm?File
=C:%5CTownHall%5Cdocroot%5CGuidanceDocs_Proposed%5C201%5CGDoc_DOE
_4683_20201208.pdf.

63. The Policy authorizes “gender-expansive or transgender students” to specify
names and gender pronouns on the basis of gender identity rather than biological sex.
64. The Policy does not define the term “gender-expansive.”
65. The Model Policies do not define “gender-expansive.” The Model Policies only
state that “[g]ender-expansive,” along with “gender-diverse/gender-fluid/gender-
nonbinary/agender/gender queer” are among “[t]erms that convey a wider, more
inclusive range of gender identity and/or expression than typically associated with
the social construct of a binary (two discrete and opposite categories of male and
female) gender system.”
66. As proposed, Policy 8040 would:
(1) allow students to use a chosen name different than their legal name
“without any substantiating evidence, regardless of the name . . . recorded in
the student’s permanent educational record.”
(2) allow students to use a chosen gender identity pronoun different than the
pronoun consistent with their biological sex “without any substantiating
evidence, regardless of the name and gender . . . recorded in the student’s
permanent educational record.”
(3) at the request of a student or parent/legal guardian, require school staff
“when using a name or pronoun to address the student, [to] use the name and
pronoun that correspond to their gender identity” rather than their legal name
and pronoun consistent with their biological sex.
(4) allow students to use restrooms and locker rooms based on their gender
identity rather than their biological sex (i.e., allow biological boys to use locker
rooms and bathrooms alongside biological girls).

(5) revise existing Policy 8350 to allow students to participate in
interscholastic, co-curricular, and extra-curricular activities, including sports,

based on their gender identity rather than their biological sex (i.e., allow
biological males to compete against biological females and vice versa).
(6) require all instructional staff to “annually acknowledge review” of the
Policy.
Plaintiffs’ Philosophical and Religious Beliefs
67. Plaintiffs believe, based on scientific evidence, that children do not have a
fully developed capacity to understand the long-term consequences of their decisions.
68. Plaintiffs want to protect children from making potentially irreversible and
life-changing decisions that they may later regret. Plaintiffs believe that, because of
the difficulty of assessing matters of gender identity and the long-term irreversible
consequences of certain treatments for transgender-identifying people, including
puberty blockers, hormone replacement therapy, and sex-reassignment surgery,
children should not be encouraged to undertake social or medical transition because
of their inability to assess long-term consequences.
69. Plaintiffs believe that parents must help children understand the many and
complex factors surrounding gender identity.
70. Plaintiffs believe that educators can assist parents in this effort.
71. Plaintiffs believe that parents have a fundamental right to control the
upbringing and education of their children.
72. Plaintiffs believe that any gender-identity education policy must account for
this fundamental right.
73. Plaintiffs believe that any gender-identity education policy that does not
account for parents’ fundamental right to control the upbringing and education of
their children is deceptive and disserves both children and their parents.
74. Plaintiffs believe educators have free speech and religious freedoms that may
be impacted by gender-identity education policy.

75. Plaintiffs believe that all education policy must protect educators’
fundamental freedoms.
76. Plaintiffs believe, based on scientific evidence, that there are only two
anatomical sex presentations (except in very rare scientifically demonstrable medical
circumstances), which are male and female.
77. Plaintiffs also believe, based on scientific evidence, that scientifically
demonstrable and anatomically-correct designations of sex should control access to
shared public-school restrooms and locker rooms for minors.
78. For those students who are not comfortable using facilities associated with
their anatomical sex, Plaintiffs support those students having access to and using a
private restroom or locker space.
79. To accommodate the interests of students, parents, and teachers, Plaintiffs
believe that teachers and student peers can—but should not be required to—call a
student, who has obtained parental permission, by a derivative of his or her legal
name.
80. To accommodate the interests of students, parents, and teachers, Plaintiffs
believe that teachers and student peers can—but should not be required to—refer to
a student, who has obtained parental permission, by pronouns that do not correspond
to the student’s biological sex.
81. Plaintiffs are also professing Christians who strives to live out their faith
daily.
82. Because of their Christian faith, Plaintiffs have sincerely held religious
beliefs that govern their views about human nature, marriage, gender, sexuality,
morality, politics, and social issues.

83. Their Christian faith informs Plaintiffs’ convictions concerning human
nature, the purpose and meaning of life, and ethical and moral standards that should
govern human conduct.

84. Plaintiffs’ faith teaches them that God immutably creates each person as
male or female; these two distinct, complementary sexes reflect the image of God; and
rejection of one’s biological sex is a rejection of the image of God within that person.
85. Plaintiffs also believe they cannot affirm as true those ideas and concepts
that they believe are not true. Doing so, they believe, would violate biblical commands
against dishonesty and lying.
86. Plaintiffs believe that referring to a child using pronouns inconsistent with
the child’s biological sex is harmful to the child because it is untrue.
87. Plaintiffs also endeavor to treat every person with dignity, love, and care,
because they believe all people are created in the image of God.
88. Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ regulation, suppression, and censorship of
their sincerely held religious beliefs.

Mr. Cross’s Public Comments at a School Board Meeting
89. Mr. Cross learned that the Defendant School Board was considering adopting
proposed Policy 8040 at an upcoming School Board meeting.
90. On the evening of May 25, Mr. Cross attended the School Board’s public
meeting.
91. Mr. Cross registered to speak during the public comments portion of the
meeting pursuant to the Defendant School Board’s policies.
92. When called upon, Mr. Cross delivered these remarks during the public
comments portion of the meeting:
My name is Tanner Cross. And I am speaking out of love for those who
suffer with gender dysphoria. 60 Minutes, this past Sunday, interviewed
over 30 young people who transitioned. But they felt led astray because lack
of pushback, or how easy it was to make physical changes to their bodies in
just 3 months. They are now de-transitioning. It is not my intention to hurt
anyone. But there are certain truths that we must face when ready. We
condemn school policies like 8040 and 8035 because it will damage children,
defile the holy image of God. I love all of my students, but I will never lie to
them regardless of the consequences. I’m a teacher but I serve God first.

And I will not affirm that a biological boy can be a girl and vice versa
because it is against my religion. It’s lying to a child. It’s abuse to a child.
And it’s sinning against our God.
93. When Mr. Cross delivered his remarks, he spoke as a private citizen on a
matter of public concern. Specifically, he was speaking on his own time at a public
meeting, during the time reserved for public comment, about a proposed policy under
consideration by the School Board that addressed issues being debated on the
national stage, including on 60 Minutes.
94. Mr. Cross did not violate any School Board policies during his participation
in the meeting.
Defendants’ Unlawful Retaliation Against Mr. Cross
95. On Wednesday, May 26, Mr. Cross went to work at Leesburg Elementary just
like he has every other day for the last three years.
96. Mr. Cross played t-ball with his students and performed his other normal
teaching duties.
97. Mr. Cross’s public comments at the School Board meeting did not interfere
with the performance of his duties as a teacher at Leesburg Elementary.
98. Mr. Cross’s public comments at the School Board meeting did not disrupt the
educational activities of Leesburg Elementary.
99. That evening, Alix Smith, HRTD Supervisor for Equity, Compliance and
Respectful Workplace at Loudoun County Public Schools, called Mr. Cross and asked
him to meet with her the next morning.
100. On Thursday morning, Mr. Cross met with Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith
immediately informed Mr. Cross that he was being placed on administrative leave.
101. Mr. Cross asked why he was being placed on leave.
102. Ms. Smith handed Mr. Cross a folder with a letter inside. She said that the
letter explained the basis for his suspension.

103. The letter is from Defendant Sebastian. The only explanation provided in the
letter is that the School Board was conducting “an investigation of allegations that
you engaged in conduct that has had a disruptive impact on the operations of
Leesburg Elementary School.” A true and correct copy of the letter of suspension is
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
104. Upon information and belief, the conduct referenced in the letter is Mr.
Cross’s public comments at the School Board meeting two days prior.
105. The letter further provides that during the suspension Mr. Cross (1) is
banned from the buildings and grounds of all Loudoun County Public Schools, and
(2) may not attend any school-sponsored activities or extra-curricular events on or off
School property. Ex. B.
106. Later that day, an e-mail was sent to all Leesburg Elementary parents and
staff that Mr. Cross was placed on leave.
107. As a consequence of administrative leave, Mr. Cross was prohibited from
conducting any school business.
108. Because of administrative leave, Mr. Cross lost opportunities to develop his
skills as an educator and lost opportunities to mentor his students.
109. As a consequence of administrative leave, Mr. Cross lost opportunities to
continue to inform the ongoing debate about whether the District will adopt Policy
8040, or something like it, including participating in Loudoun County School Board
meetings.
110. By placing Mr. Cross on administrative leave within 48 hours of offering
public comment on Policy 8040, Defendants attacked Mr. Cross’s qualifications as an
educator and assaulted his credibility in offering public comment on school policy.
111. By placing Mr. Cross on administrative leave within 48 hours of offering
public comment, Defendants sent a message to Mr. Cross and all District employees
that offering public comment in opposition to proposed policies that would compel

teachers to use pronouns inconsistent with biological sex or in opposition to proposed
policies that would compel access to sex-segregated facilities based on gender-identity
rather than biological sex will result in punishment, including suspension or
termination.
112. On May 28, through counsel, Mr. Cross sent a letter to Defendant Sebastian
informing her that the suspension violated his constitutional rights and requesting
that Defendants immediately reinstate Mr. Cross. A true and correct copy of the letter
is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
113. Later that day, Defendants’ counsel sent an e-mail refusing to reinstate Mr.
Cross. The e-mail confirms that Mr. Cross’s suspension was based solely upon
complaints relating to “Mr. Cross’s comments to the School Board.” No other
justification was given. A true and correct copy of the e-mail is attached hereto as
Exhibit D.
114. On June 1, Mr. Cross filed this action alleging that Defendants’ actions
violated his rights and seeking an injunction to immediately reinstate him to his
teaching position.
115. On June 8, this court found that Mr. Cross was likely to prevail on the merits
of his claims and issued a preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to
“immediately reinstate [Mr. Cross] to his position as it was prior to the issuance of
his suspension and remove the ban that was placed on him from all buildings and
grounds of Loudoun County Public Schools.”
116. As a result, Mr. Cross returned to his teaching position for the final five days
of school. During that period, Mr. Cross’s comments at the board meeting did not
disrupt school activities or otherwise interfere with his ability to perform his duties.
LCPS enacts unconstitutional Policy 8040
117. On August 11, Defendant School Board enacted Policy 8040 without
addressing any of the concerns raised by Mr. Cross, other LCPS staff, parents,

students, and other concerned citizens. At the hearing, two amendments were made
to the proposed policy, but neither amendment revised Subsection A which governs
the use of names and pronouns.
118. Accordingly, the Policy as approved by the School Board contains all the
provisions set forth in paragraph 66 herein.
119. Among other things, the Policy provides: “LCPS staff shall allow gender-
expansive or transgender students to use their chosen name and gender pronouns
that reflect their gender identity without any substantiating evidence, regardless of
the name and gender recorded in the student’s permanent educational record. School
staff shall at the request of a student or parent/legal guardian, when using a name
or pronoun to address the student, use the name and pronoun that correspond to their
gender identity.”
120. Under Defendants’ Policy, students may select any gender identity they
choose because the selection is based entirely on an individual student’s subjective
feelings.
121. By using the term “gender-expansive,” Defendants support the view that
there are an infinite variety of gender identities.
122. Defendants note that gender identity is completely subjective, saying that
students can choose their gender identity “without any substantiating evidence.”
123. Some sources say that there are currently 112 different options for one’s
gender identity, including genders that “refuse[] to be categorized,” that are
“influenced by your surroundings,” are “affected by mood swings,” that “change[]
depending on which friend you’re with,” and those that “outright refus[e] to accept or
identify in, on, or around the gender spectrum.” 2
124. These sources say “this list is non-exhaustive” because one should “[f]eel free

2 See, e.g., Dude Asks: How Many Genders Are There In 2021?, available at
https://dudeasks.com/how-many-genders-are-there-in-2021/ (last visited 8/5/21).

to mix and match your own prefixes and suffixes to create the orientation that best
describes you.”3
125. Other sources note that the number of possible gender identities is infinite.4
126. Under Defendants’ Policy, students may demand that LCPS staff, including
Plaintiffs, and all students refer to them by any pronoun they choose, from the
standard English pronouns (e.g., “he” or “she”), to the standard pronouns applied in
a nonstandard way (e.g., “they” used to refer to one person), to those invented within
the last few years (e.g., “ze,” “zie,” “sie,” “hir,” “hirs,” “zie,” “xe,” “xem,” “xyr,” “xyrs,”
“per,” “ve,” “ver,” “vis,” “fae,” “faer,” “ae,” “aer,” “e,” “ey,” “em,” “eir,” “eirs,” “tey,” “ter,”
“tem,” “ters”),5 to any others a student idiosyncratically requests.

127. According to some sources, the number of possible pronouns is infinite
because “[a]ny combination is possible.”6
128. Using a pronoun when referring to a student expresses a message about that
student’s sex.
129. How to respond to individuals with gender dysphoria, or who identify as
transgender is a matter of national and local public debate and concern, including
whether it is appropriate to treat males as if they are females and vice versa in
matters of personal privacy, pronouns, and sports competitions.
130. Compelling Plaintiffs to express that a female is a male by using male
pronouns, or vice versa, forces them to express a message on that matter of public
concern and debate.

3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Marco A. Hildalgo, Diane Ehrensaft, et al., The Gender Affirmative
Model: What We Know and What We Aim to Learn, 56 HUM. DEV. 285, 288 (2013)
(advocating for “self-acceptance within an infinite variety of authentic gender
selves”).
5 See, e.g., Univ. of Wis., Milwaukee, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Res. Ctr.,
Gender Pronouns, available at https://uwm.edu/lgbtrc/support/gender-pronouns/ (last
visited Aug. 5, 2021).
6 See, e.g., Univ. of Cal., Davis, LGBTQIA Res. Ctr., Pronouns, available at
https://lgbtqia.ucdavis.edu/educated/pronouns (last visited Aug. 5, 2021).

131. If students heard Plaintiffs use a male pronoun to refer to a female student,
or vice versa, they would reasonably understand that Plaintiffs were endorsing the
idea that a person can change their sex, or that it is appropriate to refer to a female
as a male, or vice versa.
132. The use or non-use of a pronoun does not interfere with the efficient
functioning of a school.
133. The use or non-use of a pronoun does not constitute prohibited
discrimination or harassment because it does not objectively and substantially impair
access to education.
134. Using a person’s preferred name rather than a pronoun to refer to them
does not create a hostile learning environment.
135. Using a person’s preferred name rather than a pronoun to refer to them is
not discriminatory.
136. Defendants do not have a compelling interest in mandating that Plaintiffs
use a male pronoun to refer to a female student or vice versa.
137. Plaintiffs’ speech on matters of public concern, including their use or non-
use of pronouns, have not prevented, and will not prevent, Defendants from efficiently
providing services to the public (or even threaten to do so).

Defendants have no valid interest in enforcing the Policy against
Plaintiffs
138. Virginia law tasks the Department of Education with developing model
policies “that address common issues regarding transgender students in accordance
with evidence-based best practices.” Va. Code § 22.1-23.3.
139. The Model Policies and the Policy are inconsistent with “evidence-based
best practices” because they require social transition at the request of a child “without
any substantiating evidence.” The Policy requires that LCPS staff participate in
social transition: (1) even if the child does not meet any diagnostic criteria of gender

dysphoria as set forth in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)7; (2) even though there are different
types of gender dysphoria which have different causes, different rates of desistance,
and require different kinds of treatment, which may not include social transition; (3)
even though the majority of childhood cases of gender dysphoria will desist; (4)
without any kind of waiting period whereby other mental health disorders might be
diagnosed or addressed; and (5) even without obtaining consent from, or even
notifying, the student’s parents or guardians.
140. Administering treatment for gender dysphoria in lieu of diagnosis and
treatment of other mental health conditions is harmful to children with such
conditions, especially if the child is in the statistical majority of cases where the
gender dysphoria will desist.
141. Administering treatment for gender dysphoria in the form of social
transition is harmful to a child if the child is in the statistical majority of cases where
the gender dysphoria will desist, regardless of whether the child has other mental
health conditions.
142. Defendants have no valid interest in forcing Plaintiffs to participate in any
child’s treatment for any condition, including gender dysphoria, when a child has not
met the diagnostic criteria for that condition or when the mandated treatment will
be harmful to the child.

Defendants’ unconstitutional actions are violating Plaintiffs’ rights
143. Plaintiffs desire to speak publicly, as private citizens, about the Policy and
about other gender-identity education policies, including at future Loudoun County
School Board meetings.

7 American Psychiatric Association, What is Gender Dysphoria? (Nov. 2020)
available at https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-
gender-dysphoria (accessed Aug. 8, 2021).

144. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have been chilled in their speech
about the Policy and about other gender-identity education policies.
145. If Plaintiffs make public comments about the Policy or gender-identity
education policy, Defendants will likely impose adverse employment consequences on
Plaintiffs because of their speech.
146. Other District employees desire to communicate their opinions on the Policy.
However, after learning of Defendants’ suspension of Mr. Cross, they have refrained
from doing so because they fear Defendants will retaliate against them. A true and
correct copy of the Affidavits from the employees are attached hereto as Exhibit E.
147. Other District employees have made public comments at School Board
meetings on a variety of proposed policies, including in support of the Policy and other
gender-identity related policies but Defendants have not punished those employees
because of their viewpoints.
148. Defendants’ Policy compels Plaintiffs to refer to students using a student’s
preferred pronouns even if the pronouns differ from the student’s biological sex.
149. Plaintiffs desire to refer to all students using pronouns that correspond to the
students’ biological sex. As discussed herein, Plaintiffs object to referring to a student
using a pronoun different than the student’s biological sex. If a student requests,
Plaintiffs will refer to the student using the student’s chosen name and will use their
best efforts to refrain from referring to or addressing the student with any pronoun.
150. During the hearing on June 4, in response to a question from the Court,
Defendants’ counsel stated that a teacher would violate the Policy, and thus be
subject to punishment, if he declined to use a student’s preferred pronoun but used
biological pronouns for all other students. Transcript at p. 85.

STATEMENTS OF LAW
151. At all times relevant, each and all the acts and policies alleged in this
Complaint were attributed to Defendants who acted under color of a statute,
regulation, or custom of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
152. Defendants knew or should have known that they were violating Plaintiffs’
constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights, and did violate Plaintiffs’
constitutional, statutory, and contractual rights by (i) subjecting Mr. Cross to
disciplinary action because he communicated his philosophical and religious beliefs
regarding gender-identity education policy and his belief that biological sex is fixed
and binary, and by banning him from School District Property including attending
future Loudoun County School Board meetings, and (ii) by enacting the Policy
compelling Plaintiffs to speak messages that violate their consciences.
153. The policies and practices that led to the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights remain in effect.
154. Plaintiffs are suffering irreparable harm from Defendants’ actions.
155. Plaintiffs have no adequate or speedy remedy at law to correct the
deprivation of their rights by Defendants.

156. Punishing Mr. Cross for communicating his views on proposed gender-
identity education policy does not serve any legitimate or compelling state interest
and is not narrowly tailored to serve any such interests.
157. Defendants’ actions have caused injury to Mr. Cross including depriving him
of his constitutional and statutory rights.

158. Compelling Plaintiffs to speak messages about sex and gender identity do not
serve any legitimate or compelling state interest and is not narrowly tailored to serve
any such interests.
159. Defendants’ actions have caused injury and continue to cause injury to
Plaintiffs including depriving them of their constitutional and statutory rights.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Mr. Cross’s Right to Freedom of Speech
Under the Virginia Constitution:
Retaliation and Prior Restraint
(Va. Const. art. I, § 12)
160. Mr. Cross repeats and realleges each of the allegations in paragraphs 1–159
of this Complaint.
161. By punishing and threatening to punish Mr. Cross for expressing his views
regarding gender-identity education policy, Defendants have retaliated and are
retaliating against Mr. Cross for exercising his rights under the Virginia
Constitution.
162. When Mr. Cross communicated his views regarding proposed gender-identity
education policy, he was speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern and
engaging in expression the Virginia Constitution protects.
163. Mr. Cross’s interest as a private citizen discussing matters of public concern
outweighs Defendants’ interest in the efficient provision of services.
164. Defendants’ decision to sanction Mr. Cross for offering comment in a forum
designed to solicit public input on policies under consideration by the Board
undermines Defendants’ interest in the efficient provision of services.

165. Defendants’ disciplinary action and their threatened future disciplinary
action has deterred Mr. Cross from exercising his right to free speech.
166. Defendants imposed a prior restraint on Mr. Cross by banning him from
attending and providing comments at future Loudoun County School Board meetings
during his suspension.

167. Defendants’ disciplinary action and their threatened future disciplinary
action would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to free
speech in the future.

168. Defendants have taken disciplinary action against Mr. Cross and threaten to
do so in the future because of the views Mr. Cross has expressed on matters of public
concern, expression that the Virginia Constitution protects.
169. Defendants subjected Mr. Cross to discipline and threaten to do so in the
future due to the content and viewpoint of Mr. Cross’s speech.
170. By placing Mr. Cross on administrative leave, Defendants punished Plaintiff
for engaging in expression the Virginia Constitution protects.
171. Defendants’ disciplinary action violates Mr. Cross’s right to free speech as
guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Mr. Cross’s Right to Freedom of Speech
Under the Virginia Constitution:
Content and Viewpoint Discrimination
of this Complaint.
174. By punishing and threatening to punish Mr. Cross for expressing his views
regarding proposed gender-identity education policy, Defendants have engaged in
content and/or viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Virginia Constitution.
175. Defendants considered the content and viewpoint of Mr. Cross’s expression
when they decided to suspend Mr. Cross. And Defendants threaten to do so again if
Mr. Cross continues to express his views.
176. Defendants’ policies confer unbridled discretion upon School District officials,
including Defendants, to discriminate based on content or viewpoint.
177. Defendants exercised this unbridled discretion when they punished Mr.
Cross for expressing his views regarding gender-identity education policy.

178. Defendants have allowed and failed to punish speech by other District
employees that expressed different views on proposed gender-identity education
policy.
179. Defendants’ policies and enforcement of those policies are unconstitutionally
overbroad because they restrict a significant amount of constitutionally protected
speech.
180. The overbreadth of Defendants’ policies chills the speech of Mr. Cross, who
seeks to engage in protected expression, including expression about gender-identity
education policy.
181. The overbreadth of Defendants’ policies chills the speech of all employees
within the District who wish to engage in protected expression, including by offering
their insight into the policy formulation process by offering comments at public
meetings.
182. Mr. Cross’s expression regarding proposed gender-identity education policy
is protected by the Virginia Constitution.
183. Defendants’ actions violated Mr. Cross’s right to free speech as guaranteed
by the Virginia Constitution.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Mr. Cross’s Right to Free Exercise of Religion
Under the Virginia Constitution and the Act for Religious Freedom
(Va. Const., art. I, § 16 and Va. Code § 57-1)
of this Complaint.
186. By punishing and threatening to punish Mr. Cross for exercising his sincerely
held religious beliefs in the way he discusses issues regarding gender-identity
education policy, Defendants have violated and are violating Mr. Cross’s right to free

exercise of religion under the Virginia Constitution and the Act for Religious
Freedom.
187. Mr. Cross’s views and expression related to gender-identity education policy
are motivated by his sincerely held religious beliefs, are avenues through which he
exercises his religious faith, and constitutes a central component of his sincerely held
religious beliefs.
188. Suspending Mr. Cross for expressing his views on gender-identity education
policy restricted his “free[dom] to profess, and by argument to maintain, [his] opinions
in matters of religion, and . . . diminish[ed] [his] . . . civil capacities.”
189. Defendants’ actions and practices have created a religious test for public
school teachers.
190. Defendants’ policies and related practices are neither neutral nor generally
applicable. The policies instead allow Defendants to target religious expression and
activities specifically and to express hostility to that expression.
191. Defendants’ policies and related practices are neither neutral nor generally
applicable because they represent a system of individualized assessments.
192. Defendants’ policies and related practices are underinclusive, prohibiting
some expression while leaving other expression equally harmful to the District’s
asserted interests unprohibited.
193. Defendants violated Mr. Cross’s right to free exercise of religion when they
disciplined Mr. Cross for communicating his views on issues related to proposed
gender-identity education policy.
194. Defendants’ policies and related practices and Defendants’ discipline and
threatened discipline of Mr. Cross for speaking his deeply held religious beliefs violate
Mr. Cross’s right to free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the Virginia
Constitution and the Act for Religious Freedom.


FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Mr. Cross’s Right to Free Exercise of Religion
(Va. Code § 57-2.02)
of this Complaint.
197. Mr. Cross expressed his sincerely held religious beliefs during the public
School Board meeting on May 25.
198. By suspending Mr. Cross for expressing his sincerely held religious beliefs,
Defendants imposed a substantial burden on Mr. Cross’ religious exercise and coerced
him into either changing or violating his sincerely held religious beliefs.
199. Suspending Mr. Cross for expressing his religious beliefs furthers no
compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored to further any
compelling governmental interest.
200. Suspending Mr. Cross was not the least restrictive means of furthering
Defendants’ stated interests.
201. Suspending Mr. Cross violated Mr. Cross’s civil rights under Virginia Code §
57-2.02.
202. Defendants’ actions caused injury to Mr. Cross including depriving him of his
constitutional and statutory rights.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to Freedom of Speech Under the Virginia
Constitution:
Compelled Speech
203. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1–159 of this complaint.
204. Referring to a person using a pronoun that is different than an individual’s
biological sex communicates a message about gender identity.

205. Defendants’ Policy compels Plaintiffs, subject to discipline, to communicate
a message about gender identity, a message that they do not hold, that they do not
wish to communicate, and that conflicts with their religious beliefs and conscience.
206. The discussion of how to respond to individuals with gender dysphoria and
whether to alter use of pronouns, or not use pronouns, is a matter of public concern
and public debate as defined by the Supreme Court in Janus v. American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2473 (2018).
207. Compelling an individual to express an objective biological falsehood is not
a lawful message.
whether to alter use of pronouns is not curricular speech.
209. Using, or not using, pronouns to refer to students is not curricular speech.
210. Using, or not using, pronouns to refer to students is not part of Plaintiffs’
official duties as defined by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,
425 (2006).
211. Plaintiffs’ expression, or lack thereof, regarding gender identity is protected
212. Defendants’ Policy and their threatened enforcement of the Policy to compel
Plaintiffs to express messages that they do not wish to express violate their right to
free speech as guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution. Va. Const. art. I, § 12.
213. Defendants’ Policy has caused and is continuing to cause injury to Plaintiffs
including depriving them of their constitutional and statutory rights.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to Freedom of Speech Under the Virginia
Constitution:
Viewpoint and Content Discrimination
215. By threatening to punish Plaintiffs for expressing their views regarding
gender identity and for not expressing the Board’s views regarding gender identity,
Defendants have engaged in content and/or viewpoint discrimination in violation of
the Virginia Constitution.
216. Defendants’ Policy requires the Board or its designees to evaluate the
content and viewpoint of faculty and student expression to determine whether it is
consistent with the mandate of the Policy.

whether to alter use of pronouns, or not use pronouns, is a matter of public concern
and public debate as defined by the Supreme Court in Janus v. American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2473 (2018).
218. Compelling an individual to express an objective biological falsehood is not
a lawful message.
whether to alter use of pronouns is not curricular speech.
220. Using, or not using, pronouns to refer to students is not curricular speech.
221. Using, or not using, pronouns to refer to students is not part of Plaintiffs’
official duties as defined by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,
425 (2006).
222. Plaintiffs’ expression, or lack thereof, regarding gender identity is protected
223. By threatening to punish Plaintiffs for violating the Policy, Defendants

have threatened to punish Plaintiffs for engaging in expression, or lack thereof, that
the Virginia Constitution protects.
224. Defendants’ Policy and their threatened enforcement of the Policy to punish
Plaintiffs have violated and continue to violate their right to free speech as
guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution. Va. Const. art. I, § 12.
225. Defendants’ actions have caused and continue to cause injury to Plaintiffs

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to Due Process of Law
Under the Virginia Constitution
(Va. Const., art. I § 11)
227. The Virginia Constitution prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.
228. Rules which use terms that are so vague that ordinary citizens must guess
at their meaning and will differ as to the rule’s application unconstitutionally deprive
citizens of liberty without due process of law.
229. A rule must afford citizens a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited in order to comport with constitutional due process requirements.
230. Rules which restrict or compel speech must meet a higher standard of
specificity than other rules in order to comport with constitutional due process
requirements.
231. Defendants’ Policy and their enforcement of the Policy are
unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous, and contradictory.

232. Defendants’ Policy and related practices are unconstitutionally vague
because they prohibit both “sex” discrimination and “gender identity” discrimination
which are inherently in conflict.

233. Defendants’ Policy is unconstitutionally vague because it applies to
“gender-expansive” students without defining the term “gender-expansive,” leaving
teachers unaware of the circumstances under which their use of names and pronouns
is under restriction or compulsion and subject to sanction.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to Free Exercise of Religion Under the
Virginia Constitution and the Act for Religious Freedom
(Va. Const., art. I, § 16 and Va. Code §57–1)
235. By threatening to punish Plaintiffs for exercising their sincerely held
religious beliefs in the way that they discuss issues regarding gender identity,
including the use of pronouns consistent with a person’s biological sex, Defendants
have violated and continue to violate their right to free exercise of religion under the
Virginia Constitution and the Act for Religious Freedom.
236. Plaintiffs’ views and expression related to gender identity, including the
use of pronouns, are motivated by their sincerely held religious beliefs and are
avenues through which they exercise their religious faith.
237. Expressing Defendants’ mandated message regarding gender identity
would require Plaintiffs to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
238. Threatening to punish Plaintiffs for not using pronouns that violated their
conscience compelled them to “suffer on account of [their] religious opinions or belief.”
239. Threatening to punish Plaintiffs for not using pronouns that violated their
conscience restricted their “free[dom] to profess, and by argument to maintain, [their]
opinions in matters of religion, and . . . diminish[ed] [their] . . . civil capacities.”
240. Defendants’ Policy and their interpretation and enforcement of their Policy
creates a religious test for public school teachers.

241. Defendants’ Policy and their threatened enforcement of the Policy to punish

Plaintiffs violated and continue to violate Plaintiffs’ right to free exercise of religion
as guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution and the Act for Religious Freedom. Va.
Const., art. I, § 16 and Va. Code §57–1.
242. Defendants’ actions have caused and continue to cause injury to Plaintiffs

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Plaintiffs’ Right to Exercise of Religion
Under Virginia Code § 57–2.02
244. Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit them from using male
pronouns to refer to a female and vice versa.
245. By compelling them to use male pronouns to refer to a female, and vice
versa, or be punished, Defendants have imposed and are imposing a substantial
burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise and are attempting to coerce them into either
changing or violating their sincerely held religious beliefs or being punished.
246. Compelling Plaintiffs to use male pronouns to refer to a female student, and
vice versa, furthers no compelling governmental interest and is not narrowly tailored
to further any compelling governmental interest.
247. Threatening to punish Plaintiffs or compelling them to speak specific words
was not the least restrictive means of furthering Defendants’ stated interests.
248. Threatening to punish Plaintiffs if they do not comply with the Policy
violated and will continue to violate Plaintiffs’ civil rights under Virginia Code §57–
2.02.
249. Defendants’ Policy and threatened enforcement of the Policy caused injury
and will continue to cause injury to Plaintiffs including depriving them of their
constitutional and statutory rights.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment
against Defendants and provide Plaintiffs with the following relief:
A. A judgment declaring that Defendants’ retaliation against Mr. Cross for
expressing his views regarding proposed gender-identity education policy
violates his rights under the Virginia Constitution and Virginia law;
B. A temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction
directing Defendants sued in their official capacities and their agents, officials,
servants, employees, and any other persons acting on their behalf to reinstate
Mr. Cross to his position at Leesburg Elementary School.
C. A preliminary and permanent injunction directing Defendants sued in their
official capacities and their agents, officials, servants, employees, and any
other persons acting on their behalf to remove from Mr. Cross’s personnel files
any reference to the discipline Defendants imposed on Mr. Cross for expressing
his views regarding proposed gender-identity education policy.
D. A temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction
prohibiting Defendants sued in their official capacities and their agents,
officials, servants, employees, and any other persons acting on their behalf
from enforcing Defendants’ policies to prohibit Mr. Cross from, or punish Mr.
Cross for, expressing his views on gender-identity education policy.
E. A temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction
prohibiting Defendants sued in their official capacities, their agents, officials,
servants, employees, and any other persons acting on their behalf from
enforcing the Policy to (i) compel individuals to express ideas regarding gender
identity that violate their conscience, including referring to or addressing
students using pronouns different than their biological sex, or (ii) prohibit
individuals from expressing views regarding gender identity or to punish them

for expressing those views, including addressing and referring to students
based on their biological sex.
F. Nominal damages for the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory
rights;
G. Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and other costs and disbursements
in this action; and
H. All other further relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled.
Respectfully submitted this _____ day of August, 2021.
___________________________________
TYSON C. LANGHOFER
VA Bar No. 95204
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
20116 Ashbrook Place, Suite 250
Ashburn, VA 20147
(571) 707-4655
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

I, BYRON TANNER CROSS, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State
of Virginia, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the foregoing
and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed this ____ day of August, 2021, at Hamilton, Virginia.
Byron Tanner Cross


I, MONICA GILL, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of
Virginia, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the foregoing and
that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed this ____ day of August, 2021, at ___________, Virginia.
Monica Gill


I, KIMBERLY WRIGHT, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State
of Virginia, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the foregoing
and that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed this ____ day of August, 2021, at __________, Virginia.
Kimberly Wright

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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF LOUDOUN

BYRON TANNER CROSS, MONICA Case No. CL21-3254

v. FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED

2. Defendants solicited public comment to assist them in evaluating a policy

Board Meeting on May 25.

held philosophical and religious beliefs and years of experience as an educator.

5. Mr. Cross spoke on his own time in his personal capacity.

speech, Defendants swiftly retaliated against Mr. Cross by placing him on

District functions, including attending future Loudoun County School Board

8. Defendants placed Mr. Cross on administrative leave and threatened

against him for engaging in protected speech.

five days of school for the Spring 2021 semester.

expansive or transgender” students using whatever gender pronoun is chosen by the

believes are false.

15. Additionally, it is about whether the government may force Plaintiffs to

were to comply with Defendants’ demands, they would be forced to communicate a

16. Whether the topic is immigration, healthcare, welfare, or no-cost higher

Defendants cannot compel one side to voice the other’s beliefs.

practical implementation of policy in the classroom that Board members, school

administrators, and parents do not possess. Teachers, therefore, make an invaluable

contribution to the Board’s policy formation process. Enriching that process by

violate their conscience.

19. A temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctive

Commonwealth of Virginia. Defendants violated the Virginia Constitution and laws

education teacher at Leesburg Elementary, part of Loudoun County Public Schools.

23. Kimberly Wright is a resident of Leesburg, Virginia and a middle school

“District”) and is located in Loudoun County, Virginia.

and acts under the authority of the Commonwealth of Viriginia.

Policy and actions challenged herein.

his rights protected under the Viriginia Constitution and statutes.

in enforcing the policies and procedures governing District employees, specifically in

the suspension of Mr. Cross.

Defendants, to reinstate Mr. Cross or otherwise to modify school policies to comply

of the School District.

32. As superintendent, Defendant Ziegler is the chief executive officer of

Loudoun County Public Schools.

34. Defendant Ziegler’s duties include, among others, authorizing, executing,

enforcement of Policy 8040.

with constitutional mandates.

36. As superintendent, Defendant Ziegler has the authority to review, approve,

application of the policies to suspend Mr. Cross in a discriminatory and retaliatory

Interim Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources and Talent Development.

and regulating District employees at Loudoun County Public Schools, including

enforcement of Policy 8040.

exercising his rights under the Virginia Constitution and statutes.

Teacher at Leesburg Elementary.

Freshman Football Coach at Loudoun County High School.

Principal Nikole Mullen described Mr. Cross as “extremely professional,” an

concluded her review with these remarks:

Mr. Cross is an important and valuable member of our Leesburg

2021–22 school year.

Comparative Government, World History, Philosophy, International Relations,

Sociology, and Journalism.

Chair for 2 years.

University and has been a teacher for twenty-two years.

a time of extreme negativity” and “a shining example of what it means to be a

Proposed Policy 8040

8040 entitled “Rights of Transgender Students and Gender-Expansive Students.” A

recommendations in the Virginia Department of Education’s Model Policies for the