Institutional Discourse: Michaelagar
Institutional Discourse: Michaelagar
Institutional Discourse: Michaelagar
MICHAELAGAR*
Abstract
l. Introduction
Discourse analysis takes äs its data any Stretch of talk or text. No constraints
are placed on the contexts within which the talk/text of interest was pro-
duced. One favorite type of discourse, for example, is called 'natural conver-
sation', implying a class of contexts that involve symmetrical social relations,
unconstrained topic flow, and infbrmality of style.
Another type—represented by a list of studies that is growing exponen-
tially-rests on discourse produced in contexts of quite another sort. One
person-a citizen of a modern nation/state—comes into contact with another
—a representative of one of its institutions. The discourse that results is some-
thing more than 'unnatural non-conversation'. I would like to take a sample
of studies of discourse that fit this loose definition of context-type and
examine them for pattern.
The proliferation of such studies in the past few years is remarkable.
Gumperz, one of the pioneers, deals with employment Interviews and court
The institutional discourse must accomplish three things. First, the institu-
tional representative must diagnose the client. Who is the client? Why is he/
she now in contact with the Institution? The Institution provides a limited
number of ways to describe people, their problems and the possible Solutions.
These ways are called Institutional Frames. Clients, on the other hand, come
to the encounter with a variety of ways of thinking about themselves, their
problems, and the institution's relationship to them. They have their own
Client Frames. Diagnosis is that part of the discourse where the institutional
representative flts the client's ways of talking about the encounter to ways
that fit the institution's. In our symbolic shorthand, diagnosis is the process
through which the institutional representative fits the client frame to the
institutional frame.
Another part of institutional discourse is the directives. They are one of
the goals of the diagnosis; the institutional representative directs the client to
do certain things or directs an organization to do certain things to or for the
client. A third part of the institutional discourse is the report. A report is the
summary of the institutional discourse that the institutional representative
produces. The client may not be present; in fact, the report, in written or oral
form, may be directed only to other institutional representatives. The institu-
tional frames prescribe how a report should look and what it should contain.
The segments of institutional discourse, then, are diagnoses, directives, and
reports. Actual cases of institutional discourse do not always follow so neat
a paradigm—a physician, for example, miglit ask a question (diagnosis), teil
the patient to do something (directive), and jot a note into the medical record
(report). Or he/she might ask a long series of questions, give the patient a long
lecture, and then go to his/her office to write a lengthy summary. The
concepts developed here are meant to organize a general understanding of
institutional discourse, not to predict the actual sequences of utterances of
which they are made.
2.1 Diagnosis
No matter what the biases of the investigator, questions and answers play
a central analytic role. With few exceptiom, the institutional representative
does the asking, and the dient answers. Several of the studies present actual
frequency counts to document this claim (Todd, 1983, and Philips, 1984,
for example). West (1983) tallied 773 questions in 532 pages of transcript.
91% were initiated by the institutional representative ( a doctor, in this case);
9% by the client-patients.
The goal of diagnosis requires the institutional representative to fit the
client's problem to the institution's frames; therefore, the active questioning
of the institutional representative is not surprising. But the studies go beyond
a description of a neutral elicitation of information. Instead, reading across
the different studies, the institutional representative Starts to look heavy-
handed. He/she takes a discourse device—the initial turn in a q/a adjacency
pair—uses it to drag the client, willing or not, through the institutional repre-
sentative's topic of choice. When the client does ask questions, it is often at
the invitation of the institutional representative, besides, äs West found out,
half the client questions were 'marked by speech disturbances' (1983:100),
signalling their own recognition that a client question is out of character.
If we shift from the clinic to the courtroom, we find the same institutional
representative control described:
First, the whole dialogue is organized along question-and-answer lines with
the judge asking the questions (with one notable exception) and the witness
providing the answers. This confirms the results of previous studies on court
interaction in different contexts demonstrating the fixed question-answer
format of court interactions. Moreover, the judge's questions sharply limit the
ränge of alternatives open t o the witness. Some of his questions, particularly
in the opening sequence, are Statements intoned äs questions requiring
consent. Later, when addressing new points, the judge often begins with a
series of queries starting with an open question which is then narrowed to
focus on a particular point by the more specific questions that follow. Thus,
the judges shape the hearing into an 'interrogation' from the start. While this
is an economical procedure, it clearly violates the procedural law according to
which the witness should be requested, at the beginning of the hearing to
provide a coherent description of the events in question "in his own words"
(Ceasar-Wolf, 1984:202, citations omitted).
The quantitative count and the qualitative quote both report a conclusion
about a particular discourse device and its institutional discourse function
that appear in study after study. Questions are used by the institutional repre-
sentative to control the flow of information. Shift the perspective from
questions to the topics they introduce, and we get the same conclusion. Shuy
(1983), known for his topic analyses of medical and legal institutional dis-
course, concludes that topic introductions and reintroductions are typically
the institutional representative's perogative.
The global conclusion—that institutional representatives use questions
both to elicit Information and to control institutional discourse—is robust.
But when we lift the top off the 'question' concept we find a variety of inter-
pretations about what kind of utterances count äs what kind of questions.
The simple idea of the q/a adjacency pair is actually far from simple. There is,
first of all, the traditional ethnomethodology discussion that introduces such
complications äs insertion and side sequences. Then the elaborate work of
Labov and Fanshel (1977) shows the many 'indirecf ways that requests are
posed in a psychiatric interview. Even when we move onto the solid ground
of direct Speech acts, an immediate distinction between yes/no questions
and wh-questions appears. Wh-questions are generally thought to be less coer-
cive, but in some circumstances Philips suggests they may be less polite
instead (1984). She also further complicates the issue by distinguishing four
types of yes/no questions—the usual form, a declarative form, a deleted aux
form, and an anaphoric tag.
West turns an ethnomethodological eye to the problem and shows that
q/a pairs differ in institutional discourse function. In her quantitative work—
mentioned above—she only counted q/a pairs where the question pointed
towards the answer. She did not count questions that pointed backwards—
'requests for repair of a previous item, requests for confirmation of a previous
item, and markers of surprise at a previous item' (1983:85). The q/a pairs she
rules out in fact represent a crucial area of client participation, since, äs Shuy
notes, the client can only '. . . request clarification, Interrupt, pause, express
hesitation or uncertainty even in the presentation of a response, agree, or
respond directly' (198 3:196).
Another slant on the function of q/a pairs is that some institutional repre-
sentatives provide a question that allows the client to demonstrate his/her
competence. In fact, this 'competence slof was critical in Fisher's study;she
notices that the clinic catering to higher SES womea more frequently
provides such slots, and that their presence, together with a competent
answer, is a condition present in the relatively few cases of institutional dis-
course where the client influenced the treatment decision outcome (Fisher,
1983).
Another interesting fly in the q/a ointment is that students of educational
institutional discourse, a field not covered in this article, point out that
'adjacency pair' doesn't cover the international territory. Instead, teacher/
Student exchanges have a third part, the teacher's evaluation of the
preceding teacher question and Student answer (Mehan, 1979; Stubbs, 1983).
With the help of D'Andrade's speech-act coding System, Todd looks at
some doctor/patient talk and finds a similar structure there. Like other
students of institutional discourse, she points out that the institutional
representative asks the questions and the client provides the answers. But
then the institutional representative—the doctor—'reacts'.
The doctor's reactive serves two purposes. The doctor initiates the interaction
with a question. In so doing, the doctor also controls the topics discussed in
their relation to the patient's presentation. The reactive serves, first, to end
the interactional segment and the topic, and second, to bring control of the
interaction back to the doctor, allowing the doctor to end that frame and to
initiate a new one (1983:165).
Not only does the institutional representative control through question and
topic; he/she also metacomments on the adequacy of the client's responses.
Todd (and the educational researchers) describes metacomments in a struc-
tured three-part sequence, but, by extension, we can expect metacomments
by the institutional representative to appear in other, less structured ways äs
well.
No matter how you look at it, the overwhelming conclusion from the
court-room and clinic studies is that the institutional representative asks the
questions and the client provides the answers. Questions and meta-evaluations
of the answers, control of the topic flow, and determination of the territory
within which the client can talk are in the hands of the institutional represen-
tative. In the verbal dance of institutional discourse diagnosis, the institution-
al representative takes the lead.
The studies emphasize questions and topic shifts; but scattered through
the different cases are other devices äs well, though these are less consistently
used. Different authors report other ways to gain control—such äs back-
channelling, Interruption, the melodic, rhythmic, poetic and prosodic
qualities of language, deictic shifts, forms of address, lexical selection, register
—in fact, this list is not exhaustive. Many devices are candidates for the
diagnosis control function, but for the present, we will emphasize the q/a
and topic shift issues, just äs is emphasized in the various articles.
The model of institutional discourse diagnosis shows the institutional
devices to control the client into two distinct and opposing Images—girl vs.
woman, vulnerable vs. scheming, childish innocence vs. sexy and street smart,
and so on.
After you read through the cases, you begin to wonder if things could be
any other way. There are cases of client questions, sometimes ignored, some-
times well and competently answered, but they are rare. The best Vignette is
reported by Treichler and her colleagues. After the institutional representa-
tive (a doctor) finishes diagnosing a patient, he says that 'if you don't mind' a
Student Vould like to maybe talk with you before you split, ok?' the shift to
polite and mitigating discourse devices is striking. The Student says Tm just
kinda curious um about the pain you're having now'. The Student is silent,
allows pauses, and encourages the client to develop his story. He learns that
client sees a psychiatrist, has completed an alcohol program, and takes
thorazine. None of this is taken up by the resident, nor does it enter into the
record. The Student is not an institutional representative, and the talk was not
an official part of the institutional discourse.
2.2 Report
The record that the doctor just ignored in the clinic example is a critical part
of institutional discourse. Diagnosis, once successfully accomplished from the
institutional representative's point of view, is a means to an end. One end is
the report that goes into the archives. Among the studies reviewed here,
several investigate the relationship between the verbal discourse and the re-
port that it generates. Cicourel (1983), in fact, views the relationship between
institutional discourse and reports äs being the core problem. His analysis
focuses on the interpretive processes between medical diagnoses and medical
reports. In his case, the concern comes äs no surprise. Cicourel is part of the
ethnomethodological tradition that developed around the relationships
between organizational records and the human interaction that led to them.
Shuy looked at three case-history Interviews, also in a medical setting, and
described this complicated relationship äs well.
Fisher opens her article with an observation that women who go to one clinic
get hysterectomies more often than women who go to another. Nothing in
the medical records, she observes, explains why this should be so (1983).
Other case studies of institutional discourse also deal with reports. Some
focus on the characteristics of 'legalese', the nature of the report code that is
neglected in this article (Danet, 1984; Kurzon, 1984). Others examine the
form of verbal rather than written reports. In a case described earlier, two
competing institutional representative attorneys in a courtroom—used dis-
course devices to construct two different images of the same client. Ceasar-
Wolf (1984) shows how the inquiring judge works towards a 'plausible and
consistent' story to account for differences in client descriptions of a traffic
accident. Tannen and Wallat (1983) show how the institutional representative
describes a problem äs more serious when reporting to her colleagues,
compared with the aloof tone she used with the client.
Reports are critical; they may be the goal against which the progress of the
diagnosis is measured. In a general way, that is what the institutional repre-
sentative does when he/she fits the client frame to the institutional frame.
The move from diagnosis to report calls into play a new set of interpretive
procedures that organize the problem in an institutionally prescribed way.
The transformation from diagnosis to report may occur during the face-to-
face institutional discourse, or the institutional representative may produce it
solo. In whatever form, a report is another example of institutional represen-
tative control of the outcome of institutional discourse.
2.3 Directive
tives while patients do not. That is natural enough, since the client goes to the
doctor seeking guidance on what to do about a problem, äs well äs advice on
what the problem is. Adversary lawyer institutional representatives in a court-
room also recommend directives to the judge, who in turn must select and
implement them. Later in this article, when a couple of other institutional
discourse cases are described, directives will also be seen to play a critical role.
But by and large, the studies reviewed here deal more with diagnosis, less so
with reports, and least of all with directives. Perhaps the study bias reflects
real institutional discourse priorities; the greatest amount of effort goes into
fitting the variety of client frames found in any society into a small set of
institutional frames. The next problem is to map the institutional frames onto
a still smaller set of report frames. At that point, the directive is almost
automatic. That is what institutions are supposed to provide—efficient ways
to handle routine problems. On the other hand, the neglect of directives may
come from a narrow focus on the verbal part of institutional discourse, a
natural focus for someone interested in discourse.
3. Discourse ecology
In several studies, the authors note that one reason for institutional discourse
control is a response to pressures about which the institutional representative
can do nothing. Ceasar-Wolf, in the elaborate quote cited earlier, said that the
judge's control may be an 'economicaP procedure (1984). West (1983) talks
about time pressures on the institutional representative. Paget (1983) shows
how a physician uses discourse devices to steer the institutional discourse
away from the client frame of cancer. Yet she also describes how medical
readers of the transcript see the physician institutional representative's talk äs
being, in fact, about the patient's cancer. Perhaps the medical reader/listener
has adequate institutional frames to connect text to topic with inferential
chains while the client, lacking those same institutional frames, cannot do
so and therefore concludes that the cancer topic is fenced off by the institu-
tional representative's discourse devices.
Efficiency, economy, time pressure and background knowledge; there are
circumstances around the institutional discourse over which neither the
institutional representative nor the client have any control. We will call these
circumstances the discourse ecology of the institutional representative and
the client. The concept is critical, since it shifts our explanatory focus away
In this article I have used cases from the courtroom and the clinic. A huge
literature on discourse in educational settings also exists. In addition, other
discourse studies cover institutional discourse in occupational settings. Just to
foreshadow some of the complications that any institutional discourse frame-
work must eventually handle, I would like to describe two additional cases
from my own experience. The first case is a hearing held by the Interstate
Commerce Commission a few years ago. (The study is published elsewhere
Agar, 1983). Briefly, the hearing dealt with an issue about a 'surcharge'
paid to independent truckers to compensate them for the rising cost of fuel.
The system that had been in force was unsatisfactory, said the ICC, so a
public hearing was held to hear the views of different participants in the
trucking industry on which alternative system would be better.
Notice the differences. The institutional discourse begins with a series of
proposed directives rather than a diagnosis. The discourse ecology immedi-
ately comes into play, since so many clients wanted to testify that each was
only allowed a few minutes. Each client gave a report and a directive. The
institutional representative—in this case a panel of ICC commissioners— then
moved into the diagnosis, asking questions to map the client frameworks just
presented to the institutional frameworks that they were using to organize
their decision. The institutional representatives then retired from the open
hearing and at some later time met, discussed the case, and eventually
published a report of their decision. That decision, in turn, was taken to court
by those clients upon whom it had a negative impact, leading to another
series of institutional discourses of the type examined in the court studies.
The framework fits, but there are some differences:
The next case I would like to informally describe is the IRS office audit. I
have been through four of them in about ten years and consider myself, if
not an analyst, at least an experienced client. In this case, control is estab-
lished at the outset because the client is required to appear. The diagnosis
proceeds pretty much äs described earlier, with one notable exception. If the
client introduces a topic, the institutional representative will sometimes allow
it to see what additional Information they can learn about the client relevant
to the audit. If no such helpful Information is forthcoming, the institutional
representative uses discourse devices to regain control and put the audit back
in Service of the institutional frames.
Clients also learn the institutional frames with experience. Knowing them
allows the client to 'pre-package' Information to fit those institutional frames
to his advantage. After the audit, the client receives a copy of a written report
that also goes into the archives. The report contains directives to the client
and to the agency. If you hadn't been there, you wouldn't know why they
were made. The client can then request a review by the auditor's superior—a
kind of 'meta-institutional discourse'. After that, the client must go to the
courts.
The IRS audit fits the framework a little more clearly, partly because the
face-to-face discourse between a single institutional repräsentative and a single
client is the canonical form described in the articles. But again, there are some
noteworthy differences.
1. The client does not come to the organization for help with a problem.
The organization .requires him/her to appear with sanctions looming over
his/her head if the invitation is ignored.
2. The client can introduce topics during diagnosis, but only because it is in
the institutional representative's interest to allow it, a more malevolent
version of the 'competence display slot' provided by the doctor des-
cribed earlier.
3. Institutional discourses are linked again, only this time a hierarchical
linkage is emphasized—an appeal to the auditor's superior is an institu-
tional discourse about an institutional discourse.
I use these two informal examples—one from research and one from
personal experience—to make two points: (1) The framework for under-
standing institutional discourse resulting from the studies of courtroom and
clinic has a broader application than just the cases that generated them;T)ut,
(2) äs the framework is applied across wider ranges of institutional discourse
types it will have to be enriched to accommodate them. The point of this
article is t o suggest a framework, not conclude it.
In this article discourse analysis has been used äs a 'theory of the data', a
series of guidelines to untangle multi-level patterns in a complex structured
object. The question now is, data in service of what broader issues? We have
some of the raw material of citizens and institutions in contact. If we look at
a number of cases, what kinds of inferences can we make about the society
from which they were taken? We need to exchange the microscope for a
wide-angle camera.
Consider, for example, Foucault's key discourse hypothesis:
In the final analysis, the Speaker can illocutionarily influence the hearer and
vice versa, because speech-act-typical commitments are connected with
cognitively testable validity Claims—that is, because the reciprocal bonds have
a rational basis (l979:63).
There are four validity Claims. Comprehensibility is the first. The other three
are (1) that the Speaker utter a true proposition; (2) that he/she wants to be
truthful or trustworthy; and (3) that a normative background obtains within
which the utterance is appropriate. The validity claims, then, lead to three
'felicity conditions'—the Obligation to provide grounds, the Obligation to
prove trustworthy, and the Obligation to provide justification.
I cannot ränge comfortably through the prolifk and often difficult
writings of Foucault and Habermas, and do not mean to imply that tlieir
theories are the only two candidates for placing detailed discourse analyses of
single cases in broader perspective. Nor do I think that we (the nose-to-the-
data discourse analysts) need them more than they (the grand theorists
unhindered by the complex and intricate details of real-world social action)
need us; good arguments can be made to the contrary. For the present, I only
wish to experiment with the institutional discourse framework äs a mediator
between grand theory and case study.
Foucault develops a series of 'rules' to focus on how discourse control
is accomplished—historically developed and institutionally supported rules of
exclusion, rules of limitation where discourse exercises its own control, and
rules that determine the conditions for discourse use. His rules of exclusion—
what you can't say, what's crazy to say, what's useless or unprovable—
certainly ring true äs three characteristics of institutional framework bound-
aries. For medlcine and law, his 'disciplinary' rule of limitation also applies;
before a proposition is eligible for expression it must already be 'within the
true', and his 'commentary' limitation rule, where a particular narrative is
simply the token of a Standard type, models some of the discussion of reports.
Finally, his rules on conditions for discourse deal with 'fellowships of dis-
course' and 'doctrinal groups' in ways that suggest a social coherence to the
institutional repräsentative role. But the detailed analysis of single cases blurs
some of the distinctions that look so crisp in the social-theoretic air. The
institutional framework boundaries are not razor-sharp, and some of institu-
tional discourse, in spite of the institutional representative's controlling role,
is a mediation of the client framework and the institutional framework. In
the medical/legal cases, the discipline, the fellowship and the doctrinal group
may be three redundant labels for the same phenomenon. Foucault could use
some data.
Habermas offers a complementary view of the case studies, though there is
an initial complication. His universal pragmatics doesn't apply to 'institution-
ally bound' speech actions. As he himself says:
dient frameworks; he/she must also create the client's need to stay with
him/her. More variety in the cases will require enrichment of the Frame-
work.
The relationship of Institution to its organizational context also awaits
clarification. Most of the institutions reported on in this article—
medicine, law and government-have been examined in organizational
contexts—hospitals, courts and meeting rooms. But not all institutional
representatives will operate in organizational settings, at least not all of
the time. Further, some organizations are built on a single institution-
like a hospital—while others draw institutional representatives from
several different institutions—like a large corporation that is both verti-
cally and horizontally integrated.
7. Conclusions
We have come a long way from the q/a adjacency pairs that began the
dis;ussion. We are left with several propositions:
1. Contact between representatives of institutions and those clients who
need to or must deal with them generates institutional discourse.
2. Case studies of institutional discourse highlight discourse devices that
allow for institutional representative control. The devices include the
initial position in q/a pairs, topic shift, and evaluative metacomments in
diagnosis, äs well äs the directives issued and the report prepared by the
institutional representative.
3. Control is exercised to remain within topic frameworks motivated by
institutional frames.
4. From a broader perspective, the control maintains the boundaries of
current discursive practices and serves äs a barrier against validity Claims.
5. In any particular instance, the discourse ecology suggests that even a
motivated institutional representative/client pair can do little to alter the
institutional discourse. An institutional representative can be more
sympathetic and a client can be more manipulative, but that is about it.
6. Changes in institutional discourse can come about with a shift in dis-
course from institution-person to organization-organization. You cannot
fight city hall, unless of course you're a judge or a corporation executive
offlcer.
7. We need a better sense of what institutions are, viewed from a discourse
Note
Although I have not dealt with them all, excellent comments on an earlier draft
were provided by Erve Chambers, Linda Coleman, George Dillon and Kit Woolard.
Conversations with Deborah Pruitt also contributed to the final shape of the article.
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