SOCIAL CHOICES (VOTING METHODS)

In a society, decisions are made by its members in order to come up with a situation that
benefits the most

There are 2 questions we want to answer:

1. What is the best voting method of arriving at a decision as a group?
2. What makes a decision process fair?

The problem
1. There is a group of 15 people would like to discuss: where to have lunch?
5 3 6 1
st
1 Mcdo Mcdo Jollibee Burger King
choice
2nd KFC KFC KFC KFC
choice
3rd Jollibee Burger King Burger King Mcdo
choice
4th Burger King Jollibee Mcdo Jollibee
choice

 5 people voted for:

o Mcdo as their 1st choice
o KFC as their 2nd choice
o Jollibee as their 3rd choice
o Burger king as their 4th choice
 3 people voted for:
o Mcdo as their 1st choice
o KFC as their 2nd choice
o Burger King as their 3rd choice
o Jollibee as their 4th choice
 6 people voted for:
o Jollibee
o KFC
o Burger King
o Mcdo
 1 person voted for:
o Burger King
o KFC
o Mcdo
o Jollibee

With the given result, where should they have lunch?

 2. Who will be the representative?
No. of 49 48 3
voters
1st Mr. R H C
choice
2nd Mr. H S H
choice
3rd Mr. C O S
choice
4th Mr. O C O
choice
5th Mr. S R R
choice

Social choice and voting

 Social choice theory looks at processes by which different and conflicting choice of
members of a group consolidated into a single choice of the group
 Voting is the main vehicle by which decisions are arrived at in a democratic society
 The social choice theory is obtained by voting method
 There are several voting methods

Terminologies
 A preference ballot is a ballot on which each voter ranks all eligible candidates, from
first to last place, with NO tied ranks
Rank Vote
st
1 B
nd
2 D
3rd A
th
4 C
 A preference table is a table showing how many times each possible ballot was
submitted
No. of votes
Rank 6 5 3 1
st
1 A B D C
nd
2 B D B A
rd
3 C A A B
4th D C C D
 A voting method is mathematical procedure that uses data from the preference table to
determine a winner
Some methods of voting
1. Plurality method
 In this method, whoever receives the most first-place votes is declared the winner.
 This is by far the simplest and widely used voting method. It may require a tiebreaker
though
Where to have lunch?

By the most number of 1st place votes, Mcdo wins with 8 votes

Terminologies
 A fairness criterion is a mathematical statement about our expectations for a voting
system

Fairness criteria
1. The majority criterion
 If a candidate receives majority of first-place votes, that candidate should win the
election
Where to have lunch?

 Plurality winner is Mcdo with 8 votes

 Majority is more than half. The total number of voters is 15 (5+3+6+1).
o 15/2= 7.5
 Since Mcdo has 8 votes which is more than 7.5, then Mcdo is the majority
 winner
 Plurality satisfies the majority criterion

“Plurality will not always satisfy the majority criterion”

Majority Condorcet IIA criterion Pareto Monotonicity
criterion criterion criterion criterion
Plurality Not always

2. The Condorcet criterion

 If a candidate beats any other candidate in a head-to-head contest, that candidate
should win the election. Such a candidate, if one exists, is called a Condorcet candidate
or Condorcet winner.
 Not every election necessarily has one

 Mcdo vs Jollibee
o Mcdo= 8, Jollibee= 6
 Mcdo vs. KFC
o Mcdo= 8, KFC= 7
 Mcdo vs. BK
o Mcdo= 8, BK=7

 Head-to-head, Mcdo vs. Jollibee, Mcdo wins

 Plurality winner is Mcdo. The Condorcet criterion is satisfied
 Mcdo is the Condorcet winner

“Plurality will not always satisfy the Condorcet criterion”

Majority Condorcet IIA criterion Pareto Monotonicity
criterion criterion criterion criterion
Plurality Not always Not always
 3. The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) criterion
 If a re-election is held with the same ballots and non-winning candidates are removed,
the previous winner should still win

 We know that the winner is Mcdo. So the non-winning candidates are Jollibee,
Burger King, and KFC
 If we eliminate one of the non-winning candidates (if we remove BK)
 Mcdo is still the winner
o Mcdo= 8
o Jollibee= 6
o KFC= 1

 After taking away the non-winning candidate Burger King, Mcdo is still the
winner
 Plurality satisfies the IIA criterion

“Plurality will not always satisfy the IIA criterion”

Majority Condorcet IIA criterion Pareto Monotonicity
criterion criterion criterion criterion
Plurality Not always Not always Not always

4. Pareto criterion
 If there is at least one candidate, say candidate 1, that every voter prefers to another
candidate, say candidate 2, then it should be impossible for candidate 2 to win the
election
 The Pareto condition is named after Vilfred Pareto (1848-1923), an Italian economist
 KFC is preferred by all voters over Burger King. It should be impossible for burger King
to win

“Plurality will always satisfy the Pareto criterion”

Majority Condorcet IIA criterion Pareto Monotonicity
criterion criterion criterion criterion
Plurality Not always Not always Not always Always

5. Monotonicity criterion
 It should be impossible for a winning candidate to lose in a re-election if the only
changes in the votes were changes that were favorable to that candidate

“Plurality will always satisfy the Pareto criterion”

Majority Condorcet IIA criterion Pareto Monotonicity
criterion criterion criterion criterion
Plurality Not always Not always Not always Always Always

Fairness criteria
 All voters should be treated equally
o No voter has special influence, only the ballot counts. If voters exchange
ballots, the result of the election should still be the same
 All candidates should be treated equally
o No candidate has more privilege than any other. In the case of two candidates,
this means if every voter reversed their vote, the election result would be
revered as well
 Unanimity
o If every individual prefers a certain option to another, then so must the result
societal choice
 Non-dictatorship
o The social choice function should not simply follow the preference order of a
single individual while ignoring all others

Regarding the plurality method

 Voting systems which make use of the plurality method include barangay, local, and
national elections in the Philippines
  However, voters simply choose candidates without ranking them

There is 1 problem with the plurality method:

Plurality is vulnerable to strategic voting
 A voter voting strategically reasons as follows: “if my preferred candidate has no chance
to win, then I will vote instead for someone I like less, but who has a change to win”
 Whenever voters vote differently from their true preferences, the voting method may
be flawed

 Illustration

o A voter prefers candidate C, but since candidate C has no chance of winning,

instead the voter would choose the candidate he likes less

Gibbard-Satterhwaite’s Theorem
No voting method is completely resistant to strategic voting

Some methods of voting (cont.)

1. Plurality method
2. Majority rules
 In this method, the candidate which receives the majority (more than 50%) of first-place
votes wins the election
 Illustration:

o A is the winner, having obtained majority first-place votes (10 of 17 votes)

  Looking only at the first place:
 A 6 + 4 votes
 B 5 votes
 C 2 votes
 6 + 5 + 4 +2= 17 voters in total
 17/2= 8.1 = 9
 Since 10 voted for A, A is the winner using the majority method
 Majority rules is a good method of voting but only guarantees a winner if there are two
candidates and an odd number of voters
 If there are more than two candidates, it is possible that none of the candidates receives
a majority and thus no winner could be determined by majority rules
 Illustration:

o A has the most number of first-place but cannot be the winner under majority
rules. 6 out of 15 is not a majority
 Looking at the first-place:
 A 6
 B 5
 D 3
 C1
 15/2= 7.1= 8
 Since nobody got more than 8 votes. Thus, there is no winner using the
majority rule
 However, A is declared the winner using plurality method

May’s theorem
If the number of voters is odd, there are only two candidates, and we want a voting method
that never results in a tie, then majority rules is the only method that satisfies the following
three criteria:
1. All voters are treated equally
2. Both candidates are treated equally
3. Monotonicity
Plurality vs. majority
PLURALITY MAJORITY
 Candidate with more first place votes  Candidate with more than 50% of the
than any other first-place votes
 The most votes  Most of the votes

Illustration:

 Since there are 37 votes cast (14 + 4 + 11 + 8), the majority is 19 votes (37/2= 18.5).
 A received a plurality but not a majority

Method vs. criterion

The majority criterion Majority rules method
 If a candidate receives a majority of  The candidate who receives the
first-place votes, that candidate majority of first-place votes wins the
should win the election election
We note here that majority rules method guarantees that the process satisfies the majority
criterion

Some methods of voting (cont.)

1. Plurality method
2. Majority rule
3. Condorcet method
 A candidate is a winner when he would, on the basis of the ballots cast, defeat every
other candidate in a one-on-one contest using majority rule. In fact, if there are only
two candidates, the Condorcet method is exactly the same as majority rules
 This was popularized in the 18th century by Marquis de Condorcet
 Illustration:
 o B vs. A
 B is over A on 5+3=8 of the ballots, while A is over B on 6+1=7 of the
ballots. Thus, B defeats A by a score of 8 to 7
To further explain it:
 In the first column, there were 6 who preferred A to B
 In the second column, there were 5 who preferred B to A
 In the third column, there were 3 who preferred B to A
 In the fourth column, there was 1 who preferred A to B

So among the 15 votes, 8 preferred B, and 7 preferred A.

o B vs. C
 B is over C on 6+5+3= 14 of the ballots, while C is over B on 1 of the
ballots. Thus, B defeats C by a score of 14 to 1
 In the first column, 6 preferred B to C
 In the second column, 5 preferred B to C
 In the third column, 3 preferred B to C
 In the fourth column, 1 preferred C to B

So among the 15 votes, 14 preferred B, and 1 preferred C

o B vs. D
 B is over D on 6+5+1= 12 of the ballots, while D is over B on 3 of the
ballots. Thus, B defeats D by a score of 12 to 3.
 In the first column, 6 preferred B to D
 In the second column, 5 preferred B to D
 In the third column, 3 preferred D to B
 In the fourth column, 1 preferred B to D

So among the 15 votes, 12 preferred B, and 3 preferred D

o Since B defeated all other candidates, B is the Condorcet winner

Condorcet’s voting paradox

 The Condorcet’s method may not produce a winner when there are more than two
candidates
 Illustration:
 o There are only 3 voters. And we can see that no one wins on a head-to-head
collision
 A/B/C cannot be a Condorcet winner because they all defeat each other

Some methods of voting (cont.)

1. Plurality method
2. Majority rule
3. Condorcet method
4. Runoff voting
 Used in deciding the site for the Olympic games
o Steps:
(1) A plurality vote is taken first
(2) If one of the candidates has more than 50% of the votes, the candidate wins
(3) If no candidate has more than 50% of the votes, a second round of plurality
voting occurs with a designated number of the top candidates
 Ex: there are 6 candidates and none of them got 50% of the votes.
Then another plurality voting occurs with only the top 3. So the
lower 3 are dropped
(4) The process continues until one of the candidates has more than 50% of the
votes

 Illustration: the hare system

 o A 14 votes
o C 11 votes
o D 8 votes
o B 4 votes

In order to have a winner, there must be someone who will receive more than 50% of
the votes
 There are a total of 37
 50%= 18.5= 19
 But in the first round, no candidate received more than 50% or 19 votes
Among the candidates B received the lowest votes (4 votes only)
 Using the hare system, we drop B

There is no election done in the hare system. We keep the original election results

By dropping B:

o A 14 votes
o C 11 votes
o D 12 votes
Since none got more than 19 votes, eliminate the lowest, which is C

By dropping C:

 A 14
 D 10+8+4+1= 23
 Since D has more than 50%, D wins the election

Borda count
 The Borda Count method is named after Jean-Charles do Borda (1733-1799)
 Borda Cound method assigns points in a non-increasing manner to the ranked
candidates on each voter’s preference list
o Ex: given N candidates, below is the point system. Political elections in at least 3
countries, Slovenia and the tiny Micronesian nations of Kiribati and Nauru

 Illustration:

o There are 6 voters who voted for:

 1st A
 2nd B
 3rd C
 4th D
Since:
RANK
st
1 3 points
nd
2 2 points
rd
3 1 point
4th 0 points
  Borda score is the total points received for each candidate from all voters are added
 The winner is the candidate with the highest Borda score
o A 18+5+3+2= 28
o B 12+15+6+1= 34 (winner)
o C 6+0+0+0= 6
o D 0+10+9+0= 19

Some methods of voting (cont.)

1. Plurality method
2. Majority rule
3. Condorcet method
4. Runoff voting
5. Sequential pairwise voting
 Fixing an ordering
o Also called an agenda of the candidates (chosen however you please, ex:
A,D,B,C,F,E)
 Have the first two compete in a head-to-head (plurality method) race, the winner of this
race will then face the 3rd candidate on the list in a head-to-head race, the winner of
that race will face the next candidate…. Continue until the last candidate in the ordering
is in a head-to-head race with the winner of the pervious head-to-head and the winner
of that race is declared the winner of the general election

 Example: where to have lunch?

o Agenda: Mcdo vs. Jollibee vs. KFC vs. Burger King

 First, we have a head-to-head collision with Mcdo and Jollibee
 Column 1= Mcdo wins (5) Mcdo:
  Column 2= Mcdo wins (3) 5+3+1= 9
 Column 3= Jollibee wins (6)
 Column 4= Mcdo wins (1) Jollibee:
6
Between Mcdo and Jollibee, Mcdo wins.
 We drop Jollibee from the list

 Second, Mcdo will go against KFC

 Column 1= Mcdo wins (5) Mcdo:
 Column 2= KFC wins (3) 5
 Column 3= KFC wins (6)
 Column 4= KFC wins (1) KFC:
3+6+1= 9
Between Mcdo and KFC, KFC wins

 Third, KFC will go against Burger King

 Column 1= KFC (5) KFC:
 Column 2= KFC (3) 5+6+3= 14
 Column 3= KFC (6)
 Column 4= Burger King (1) BK:
1
KFC is the winner

o Agenda: KFC vs. Jollibee vs. Mcdo vs. Burger King

 KFC vs. Jollibee
 Jollibee wins with 11:4 points
 Jollibee vs. Mcdo
 Mcdo wins with 9:6 points
 Mcdo vs. Burger King
 Mcdo wins with 8:7
 Mcdo is the winner
- Thus, it is possible to have a different winner with different agenda

Some methods of voting (cont.)

1. Plurality method
2. Majority rule
3. Condorcet method
4. Runoff voting
5. Sequential pairwise voting
6. Approval voting
- Used in the selection of the secretary-general of the United Nations and mathematical
association of America
 - Approval voting is a single-winner voting method that allows voters to choose any
number of candidates. The candidate chosen the most wins.
- Approval voting is most often discussed in the context of single-winner elections, but
variations using an approval-style ballot can also be applied to multi-winner (at-large)
elections

Summary
Majority Condorcet IIA criterion Pareto Monotonicity
criterion criterion criterion criterion
Plurality Not always Not always Not always Always Always
Borda Count Not always Not always Not always Always Always
Sequential Always Always Not always Not always Always
pairwise
Hare system Always Not always Not always Always Not always
Approval Not always Not always Always Not always Always
voting

Arrow’s impossibility theorem

There is not voting method that will satisfy a reasonable set of fairness criteria when there are 3
or more candidates (1951)
 GAME THEORY: A TOOL FOR DECISION-MAKING
The problem
Two suspects were caught be the police and interrogated in separate rooms. Three cases
were presented to them
 CASE A: if only one of them confesses, then one will go to jail for 1 year and the other
will go to jail for 25 years
 CABE B: if neither of them confesses, then each will go to jail for 3 years
 CASE C: if both of them confess, then each will go to jail for 10 years

1. If you are one of the two suspects, what are you going to do in this scenario?
CONFESS or REMAIN SILENT
2. What would be your “best” response and what would be the other suspect’s best
response?

What is game theory?

Game theory is the study of strategic interaction between participants (players) in a situation
(games) that contains a set of rules and a set of outcomes
- It consists of a set of players and a set of actions (moves) for each of them
- A sequence of actions (moves) is called a strategy
- Each player receives a payoff that depends on the actions of all the players involved

Basic idea in game theory

What would be the player’s best strategy to different moves of the other players to achieve the
“best” or maximum playoff?
Some real-life situations with game theory
1. A person deciding which more of transportation to use
2. Businesses competing in a market
3. Sports game
4. Choosing where to eat
5. Food sharing and bill splitting
6. Species fighting for survival

Some classification of games

1. Simultaneous vs. sequential game
2. Perfect vs. imperfect information game
3. Complete vs. incomplete-information game

Simultaneous vs. sequential

Simultaneous Sequential
 Each player has only one move and all  No two players move at the same
these moves are done simultaneously time and players may have several
 Ex: rock paper scissors actions (moves)
 Ex: Tic-tac-toe/ board games

Perfect vs. imperfect-information

Perfect Imperfect-information games:
 A game is said to be of perfect-  Ex: card games (bc you don’t show
information if each player, when your opponent your hand)
making a decision, is perfectly
informed of all the actions that have
previously occurred including the
“initialization event: of the game.
Otherwise, the game is of imperfect-
information
 Ex: chess, tic-tac-toe

Complete vs. incomplete-information

Complete Incomplete-information
 In a game of complete- information,  Otherwise, the game is said to be of
the strategies, payoffs and player incomplete information. Some of the
information are common knowledge game structures are not commonly
to all players known to the players. Some players
may possess private information
Normal form
A game in formal form is a table of numbers with the strategies listed along the margins of the
table and the payoffs for the participants in the cells of the table

To explain:
Player 2
Rock Paper Scissors
Player Rock (0,0) (-1,1) (1,-1)
1 It is (0,0) It is (-1,1) it is (1,-1)
because because because rock
they are the rock loses beats
same to paper. scissors.
So: So:
Rock= -1 Rock= 1
Paper= 1 Scissors= -1
Paper (1,-1) (0,0) (-1,1)
Scissors (-1,1) (1,-1) (0,0)

Example 3: normal form of a game

Construct the normal form of the Prisoner’s dilemma game
 CASE A: if only one of them confesses, then one will go to jail for 1 year and the other
will go to jail for 25 years
 CASE B: if neither of them confess, then each will go to jail for3 years
 CASE C: if both of you confess, then each will go to jail for 10 years
For each prisoner, there is only two choices: to confess or not to confess
Let C= “to confess”
Let R= “to remain silent”

Player 2
C R
Player 1 C (-10,-10) (-1,-25)
If they both Since
confess, then they player 1= confess
BOTH go to jail for player 2= silent
10 years
R (-25,-1) (-3,-3)
Example 4: normal form of a game
Two companies share a market where they make P50 million each. They need to decide
whether they will advertise or not. Advertising costs P20 million but captures P30 million in
revenues from the competitor provided that the competitor does not advertise.
Construct the normal form of this game

Let A= “to advertise”

Let N= “to not advertise”

Company 2
A N
Company 1 A (30,30) (60,20)
Since both Company 1
companies (advertises) : 50-
advertise, the 20+30= 60
payoff is 50-20=30. Company 2 (does
not advertise) : 50-
30= 20
N (20,60) (50,50)
Since neither
company
advertises, there is
no advertising cost

Exercise: normal form of a game

Anna and Belle have a lot of common friends but the two of them are not on speaking terms.
Both want to invite their friends to a get-together this weekend. The one who schedules the
event on a Saturday gets a payoff of 5 while a payoff of 4 goes to the one who schedules it on a
Sunday. The worst case scenario occurs when both set the get-together on the same dat. This
has a payoff of -10 for both.
Express the scenario in normal form

Belle
Saturday Sunday
Anna Saturday (-10,-10) (5,4)
Sunday (4,5) (-10,-10)
Analyzing simultaneous games in normal form
 Games in normal form are used to analyze one-shot games. Each player chooses one
actions and all of them chooses simultaneously
 How do we decide? We can use the following:
o Maximin solution
o Nash equilibrium

Maximin solution
 This solution involves choosing the strategy that gives you the maximum among your
worst payoffs
 This was proposed by the mathematician John von Neumann

Example 5: maximin strategy

Working on a project game: you and your classmate work together on a course requirement
and each of you can choose to either work hard (W) or take it easy (T). You both want to pass
but both of you do not like working very hard. Assume that the two of you would meet
tomorrow to combine your outputs. Determine you and your classmate’s maximin strategy
The payoff matrix is shown below and the payoff values represent “happiness” or
“satisfaction” levels

Step 1: separate the payoff values of each player into two matrices

 If you decide to work hard (W), the payoff for YOU is 2 and 0
 If you decide to take it easy (T), the payoff for YOU is 3 and 1
  If classmate decides to work hard (W), the payoff for him is 2 and 0
 If classmate decides to take it easy (T), the payoff for him is 3 and 1

Step 2a: determine the maximin strategy of the row player. To do this, highlight the
worst payoff in each row. Among the highlighted payoff values of the row player,
determine the maximum. The strategy corresponding to this maximum value is the
maximin strategy of the row player

- Taking it easy is the maximin strategy for you (row player)

Step 2b: determine the maximin strategy of the column player. to do this, highlight
the worst payoff in each column. Along the highlighted payoff values of the column
player, determine the maximum. the strategy corresponding to this maximin value is
the maximin strategy of the column player

- Taking it easy is the maximin strategy for classmate (column player)

Step 3: if both players have a maximin strategy, then the game has a maximin
solution. We write it as an ordered pair (A,B) where A and B are the maximin
strategies of the row and column plater, respectively
 For the working on a project game, the maximin solution is (take it easy, take
it easy). This solution leads to the payoff pair (1,1)
Example 6: maximin strategy
Battle of the sexes: suppose, on a given night, a husband can either watch a sports program or a
TV series. The husband prefers the sprots program while his wife prefers the TV series. The
worst possible thing to happen would be to have an argument and not watch together, or at all.
What should the husband do? Determine the maximin solution of this game.
Let S= watch sports program
Let T= watch TV series

Wife
S T
Husband S (2,1) (0,0)
T (0,0) (1,2)

Since at least one of the players (husband or wife) does not have a maximin strategy,
the batter of the sexes game does not have a maximin solution

Equal worst payoffs, therefore no maximin strategy for the husband

Exercise: maximin strategy

Determine the maximin solution of the Prisoner’s dilemma game, if it exists.

Therefore, there maximin solution is (confess, confess) with payoff (-10,-10)

Nash equilibrium
- A Nash equilibrium is a strategy for each player such that every player’s action is the
best response to the other players’ actions
- Each player is using his best response in the game. So, switching into another strategy
would result into a lower payoff
- In other words, no player can reach a better payoff by changing strategies
 This solution concept was named after John Forbes Nash, Jr. His theories are used in
economics, and in fact he won the Nobel prize for economic sciences in 1994

Example 7: Nash equilibrium

Let us consider again the normal form of the working on a project game. Determine any Nash
equilibrium of this game

Steps to determine the Nash equilibrium

1. Determine the best response of the row player to every strategy of the column
player. To do this, underline the highest payoff value among the first
coordinates of the ordered pairs in each column. If there are ties, underline all
2. Determine the best response of the column player to every strategy of the row
player. To do this, underline the highest payoff value among the second
coordinates of the ordered pairs in each row. If there are ties, underline all
3. If there are ordered pairs with both coordinates underlined, then the game
has a Nash equilibrium

Column player= first component (X,?)

Row player= second component (?, X)

Column
 Between 2 and 3, 3 is higher
  Between 0 and 1, 1 is higher

Row
 Between 2 and 3, 3 is higher
 Between 0 and 1, 1 is higher

Thus:

If there are ordered pairs that are both highlighted, then the game has a Nash
equilibrium
 Since both numbers are highlighted, (1,1) is the Nash equilibrium
 For this game, the maximin strategy and the Mash equilibrium coincides
 The Nash equilibrium is (take it easy, take it easy)

Example 8: Nash equilibrium

Let us consider again the normal form of the Baller of the Sexes game. Determine any Nash
Equilibrium of this game

***yellow= column
***blue= row
 (S,S) and (T,T) are both Nash equilibrium
Exercise: Nash equilibrium
Consider again the normal form of the Prisoner’s dilemma game. Determine any Nash
Equilibrium
Player 2
C R
Player 1 C (-10,-10) (-1,-25)
R (-25,-1) (-3,-3)

 Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is (confess, confess) with payoff (-10,-10)

Sometimes the result of the maximin solution to Nash equilibrium are the same, sometimes
they don’t

Dominating vs. dominant strategy

- Situation:
o Suppose you are the class advisor of an honors’ class, and you are asked to send
a representative for general information quiz bee
Below are your candidates and their performance per subject:

 Does Anna “dominate” Belle? (is Anna “dominating” Belle?)

 Just by looking, we notice that Anna has better grades than Belle
in most subjects
 Anna dominates Belle
 Is Cathy “dominated by” Anna?
 Anna scores higher in all the 5 subjects, except Chemistry, where
they are tied
 Anna dominates Cathy
 Is Anna “dominant”?
 Since Anna dominates both Belle and Cathy
 Anna is dominant
 If you are the adviser, who will you send as representative?
 It would be best to send Anna
- Suppose that A and B are strategies of the row/ column player. We say that “A is
dominating B” or “B is dominated by A” if it outperforms B regardless of the strategies
chosen by the opposing player/s
o Basically: B gets a better payoff than A
 - We say that A is a dominant strategy of the row/ column player if it is dominating all the
other strategies of the row/ column player

Example 9: dominant strategy

Consider the following normal form of a game. Determine any dominant strategy for both
players

 Strategies for player 1= A1, A2, A3

 Strategies for player 2= B1, B2, B3, B4
Row player= first components
Column player= second components

Step 1: separating the payoff values of the row and column players

- For the row player (player 1), A3 is dominating A1 and A2. Thus, A3 is a dominant
strategy of the row player.
o A2 is dominating A1 but does not dominate A3. Hence, A2 is not a dominant
strategy of the row player
o Thus, the row player has a dominant strategy
 - For the column player (player 2), B2 is dominating B1, and B3 is also dominating B1.
However, neither of them is a dominant strategy because they don’t dominate all the
other strategies.
o Thus, the column player does not have a dominate strategies

Example 10: dominant strategy

Consider the following game in normal form. Determine if there are any dominant strategy for
player

- Kiko’s payoff values:

o Hence, Kiko’s dominant strategy is B

- April’s payoff values:

o Hence, April’s dominant strategy is F

Dominant strategy equilibrium

A game in normal form has a dominant strategy equilibrium if both players have dominant
strategies
Example 11: dominant strategy equilibrium
With reference to Example 10, the dominant strategy equilibrium of the game is (B,F)