RELIABILITY AND INSPECTION MODELING OF

RAILWAY SIGNALING SYSTEM

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF

MECHANICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

by

NIKESH KUMAR

Roll Number M4MEC12-05(Examination)

Under the Guidance of

Dr. Subhash Chandra Panja

Faculty of Engineering and Technology

Department of Mechanical Engineering

Jadavpur University

Kolkata (W.B.) -700032

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY AND COMPLIANCE OF
ACADEMIC ETHICS

I hereby declare that this thesis contains literature survey and original research
work by the undersigned candidate, as part of his Master of Mechanical
Engineering studies.

All information in this document have been obtained and presented in

accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct.

I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and
referred all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name Nikesh Kumar

Roll Number M4MEC12-05(Examination)

Thesis Title “Reliability and inspection modeling of railway signaling system”

Signature

Date
 Faculty of Engineering and Technology
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Jadavpur University
Kolkata-700032

We here by recommend the thesis entitled “Reliability and inspection modeling

of railway signaling system ” by Nikesh Kumar, a student of ME second year, has
been evaluated by us and found satisfactory. It is, therefore, be accepted in
partial fulfilment of the requirement for Master of Engineering in mechanical
engineering, Jadavpur University.

Countersigned

____________________________
Thesis Advisor
____________________________________

Head of Department, Mechanical Engineering

______________________________________
Dean of Faculty of Engineering and Technology
 Faculty of Engineering and Technology
Department Mechanical Engineering
Jadavpur University
Kolkata-700032

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

The foregoing thesis entitled “Reliability and inspection modeling of railway

signaling system ” hereby as a creditable study in the area of production engineering

carried out and presented by Nikesh kumar in a manner of satisfactory to warrant its

acceptance as a prerequisite to the degree for which it has been submitted. It is

notified to be understood that by this approval, the undersigned do not necessarily

endorse or approve any statement made, opinion expressed and conclusion drawn

therein but approve the thesis only for the purpose for which it has been submitted.

Final Examination for Evaluation of Thesis.

Board of Members:

_____________________ _____________________

_____________________ _____________________

_____________________ _____________________

*Only in case this thesis recommendation is concurred in.

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis entitled of” is “ RELIABILITY AND INSPECTION MODELING OF RAILWAY

SIGNALING SYSTEM” by far the most significant scientific accomplishment in my life and
it would be impossible without people who supported me and believed me.

I would like to take the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to my

project supervisors, Dr. Subhash Chandra Panja, Mechanical Engineering Department,
Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India for their valuable advice, resourceful guidance, inspiring
instructions, active supervision and constant encouragement without which it would not be
possible to give this thesis in shape.

I am also thankful to the H.O.D for rendering their sincere help during all my investigating
procedure.

I am also thankful to my all respected teachers, and all the faculty members of Mechanical
Engineering Department, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India for their guidance and valuable
suggestions.

I am also thankful to research scholars, library staffs, laboratory staffs and my

friends for their valuable help and cooperation.

I would like to thank all my friends, seniors and juniors who directly or
indirectly help me to prepare this thesis work.

I would also like to grab this opportunity to express my heart-felt gratitude to

my parents, brothers whose suggestions and helping attitudes helped my way out to
the timely completion of the thesis.

Nikesh Kumar
Examination Roll No.

i
 ABSTRACT

Being an integral part of railways, signaling system plays an important role for safe running of

trains. As most of its subsystem and components are working in open atmospheres, its operations

are sometimes very difficult to monitor. In this context, proper and efficient maintenance

activities can be useful to its effective operation. This thesis seeks to study the reliability,

availability and maintainability of a signaling system with failure and repair data by Markov

modeling. The signaling system is classified in different subsystems like track circuit, signal unit

and point and point machine. Then reliability and maintainability of every sub systems are

evaluated and graph is plotted for different time intervals. Moreover, maintenance intervals at

different reliability values are also evaluated. Steady state reliability of different subsystems are

also estimated. Three railway subsystems and their reliability patterns are plotted for different

time intervals. Further, Inspection interval of different signaling subsystem is calculated to get

optimum inspection interval with the help of different inspection policies so that rail

maintenance cost can be decreased and also danger of accidents can be reduced.

Keywords: Reliability, availability, maintainability, Markov model, inspection models, railway

signaling system,

ii
 Contents
PAGE NO.

Acknowledgment i

Abstract ii

List of figures v

List of tables vi

Nomenclature vii

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Problem and Research Issues 6

1.3 Objective of Study 7

1.4 Organization of Thesis 8

Chapter 2: Indian Railways and Signaling System

2.1 Introduction 10

2.2 Overview of Indian Railways 10

2.3 Overview of Signaling System 12

2.4 Track Circuit 14

2.5 Point Mechanism 15

2.6 Signal Unit 17

2.7 Conclusion 18

Chapter 3: Literature Survey

3.1 Introduction 19

3.2 Reliability Models 19

iii
 3.3 Maintenance Models 21

3.4 Inspection Models 32

3.5 Conclusion 33

Chapter 4: RAM Modeling of Different Signaling Sub-Systems.

4.1 Introduction 34

4.2 Markov Process 35

4.3 Results and Discussion 42

4.4 Conclusion 47

Chapter 5: Inspection Policies

5.1 Introduction 49

5.2 Inspection Models 49

5.2.1 Model 1 52

5.2.2 Model 2 52

5.2.3 Model 3 54

5.3 Relation Between Reliability and Inspection 56

5.4 Results and Discussion 57

5.5 Conclusion 59

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future scope

6.1 Concluding Remarks 60

6.2 Future Scope of the Work 61

References 62

iv
 List of Figures

Figure Page no

Figure 1: Schematic diagram of track circuit 14

Figure 2: Schematic diagram of point mechanism 16

Figure 3: Schematic diagram of signal unit 17

Figure 4: Framework for reliability modelling by markov process 37

Figure 5: Transition diagram for signaling system and subsystems 38

Figure 6: Reliability pattern of different signaling subsystems 43

Figure 7: Maintainability pattern of signaling subsystems 44

Figure.8: Expected reliability for different time interval (h) 46

Figure 9: Framework of inspection model 51

Figure 10: Reliability based inspection interval graph 57

v
 List of Tables

TABLE PAGE NO

1. Repair rate and failure rate of different signaling subsystem 42

2. Reliability of different signaling subsystem for different time interval 43

3. Maintainability of three signaling subsystems 44

4. Expected reliability for different maintenance interval 46

5. Number of inspections of different signaling subsystems by model 58

6. Numbers of inspections of different signaling subsystems by model 2 59

vi
 NOMENCLATURE

SYMBOLS REPRESENTATIONS

C a constant associated with a particular facility

Tb facility downtime per breakdown or failure

Ti facility downtime per inspection

YI no of inspection per unit of time

DTr equipment/ facility downtime due to per unit of time repairs

DTi equipment/ facility downtime due to per unit of time inspection

N inspection frequency

λ(n) equipment/ facility failure rate

μ equipment/ facility repair rate

1/θ mean of exponentially distributed inspection time

N number of inspections performed per unit of time

P profit at no downtime losses

Ci average inspection cost per uninterrupted unit of time

Cr average cost of repairs per uninterrupted unit of time

λ equipment failure rate

μ equipment repair rate

vii
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Signaling system is an integral part of Indian railways so it should be very reliable and should be

maintained effectively and efficiently. This thesis seeks to study the reliability, availability and

maintainability of a signaling system with failure and repair data. In this thesis we classified the

signaling system in different sub systems like track circuit, signal unit and point and point

machine then reliability and maintainability of every sub systems are evaluated and graph is

plotted for different time interval. We also got from the experiments that for certain amount of

reliability what should be the maintenance interval. Reliability of different subsystems and

steady state reliability of different subsystems is calculated with the help of Markov chain

process so that rail maintenance cost can be decreased and also danger of accidents can be

reduced. These subsystems can be brought back into serviceable condition after repair or

replacement. It is interesting to note that the failure of subsystems and their units can never be

predicted precisely as they depend upon the operating conditions, environment, and repair policy

used. Again, the performance/ effectiveness of an signaling systems depends on the reliability,

availability and maintainability characteristics of subsystems, maintenance efficiency, operation

process and the technical expertise of the worker etc. Availability is a function of reliability and

maintainability. The return on investment on a piece of equipment can be maximized by

optimizing its availability. Information on system behavior and failure modes is extremely

1
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

important for taking decisions on maintenance strategy or action. So measuring the effectiveness

of a signaling system using reliability modeling and performance analysis by Markov modeling

appears to be appropriate. The reliability of the Signaling system is analyzed based on a five and

half -year failure database. Such reliability has been estimated by selecting Proper model and

different models for repairable system analysis are discussed. The reliability estimation by using

non homogeneous process and homogenous renewal Process are explained. Reliability Pattern at

different Operating interval was drawn and the behavior was analyzed. The behavior shows

abnormality in some component level. Finally Reliability Pattern at system level was analyzed

by the reliability pattern at different operating interval. All the units showed consistent reliability

improvement in different operating intervals. In any real-life situation, the operation of a

repairable system, consisting of a number of subsystems and components, is affected by a

number of factors, such as their configuration, intensity of use, maintenance and repair, and

environmental stress. Any user of such a system is typically interested in the analysis of

performance of the components, and/or subsystems so as to suggest methods of improving

system utilization with reduced risk and maintenance cost. The traditional approach for

addressing this objective is to monitor the operation of components and subsystems through their

degradation states. This thesis deals with RAM modeling and performance analysis of signaling

system failure and repair data analysis using a Markov model. Appropriate conclusions have

been drawn on the basis of this analysis. Reliability, Maintainability, Availability Modeling of

Different Signaling Subsystems is done with the help of Markov process. Reliability block

diagram (RBD) of the Signaling system has been developed. Markov’s transition diagram has

been presented, making some assumptions. From the transition diagram state transition linear

2
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

differential equations are derived for the Markov process and then the steady state performance

of Signaling system has been discussed. Again special attention in relation to maintenance and

inspection activities and logistics support is taken to improve the reliability and maintainability

of signaling subsystems and system. It is extremely important to avoid failure during actual

operation because it can be dangerous and disastrous. Therefore inspection on them is necessary

since it can improve reliability, therefore inspection interval and maintenance interval of

different signaling subsystems is calculated to improve its reliability.

Some terms are following which is being used in the present thesis.

Failure rate: It is the frequency with which an engineered system or component fails, expressed

for example in failures per hour. It is often denoted by the λ (lambda) and is important in

reliability engineering. The failure rate of a system usually depends on time, with the rate

varying over the life cycle of the system. In practice, the mean time between failures (MTBF,

1/λ) is often reported instead of the failure rate. This is valid and useful if the failure rate may be

assumed constant - often used for complex units / systems, electronics - and is a general

agreement in some reliability standards (Military and Aerospace). It does in this case only relate

to the flat region of the bathtub curve, also called the "useful life period". The reason of the

preferred use for MTBF numbers is that the use of large positive numbers (like 150.000 hours) is

more intuitive and easier to remember than very small numbers (like 1.3e-4 per hour). The

MTBF is an important system parameter in systems where failure rate needs to be managed, in

particular for safety systems. The MTBF appears frequently in the engineering design

requirements, and governs frequency of required system maintenance and inspections. In special

processes called renewal processes, where the time to recover from failure can be neglected and

3
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

the likelihood of failure remains constant with respect to time, the failure rate is simply the

multiplicative inverse of the MTBF (1/λ).

Signal: A signal is a mechanical or electrical device erected beside a railway line to pass

information relating to the state of the line ahead to train. The driver interprets the signal's

indication and acts accordingly. Typically, a signal might inform the driver of the speed at which

the train may safely proceed or it may instruct the driver to stop.

Reliability: The ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under stated

conditions for a specified period of time. Reliability Engineering is a sub-discipline within

Systems Engineering. Reliability is often measured as probability of failure, frequency of

failures, or in terms of availability, a probability derived from reliability and maintainability.

Maintainability and maintenance are often important parts of reliability engineering. Reliability

engineering is closely related to safety engineering, in that they use common methods for their

analysis and may require input from each other. Reliability engineering focuses on costs of

failure caused by system downtime, cost of spares, repair equipment, personnel and cost of

warranty claims. The focus of safety engineering is normally not on cost, but on preserving life

and nature, and therefore deals only with particular dangerous system failure modes. Reliability

engineering for complex systems requires a different, more elaborate systems approach, than

reliability for non-complex systems. Reliability analysis has important links with function

analysis, requirements specification, systems design, hardware design, software design,

4
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

manufacturing, testing, maintenance, transport, storage, spare parts, operations research, human

factors, technical documentation, training and more. Effective reliability engineering requires

experience, broad engineering skills, and knowledge from many different fields of engineering.

Maintainability: It is the ease with which a product can be maintained in order to: isolate defects

or their cause correct defects or their cause, meet new requirements make future maintenance

easier, or cope with a changed environment. In some cases, maintainability involves a system of

continuous improvement - learning from the past in order to improve the ability to maintain

systems, or improve reliability of systems based on maintenance experience. In

telecommunication and several other engineering fields, the term maintainability has the

following meanings: A characteristic of design and installation, expressed as the probability that

an item will be retained in or restored to a specified condition within a given period of time,

when the maintenance is performed in accordance with prescribed procedures and resources. The

ease with which maintenance of a functional unit can be performed in accordance with

prescribed requirements.

Availability: The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is in a specified operable

and committable state at the start of a mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e.,

a random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time a system is in a functioning

condition. This is often described as a mission capable rate. Mathematically, this is expressed as

1 minus unavailability. The ratio of (a) the total time a functional unit is capable of being used

during a given interval to (b) the length of the interval. The most simple representation for

availability is as a ratio of the expected value of the uptime of a system to the aggregate of the

expected values of up and down time, or

5
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

If we define the status function as

Therefore, the availability A(t) at time t>0 is represented by

Average availability must be defined on an interval of the real line. If we consider an arbitrary

constant , then average availability is represented as

Limiting (or steady-state) availability is represented by

Limiting average availability is also defined on an interval as,

6
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

1.2 Problem and Research Issues

Railway signaling system is the measure part of railways, so it was the part of research from

many years. Many work has been done in this field for the safety and maintenance of railway

signaling system. Degradation of signaling system is due to many reasons.

Degradation of a subsystem or a component may be reduced by two types of actions, viz. repair

and major overhaul. In view of this observation, a repairable system may have two kinds of

states: (i) operating state (or ‘up’ condition), and (ii) maintenance state (or ‘down’ condition,

either corrective or preventive type). While a component or subsystem runs its several states, the

current state of the system may not be same as its original in the beginning. When such a system

fails, the repair work, carried out to restore the system back to its state just before the occurrence

of its failure, is minimum. As the frequency of failure of subsystems and/or components

increases over time, a corrective maintenance action is performed to improve the conditions of

subsystems and components, thereby reducing the probability of failure in subsequent time-

interval. As a repairable system goes through different phases of its bathtub curve (infant

mortality phase, useful life phase, and burn-in phase), it is necessary to adequately model the

reliability of a system in terms of variations and heterogeneity in failure rates of the components

and their impact on the operation of the system. The use of such a reliability model would help

an analyst identify the problem causes and suggest remedial measures so as to continually

improve its reliability. This would in effect ensure a consistent performance of the system as a

whole. A study, therefore, was conducted for analysis reliability, availability and maintainability

(RAM) of signaling system and improvement of it by proper inspections.

7
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

1.3 Objective of study

The objectives of present study are set as follows:

1 To estimate reliability and maintainability pattern of different signaling subsystems at

different time intervals and

2 To model the optimum inspection intervals of different signaling subsystems.

1.3 Organization of thesis

The objective of the present investigation is set as enumerated below

Chapter1: In this chapter Indian railway, signaling system is introduced. Reliability,

maintainability, availability and other terms are defined which is used in this paper. After this

Objectives of present work is discussed and on this basis organization of thesis is done.

Chapter 2: In the chapter 2 Indian railways, signaling system is overviewed. Here Signaling

system is divided in three signaling subsystems Viz Track circuit, Signal unit, Point –and-Point

mechanism and functions, importance of every subsystem is discussed.

Chapter 3: Rail is playing a very important role in the transportation hence work is being done

in this field from many years. Many research works has been done to improve working of

signaling systems to make it more reliable. Therefore in this chapter Literature survey is done.

Literature survey is categorized in three parts: Reliability model, Inspection model and

Maintenance model.

8
 Chapter1 [Introduction]

Each model is discussed the different work done by different researchers.

Chapter 4: In this chapter Reliability, Maintainability, Availability Modeling of Different

Signaling Subsystems is done with the help of Markov process. In this section a reliability

block diagram (RBD) of the Signaling system has been developed. Markov’s transition diagram

has been presented, making some assumptions. From the transition diagram state transition linear

differential equations are derived for the Markov process and then the steady state performance

of Signaling system has been discussed. Reliability block diagram (RBD) of the Signaling

system for reliability modeling and performance analysis is constructed. It is a graphical

representation of the components of the system from a reliability viewpoint. With the help of

repair and failure rate data’s, then graph of reliability, maintainability is plotted with respect to

time interval and finally expected reliability for different maintenance interval is calculated and

graph is plotted between expected reliability and different maintenance interval.

Chapter 5: In this chapter inspection policies are discussed. Relation between reliability and

inspection intervals is discussed. Three inspections model is discussed to get the optimum

inspection interval for different signaling subsystems. From each model inspection interval of

different signaling system is calculate and discussed.

Chapter 6: Finally in this chapter conclusion of all the five chapters is summarized and future

scope of work is discussed.

9
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

CHAPTER 2: INDIAN RAILWAYS AND SIGNALING SYSTEM

2.1 Introduction

Indian Railways (IR) is the central government-owned railway company of India, which owns

and operates most of the country's rail transport. It is overseen by the Ministry of Railways of the

Government of India. Indian Railways has more than 64,215 kilometers of track and 7,083

stations. It has the world's fourth largest railway network after those of the United States, Russia

and China.

2.2 Overview of Indian Railways

The railways traverse the length and breadth of the country and carry over 30 million passengers

and 2.8 million tons of freight daily. It is one of the world's largest commercial or utility

employers, with more than 1.6 million employees. Outdated communication, safety and

signaling equipment, which used to contribute to failures in the system, is being updated with the

latest technology. A number of train accidents happened on account of a system of manual

signals between stations, so automated signaling is getting a boost at considerable expense. It is

felt that this would be required given the gradual increase in train speeds and lengths, that would

tend to make accidents more dangerous. In the latest instances of signaling control by means of

interlinked stations, failure-detection circuits are provided for each track circuit and signal circuit

with notification to the signal control centers in case of problems. Though currently available

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Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

only in a small subset of the overall IR system, anti-collision devices are to be extended to the

entire system. Aging colonial-era bridges and century-old tracks also require regular

maintenance and upgrading. Comparison of different gauges common in India with the standard

one, which is not common in India. The fastest trains of Indian Railways face competition from

low-cost airlines since they run at a maximum speed of only 150 kilometers per hour (93 mph).

At least six corridors are under consideration for the introduction of high speed trains to India

with expert assistance from France and Japan.IR is in the process of upgrading stations, coaches,

tracks, services, safety, and security, and streamlining its various software management systems

including crew scheduling, freight, and passenger ticketing. Crew members will be able to log in

using biometric scanners at kiosks while passengers can avail themselves of online booking.

Initially, various upgrade and overhaul work will be performed at more than five hundred

stations, some of it by private contract. All meter gauge lines in the country will be converted to

broad gauge). New stainless steel coaches, manufactured in India, have been installed in

Rajdhani and Shatabdi express trains. These coaches enhance the safety and riding comfort of

passengers besides having more carrying capacity, and in time will replace thousands of old

model coaches throughout Indian Railways. More durable and conforming polyurethane paint is

now being used to enhance the quality of rakes and significantly reduce the cost of repainting.

Improved ventilation and illumination are part of the new scheme of things, along with the

decision to install air brake systems on all coaches. New manufacturing units are being set up to

produce state-of-the-art locomotives and coaches. IR is also expanding its telemedicine network

facilities to further give its employees in far-flung and remote areas access to specialized

medicine. IR has also piloted Internet connectivity on the Mumbai-Ahmadabad Shatabdi

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Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

Express. It is estimated that modernization of IR and bringing it up to international standards

would require 280 billion in new upgrades and investment from 2010 to 020.Sanitation in trains

and stations throughout the system is getting more attention with the introduction of eco-friendly,

discharge-free, green (or bio-) toilets. Updated eco-friendly refrigerant is being used in AC

systems while fire detection systems will be installed on trains in a phased manner. New rodent-

control and cleanliness procedures are working their way into the many zones of IR. Central

Railway's 'Operation Saturday' is gradually making progress, station by station, in the cleanup of

its Mumbai division.

2.3 Overview of signaling systems

A signal is a mechanical or electrical device erected beside a railway line to pass information

relating to the state of the line ahead to train. The driver interprets the signal's indication and acts

accordingly. Typically, a signal might inform the driver of the speed at which the train may

safely proceed or it may instruct the driver to stop.

Signals are used to indicate one or more of the following:

1. That the line ahead is clear (free of any obstruction) or blocked.

2. That the driver has permission to proceed.

3. Which way points are set.

4. The speed the train may travel.

5. The state of the next signal.

6. That the train orders are to be picked up by the crew.

12
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

Different types of signals are explained as follows. Semaphore signals were patented in the early

1840s by Joseph James Stevens, and soon became the most widely-used form of mechanical

signal, although they are now decreasing in number. The semaphore arm consists of two parts:

An arm or blade which pivots at different angles, and spectacles holding colored lenses which

move in front of a lamp in order to provide indications at night. Usually these were combined

into a single frame, though in some types (e.g. "somersault" signals in which the arm pivoted in

the centre), the arm was separate from the spectacle. The arm projects horizontally in its most

restrictive aspect; other angles indicate less restrictive aspects. A position light signal is one

where the position of the lights, rather than their color, determines the meaning. The aspect

consists solely of a pattern of illuminated lights, which are all of the same color. In many

countries, small position light signals are used as shunting signals, while the main signals are of

color light form. Also, many tramway systems use position light signals.

Searchlight signals were the most often used signal type in the U.S until recently, although these

have become less popular due to vandalism. In these, a single incandescent light bulb is used in

each head, and either an A.C. or D.C. delay mechanism is used to move a colored spectacle in

front of the lamp. In this manner, gravity (fail safe) returns the red roundel into the lamp's optical

path. It is observed that point and point machine, signal unit and track circuit are the critical

subsystems of railway signaling system. Keeping this in mind, in this paper three subsystems of

signaling system is taken for the analysis of signaling system and reliability, maintainability and

availability of signaling system and subsystems are determined with the help of Markov chain

process for getting the optimal reliability and maintainability of signaling system. Different

components of signaling system. 1. Track circuit, 2. Point and point machine., 3. Signal unit.

13
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

2.4. Track circuit

One of the most common ways to determine whether a section of line is occupied is by use of

this.

Figure1: Schematic diagram of track circuit

14
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

The rails at either end of each section are electrically isolated from the next section, and an

electrical current is fed to both running rails at one end. A relay at the other end is connected to

both rails. When the section is unoccupied; the relay coil completes an electrical circuit, and is

energized. However, when a train enters the section, it short-circuits the current in the rails, and

the relay is de-energized. This method does not explicitly need to check that the entire train has

left the section. If part of the train is left in the section, that part will continue to be detected by

the track circuit.

2.5. Point mechanism

Approximately 55% of railway infrastructure component failures on high speed lines are due to

signaling equipment and turnouts. ‘Signaling equipment’ covers signals, track circuits,

interlocking, automatic train protection (ATP) or LZB (track loop-based ATP), and the traffic

control centre. From another point of view, the annual cost of maintaining points is rather high

compared to other infrastructure elements, about 3.4 million UKP (United Kingdom Pound) per

year for about 1000 km of railway. TC-TCR trade circuits, for example, cost 2.1 million UKP

per year for the same area. Of the points expenditure, 1.2 million UKP is for clamp lock type

(hydraulic) turnout and 1.4 UKP million for electrically operated turnouts (data provided by a

British asset manager). Turnouts can also be used to implement flank protection for a train route

allocated to another train. This is achieved by positioning the blades of the turnout in such a way

that a train driving through the turnout is not directed into a track segment belonging to the route

of another train. Most standard point machines contain a switch actuating and a locking

mechanism which includes a hand-throw lever and a selector lever to allow operation by power

15
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

or hand. The mechanism is normally divided into three major subsystems: (i) the motor unit

which may include a contactor control arrangement and a terminal area; (ii) a gearbox

comprising spur-gears and a worm reduction unit with overload clutch; and (iii) the dual control

mechanism as well as a controller subsystem with motor cut-off and detection contacts.

Generally, there are also mechanical linkages for the detection and locking of the point. The

standard railway point is, therefore, a complex electro-mechanical device with many potential

failure modes machine housing.

Figure 2: Schematic diagram of point mechanism.

16
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

The current transformers are toroidal coils through which the common return wire from the

motor passes. The force in the drive bar is measured with a load pin. This is inserted in place of

the bolted connection between the drive bar and the drive rod. This component carries Railtrack

approval and can thus be used on points, which are in service.

2.6 SIGNAL UNIT:

It consists of one arm, red and green glasses, crank rod etc which is used for proper guiding of

trains on the tracks [Figure 3] .A signal helps to inform the driver about the speed at which the

train may safely proceed or it may instruct the driver to

stop.

Figure3: Schematic diagram of signal unit.

17
Chapter 2 [Indian railways and signaling system]

2.7 Conclusion

From above discussion it is clear that Track circuit, Signal unit, Point and Point mechanism are
the measure part of signaling system and hence we will consider three subsystems of signaling
system for our present thesis.

18
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE SURVEY

3.1 Introduction

Rail is playing a very important role in the transportation hence work is being done in this field

from many years. Many research work has been done to improve working of signaling systems

to make it more reliable, to decrease maintenance cost, to make its working fast so that accidents

and other things can be stop by minimum effort .

3.2 Reliability model

Carretero et.al [2003] studied the Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) approach for the

infrastructure and logistics of railway operation’ aimed to study the application of Reliability

centered maintenance techniques to the railway infrastructure. In this RCM was applied to large

scale railway infrastructure networks for achieving an efficient and effective maintenance

concept. First, technical insights obtained were better than the existing, so that several

maintenance processes could be revised and adjusted. Second, the interdisciplinary approach

used to make the analysis was very enriching and very encouraging for maintenance staff

consulted. Third, using the RCM structured approach allowed to achieve well-documented

analysis and clear decision diagrams. Our methodology includes some new features to overcome

the problems of RCM observed in other projects. As a whole, our methodology and

Computerized Maintenance Management Systems have produced better collection of

information. It will also have some long-term benefits: better PM will increase equipment life

and will help to reduce corrective maintenance costs; Production will increase as unscheduled

19
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

downtime decreases; purchase costs of parts and materials will be reduced; more effective and

up-to-date record of inventory/stores reports; and better knowledge of the systems to help the

company to chose those systems with the best LCC.

Vormen et.al [2004] described to increase the reliability to reduce the propagation of delays due

to the interdependencies between trains. By reducing the runtime differences per track section

and by thus creating more homogeneous time.

Vanderhaegen [2000] described a method to analyze human reliability. which aims at

identifying both tolerable and intolerable sets of human behavioral degradations, which may

affect the system safety. System development methods are usually studied for two life-cycle

steps: a design related step and an operation related step. Those steps take into account the

results of Probabilistic Risk Assessment methods to determine acceptable and unacceptable risks

and to find solutions in order to eliminate or reduce them. Generally, they are Probabilistic

Safety Assessment methods because risk analysis concerns system safety. Nevertheless, those

methods do usually not integrate explicitly the possibility to use both human and machine

together to guarantee the system safety. Unfortunately, human–machine interaction may also be

the cause of incidents or accidents. Therefore, safety analysis has to focus not only on machine

centered analyses but also on human centered analyses. This focuses on Human Reliability

Assessment or Analysis methods which integrate human factors on safety analysis, and which

may be used as a prospective analysis during the design step or as a retrospective analysis during

the operation step of the life-cycle. Both prospective and retrospective analyses may guide the

design of tolerant and robust operational systems: a robust system is a system on which human

error occurrence is impossible or limited during operations, whereas a tolerant system uses

20
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

operational means to recover from human errors that may occur during operations. When human

errors are interpreted in terms of a degradation function, a given task may cause the degradation

of another task or the degradation of the controlled system state. Degradations are deviations,

which have negative consequences for either the human behavior or the system state. They

usually focus on system safety. Two sets of degradations may occur: the set of tolerable

degradations, and the set of intolerable degradations. The notion of severity of degradation can

then be introduced. Even if risk is defined as the combination of the probability of the occurrence

of a degraded event and the consequences of this event, the use of probabilities is often

inefficient because of the inter-variability and intra-variability of human behavior.

3.3 Maintenance model

A.Carrarini (2004) used to assess the crosswind stability of railway vehicles by multimode

simulation (MBS) are affected by large uncertainties. Especially, the aerodynamic loads acting

on the vehicle are difficult to model and the respective parameters cannot be easily acquired.

Such uncertainties are usually neglected in the safety norms even though their effects on the risk

assessment can be very large. In this paper the problem is tackled by modeling the most

influential but uncertain parameters as stochastic variables. The resulting task can be efficiently

managed by reliability techniques, mainly inherited from structural mechanics. This finally leads

to the substitution of the conventional characteristic wind curve (CWC) by the probabilistic

characteristic wind curve (PCWC). The proposed approach is referred to the most recent

European norms for crosswind stability and exemplified on the test case of a German high speed

train (ICE2). According to the newly adopted European norm within the Technical

21
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

Specifications for Interoperability, CEN (2005), the safety proof is performed by means of

numerical simulation. This norm is referred to in what follows as ‘‘TSI norm’’. The use of

simulation is seen as the best compromise between accuracy and impossibility to perform on

track tests. Actually, tests are still the standard procedure for the homologation of railway

vehicles with respect to driving performances (steering behavior, comfort, etc.). But, in the case

of crosswind stability, many additional technical difficulties arise and the costs are definitively

not bearable. Crosswind test facilities for railway vehicles, similar to those used for cars, would

be very helpful but do not exist yet. However, the use of simulation is also very advantageous

because it allows safety proofs to be performed in early design phases, when no prototypes but

only virtual models are available. The simulation based approach requires a good, possibly

validated vehicle model to be available. This is usually not true, the main problem being not the

definition of the models topology and setup but the determination of numerical values for the

model parameters. Although the mechanical parameters—stiff nesses, damping ratios and even

masses—are also often known with poor accuracy, the main problem in the crosswind stability

proof lies in the aerodynamic sub model. The aerodynamic loads depend on the aerodynamic

properties of the vehicle, its instantaneous configuration (driving velocity, inclination in the

curve, etc.) and the wind scenario, which also includes the local aerographic effects. A large

bibliography exists on railway vehicle aerodynamics and many authors have stressed the

importance of a large number of factors, e.g. Baker and Humphreys (1996),Schetz (2001),

Bocciolone et al. (2003), Cheli et al. (2003) and Baker et al. (2004). Theeffects on the loads of

most of these factors, like turbulence intensity, wind velocity profile etc., are very difficult to

assess. Only effects directly related to known and immutable characteristics of the track, like

embankments or tunnels, are taken into account in the safety proof (Delaunay et al., 2003). In

22
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

practice, even if a complete and correct aerodynamic model of the vehicle could be finally

established, uncertainty would persist because the real conditions under which the vehicle drives

are very inhomogeneous in space and time and can only be roughly estimated.

Vinod chandra(2004) propose a Markov Reliability model for a transputer based fail safe and

fault tolerant node for use in a network of distributed safety critical railway signaling systems.

Using the Markov model we quantify the reliability and safety in terms of Probability of being in

unsafe state, Probability of Safe shutdown during the useful life period and last phase of bath-tub

curve. A fault analysis of the fail safe and fault tolerant node addressing Byzantine (malicious)

faults with an extension of Byzantine General's problem The reliability and safety of the node

depends on the failure rate of the components in use in the node. To quantify the reliability and

safety of the node, a Markov reliability model having finite number of states of the node has

been proposed. The node consists of four transputers and is based on a new technique of

leadership based on rotation described. The Markov chain contains both safe states and unsafe

(dangerous) states of the node. The transient and recurrent analysis of the Markov model is

described for a given component failure rate and fault recovery rate and the state transition

probability matrix quantifying the probability of being in unsafe state of the node and probability

of node failure has been obtained. The component failure rate follows a bath-tub curve with age

and the worst case probability of being in unsafe state, worst case probability of node failure,

mean time to failure (MTTF) of the node and the availability of the node is obtained.

A. Azadeh(2005) presents an integrated simulation, multivariate analysis and multiple decision

analysis for railway system improvement and optimization. Furthermore, the integrated model is

23
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) and analytical hierarchy process (AHP) that is

integrated with computer simulation . The integrated DEA and AHP simulation model can be

used for selecting optimum alternatives by considering multiple quantitative and qualitative

inputs and outputs. First, computer simulation is used to model verify and validate the system

being studied. Second, AHP methodology determines the weight of any qualitative criteria (input

or outputs). Finally, the DEA model is used to solve the multiobjective model to identify the best

alternative(s) and also to identify the mechanism to optimize current system. An 800-km train

route system was selected as the case of this study. Visual SLAM language was used to develop

the simulation model of the railway system. The objective of simulation model is to increase

reliability related to the time table of the passenger trains, to decrease average traverse time of

passenger trains and to decrease average traverse time of cargo trains. In addition, for

multivariate assessment of the alternatives by DEA, safety and cost factors are derived and

considered from an AHP analysis. Previous studies use simulation and DEA based on

quantitative variables for identification of the most efficient scenarios, while this study considers

both quantitative and qualitative variables for efficiency assessment and performance

optimization by integration of simulation, DEA and AHP. This is quite important for systems

where some of their performance measures are qualitative such as railway and production

systems .

Min An , Yao Chen(2010) studied the risk management which is becoming increasingly

important for railway companies in order to safeguard their passengers and employees while

improving safety and reducing maintenance costs. However, in many circumstances, the

application of probabilistic risk analysis tools may not give satisfactory results because the risk

data are incomplete or there is a high level of uncertainty involved in the risk data. This article

24
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

presents the development of a risk management system for railway risk analysis using fuzzy

reasoning approach and fuzzy analytical hierarchy decision making process. In the system, fuzzy

reasoning approach (FRA) is employed to estimate the risk level of each hazardous event in

terms of failure frequency, consequence severity and consequence probability. This allows

imprecision or approximate information in the risk analysis process. Fuzzy analytical hierarchy

process (fuzzy-AHP) technique is then incorporated into the risk model to use its advantage in

determining the relative importance of the risk contributions so that the risk assessment can be

progressed from hazardous event level to hazard group level and finally to railway system level.

This risk assessment system can evaluate both qualitative and quantitative risk data and

information associated with a railway system effectively and efficiently, which will provide

railway risk analysts, managers and engineers with a method and tool to improve their safety

management of railway systems and set safety standards.

Dong San Kim (2005) presents a computer-aided system for analyzing human error in railway

operations, called Computer-Aided System for Human Error Analysis and Reduction (CAS-

HEAR). It supports analysts to find multiple levels of error causes and their causal relations by

using predefined links between contextual factors and causal factors as well as links between

causal factors. In addition, it is based on a complete accident model; hence, it helps analysts to

conduct a thorough analysis without missing any important part of human error analysis. A

prototype of CAS-HEAR was evaluated by nine field investigators from six railway

organizations in Korea. Its overall usefulness in human error analysis was confirmed, although

development of its simplified version and some modification of the contextual factors and causal

factors are required in order to ensure its practical use.

25
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

Diego J. Pedregal (2006) studied a predictive maintenance system in point mechanism, called

RCM2, has been implemented for increasing the quality service. RCM2 is based on the

integration of the two other types of maintenance techniques, namely Reliability Centred

Maintenance (RCM1) and Remote Condition Monitoring (RCM2). The core of the system

consists of an Unobserved Components model set-up in a State Space framework, in which the

unknown elements of the system are estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The detection of faults

in the system is based on the correlation estimate between a curve free from faults (that is,

continuously updated as new curves are incorporated in the data base) with the current curve

data. If the correlation falls far from one, a fault is at hand. The detection system is tested on a

set of 476 experiments carried out by the Universities of Sheffield and Castilla-La Mancha.

Vojan Rozman(2003) describes an analysis of reliability of railway traffic personnel. The human

tasks critical to system safety are identified. Human error probability is chosen as a measure of

human reliability in performing these tasks. The probabilities of some critical errors are

estimated using the field data collected in the Slovenian railway traffic system. As stress

conditions strongly affect the human performance, a simple model of the dependence of human

error probability on stress levels is proposed . A railway traffic system (RTS) is a complex man-

machine system. Human unreliability can seriously affect system functioning. Therefore, an

investigation of possible human errors in the system is worthwhile. Human error in this context

means 'a failure on the part of the human to perform a prescribed act (or to perform a prohibited

act) within specified limits of accuracy, sequence, or time, which could result in damage to

equipment and property or disruption of scheduled operations'. 4 Each human action represents

26
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

an opportunity for human error. However, some actions are more error prone than others,

depending on task complexity and on stress conditions experienced by the human. In this paper

human errors affecting basic functions of RTS, i.e., 'the transportation of passengers and goods

from the initial location to the final location on a traffic line,' are considered. Traffic accidents

terminating the RTS basic function can be treated as system failures. Our study has been limited

to the analysis of human errors that may cause critical system failures. Three traffic accidents,

train collision, train impact and train derailment, have been identified as critical system failures

because they terminate the basic system function and may cause significant damage to

equipment or property and human injuries or death. In a study of the safety of the Slovenian RTS

5 this system has been represented by a railway cross consisting of seven traffic lines in total

length 566 km, with 97 stations, 1172 active points and 353 level crossings. Traffic lines are

equipped with traction and signaling/safety devices of different types. A fault tree analysis of

traffic accidents has shown that human errors are the most probable causes for critical system

failures. The following erroneous tasks of railway personnel have been found to be potential

causes of these failures.

Fernande Lamonde(2004) discusses the application of an ergonomic modeling approach to the

design of complex production systems. Specifically, in improving system reliability, certain

questions arise concerning the modeling and the designing of activity coordination of physically

isolated operators, whom either work in a centralized control room or in the field. The following

findings stem from an ergonomic study done in a Canadian railway company. The modeling of

cognitive activity of locomotive engineers in real work situations allowed the description of

natural coordination process between train crews and dispatchers. In addition, it revealed the role

27
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

of this process in railway system reliability and unreliability. Consequently, short-term and long-

term coordination design criteria were identified. It also raised pertinent methodological

questions about optimizing the reliability of any complex system based on a division of

responsibilities between physically isolated operators.

Enrico Zio (2006) modeled the railway network within a multi-state perspective in which each

rail section is treated as a component, which can stay in different discrete states representing the

speed values at which the section can be travelled, depending on the tracks degradation and on

the traffic conditions. The Monte Carlo method is used to simulate the complex stochastic

dynamics of such multi-state system. A prioritization of the rail sections based on importance

measures is then used to most effectively improve the performance of the rail network, in terms

of a decrease in the overall trains delay. High-importance sections, i.e. with highest impact on

the overall delay, are considered for a relaxation of their speed restrictions and the proposed

changes are then verified, from the risk-informed perspective, to have negligible impact on the

risk associated to the rail infrastructure. Operation and maintenance procedures in the railway

industry have been traditionally based on the knowledge and experience of each individual

company and applied with the primary goal of providing a high level of safety to the

infrastructures. Nowadays, the competition from other forms of transportation has forced the

railway industry to produce significant efforts for the application of reliability-based and risk-

informed approaches to maintenance optimization, with the aim of reducing operational

expenditures while maintaining high standards of safety. In risk-informed decision-making, a

key role is played by the importance measures (IMs), which provide information about the

importance of the components constituting a system with respect to its performance. This piece

28
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

of information can be of great practical aid to system designers and managers: the identification

of which components mostly determines the overall system performance allows tracing system

bottlenecks and provides guidelines for effective actions of system improvement. The risk-

informed decision-making process for system improvement can be generally thought of as a

three-stages procedure. First, a comprehensive, realistic model of the system behavior is built.

Then, IMs are computed and used to select the components to be prioritarily addressed for

effective system improvement. The final stage is the demonstration that the system improvement

proposed is actually acceptable from the risk-informed perspective, i.e. that the value of risk

associated to the system after the improvement is under control and in accordance with the safety

regulations.

Fabien Belmonte (2006) presents an application of functional resonance accident models

(FRAM) for the safety analysis of complex socio-technological systems, i.e. systems which

include not only technological, but also human and organizational components. The supervision

of certain industrial domains provides a good example of such systems, because although more

and more actions for piloting installations are now automatized, there always remains a decision

level (at least in the management of degraded modes) involving human behavior and

organizations. The field of application of the study presented here is railway traffic supervision,

using modern automatic train supervision (ATS) systems. Examples taken from railway traffic

supervision illustrate the principal advantage of FRAM in comparison to classical safety analysis

models, i.e. their ability to take into account technical as well as human and organizational

aspects within a single model, thus allowing a true multidisciplinary cooperation between

specialists from the different domains involved. A FRAM analysis is used to interpret

29
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

experimental results obtained from a real ATS system linked to a railway simulator that places

operators (experimental subjects) in simulated situations involving incidents. The first results

show a significant dispersion in performances among different operators when detecting

incidents. Some subsequent work in progress aims to make these ‘‘performance conditions’’

more homogeneous, mainly by ergonomic modifications. It is clear that the current human–

machine interface (HMI) in ATS systems has reached its limits and needs to be improved, for

example, by highlighting the most pertinent information for a given situation (and, conversely,

by removing irrelevant information likely to distract operators). it deals with industrial risks

assessment in complex socio-technical systems comprising a technical level (hardware and

software), a human level (maintenance agents, operators, designers) and an organizational level

(a set of rules and interactions governing the different actions that can be performed on the

system). Each one of these components could be addressed separately by adopting either a

machine-centered approach (or technical-centered approach) or a human-centered approach.

Instead, we propose to adopt a human–machine system (HMS) approach that considers these

separate levels in a systemic way. Paul Weston describes the development of a condition

monitoring system based on pattern recognition for detecting and diagnosing point machine

failures. It is shown that initially, when data is acquired from a point machine, it is difficult to

detect faults. However, upon the application of a moving average filter, fault conditions can be

more straightforwardly detected and diagnosed. Using data collected from a set of points under

test it is shown that all potentially tested failure modes can be successfully detected and

diagnosed. Railway operations have changed dramatically since the early 1990s, partly as a

result of new European Union Directives, and also with increasingly demanding performance

target. This subsequently applies to all railway subsystems. This paper focuses on infrastructure

30
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

components, in particular on points (or ‘turnouts’). The maintenance costs of railway

infrastructure generally outweigh the original installation cost, over its lifetime, by a factor of

two or three. Lifetime maintenance costs are particularly high for components such as points

containing moving mechanical parts.

Francesco Corman (2005) considers the bi-objective problem of minimizing train delays and

missed connections in order to provide a set of feasible non-dominated schedules to support this

decisional process. We use a detailed alternative graph model to ensure schedule feasibility and

develop two heuristic algorithms to compute the Pareto front of non-dominated schedules. Our

computational study, based on a complex and densely occupied Dutch railway network, shows

that good coordination of connected train services is important to achieve real-time efficiency of

railway services since the management of connections may heavily affect train punctuality. The

two algorithms approximate accurately the Pareto front in a limited computation time. Transfer

connections are relevant to the passenger satisfaction but do not affect the feasibility of railway

operations, therefore one of the possible dispatching countermeasures to reduce delay

propagation is the cancellation of some scheduled connections. This action reduces overall train

delays but causes an extra delay to the passengers affected by the missed connection. Train

operating companies are clearly also interested in keeping as many connections as possible even

in the presence of disturbed traffic conditions. In fact, dispatchers discuss with train operating

companies on which connections must be kept when regulating railway traffic. To support this

negotiation process, this paper deals with the Bi-objective conflict detection and resolution

(BCDR) problem of finding a set of feasible schedules with a good trade-off between the

minimization of train delays and the maximization of respected transfer connections. A feasible

31
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

schedule of the BCDR problem is nondominated if there is no other solution with a better value

of both objective functions.

D. Diamantidis (2010) illustrate the state-of-practice related to risk analysis of long railway

tunnels. First, ambitious tunnel projects are briefly reviewed. The applicable risk-analysis

procedures are then described and discussed. The problem of risk appraisal is addressed and

quantitative target safety levels are proposed. Safety systems for risk reduction are outlined.

3.4 Inspection model

Toula Onoufriou (2002) presented a brief retrospective of the development and application of

reliability-based techniques for assessment of complex structures with emphasis on inspection

optimization of offshore and bridge structures. An optimal reliability-based inspection program

is the key to optimize the lifetime maintenance cost while maintaining the safety and

serviceability of complex structures at acceptable levels. The experience of the two authors from

the two different fields, of offshore structures, first author, and highway bridges, second author,

is brought together in this paper, which examines the approaches adopted in each field, and the

reasons which influenced the way the methods have been developed and applied. The similarities

and differences between inspection optimizations for offshore and bridge structures are also

discussed.

32
Chapter 3 [Literature survey]

3.5 Conclusion

From above discussion we get that work is being done in this field from many years. Many

research works has been done to improve working of signaling systems to make it more reliable

Train delays and missed connections can be minimized by providing a set of feasible schedules

of maintenance to reliability of the signaling system. Maintenance costs of railway infrastructure

is very which can be reduced by proper inspection therefore failure rate, repair rate and repair

rate is calculated in present work and inspection optimization is also done.

33
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

CHAPTER4: RAM MODELING OF DIFFERENT SIGNALING SYSTEM

4.1 Introduction

RAM modeling can simulate the configuration, operation, failure, repair and maintenance of

equipment. The inputs to RAM modeling will include the physical components and maintenance

schedules in a system and the outputs can determine how productive the system can be over the

plant life. RAM studies will generate sufficient data to base decisions for possible systems

changes that may increase system efficiency and hence project profits. The application of

relatively inexpensive but powerful RAM forecasting tools can provide a number of benefits to

the Signaling system. RAM modeling assesses a production systems capabilities, whether it be

operation or still in design phase. The results from RAM modeling will identify possible causes

of production losses and can examine possible system alternatives. The application of relatively

inexpensive but powerful RAM forecasting tools can provide a number of benefits to the

Signaling system.

Those benefits can include:

 Reducing maintenance and sparing costs while maintaining and/or increasing production

levels.

 Optimizing capital investment for reducing the cost of production.

 Alignment of maintenance resources based on the criticality of equipment to production

revenue.

• Detecting failures in the early part of design;

• Optimizing maintenance schedules;

34
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

• Adequately allocating the spares inventory;

• Increasing the effectiveness of the signaling system.

4.2 Markov Process:

A Markov chain, named after Andrev Markov, is a mathematical System that undergoes

transitions from one state to another, between a finite or countable number of possible states. It is

a random process characterized as memory less. The next state depends only on the current state

and not on the sequence of events that preceded it. Markov model is a better technique that has

constant failure hazards and repair hazards. Modern probability theory studies chance processes

for which the knowledge of previous outcomes influences predictions for future experiments. In

principle, when a sequence of chance experiments, all of the past outcomes could influence the

predictions for the next experiment. In Markov chain type of chance, the outcome of a given

experiment can affect the outcome of the next experiment. The system state changes with time

and the state X and time t are two random variables. Each of these variables can be either

continuous or discrete. Various degradations on signaling system can be viewed as different

Markov states and further degradation can be treated as the outcome of the present state. The

signaling system is treated as a discrete state continuous time system with four possible

outcomes, namely, s1 : Good condition, s2 : System with partial degradation failures and fully

operational, s3 : System with major faults and partially working and hence partial output power,

s4 : System completely fails. The calculation of the reliability of the signaling system is

complicated since the system has elements or subsystems exhibiting dependent failures and

involving repair and standby operations. Markov model is a better technique that has much

appeal and works well when failure hazards and repair hazards are constant. The usual practice

35
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

of reliability analysis techniques include FMEA ((failure mode and effect analysis), Parts count

analysis, RBD (reliability block diagram), FTA (fault tree analysis) etc. These are logical,

Boolean and block diagram approaches and never accounts the environmental degradation on the

performance of the system. This is too relevant in the case of PV systems which are operated

under harsh environmental conditions. This paper is an insight into the degradation of

performance of PV systems and presenting a Markov model of the system by means of the

different states and transitions between these states.

The assumptions are as follows:

1. Time between failure (TBF) and time to repair (TTR) data are exponentially distributed. So

there are no simultaneous failures of subsystems and the probability of more than one failure or

repair in a time interval is zero.

2. The repaired units are as good as new (AGAN) one repair or replacement is carried out only in

case of failure.

3. Failure rates and repair rates for all the subsystems of the system are constant over time and

statistically independent

36
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Figure 4: Framework for reliability modelling by markov process.

The transition probabilities Pij of a homogeneous Markov chain form an n x n matrix, called a

transition matrix which is:-

37
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Since all the components of signaling system are in series so reliability of whole sytem R (t)

= Π Ri = R1R2R3 (for three components of signaling system.)

= e -λ1t e -λ2t e -λ3t

=e-Σ λi t

= e-F t (where F = Σ λi, i = 1,2,3.)

From the transition diagram presented in Figure 5 and the. Markov equations, the steady state

availability of the signaling system is found as

P0= 1/[1+∑(λi/µi)]= 1/(1+D) where D =∑(λi/µi)

Figure 5: Transition diagram for signaling system and subsystems.

The formulas used are shown below. From transition diagram presented in Figure:- 4 and

Markov equations can be derived,. The probability that the machine is in the operating state

after time interval dt i.e. at time (t+dt) is given by

PS0(t +dt) = [ Probability of being in operating state at time t) and (Probability of not

failing between t+dt] +[ Probability of being failed states at time t) and ( Probability of

being repaired between t and t+dt).

38
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Probabilities of failure between t and dt are λidt and Probabilities of not failing between

t and dt are (1- λidt).Similarly the probabilities of repair are µidt.Using the addition and

multiplication rule for probabilities gives

PS0((t+dt) = PS0(t)[(1- λ1dt) + (1- λ2dt)+ (1- λ3dt)

PS0((t+dt) - PS0(t) =( - λ1dt- λ2dt- λ3dt ) PS0(t) +µ1dt PS1(t) + µ2dt PS2(t) + µ3dt PS3(t)

(Rearranging)

[PS0((t+dt) - PS0(t)]/dt =(-- λ1- λ2- λ3 ) PS0(t) +µ1 PS1(t) + µ2 PS2(t) + µ3 PS3(t)

dt 0

or [d PS0(t)/dt] =- PS0(t)( λ1+ λ2+ λ3 ) + µ1 PS1(t) + µ2 PS2(t) + µ3 PS3(t)

=∑µiPSi(t) - PS0(t)∑λi------------------(1)

Similarly for other states will be

[d PS1(t)/dt]=λ1PS0(t) - µ1PS1(t)

[d PS2(t)/dt]=λ2PS0(t) - µ2PS2(t)-------------------------------------------------------[2]

Equating first order derivative to zero for a steady state these equations will take the

following form for three signaling subsystems only,

P0( λ1+ λ2+ λ3)= µ1 P1 + µ2 P2 + µ3 P3 [(i.e. taking Psi(t)=Pi(i=0,1,2,3)].

P1µ1 = P0 λ1 so P1= (λ1/ µ1) P0

39
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

P2µ2= P0 λ2

P3µ3 = P0 λ3 ----------------------------- [3]

P0 + P1 + P2 + P3 =1------------------------------------------------- [4]

Substituting the value of P1 , P2, P3 in equation(4) the steady state availability of gas

Turbine is found as P0= 1/[1+∑(λi/µi)]= 1/(1+D) where D =∑(λi/µi)-----------------------------5]

Machine residing in other subsystem is as

P1=( λ1/ µ1)[1/(1+D) ]

P2=( λ2/ µ2)[1/(1+D) ]

P3= (λ3/ µ3)[1/(1+D)] ------------------------------------------------------------------------[6]

The reliability of different subsystems is

R1(t) = e-λ1t

R2(t) = e-λ2 t,

R3(t) = e-λ3 t.

As subsystems are connected in series, so the reliability of the signaling system will be the

product of the individual subsystem reliabilities.

R (t -λ1t
. e-λ2 t. e-λ3 t=e -∑λit= e-F t [where F =∑λi, ( i = 1,2,…6.)].

The maintainability of different subsystems and machine is as follows:

M1(t) = 1–e -μ1t, where U is the repair rate.

40
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

M2(t) = 1–e -μ2t,

M3(t) = 1–e -μ3t.

Mean time to failure MTTF = 1/Σλi = 1/F

For steady state availability (A) = MTTF/(MTTF + MTTR).

Now mean time to repair MTTR = MTTF x D , where D = Σ λi/μi

System repair rate (μs) = 1/MTTR = 1/MTTF x D

maintainability Ms(t) = 1–e -(μst).

Again, R (t) = e - F t

∴t = -lnR (t)/F

Ps0(t+dt)= Ps0t[(1-λ1dt)+(1-λ2dt)+(1-λ3dt)]+μ1dtPs1(t)+μ2dtPs2(t)+μ3dtPs3(t).

Steady state reliability

P1 = λ1/μ1 [1/(1+D)]

P2=λ2/μ2[1/(1+D)]

P3=λ3/μ3[1/(1+D)]

41
 Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION:

The failure data of 5 years of signaling system of Kharagpur to bali chalk is taken as our

maintenance study. Total number of failures from January 1998 to 2002 are taken for the

analysis. Most of the failure data is taken from the maintenance log book maintained by different

section of the 5 local station. With the help of data collected repair and failure rate is calculated

Which is shown in Table1.

Table 1: Repair rate and failure rate of different signaling subsystem

COMPONENTS FAILURE RATE REPAIR RATE
( λ) (μ)

TRACK CIRCUIT 0.00458 0.131

SIGNALING UNIT 0.00692 0.728

POINT-AND-POINT 0.00491 0.122

MECHANISM

From above repair rate and failure rate of different signaling subsystem Viz Signal unit, Track

circuit, Point-and-Point mechanism Reliability at different time interval is calculated which is

given in Table 2.

42
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Table 2: Reliability of different signaling subsystem for different time interval

TIME (H) TRACK CIRCUIT SIGNALING UNIT POINT-AND- POINT

MECHINE

0 1 1 1

100 0.6325 0.5001 0.5810

120 0.4001 0.2501 0.3376

From Table 2. reliability of different signaling sub system is calculated and graph is plotted

which is shown in figure 6.

Figure 6: Reliability pattern of different signaling subsystems.

Reliability of Signal unit, Track circuit and point-and-point mechanism are respectively 0.22,

0.41, and 0.27 respectively after 10 hours. So reliability of Signal unit is lowest between three

43
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

subsystems, hence it is required more attention than Track circuit and Point-and-Point

mechanism.

Table 3: Maintainability pattern of different signaling system

TIME (H) TRACK SIGNALING POINT-and-

UNIT POINT
MACHINE
CIRCUIT

0 0 0 0

50 0.9987 0.9744 0.9938

100 1 0.999 0.999

With the help of data collected and by using mathematical expressions as shown in the Table 3,

Maintainability pattern of three signaling subsystems are calculated and graph is plotted as

shown in Figure 7.

44
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Figure 7: Maintainability pattern of signaling subsystems.

For 100 percent of expected reliability maintenance interval should be zero for any system. From

figure 7 it is clear that after certain time interval maintainability of Signal unit is lowest. From

figure maintainability of Signal unit, Track circuit and Point-and-Point mechanism after 20 hour

is 0.55, 0.65 and 0.75 respectively. Maintainability of the Signal unit, Track circuit and Point-

and-Point mechanism are low. Maintenance time may also be reduced by proper planning and

spare parts management for increased availability of the machine. The constraints and reasons

for low reliability and maintainability suggested that possible modification and design

alternatives of the machine should be considered. For different percentage of expected reliability

we got different maintenance interval from the Indian railway data. From Table 4 for expected

reliability of 0.10, maintenance interval is 140 hours, for expected reliability of 0.20 maintenance

interval is 98 hours, for expected reliability of 0.30 maintenance interval is 74 hours, for

expected reliability of 0.40 maintenance interval is 56 hours. On this way we need a small

maintenance interval for high reliability of signaling systems.

45
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Table 4: Expected reliability for different maintenance interval

Expected 10 20 30 40 70 80 100
reliability

Maintenance 140 98 74 56 22 13 0
interval (Hour)

From the figure 8 it is observed that due to significant, causes are for the track circuit, signaling

unit, point to point machine subsystems the reliability and maintainability of the signaling system

with different time intervals get effected which is shown by the graph.

Figure 8: Expected reliability for different time interval (h).

It is found that the reliabilities of the different subsystems are different as well as decreasing with

time. It is also seen that that system will not fail for 20 hours of operation. It is observed that the

reliabilities of the subsystems are decreasing overtime and reliability of Track circuit, Signal unit

and Point-and-point machine will be 40% to 60% after 50 hours and similarly maintainability of

46
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

Track circuit, Signal unit and Point-and-point machine will be 50% to 70% after 10 hours.

Again, special attention in relation to maintenance and inspection activities and logistics support

is required to be taken in improve the reliability and maintainability of signaling subsystems and

system. With different expected reliabilities of the signaling system, the maintenance interval is

given in Table 1.

4.4 Conclusion:

It is also found that the reliabilities of the subsystems and signaling system are in decreasing

order, respectively, in particular mission time. It is seen that the reliability of the Signal unit,

Track circuit and Point-and-Point mechanism with time is not satisfactory. The overall reliability

of the Signaling system drops significantly with time. For improvement, the reliability of those

subsystems/machines requires strengthening the maintenance efforts, which can result in

decreasing their failure rate or in increasing their time to failure (TTF). Maintainability of the

Signal unit, Track circuit and Point-and-Point mechanism are low. Maintenance time may also

be reduced by proper planning and spare parts management for increased availability of the

machine. The constraints and reasons for low reliability and maintainability suggested that

possible modification and design alternatives of the machine should be considered. From the

outcome of this analysis, it is clear that there is room for better maintenance planning and for

improving the RAM of the machine from this type of modeling and quantitative analysis by the

Markov processes. The case study provides data for predicting the control needs in maintenance

or repair processes and potential design modification to ensure a desirable level of the Signaling

system’s reliability, availability and maintainability. Again, special attention is required to

improve maintainability of the signaling system. So proper resource allocation, a maintenance

47
Chapter 4 [RAM Modeling of different signaling system]

strategy suitable for the environmental as well as technical problems, and design out

maintenance can only reduce the frequency of machine failure or repair time and consequently

improve the machine availability (i.e. reliability and maintainability). For a different expected

reliability of the system, the maintenance intervals are computed in Table 4`and graphically

presented.

48
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

CHAPTER 5: INSPECTION POLICIES

5.1 Introduction

Inspections form an important part of the integrity management process as a means of

monitoring the performance of signaling system to ensure their safety and serviceability.

However, inspections can represent a significant cost. Traditionally inspection planning was

based on general guidelines and engineering judgments which is prescriptive and does not take

into account the structure specific characteristics or make optimum use of the observed

performance data. Again special attention in relation to maintenance and inspection activities and

logistics support is required to be taken to improve the reliability and maintainability of signaling

subsystems and system. It is extremely important to avoid failure during actual operation because

it can be dangerous and disastrous. Therefore inspection on them is necessary since it can

improve reliability.

5.2 Inspection Optimization model for sigaling system:

Maintenance consists of two types, The first one is Preventive maintenance (PM) and the second

one is corrective maintenance. The emphasis in analysis is given to establish the preventive

maintenance model. To develop an effective PM. programme the availability of a number of

items is necessary. some of these items include accurate historical records of equipment

manufacturer’s recommendations: Skilled personnel, Past data from similar equipments, service

manuals, unique identification of all equipments , appropriate test equipments and tools,

49
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

management support and users expectation, future information by problem/cause

/action/consumable and repairable components/ parts and clearly written instructions with a

checklist to be signed out. There are a number of steps involved in developing a P.M.

programme figure 9 presents six steps for establishing a highly effective PM. Programme. In a

short period. Each step is discussed below

1. Identify and choose the areas:- Identify and selection of one or two important areas to

concentrate the initial PM. Effort. These areas should be crucial to the success of overall

plant operations and may be experiencing a high degree of maintenance action. The main

objective of this step is to obtain immediate results in highly visible areas as well as to

win concerned management support.

2. Identify the P.M. needs: Define the P.M. requirements. Then establish a schedule of two

types of tasks daily.PM. Inspection and periodic PM. Arrangement. The daily inspection

could be conducted by either maintenance or Production personnel. Establish assignment

frequency:- Establish the frequency of the assignments. This involves reviewing the

equipment Conditions and records. Normally the basis for establishing the frequency is

the experience with those familiar with the equipment and the recommendations of the

vendors and engineering. It must be remembered that vendor recommendations are

generally based on the typical usage of the items under considerations.

3. Prepare the PM. Assignments: Daily and Periodic assignments are identified and

described in detail, then submitted for approval.

Schedule the PM. Assignments on annual basis. The defined PM. Assignments are scheduled on

the basis of a twelve month period Expand the PM programme as necessary. After the

implementation of all PM daily inspection and periodic assignments in the initially selected

50
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

areas. The PM can be expanded to other areas. Expenditure gained from the pilot PM projects

is instrumental to expanding the program.

Figure 9: Framework of inspection model.

51
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

5.2.1 Model-1

Inspections are often disruptive but they usually reduce downtime because of lesser number of

failures. The model can be used to obtain the optimum number of inspections per facility per unit

of time. Total facility downtime is defined by

TDT = yTi+ cTb/y------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1)

Where TDT = total downtime per unit of time for a facility

C= a constant associated with a particular facility

Tb = facility downtime per breakdown or failure

Ti = facility downtime per inspection

Y i= No of inspection per unit of time

By differentiating (1) with respect to Yi we get

Dtdt/dy = Ti ---------------(2)

By setting Eq (2) equal to zero and then rearranging, it is obtained

⁄
Y* = --------- (3)

Where Y* = optimum number of inspection per facility per unit of time

⁄
By substituting equation (3) into equation (1) yields TDT* =2 -------------(4)

Where TDT =total optimal downtime per unit of time for a facility

5.2.2 Model 2:

This is similar to previous one. It can be used to determine optimum inspection frequency in

order to minimize the per unit of time equipment/ facility downtime. In this model facility /

52
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

equipment (per unit time) total downtime is the function of inspection frequency. Mathematically

it is defined as follows.

TDT(n)= DTr + DTi = ---(1)

Where TDT (n)=facility/ equipment total downtime per unit of time

DTr = equipment/ facility downtime due to per unit of time repairs

DTi= equipment/ facility downtime due to per unit of time inspection

n = inspection frequency

λ(n) = equipment/ facility failure rate

μ= equipment/ facility repair rate

1/θ= mean of exponentially distributed inspection time

By differentiating (1) with respect to n we get

= -------------------------------------------(2)

Setting equation (2) equal to zero and rearranging equation yields

----(3)

The value of n will be optimum when the left and right side of equation (3) are equal. At this

point the equipment/ facility total downtime will be minimum.

Assume the failure rate of a system is defined by λ(n) = f ----(4)

Where f is the system failure rate at n=0. Obtain an expression for the optimal value of n by

using equation (3) By substituting equation (4) into equation (3) we get - f = ------(5)

53
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

Rearranging equation (5) yields n* =In[ ]----(6) where n* = optimal inspection frequency.

5.2.3 Model 3:

This is useful mathematical model that can be used to calculate optimum inspection frequencies

to maximize profit .The model is developed on the premise that facility /equipment under repair

lead to zero output, thus less profit. Further more if the equipment is inspected too often there is

danger that it may be more costly due to factors such As loss of production, cost of materials and

wages than losses due to breakdowns.

The following assumptions are associated with this model.

1. The equipment failure rate is a fraction of inspections

2. Time to inspections are exponentially distributed

3. Equipment failure rate and repair rates are constant.

The following symbols are used to develop equations for the model

N= number of inspections performed per unit of time

1/θ = mean of exponentially distributed inspection times

P= profit at no downtime losses

Ci= average inspection cost per uninterrupted unit of time

Cr = average cost of repairs per uninterrupted unit of time

λ = equipment failure rate

54
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

μ = equipment repair rate

Profit per unit time is expressed by

PR = p – PL I - PLr-IC-RC

λ
=p- - -----(1)

Where PLI =Production output value loss per unit of time due to inspections

PLr = Production output value loss per unit of time due to repairs

– – -

IC = inspection cost per unit of time

RC= repair cost per unit of time

By differentiating equation (1) with respect to n and then equating it to zero yield

= -[ (p +Cr]/ + ) ---(3)

(3) will be equal. At this point, the profit will be at its maximum value.

λ(n) = f

Using equation (4) in equation (3) yields f -[ (p +Cr]/ + )----(5)

By rearranging equation(5) we get n* = In{ ----(6)

55
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

where n* = optimal manufacturing system inspection frequency.

5.3. RELATION BETWEEN RELIABILITY AND INSPECTION:

Inspections form an important part of the integrity management process as a means of

monitoring the performance of signaling system to ensure their safety and serviceability.

However, inspections can represent a significant cost. Traditionally inspection planning was

based on general guidelines and engineering judgments which is prescriptive and does not take

into account the structure specific characteristics or make optimum use of the observed

performance data. The end result is that a substantial amount of inspections may be ineffective

by not focusing the most critical areas or by not using the most appropriate techniques therefore

resulting in uneven safety levels and wastage of limited maintenance resources. Reliability

techniques were developed to provide with a more rational tool for scheduling inspections in

order to maximize their efficiency and control the safety levels maintained in these structures.

The main characteristic of these techniques is that the uncertainties associated with the

inspection planning and execution process are recognized. Furthermore, the use of Bayesian

updating enables the inspection findings to be incorporated in the planning and decision model to

optimize subsequent actions. In recent years, there have been significant developments in the

area of reliability-based inspection planning for railway signaling system. Various tools and

methodologies were developed for fatigue reliability analysis and inspection updating. The

methods were used for developing optimum inspection plans for individual structures.

56
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

Figure10: Reliability based inspection interval.

5.4. Results and discussions:

Model 1 is applied on three sub-systems of signaling system and number of inspections is

calculated for optimum reliability of different signaling systems which is shown in Table 4 and

from the Table it is clear that signaling unit requires more number of inspections per month with

respect to signal unit and track circuit. Signal unit comes at second level in this category. So by

model 1 optimum number of inspections per facility per unit of time is calculated for different

signaling subsystems. Number of inspections for Signal unit, Track circuit and Point-and-Point

mechanism is 7, 3 and 5 per month respectively. Therefore Signal unit required highest number

of inspections per month and Track circuit required least number of inspections per month, so

these number of inspections can reduce downtime by decreasing total number of failures and can

make the signaling system more reliable.

57
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

Table 5: Number of inspections of different signaling subsystems by model 1.

TRACK CIRCUIT SIGNAL UNIT POINT-AND-POINT

MECHANISM

Tb 0.1 0.4 0.2

Ti 0.04 0.03 0.02

n 3 7 5

Model 2 is applied on three sub-systems of signaling system and number of inspections is

calculated for optimum reliability of different signaling systems which is shown in Table 5 and

from the Table 5 it is clear that Point- and- Point mechanism requires more number of

inspections per month with respect to signal unit and track circuit. Track circuit comes at second

level in this category and Point-and-Point mechanism requires less number of inspections per

month.

58
 Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

Table 6: Numbers of inspections of different signaling subsystems by model 2.

TRACK CIRCUIT SIGNAL UNIT POINT-AND- POINT

MECHANISM

1/U 0.0232 0.00693 0.0079

1/θ 0.08 0.003 0.006

n 1.06 0.9 1.3

So by model 2 optimum numbers of inspections per facility per unit of time is calculated for

different signaling subsystems.

5.5 Conclusions:

Inspection techniques provides a more rational tool for scheduling inspections in order to

maximize their efficiency and control the safety levels maintained in signaling systems. The

main characteristic of these techniques is that the uncertainties associated with the inspection

planning and execution process are recognized. So the reliability-based inspection planning for

railway signaling system can increase the reliability of signaling systems by decreasing the

maintenance interval.

59
Chapter 5 [Inspection policies]

60
Chapter 6 [Conclusion and future scope]

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE

6.1 Concluding remarks:

The concluding remarks are as follows:

1. The reliability and maintainability of Track circuit, Signal unit and Point and Point

machine is evaluated at different time intervals. Reliability of Signal unit, Track circuit

and point-and-point mechanism are respectively 0.22, 0.41, and 0.27 respectively after 10

hours and maintainability of Signal unit, Track circuit and Point-and-Point mechanism

after 20 hours are 0.55, 0.65 and 0.75 respectively.

2. The inspection intervals of Track circuit, Signal unit and Point and Point machine is

found to be 3, 7 and 5 times in a month from model 1 and inspection intervals for Track

circuit, Signal unit and Point and Point machine are 1.06, 0.9 and 1.3 months

respectively.

3. Maintenance intervals for 20 % of expected reliability of signaling system is found to be

98 hours.

60
Chapter 6 [Conclusion and future scope]

6.2 Future scope of the work:

Future scope of this work is described as follows:

1. Markov process may also be applicable to other signaling subsystems.

2. Markov process may be used to the same signaling subsystems to the section of Indian

railways.

3. These inspection policies can be further use for the cost optimization of railway signaling
system.

61
[References]

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64