The Council of State

The Jones Law of 1916 provided for a separation of powers between the executive and
legislative branches. Under the law, the governor-general was no longer a member of the
Philippine legislature. Prior to 1916, however, the governor-general presided over the
Philippine Commission which, until 1907, effectively formed the legislature and after 1916
became the Senate. After 1916 the Commission became a separate legislative body, i.e., the
upper house or Senate, and the assembly was transformed into the House of
Representatives. Nevertheless, the governor-general continued to exercise fairly extensive
powers that included:general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus
of the government in the Philippine Islands as far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions
of this act, and shall be commander-in-chief of all locally created armed forces and militia. He
is hereby vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and
forfeitures, and veto any legislation enacted as herein provided. The Jones Law granted
significant powers to both chambers of the Philippine legislature. This included the power: to
increase the number, or abolish any, of the executive departments, or make such changes in
the names and duties thereof as it may deem necessary, and to provide for the appointment
and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the governor-general.

With a strong executive in the person of the governor-general and a Nacionalista-dominated

legislature that likewise had extensive powers by 1916, the question arose as to who or
which party was actually leading the government in the Philippines. This was eventually
addressed with the creation of the Council of State on October 16, 1918, by the
governorgeneral. The council was composed of the governor-general, two presiding officers
of the legislature (one each from both chambers), and all the members of the cabinet. Its
function was to provide assistance and advice to the governor-general on matters of public
policy and action. The creation of the council effectively overshadowed the executive cabinet
since the latter was simply a set within the former. The council was a way for the Filipinos
(notably the Nacionalistas who dominated the legislature) to effect a kind of national
leadership role for the government because the governor general had been reduced to, in the
words of Harrison himself, "a mere figure-head" since key officials of the cabinet were now
subject to the concurrence of the Senate.

While its presiding officer remained the governor-general, the real power lay in the vice
president in the person of Speaker Osmeña, who became a virtual prime minister of the
government. The council's accountability was to no one else but its own. Moreover, it had the
strong backing of the Legislature with both of its key leaders (namely Osmeña who headed
the House of Representatives, and Quezon, the Senate president
-both of whom were key leaders of the dominant Nationalist Party). Liang observed that the
existence of the council "could be regarded as an approximation to parliamentary government
of the English model..."

Source: Liang 1971, 100. 97. 104-105

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The power struggle of the 1920s within the Nationalist Party resulted in Osmeña losing power
and prominence to Quezon who was reelected Senate president while the speakership went
to his close ally, Manuel Roxas, who was also a Colectivista. Effectively, the leadership of the
party as well had now passed from Osmeña to Quezon

The party quarrel, however, was short-lived. In April 1924, the two factions reunited under
the Partido Nacionalista Consolidado or Consolidated Nationalist Party. Nevertheless, the
leadership change had been effected with Quezon taking the helm of both the party and
government as Senate president

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Minority Parties in the 1930s and the Partido Sakdalista

With the dissolution of the Democratic Party in 1932, there emerged a host of other
alternative (but less powerful) electoral parties that competed with the Nationalist Party.
These included the Partido Modernista or Modernist Party (established in February 1932), the
New Youth Party of the Philippines (established in September 1933), the Young Philippines
Party (established in January 1934), and the Partido Sakdalista (sakdal means to accuse or to
put on trial). Of these minority political parties, the Sakdalistas achieved a relative measure of
success particularly in the elections of 1934 where they "won three seats in the legislature, a
provincial governor, and a number of municipal officials."

The Sakdal Party was founded by Benigno Ramos, a disgruntled Senate employee. The party
loudly denounced the government's policies and programs. It advocated immediate and full
independence for the Philippines. Their populist stand quickly made them the champion of
the oppressed, especially the peasants in the countryside. During the 1934 general elections,
they scored impressively (relative to other minority parties) by gaining three seats in the
House (that included one from Quezon's province of Tayabas) along with a number of
municipal and provincial offices. In early May 1935, the Sakdalistas launched an uprising,
which was quickly and violently suppressed by the military and police.“ Ramos ended up
being arrested but released on bail, whereupon he established a new group—the Lapiang
Ganap. which was openly pro-Japanese and anti-American.

In general, however, minority parties have appeared from time to time. Their life spans have
been short-lived owing to their inability to muster sufficient support from the ruling political
elites and also to their inability to adapt to the established institutional practices, especially
electoral politics.

Sources: Liang 1971, 198; Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 146-489;

and Constantino 1978, 11.

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The End of Opposition Parties and the Rise of the Hegemonic Party

By the late 1920s, the system of majority party-led government had become a reality. This
situation assured the dominance of the Consolidated Nationalist Party under Quezon and
Osmeña and spelled the demise of the Democratic Party. The final nail in the coffin was the
election of 1931 in which the Nationalist Party won overwhelmingly against the Democratic
Party. Meanwhile, the Nacionalistas continued to exercise their hegemony over the executive
branch through the cabinet. In the words of Liang:

no Filipino member of the cabinet should be allowed to stay in case of failing to enjoy the
majority confidence (i.e., of the party in power)."

The power of the Democratic Party had reached its lowest point. Finally, on January 31,
1932, the remaining members of the party voted for its formal dissolution.

The dissolution of the Democratic Party in 1932 was not seen positively by the majority party
"since the disappearance of opposition from without, would mean an inevitable opposition
from within, not unlike the internal struggles for party leadership a decade earlier."** For
Lance, the absence of an opposition party invariably leads to the "bifurcation" of the single
dominant party." This meant that those who were previously Democratas "simply joined the
ranks of the Nacionalistas... now all styling themselves as Nacionalistas" where a new set of
divisions awaited them. They did not have to wait long.
By the early 1930s, the question of party and government leadership was once again raised
within the Nationalist Party. This culminated in the issue surrounding the Hare-Hawes-Cutting
(HHC) Bill that established a blueprint for the eventual granting of independence to the
Philippines. The Nacionalistas were again divided this time between the Pros, led by Osmeña,
who were in favor of the HHC Bill, and the Antis, led by Quezon, who were against it. Former
Democratas also lost no time in taking one of the two sides, which even further blurred the
distinction between parties." The approval of a law that would practically grant independence
to the Philippines would certainly bring much prestige and power to whoever could secure it.

With the HHC Bill in his pocket, Quezon would be worried that such an accomplishment would
bring prestige to Osmeña who was the one who negotiated with the US for its passage.
Rather than support a partymate, Quezon instead opposed the Bill and advocated its
rejection by the Senate. He then proceeded to negotiate with the US for a new independence
bill. The result was the Tydings-Mcduffie (TM) Act of 1934.

Bringing back the TM Act (and having it approved by the Philippine legislature) assured
Quezon of his continued leadership not only of the party but of the national government as
well." The elections of June 1934 gave the Antis a significant victory over the Pros with the
former having seventeen seats and the latter having only six in the Senate. The results in the
House of Representatives were not that much different with the Antis claiming seventy seats
as against the Pros with only nineteen seats. This electoral victory assured Quezon of the
Senate presidency once again.

As provided for in the TM Act, the elections to the 202-seat Constitutional Convention were
held on July 10, 1934, with only about 40 percent of the qualified voters actually casting their
ballots. Nevertheless, the elections also reflected the partisan political groupings at the time
with 120 coming from the Antis as against sixty from the Pros (the rest were independents)."
The average age of the delegates was around forty. While on the surface, it looked like the
convention was composed of men from diverse social and economic backgrounds, it became
apparent upon closer investigation that many were actually lawyers. Amoroso (2005)
observed that:

many of the successful businessmen and financiers were lawyers; the jurists were of course
lawyers; these particular educators from the University of the Philippines were lawyers, and
the experienced politicians were certainly convention reveals many of the delegates who
made speeches to be seasoned lawyers.

The initial draft of the 1935 Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature. A key member
argued that the present system of bicameralism in our legislature is not the creation, nor the
product, nor the invention of Filipino political genius" and that "the theory of
interparliamentary check" made the two chambers "careless, hasty, and irresponsible" in
drafting legislation."

The members of the convention met from July 30, 1934, to February 8, 1935, with Senator
Claro Recto presiding. Despite the fact that the convention was led by a prominent advocate
of Philippine independence and nationalism, it cannot be discounted that the drafters of the
constitution were heavily influenced by Quezon, being that majority of its members are
composed of those associated with the Antis. Indeed, the majority members "caucused in the
Senate president's office throughout the convention.... Quezon also asserted his right to open
the convention... and contributed in key meetings where final language was drafted.…

Interestingly, one of the issues raised in the convention that was seriously debated upon was
the question of women's suffrage. Since Spanish times, women were not qualified to vote.
The legislature had given women the right to vote, subject to legal qualifications, by January
1, 1935. Critics and advocates of women's suffrage raised the issue in the convention. Those
against the vote argued that women voting "would destroy the Filipino home" while others
said that women would be contaminated by vice once they participated in politics through the
vote. Those in favor of women's suffrage insisted that they were "half of humanity and that
many already played important social functions outside the household as professionals."

As a compromise solution, the convention instead mandated a piebiscite by April 1937 in

which the women themselves would decide on whether or not they would prefer to be given
the right to vote. More than half a million women registered for the referendum. Around
490,000 voted, with only 44,307 voting against the proposal.

The draft constitution was signed by President Roosevelt on May 14, 1935, as provided for in
the TM Act, whereupon it was submitted to the Filipino electorate for ratification. As
expected, the constitution was ratified by more than a million votes. By September 1935, the
first Commonwealth election was held. Besides Quezon, there were two new parties that had
candidates for Commonwealth president-the National Socialist Party led by Emilio Aguinaldo
and the reincarnated Republican Party led by Gregorio Aglipay. For the vice presidency,
Osmeña was the candidate of the Nacionalistas.

The program of the party in power during the 1935 elections was comprehensive compared
to the platforms of the other two parties. The Nationalist Party was clearly the only major
contender. As a result, Quezon won as president with 695,546 votes as against 179,402 votes
for Aguinaldo and 148,441 for Aglipay. Interestingly enough, Osmeña received more votes
than Quezon (811,138) as against his closest rival from the National Socialist Party who got
only 51,590 votes.

In the ninety-eight-seat legislature, sixty-four seats went to the Quezon wing while nineteen
seats went to the Osmeña wing of the Nationalist Party.” At the time, the Commonwealth
constitution provided for a Assembly with ninety-eight seats. The constitution specified that
the assembly should have no more than 120 seats.

By the elections of November 11, 1941, Quezon's and Osmena's mandates were once again
renewed under the amended provisions of the constitution. Whatever was left of the
opposition parties was once again defeated. The failure of the opposition is explained by
Liang:

First, the lack of a unified leadership strong and popular enough to challenge both President
Quezon and Vice President Osmena in any political contest; second, their inability to present
any constructive program that would appeal much to the people; third, they themselves had
less in common and more in conflict; fourth, the people who psychologically and
subconsciously could not have accepted anyone other than either President Quezon or Vice
President Osmeña for leadership, and fifth, practically all the public money available for
political purposes had always been used only by the Nacionalistas.

Since Quezon had already served his first term as president for six years, he could only serve
his second term for two more years, i.e., from November 1941 to November 1943.

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