G.R. No.

177407               February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in
turn, assailed the Orders2 issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative
Case No. 1882.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for
check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr.
Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests
revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-
functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.

On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a
complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin,
III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said
doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence,
private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to
"D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:

"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the
criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally,
this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document
marked as Annex ‘2’ to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;

"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997,
which is also marked as Annex ‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in
 connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on
which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo
copy of the document marked as Annex ‘3’ which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which
is appended as such Annex ‘3’ to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x
Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.

"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996,
which is also marked as Annex ‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the examination.

"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which
is also marked as Annex ‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of
the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the
typewritten final report of the same examination which is the document appended as
Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’ respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega
and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however,
the document which is marked as Annex ‘4’ is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of
Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex ‘1’ is a certified photocopy. Both documents are
of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit
‘D.’

Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of
exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not
properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He
added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

Dispositions of the Board of Medicine

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the
[BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:

"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of

[herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of
[therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may
serve in the resolution of this case.

"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the
respondents.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons
stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.

The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It
concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative
value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is
relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, assailing the BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:

WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE

FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND

DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD
THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT
BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A
PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.4

We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the
Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were
interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely
or finally disposes of the case.5 At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that the BOM
did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits
of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.

Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay;
and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.

We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules of evidence,7 in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.8

From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals9 teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights
leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20,
Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The
Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not
prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.10

As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive
rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of
Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,

but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxxx

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January
30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The
documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits
were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed
by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure.
To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both
in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered
by mandatory judicial notice.11

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a
matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be
proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature
involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,14 include the structural make-up and composition
of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys
before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical
locations.

Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.  Section 3 of Rule
1awphil

130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning
kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper
anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established
not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s
kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s
kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-
ray of her abdominal area.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15 Witness
Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits
"because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building."16 Ultimately, since the
originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence and,
thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209386               December 8, 2014

MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the Decision  dated January 31, 2013 and the
1 2

Resolution  dated September 3, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
3

34470 which affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Qualified Theft. The Facts

In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel
fuel (diesel fuel) allegedly worth ₱497,000.00 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company
owned by private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao).  Petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria
4

(Candelaria), a truck driver employed by Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan,
Manila.5

However, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao through a phone
call that it had not yet received its order. Upon inquiry, Lao discovered that Candelaria, together with
his helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an employee of Unioil, left the company premises at 12:50
in the afternoon of the same day on board a lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 to deliver Viron’s
diesel fuel order. When Lao called Candelaria on his mobile phone, she did not receive any
response. 6

Thereafter, or at around 6 o’clock inthe evening of the same day, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s
office and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to
the Anti Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District (MPD), as well as to Camp Crame. 7

After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents found the abandoned lorry truck
in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel.  Under the foregoing premises, Lao filed a complaint
8

for Qualified Theft against Candelaria, docketed as Crim. Case No. 08-259004.  Lita Valera (Valera),
9

Lao’s mother, and Jimmy Magtabo  Claro (Claro), employed as dispatcher and driver of Unioil,
10

corroborated Lao’s allegations on material points. More specifically, Claro verified that it was
Candelaria who was tasked todeliver the diesel fuel to Viron on August 23, 2006, which likewise
happened to be Candelaria’s last trip. 11

In his defense, Candelaria demurred to the prosecution’s evidence,  arguing that there was no direct
12

evidence that linked him to the commission of the crime, as Lao had no personal knowledge as to
what actually happened to the diesel fuel.  Moreover, the information relayed by Romano is
13

considered hearsay due to his untimely demise. 14

The RTC Ruling

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) convicted Candelaria of Qualified
Theft in a Decision  dated June 21, 2011, having found a confluence of all the elements constituting
15

the abovesaid crime, to wit: (a) there was a taking of personal property; (b) said property belonged to
another; (c) the taking was done with intent to gain; (d) the taking was done without the consent of
the owner; (e) the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things; and (f) the theft was committed by a domestic servant with abuse of
confidence. 16

In convicting Candelaria, the RTC took the following circumstances into consideration: (a) on August
23, 2006, Candelaria was the driver of the truck with plate number PTA-945, loaded with 14,000
liters of diesel fuel valued at ₱497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (b) Viron did
not receive the diesel fuel; (c) Lao reported the incident to Camp Crame and the MPD; and (d) the
following day, August 24, 2006, the same truck was found abandoned and emptied of its load in
Calamba, Laguna.  On the basis of the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Candelaria was guilty
17

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Consequently, it sentenced Candelaria to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify Lao the amount of ₱497,000.00 as
the value of the stolen diesel fuel, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the
costs.18

Dissatisfied, Candelaria elevated his conviction to the CA. 19

The CA Ruling

In a Decision  dated January 31, 2013, the CA affirmed Candelaria’s conviction, ruling that a finding
20

of guilt need not always be based on direct evidence, but may also be based on circumstantial
evidence, or "evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference."  In this regard, and considering that the crime of theft in this case was
21

qualified due to grave abuse of confidence, as Candelaria took advantage of his work, knowing that
Lao trusted him to deliver the diesel fuel to Viron,  the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Citing
22

jurisprudence,  it observed that theft by a truck driver who takes the load of his truck belonging to his
23

employer is guilty of Qualified Theft. 24

However, while the CA affirmed Candelaria’s conviction as well as the prison sentence imposed by
the RTC, it modified the amount which he was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at
₱14,000.00 in the absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel was indeed
worth ₱497,000.00. 25

Aggrieved, Candelaria filed a motion for reconsideration  which was eventually denied in a
26

Resolution  dated September 3,2013, hence, this petition.

27

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Candelaria guilty
of the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310  in relation to Article 309  of the
28 29

Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are:

(a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
 (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner’s consent; (e)
it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of
the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. 30

In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements. Through the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, it was sufficiently established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into
the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by Candelaria for delivery to Viron on August 23,
2006 was taken by him, without the authority and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and
that Candelaria abused the confidence reposed upon him by Lao,as his employer.

Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering that his conviction was based merely
on circumstantial evidence, as well as on hearsay evidence, i.e., Lao’s testimony with regard to the
allegation of the deceased helper Romano that Candelaria poked a balisongat him on August 23,
2006.31

The Court is not convinced.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  Circumstantial
32

evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, tothe exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. 33

Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances in this case,
as duly established by the prosecution’s evidence, amply justify the conviction of Candelaria under
the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances are: (a) on
August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao’s Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil,
Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria
and his helper Romano left the company premises on the same day on board the lorry truck bearing
plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the same
day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed toreply to
Lao’s phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and
reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident tothe MPD and
Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents;
and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil since then. 34

Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the crime of
Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be sure, this
determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelaria’s companion, Romano, had died before he
could testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former had threatened him with a balisongon
August 23, 2006. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under
Candelaria’s custody and remains unaccounted for.Candelaria did not proffer any persuasive reason
to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial, which, as case law holds,
is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted.  With these, and,
35

moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or reported back to work at Unioil since
the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference other than that which points to his
guilt.Verily, while it is true that flight per seis not synonymous with guilt,  unexplained flight
36
nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience,  especially when taken
37

together with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered,
Candelaria’s conviction for the crime of Qualified Theft stands.

The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen.
To provethe value of the stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under Articles
309 and 310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People v. Anabe  that the prosecution
38

must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate."  In the absence of independent and
39

reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under
Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.  In Merida v. People (Merida),  which applied the doctrine enunciated in People v. Dator
40 41

(Dator),  the Court deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narraat the time of
42

the commission of its theft, as such evidence would be "unreliable and inconclusive considering the
lack of independent and competent source of such information." 43

However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People (Lozano),  the Court fixed the value of the
44

stolen magwheels at ₱12,000.00 as the "reasonable allowable limit under the

circumstances,"  notwithstanding the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant therein.
45

Lozanocited, among others, the case of Francisco v. People  (Francisco) where the Court ruled that
46

"the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public
knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration,"  further explaining that the value of
47

jewelry, the stolen items in the saidcase, is neither a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of
unquestionable demonstration. 48

In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where the
Court had no reference to ascertain the price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator, where the
Court refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of lumber and/or narra for "lack of
independent and competent source" of the necessary information at the time of the commission of
the theft, the value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by
the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be
considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on
discretionary judicial notice.  To note, "judicial [notice], which is based on considerations of
49

expediency and convenience, displace[s] evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the
object which the evidence is intended to achieve." 50

While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the uncorroborated testimony of the private
complainant, Lao, to prove that the value of the diesel fuel stolen is ₱497,000.00, the Court – taking
judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 (i.e., the time of the
commission of the crime) is within the range of ₱37.60 to 37.86 per liter  – nonetheless remains
51

satisfied that such amount must be sustained. As the value of the goods may independently and
competently be ascertained from the DOE’s price publication, adding too that the defense had not
presented any evidence to contradict said finding nor cross examined Lao anent her proffered
valuation, the Court, notwithstanding the solitary evidence of the prosecution, makes this
determination following the second prong set by case law – and that is, to fix the value of the
property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. Verily, such circumstances
militate against applying the alternative of imposing a minimum penalty and, more so, the CA’s
arbitrary valuation of ₱14,000.00, since the basis for which was not explained. Therefore, for
purposes of fixing the proper penalty for Qualified Theft in thiscase, the value of the stolen property
amounting to ₱497,000.00 must be considered. Conformably with the provisions of Articles 309 and
310 of the RPC, the proper penalty to be imposed upon Candelaria is reclusion perpetua,  without 52

eligibility for parole,  to conform with prevailing law and jurisprudence.
53 54
A final word. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases, would do well to be mindful of the
significance of determining the value of the goods involved, or the amounts embezzled in said cases
as they do not only entail the proper resolution of the accused’s civil liability (if the civil aspect has
been so integrated) but also delimit the proper penalty to be imposed. These matters, through the
trial court’s judicious direction, should be sufficiently passed upon during trial and its finding thereon
be amply explained in its verdict. Although an appeal of a criminal case throws the entire case up for
review,  the ends of justice, both in its criminal and civil senses, demand nothing less but complete
55

and thorough adjudication in the judicial system’s every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of
these cases provides a distinctive opportunity for this ideal to be subserved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2013 and the Resolution
dated September 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria is: (a) sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b) ordered to indemnify private
complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao the amount of ₱497,000.00 representing the value of the stolen
property.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181829               September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the November 5, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02210 which affirmed with modification the November 28, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51. The CA found appellant Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay his victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count.

Factual Antecedents:

On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed against appellant for the crime of rape. The
accusatory portions of the Informations read:

Crim. Case No. T-3157:

That on or about the 9th day of June, 2002, at dawn, x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the father of
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA,"3 a minor 12 years
of age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.4

Crim. Case No. T-3158:

That on or about the 27th day of September, 1999, in the evening, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the
father of complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9
years of age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudicie of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.5

Crim. Case No. T-3159:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1999, at dawn, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the
father of complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9
years of age, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353.6
When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.7

During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant is the father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed
that "AAA" was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents happened.8 "AAA’s" birth and medical
certificates were likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively.9

Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.10

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness. "AAA" narrated that when she was about 4 years
old, her mother left her in the care of her father, herein appellant. Since then, she had been living
with her father.

"AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her on September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9,
2002. During her testimony, "AAA" narrated that:

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Will you please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

WITNESS:

A I am "AAA," 13 years old, out-of-school youth, presently residing at x x x11

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, do you still remember September 27, 1999?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A That was the birthday of my father and the date when he touched me, sir.

xxxx

Q Who rape[d] you?

A My papa, sir. Witness pointed to the accused.

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q You claimed that your father touched and used you. How did he begin in touching you?

A He tied me, sir.

xxxx

Q What part of your body was x x x tied by your father?

A My mouth, sir.

Q What other parts of your body, if there [are] any?

A My hands and my feet, sir.

PROS. ULANDAY:

My witness is crying, your Honor.12

xxxx

Q Now, after your father tied you on September 27, 1999, what did he do, if there’s any?

A He raped me, sir.

COURT:

Q What do you mean by x x x saying he raped you?

xxxx

A He undressed me, sir.

xxxx

COURT:

And we make of record that [witness is now] in tears.13

xxxx

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q Madam Witness, during the last hearing you uttered the word "incua na." What do you
mean by that?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q How long a time did your father [insert] his penis into your vagina?

A About two minutes, sir.

Q At early dawn of September 28, 1999, what happened if any, between you and your
father?
A The same, sir.

Q What do you mean by the same?

A That he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q Before your father inserted his penis into your vagina, what did he do, if there was any?

A He first undressed me, sir.

Q While he was undressing you what were you doing, if any?

A I failed to do any, sir.

Q Why did you fail to do any?

A Because I was afraid, sir.

Q Why were you afraid at the time?

A Because he threatened me, sir.

Q How did he [threaten] you?

A That if I would report the matter to anyone he would kill the person to whom I will report,
sir.

Q Do you remember June 9, 2002 at 3:00 o’clock dawn?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you remember that particular date?

A Because he again raped me, sir.

Q Who raped you?

A My father, sir.

Q In what particular place [were] you raped?

A In our house, sir.

xxxx

Q You claimed that you were raped by your father, how did he rape you?

A He undressed me, sir.

 Q What else did he do aside from undressing you?

A He poked a knife at me, sir.

Q And after poking a knife at you, what happened next, if any?

A Then he touched (kinuti) me, sir.

Q What part of your body was touched by your father?

A My vagina, sir.

Q How did he touch your vagina?

A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

Q What happened when he inserted his penis into your vagina?

A I cried, sir.14

After the presentation of "AAA’s" testimony, the prosecution rested its case.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In his testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA"
is his daughter.15 He also admitted that on September 27 and 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he was
living in the same house as "AAA."16 However, when asked regarding the rape charges filed against
him by his daughter, appellant denied the same. Thus:

Q And this daughter of your[s] now charge you [with] rape in Crim. Case Nos. T-
3157/3158/3159 for allegedly having sexual intercourse with her against her will and
consent. What can you say against these charges by your daughter?

A [Those are] not true, sir.17

The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva (Marcelino) who testified that he is the father of
the appellant.18 He claimed that "AAA" filed the rape cases against appellant because the latter
forbade her to entertain suitors.19 Marcelino also alleged that after appellant was incarcerated, "AAA"
eloped with her 20-year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only separated from her boyfriend when she
was brought under the care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.20 When asked
how old "AAA" was when she allegedly eloped with her boyfriend, Marcelino answered that "AAA"
was only 13 years old.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA." However, it noted that although it was agreed
upon during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age, the fact remains that "AAA"
was 12 years, six months and 19 days when she was ravished by the appellant on June 9,
2002.22 The court below also observed that "AAA has always been a pathetic child of oppression,
abuse and neglect" and that "[h]er innocence, tender age, dependence [on appellant] for survival,
and her virtual orphanhood sufficed to qualify every sexual molestation perpetrated by her father as
rape x x x."23

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused SATURNINO VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, perpetrated
against [his] daughter on September 27, 1999, September 28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, x x x and as
mandated by Article 266-B, same Code, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH for each offense, to indemnify the complainant "AAA" for damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00 per [count], and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.24

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to present
evidence that would overcome the presumption of his innocence. Appellant also alleged that the trial
court erred in lending credence to the unrealistic and unnatural testimony of "AAA."25 He claimed that
it was unusual for "AAA" not to offer any resistance to the advances allegedly made by him
considering that he was unarmed. According to the appellant, "AAA" should have struggled or at
least offered some resistance because she was not completely helpless.26 Appellant also suggested
that "AAA" must have been coached because initially, she did not know the acts which constitute
rape. However, during the succeeding hearings, "AAA" allegedly testified in detail the bestial acts
committed against her.27

Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to formally offer in evidence the medical
certificate and to present the doctor who conducted the medical examination to testify on his
findings.28 Likewise, "AAA’s" birth certificate was not formally offered. Neither did the Municipal Civil
Registrar who allegedly prepared the same take the witness stand. Thus appellant claimed that
assuming he was indeed guilty of the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape
and not qualified rape because the minority of the victim was not duly established.29 Further, with the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346, appellant should not be sentenced to death.30

On the other hand, appellee maintained that "AAA’s" credibility was beyond doubt31 and that it was
unnecessary to offer proof of resistance where the assailant exercised moral ascendancy against his
victim, as in this case.32 Appellee insisted that the crimes committed were three counts of qualified,
and not simple, rape considering that "AAA" was a minor and the offender was her father,33 and that
the parties had already stipulated during pre-trial as regards the age of the victim.34

On November 5, 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 28 November 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51 in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157, T-3158 and T-3159 finding
accused-appellant Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
qualified rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion
perpetua for each count of qualified rape, without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103, as
amended. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant/victim ["AAA"], for
each count of qualified rape, the amounts of Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as
moral damages and Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.35

The appellate court found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
"AAA."36 Although there were occasions when "AAA" would not immediately answer the questions
propounded to her, the CA opined that it was because she was either distressed in recounting her
horrible experiences or in tears.37 The appellate court likewise considered the fact that "AAA" was
only 13 years old when she testified on her harrowing experiences.38

The appellate court likewise brushed aside appellant’s contention that "AAA" did not offer any
resistance. According to the CA, appellant’s moral ascendancy over "AAA" substitutes for violence
or intimidation.39

The CA also concluded that even without the medical certificate, appellant could still be held liable
for three counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on the credible testimony of "AAA" and
the medical certificate would only be corroborative evidence.40 Anent the birth certificate, the CA
recalled that during pre-trial, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the appellant had
already been stipulated upon. Hence, the said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the
Informations and proven during trial.41

Finally, the CA held that appellant’s denial is intrinsically weak and self-serving especially
considering "AAA’s" credible and straightforward testimony.42

Our Ruling

Both the appellant and the appellee opted not to file their supplemental briefs.43

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we must state that we entertain no doubt that appellant thrice raped his daughter,
"AAA." We examined the records and we find "AAA’s" testimony convincing and straightforward. We
therefore have no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
victim’s testimony, more so in this case where the said findings were affirmed by the CA.

We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that appellant could be convicted of rape even
without the medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony
of the victim, provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things."44 As stated above, "AAA’s" testimony was credible and
convincing. As such, appellant’s conviction could rest solely on it. The medical certificate would only
serve as corroborative evidence.

We, however, agree with the appellant that both the medical certificate and "AAA’s" birth certificate,
although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been considered by the trial court
and the CA because they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not
formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution
rested its case after presenting the testimony of "AAA" without formally offering any documentary
exhibit at all.
Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha45 is instructive, thus:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any
evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

xxxx

The Rules of Court [provide] that ‘the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.’ A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

xxxx

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during
pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as
evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It
must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the
party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that
any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.46ten.lihpwal

We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of Tax Appeals47 where one of the issues presented
was whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely abused their discretion "in allowing the
admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.48 In finding the case impressed with merit, the Court held that:

Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed
before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases.
Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the
rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the
CTA. x x x

xxxx

x x x [T]he presentation of the BIR’s evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be
disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the
truth of BIR’s claims against the Estate. The BIR’s failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence,
despite CTA’s directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a
single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the
BIR.49
We are not unaware that there is an exception to the above-stated rule. In People v. Mate,50 Silvestre
Mate (Mate) was charged with the crime of "Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder and Frustrated
Murder."51 During arraignment, he entered a plea of "guilty." The court then propounded clarificatory
questions to determine whether the accused understood the consequences of his plea. Immediately
thereafter, the trial court promulgated its decision finding the accused guilty as charged and
sentenced him to death.52 It was only after the rendition of the judgment that the trial court conducted
hearings for the reception of the prosecution’s evidence.53

From the prosecution’s evidence, it would appear that during the investigation, Mate voluntarily
made extra-judicial statements as contained in Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." Also, after his conviction,
he appeared as witness for the prosecution against his co-accused where he affirmed his extra-
judicial statements in Exhibits "A," "B," and "J." However, the state prosecutor failed to formally offer
said exhibits.

In debunking the defense’s contentions that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of
conviction on Mate even before the prosecution could present its evidence, and in considering the
exhibits which were not formally offered, the Court held thus:

The defense contends that the trial court committed a serious error in rendering judgment of
conviction immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the crime charged on the basis of his plea of
guilty and before receiving any evidence. While the trial court committed an error in rendering
judgment immediately after the accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter, conducted hearings for
the reception of the evidence for the prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient to justify the
setting aside of the judgment of conviction, considering that it is supported by the judicial and extra-
judicial confessions of the accused and by other evidence. x x x

xxxx

The defense questions also the failure of the state prosecutor Cornelio Melendres to make a formal
offer of his exhibits, although they have been marked and identified. Such an oversight appears
trivial because the entire evidence for the prosecution is recorded. Even without the exhibits which
have been incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the case
because the witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded.

Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate because it appears with clarity that he
voluntarily and spontaneously gave those narrations without compulsion from anybody. In fact, . . .
when he testified against Ben Bohol he affirmed those narrations again.54

In Mato v. Court of Appeals,55 we concretized the above ruling by holding that evidence, although not
formally offered in evidence, may be "admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case."56 In
Ramos v. Dizon,57 we deemed the exhibits to have been incorporated into the records because they
had been "presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case."58 Likewise, the first requisite was
deemed satisfied because one of the parties therein explained the contents of the exhibits when
interrogated by the respondents’ counsel.59

In the instant case, we find the rulings espoused in People v. Mate,60 Mato v. Court of Appeals,61 and
Ramos v. Dizon62 not applicable. Thus, we find that both the trial court and the CA erred in allowing
the admission of "AAA’s" medical certificate and birth certificate. The records would show that the
lone witness for the prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain their contents. When
"AAA" was placed on the witness stand, she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No reference
was ever made to her birth certificate. The same is true with the medical certificate. After the
marking during the pre-trial, the prosecution did not refer to it in any stage of the proceedings.
Neither did it present the doctor who prepared the same.

Moreover, appellant’s admission during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12 years of
age63 would not help the prosecution’s case. First, the trial court found this admission inaccurate as
in fact, "AAA" was already above 12 years of age when the rape incident transpired on June 9, 2002.
Second and more important, appellant’s admission during pre-trial is not admissible as it violates
Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which explicitly provides that: "All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed
by the accused and his counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against the accused. x x x." In
People v. Chua Uy,64 we held that:

Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits "D" to
"D-4", inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, the admission cannot
be used in evidence against him because the Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his
counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed by his counsel.

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his
counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused
against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have entered
into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference;
eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused of the facts agreed upon.

In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial Order was not signed by both appellant and his
counsel.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to
prove "AAA’s" minority. "In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged
must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the
victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and proven
beyond reasonable doubt."65

In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of three counts of simple rape66 the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua for each count. Accordingly, the awards of civil indemnity must be
reduced to ₱50,000.00 and moral damages to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the award of exemplary damages
is proper. "Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Relationship as an alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code is considered aggravating in the crime of
rape."67 In this case, the aggravating circumstance of relationship was duly established. Appellant
himself admitted when he testified in open court that he is "AAA’s" father. However, the award of
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages must be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.68
WHEREFORE, we find appellant Saturnino Villanueva GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and
accordingly sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his victim
"AAA" the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108028 July 30, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISTINA M HERNANDEZ, accused-appellant.

FRANCISCO, J.:p

Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale in violating of Article 38 (a) and (b) in relation to Article 13 (b) and
(c) of the New Labor Code , committed as follows:
1

That in or about and during the period comprised between December 14, 1988 to
December 24, 1988, inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following
persons to wit: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO P. LEGASPI, SONNY P.
BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA, BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P.
VALENZUELA, ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR.,
RONALD T. CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ (herein
known as private complainants) without first having secured the required license or
authority from the POEA.  (Emphasis supplied.)
2

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. Of the
fourteen (14) private complainants, four (4) were presented as witnesses for the prosecution,
namely: Benito L. Bernabe, Robert P. Velasquez, Gregorio P. Mendoza and Arnel Mendoza.
They testified to the following essential facts: Private complainants' first encounter with the
appellant was on December 12, 1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied them to the
office of the Philippine Thai Association, Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita, Manila to meet the
appellant. Introducing herself as the general manager of Philippine-Thai, appellant asserted
that her company recruited workers for placement abroad and asked private complainants if
they wanted to work as factory workers in Taipeh. Enticed by the assurance of immediate
employment and an $800 per month salary, private complainants applied. Appellant required
private complainants to pay placement and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00
per applicant, to be paid in three installments, to wit: P1,500 on December 14, 1988,
P10,000.00 on December 16, 1988, and P11,000.00 on December 22, 1988. When the
complainants-witnesses paid the first two installments, they were issued receipts by Liza
Mendoza, the alleged treasurer of Philippine-Thai signed by the latter in the presence of the
appellant. The receipts for the last installment paid by them were signed by Liza Mendoza,
and the appellant. After having received the entire amount  from the witnesses, appellant
3

assured them that they would be able to leave for Taipeh sometime before the end of
December, 1988. But contrary to appellant's promise, complainants-witnesses were unable
to leave for abroad. They demanded for the return of their money but to no avail. Appellant's
unfulfilled promise of employment and her refusal to return the money that had been paid by
way of placement and passport fees, triggered the filing of the complaint.
For its part, the defense presented as its lone witness, the appellant whose testimony
consisted mainly in denying the charges against her. Appellant claimed that she never met
any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of them. She likewise denied having
received money from anyone and asserted that she did not know any Liza Mendoza who is
the alleged treasure of Philippine-Thai. Appellant maintained that although she had an office
in Ermita Building located at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila, the said office belonged to B.C.
Island Wood Products Corporation which was engaged in the logging business. However,
when questioned further, appellant admitted being the president of Philippine-Thai but only in
a nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-president, she did not participate in any of
its transactions. Appellant likewise insisted that Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the
barong tagalog business.

After careful calibration of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the
court a quo rendered a decision holding that the defense of "denial" interposed by the
accused could not prevail over the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.  The 4

dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby finds that the accused
CRISTINA HERNANDEZ, (sic) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment, committed in large scale, as defined in Article 38(a) & (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1412, . . . in relation to Article 13(b) and (c) . . . , accordingly, sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment (RECLUSION PERPETUA)
with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; to return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of TWENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500) PESOS; to ROBERT P.
VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL MENDOZA the
amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS also
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, November 29, 1991. 5

Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the judgment of conviction assigning the
following errors against the lower court:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED "LIABLE OF (sic)

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN A LARGE SCALE AND BY A
SYNDICATE (sic)" FOR HAVING "MAINTAINED OFFICE WITHOUT LICENSE OR
REGISTRATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THRU ITS OFFICE, THE
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)."

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE "FACT THAT
ACCUSED CRISTINA M. HERNANDEZ HAD BEEN CHARGED . . . OF ANOTHER
 ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT . . . DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88-62599"
AND IN CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY THEREOF AS EVIDENCE OF THE
"SCHEME AND STRATEGY ADOPTED BY THE ACCUSED . . . AND PRACTICED
WITH THE HELP OF HER AGENTS AND OTHER PERSONS WORKING UNDER
THE SHADE OF HER PROTECTION."

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE OR WEIGHT TO THE

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED. 6

The first assignment of error is anchored on the contention that the prosecution failed to
prove one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment — that the offender is
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement
of workers.  The aforementioned element, specifically the fact that neither appellant nor
7

Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers as shown by the records of the
POEA, was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the prosecution and admitted by the
defense during trial. Appellant assails as erroneous the reliance placed by the prosecution
on the said stipulation of facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to prove the
said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation of
facts was not tantamount to an admission by the appellant of the fact of non-possession of
the requisite authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an admission that the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the
stipulation of facts is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. Appellant posits
the foregoing arguments to bolster her contention that the stipulation of facts did not relieve
the prosecution of its duty to present evidence to prove all the elements of the crime charged
to the end that the guilt of the accused may be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

At the outset, it should be said that the above contention and the arguments are insignificant
in view of the fact that records disclose that the prosecution had in fact presented evidence
to prove the said element of the crime of illegal recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certification
issued by the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA, attesting to the fact that neither appellant
nor Philippine-Thai is licensed/authorized to recruit workers for employment abroad, was
offered and admitted in evidence without the objection of the appellant. 8

Although appellant's arguments find no significant bearing in the face of the existence of
"EXHIBIT I", they nonetheless require deeper scrutiny and a clear response for future
application. Hence, the following discussion.

Appellant correctly distinguishes between an admission that a particular witness if presented

in court would testify to certain facts, and an admission of the facts themselves. According to
the appellant, what was stipulated on between the prosecution and defense counsel at the
hearing on June 6, 1990 was "merely that the testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the
POEA would be to the effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers",  Thus:
9

Prosecutor

. . . Before we call on our first witness, we propose some stipulations regarding the
testimony of the Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA — that Cristina Hernandez is
not a (sic) licensed nor authorized by the Department of Labor to recruit workers
abroad.
 Court

Would you agree?

Atty. Ulep (Counsel for the Accused): Agreed, Your Honor.  10

She claims that the foregoing clearly indicate that there was no judicial admission of the fact of non-
possession of a license/authority but rather a mere admission that the witness, if presented, would
testify to such fact. This being the case, it remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present
evidence of such fact. To buttress her position, the following was cited to note the distinction:

Suppose a case is set for trial and one of the parties moves for a continuance
because of the absence of W, an important witness. His opponent, who is anxious to
go to trial; asks what are the facts to which W would testify. The other attorney tells
him, adding: "If I consent to the overruling of my motion, will you stipulate that those
are the facts?" The attorney who is pressing for trial says: "No but I will stipulate that
if W were called in this case as a witness, he would so testify." What is the difference
between the two stipulations?

In the first stipulation proposed there is a judicial admission of the facts, and they
cannot be contradicted. But the second stipulation proposed will only have the same
effect as if the witness had testified to the facts. Such testimony the party is free to
contradict.11

The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately inapplicable to the case at bar. Conveniently omitted
from the appellant's reply chief is the ensuing statement made by the court after counsel for the
accused, Atty. Ulep agreed to the stipulation proposed by the prosecution, to wit:

Atty. Ulep (counsel for the accused): Agreed, Your Honor.

Court

The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate/admit that from the record of the
POEA Licensing and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and Employment, accused
Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc., Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by the office
to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if the duly authorized representative from
the POEA Administration is to take the witness stand, he will confirm to this fact as
borne by the records.  (Emphasis supplied.)
12

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution and the defense counsel stipulated on two
things: that ". . . from the record of the POEA, . . . accused Cristina Hernandez, Phil. etc. Ass. . . . is
neither licensed nor authorized by that office to recruit workers for overseas abroad and that if the
duly authorized representative from the POEA Administration (sic) is to take the witness stand, he
will confirm to this fact . . . ."  The claim that the lower court mistakenly interpreted defense counsel's
13

acquiescence to the prosecution's proposed stipulation as an admission of non-possession of the

requisite POEA license or authority is belied by the fact that after the above enunciation by the court,
no objection was interposed by defense counsel.

Appellant further contends that granting arguendo that defense counsel had in fact agreed to the
above stipulation of facts, the same is null and void for being contrary to the well-established rule
that a stipulation of facts is not allowed in criminal cases. To bolster this contention, appellant cited
the consistent ruling of this Court on the matter. Thus, as held in the case of U.S. vs. Donato: 14

Agreements between attorneys for the prosecution and for the defense in criminal
cases, by which it is stipulated that certain witnesses, if present, would testify to
certain facts prevent a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court and arc in
violation of the law. 15

The above ruling was reiterated in a subsequent case where the accused was convicted solely on
the basis of an agreement between the fiscal and the counsel for the accused that certain witnesses
would testify confirming the complaint in all its parts. In reversing the judgment of conviction, this
Court held that:

It is neither proper nor permissible to consider a case closed, or to render judgment

therein, by virtue of an agreement entered into between the provincial fiscal and the
counsel for the accused with reference to facts, some of which are favorable to the
defense, and others related to the prosecution, without any evidence being adduced
or testimony taken from the witnesses mentioned in the agreement; such practice is
not authorized and defeats the purposes of criminal law; it is an open violation of the
rules of criminal procedure . . . .
16

The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal cases is grounded on the fundamental right of
the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and corollary duty of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefor advanced that the prosecution
being duty-bound to prove all the elements of the crime, may not be relieve of this obligation by the
mere expedient of stipulating with defense counsel on a matter constitutive of an essential elements
of the crime charged.

The rationale behind the proscription against this class of agreements between prosecution and
defense was enunciated in the case of U.S. vs. Manlimos: 7 1

It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or competence of counsel to predict

what a proposed witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the test of
cross-examination. A conviction for crime should not rest upon mere conjecture. Nor
is it possible for a trial court to weigh with exact nicety the contradictory declaration of
witnesses not produced so as to be subjected to its observation and its judgment as
to their credibility.
18

However, in the light of recent changes in our rules on criminal procedure, particularly the pre-trial
provisions found in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal cases no longer
holds true. Rule 118 provides the following:

Sec. 1. Pre-trial; when proper — To expedite trial, where the accused and counsel
agree, the court shall conduct a pre-trial conference on the matters enunciated in
Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the accused.

Sec. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects . . . The pre-trial conference shall consider the
following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

 (b) Stipulation of facts;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

By virtue of the foregoing rule, a stipulation facts in criminal cases is now expressly sanctioned by
law. In further pursuit of the objective of expediting trial by dispensing with the presentation of
evidence on matters that the accused is willing to admit, a stipulation of fact should be allowed not
only during pre-trial but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself. Parenthetically, although
not expressly sanctioned under the old rules of court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal
cases has long been allowed and recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence,
binding upon the parties. In the case of People vs. Mapa  where the accused was charged with
19

illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the fact that the
accused was found in possession of gun without the requisite permit or license. More at point is the
case of People vs. Bocar  wherein the fiscal proposed the admission by the accused of the affidavits
20

and other exhibits already presented by the prosecution to dispense with oral testimonies on the
matter. Holding that the admissions made by the parties were binding, this Court stated that:

. . . [T]here is nothing unlawful or irregular about the above procedure. The

declarations constitute judicial admission, which are binding on the parties, by virtue
of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and
the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statements
contained in the exhibits.  (Emphasis supplied.)
21

American jurisprudence has established the acceptability of the practice of stipulating during the trial
of criminal cases, and categorically stated in People vs. Hare  that:
22

The record discloses that the defense counsel stipulated to what certain witnesses
would testify if they were present in court. . . .

. . . The defendant contends that it was error for his counsel to make these
stipulations. This court has held that an accused may by stipulation waive the
necessity of a proof of all or any part of the case which the people have alleged
against him and that having done so, he cannot complain in this Court of evidence
which he has stipulated into the
record. 23

The collorally issue left for the determination of this Court is whether or not Section 4 of Rule 118—
requiring an agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference to be reduced
in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel before the same may be used in evidence
against the accused-equally applies to a stipulation of facts made during trial. We resolved this issue
in the negative.

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is
automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in
court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in
view of the fact that: ". . . an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit . . .
has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, . . . which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive."  (Emphasis supplied.)
24

In fact, "judicial admission are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the
purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the
trial."
25
The foregoing find basis in the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of his counsel who
represents him.  For all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the
26

acts of his client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the lawyer
except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice to the client. 7 No cogent reason
2

exists to make such exception in this case. It is worth noting that Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in
the lower court, agreed to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution not out of mistake nor
inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of facts was also in conformity of defense's
theory of the case. It may be recalled that throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant
staunchly denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either in her personal capacity or
through Philippine-Thai. Therefore, it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that
neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to recruit workers.

It is true that the rights of an accused during trial are given paramount importance in our laws on
criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the accused is the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against
him.  But the right of confrontation guaranteed and secured to the accused is a personal privilege
28

which may be waived.  Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Anastasio,  this Court deemed as a waiver of
29 30

the right of confrontation, the admission by the accused that witnesses if present would testify to
certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.
31

In the same vein, it may be said that such an admission is a waiver of the right of an accused to
present evidence on his behalf. Although the right to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than
the Constitution itself for the protection of the accused, this right may be waived expressly or
impliedly.  This is in consonance with the doctrine of waiver which recognizes that ". . . everyone has
32

a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large." 33

The abovementioned doctrine is squarely applicable to the case at bar. Appellant was never
prevented from presenting evidence contrary to the stipulation of facts. If appellant believed that the
testimony of the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her case, then it is the
defense who should have presented him. Her continuous failure to do so during trial was a waiver of
her right to present the pertinent evidence to contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her
defense.

In view of the foregoing, the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by
defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on.
Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in

the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.

We now go to appellant's second and third assignment of errors. In her second assignment of error,
appellant makes much ado of the "judicial notice" taken by the lower court of the fact that appellant
had been charged with another illegal recruitment case,  and in considering the pendency thereof as
34

evidence of the scheme and strategy adopted by the accused. Appellant cites a violation of Section
3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that before the court may take judicial notice of
any matter, the parties shall be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case. It is claimed that the lower court never announced its intention to take judicial notice of the
pendency of the other illegal recruitment case nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon.
It is true that as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge.  However, this rule is subject to the exception that:
35

. . . in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court

may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives
as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated, . . .  (emphasis supplied.)
36

The judicial notice taken by the lower court of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case
against the appellant falls squarely under the above exception in view of the fact that it was the
appellant herself who introduced evidence on the matter when she testified in open court as follows:

Q: You mean to say . . . by the way, where (sic) were you at the NBI
when Mrs. Cinco inquired from you about placement abroad?

A: I was just invited by the personnel of the NBI and I was not allowed
to go home.

Q: Whey were you invited by the NBI?

A: They told me that there was a complaint against me.

Q: Complaint about what?

A: The same case.

Q: You mean illegal recruitment also?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: You made mention that an illegal recruitment case which was

supposed to be the cause of your detention at the NBI . . .

I am not referring to this case, Mrs. Hernandez — what happened to

that case, what is the status of that case?

A: It is also in this sala.

COURT: It is already submitted for decision.  7 3

Even assuming, however, that the lower court improperly took judicial notice of the pendency of
another illegal recruitment case against the appellant, the error would not be fatal to the
prosecution's cause. The judgment of conviction was not based on the existence of another illegal
recruitment case filed against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the
overwhelming evidence against her in the instant case.
Anent the last assignment of error, suffice it to say that we do not find any compelling reason to
reverse the findings of the lower court that appellant's bare denials cannot overthrow the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses against her.

Well established is the rule that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.  That
38

she did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her appointment as mere
nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt at exculpating herself and is of no
consequence whatsoever when weighed against the positive declarations of witnesses that it was
the appellant who executed the acts of illegal recruitment as complained of.

Finally, under Article 39 of the New Labor Code, the penalty for illegal recruitment committed in large
scale is life imprisonment and a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00). As
previously held by this Court, life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua.  The
39

lower court erred in imposing "the penalty of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) with the
accessory penalties provided for by law; . . .  (Emphasis supplied)
40

WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby
AFFIRMED, and the penalty imposed MODIFIED as follows: the court sentences the accused to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to return and pay to
BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500.00)
PESOS; to ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO P. MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,000.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198742               August 10, 2012

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN, Respondents.

SERENO,*

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ *

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public
office.

The Case

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
1 

Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC
2 

(AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order dated November 30, 2010 of
3 

COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioner’s appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated
Decision dated October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33,
4 

declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her position
as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.

The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to
a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and
5 

the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which
in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.
6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in
her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position
of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M.
7 

Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for
8 

quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to
be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

Ruling of the RTC

In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioner’s failure to
comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As
admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in
Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer
oath. Consequently, the RTC’s decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents]
and AGAINST (petitioner):

1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the

office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;

2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and

3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.

SO ORDERED. 9

Ruling of the COMELEC

The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in
its Order dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period.
10 

On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its
Resolution dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal
11 

were given due course. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the
RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents.

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as

follows:

1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;

2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and

3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

12 

Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc.

The Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006,
she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of
candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does
not apply to her.

She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In
support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5,
2003 containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No.
9225.

She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they
failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.

Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive
merits of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the
continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC’s
judgment.

The Issues

Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the
merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order
the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private
respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of
determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.

The Court’s Ruling

I. An appeal may be simultaneously

reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC
en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
to wit:

Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved
by the division which issued the order.

Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en banc’s
prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from
directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of
remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it.

We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en
banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement.

Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the
petitioner not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her
eligibility. She even filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting
documents to her contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after
13 

obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc’s exercise of

discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first
place.

The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially
dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioner’s appeal. A decision
or resolution of any adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioner’s
argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en banc’s adjudicatory
powers.

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be
unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases
espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 14

II. The COMELEC en banc has the

power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.

We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order
the issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment
in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by
Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 15

Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an
appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, we stressed the import of
16 

the provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be
executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the
COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
III. Private respondents are not
estopped from questioning
petitioner’s eligibility to hold public
office.

The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of
candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo
warranto before the RTC.

Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a
petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his
certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)

Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition
within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for
whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another
chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten
(10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 17

The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they
did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253.

IV. Petitioner is disqualified from

running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
18 

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil
and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in
Section 5, viz:

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5,
2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not
under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to
interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro
forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on
the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the
precursor of R.A. No. 9225.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is
exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of
the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no
occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A.
19 

No. 9225 is one such instance.

Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one
way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered
ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible meanings. 20

The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
21 

categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective
public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the
renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal, when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or
22 

retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for
those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under
the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with
under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in
the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225),
where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to
Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of
foreign citizenship;

xxxx

The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have
one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)
23 

Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC, we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running

24 

for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his
American citizenship.

We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase
"sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be
25 

formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even a26 

resort to the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same
inference, viz:

INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER

Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born
Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.

Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos
who have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he
sought clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce
their foreign citizenship.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full
civil and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they
are required to make a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for
public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular provision.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any
issues that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently
cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States considered a naturalized
American still as an American citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its
elections.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not
required to renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for
public office must renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction
in the Bill.

Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and
are now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As
such, he likewise inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run for the highest
elective positions in the country.

Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn
renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration
requirements as provided for in the Constitution.

Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens at the time of birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her
citizenship.

Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No.
63. The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their
citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to
include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the
accountability of public officers.

In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign
citizenship will only become a pro forma requirement.

On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who
became foreign citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be
considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-
presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a
natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that
the Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of
being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.

As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino
citizens and Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He
then suggested that the Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos
who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they
should be considered as repatriated citizens.

In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latter’s
comments on the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the
Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being natural-
born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now
wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship.

Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage
to a foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by
simply taking her oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens
who are not considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had
renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be allowed to
revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino
citizenship. He underscored that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.

On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep.
Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign
citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated
citizens.

Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino
citizens under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
maturity, are not deemed as natural-born citizens.

In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery
of one’s original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.

On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to
natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body
in plenary session will decide on the matter. 27

The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javier’s statement; she
conveniently disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records.

The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javier’s statement
ought to be understood within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former
natural-born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to
their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions
reserved only to natural-born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.

It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and
not as natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their
citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status
as natural-born citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that
natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship,
Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as
a mere pro forma requirement.

Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must
be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-
born Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform
any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner
wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for
public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18,
Article XI of the Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which
provides:

Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times
and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing,

that one’s statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath
implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an
oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false. 28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to
the prospective public officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance
and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes;
it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when
the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.

Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed
to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
29 

Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign
law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an
attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section
of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2)
likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed
rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the
circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a
number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law. 30

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above
methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of
the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing
that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a
quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the
said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of
the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law
31 

to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so
conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read
the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a
brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. 32

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation
of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with
dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign
citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on
33 

August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship.34

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the
most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.35

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship
and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all
36 

those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether
they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for
public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens
who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores
their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the
exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run
for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010
is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182864               January 12, 2015

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., & MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD., Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  of the Decision  of the Second Division of the
1 2

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88744 dated 31 January 2008, modifying the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) by upholding the liability of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI) but
absolving Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) from liability and deleting the award of attorney's fees.

The facts gathered from the records follow:

On 29 December 2004, BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS) and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance
Company Limited (Mitsui) filed a Complaint  before the RTC of Makati City against ESLI and ATI to
3

recover actual damages amounting to US$17,560.48 with legal interest, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit.

In their complaint, BPI/MS and Mitsui alleged that on 2 February 2004 at Yokohama, Japan,
Sumitomo Corporation shipped on board ESLI’s vessel M/V "Eastern Venus 22" 22 coils of various
Steel Sheet weighing 159,534 kilograms in good order and condition for transportation to and
delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in favor of consignee Calamba Steel Center, Inc. (Calamba
Steel) located in Saimsim, Calamba, Laguna as evidenced by a Bill of Lading with Nos.
ESLIYMA001. The declared value of the shipment was US$83,857.59 as shown by an Invoice with
Nos. KJGE-03-1228-NT/KE3. The shipment was insured with the respondents BPI/MS and Mitsui
against all risks under Marine Policy No. 103-GG03448834.

On 11 February 2004, the complaint alleged that the shipment arrived at the port of Manila in an
unknown condition and was turned over to ATI for safekeeping. Upon withdrawal of the shipment by
the Calamba Steel’s representative, it was found out that part of the shipment was damaged and
was in bad order condition such that there was a Request for Bad Order Survey. It was found out
that the damage amounted to US$4,598.85 prompting Calamba Steel to reject the damaged
shipment for being unfit for the intended purpose.

On 12 May 2004 at Kashima, Japan, Sumitomo Corporation again shipped on board ESLI’s vessel
M/V "Eastern Venus 25" 50 coils in various Steel Sheet weighing 383,532 kilograms in good order
and condition for transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in favor of the same
consignee Calamba Steel asevidenced by a Bill of Lading with Nos. ESLIKSMA002. The declared
value of the shipment was US$221,455.58 as evidenced by Invoice Nos. KJGE-04-1327-NT/KE2.
The shipment was insured with the respondents BPI/MS and Mitsui against all risks under Marine
Policy No. 104-GG04457785.

On 21 May 2004, ESLI’s vessel withthe second shipment arrived at the port of Manila partly
damaged and in bad order. The coils sustained further damage during the discharge from vessel to
shore until its turnover to ATI’s custody for safekeeping.
Upon withdrawal from ATI and delivery to Calamba Steel, it was found out that the damage
amounted to US$12,961.63. As it did before, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged shipment for
being unfit for the intended purpose.

Calamba Steel attributed the damages on both shipments to ESLI as the carrier and ATI as the
arrastre operator in charge of the handling and discharge of the coils and filed a claim against them.
When ESLI and ATI refused to pay, Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim for the total amount of
the cargo against BPI/MS and Mitsuias cargo insurers. As a result, BPI/MS and Mitsui became
subrogated in place of and with all the rights and defenses accorded by law in favor of Calamba
Steel.

Opposing the complaint, ATI, in itsAnswer, denied the allegations and insisted that the coils in two
shipments were already damaged upon receipt from ESLI’s vessels. It likewise insisted that it
exercised due diligence in the handling of the shipments and invoked that in case of adverse
decision, its liability should not exceed ₱5,000.00 pursuant to Section 7.01, Article VII  of the
4

Contract for Cargo Handling Services between Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and ATI.  A cross-
5

claim was also filed against ESLI.

On its part, ESLI denied the allegations of the complainants and averred that the damage to both
shipments was incurred while the same were in the possession and custody of ATI and/or of the
consignee or its representatives. It also filed a cross-claim against ATI for indemnification in case of
liability.
6

To expedite settlement, the case was referred to mediation but it was returned to the trial court for
further proceedings due tothe parties’ failure to resolve the legal issues as noted inthe Mediator’s
Report dated 28 June 2005. 7

On 10 January 2006, the court issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein the following stipulations
wereagreed upon by the parties:

1. Parties admitted the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued;

2. Parties likewise admitted the existence and due execution of the Bill of Lading covering
various steel sheets in coil attached to the Complaint as Annex A;

3. Parties admitted the existence of the Invoiceissued by Sumitomo Corporation, a true and
faithful copy of which was attached to the Complaint as Annex B;

4. Parties likewise admitted the existence of the Marine Cargo Policy issued by the Mitsui
Sumitomo Insurance Company, Limited, copy of which was attached to the Complaint as
Annex C;

5. [ATI] admitted the existence and due execution of the Request for Bad Order Survey
dated February 13, 2004, attached to the Complaint as Annex D;

6. Insofar as the second cause of action, [ESLI] admitted the existence and due execution of
the document [Bill of Lading Nos. ESLIKSMA002, Invoice with Nos. KJGE-04-1327-NT/KE2
and Marine Cargo Policy against all risks on the second shipment] attachedto the Complaint
as Annexes E, F and G;
 7. [ATI] admitted the existence of the Bill of Lading together with the Invoices and Marine
Cargo Policy. [It] likewise admitted by [ATI] are the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes
attached to the Complaint as Annexes H, H-1 and J. 8

The parties agreed that the procedural issue was whether there was a valid subrogation in favor of
BPI/MS and Mitsui; and that the substantive issues were, whether the shipments suffered damages,
the cause of damage, and the entity liable for reparation of the damages caused.  Due to the limited
9

factual mattersof the case, the parties were required to present their evidence through affidavits and
documents. Upon submission of these evidence, the case was submitted for resolution. 10

BPI/MS and Mitsui, to substantiate their claims, submitted the Affidavits of (1) Mario A. Manuel
(Manuel),  the Cargo Surveyor of Philippine Japan Marine Surveyors and Sworn Measurers
11

Corporation who personally examined and conducted the surveys on the two shipments; (2) Richatto
P. Almeda,  the General Manager of Calamba Steel who oversaw and examined the condition,
12

quantity, and quality of the shipped steel coils, and who thereafter filed formal notices and claims
against ESLI and ATI; and (3) Virgilio G. Tiangco, Jr.,  the Marine Claims Supervisor of BPI/MS who
13

processed the insurance claims of Calamba Steel. Along with the Affidavits were the Bills of
Lading  covering the two shipments, Invoices,  Notices of Loss of Calamba Steel,  Subrogation
14 15 16

Form,  Insurance Claims,  Survey Reports,  Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes  and Request
17 18 19 20

for Bad Order Survey. 21

ESLI, in turn, submitted the Affidavits of Captain Hermelo M. Eduarte,  Manager of the Operations
22

Department of ESLI, who monitored in coordination with ATI the discharge of the two shipments, and
Rodrigo Victoria (Rodrigo),  the Cargo Surveyor of R & R Industrial and Marine Services, Inc., who
23

personally surveyed the subject cargoes on board the vessel as well as the manner the ATI
employees discharged the coils. The documents presented were the Bills of Lading, Secretary’s
Certificate  of PPA, granting ATI the duty and privilege to provide arrastre and stevedoring services
24

at South Harbor, Port of Manila, Contract for Cargo Handling Services,  Damage Report  and Turn
25 26

Over Report made by Rodrigo.  ESLI also adopted the Survey Reports submitted by BPI/MS and
27

Mitsui.28

Lastly, ATI submitted the Affidavits of its Bad Order Inspector Ramon Garcia (Garcia)  and Claims 29

Officer Ramiro De Vera.  The documents attached to the submissions were the Turn Over Surveys
30

of Bad Cargo Order,  Requests for Bad Order Survey,  Cargo Gatepasses issued by ATI,  Notices
31 32 33

of Loss/Claims of Calamba Steel  and Contract for Cargo Handling Services.

34 35

On 17 September 2006, RTC Makati City rendered a decision finding both the ESLI and ATI liable
for the damages sustained by the two shipments. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [BPI/MS and Mitsui] and against [ESLI Inc.] and [ATI], jointly
and severally ordering the latter to pay [BPI/MS and Mitsui] the following: 1. Actual damages
amounting to US$17,560.48 plus 6% legal interest per annum commencing from the filing of this
complaint, until the same is fully paid;

2. Attorney’s fees in a sum equivalent to 20% of the amount claimed;

3. Costs of suit. 36

Aggrieved, ESLI and ATI filed their respective appeals before the Court of Appeals on both
questions of fact and law. 37

Before the appellate court, ESLI argued that the trial court erred when it found BPI/MS has the
capacity to sue and when it assumed jurisdiction over the case. It also questioned the ruling on its
liability since the Survey Reports indicated that the cause ofloss and damage was due to the "rough
handling of ATI’s stevedores during discharge from vessel to shore and during loading operation
onto the trucks."It invoked the limitation of liability of US$500.00 per package asprovided in
Commonwealth Act No. 65 or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).  On the other hand, ATI
38

questioned the capacity to sue of BPI/MS and Mitsui and the award of attorney’s fees despite its lack
of justification in the body of the decision. ATI also imputed error on the part of the trial court when it
ruled that ATI’s employees were negligent in the ruling of the shipments. It also insisted on the
applicability of the provision of COGSA on limitation of liability. 39

In its Decision,  the Court of Appeals absolved ATI from liability thereby modifying the decision of the
40

trial court. The dispositive portions reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of ESLI is DENIED, while that of ATI is GRANTED. The assailed
Judgment dated September 17, 2006 of Branch 138, RTC of Makati City inCivil Case No. 05-108 is
hereby MODIFIED absolving ATI from liability and deleting the award of attorney’s fees. The rest of
the decision is affirmed. 41

Before this Court, ESLI seeks the reversal of the ruling on its liability.

At the outset, and notably, ESLI included among its arguments the attribution of liability to ATI but it
failed to implead the latter as a party to the present petition. This non-inclusion was raised by
BPI/MS and Mitsui as an issue  in its Comment/Opposition  and Memorandum:  For reasons known
42 43 44

only to [ESLI],it did not implead ATI as a party respondent in this case when it could have easily
done so. Considering the nature of the arguments raised by petitioner pointing to ATI as solely
responsible for the damages sustained by the subject shipments, it is respectfully submitted that ATI
is an indispensable party in this case. Without ATI being impleaded, the issue of whether ATI is
solely responsible for the damages could not be determined with finality by this Honorable Court. ATI
certainly deserves to be heard on the issue but it could not defend itself because it was not
impleaded before this Court. Perhaps, this is the reason why [ESLI] left out ATI in this case so that it
could not rebut while petitioner puts it at fault.
45

ESLI in its Reply  put the blame for the non-exclusion of ATI to BPI/MS and Mitsui:
46

[BPI/MS and Mitsui] claim that herein [ESLI] did not implead [ATI] as a party respondent in the
Petition for Review on Certiorari it had filed. Herein Petitioner submits that it is not the obligation of
[ESLI] to implead ATI as the same isalready the look out of [BPI/MS and Mitsui]. If [BPI/MS and
Mitsui] believe that ATI should be made liable, they should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with the Honorable Court of Appeals. The fact that [BPI/MS and Mitsui] did not even lift a finger to
question the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals goes to show that [BPI/MS and Mitsui] are
not interested as to whether or not ATI is indeed liable. 47

It is clear from the exchange that both [ESLI] and [BPI/MS and Mitsui] are aware of the non-inclusion
of ATI, the arrastre operator, as a party to this review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. By
blaming each other for the exclusion of ATI, [ESLI] and [BPI/MS and Mitsui] impliedly agree that the
absolution of ATI from liability isfinal and beyond review. Clearly, [ESLI] is the consequential loser. It
alone must bear the proven liability for the loss of the shipment. It cannot shift the blame to ATI, the
arrastreoperator, which has been cleared by the Court of Appeals. Neither can it argue that the
consignee should bear the loss.

Thus confined, we go to the merits of the arguments of ESLI.

First Issue: Liability of ESLI

ESLI bases of its non-liability onthe survey reports prepared by BPI/MS and Mitsui’s witness Manuel
which found that the cause of damage was the rough handling on the shipment by the stevedores of
ATI during the discharging operations.  However, Manuel does not absolve ESLI of liability. The
48

witness in fact includes ESLI in the findings of negligence. Paragraphs 3 and 11 of the affidavit of
witness Manuel attribute fault to both ESLI and ATI.

3. The vessel M.V. "EASTERN VENUS" V 22-S carrying the said shipment of 22 coils of various
steel sheets arrived at the port of Manila and discharged the said shipment on or about 11 February
2004 to the arrastre operator [ATI]. I personally noticed that the 22 coils were roughly handled during
their discharging from the vessel to the pier of [ATI] and even during the loading operations of these
coils from the pier to the trucks that will transport the coils to the consignees’s warehouse. During
the aforesaid operations, the employees and forklift operators of [ESLI] and [ATI] were very
negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes.

xxxx

11. The vessel M.V. "EASTERN VENUS" V 25-S carrying the said shipment of 50 coils of various
steel sheets arrived at the port of Manila and discharged the said shipment on or about 21 May 2004
to the arrastre operator [ATI]. I personally noticed that the 50 coils were roughly handled during their
discharging from the vessel to the pier of [ATI] and even during the loading operations of these coils
from the pier to the trucks that will transport the coils to the consignees’s warehouse. During the
aforesaid operations, the employees and forklift operators of [ESLI] and [ATI] were very negligent in
the handling of the subject cargoes.  (Emphasis supplied).
49

ESLI cannot rely only on parts it chooses. The entire body of evidence should determine the liability
of the parties. From the statements of Manuel, [ESLI] was negligent, whether solely or together with
ATI.

To further press its cause, ESLI cites the affidavit of its witness Rodrigo who stated that the cause of
the damage was the rough mishandling by ATI’s stevedores.

The affidavit of Rodrigo states that his functions as a cargo surveyor are, (1) getting hold of a copy of
the bill of lading and cargo manifest; (2) inspection and monitoring of the cargo on-board, during
discharging and after unloading from the vessel; and (3) making a necessary report of his findings.
Thus, upon arrival at the South Harbor of Manila of the two vessels of ESLI on 11 February 2004
and on 21 May 2004, Rodrigo immediately boarded the vessels to inspect and monitor the unloading
of the cargoes. In both instances, it was his finding that there was mishandling on the part of ATI’s
stevedores which he reported as the cause of the damage.  Easily seen, however, is the absence of
50

a crucial point in determining liability of either or both ESLI and ATI – lack of determination whether
the cargo was in a good order condition as described in the bills of lading at the time of his boarding.
As Rodrigo admits, it was also his duty to inspect and monitor the cargo on-board upon arrival of the
vessel. ESLI cannot invoke its non-liability solely on the manner the cargo was discharged and
unloaded. The actual condition of the cargoes upon arrival prior to discharge is equally important
and cannot be disregarded. Proof is needed that the cargo arrived at the port of Manila in good order
condition and remained as such prior to its handling by ATI.

Common carriers, from the nature of their business and on public policy considerations, are bound to
observe extra ordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to
certain exceptions enumerated under Article 1734  of the Civil Code, common carriers are
51

responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of
the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively,
by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. 52

In maritime transportation, a bill of lading is issued by a common carrier as a contract, receipt and
symbol of the goods covered by it.  If it has no notation of any defect ordamage in the goods, it is
1âwphi1

considered as a "clean bill of lading." A clean bill of lading constitutes prima facie evidence of the
receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described. 53

Based on the bills of lading issued, it is undisputed that ESLI received the two shipments of coils
from shipper Sumitomo Corporation in good condition at the ports of Yokohama and Kashima,
Japan. However, upon arrival at the port of Manila, some coils from the two shipments were partly
dented and crumpled as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes No. 67982 dated
13 February 2004  and Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes Nos. 68363  and 68365  both
54 55 56

dated 24 May 2004 signed by ESLI’s representatives, a certain Tabanao and Rodrigo together with
ATI’s representative Garcia. According toTurn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes No. 67982, four
coils and one skid were partly dented and crumpled prior to turnover by ESLI to ATI’s possession
while a total of eleven coils were partly dented and crumpled prior to turnover based on Turn Over
Survey Bad Order Cargoes Nos. 68363 and 68365.

Calamba Steel requested for a re-examination of the damages sustained by the two shipments.
Based on the Requests for Bad Order Survey Nos. 58267  and 58254  covering the first shipment
57 58

dated 13 and 17 February 2004, four coils were damaged prior to turnover. The second Request for
Bad Order Survey No. 58658  dated 25 May 2004 also affirmed the earlier findings that elevencoils
59

on the second shipment were damaged prior to turnover.

In Asian Terminals, Inc., v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc.,  the Court based its ruling on liability on the
60

Bad Order Cargo and Turn Over of Bad Order. The Receipt bore a notation "B.O. not yet over to
ATI," while the Survey stated that the said steel case was not opened at the time of survey and was
accepted by the arrastre in good order. Based on these documents, packages in the Asian
Terminals, Inc. case were found damaged while in the custody of the carrier Westwind Shipping
Corporation.

Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad
order at their destination constitutes a prima faciecase of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no
adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, loss, or destruction of the goods
happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.  From the foregoing, the fault is attributable to
61

ESLI. While no longer an issue, it may be nonetheless state that ATI was correctly absolved of
liability for the damage.

Second Issue: Limitation of Liability

ESLI assigns as error the appellate court’s finding and reasoning that the package limitation under
the COGSA  is inapplicable even if the bills of lading covering the shipments only made reference to
62

the corresponding invoices. Noticeably, the invoices specified among others the weight, quantity,
description and value of the cargoes, and bore the notation "Freight Prepaid" and "As
Arranged."  ESLI argues that the value of the cargoes was not incorporated in the bills of
63

lading  and that there was no evidence that the shipper had presented to the carrier in writing prior
64

to the loading of the actual value of the cargo, and, that there was a no payment of corresponding
freight.  Finally, despite the fact that ESLI admits the existence of the invoices, it denies any
65

knowledge either of the value declared or of any information contained therein. 66

According to the New Civil Code, the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported
shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.  The Code
67

takes precedence as the primary law over the rights and obligations of common carriers with the
Code of Commerce and COGSA applying suppletorily. 68

The New Civil Code provides that a stipulation limiting a common carrier’s liability to the value of the
goods appearing in the bill of lading is binding, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater
value.  In addition, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the
69

loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. 70

COGSA, on the other hand, provides under Section 4, Subsection 5 that an amount recoverable in
case ofloss or damage shall not exceed US$500.00 per package or per customary freight unless the
nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in
the bill of lading.

In line with these maritime law provisions, paragraph 13 of bills of lading issued by ESLI to the
shipper specifically provides a similar restriction:

The value of the goods, in calculating and adjusting any claims for which the Carrier may be liable
shall, to avoid uncertainties and difficulties in fixing value, be deemed to the invoice value of the
goods plus ocean freight and insurance, if paid, Irrespective of whether any other value is greater or
less, and any partial loss or damage shall be adjusted pro rataon the basis of such value; provided,
however, that neither the Carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss,
non-delivery or misdelivery of or damage or delay to, or in connection with the custody or
transportation of the goods in an amount exceeding $500.00 per package lawful money of the United
States, or in case of goods not shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, unless the nature of
the goods and a valuation higher than $500.00 is declared in writing by the shipper on delivery to the
Carrier and inserted in the bill of lading and extra freight is paid therein as required by applicable
tariffs to obtain the benefit of such higher valuation. In which case even if the actual value of the
goods per package orunit exceeds such declared value, the value shall nevertheless be deemed to
be the declared value and any Carrier’s liability shall not exceed such declared value and any partial
loss or damage shall be adjusted pro-rata on the basis thereof. The Carrier shall not be liable for any
loss or profit or any consequential or special damage and shall have the option of replacing any lost
goods and replacing o reconditioning any damage goods. No oral declaration or agreement shall be
evidence of a value different from that provided therein. 71

xxxx

Accordingly, the issue whether or not ESLI has limited liability as a carrier is determined by either
absence or presence of proof that the nature and value of the goods have been declared by
Sumitomo Corporation and inserted in the bills of lading.

ESLI contends that the invoices specifying the weight, quantity, description and value of the cargo in
reference to the bills of lading do not prove the fact that the shipper complied with the requirements
mandated by the COGSA. It contends that there must be an insertion of this declaration in the bill of
lading itself to fall outside the statutory limitation of liability.

ESLI asserts that the appellate court erred when it ruled that there was compliance with the
declaration requirement even if the value of the shipment and fact of payment were indicated on the
invoice and not on the bill of lading itself.
There is no question about the declaration of the nature, weight and description of the goods on the
first bill of lading.

The bills of lading represent the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and obligations. It is
the best evidence of the intention of the parties which is to be deciphered from the language used in
the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who
are strangers to the contract.  Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,
72

it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. 73

As to the non-declaration of the value of the goods on the second bill of lading, we see no error on
the part of the appellate court when it ruled that there was a compliance of the requirement provided
by COGSA. The declaration requirement does not require that all the details must be written down
on the very bill of lading itself. It must be emphasized that all the needed details are in the invoice,
which "contains the itemized list of goods shipped to a buyer, stating quantities, prices, shipping
charges," and other details which may contain numerous sheets.  Compliance can be attained by
74

incorporating the invoice, by way of reference, to the bill of lading provided that the former containing
the description of the nature, value and/or payment of freight charges isas in this case duly admitted
as evidence.

In Unsworth Transport International(Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  the Court held that the
75

insertion of an invoice number does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner had
knowledge of the value of the cargo. However, the same interpretation does not squarely apply if the
carrier had been advised of the value of the goods as evidenced by the invoice and payment of
corresponding freight charges. It would be unfair for ESLI to invoke the limitation under COGSA
when the shipper in fact paid the freight charges based on the value of the goods. In Adams Express
Company v. Croninger,  it was said: "Neither is it conformable to plain principles of justice that a
76

shipper may understate the value of his property for the purpose of reducing the rate, and then
recover a larger value in case of loss. Nor does a limitation based upon an agreed value for the
purpose of adjusting the rate conflict with any sound principle of public policy." Conversely, but for
the same reason, it is unjust for ESLI to invoke the limitation when it is informed that the shipper paid
the freight charges corresponding to the value of the goods.

Also, ESLI admitted the existence and due execution of the Bills of Lading and the Invoice
containing the nature and value of the goods on the second shipment. As written in the Pre-Trial
Order,  the parties, including ESLI, admitted the existence and due execution of the two Bills of
77

Lading  together with the Invoice on the second shipment with Nos. KJGE-04-1327-NT/KE2  dated
78 79

12 May 2004. On the first shipment, ESLI admitted the existence of the Invoice with Nos. KJGE-
031228-NT/KE3  dated 2 February 2004.
80

The effect of admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or itwas signed by another
for him and with his authority.81

A review of the bill of ladings and invoice on the second shipment indicates that the shipper declared
the nature and value of the goods with the corresponding payment of the freight on the bills of
lading. Further, under the caption "description of packages and goods," it states that the description
of the goods to be transported as "various steel sheet in coil" with a gross weight of 383,532
kilograms (89.510 M3).On the other hand, the amount of the goods is referred in the invoice, the due
execution and genuineness of which has already been admitted by ESLI, is US$186,906.35 as
freight on board with payment of ocean freight of US$32,736.06 and insurance premium of
US$1,813.17. From the foregoing, we rule that the non-limitation of liability applies in the present
case.

We likewise accord the same binding effect on the contents of the invoice on the first
shipment.  ESLI contends that what was admitted and written on the pre-trial order was only the
1âwphi1

existence of the first shipment’ invoice but not its contents and due execution. It invokes admission
of existence but renounces any knowledge of the contents written on it. 82

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in
civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,Rule
18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the
subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas v.
Sandiganbayan,  this Court emphasized that:
83

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. 84

Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,  this Court declared that:

85

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party,
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent there with should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistent with what was pleaded.  (Citations omitted)
86

The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated
as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof. 87

It is inconceivable that a shipping company with maritime experience and resource like the ESLI will
admit the existence of a maritime document like an invoice even if it has no knowledge of its
contents or without having any copy thereof.

ESLI also asserts that the notation "Freight Prepaid" and "As Arranged," does not prove that there
was an actual declaration made in writing of the payment of freight as required by COGSA. ESLI did
not as it could not deny payment of freight in the amount indicated in the documents. Indeed, the
earlier discussions on ESLI's admission of the existence and due execution of the invoices, cover
and disprove the argument regarding actual declaration of payment. The bills of lading bore a
notation on the manner of payment which was "Freight Prepaid" and "As Arranged" while the
invoices indicated the amount exactly paid by the shipper to ESLI.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated 31 January 2008
and Resolution dated 5 May 2008 of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 88744 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 143689-91           November 12, 2002

SIXTO M. BAYAS and ERNESTO T. MATUDAY, petitioners,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

May pretrial stipulations duly signed by the accused and their counsel be unilaterally withdrawn
before the commencement of the trial? To this main issue, the answer is "No." Stipulations freely
and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside unless for good cause. The
Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to stipulate facts. Once they have validly and
voluntarily signed the stipulations, the accused and their counsel may not set these aside on the
mere pretext that they may be placed at a disadvantage during the trial.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying for the setting aside
of the April 28, 2000[1] and the May 26, 2000[2] Orders of the Sandiganbayan[3] (SBN) in Criminal
Case Nos. 25280-82. The first Order denied petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Documents,[4] while the second denied reconsideration.[5]

The Facts

On May 6, 1999, three Informations[6] were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto T.
Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended; and two
counts of malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of
the Revised Penal Code. They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal
treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Kabayan, Province of Benguet.

During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners pled "not guilty." The pretrial
conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was cancelled and reset to November 5, 1999, because
the counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose M. Molintas, was not prepared.[7] On November 5, 1999, the
pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of Atty. Molintas, who was allegedly "suffering
from the flu." Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the
stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. They were asked to do
so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass
upon all other matters that still remained to be resolved.[8]

On December 10, 1999, the parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," which
had been duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero.
It is reproduced hereunder:

"JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND DOCUMENTS

"COME NOW the accused, counsel for the accused and the Prosecution, by and through the
undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, unto the Honorable Court,
most respectfully aver: THAT -
"1. After a conference the Defense and the Prosecution admitted the following facts as
follows:

"a. Accused Ernesto Matuday was then the Municipal Mayor and accused Sixto
Bayas was and [is] still the Municipal Treasurer and designated Municipal
Accountant both of Kabayan, Benguet during the period relevant to this case;

"b. Both of the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and
P55,000.00.

"2. The Prosecution and Defense jointly admit the following documents as their respective
documentary exhibits x x x ([with] reservation to mark additional exhibits during the trial of
the case) as follows:

‘For the

Prosecution Common Exhibits

Exhibits for the Defense

Description

‘A’

‘1’

COA Report dated February 29, 1996

‘B’

‘2’

COA Memorandum Dated September 25, 1996

‘C’

‘3’

Page of journal entry of the Office of the Municipal Accountant

‘D’

‘4’

Resolution No. 138 of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Kabayan

Benguet carried on August 15, 1996

‘E’

‘5’
Transcript of the [S]tenographic Notes taken during the closed door session of the
Sangguniang Bayan[,] Kabayan, Benguet on August 15, 1996 at 1:50 P.M.

‘F’

‘6’

Result of the Statement of Investigation conducted On March 24, 1997

‘For Criminal Cases Nos. 25280-25281

‘G’

‘7’

Undated disbursement Voucher No. 401-9505186 For the payment of Mobilization

fee for the various Projects at Kabayan, Benguet For P510,000.00

‘H’

‘8’

Check No. 60915S-1 for P510,000.00 dated May 4, 1995 signed by both Accused
Mayor Matuday and Treasurer Bayas

‘H-1’

‘8-a’

Dorsal portion of Check No. 60915 S-1

‘H-1-a’

‘8-a-1’

Signature of accused Mayor Matuday at the Dorsal portion of Check No. 60915- S-1

‘Criminal Cases Nos. 25282-25280

‘I’

‘a’

Check No. 609177 for P55,000.00 dated June 28, 1995 signed by Mayor Matuday
and Treasurer Bayas

‘I-1’

‘9-a’
 Dorsal portion of Check No. 609177

‘I-1-a’

‘9-a-1’

Signature of Yolanda Millanes

‘I-1-b’

‘9-a-2’

Signature of Mayor Matuday

‘J’

‘10’

Undated Disbursement Voucher for P55,000.00

"3. The Defense shall present at least four witness while the Prosecution opts not to present
any witness considering that Defense admitted all the documentary evidence of the
Prosecution.

"Quezon City, December 10, 1999.

(signed) (signed)
ATTY. JOSE M. MOLINTAS ATTY. EVELYN TAGUBA LUCERO
Counsel for Accused Ombudsman Prosecutor II
(signed) (signed)
SIXTO BAYAS ERNESTO MATUDAY
Accused Accused"9

On January 14, 2000, the pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence of Atty.
Molintas. The hearing was rescheduled for February 14, 2000. However, on February 7, 2000, he
moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. His motion was granted by the anti-graft court in an
Order dated February 14, 2000. In the same Order, the pretrial was rescheduled for March 31, 2000,
to give the accused ample time to employ a new counsel.

On April 26, 2000, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia M. Cinco, moved to
withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first,
Stipulation 1(b) which states that "Both the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of
P510,000.00 and P55,000.00"; and second, Exhibits "1" to "8-a". They invoked their constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan justified its denial of petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Documents in this wise:
"x x x. [For] the fact that there [was] express statement from Atty. Rogelio A. Cortes this morning that
neither fraud nor any other mistake of a serious character vitiated the consent of the parties when
they affixed their conformity to the stipulations of facts, the reason put forth by the accused or
movant’s counsel at this time, is that if these stipulations were to remain, then the accused might as
well not present any evidence on the entire accusation against him as this will already be supported
by the evidence on record. While the court, indeed, sees this as a possibility, that, by itself, is not a
ground for withdrawing any stipulation freely and knowingly made and given."[10]

In the second assailed Order, the anti-graft court denied reconsideration and reiterated its previous
stand, as follows:

"x x x. The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the accused to defend himself
is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial order; in fact, an accused can plead guilty if he so desires
or make admissions as he deems appropriate and truthful, even if in the mind of the new counsel, it
gave very few opportunities to present contesting evidence."[11]

It then added that "the pre-trial order shall remain. The admissions therein contained can be used in
this case and for whatever purpose the Rules on Evidence will allow."

Hence, this Petition.[12]

The Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

"I

Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents, considering the relevant facts and applicable laws and rules.

"II

Whether or not the denial by respondent Sandiganbayan of the withdrawal of the Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Documents would result in manifest injustice and impairment of the constitutional rights of
the petitioners.

"III

Whether or not there is a law or rule which would bar petitioners from withdrawing their Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Documents from the respondent Sandiganbayan."[13]

Plainly put, the issue raised by petitioners is whether they may be allowed to withdraw unilaterally
from the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Withdrawal from the Joint Stipulation

Petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because
allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them.
We are not persuaded.

Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases.
The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and
evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in
a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the
same time, help unclog court dockets.

Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause.[14] They should
be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound
public policy.[15] When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made
them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation
as to facts, and undue influence;[16] or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will
serve justice in a particular case.[17] Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly
made lies in the court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be
disturbed on appeal.[18]

Validity of the Joint Stipulations

While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not allege that these
were false or misleading or were obtained through force or fraud. On the contrary, they do not
dispute the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake vitiated their and their
counsel’s consent to the signing of these stipulations. They even admitted, in answer to its query,
that they had freely given their consent.

Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position, petitioners lay the blame on the alleged
incompetence of their former counsel. They claim that, in agreeing to the Joint Stipulation, he failed
to consider their legal interests.

To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact -- not, as in this case, a
mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it.[19]

Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel.
To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the
acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the
counsel.[20]

Presumption of Innocence

In their effort to withdraw from the Joint Stipulation, petitioners argue that the two questioned items
impair their constitutional right to be presumed innocent, violate their right against self-incrimination,
and deny them due process in the sense that the trial would be a "useless formality, an idle
ceremony."[21]

Other than by generalized argumentation, petitioners have not convinced us that the aforementioned
constitutional rights would be violated. True, the old Rules of Court frowned upon stipulations of facts
in criminal cases because of a perceived danger -- that by the mere expedient of stipulating with the
defense counsel the elements of the crime charged, the prosecution would relieve itself of its duty to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[22] However, the Rules were amended in
1985, precisely to enable parties to stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [23]

The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. In a case
involving illegal possession of firearms,[24] the prosecution and the defense stipulated the fact that
the accused had been found in possession of a gun without the required permit or license. In People
v. Bocar,[25] the Court considered as valid the admission by the accused of the existence of certain
affidavits and exhibits, which the prosecution had presented to dispense with oral testimonies on the
matter contained therein. In People v. Hernandez,[26] which involved illegal recruitment, the Court
upheld the joint stipulation that the accused had not been licensed or authorized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency to recruit workers for overseas jobs.

There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it
is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that "x x x everyone has a right to waive
and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on
any public right and without detriment to the community at large."[27]

In the present case, the Joint Stipulation made by the prosecution and petitioners was a waiver of
the right to present evidence on the facts and the documents freely admitted by them. There could
have been no impairment of petitioners’ right to be presumed innocent, right to due process or right
against self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel
and is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Necessity of a Pretrial Order

Petitioners further contend that the law on pretrial requires the issuance of a pretrial order to make
pretrial stipulations binding. We do not agree.

Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:

"Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. -- All agreements or admissions made or entered [into] during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they
cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of
this Rule shall be approved by the court."[28]

Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must
satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be
signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned in the last sentence
of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such
approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable
it to control the flow of the proceedings.

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated.[29] Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind
them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.[30] If the accused are
allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise
be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.
There is another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must be noted that the
SBN could not fully act on the matter, not through its fault, but because of the continued absence of
petitioners’ counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the intended completion of the pretrial on
January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint Stipulation because he was absent. Also, the
pretrial conference had to be re-scheduled six times, just to ensure the attendance of the parties and
their counsels and to prepare them for the conference.

Therefore, under these circumstances, the SBN cannot be faulted for its failure to approve expressly
the stipulations. It had the opportunity to rule on the matter only when the accused, through their
new counsel, Atty. Cecilia L. Cinco, moved to withdraw their stipulations. In its first assailed Order,
the SBN upheld their validity, thereby effectively approving the submitted Joint Stipulation of Facts
and Documents. The assent of the court to agreements of the parties, assisted by their counsel, is
assumed until they indicate a dissent.[31] Thus, the stipulations freely made by the latter are to be
respected as their true will and intention with regard to the facts and evidence of the case, especially
if the anti-graft court has not struck them down for being violative of the law.

Role of Lawyers in Pretrials

Pretrial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. It is therefore important
that the parties take active roles in the proceedings. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if
the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an
acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
[32]

Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real
issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or
injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise
relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid
stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully assented to.[33]

The records reveal that the parties were the ones who volunteered to make the Joint Stipulation of
the facts of the case. Thus, the anti-graft court can rightfully expect that both parties arrived upon it
with fairness and honesty. Therefore, petitioners may not assail it on the mere ground that it would
allegedly put the accused at a disadvantage. Furthermore, a new counsel cannot justify such
withdrawal by the simple expedient of passing the blame on the previous counsel, who had
supposedly not sufficiently discharged his duty to the client.

If we allow parties to renege on stipulations they validly entered into during the course of pretrial
proceedings, there would be no end to litigations.[34] Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements
the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember, however, that they are not merely
representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties
-- assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice[35] -- is more significant than that of
acquitting their client,[36] rightly or wrongly.

We stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.[37] They should realize that the earlier they dispose of their cases, especially at the
pretrial stage, the better for them. In doing so, they can now concentrate and work more efficiently
on their other cases.[38]

Grave Abuse of Discretion

As already discussed, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the sound
discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed on
appeal.[39] There is "grave abuse of discretion" where "a power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and
so gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or
in contemplation of law."[40]

Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into.
Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the anti-graft court for failing to immediately
act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the
continued absence of petitioners’ counsel.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 213198, July 01, 2019

GENEVIEVE ROSAL ARREZA, A.K.A. "GENEVIEVE ARREZA TOYO," PETITIONER,

v. TETSUSHI TOYO, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. They must
be proven as fact under our rules on evidence. A divorce decree obtained abroad is
deemed a foreign judgment, hence the indispensable need to have it pleaded and
proved before its legal effects may be extended to the Filipino spouse. 1

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Regional Trial Court's February 14, 2014 Judgment 3 and June
11, 2014 Resolution4 in SP. PROC. No. Q-12-71339 be reversed and set aside. The
Regional Trial Court denied Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a. Genevieve Arreza Toyo's
(Genevieve) Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry.5

On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a

Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named
Keiichi Toyo.6

After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which
the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was
later recorded in Tetsushi's family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City,
Osaka Fu.7

On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. 8

In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce

Certificate,9 Tetsushi's Family Register,10 the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification
of Divorce,11 and an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, 12 among others.13

After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court set
the case for hearing on October 16, 2012.14

On the day of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the Petition. After the
jurisdictional requirements were established and marked, trial on the merits ensued. 15

On February 14, 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment 16 denying
Genevieve's Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by
Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government
of Japan,17 she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's law. 18
The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English
translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.19

Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the
Regional Trial Court's June 11, 2014 Resolution. 20

Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. 21

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in not treating the English translation of the
Civil Code of Japan as an official publication in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(gg)
of the Rules of Court. That it is an official publication, she points out, makes it a self-
authenticating evidence of Japan's law under Rule 132, Section 25 of the Rules of
Court.22

Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in not considering the English
translation of the Japan Civil Code as a learned treatise and in refusing to take judicial
notice of its authors' credentials.23

In its August 13, 2014 Resolution,24 this Court required respondents to file their
comment.

In their Comment,25 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain

that the Regional Trial Court was correct in denying the petition for petitioner's failure
to prove respondent Tetsushi's national law.26 They stress that in proving a foreign
country's law, one must comply with the requirements under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25 of the Rules of Court.27

Respondents similarly claim that what Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court
presumes is "the fact of printing and publication[,]" 28 not that it was an official
publication by the government of Japan.29

Finally, respondents insist that before the English translation of the Japan Civil Code
may be considered as a learned treatise, the trial court must first take judicial notice
that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject. 30

In its March 25, 2015 Resolution,31 this Court directed petitioner to file her reply.

In her Reply,32 petitioner asserts that she submitted in evidence the Civil Code of Japan
as an official publication printed "under authorization of the Ministry of Justice[.]" 33 She
contends that because it was printed by a public authority, the Civil Code of Japan is
deemed to be an official publication under Rule 131, Section 3(gg) of the Rules of Court
and, therefore, is a self-authenticating document that need not be certified under Rule
132, Section 24.34

In its August 3, 2016 Resolution,35 this Court resolved to dispense with the filing of
respondent Tetsushi's Comment. In addition, the parties were required to file their
respective memoranda.
In her Memorandum,36 petitioner reiterates that the Regional Trial Court erred in not
considering the Civil Code of Japan as an official publication and its English translation
as a learned treatise.37

On September 23, 2016, respondents manifested that they are adopting their Comment
as their memorandum.38

The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in
denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry filed by petitioner Genevieve Rosal Arreza a.k.a. Genevieve Arreza
Toyo.

When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid
divorce abroad, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the
divorce obtained by the foreign spouse enables him or her to remarry. Article 26 of the
Family Code, as amended,39 provides: cralawred

ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)

The second paragraph was introduced as a corrective measure to resolve an absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse even after their
marital bond had been severed by the divorce decree obtained abroad. 40 Through this
provision, Philippine courts are given the authority "to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage."41 It bestowed upon the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage considered dissolved, granting him or her the capacity
to remarry.42

Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign
judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse's national law. This rule is
rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. As explained in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:43

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his [or her] claim or defense. 44 (Citations
omitted)

Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse's national law, purported to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate
of Rule 132, Sections 2445 and 2546 of the Rules of Court: cralawred

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.47 (Citations omitted)

Here, the Regional Trial Court ruled that the documents petitioner submitted to prove
the divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25.48 However, it found the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation
insufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce. It noted that these documents were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or
the Department of Foreign Affairs.49

Notwithstanding, petitioner argues that the English translation of the Japan Civil Code is
an official publication having been published under the authorization of the Ministry of
Justice50 and, therefore, is considered a self-authenticating document. 51

Petitioner is mistaken.

In Patula v. People,52 this Court explained the nature of a self-authenticating

document: cralawred

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents
may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or
sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public
(except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by
law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the
manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of
Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity
of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted;
or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. 53 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha,
Inc.,54 a private company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of
Japanese laws, which came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. 55 However,
these translations are "not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese
laws;"56 rather, it is in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws and
regulations are published, albeit in Japanese.57

Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication

exempted from the requirement of authentication.

Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules
of Court, "[a] witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his [or her]
personal knowledge[.]"58 The evidence is hearsay when it is "not . . . what the witness
knows himself [or herself] but of what he [or she] has heard from others." 59 The rule
excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to oral testimony or statements, but also
covers written statements.60

The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative value[.]" 61 However, a
published treatise may be admitted as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1)
the court takes judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is
recognized in his or her profession as an expert in the subject. 62

Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator's and
advisors' qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this matter.
The only evidence of the translator's and advisors' credentials is the inside cover page
of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. 63 Hence, the Regional Trial Court
was correct in not considering the English translation as a learned treatise.

Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in
a Rule 45 petition.64 Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan's law on divorce, 65 are
not within this Court's ambit to resolve.66

Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike,67 this Court ruled that while the Petition raised
questions of fact, "substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the
[Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings": cralawred

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual
that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised
in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule
45 petition for review.

....

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted,

the Court may refer the case to the [Court of Appeals] under paragraph 2, Section 6 of
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides: cralawred

SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. — ...

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.

This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal
likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of appeal.

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the
appeal or refer the case to the [Court of Appeals], the question of fact involved in the
instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the
[Court of Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that
procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The
rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts. 68 (Citations
omitted)

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, including the
reception of evidence, to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.