FIRST DIVISION 2. Criminal Cases Nos.

36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby

ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of
[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006] Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela;
andcralawlibrary
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO
B. OCON, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent. 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED
to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of
DECISION private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of follows:
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June
2003 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok
Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the
decision reads as follows: dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. protection program.
Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin,
hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
ordered: Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999,
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced
Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal
Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36- case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we,
3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or of reasonable doubt.
excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On
2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan; petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition
as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with
and Elizer Tuliao. prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001,
the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, and 22 October 2001.
Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving
to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases.
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a
quash the warrants of arrest. Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two
Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge 2001, this Court took note of respondent's cash bond evidenced
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued
Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime,
petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Reyes to the Department of Justice. Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November
Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of
the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner the previous referral to it of respondent's petition for certiorari,
Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and prohibition and mandamus .
Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State
Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City,
was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of
October 2001. this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition. petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become
final and executory.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to
this Court the following assignments of error: Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR of law over the body of the accused.

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals
erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:
Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21,
2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction
upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, over the person of the accused may be acquired either through
2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police
judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired
of the court. jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico v. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr.,
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused
must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners. deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion
to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
Motion. the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of
Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over
dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished
the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over
person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the voluntary appearance.10 One can be under the custody of the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado v. law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
having been arrested. In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254 other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
of Justice. And in Lacson v. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA commenced.11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
1025 ), the Court ordered the case transferred from the on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6 law.12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the
accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the
D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7 : issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail
of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant
and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
before considering the application for bail. 13 consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks
an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
jurisdiction of the court.15 As we held in the aforecited case of cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.' " The himself to the custody of the law.
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages
and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the
the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement
therefor.17 for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best
illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail,
the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in
civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of 1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause,
other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate
quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the the records to us.
fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused's determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance guilt.
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a
Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his
proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher
warrants of arrests against the accused. preference in the hierarchy of rights than property
rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the must come before its taking and not after.
accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and based on
Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest. doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of
the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners.
persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his
elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the
ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the
quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the
the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the
judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the
he really did find probable cause after personally examining the case.
records of the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of
any time of the day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad,
absence of the accused can be taken against him in the "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a
deferment of the proceedings is but proper." 24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the Petition for Review was filed judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. or things to be seized.27

In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case,
assail as premature the filing of the information in court against including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the
them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the According to petitioners:
same ground.
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order
the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable
Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal
question: and not on a separate determination personally made by the
Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, only on the fiscal's certification.28
Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan's Joint Order
query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, contains no such indication that he relied solely on the
this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in prosecutor's certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" contrary:
Miranda.26
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor,
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable
Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan: cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor's certification reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody
was accompanied by supporting documents, following the of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by
requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
supporting documents are the following: fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an
obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. given during the election period amidst a "politically charged
Reyes; scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each
other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez; former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of
DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of
Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz; Judge Tumaliuan.

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio; It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility
of a witness is not within the province of the determination of
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of probable cause. As we held in Webb33 :
Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal; showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed
and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; andcralawlibrary guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
Vicente Buazon. probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It
is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no
violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that
the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v.
abuse of discretion. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
among other things, that there was a Petition for Review of the informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of dismissed.34
Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had
two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of
following explanation: SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision,
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People v. Wilfredo even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime
Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda - the different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in
Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly Leaño that the crime did not happen; we just found that there
makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein,
and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial
were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is
made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's son,
agrees with the defense's views. Indeed, of what use is whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony
Maderal's statements when the Supreme Court rejected the of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon
prosecution's evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Committee.
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state
witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
practically nil. Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements
and therefore the same is without probable value." 35 On the
xxx contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño,
an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused to the probability of the prosecution's version of the facts
Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary
therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
probable cause. by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad's order quashing
the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad's dismissal of the warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing
of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the
further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of
after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them
the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this
(days after this Court's resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to
Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely
Anghad. on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado
v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding. resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable
cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision
Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the
issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad ground of grave abuse of discretion.
to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the
petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal
so, without a personal determination of probable cause. case dismissed before arraignment

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court
issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become
inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the final and executory. According to petitioners:
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the
other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent
warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed
declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision,
only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals.
questioned by private respondent, to wit: In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court
in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001; ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; andcralawlibrary November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so
as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001. said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent
Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36- Tuliao's filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00.
3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not
have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in
November 14, 2001.38 contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court
and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao's which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in
with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the
Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14
November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the dismissed.40
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both the original petition
Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to
Tuliao's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus . disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of
People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be
transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge

of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to
effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt
hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,

Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance
hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;

3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to

raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed

to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within
ten (10) days from said compliance; andcralawlibrary

5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is

directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.

6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue

forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners
Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968 After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court
vs. issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec.
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant. opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees. payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion
Lucia Baguio. for execution against its counter-bond but also the
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding
for defendant-appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id.
Inc. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no
previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
DIZON, J.: satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand
was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the against the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing
spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted
Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion.
the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground
complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against that the same was issued without the required summary hearing
defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As
the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court
and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying
the 31st of the same month. its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal
was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones
answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of covered by the following assignment of errors:
the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
 I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the
order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion
and compliance with the other mandatory requirements prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court
of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the
issuance of execution against the herein bonding same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to
company-appellant. certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution
read as follows:
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the
motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein It would indeed appear from the record that the action at
bonding company-appellant as well as its subsequent bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum of
motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally
setting aside the writ of execution. instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the
question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of
First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
orders appealed from.
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's
On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice motion is an important one which merits serious
of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July
within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for
Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a There are three cases decided by the Honorable
month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs.
Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive Filipinas Compañia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of 10096, March 23, 1956; Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc.
the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591,
 September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen
September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first
appellants submitting their case for decision and then time.
accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction when adverse. It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed
"exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment
the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue" (See. 1, issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19).
Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific
no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance
case to the Supreme Court.1äwphï1.ñët with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs.
Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case be Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the
forwarded to the Supreme Court. counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition
thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support
spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not
an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior being one of them.
courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against
when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition,
of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of
the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done estoppel by laches.
heretofore in the case with its active participation.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20,
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the
it. "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.,
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
claim to be enforced or asserted. and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of
79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
not important in such cases because the party is barred from proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
public policy. rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise
the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, not only patent but revolting.
141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular entire record, We have become persuaded that We can do
nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision be given time within which to answer the motion, and so
rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as an order was issued in open court, as
follows: follows:1äwphï1.ñët

In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr.,
Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of money, counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.,
a writ of attachment was issued against defendants' Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday,
properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the
discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
by defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety & dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after
Fidelity Co., Inc. which this incident shall be deemed submitted
for resolution.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The writ of execution against defendants having been
returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under
Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution
against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the
obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the
surety's opposition, denied on the ground that there was
"no showing that a demand had been made, by the
plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the
amount due under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p.
60).

Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the

surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the
latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again
filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of
writ of execution against the surety, with notice of
hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the
surety received copy of said motion and notice of
hearing.

It appears that when the motion was called on

November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that he
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995 later escaped from prison. The others have remained at
large up to the present. 2
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE was implicated in the crime. In an amended information
PHILIPPINES, respondents. dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused
therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer
and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's
services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course
REGALADO, J.: of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in
a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the
on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April Bucag family.3
26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof,
are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of
issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance
admitted to bail. of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal
in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new
crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case
City for the killing of members of the Bucag family in a second amended information dated October 6,
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-
was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080
on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M.
Gingoog City,1 had initially indicted for multiple murder Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F.
eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the
Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged Court sustained the filing of the second amended
conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses information against him.4
Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed.
on him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued,
1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court he also personally appeared and attended all the
which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. scheduled court hearings of the case.7
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution
Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. filed twenty (20) days later on November 26, 1992 by
Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the
court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was
petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29,
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later,
Prosecution's Office appeared for the prosecution.5 Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court
of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus were
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to
College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now
his counsel manifested that they were submitting under review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave
custody over the person of their client to the local abuse of discretion.8
chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines
and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail Respondent court observed in its decision that at the
application, he considered being in the custody of the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in
law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his
trial court that in accordance with the directive of the motion for admission to bail before he was actually
chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was
opposing the application for bail and that they were charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out
judge.6 by the fact that no bail was recommended by the
prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution,
Abejo announced that he was waiving any further according to respondent court, was not afforded an
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail
resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this
admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. appeal.
The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner,
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of
managed to personally appear before the clerk of court this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his filing
of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court voluntary surrender.11 As this Court has put it in a case
effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is
person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in free."12
the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the
"invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and
filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him whereby an accused could just send another in his stead
within the custody of the law." to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court by his personal appearance therein and
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on compliance with the requirements therefor. 13 Thus,
record negates the existence of such strong evidence as in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14 where the
would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with
the prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor murder went into hiding without surrendering himself,
Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to
the application for bail and whose representation in court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending
in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that
legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special
civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who
after an unjustifiable length of time. have either been arrested, detained, or other wise
deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The
and the equities involved in this case, the Court finds for person seeking his provisional release under the
petitioner. auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed against him as it is
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as available to "all persons"15 where the offense is bailable.
the security given for the release of a person in custody The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or
of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law.16
upon his appearing before any court as required under
the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the
then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section
appearance at the trial.10 As bail is intended to obtain or 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5,
secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
posted before custody over him has been acquired by Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has
the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities.17 in this matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the
light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained. has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that
Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail
purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for before he was actually and physically placed under
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual
the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious ambience therefore, be considered as being
physical injuries which she sustained in a major constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing
leave "that she be considered as having placed herself of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of
under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have
purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law
On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an
Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee
bond for her provisional liberty without need of her or merely by his submission to the custody of the person
personal appearance in view of her physical incapacity making the arrest.19 The latter mode may be exemplified
and as a matter of humane consideration. by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military
offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure to the military camp area.
order against her, she question the jurisdiction of that
court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his
the ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he
not validly posted bail since she never personally could not personally appear as he was then confined at
appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital
the Court held that she was clearly estopped from for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution
own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner,
Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly
accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the
its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody
of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able
under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer to avoid arrest should the application therefore be
away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him denied.
under guard.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except
constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance
they never attempted to have him physically restrained. thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial
and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its
and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the personal nature21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption
his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not
issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would
any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond
his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he reasonable doubt.22
was charged in court, up to the submission application
for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional
trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions
confinement at the hospital on account of an acute thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with
ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his perpetua or life imprisonment23 and the evidence of guilt is
good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused
court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
Misamis Oriental Chapter.20 In other words, the motion accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the
for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial
the manner of the former practice which the law discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the
proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be
jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,24 is required
in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue
or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to
the applicant.25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the oppose that application for bail.
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum.26 We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor acted as the collaborating counsel,
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No.
prosecution must be give an opportunity to present, within a 86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through radio
before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of
entitled as the accused to due process.27 If the prosecution is the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This
denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was
due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn
respect of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing, the only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M.
petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned
by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in the authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado
rebuttal.29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance
granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal
the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as case.32 It was in fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same
to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana
though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the
contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay previous hearing in said case.33 Hence, on the strength of said
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail,
evidence that the law requires.31 the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor
Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a held on November 5, 1992.
violation of procedural due process when the court below
allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor
State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the case, he
instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position
to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter.
handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of
on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is,
the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to
authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither
in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that
they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Place that manifestation on record. For the record,
Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at Fiscal Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
that particular posture of the case, was waiving the appearance in this matter?
presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the
court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was
the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo,
the latter readily answered in the affirmative. PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

The following exchanges bear this out: Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office represented by State
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO: Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.

I was informed to appear in this case just now Your COURT:

Honor.
By that manifestation do you want the Court to
COURT: understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution is
dispensing with the presentation of evidence to
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the
a copy of the motion as early as October 28. There denial . . .
is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only
informed just now. The one assigned here is State COURT:
Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the
son. I do not know about this but before I came I incident covered by this particular motion for
received an instruction from our Chief to relay to this resolution by this court?
court the stand of the office regarding the motion to
admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
opposing it and we are submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: COURT:
 Without presenting any further evidence? trial court should nevertheless set the application for
hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
PROSECUTOR ABEJO: prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the
bail application.
Yes, Your Honor.34
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process,
It is further evident from the foregoing that the could therefore be attributed to the trial court here as
prosecution, on the instructions of Regional State regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of
prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its
the motion for bail and this should be so notwithstanding resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order
the statement that they were "neither supporting nor of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous
opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its
manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all
motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of
By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
dispensing with the introduction of evidence en omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the
contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and
the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing only after sifting through them did the court conclude that
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself petitioner could be provisionally released on bail.
that such was the position of the prosecution. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and
up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,35 it was violation of the conditions of his bail.
stressed that where the trial court has reasons to believe
that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given
application for bail is not justified, as when he is the opportunity to present its evidence within a
evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The
duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire records indicate that the Regional State Prosecutor's
from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on
evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court
in the very recent administrative matter Re: First on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the
Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such
Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that
City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the
vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor circumstances, that period was more than reasonable.
interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of
 the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the SO ORDERED.
point for, as already established, the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for
the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the

prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable period of
time that elapsed before it questioned before the
respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order
of the trial court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the
delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred
eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due
to the attendant difficulties which characterized the
prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But
then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the
respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case
had ensued in the court below with the active
participation of prosecution lawyers, including
Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now
in that the special civil action for certiorari should not be
instituted beyond a period of the three months,38 the
same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration
of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained to annul the same.39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on November 24, 1993,
annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's
resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the
Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.
Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 117363 December 17, 1999 alleging that said father of the minor further
instructed her that the stereo component be
MILA G. PANGILINAN, petitioner, tested in a turntable somewhere in EDSA,
vs. Mandaluyong, Metro Manila did then and there
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and taking
PHILIPPINES, respondents. advantage of the inexperience and feelings of
the said minor, induce the said minor Luzviminda
SJ Elnar to give her said stereo component and
electrical parts belonging to spouses Rolando
KAPUNAN, J.: Elnar and Soledad SJ Elnar when in truth and in
fact said accused was not authorized by Mr.
Is the conviction of the accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Rolando Elnar to have said stereo components
Court under an information falling within the jurisdiction of the be tested and once said accused had in her
Municipal Trial Court valid? possession the said articles, she took them away
to the damage and prejudice of such Mr. and
Mrs. Rolando Elnar in the aforesaid amount of
On 20 September 1990, appellant Mila G. Pangilinan was
P17,450.00.
charged with the crime of Estafa in an information 1 which
reads:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The undersigned Asst. Prov'l. Prosecutor
accuses Mrs. Mila Pangilinan of the Crime of On 12 March 1991, appellant was arraigned before the Regional
Estafa, committed as follows: Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, where she entered a plea of "not
guilty." After due trial, said court in a Decision dated 7 October
1991 2 convicted the appellant of the crime of ESTAFA under
That on or about the 15th day of June, 1984 in
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
the municipality of Tanay, Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused, by means of false This unfavorable verdict was appealed to the Court of Appeals
pretenses and misrepresentation introduced and which, on 13 August 1993, affirmed the conviction but modified
misrepresented herself that she was instructed the sentence, to wit:
by Mr. Rodolfo Elnar, father of Miss Luzviminda
SJ Elnar, a girl 15 years of age, to get one (1) . . . and that there being no proof of mitigating
stereo component, marked Fisher PH 430k and or aggravating circumstances which
valued at more or less P17,000.00, one (1) attended the commission of the offense, the
headphone, one (1) electrical jack and two (2) appellant should suffer the penalty of four (4)
record tapes worth P450.00, or with total amount months of arresto mayor and a fine of
of P17,450.00 from their house and falsely
 P17,450.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in RPC. This is evidenced by the trial court's assumption of
case of insolvency. 3 jurisdiction over the case and its subsequent conviction of the
appellant for this form of estafa, 8 to wit:
A Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent
court on 11 November 1993. 4 On 3 December 1993, appellant WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MILA
filed a Petition for New Trial in the Court of Appeals 5 which was PANGILINAN, GUILTY of the Crime of Estafa, in
denied by said Court on 10 January 1994. 6 Hence, the present violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Code, as amended and hereby sentences her to
Court premised on the following grounds: suffer imprisonment of One (1) year, Eight (8)
months and Twenty (20) days of Prision
I Correcional, as minimum to Five (5) years, Five
(5) months and Eleven (11) days of Prision
THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT Correcional as maximum, plus costs.
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED IS NULL AND VOID
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME Further to pay the complainant Soledad Elnar
CHARGED. BEING NULL AND VOID, THE DECISION the amount of P17,000.00 the value of the
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON APPEAL HEREIN unrecovered one stereo component.
CANNOT VALIDATE IT;
SO ORDERED.
II
In order to find estafa with abuse of confidence under
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ASSUMING WITHOUT subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315, the following elements
ADMITTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD must be present:
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE GUILT OF
THE PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND 1. That money, goods, or other personal property
REASONABLE DOUBT. 7 be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any
The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and other obligation involving the duty to make
finds the appeal to be impressed with merit. delivery of, or to return the same;

The information uses the generic term Estafa as the 2. That there be misappropriation or conversion
classification of the crime appellant is charged with without of such money or property by the offender, or
citing the specific article of the Revised Penal Code violated. denial on his part of such receipt;

The trial court, however, presumed that the petitioner was 3. That such misappropriation or conversion or
charged with the crime of estafa falling under Article 315 of the denial is to the prejudice of another; and
 4. That there is a demand made by the offended including the civil liability arising from such
party to the offender. 9 offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value, or amount
A circumspect examination of the allegations in the information thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
will disclose that the information under which the appellant is involving damage to property through criminal
charged with does not contain all the elements of estafa falling negligence they shall have exclusive jurisdiction
under Article 315 (b). There was a failure to allege that demand where the imposable fine does not exceed
was made upon the appellant by the offended party. twenty thousand pesos.

Thus, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in the Settled is the rule that it is the averments in the information
questioned decision, to which the Solicitor General agrees, which characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court
appellant was charged under an information alleging an offense before which it must be
falling under the blanket provision of paragraph 1 (a) of Article tried. 11 Without a doubt, it was the Municipal Trial Court who
318 of the Revised Penal Code, which treat "Other Deceits." 10 had jurisdiction over the case and not the Regional Trial Court.

As prescribed by law, a violation of Article 318 of the Revised However, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the
Penal Code is punishable by imprisonment for a period ranging appellant is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction, estoppel
from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. At the having already set in.
time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force
was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the express provision of This contention is without merit. In our legal system, the
Section 32 of B.P. 129, the offense of which the petitioner was question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
charged with falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the proceedings. The Office of the Solicitor General relies on this
Municipal Trial Court: Court's ruling in the landmark case of Tijam
vs. Sibanghanoy 12 where the Court stated that:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial It has been held that a party cannot invoke the
Courts in criminal cases. jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or
xxx xxx xxx failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction. In the case just cited, by
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
offenses punishable with imprisonment of not the question whether the court had jurisdiction
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
of not more than four thousand pesos, or both parties was not important in such cases because
such fine and imprisonment regardless of other the party is barred from such conduct not
imposable accessory or other penalties, because the judgment or order of the court is
 valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for courts should not lightly brush aside errors in jurisdiction
the reason that such a practice can not be especially when it is the liberty of an individual which is at stake:
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public
policy. Where life or liberty is affected by its
proceedings, the court must keep strictly within
The Office of the Solicitor General's reliance on the said ruling the limits of the law authorizing it to take
is misplaced. The doctrine laid down in the Tijam case is an jurisdiction and to try the case and to render
exception to and not the general rule. Estoppel attached to the judgment. It cannot pass beyond those limits in
party assailing the jurisdiction of the court as it was the same any essential requirement in either stage of
party who sought recourse in the said forum. In the case at bar, these proceedings; and its authority in those
appellant cannot in anyway be said to have invoked the particulars is not to be enlarged by any mere
jurisdiction of the trial court. inferences from the law or doubtful construction
of its terms. There has been a great deal said
Thus, we apply the general rule that jurisdidion is vested by law and written, in may cases with embarrassing
and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on looseness of expression, as to the jurisdiction of
appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue the courts in criminal cases. From a somewhat
of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling extended examination of the authorities we will
that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case: venture to state some rule applicable to all of
them, by which the jurisdiction as to any
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the particular judgment of the courts in such cases
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon may be determined. It is plain that such court has
whether the lower court had jurisdiction or not. If jurisdiction to render a particular judgment only
it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and when the offense charged is within the class of
decided upon the theory it had jurisdiction, the offenses placed by the law under its jurisdiction;
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing and when, in taking custody of the accused, and
such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a its modes of procedure to the determination of
matter of law, and may not be conferred by the question of his guilt or innocence, and in
consent of the parties or by rendering judgment, the court keeps within the
estoppel." 13 limitations prescribed by the law, customary or
statutory. When the court goes out of these
Estoppel in questioning the jurisdiction of the court is only limitations its action, to the extent of such
brought to bear when not to do so will subvert the ends of excess, is void. 14
justice. Jurisdiction of courts is the blueprint of our judicial
system without which the road to justice would be a confusing The Office of the Solicitor General makes a final attempt to
maze. Whenever the question of jurisdiction is put to front, bolster its position by citing Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
 Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal
allegation and proof. When there is a variance Case No. 0867-M.
between the offense charged in complaint or
information, and that proved or established by SO ORDERED.
the evidence, and the offense as charge is
included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged
or of the offense charge included in that which is
proved.

According to the OSG, since the offense proved (Article

318 of the Revised Penal Code) is necessarily included
in the offense charged, then the decision of the
respondent court modifying the court of origin's
judgment is perfectly valid and the petitioner's claim that
the trial court had no jurisdiction must necessarily
fail. 15

This argument is specious. Aforementioned section applies

exclusively to cases where the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved. It presupposes
that the court rendering judgment has jurisdiction over the case
based on the allegations in the information. However, in the
case at bar, from the onset of the criminal proceedings, the
lower court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court

did not have jurisdiction to try the case against the appellant, it
is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as
the decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CR No. 12320 is set aside as the Regional Trial Court, whose
 G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015 the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to
own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

DECISION Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under

the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4 (R.A. 9225) as
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by
the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse 11, 2007.
the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
Petitioner assailed the Order 2 dated March 22, 2011 of the and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought
denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause. the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that
the subject property was titled land and they have the right and
The factual antecedents:ch authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the
institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a respondent’s family.
Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner
in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the
residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
know that the portion where they built their house is public land challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed
and part of the salvage zone. before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in
Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a
Filipino citizen. In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed
by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of public
document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a
notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of discretion on the part of the MTC. He asserted that first,
falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-
Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal Case No. condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the court
2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011
Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re- acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship
Determination of Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court naturalization.
denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction
between those who became foreign citizens during its In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized
effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before that the act of falsification was already consummated as
its enactment when the governing law was Commonwealth Act petitioner has not yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and
No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only
charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed on affect his citizenship status and not his criminal act which was
April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time
still a Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying
ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court,
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate
SO ORDERED.12 petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse because he
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the can proceed to trial where he can make use of his claim to be a
foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown
jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction.
argued that since his application had yet to receive final
evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, SO ORDERED.17
it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) Petitioner is now before us arguing that –
who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he
applied for lease of public land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner
for falsification, the lower court has disregarded
 the undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural- On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused
born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an
same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion
legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed
time of his naturalization in Canada and through to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by
the time when he was said to have falsely his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled
claimed Philippine citizenship. that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in their
legal residence in Canada and to surrender or respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the
allow himself to be arrested under a warrant for court.
his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship,
the lower court has pre-empted the right of In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may
petitioner through his wife and counsel to be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino
question the validity of the said warrant of arrest in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
against him before the same is implemented, acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A.
which is tantamount to a denial of due process.18 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for
re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioner’s jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without
merit. It is contended that this Court’s rulings in Frivaldo v. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Re-acquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President
Elections20 on the retroactivity of one’s re-acquisition of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor of said law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that such doctrine applies in SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby declared the policy
the present situation, it will still not work for petitioner’s cause of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much less proved, another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of
falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
of gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
petitioner’s defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
which may be properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial. deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to
Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the
“I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing
aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied) dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-
acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance
phrase “under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down under the new law.
such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re- criminal cases, that interpretation of the law which favors the
acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of accused is preferred because it is consistent with the
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it
paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became becomes more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of is a non-lawyer, at the time of the commission of the alleged
oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31,
Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating
the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by
group, and “retain” for the second group. Section 2 of R.A. 9225.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born These contentions have no merit.
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention
“Retention of Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law
of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The
Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the
on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon was effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the
responding to the query of Representative Exequiel effectivity of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act
Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of the
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under act.
Section 3 of the Senate version, “Any provision of law on the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall… and so applying to future instances. So that’s the distinction.
forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.
REP. JAVIER. Well, I’m just asking this question because we
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have are here making distinctions between natural-born citizens.
lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the Because this is very important for certain government positions,
effectivity of this Act are deemed to have reacquired… ‘no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a
specific…
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens
here. Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the
after the effectivity of this act are considered to have retained law.
their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino
citizenship before the effectivity of this act are considered to THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later
have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to on. It’s one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the
say that natural-born citizens who became, let’s say, American explanation, Congressman Javier, that is our
citizens after the effectivity of this act are considered natural- conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously
born? lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth Act
63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian
lost their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first
longer natural born citizens because they have just reacquired category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
Chairman. foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was
able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate required oath of allegiance.
 (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the
rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his in Article 171 of the RPC; and
category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, commercial document.26
Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
after the new law’s effectivity. naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification
application of reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who was already a consummated act, the said law having no
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
9225. concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable
cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
Petitioner’s plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the paragraph 1.
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation
more favorable to the accused following the time-honored The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioner’s motion for
State and liberally in favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed
however, is not a penal law. prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required
for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash
relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between
private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived
commercial documents. The elements of falsification of when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person
was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, x x x x
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, in Santiago v. While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as
Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing voluntary appearance.
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot x x x x
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
surrender.cralawred cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis
upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the supplied)
custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the erred in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person.
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTC’s
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack
after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law
of merit.
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated
of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case
No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, (OSRFI).3
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
DECISION for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according
to the information, was the Office of the President.
REYES, R.T., J.:
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
government funds? U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan? On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the
assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her
motion for reconsideration. The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office
of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
The Antecedents EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the
crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state amended committed as follows:
university is known as a government scholar. She was
appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her
 official functions, committing the offense in relation to jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over
her office and taking advantage of her position, with crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount the coffers of the government.10
of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
and the latter relying and believing on said false jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to public officer since she merely represented her peers, in
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was did not receive any salary as a student regent.
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana
on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their She further contended that she had no power or authority to
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board
demands made upon the accused for them to return of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused information that it was among her functions or duties to receive
to do so to the damage and prejudice of the funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
government in the aforesaid amount. official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
regent. charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution
countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds
the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a (A) x x x
public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated,
hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
petitioner was compensated.14 Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
Sandiganbayan Disposition
xxxx
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated: (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Sandiganbayan over this case. (Italics supplied)

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over
II of the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and
committed by public officials and employees in relation functions.
to their office. From this provision, there is no single
doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense Is accused-movant included in the contemplated
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his provision of law?
office.
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
representation of the student body, she was never a Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
public officer since she never received any exercises the general powers of administration and
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
is of no moment, in view of the express provision of receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides: such sums as may be provided by law for the support of
the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own of the government, is a matter a defense that should be
government and to enact for the government of the properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this
university such general ordinances and regulations, not case.16
contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of
the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
the President of the University, professors, instructors, reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
their compensation, hours of service, and such other
duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to Issue
them in its discretion leave of absence under such
regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
have been had. JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS
It is well-established in corporation law that the NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
corporation can act only through its board of directors, INFORMATION."19
or board of trustees in the case of non-stock
corporations. The board of directors or trustees, In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below,
therefore, is the governing body of the corporation. namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;
(b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed
the University of the Philippines is performing functions in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock came from President Estrada, not from the government.
corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being
a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly Our Ruling
falls within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, The petition cannot be granted.
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
1989.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s
procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
contention that the same of P15 Million was received
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not
from former President Estrada and not from the coffers
a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial
motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often the subject matter, this Court granted the petition
dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of
multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22 Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the
case.
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court
clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial
thus: of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over
the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss and enjoined the respondent court from further
is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal proceeding in the case.
until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule
41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial
case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer except to dismiss the same.
a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of
acquittal. In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the
court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to respondent judge to dismiss the case.
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the dismissed the amended complaint.
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted
to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and ordered him to desist from further action in the
and adequate. The following are a few examples of the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
exceptions to the general rule.
 In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and
the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this
Court.24 P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
abuse of discretion.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A.
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
R.A. No. 3019, as amended. amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now
the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We
note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
before the Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the
instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
authorities.27 other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated more of the accused are officials occupying the following
this claim twice despite corrections made by the positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
Sandiganbayan.28 acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept " (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city " (5) All other national and local officials classified as
department heads; Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the this section in relation to their office.
position of consul and higher;
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
captains, and all officers of higher rank; A, issued in 1986.

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while " In cases where none of the accused are occupying
occupying the position of provincial director and those positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher,
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher; as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. " The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; herein provided.

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the " The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
provisions of the Constitution; jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
Constitution; and similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. and joint determination with the criminal action,
129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, abandoned."
relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to
its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases
" In case private individuals are charged as co- over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with
officers or employees, including those employed in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall private individuals. We quote:
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall
jurisdiction over them. be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary exploit or take advantage of such family or close
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and advantage from any other person having some
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the business, transaction, application, request or contract
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of with the government, in which such public official has to
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil
the filing such civil action separately from the criminal degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That close personal friendship, social and fraternal
where the civil action had heretofore been filed connections, and professional employment all giving
separately but judgment therein has not yet been
 rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that
officer. a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that
the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. 36 Optima
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon
ay ang mismong batas.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices
and provides for their penalties. B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
the offense of estafa. this section in relation to their office.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
provision. simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust offense is committed in relation to their office.
or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
katawa-tawa.
The National Parks Development Committee was
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be created originally as an Executive Committee on
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National
every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a
Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3).
Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Petitioner UP student regent
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on is a public officer.
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39,
issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981). regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be
called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not
Office of the President and allotments for its define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and
maintenance and operating expenses were issued concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated
with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent A public office is the right, authority, and duty created
parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read: and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise
simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
over the offenses. As already above intimated, the Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of office under our political system is therefore not a natural
Bondoc’s cases and those of the government right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by
employees separately charged for the same crimes, has virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
not altered the nature of the offenses charged, conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such
as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government constitutional offices which provide for special immunity
employees in conspiracy with private persons, including as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur.
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot 881).
be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an
Mechem of a public office: essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42 The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers is not a corporation created for profit.50
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We
held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials The offense charged was committed
with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically in relation to public office, according
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of to the Information.
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision
of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
placed there by express provision of law.44 jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in
relation to her office.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments
in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent
in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that
quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should
almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53 be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain A lawyer owes candor, fairness
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while and honesty to the Court.
in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
(Underscoring supplied) memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s
counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that
the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
on this ground.
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v.
Source of funds is a defense that should Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
be raised during trial on the merits. D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled
that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
It is contended anew that the amount came from President different from that with which he was authorized. We severely
Estrada’s private funds and not from the government coffers. reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on. warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and
from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is should be characterized by candor and fairness. 57 The
averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of act with complete candor and honesty before the courts. 58
the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000
in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)." SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010 Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate
vs. the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
PLAZA, Respondents. criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱33,000.00,
Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and
DECISION prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

PERALTA, J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.

For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 dated
2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued
and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its
Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to
27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan
lack of jurisdiction. promulgated its Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before
The facts follow. the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution
provides:
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby
case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential filing in the proper court.
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines
for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on SO ORDERED.
December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand
Pesos (₱33,000.00) . The Information reads: Thus, the present petition.

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal
subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended
the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not
public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and
of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or
committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
questioned the Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of this Court's the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27
decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or Philippines.
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases This Court has already resolved the above issue in the
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a case
R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the
Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein
of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang
was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this
3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five
relation to public office. Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate
the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00).
In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza
argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member
it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below
defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v.
Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of
has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher;
(b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486,
27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June
in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of
offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and official conduct required of public officers and employees,
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and based on the concept that public officers and employees shall
(c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher people.11
in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over
him must apply. P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. of the commission of the offense: x x x.14
No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x . public officials or employees in relation to their office are
involved where the said provision, contains no exception.
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule
which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the
applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly time of the commission of the offense. The present case having
committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249
having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
in the earlier mentioned case,
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
determined at the time of the institution of the action, not
at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
where it expressly provides that to determine the Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, of the principal accused are officials occupying the
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal following positions in the government, whether in a
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the commission of the offense:
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of
paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other including:
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are members of the sangguniang
officials occupying the following positions in the government, panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
 assessors, engineers, and other city (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
department heads; Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city (5) All other national and local officials classified
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and as Grade "27" and higher under the
other city department heads. Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or
higher; complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, this section in relation to their office.
naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank; C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP A.
officers of higher rank;
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and The above law is clear as to the composition of the original
prosecutors in the Office of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
managers of government-owned or Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses,
controlled corporations, state universities the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the
or educational institutions or foundations; executive branch occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
classified as Grade "27" and up under the However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
Compensation and Position Classification Act of classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
1989; jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold
the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
the provisions of the Constitution; govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, thoroughly discussed:
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a
of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that
and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official,
PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions
their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies involved are
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
same law provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15 to their office.

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation
(a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary that as long as the offense charged in the information is
grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have
Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case been perpetrated while the accused was in the
of People v. Sandiganbayan and performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
Amante,17 that the Inding case did not categorically nor functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have
1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his
charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or
office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
al..,19 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that: over the case.1avvphi1

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading
include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in of the Information filed against respondent Amante for violation
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall
is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if
the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled: could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need
to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed
of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The is not disputed that public office is essential as an element
Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses
a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing, and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the
petitioner’s administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by relation to office, this Court held:
public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held
that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court
mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
"accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the
criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and
the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People
response to private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out
not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as
whatever private complainant might have said during said committed in relation to the accused’s office if "the offense
privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, SO ORDERED.
the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder
in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with

[the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x" 21

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of

Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the public
officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section.
Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27
and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-
settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation
and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics
supplied.)24

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case
of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is

hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999 of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
vs. Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR., petitioner-intervenors. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May
18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a
shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
MARTINEZ, J.:
investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by police operation.1
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr.,
also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple
Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding
murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against
twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows: Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against
Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved
those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in- for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the-fact. the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some
of the accused.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for While these motions for reconsideration were pending
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4 resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up
with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996,
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by
March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5 before the Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. 84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from the case. introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused"
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on February
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are 5, 1997.
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or
PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan
General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the promulgated a Resolution14 denying the motion for
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands
and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and
on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and portion of which reads:
Garchitorena dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the
amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted
Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
 Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due
Considering the pertinent provisions of the new process and the equal protection clause of the
law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in Constitution. Further, from the way the
favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9)
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. months the resolution of a pending incident
Justice de Leon has already done so in his involving the transfer of the cases to the
concurring and dissenting opinion. Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may
have been timed to overtake such resolution to
xxx xxx xxx render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the
exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the
Considering that three of the accused in each of old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents:
namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of circumstances in which petitioner's cases were
arrest has been issued — this court has under, namely, that the trial had not yet
competence to take cognizance of these cases. commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make
certain that those cases will no longer be
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial
is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
the Amended Informations in these cases by the them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation
unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not and a denial of the right of petitioner as an
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to
the cases16 (Empahasis supplied) procedural due process.

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of c) The title of the law is misleading in that it
R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in
the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather
which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA
argues that: 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject
requirement for the passage of statutes under
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.17
introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as
it was made to precisely suit the situation in For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention,
which petitioner's cases were in at the add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to
Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5,
upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the
Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a
Sandiganbayan.18 They further argued that if their case is tried special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and
would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. and such other offenses committed by public
7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court. officers and employees including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General relation to their office as may be determined by
filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the law.
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that
both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed. The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution
under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the be provided by law.
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning
Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the 148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following
Sandiganbayan. laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were
enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and
the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest amendments introduced by
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the following cases:
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No.
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The read as follows:
burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
cases involving:
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as while occupying the position of provincial
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and director and those holding the rank of senior
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, superintendent or higher.
and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the (f) City of provincial prosecutors and their
accused are officials occupying the following assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
positions in the government, whether in a Office of the Ombudsman and special
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time prosecutor;
of the commission of the offense:
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying managers of government-owned or controlled
the positions of regional director and higher, corporations, state universities or educational
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of institutions or foundations;
the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
including: classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, 1989;
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
engineers, and other provincial department the provisions of the Constitution;
heads;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, of the Constitution;
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; (5) All other national and local officials classified
as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service and Position Classification Act of 1989.
occupying the position of consul and higher;
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
Subsection a of this section in relation to their these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
office. Supreme Court.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa
connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
and 14-A, issued in 1986. the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to
In cases where none of the accused are appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
occupying positions corresponding to salary Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial of the Ombudsman, through its special
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in
privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as 1986.
amended.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive principals, accomplices or accessories with the
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, public officers or employee, including those
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts employed in government-owned or controlled
whether in the exercise of their own original corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as public officers and employees in the proper
herein provided. courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise apply to all cases pending in any court over
in cases filed or which may be filed under which trial has not begun as of the approval
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides: other city department heads;

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree (c) Officials of the diplomatic service
[Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is occupying the position of consul and
hereby further amended to read as follows: higher;

Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels,
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all naval captains, and all officers of higher
cases involving: rank;

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and officers of higher rank;
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
pricipal accused are afficials occupying the the Office of the Ombudsman and special
following positions in the government, whether in prosecutor;
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense: (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying controlled corporations, state universities
the positions of regional director and higher, or educational institutions or foundations;
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification (2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically classified as Grade "27" and up under the
including: Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, the provisions of the Constitution;
assessors, engineer, and other provincial
department heads; (4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of of the Constitution;
the sangguniang panlungsod, city
(5) All other national and local officials classified public officers or employees, including those
as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation employed in government-owned or controlled
and Position Classification Act of 1989. corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction
public officials and employees mentioned in over them.
Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 4-A. Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal
cases in which trial has not begun in the
In cases where none of the principal accused are Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper
occupying positions corresponding to salary courts.
Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was
vested in the proper regional trial court, deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A.
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases
since none of the principal accused under the amended
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher. On the
appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special
judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the
where all the accused are occupying positions Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that the
lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
by the preceding enumeration.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that
xxx xxx xxx to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
In case private individuals are charged as co- offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended
principals, accomplices or accessories with the (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the
law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too
II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of
(sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the
official or employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated party who challenges the law must present proof of
in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in arbitrariness.34
relation to the office.
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification
VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, four elements, namely:
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other (1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only,
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, and
under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that (4) must apply equaly to all members of the same
is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees class,35
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not
all of which are present in this case.
make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused
public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut
simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the
not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a questioned provisions. The classification between those
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose
trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A.
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law33 because
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
distinction that makes real differences.36 In the first instance,
evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of
examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is the Philippines.
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts
subject to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be reasonably On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings,
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an
for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since
7 placed them under a different category from those similarly the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member
that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid
argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the of legislation.40
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the
court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng
of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are deprived of
had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail
under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired
under R.A. 7975.
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post facto law is
their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In one —
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the law and which was innocent when committed, and
the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further punishes such action; or
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims
to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when
as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph it was committed; or
a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory
provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted,
deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
 (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was unconstitutional.
committed.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
less or different testimony that the law required at the time diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same
of the commission of the offense on order to convict the contention has already been rejected by the court several
defendant.43 times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right
but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.51 R.A.
disadvantage.44 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely
an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex
This Court added two more to the list, namely: post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore,
does not come within the prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.54

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
proclamation of a amnesty.45 Court still has the power of review to determine if he
presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal
laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is
acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.48 R.A 7975, "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the
which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement
a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can title57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this
properly administer justice.49 Not being a penal law, the case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which
the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally interpreted public officers and employees, including those in goverment-
and should be given a practical rather than a technical owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was
requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in
subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
of the law are germane to that general subject.59 The Congress, provided by law.
in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within
its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.60 office of the accussed PNP officers.

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors. informations."66

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations,
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the omissions complied of as constituting the
complaint or informations,61 and not by the evidence presented offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
by the parties at the trial.62 language without repetition not necessarily in
the terms of the statute defining the offense, but
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of
and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. common understanding to know what offense is
8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be intended to be charged, and enable the court to
committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional supplied)
requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that
shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67 The
real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present
caption or preamble of the informations nor from the case, we find the amended informations for murder against
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the
of facts in the complaint or information.68 offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders.
The noble object or written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69 In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations71 for murder reads:
The object of this written accusations was —
First; To furnish the accused with such a AMENDED INFORMATIONS
descretion of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense and second to The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III.
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses
protection against a further prosecution for the CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF
same cause and third, to inform the court of the INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
facts alleged so that it may decide whether they JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
should be had. In order that the requirement may ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO
be satisfied, facts must be stated, not V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ,
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
certain acts and intent these must be set forth in ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
the complaint with reasonable CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON,
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
complaint must contain a specific FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO
allegation of every fact and circumstance A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO
necessary to constitute the crime charged. III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
(Emphasis supplied) INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
offense."70 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalize under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
follows CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano office as officers and members of the Philippine
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and National Police are charged herein as
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accessories after-the-fact for concealing the
accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, crime herein above alleged by among others
CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR falsely representing that there where no
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. arrest made during the read conducted by the
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 dawn of May 18, 1995.
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, CONTRARY LAW.
and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking
advantage of their public and official positions as While the above-quoted information states that the above-
officers and members of the Philippine National named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in
Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific
relation to their public office, conspiring with allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
intent to kill and using firearms with treachery principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their
evident premeditation and taking advantage of official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
their superior strenghts did then and there information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal custody.
wounds which caused his instantaneous death
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
said victim. herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories
after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing
CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR the amended information that the victim was one of those
arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as
arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, such, has organized groups of police patrol and
Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately civilian commandoes consisting of regular
preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting policeman and . . . special policemen appointed
of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano and provided by him with pistols and higher power
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo
shooting happened in the two places far away from each other which is under his command . . . supervision and
is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended control where his co-defendants were stationed
information that the said accessories committed the offense "in entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, corresponding investigations as well as assumed
however, do not see the intimate connection between the the authority to arrest and detain person without
offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as due process of law and without bringing them to
earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the the proper court, and that in line with this set-up
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such,
and acting upon his orders his co-defendants
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied
particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which in consequence thereof.
the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere we held that the offense charged was committed
allegation in the amended information that the offense was in relation to the office of the accused because it
committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office was perpetreated while they were in the
is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of performance, though improper or irregular of their
law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy official functions and would not have been
between the offense charged and the discharge of the committed had they not held their office, besides,
accused's official duties. the accused had no personal motive in committing
the crime thus, there was an intimate connection
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the between the offense and the office of the accused.
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we
ruled: Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by do not indicate that the accused arrested and
the allegations in the complaint or information and not by investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the result of evidence after trial. the course of the investigation. The informations
merely allege that the accused for the purpose of
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00
amended information alleged abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims,
 and failing in their common purpose they shot; and
killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by
the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy

that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not
appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties
and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify
the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations

that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.

8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.