Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great.

Plan:

1. Political division in Greece.

2. Macedon transformed under Philip.

3. The Macedonian professional army.

4. Despotism and conquest.

5. Alexander’s Asian trappings.

Throughout first two-thirds of the 4 th century B.C many Greeks took to heart a
verse from Euripides’s play “Andromadic” in Greece “alas!” how “ill things
ordered are!” but none seemed able to do much about it. Greece’s “ill order” was
its political division. As Thebes warred with Sparta and Athens warred with
Thebes , ever more Greeks began to long for a national “strong man” to quell all
strife, however much imperialism and tyranny were at variance with pristine
Greek ideals city fought city and faction fought faction. Finally a strong man
appeared in the person of Philip of Macedon.

Had Philip’s fame not been overshadowed by that of his son Alex, he surely would
have been known as Philip the Great. Before he assumed rule in Macedon in 359
B.C the Greek speaking territory, north of Greece, had no cities, little agriculture,
and no political stability, being little more than a warring-ground for rival class yet
by sheer force of will Philip transformed Macedon into a major power within two
decades. First he eliminated all his rivals, then he introduced autocratic
institutions of government, and then he gegan to expand his frontiers by a
combination of military skill and “divide and conquer” diplomacy. Philip’s fighting
style led to a revolution in the art of warfare, as contemporaries themselves
recognized. Hitherto the Greeks had formed their armies almost exclusively from
citizen-volunteers and conscripts, all of whom could fight for only part of the year
because they could not abandon their crops during farming seasons. With limited
periods of training, almost all soldiers in such Greek armies fought the same way,
as massed infantry with heavy arms. In contrast, drawing partly on mercenaries
and partly on loyal Macedonians who had no farming commitments, Philip built a
professional army.

The advantages of the Macedonian professional army, an army that later served
Alex. the Great as well as Philip, were manifold. For one, the commander of such
a force could count on a wide range of “specialists”. Philip’s army had an effective
mobile cavalry it had “skirmishers”- fighters whose goal was to demoralizeand
confuse the enemy at the onset of battle by distracting them with a rain of
projectiles coming from the wrong part of the field. Not least among Philip’s
specialists were well-trained spies and counter-spies, adept at the art of
spreading “disinformation”. Another advantage of professionalism was that one
could impose the strictest discipline. Free Greeks who volunteered for service
might, from idealism, hav imposed some discipline on themselves, yet it would
have been difficult for a commander to address them peremptorily, and their
idealism would have tended to diminish in inverse proportion to the length of
campaigns. Philip’s army on the other hand, invariably took orders without
flinching, having no doubts about the consequences of subordination: supposedly
Philip once murdered a sleeping sentry on the spot, starting coolly as he walked
off, “I left him as I found him”. Finally, professionalism allowed Philip to eliminate
large numbers of noncombatant servants who carried provisions. Earlier Greek
forces moved slowly from site to site and were hampered by logistical problems
because they were swelled with men who carried food and arms for other men,
but Philip forced his fighters to carry their necessities for themselves as much as
strength allowed. All of Philip’s innovations were considered uncouth by the
“gentlemanly” Greeks of the city-states, but his indifference to military “good
manners” allowed him to engage in lightning strikes and ensured his total victory
of 338 B.C. over combined Athenian and Theban forcesat the battle of Chaeronea.

That victory ended Greek city-state freedom once and for all because after
Chaeronea Philip installed his despotic rule throughout Greece and his son Alex
thereafter maintained that despotism as the springboard for the conquest of half
of Asia. Much irony resides in the fact that Alex’s tutor during his early teenage
years had been Aristotle, the very Greek philosopher who insisted that humans
are so designed by nature for life in city-states that “he who can live without one
must be either a beast or a god”, for after Alex proved indifferent to this teaching
and proceeded to act as if his tutor had not been a Greek but a Persian. Some
historians used to think that Alex’s amazing march through Asia Minor, Egypt,
Mesopotamia, Persia and Afghanistan to the borders of India was motivated by
an urgent sense of mission to bring Greek enlightenment to presumably
benighted Asians, but it is now widely agreed upon that Alex was driven forward
solely by a quest for power and glory that verged on megalomania. In his own day
the story was told that a sea pirate taken captive by the mighty conqueror told
him that the only difference between them was one of scale. If put aside motives,
however, it was Alex’s conquests and not the pirate’s that provided the
foundations for the Hellenistic civilization.

Alex’s pattern of rule itself was Hellenistic in mixing Greek and Asiatic traits. For
propaganda purposes the young Macedonian claimed to be punishing Persia for
insults inflicted earlier on Greeks and in fact he not only replaced Persian
governors with Greek speaking ones wherever he went nut he imported Greek
settlers to inhabit newly founded cities as a means of keeping conquered
populations in a state of subordination. Yet Alex also recognized that he and his
Greeks could never hope to rule a gigantic Asian empire as hated foreigners, and
hence encouraged intermarriage. In keeping with this policy Alex himself married
a Bactrian princess, Roxane, and divided a loaf of breed with his bride at the
wedding as a gesture of deference to local custom.

What inspired Alex most about the ways of Asia were not princesses or loaves of
bread, but any Asian customs that might enhance his autocracy and his glamour.
The traditions of Greece, of course were thoroughly at odds with flattery and
ostentation. Well known is the story that when Alex first assumed rule in Greece
he met the philosopher Diogenes sitting in a wooden tab that served as his home
and asked the sage if he would like a favor. “Yes”, said Diogenes, “move out of my
sun”. Determined not to be spoken to this way if, he could possibly help it. Alex
adopted lavish Persian dress as he moved through Asia and commanded subjects
to approach him, depending on their rank, on bended knee of fully prostrate.
Most extreme was Alex’s decision to proclaim himself God. Although he did this
only in Egypt, where the pharaohs had been worshipped as offspring of the sun-
god Amon for millennia, claiming divinity was an extraordinary measure for a
Greek who was expected to move out of the sun when an unkempt philosopher
told him to do so.

After the death of Philip II, Olympias ordered the execution of Eurydice and her
child, in order to secure Alexander's position as king of Macedonia. During
Alexander's campaigns, she regularly corresponded with him and may have
confirmed her son's claim in Egypt that his father was not Philip but Zeus. The
relationship between Olympias and Alexander was cordial, but her son tried to
keep her away from politics. However, she wielded great influence in Macedonia
and caused troubles to Antipater, the regent of the kingdom. In 330 BC, she
returned to Epirus and served as a regent to her cousin Aeacides in the Epirote
state, as her brother Alexander I had died during a campaign in southern Italy.
After Alexander the Great's death in Babylon in 323 BC, his wife Roxana bore him
a posthumous son who was called Alexander IV. The latter, along with his
uncle Philip III Arrhidaeus, half brother of Alexander the Great and mentally
disabled, were subject to the regency of Perdiccas, who tried to strengthen his
position by a marriage with Antipater's daughter Nicaea. At the same time,
Olympias offered Perdiccas the hand of her daughter Cleopatra. Perdiccas chose
Cleopatra, which angered Antipater, who invaded Macedon, deposed Perdiccas,
and declared himself regent, only to die within the year.
Polyperchon succeeded Antipater in 319 BC as regent, but Antipater's
son Cassander established Philip II’s simpleminded son Philip III (Arrhidaeus) as
king and forced Polyperchon out of Macedonia.[8] He fled to Epirus,
taking Roxana and her son Alexander IV with him. At the beginning, Olympias had
not been involved in this conflict, but she soon realized that in case of Cassander's
rule, her grandson would definitely lose the crown and as a result, she allied with
Polyperchon in 317.The Macedonian soldiers supported her return and the united
army of Polyperchon and Olympias with the house of Aeacidesinvaded
Macedonia to drive Cassander out from power.
After winning in battle, Olympias captured and executed Philip III Arrhidaeus and
his wife Eurydice in October 317 BC, as well as Cassander’s brother and a hundred
of his partisans.[8] Cassander blockaded and besieged Olympias in Pydna and
forced her to surrender. One of the terms of the capitulation had been that
Olympias's life would be saved, but Cassander had decided to execute her,
sparing only temporarily the lives of Roxana and Alexander IV (they were later
executed in 310 BC). When the fortress of Pydna fell Cassander ordered Olympias
killed but the soldiers refused to kill the mother of Alexander. In the end, the
families of her many victims stoned her to death with the approval of
Cassander, who is also said to have denied to her body the rights of burial.
The political relationship between Macedonia and Greece during the reigns of
Philip and Alexander changed drastically. When Philip first came to the throne in
359 Macedonia was a backwater of Greece that served as a pawn in the political
games of the more powerful city-states to the south. By the end of Alexander's
reign the respective roles of the Macedonians and Greeks had reversed
completely. Macedonia now stood as the most powerful state in all of Greece and
by this power was beginning to create a stable Greek state within the larger
Macedonian Empire. Thus over a period of thirty-six years, Macedonia was able to
improve her status to compete within and then conquer the elite of Greek
society. A major portion of this transformation was the political policies towards
Greece set forth and followed by Philip and Alexander. The following work will
examine these political policies in an effort to' investigate the Macedonian
metamorphosi from pawn to king of Greece. Before this dynamic change in
fortune, Macedonia was not a model of stability.1 To begin, political intrigue
including regicide was commonplace in the Macedonian court and shortened
many kings' reigns. Moreover, the actual unity of Macedonia was problematic.

Before this dynamic change in fortune, Macedonia was not a model of stability.1
To begin, political intrigue including regicide was commonplace in the
Macedonian court and shortened many kings' reigns. Moreover, the actual unity
of Macedonia was problematic. For all practical purposes, the kingdom was
separated into two halvesUpper Macedonia and Lower Macedonia. Lower
Macedonia, in actuality eastern Macedonia, was the heartland of the Macedonian
kingdom. This area was well developed and controlled by the king. Upper or
western Macedonia, on the other hand was just the opposite. This mountainous
terrain bred the most unruly of the Macedonians and was a constant source of
chaos for the more organized and controlled lower or eastern Macedonia. Despite
the best efforts of several kings, these two halves were never truly united until
Philip's reign. Beyond Macedonia's internal struggles, the kingdom also suffered
external incursions into her independence from all sides. From the north and the
west came the first and most formidable form of trouble. The barbarian tribes of
Paeonia and Illyria represented a constant threat to Macedonian security. The
Illyrians had occupied most of upper Macedonia and regularly raided down into
the lower Macedonian kingdom. By that same token, the Paeonians to the north
never hesitated to take what they could from their southern neighbor. To the
east, Macedonian economic independence was hampered by the cities of the
Chalcidice. Macedonian imports and exports were entirely dependent upon
Chalcidian port cities for their trade. As a result the relationship between
Macedonia and the Chalcidice was often strained to the point of open war."
Finally, to the south, Macedonia also suffered incursions into her politics by
Athenian and Theban interests. In this respect, the Athenians were focused on
regaining control of their access to the timber resources of the Strymon River
Valley in western Thrace. By 359 these external pressures came to a head. 5 The
lllyrians attacked Macedonia, defeated the best of the Macedonian troops and in
the process killed the king, Philip's predecessor, Perdiccas III. Philip came to
power at this point with his kingdom collapsing all around him. The lllyrians could
be expected to follow up on their victory by advancing further into Macedonia,
the Paeonians were gathering to exploit the current Macedonian weakness and
the Chalcidian and Athenians both supported different rivals to the throne against
Philip. Thus, upon his ascension, Philip took control of a kingdom notorious for
internal instability and now beset externally by enemies from all sides. It was at
this point that Philip began a process of political maneuvering that would
transform Macedonia into a world power. This thesis will break this process down
into three phases. The first was defined by necessity. Philip had to contrive some
plan to insure the immediate security of his kingdom. Tn relation to Greece, this
meant dealing with the threat posed by an Athenian back pretender to the throne
(see Chapter III). When this first bout of frantic crisis management had passed,
insuring the immediate security took on a new meaning to Philip and pushed him
into a second phase of dealing with Greece.

Philip died shortly after he had put himself in position to carry out his war of
expansion against Persia, but the foundations he had laid for the war were more
than sufficient. In fact, his son and successor, Alexander III, did not deviate from
Philip's established political relationship with Greece for the first twelve years of
his thirteen-year reign (see Chapter V). It was not until his final year as king, when
Alexander turned back from expansion eastward, that he made any attempt to
change Macedonian and Greek political relations. During this period, Alexander
began implementing a dynastic form of governance for Greece intended to create
a stable Greek state within a larger empire (see Chapter IV). Ironically, this
adjustment in policy might also have been made following precedents set by
Philip. Alexander's changes, however, were ill-fated. He died before they could
properly develop and his vision was not shared by his successors. Macedonian
and Greek political relations under Philip and Alexander represent arguably one of
the greatest reversals of fortune in all of history. In three stages, from 359 to 336
Macedonia rose to prominence by avoiding possible subjugation by Athens in the
form of a puppet king, fortifying herself against Greek political interference and,
once in a position of power, creating an effective system to govern the Greeks,
which also enabled an enormous expansion to the east. From 336 to 324 this
system operated effectively, dealing with any and all tests. Finally, in 324, when
the war had been carried out to the fullest, Macedonia turned to a long-term
solution to create a stable Greek state within the larger Macedonian Empire. The
remaining pages will investigate the 4 relationship with the Greeks. To expand
east required Philip to create a political mechanism to maintain his now
prominent position amongst the Greeks and Philip finally did so in the form of the
Corinthian League. Philip died shortly after he had put himself in position to carry
out his war of expansion against Persia, but the foundations he had laid for the
war were more than sufficient. In fact, his son and successor, Alexander III, did
not deviate from Philip's established political relationship with Greece for the first
twelve years of his thirteen-year reign (see Chapter V). It was not until his final
year as king, when Alexander turned back from expansion eastward, that he
made any attempt to change Macedonian and Greek political relations. During
this period, Alexander began implementing a dynastic form of governance for
Greece intended to create a stable Greek state within a larger empire (see
Chapter IV). Ironically, this adjustment in policy might also have been made
following precedents set by Philip. Alexander's changes, however, were ill-fated.
He died before they could properly develop and his vision was not shared by his
successors. Macedonian and Greek political relations under Philip and Alexander
represent arguably one of the greatest reversals of fortune in all of history. In
three stages, from 359 to 336 Macedonia rose to prominence by avoiding
possible subjugation by Athens in the form of a puppet king, fortifying herself
against Greek political interference and, once in a position of power, creating an
effective system to govern the Greeks, which also enabled an enormous
expansion to the east. From 336 to 324 this system operated effectively, dealing
with any and all tests. Finally, in 324, when the war had been carried out to the
fullest, Macedonia turned to a long-term solution to create a stable Greek state
within the larger Macedonian Empire. The remaining pages will investigate the
respective roles of Philip and Alexander in pushing Macedonia to the forefront of
Greek politics.

The sources available to the modern scholar regarding Macedonia between 359
and 323 BC are problematic. To begin, there may be no other person in the
recorded history of mankind who has been written on more than Alexander of
Macedon. On the other hand, his father, while widely esteemed in antiquity, has
not drawn the attention of historians and the documents pertaining to his life
therefore are not as abundant. Even so, full ancient historical accounts of either
man are not only rare, but those that have survived in full are separated by
centuries from the men that they describe. The problem for the modern historian
then is to assess the reliability of these accounts. Thus, an analysis of the sources'
compositions is an unavoidable prerequisite to any examination of Macedon
under the reigns of Philip and Alexander. While the final goal of this analysis will
be an historical assessment of the validity of the five surviving full narratives, it
will be beneficial first to identify the source material available for use by the
authors of those surviving texts. These are known indirectly to us through textual
references within the surviving narratives, as well as in extant fragments.
Furthermore, these authors represent two levels of separation between the
extant sources of Philip and Alexander themselves. First are those authors who
lived as contemporaries to Philip and Alexander.

r. The second represents lost works on these men that were written by authors
who lived and wrote in the intermediary time period between the death of
Alexander and the composition of Diodorus Siculus' history, which 7 6 "Isocrates"
(G.L.C.) The Oxford Classical Dictionary 3rd edition, Ed. Simon Hornblower and
Antony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 769-770; Peter Green,
Alexander of Macedon 336- 323 BC: A Historical Biography (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1991), 570. was the first of the extant sources to be
produced. The source analysis that follows is organized with the above in mind.
This analysis will discuss the pertinent primary sources and intermediary sources,
which were available to some degree for the composition of the five major
sources. Then it will move to a discussion of the relative merits of the five major
extant sources. Finally, there will be a discussion of the material evidence
available in coinage, art, and archaeology.