Studies in Dharmakirti S Religious Philo

HELMUT KRASSER, HORST LASIC, ELI FRANCO, BIRGIT KELLNER (ED.
Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis

Proceedings of the
Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference
Vienna, August 23–27, 2005
ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN, 424. BAND
BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

Nr. 69
ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN
PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE
DENKSCHRIFTEN, 424. BAND
HELMUT KRASSER, HORST LASIC, ELI FRANCO, BIRGIT KELLNER (ED.)
Religion and Logic in Buddhist

Philosophical Analysis
Proceedings of the
Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference
Vienna, August 23–27, 2005
VERLAG DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN

WIEN 2011
Vorgelegt von k. M. HELMUT KRASSER in der Sitzung am 17. Dezember 2010
Alle Rechte vorbehalten

ISBN 978-3-7001-7000-6
Copyright © 2011 by Österreichische
Akademie der Wissenschaften Wien
Druck und Bindung: Prime Rate kft., Budapest



Contents
Frontispiece: Paricipants at the conference .................................................. v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Account of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference in Vienna, August 23–27, 2005
Program .............................................................................. xi
List of participants .................................................................... xv
Ernst Steinkellner, Opening speech – News from the manuscript department .................... xvii
Proceedings
Piotr Balcerowicz, Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (ane-
kāntavāda) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Junjie Chu, Sanskrit fragments of Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi ........................... 33
Vincent Eltschinger, Studies on Dharmakīrti’s religious philosophy (3): Compassion and its
role in the general structure of PV 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Koji Ezaki, Can we say that everything is ineffable? Udayana’s refutation of the theory of
apoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Eli Franco, Perception of yogis – Some epistemological and metaphysical considerations ......... 81
Toru Funayama, Kamalaśīla’s view on yogic perception and the bodhisattva paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Brendan S. Gillon, Dharmakīrti on inference from effect. A discussion of verse 12 and the
Svavṛtti of the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Klaus Glashoff, Problems of transcribing avinābhāva into predicate logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Keijin Hayashi, Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of mental perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Yoshichika Honda, Bhoja and Dharmakīrti ................................................... 151
Pascale Hugon, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s views on perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Masahiro Inami, Nondual cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Hisataka Ishida, On the classification of anyāpoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Takashi Iwata, Compassion in Buddhist logic – Dharmakīrti’s view of compassion as inter-

preted by Prajñākaragupta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
viii Contents
Kyō Kanō, Dichotomy, antarvyāpti, and dṛṣṭānta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Kei Kataoka, Manu and the Buddha for Kumārila and Dharmakīrti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Shoryu Katsura, From Abhidharma to Dharmakīrti – With a special reference to the concept
of svabhāva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Yohei Kawajiri, A critique of the Buddhist theory of adhyavasāya in the Pratyabhijñā school ...... 281
Birgit Kellner, Dharmakīrti’s criticism of external realism and the sliding scale of analysis ........ 291
Hisayasu Kobayashi, On the development of the argument to prove vijñaptimātratā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Taiken Kyuma, On the (im)perceptibility of external objects in Dharmakīrti’s epistemology ....... 309
Lawrence McCrea, Prajñākaragupta on the pramāṇas and their objects .......................... 319
Shinya Moriyama, pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajña, sarvajña and sarvasarvajña . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Yasutaka Muroya, Bhāsarvajña’s Interpretation of bhāva eva nāśaḥ and a related chrono-
logical problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Hiroshi Nemoto, The proof of impermanence in the dGe lugs pa’s pramāṇa theory ............... 363
Miyako Notake, The concept of samayābhoga in the refutation of the existence of universals. . . . . . . 375
Hideyo Ogawa, On the term anupalabdhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Masamichi Sakai, Śākyabuddhi and Dharmottara on the inference of momentariness based on

the absence of external causes of destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Kiyokuni Shiga, antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti re-examined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
John Taber, Did Dharmakīrti think the Buddha had desires? .................................... 437
Tom J.F. Tillemans, Dignāga, Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti on apoha. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
Toshikazu Watanabe, Dharmakīrti’s intention to quote Pramāṇasamuccaya III 12 ................ 459
Jeson Woo, Vācaspatimiśra and Jñānaśrīmitra on the object of yogipratyakṣa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Zhihua Yao, Non-cognition and the third pramāṇa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
Chizuko Yoshimizu, What makes all the produced impermanent? Proof of impermanence and
theory of causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Reconsidering the fragment of the Bṛhaṭṭīkā on restriction (niyama) ......... 507
Studies on Dharmakīrti’s religious philosophy (3):
Compassion and its role in the general structure of PV 2
Vincent Eltschinger, Vienna
Translated from the French by

Raynald Prévèreau
1. Introduction
1.1. The focus of the present study is PV 2.120–131ab (§2). In those verses, Dharmakīrti at-
tempts to prove, against a Mīmāṃsaka opponent, that compassion,1 when practiced constantly
over a myriad of successive lifetimes, is liable to increase gradually until it may become the
very essence of a given mental series.
That argument largely rests on the belief in compassion’s “spontaneity” (svarasavāhitva,
etc.), a notion that itself cannot be fully understood without appealing to the Mahāyāna dogma
of the three “objects” of immeasurable (apramāṇa) sentiments. Since I contend that under-
standing that doctrinal theme, especially in its ANS formulation, is essential to grasping the
full meaning of PV 2.120–131ab, I will here take up a detailed exegesis of the ANS, the BoBh,
the MSA(Bh) and their explanation by Sthiramati (§4). Contrary to Takashi Iwata, I tend to be-
lieve that Dharmakīrti did not commit himself on the causes and conditions that lead to the ini-
tial impulse toward the constant practice (abhyāsa, bhāvanā) of compassion. This was also De-
vendrabuddhi’s and Śākyabuddhi’s understanding, both of whom, by resorting to the tradi-
tional themes of gotra and kalyāṇamitra (§3), remind the exegete of another Mahāyāna doctri-
nal complex that was well in favour in Idealist sources.
1.2. In contrast to Dignāga,2 Dharmakīrti shows a constant concern for grounding logic and
1
On compassion in Dharmakīrti, see Inami 1986, Dunne 1996, Franco 1997: 4–8, Iwata 2011. The research for
this paper was made possible through the generous support of the Swiss National Research Fund. Financial
support for its English translation was provided by the Fonds Elisabet de Boer (Lausanne). I wish to thank T.
Iwata for having put the manuscript of his study at my disposal.
2
PV 2 is Dharmakīrti’s exhaustive commentary on the benedictory verse (maṅgalaśloka) of PS. In that verse,
Dignāga attributes five properties to the Blessed Buddha (or rather: describes him by means of five proper-
ties): the Blessed One is (has become and is similar to?) a means of valid cognition (pramāṇabhūta); he strives
for the good of the world (jagaddhitaiṣin); he is the teacher (śāstṛ), the sugata, the protector (tāyin) of living
beings. In his own commentary (PSV) to this verse, Dignāga subsumes the last four properties/epithets under
Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis.
Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, August 23–27, 2005. Wien 2011, pp. 43–72.
44 Vincent Eltschinger
epistemology in reality. This is the case for his theories of language and universals, perception
and reasoning. Even what falls under buddhology is not an exception. But in order to secure
the validity of Dignāga’s inference regarding the Buddha’s authority as a source of knowledge,
Dharmakīrti had to explain the properties/epithets introduced by his predecessor in terms of a
network of causal relations that would allow logical “retrogression.” From the outset, that
epistemological necessity led Dharmakīrti into a “narrativization” of the fourfold structure in-
herited from Dignāga. For as is obvious, every causal sequence implies a process in time. And
when it comes to buddhology, a chronological sequence generally coincides with a narrative or
“biographical” sequence. We could therefore reasonably expect that Dharmakīrti would appeal
to the more or less standardized descriptions of a Bodhisattva’s career, i.e., to a set of narrative
sequences that would be recognizable both doctrinally and textually. These sequences provide
Dharmakīrti with the model for a unilinear causal process in the form of a narrative where both
norm and mythology are intertwined. The categories inherited from Dignāga then serve to
mark the sequence or periods of that process. Such periodization, however, does not always fit
perfectly with the standard descriptions of a Bodhisattva’s career. In other words, in Dharma-
kīrti the fourfold structure inherited from Dignāga is superimposed on a complex series of nar-
rative micro-sequences that are always doctrinally recognizable. And the true basis for the
causal relations introduced among those properties/epithets is to be found in the concatenation
of these micro-sequences. At the end of this paper, I will take up one of those narrative micro-
sequences, namely, the micro-sequence of (conventional) bodhicittotpāda and its concomitant
praṇidhāna (§5). For that notion seems to me capable of explaining why the property of striv-
ing for the good of the world, that is to say the property of being moved by compassion, is the
direct cause of the property of being the Teacher, and the indirect cause of the very authority
(prāmāṇya) of the Buddha in salvational matters.
2. The systematics of karuṇā
2.1. At PV 2.34b–119, Dharmakīrti presents his arguments in favour of rebirth. In his PVP to
PV 2.119, Devendrabuddhi summarizes the position as follows:3 “In this way, the [uninter-
rupted] series of births and deaths is established; hence the constant practice (abhyāsa) of
mental qualities such as compassion is [made possible over these successive lifetimes], and
there is no incompatibility in [the claim that those mental qualities] become the essence [of a
mental series] if [their] practice is extreme[ly intense].” Then follow two formal arguments
(prayoga) using a svabhāvahetu as evidence and taking great compassion (mahākaruṇā) as
their subject. In the first case, the evidence, “being a mental quality” (manoguṇa), is said to
abhidharmic categories: the Blessed One is (has become and is similar to?) a means of valid cognition because
he is possessed with the double perfection of cause (hetu°) and effect (phalasampad). Here, “perfection of
cause” refers to the double perfection of intention (āśaya°) and praxis (prayogasampad), while “perfection of
effect” refers to the double perfection of one’s own good (svārtha°) and the good of others (parārthasampad).
These four sub-perfections therefore correspond to properties/epithets 2 to 5 of PS: āśayasampad corresponds
to jagaddhitaiṣitva, prayogasampad corresponds to śāstṛtva, svārthasampad corresponds to sugatatva, and
parārthasampad corresponds to tāyitva. See §5 below.
3
PVP D51b4–5/P58a8–b1: de ltar na / skye ba dang ’chi ba’i rgyun grub pa de ltar na snying rje la sogs pa’i yid
kyi yon tan rnams goms pa yod pa dang / shin tu goms pa yod pa na de’i bdag nyid du gyur pa ’gal ba yod pa
ma yin no //. Note also PVV 53,13–14: tad evam … dehanivṛttāv api janmaparamparāsambhave yuktaḥ
kṛpābhyāsa ity abhyāsāt seti samarthitam /.
Compassion and its role in the general structure of PV 2 45
imply the property to be proven, namely, “to become the entire essence of man if its practice is
extreme[ly intense].” In the second case, the property of “being a mental quality that [always]
improves with constant practice” is said to imply the property of “gradually becoming the es-
sence of man as a result of an extreme[ly intense] practice.”4 This then is broadly the doctrine
that Dharmakīrti will attempt to establish at PV 2.120–131ab: as a result of a constant practice
over a myriad of successive lifetimes, the mental quality of compassion gradually forms the
very essence of the mental series, to the detriment of opposing mental events (dharma).
2.2. It should be noted at this point that compassion is defined in the Buddhist tradition in
terms of its intention (bzhed pa), object (yul = viṣaya), aspect (rnam pa = ākāra) and nature
(rang bzhin/rang gi ngo bo = svabhāva/svarūpa).5 (1) Disinterested action guides the
compassionate being: “[compassion] does not rest on the [expectation] of a benefit in return
(pratyupakāra), or on [reputation and honour];” it consists in acting with the sole good of oth-
ers (parārtha) in mind.6 (2) Compassion is “equality toward all beings” (sarvasattveṣu samatā):
it is directed toward the totality of beings living on the three planes of existence (tridhātu)
since it is free of attachment toward friends and free of hostility toward enemies.7 (3) Compas-
sion “has as its aspect the desire that [beings] be entirely liberated from the suffering [that af-
flicts them]” (*atyantaduḥkhaviyogecchākāra) so that suffering acquires the property of being
unable to reappear (*apunarutpattidharma).8 (4) Finally, the nature of compassion is the “ab-
sence of hatred” (adveṣa).9
4
See PVP D51b5–7/P58b1–5 (with the example of a śrotriya who has become a kāpālika), together with
PVṬ Nye D116a4/P142a2 and PVṬ Nye D116a5/P142a2–3.
5
Note PVṬ Nye D88a7/P107b4–5: thugs rje* yang ci zhig bzhed pa na’am / gang la’am / rnam pa** gang gis
sam / ci’i rang bzhin can du ’jug par ’gyur zhe na / *P rjes; **P par. See also PVṬ Nye D88b1–2/P107b6–8
and, for references to this type of classification, Iwata 2011: 213–214, note 9; the rubrics svabhāva, ākāra and
ālambana are found in AKBh 415,7–8 ad AK 7.33d.
6
PVP D16a3–4/P18a1: phan btags pa’i lan la sogs pa la ltos pa med pa can … PVṬ Nye D88b1–2/P107b5–7:
phan gdags pa byas pa dag las* rnyed pa thob pa ni phan btags** pa’i lan no // sogs pa’i sgras ni grags pa
dang bsnyen bkur la sogs pa bzung ngo // … sems can gyi don nyid bzhed pa na ’jug par ’gyur ro zhes bya ba’i
don to // *P la; **D gdags. pratyupakāra at PVA 107,5; see also MSA(Bh) 17.58.
7
PVP D16a4/P18a1: sems can thams cad la snyoms pa … Śākyabuddhi’s explanation at PVṬ Nye D88b2/
P107b7 goes as follows: mdza’ po dang dgra po dag la rjes su chags pa dang khong khro ba mi mnga’ ba’i
phyir / khams gsum gyi khongs su gtogs pa’i sems can thams cad la snyoms pa’o //. I find problematic the claim
that compassion is equality toward all beings. Indeed, as is suggested in the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi
and Śākyabuddhi, the compassion that is here defined has not been practiced yet (PVṬ Nye D88b3/P108a1: ji
ltar de nyid goms pa yin zhe na /. “The [compassion that we just defined], how do we come to practice it?”).
Now, in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma, while equality is a characteristic of the great compassion (mahākaruṇā)
of Buddhas and great Bodhisattvas, it is not so for ordinary compassion (karuṇā; on the notion of “great com-
passion,” see §4.3 below). At AK 7.33d it is asked (AKBh 415,5: karuṇāmahākaruṇayoḥ kiṃ nānākaraṇam /):
“What is the difference between compassion and great compassion?” Referring to the third difference,
Vasubandhu answers (AKBh 415,7–8: ālambanata ekatridhātvālambanatvāt /): “[Their] object, since [whereas
compassion] is only directed toward one [plane of existence, great compassion is directed] toward [all] three
planes of existence.” Take note also of AKBh 415,3 ad AK 7.33bc, where gocara is explained as ālambanena
traidhātukālambanāt, and samatva as samatvena sarvasattveṣu samavṛttitvāt. Śākyabuddhi himself noted that
sarvasattveṣu samatā defines great compassion and not ordinary compassion (PVṬ Nye D88b2/P107b7–8: ’dis
ni* yul chen po can nyid du bstan pa’i phyir thugs rje chen po bshad do // *D omits ni).
8
PVP D16a4/P18a1–2: shin tu sdug bsngal dang bral bar ’dod pa’i rnam pa can … Explained as follows by
2.3. At PV 2.120ad1, an opponent comes in who believes that the two prayogas mentioned
above (§2.1) are inconclusive (anaikāntika). The opponent objects:10
[Objection:] Even though [compassion can be] improved (viśeṣa) [slightly] through constant practice, nature
(svabhāva) [still] cannot be transgressed, as is examplified by jumping or heating water.
According to Devendrabuddhi, this svabhāvātikrama consists in “freeing [oneself] from [com-

passion’s] opposing (vipakṣa) [dharmas];” according to Manorathanandin, it consists in “going
beyond the property, belonging to [mental qualities] such as compassion, of [always] being
mixed with their opposing [dharmas].”11 Transgressing nature, in the case of a given mental se-
ries, would therefore mean12 “to consist [entirely] in [a mental quality] such as compassion, [a
compassion that is] not mixed with its opposing [dharmas] and emerges spontaneously (sva-
rasena).”
We learn from Śākyabuddhi that the opponent introduced at PV 2.120ad1 is none other than
the Mīmāṃsaka doctor, Kumārila, of whom he quotes one verse. The verse in question reads
as follows:13 “[A person] may well jump as far as ten cubits (hasta) in the air; [nonetheless,]
Śākyabuddhi at PVṬ Nye D88b3/P107b8: de yang mi skye ba’i chos can nyid yin pa’i phyir … See
MSABh 121,21: karuṇā duḥkhaviyogākārā, and more importantly MSAVBh D55b4–5/P65b5: snying rje ni
sdug bsngal dang bral bar ’dod pa’i rnam pa yin pas sems can rnams sdug bsngal dang bral bar gyur cig ces
dmigs pa’i phyir ro //. See also PVA 53,11; 53,12; 53,15. According to the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika Abhi-
dharma and Mahāyānist sources, only great compassion is possessed with a real salvational efficiency: “[l]a
karuṇā, simple sentiment de commisération, ne protège pas les êtres; la mahākaruṇā est une compassion effi-
cace et protège les êtres de la terreur du Saṃsāra” (Traité III.1707). See in general Traité III.1705–1710, and
AKBh 415,10 ad AK 7.33d (seventh difference between karuṇā and mahākaruṇā [aparitrāṇaparitrāṇataḥ /]:
“La pitié ne protège pas, la grande pitié protège” [Kośa 7.79]). Compassion is thus defined here as a desire ra-
ther than as the salvational act itself.
9
PVP D16a4/P18a2: zhe sdang med pa … Note also AKBh 415,7: svabhāvato ’dveṣāmohasvabhāvatvāt /.
“[Compassion and great compassion differ firstly] in nature, since [whereas] the nature of [compassion] is the
absence of hatred, [the nature of great compassion] is the absence of bewilderment.”
10
PV 2.120ad1: abhyāsena viśeṣe ’pi laṅghanodakatāpavat / svabhāvātikramo mā bhūd iti cet … For the incon-
clusiveness of the two prayogas, see PVP D51b7–52a1/P58b5.
11
PVP D52a1/P58b5–6: rigs mi mthun pa las ’das pa; PVV 53,17–18: kṛpādes tadvipakṣasaṅkīrṇatvasyāti-
kramaḥ.
12
PVV 53,18: vipakṣāvyavakīrṇasvarasapravṛttakṛpādimayatā sātmībhāvaḥ. Cf. PVP D52a1/P58b6: rang gi
ngang gis ’jug pa’i mtshan nyid can snying rje la sogs pa’i bdag nyid du ’gyur ba.
13
PVṬ Nye D116a5–6/P142a4–5: de skad du gZhon nu ma len gyis / mkha’ la dom bcu tshun chad du // mchongs
nas ’gro ba zhes bya gang // des ni lan brgyar goms na yang // rgyang grags brgyar ni mchong mi nus // zhes
smras pa yin no //. TS no. 3168 ≈ R 9,16–17 (where the verse is explicitly ascribed to the BṬ): daśahastānta-
raṃ vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati / na yojanam asau gantuṃ śakto ’bhyāsaśatair api //. Kamalaśīla’s ex-
planation at TSP K826,25–27 ad TS no. 3168/S1000,17–20 ad TS no. 3167 goes as follows: yadi nāma kecid
upacitaśleṣmavapuṣo hastamātravyomotplavanāsamarthāḥ paścād abhyāsakrameṇa samāsāditagātralāghavā
daśahastāntaragaganavilaṅghano (sic) jātāḥ, tathāpi na te yojanam ekam api khagapatham utpatituṃ samar-
thāḥ prayatnaśatenāpi bhavanti /. “Some [people] whose body abounds in phlegm cannot even jump a single
cubit in the air; [now,] it is quite possible that due to a series of exercises, having regained the lightness of
their bodies, they then start jumping up to ten cubits in the air; [but] even thus, a hundred attempts would not
suffice for them to reach an upward distance of one yojana.” It is clear from TS no. 3169 that the real target of
this verse was not compassion, but rather jñāna/prajñā, which leads to omniscience when perfected. Accord-
ing to Decourtemanche (1911: 376), the hasta (“average cubit”) is a unit of length equivalent to 0.4794 metres;
the distance measurements are easily obtained from the cubit: a krośa is equivalent to 3 835.2 metres, while a
hundreds of repetitions will not suffice to enable him to reach [the distance of] one yojana.”
Now if we are to accept the portrayal proposed by Dharmakīrti and his successors, Kumārila
here did not deny compassion or its quality as a psychological event. Rather, Kumārila ob-
jected to the claim that such mental qualities have the potential to increase through constant
practice up to the point where, at the very end of their developing process (atyantaprakarṣa-
niṣṭhāṃ gacchanti, etc.),14 they may form the essence (sātmībhāva, etc.) of the human psyche.
The development of these mental qualities, argued Kumārila, is strictly limited (vyavasthitot-
karṣa, etc.).15
Of the two examples provided by Dharmakīrti to illustrate Kumārila’s position, namely,
jumping and heating water, the first is supposed to refute the claim that constant practice leads
to continuous improvement of the competence in question:16 “When jumping, a person very
well trained at jumping may cover (gnon par byed pa) a certain distance, but not more; [i.e., he
does not jump] one yojana, half a krośa or even one krośa.” The second example is meant to
show that even if we admitted the possibility of a constant increase on the level of the cause,
the result would still be finite due precisely to the finite nature of the substratum (āśraya):17
“Even when heated [very] intensely, water does not turn into fire, even after a long time[, since
it will have evaporated completely in the meantime].” Manorathanandin therefore concludes as
follows his explanation of the Mīmāṃsaka objection:18 “Just as there is only a [slight] differ-
ence [compared to] the naturally fixed (prakṛtisiddha) [limit of] jump and temperature, so too
there is only a [slight] increase [of compassion] but [the mental series] does not become coes-
sential with compassion.” Unless a transgression of ordinary psychological structure is possi-
ble, Dharmakīrti’s argument must be rejected as inconclusive.19
yojana is equivalent to 15 340.8 metres.

14
Atyantaprakarṣaniṣṭha at PVA 105,32; paraprakarṣaniṣṭhā at PVA 106,27; prakarṣaniṣṭhām … gacchet at
PVV 54,5; prakarṣaniṣṭhāṃ gacchanti at PVV 55,28; de’i bdag nyid du gyur pa’i thugs rje gang yin pa de ’dra
ba mthar phyin pa ldog pa med par ’gyur ro at PVP D16a6–7/P18a5 (PVṬ Nye D89a1/P108a8: mthar phyin pa
ni ’phel ba’i mthar phyin pa’o); shin tu ’phel ba’i chos can at PVP D53b1/P60b4; see also note 34 below.
15
Vyavasthitotkarṣabhāgin at PVA 106,8; vyavasthitotkarṣatā at PVA 106,11, 106,13, 107,3, PVV 54,15–16,
55,14, 55,19; vyavasthitotkarṣa at PVA 106,14; rnam par gnas pa nyid ’phel bar ’gyur ro at PVP
D52a6/P59a4; rnam par gnas pa ’phel ba can at PVP D52a7/P59a5; khyad par du rnam par gnas pa can at
PVP D53a7/P60b3; ’phel ba tshad nges pa can at PVṬ Nye D116b3/P142b2, D116b4/P142b4, PVP
D53b1/P60b4.
16
PVP D52a2/P58b6–7: mchongs bzhin te / dper na shin tu legs par goms par byas pa can gyi skyes bu mchongs
pa na / yul cung zad cig gnon par byed kyi / dpag tshad dam rgyang grags phyed dam / rgyang grags sam lhag
pa ma yin pa lta bu’o //. See also PVṬ Nye D116a5/P142a3–4, and note PVV 53,21: na hi puruṣo ’tyarthaṃ
laṅghane kṛtābhyāso yojanam ardhayojanaṃ vā laṅghayati /.
17
PVP D52a2–3/P58b6–7: chu’i dro ba bzhin du ste chu’i dro ba ches shin tu gyur pa na yang dus yun ring po
nas kyang ’bar ba nyid du mi ’gyur ba lta bu’o //. Note also PVV 53,21–22: nāpy udakam ekāntaṃ tāpya-
mānaṃ dahanībhavati; PVP D52a5/P59a3–4: dper na chu’i dro ba nyid thob par byung ba’i rang bzhin zad pa
nyid lta bu’o; PVV 54,3–4: udakatāpavat / kvāthyamānaṃ hy udakaṃ kṣīyata evety asthirāśrayaḥ; Vibh. 54,
note 1: na jvalati /.
18
PVV 53,22–24: prakṛtisiddhāl laṅghanāt sparśāc ca viśeṣamātraṃ bhavati yathā / tathotkarṣamātraṃ syāt
kṛpayā na tu sātmībhāva iti cet /.
19
PVP D52a3/P58b8: de ltar na rang bzhin las mi ’das pa’i phyir ma nges pa yin no zhe na /.
2.4. In his reply, Dharmakīrti begins by shedding some light on the specific properties of jump-
ing; an explanation in which he has no choice but to concede to Kumārila the validity of his de-
scription. But in so doing, Dharmakīrti spells out the two conditions that compassion would
have to meet, in contrast to jumping and heating water, for its maximum increase to be possi-
ble, and for his argument to be conclusive:20
If the [improvement that has been] produced [by the constant practice of compassion] required, [as is the case
for jumping,] a further effort [to come again into existence], and if its substratum were unstable [as is the case
for water, then] the improvement could not increase [by much]. Now a nature is not like that[, i.e., it does not
fail to proceed spontaneously]. [The growth of that which requires a further effort to come again into existence
is strictly limited] because the factors (sādhana) whose power is occupied with [recreating] the [previous im-
provement] are [ipso facto] incapable (asāmarthya) [of adding a supplementary property] to subsequent im-
provements, and because its substratum does not last indefinitely (nityam). [Therefore,] because the improve-
ment, even when it is [slightly] increased, is not natural[, it requires a further effort to be recreated]. [But] if it
were the case that an [improvement] that has been produced did not depend on a further effort (punaryatna) [to
come again into existence], then any new effort (yatno ’nyaḥ) could produce a [new] improvement (viśeṣakṛt).
The improvement (viśeṣa, phul du byung ba = atiśaya) that is peculiar to jumping requires a
further effort (punaryatnāpekṣā, etc.) to come again into existence “once [the factor, i.e., the
effort,] that brought [it into existence] has ceased (ādhāyakanivṛttau).”21 Now, according to
Devendrabuddhi,22 “the growth of any improvement that requires a [further] effort in order to
be produced anew is [strictly] limited (vyavasthitotkarṣa);” or, to use an equivalent formulation
by Manorathanandin,23 “to have a limited growth implies depending on a further effort [and]
having an unstable substratum.” Moreover, that improvement24 “is not at all a svabhāva, [i.e.,]
prakṛti, since the existence and cessation of the [said] improvement depend on the presence
and absence of [its] cause[, i.e., of the effort by which it is produced].” Indeed, a nature, like
space for example, does not depend on anything other than itself, but proceeds spontaneously
(svarasavāhin).25
20
PVP D52a3–4/P58b8–59a1: gal te de byas na yang zhes bya ba la sogs pas khyad par dang bcas pa’i gtan
tshigs bstan pa’i sgo nas ma nges pa’i lan ’debs par byed do //. PV 2.120d2–123: āhitaḥ sa cet // punaryatnam
apekṣeta yadi syāc cāsthirāśrayaḥ / viśeṣo naiva vardheta svabhāvaś ca na tādṛśaḥ // tatropayuktaśaktīnāṃ
viśeṣān uttarān prati / sādhanānām asāmarthyān nityaṃ cānāśrayasthiteḥ // viśeṣasyāsvabhāvatvād vṛddhāv
apy āhito yadā / nāpekṣeta punaryatnaṃ yatno ’nyaḥ syād viśeṣakṛt //. My interpretation of PV 2.120d2–123 is
based on PVP D52a6–b1/P59a4–8.
21
PVV 54,1–2: ādhāyakanivṛttāv ātmalābhāya punaryatnam apekṣeta. Note also PVP D52a4/P59a2: yang bya
ba’i phyir ’bad rtsol la yang ltos yin te; PVP D52b2/P59b1: ’jug pa’i phyir yang ’bad rtsol la ltos …; PVP
D52a6–7/P59a5: yang bya ba’i phyir ’bad rtsol la ltos pa; PVV 54,17: apekṣeta punaryatnam … ātmano
lābhāya; PVV 54,2–3: punaryatnāpekṣayaiva pravartate. Note also PVP D52b1–2/P59a8–b1: ’bad rtsol gyis
bsgrub par bya ba yin te.
22
PVP D52a6–7/P59a5: gang zhig yang bya ba’i phyir ’bad rtsol la ltos pa … phul du byung ba rnam par gnas
pa ’phel ba can …
23
PVV 54,15–16: punaryatnāpekṣitvenāsthirāśrayatvena vyavasthitotkarṣatā vyāptā.
24
PVV 54,5–6: naiva svabhāvaḥ prakṛtiḥ … <viśeṣasyaVibh. 54, note 4> hetusannidhānavyavadhānasāpekṣatvāt pra-
vṛttinivṛttyoḥ /. PVA 106,18–19: tathāpi tasya na svabhāvatā / na hi hetusannidhānatāpekṣī svabhāvo yuktaḥ /.
25
Svarasavāhin at PVV 54,2–4, 54,17, 55,1, 55,3, 55,6; PVA 106,19, 106,24, 106,28, 106,29; svarasapravṛtta-
kṛpādimayatā at PVV 53,18; rang gi ngang gis ’jug pa(/’gyur ba) at PVP D52a4–5/P59a2–3, D52b1/P59a7–8,
D54a7–b1/P61b7–8 and passim; PVṬ Nye D116a7/P142a5; D116b1/P142a8; D116b6/P142b6. “Like space”
according to Vibh. 54, note 2: laṅghanaviśeṣavan na prakṛtiḥ / anyānapekṣatvāt svabhāvasyākāśavat /.
2.5. Let us now consider how a mental quality such as compassion meets this general condition
when constantly practiced. Devendrabuddhi introduces the next verse as follows:26
At a given moment, when one has reached a distinctive practice (prayoga) of [mental qualities] such as com-
passion, [these qualities] no longer depend on a new practice to proceed, but [rather], the acquisition of [each
new] improvement proceeds without [any] effort.
Once the practice or cultivation of the mental quality has been developed, its progress no
longer follows the model of jumping, but rather that of wood when put in the presence of fire,
that of mercury transmuted through diverse alchemical operations, or that of base gold that we
refine:27
[Mental qualities] of the likes of compassion[, joy and equanimity], which arise as a result of constant practice,
proceed spontaneously in the mind, just as wood, mercury or gold [change spontaneously] due to fire[, to al-
chemical processes] or to [heat in an isolation chamber].28
Put in fire, wood is consumed; submitted to the alchemical operations (saṃskāra) of calcina-
tion or oxidation, mercury is transmuted; heated in an isolation chamber (puṭapāka,
PVV 54,23, PVA 106,25), gold is refined. At the end of the process, wood will have turned
into ashes; mercury will have acquired the power to dye silver (rūpyarañjanasāmarthya,
PVV 54,24); gold will have reached a refined state (varṇikā, kalyāṇasuvarṇatā, PVV 54,24 and
Vibh. 54, note 8). In the course of the process, fire transforms wood into coal (aṅgāra,
PVV 55,2), then into ashes (bhasman, Vibh. 55, note 1); when coal is no longer exposed to fire,
it does not return to wood: contrary to jumping, the process never needs be started anew. The
states previously obtained no longer need a further intervention of fire, alchemical operations
or isolated heat in order to exist: they are obtained irreversibly. Contrary to athletic effort,
these agents of change can therefore engage their full power in “supplementing,” rather than
simply recreating, the last state that they generated, and they can do so all the way to the end of
the process.29 Following this model, the existence of the improved mental quality generated by
constant practice no longer depends on a further action of its cause, and therein lies its sponta-
26
PVP D52b4–5/P59b4–5: dus gcig gi tshe ’ga’ zhig brtse ba la sogs pa’i khyad par gyi sbyor ba thob nas yang
sbyor ba la ltos pa dang bcas pas ’jug pa ma yin gyi / ’on kyang khyad par thob pa gang yin pa de ni ’bad rtsol
med par ’jug pa yin no // (des na …)
27
PV 2.124: kāṣṭhapāradahemāder agnyāder iva cetasi / abhyāsajāḥ pravartante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ //. Note
also PVV 55,2–3: tathābhyāsajāḥ kṛpādayaḥ punaryatnānapekṣitvāt sthirāśrayatvāc ca svarasena pravar-
tante /. muditā and upekṣā according to PVP D52b5/P59b5.
28
On cāraṇa and jāraṇa (PVA 106,25, PVV 54,23; spyod pa and sbyor ba: two forms of calcination), see the (ra-
ther obscure) explanations provided at PVP D53a1/P60a1, PVṬ Nye D116b2/P142a8–b1 ad loc., Vibh. 54,
note 5. The puṭa (or sampuṭa) designates the equipment (yantra) as well as the process; see Renou/Filliozat
1985: II.§1692.
29
Based on the following explanations: (1) PVP D52b6–53a1/P59b7–60a1: yang dper na kha sbyar du bzhu ba la
sogs pas gser rnam par dag pa’i mtshan nyid can gyi byang ba’i yon tan de ni kha sbyar gnyis pa bzhu ba la
ltos pa med pa lta bu’o // de ltar na kha sbyar du bzhu ba phyi ma phyi ma ni gzhan dang gzhan gyi byed pa yin
pas na / rim bzhin du sbyor bar byed do zhes bya ba ni rnam par sbyar ba’i mthar phyin pa’o //. (2) PVP
D52b6/P59b6–7: dper na mes shing la byas pa’i tshos pa las byung ba’i yon tan ji tsam pa can gang yin pa de
dang de yang de’i ngo bo’i phyir me la ltos pa med pa de lta bu de ni gags byed pa med na / thams cad thal bar
gyur gyi bar du phyi ma phyi ma lhag par byed pa yin no //. (3) PVV 55,1–2: teṣu yadā punar vahnyādayo
vyāpriyante tadā samadhikam aṅgārādiviśeṣam ādadhati /.
neity. Proceeding spontaneously and having a stable substratum, compassion becomes a na-
ture:30
Consequently, the [mental] quality that arises in those [who constantly practice compassion] becomes [their]
nature; each further effort31 that is made after the one [that preceded it can] add [a new] improvement [to this
mental quality compared to what it was previously].
According to Devendrabuddhi, the mental quality here discussed is none other than the great
compassion that results from an extremely intense practice.32 But mahākaruṇā and
*atyantābhyāsa can only properly be used to define the Blessed Buddhas and those Bodhisat-
tvas who are far advanced in their career. Moreover, the fact that this mental quality has be-
come a svabhāva/prakṛti is due, according to our two commentators, to its durable substratum
(sthirāśraya).33 And as we will see below (§4.5), that property is an exclusive characteristic of
the mental series of the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, i.e., of those who decline nirvāṇa or, in
other words, the cessation/extinction of the mental continuum. Among those Bodhisattvas,
each successive state of the mental quality is as irreversibly acquired (susthita, PVV 55,8) as
those of consumed wood, mercury that is being calcinated, or gold in the process of refine-
ment. The addition, through practice, of successive improvements can therefore last all the way
to the final stage where the increased quality forms the very nature of the mind.34
At PV 2.126 and 129–130, in order to make explicit the contrast with the examples ad-
vanced by Kumārila, Dharmakīrti describes the type of causality that is specific to mental
events like karuṇā and prajñā; those three verses also show how each successive state of the
mental quality is retained and then increased:35
And since mental events (buddhi) such as compassion grow out of a previous seed of the same type, how could
they stagnate (sthiti) when practiced constantly? (…) Arising out of its own seed, compassion will come to
form the entire essence of the mind[, i.e., the mental series], provided that it is not destroyed (bādhyate) by its
opposing (vipakṣa)36 [dharmas] which [also] arise out of their own seeds. Indeed, each preceding exercise con-
30
PV 2.125: tasmāt sa teṣām utpannaḥ svabhāvo jāyate guṇaḥ / taduttarottaro yatno viśeṣasya vidhāyakaḥ //.
Note the following explanations of tasmāt and svabhāvo jāyate: (1) PVP D53a2/P60a2–3: gang gi phyir brtse
ba la sogs pa goms pa las skyes shing ’byung ba’i yon tan yang sbyor ba la ltos pa can ma yin pa dang / rten
brtan pa can yin pa de’i phyir; PVV 55,6: tasmāt svarasavāhitvāt. (2) PVP D53a2–3/P60a3–4: rang bzhin nyid
du ’gyur te / ’bad rtsol la ltos pa med par rang gi ngang gis ’jug pa; PVV 55,6–7: svabhāvo jāyate manasaḥ
prakṛtir bhavati /.
31
On this apparently untimely reference to effort (yatna), see note 115 below.
32
PVP D53a4–5/P60a6: skyes bu rnams kyi snying rje chen po shin tu goms pa yod pa can; note also PVV 55,6:
teṣām abhyāsavatāṃ puṃsām.
33
PVV 55,3: sthirāśrayatvāc ca; for PVP D53a2/P60a3, see note 30 above.
34
“To the final stage” according to PVP D53a3/P60a4–5: khyad par phyi ma phyi ma mthar phyin pa’i bar du
byed pa yin no, and PVP D53a4/P60a5–6: goms pa las shin tu mthar thug par ’gro ba yin te.
35
PV 2.126, 129–130: yasmāc ca tulyajātīyapūrvabījapravṛddhayaḥ / kṛpādibuddhayas tāsāṃ saty abhyāse kutaḥ
sthitiḥ // kṛpā svabījaprabhavā svabījaprabhavair na cet / vipakṣair bādhyate citte prayāty atyantasātmatām //
tathā hi mūlam abhyāsaḥ pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ parasya tu / kṛpāvairāgyabodhādeś cittadharmasya pāṭave //.
36
Note PVV 56,4: vipakṣair dveṣādibhir bādhyate svotpattyā vyāhanyate …
stitutes the cause (mūla)[, not of the production, but37] of the [improved] acuity (pāṭava) of [each] new mental
event of compassion, detachment or understanding.
As long as the causal complex (hetusāmagrī, PVP D53a7/P60b2) remains unchanged and as
long as compassion’s opposing dharmas, like hatred, are not cultivated, compassion generates
compassion. It is the immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya) of its ulterior
phases, and their “material cause” (upādānakāraṇa).38 And in so far as the psychological pro-
cess falls within a dynamic of mental cultivation or constant practice, each mental instance of
compassion, rather than being identical to the previous one, tends to be stronger. Therefore,
each phase of compassion does not only exist due to the phase immediately preceding it, but
also increases relative to its predecessor, until it will reach the climax of its development: its
cultivation will lead compassion to form gradually the essence of the mental series, a nature
henceforth free of all opposing or contradictory dharmas (viruddha°, virodhidharma).39 Dhar-
makīrti is therefore able to conclude:40
With constant practice, [a mental series can therefore] consist in compassion, as is the case for repulsion, dis-
passion and concupiscence[, all of which also have the power to proceed spontaneously in those who cultivate
them intensely].
37
According to PVP D54a3–4/P61a8–b1 and PVV 56,9.
38
upādānakāraṇa at PVP D53a6/P60b1; samanantarapratyaya at PVV 55,12–13 and 56,3–4. A notable anteced-
ent to this position is found at MSAVBh D79b2–3/P94b4–5 where it is meant to explain MSABh 131,11 (sa-
manantarapratyaya, ad MSABh 17.63d2 [svabhāvatvāt]): snying rje dang ldan pa’i sems dang sems las byung
ba snga ma ’gags / de dang rang bzhin gcig la snying rje dang ldan pa’i sems dang sems las byung ba phyi ma
’byung ste / snga ma ’gags pa ni de ma thag pa’i rkyen to //. “The preceding [group of] cittacaitta endowed
with compassion [having] come to an end, a new [group of] cittacaitta is produced that has the same nature
(ekasvabhāva) as the [previous one]; the previous [group, i.e. the one that] has come to an end, is the immedi-
ately antecedent condition.” MSAṬ D139a6–7/P156b6–7, edited in Maithrimurthi 1999: 403: sems dang sems
las byung ba’i tshogs sngar byung ba ni snying rje skye bar ’gyur ba’i mtshungs pa de ma thag pa’i rkyen to //.
“Das vorher entstandene Bündel von Geist und geistartigen Faktoren ist die unmittelbar vorangehende
gleichartige Bedingung, aus der das Mitleid entsteht.” Translation by Maithrimurthi 1999: 425. In the context
of the MSA 17.63/MSABh/MSAVBh/MSAṬ corpus ad loc., the threefold suffering (duḥkhatātraya) forms the
ālambanapratyaya (condition as object) of compassion; the vāsanā (in the ālaya, MSAVBh) is its hetupratyaya
(condition as cause); the (kalyāṇa)mitra is its adhipatipratyaya (dominant condition).
39
Based on PVV 56,5: prayāty atyantasātmatāṃ vipakṣāsaṅkīrṇasātmatāṃ prakṛtitām /. See also notes 11–12
above, and PVP D53b7/P61a4–5, PVV 55,28. On the vi°/pratipakṣa, see Maithrimurthi 1999: 191; see also
Traité III.1242 and note 2 for references. Note also MSABh 1,11–12 ad MSA 1.1 (tanmayaḥ): tanmaya iti
kāruṇyamayaḥ, and MSAVBh Mi D8a7–b1/P8b7: byang chub sems dpa’ rnams ni snying rje dang ldan pa’i
rang bzhin can yin no zhes bya ba’i don to; MSAVBh Mi D6a2–3/P6b1: byang chub sems dpa’ rnams snying
rje’i bdag nyid du gyur pas …
40
PV 2.131ab: kṛpātmakatvam abhyāsād ghṛṇāvairāgyarāgavat /. The definition of ghṛṇā at PVP D54b1/P61b7
is: mi gtsang ba la smod pa’i mtshan nyid can mi gtsang ba, which is close to Vibh. 57, note 1: aśu-
civi[ju]gup[s]ā, so that it can be reconstructed as: *aśucivijugupsālakṣaṇā ghṛṇā. “Repulsion is defined as dis-
gust of the impure.” The definition of vairāgya at PVP D54a7/P61b5–6 is: grol ba rnams kyi bde ba dang sdug
bsngal dag la skyo ba dang skyo ba med pa’i mtshan nyid can gyi chags pa dang bral ba, which is close to
Vibh. 57, note 1: sukhaduḥkhayor udvegānudvegau, so that it can be reconstructed as: *muktānāṃ sukhaduḥ-
khayor udvegānudvegalakṣaṇaṃ vairāgyam. “The dispassion of those who are delivered is defined as retreat-
ing from pleasure and not retreating from suffering.” See also PVṬ Nye D116b7–117a1/P142b8–143a1 (where
*sukha udvegaḥ = *asakti/asaṅga, and duḥkhe ’nudvegaḥ = *apratigha).
2.6. We now have enough theoretical elements on hand to understand why the example of
jumping is irrelevant to the case under scrutiny. Dharmakīrti spells this out at PV 2.127–128,
of which the first verse reads as follows:41
Contrary [to compassion, which proceeds from compassion itself], the [next] jump does not [proceed] from the
[previous] jump, [but from physical strength and applied effort;42 and] since the two causes of [jumping, physi-
cal] strength and [applied] effort, have a fixed capacity,43 the [resulting] jump [also] has a fixed nature, [and its
potential increase is therefore finite].
But someone may object:44 “if the jump proceeds only from [physical] strength and effort,
[and] not from its homogeneous [antecedents], it should already be of such a measure (tāvatpa-
rimāṇa) before [our] practice.” PV 2.128 answers that objection:45
[If] this [man] does not initially jump as [he jumps] later after [practicing, it is] because [the weight generated
by phlegm, etc., has made his] body deficient; [but] once [that] deficiency is progressively eliminated through
effort, [the body’s] own strength [becomes] stable.46
Let us consider the example of a person determined to improve his ability to jump. Because the
abundance of phlegm (śleṣman) in his body makes him too heavy (gaurava),47 he cannot jump
more than one cubit (hastamātra). But with athletic effort – gymnastics, etc. (vyāyāmādi) – ap-
plied over time, he will eliminate little by little his excessive weight,48 and his body will re-
cover its own strength. As spectacular as progress may be while the person’s physical condi-
tion and training continue to advance, his progress will nonetheless tend to stagnate as he
comes closer to his maximum athletic potential. For indeed, since jumping is conditioned by
causes that have a limited potential, it is itself liable to a limited progress. More importantly,
since none of the acquired improvements create a solidly established (susthita) basis for ulte-
rior efforts, everything must always be started anew.49
41
PV 2.127: na caivaṃ laṅghanād eva laṅghanaṃ balayatnayoḥ / taddhetvoḥ sthitaśaktitvāl laṅghanasya sthi-
tātmatā //.
42
According to PVV 55,17–18: yathā kṛpādibhya eva kṛpādayaḥ / tathā na laṅghanād eva laṅghanam api tu
balayatnābhyām /. Compare with PVP D53b2–3/P60b6–7.
43
sthitaśaktitva is glossed as sāmarthyaniyama at PVV 55,18 and PVP D53b4/P60b8.
44
According to PVV 55,20–21: yadi balayatnābhyām eva laṅghanaṃ na svabhāvajātīyāt (?) tadābhyāsāt prāg
api tāvatparimāṇaṃ syād ity āha … PVP D53b4–5/P61a1–2: gal te stobs dang ’bad rtsol dag las mchongs pa
yin gyi / rang gi rigs las ’jug pa can ni ma yin te / ’di ltar goms pa’i dus phyis skyes bu’i sa ji tsam chod pa can
gyi mchongs pa yin pa de ltar sngar yang ci’i phyir mi ’gyur zhe na /.
45
PV 2.128: tasyādau dehavaiguṇyāt paścādvad avilaṅghanam / śanair yatnena vaiguṇye niraste svabale
sthitiḥ //.
46
PVP D53b6–7/P61a3–4: ji srid bgrod par bya ba nyid yin par phyin pa yin gyi / lhag par ma yin pa de ltar na /
’di las ring du song ba ma yin pa zhes bya ba la kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no //. “He will go only as far
as it is possible [for him] to go and no further; hence he cannot go beyond that point; [our position] is therefore
flawless.” See also PVV 55,26.
47
According to PVP D53b6/P61a2–3: bad kan la sogs pas lus mi mthun phyir te / lci ba nyid kyi rgyu’i phyir
ro //. PVV 55,24: dehavaiguṇyāc chleṣmādikṛtagauravāt /. See also note 13 above.
48
According to PVP D53b6/P61a3: phyis kyang rtsol bas rim gyis mi mthun pa bsal na lus lci ba med pa na …
PVV 55,25: śanair yatnena vyāyāmādinā vaiguṇye niraste …
49
Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not hesitate to hold that the sthitotkarṣatā of the jump itself is not established
2.7. A second condition remains to be met for Dharmakīrti’s argument to hold: the substratum
of this improvement must be durable enough to carry this deployment to its end. If Dharmakīrti
has remained silent on this issue, his successors did not hesitate to show that only Bodhisattvas
aspiring to become Buddhas met this condition, contrary to the Hearers and Buddhas-for-them-
selves. PV 2.198 summarizes the issue:50
And since the compassion [of śrāvakas is] weak, [they make] no great effort to remain [in saṃsāra]. But [the
great saints who are] devoted to others [and] whose compassion is great do remain [in saṃsāra].
The intensity of the compassion characteristic of those various “anthropo-religious” types con-
ditions the duration of their respective stay in saṃsāra. Motivated, as we will see (§5.4), by the
fear of saṃsāra and by the correlated desire for a prompt liberation, the śrāvaka – but also the
arhat and the pratyekabuddha – reach nirvāṇa too quickly to be able to develop compassion to
its utmost level. The Bodhisattva, on the other hand, is motivated only by his desire to rescue
other beings: his own good corresponds to the good of others. To be able to teach the path (or
the four noble truths) to sentient beings, he will cultivate compassion to its utmost limit and
will consequently extend his saṃsāric existence. The diversity of motivations therefore deter-
mines the duration of the mental series that serves as a substratum for the development of
compassion.51 We owe it to Devendrabuddhi to have correlated this theme with the issue of the
durability of the substratum:52
If the substratum is durable, [each new effort] will bring the next improvement. If it is not, [then] what nature
would the noble Hearers (āryaśrāvaka) ever acquire [through compassion], they whose mental series are inter-
rupted [upon attaining nirvāṇa]? Those who seek the good of the world (jagaddhitaiṣin), however, do not have
substrata that are rendered unstable by the interruption of their [mental] series [due to entry into nirvāṇa].
(asiddha), a position of which there is no trace in Dharmakīrti and his direct commentators. To do so, they use
the notion of manojavā (“fast like the mind”), which is the third type of ṛddhi applicable to motion (see AK
7.48ab and Kośa 7.113, note 2). TSP K893,15–18 ad TS no. 3425–3427/S1080,18–22 ad TS no. 3424–3426:
samādhibalaviśeṣaprayogāl laṅghanasyāsmābhir iṣyata evātyantaprakarṣavartitvam, yathā bhagavato mano-
javā nāma siddhiḥ (TSPtib Ye P377b8: rdzu ’phrul) paṭhyate … na cāsyā bādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti / nāpy
adarśanamātreṇa pratikṣepo yukto ’tiprasaṅgāt /. “We [Buddhists] accept [the claim] that jumping, because it
is connected to the particular power of a [mental] concentration, can reach a very high [level of] development:
the scriptures tell (paṭhyate) [us] for example that the Blessed [Buddha] possesses a miraculous power named
manojavā … Now, no pramāṇa can invalidate [the existence] of [that miraculous power], and neither can it be
rejected simply because it is not perceived, for this would be absurd.”
50
PV 2.198: mandatvāt karuṇāyāś ca na yatnaḥ sthāpane mahān / tiṣṭhanty eva parādhīnā yeṣāṃ tu mahatī
kṛpā //.
51
This can be compared to the general motif of apratiṣṭhitasaṃsāranirvāṇatva (MSABh 124,23) as it is devel-
oped at MSA(Bh) 17.32–33: see Maithrimurthi 1999: 369–370 and, for the useful MSAṬ D136a3–5/ P153a5–
8 ad MSABh 17.32, Maithrimurthi 1999: 413–414; see also Nagao 2000: 2–4 and Viévard 2002: 270–271. See
as well Sthiramati’s excellent overview at MSAVBh D63b5–64a4/P75b2–76a3 ad MSA(Bh) 32, and
MSAVBh D64a4/P76a2–3: snying rje yod pas mya ngan las ’das pa la gnas pa ma yin / shes rab yod pas ’khor
ba la gnas pa ma yin no //. “Because of [his] compassion, [the Bodhisattva, contrary to the Hearers and Bud-
dhas-for-themselves,] does not stay in nirvāṇa. [But] because of [his] insight, [i.e., because of his penetration
of the two selflessnesses, the Bodhisattva] does not stay in saṃsāra [either, contrary to the Profanes].” See also
§4.4 below.
52
PVP D52b3–4/P59b2–4: rten brtan pa nyid du gyur pa na khyad par phyi ma byed par ’gyur ro // de lta ma yin
na ’phags pa nyan thos rgyud rgyun chad pa can rnams de’i bdag nyid du gyur pa gang yin / ’jig rten la phan
par bzhed pa rnams ni rgyud rgyun bcad pas kyang rten mi brtan pa nyid ma yin no //.
The close integration of this theme with Mahāyāna buddhology culminates in the works of
Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.53
3. Compassion and the initial impulse toward the practice of compassion
3.1. According to Iwata, Dharmakīrti holds that compassion arises (or rather, becomes actual-
ized, in the sense of the prabodha of an impregnation, vāsanā) from the direct realization that
everything that is conditioned (saṃskāra), in particular the aggregates of appropriation, is suf-
fering in so far as it is conditioned and thus impermanent.54 Iwata’s analysis rests on two im-
portant comments made by Dharmakīrti at PVSV 9,13 (duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇa) and
PV 2.196cd (duḥkhasantānasaṃsparśamātreṇa). On that hypothesis, compassion would result
from the direct cognitive confrontation55 with (a particular type of) suffering. Iwata’s hypothe-
sis is not without problem, however, since the direct realization of the painfulness of what is
conditioned, in so far as it belongs to the āryas who understand the emptiness of the personal-
ity (pudgalaśunyatā), does not account for the arising of compassion among the Profane and
Heretics, i.e., it does not account for the initial impulse toward abhyāsa. For them, indeed,
compassion rests entirely on the (erroneous) superimposition of a personal being: their com-
passion is sattvālambanā karuṇā which, among the three kinds of karuṇā, is the only one clas-
sified as passion (see below, §4).
(1) In this regard, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin will confirm my hypothesis in that they
do not hesitate to gloss duḥkhaviśeṣa (PVSV 9,13) as saṃskāraduḥkhatā,56 a type of suffering
the intuition of which is traditionally reserved for āryas.57
(2) The context of the second comment in fact also plays in favour of an interpretation of
duḥkhasantānasaṃsparśa as a compassion characteristic of the āryas:58 “If we know [the truth
of] suffering [in its four aspects of impermanence, painfulness, emptiness and insubstantiality],
the production of compassion that proceeds from prior conditioning is a property of the [suf-
fering] entity [itself] and [arises] without considering any living being. Passion (rāga) [arises
however] from the superimposition of a distinct (antara) self [that is permanent, happy and
substantial in nature] on something that does not have such nature[, since it consists merely in
the aggregates]. Compassion, [on the other hand,] is born through nothing but [cognitive] con-
tact with the suffering series (duḥkhasantāna)[, and not through the erroneous superimposition
53
TSP K894,23–27 ad TS no. 3433/S1082,13–17 ad TS no. 3432, to compare with TSPtib Ye P378b4–7.
54
See Iwata 2011, pp. 216–217.
55
For example, PVP D84a6/P96b7: goms pa las sdug bsngal tsam mngon du byed pa’i sgo nas ’jug pa;
PVV 78,10–11: sammukhībhāvamātreṇa.
56
PVṬ Je D24b4–5/P29b1 = PVSVṬ 52,28–53,7: duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇeti saṃskāraduḥkhatānirūpaṇa-
mātreṇa.
57
AKBh 329,11–12 ad AK 6.3: sarve tu saṃskārāḥ saṃskāraduḥkhatayā duḥkhāḥ / tāṃs tv āryā eva paśyanti //.
See Kośa 7.125–126.
58
PV 2.195–196 (with ’viruddhasya left untranslated!): duḥkhajñāne ’viruddhasya pūrvasaṃskāravāhinī / vastu-
dharmo dayotpattir na sā sattvānurodhinī // ātmāntarasamāropād rāgo dharme ’tadātmake / duḥkhasantāna-
saṃsparśamātreṇaiva dayodayaḥ //. See PVP D84a4b2/P96b5–97a4, PVṬ Nye D131a5–7/P161b3–7,
PVV 78,4–18.
of a self: that is the reason why compassion is not a passion].” Vibhūticandra, incidentally, is
right in seeing in this passage a reference to the dharmālambanī kṛpā characteristic of the
ārya(/śrāvaka/pratyekabuddha), as we will see below.59
(3) Some further arguments will also support my hypothesis. First, the direct realization of
the suffering nature of what is conditioned does not appear among the causes and conditions
mentioned by Devendrabuddhi (and Śākyabuddhi) to explain why anyone would begin the
practice of compassion (see below, §3.2). Also, the context of Dharmakīrti’s comments sug-
gests that the compassion here intended is already abhyāsajā,60 so that the darśana/saṃsparśa
to which Dharmakīrti refers could not serve as the cause of the initial practice of compassion.
Finally, both of Dharmakīrti’s comments appear in the context of an argument advanced to
deny that compassion is necessarily a passion, i.e., that compassion necessarily entails the
cause of suffering and the passions (sattvadarśana/satkāyadṛṣṭi);61 they could not, therefore,
apply to the only type of compassion considered to be impure, i.e., to sattvālambanā karuṇā. I
am therefore inclined to believe that the direct cognitive confrontation with suffering is char-
acteristic of the compassion of the āryas/śrāvakas/pratyekabuddhas (and, of course, of the
compassion of the advanced Bodhisattvas and the Tathāgathas) who have come to understand
the suffering nature of what is conditioned, i.e., we are here in the presence of dharmālambanā
karuṇā, which follows from dharmaśunyatā. In other words, those two comments made by
Dharmakīrti do not pinpoint the cause of the initial impulse toward abhyāsa, but rather, they
point to that which, due to the universal nature of suffering, makes compassion coexist with
any of the thoughts of those saints who are advanced on the path(s).
3.2. Devendrabuddhi, however, identifies five (alternative) factors to account for the initial im-
pulse toward the practice of compassion. Śākyabuddhi appears to divide those five factors into
two causes (hetu) and three conditions (pratyaya).62 Based on this analysis, the causes of the
impulse toward practice are: (1) attachment to qualities/advantages (yon tan la chags pa las
sam)63 and (2) [the quality of being] a living being of a particular type (sems can gyi khyad par
59
Vibh. 78, note 3 ad PV 2.195: etena dharmālambanī kṛpoktā /.
60
See PV 2.195, quoted in note 58 above, with the following explanations for pūrvasaṃskāravāhinī: PVP
D84a5/P96b6–7: ’du byed snga ma ’jug pa can / de dag gis sngar yang snying rje goms par byas shing de goms
pas las phyis kyang brtse ba skye ba yin no //. PVV 78,8: pūrvasaṃskāravāhinī pūrvābhyāsapravṛttā. Note also
PVSV 9,12–14: asaty apy ātmagrahe duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇābhyāsabalotpādinī bhavaty eva karuṇā /.
“[Contrary to passion,] compassion, which is produced by the power of constant practice, occurs due to the
perception of a particular suffering[, namely, the suffering of what is conditioned], even when there is no
grasping at a self.”
61
See Manorathanandin’s concluding remark ad PV 2.195 (PVV 78,10–11): unmūlitātmadṛṣṭīnām api … sam-
mukhībhāvamātreṇa dayotpadyata ity arthaḥ /. Devendrabuddhi’s commentary ad PV 2.196cd (PVP D84b1–
2/P97a2–4) reads: sdug bsngal rgyun gyi ’dus reg tsam spyod yul thob par gyur pa tsam nyid las brtse ba skye
ba yin / brtse ba ’byung ba yin gyi / rang bzhin gzhan sgro btags pa las ma yin pa de ltar na ’dod chags kyi
mtshan nyid las bzlog pa’i rang bzhin can yin pa’i phyir ’dod chags snying rje ma yin no //. Note also PVṬ Nye
D131a7/P161b6–7 ad loc.: ’dus reg tsam zhes bya ba la tsam smos pa ni don lhag par sgro ’dogs pa spangs
pa’i phyir ro //.
62
PVṬ Nye D88b5/P108a4: … ’dis ni rgyu’i stobs bshad do // rkyen gyi stobs ni gzhan zhes bya ba la sogs pa
smos te /.
63
Śākyabuddhi’s explanation does not add anything substantial for our understanding of the first factor (PVṬ
las sam). The conditions of the said impulse are: (3) the action of other [beings] acting for the
good of others (gzhan gyi don la ’jug pa gzhan dag gi byed pa las sam), (4) the service [pro-
vided] to them (de bsnyen pa las sam), and finally (5) the personal desire [to proceed with this
practice] (bdag nyid ’dod pa las sam).64
3.3. First a few words about the second causal factor advanced by Devendrabuddhi, namely,
*sattvaviśeṣa, or “[the quality of being] a living being of a particular type.” Śākyabuddhi inter-
prets sattvaviśeṣa as “[the quality of possessing] a particular nature” (prakṛti°/svabhāvaviśeṣa),
and goes on to explain it briefly by referring to the notion of gotra (tib. rigs), or family.65 The
author of the MSA XVII.34 also holds that the compassion of Bodhisattvas can be due to their
very nature (prakṛti), which the bhāṣyakāra explains as gotraviśeṣataḥ, “due to a particu-
Nye D88b4/P108a2–3: yon tan dag la ’ga’ zhig chags pas goms par byed pa’i phyir de* goms pa la ’bad rtsol
dang ldan par ’gyur ro // snying rje yang khyad** par ’phags pa’i yon tan yin par dam pa rnams bzhed pa de
bas na yon tan la chags pa las snying rje la ’jug par ’gyur ro // *D te; **P khyab. That explanation borrows
from Dharmakīrti’s religious anthropology as it appears at PV 1.221 [with PVSV 111,1–11] = PV 2.210; see
also PVP D90a1–3/P103b7–104a2 [with PVṬ Nye D134b3–5/P166a1–3] and TSP K874,5–17 ad TS
no. 3338/S1058,12–1059,1 ad TS no. 3337). However, Vasubandhu’s (?) and Sthiramati’s commentaries to
MSA 17.34 are more directly useful to our exegesis. Maitreya(nātha) declares: “Dieses Mitgefühl (kṛpā) [der
Bodhisattvas], die Mitleid zum Wesen haben, ist … vierfach: … [b.] Mitgefühl aufgrund von Überlegung
(/Abwägen) …” (MSA 17.34, partially: kṛpā … pratisaṃkhyayā … karuṇātmakānām //. Translated by Maithri-
murthi 1999: 370). That pratisaṃkhyā is interpreted as guṇadoṣaparīkṣaṇa at MSABh 125,11: “die gründliche
Untersuchung der Vorzüge [des Mitgefühls] und der Fehler(/Mängel) [des entsprechenden Faktors]” (Maithri-
murthi 1999: 370). For Sthiramati’s explanation of doṣaparīkṣaṇa, see MSAVBh D64b6–65a1/P76b7–77a2,
edited and translated in Maithrimurthi 1999: 441, note 34. As for the examination of the qualities/advantages,
Sthiramati provides the following explanation: “The examination of the qualities/advantages [to practice com-
passion consists in] considering the qualities/advantages in the following manner: ‘Showing friendliness and
compassion to sentient beings is appropriate for the Bodhisattva [who wishes to behave] in conformity with
compassion.’ Alternatively, [it consists in] considering these qualities/advantages by reflecting in a manner
that has been presented earlier: ‘All these faults/disadvantages do not appear among those who are well estab-
lished in [immeasurables] like friendliness.’ For the good of other sentient beings, he[, i.e., the Bodhisattva,]
does not leave saṃsāra, [but still remains] pure.” (MSAVBh D65a1–2/P77a2–3: yon tan kun tu rtog pa ni sems
can la byams pa dang snying rje byed pa ni snying rje dang rjes su mthun pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ cha yin no
zhes yon tan du rtog pa’o // yang na gong du bshad pa ltar nyes pa de dag thams cad ni // byams pa la sogs pa
gnas mi ’byung // nyon mongs med par sems can don // ’khor ba ’dor bar mi byed do // zhes bya ba la sogs pa’i
tshul du rtog pa ni yon tan rtog pa’o //. The verse here quoted is MSA 17.27, edited by Maithrimurthi [1999:
336] as follows: ete sarve doṣā maitryādiṣu susthitasya na bhavanti / akliṣṭaḥ saṃsāraṃ sattvārthaṃ no ca
saṃtyajati //. MSABh 123,24–25 ad loc.: iti brāhmavihārayoge dvividhaṃ guṇaṃ darśayati / yathoktadoṣā-
bhāvam akliṣṭasya sattvahetoḥ saṃsārāparityāgam /. “Mit diesem Vers [iti] zeigt er [d.h. der Verfasser], daß
sich bei Übung der brahmischen Zustände zweierlei Vorzüge [einstellen: nämlich] daß die obengenannten
Fehler nicht vorhanden sind, und daß man um der Lebewesen willen den Saṃsāra nicht aufgibt, ohne aber
[durch ihn] befleckt zu werden.” Translated in Maithrimurthi 1999: 366.)
64
PVP D16a5/P18a3–4. On the fifth factor, see PVṬ Nye D88b6–7/P108a5–6: bdag ’dod pa las zhes bya ba ni de
dag gis byed pa’am bsnyen pa las ma yin mod kyi / ’on kyang bdag nyid de snying rje ’dod pa yin no //.
65
PVṬ Nye D88b5/P108a3–4. Let us remember the “classical” definition of gotra as ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣa, “a
specificity of the six sensory extension bases,” which is caracteristic of the gotra existing by nature (prakṛti-
stha, as opposed to acquired gotra, samudānīta). See BoBh D2,4–9/W3,1–9 (and particularly D2,5/W3,2–3:
tatra prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ yad bodhisattvānāṃ ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣaḥ /), Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 88 and MSAVBh
Mi D2a2–5/P2b1–4.
lar/specific gotra.”66 The fact that Śākyabuddhi analyses this *sattvaviśeṣa = gotra as a cause
for the practice of compassion should not come as a surprise, however, for both the MSA(Bh)
and the BoBh identify the bodhisattvagotra as the cause of conventional bodhicitta (sāṅketika°)
and the career that culminates in awakening.67 Moreover, the bodhisattvagotra is intrinsically
linked to compassion since, indeed, among the four marks (liṅga) of the bodhisattvagotra listed
at MSA(Bh) 3.5, it is compassion (kāruṇya and ādiprayogata eva kāruṇyaṃ sattveṣu,
MSABh 11,18) that figures in first place.68
3.4. Now let us consider the first two conditioning factors mentioned by Devendrabuddhi. The
initial impulse toward compassion can be conditioned “by the action of other [beings] acting
for the good of others (*parārthavṛtti) or by the service (sevā) [provided] to those [compassio-
nate beings].” By “action” (byed pa = *kriyā?), we must understand the invitation to engage in
compassion69 (snying rje nges pa sbyar ba = *karuṇāsaṃviniyojana?), an invitation which
comes from “Bodhisattvas who have practiced compassion [constantly].”70 As for “the service
[provided] to those [compassionate beings],” it is interpreted as follows:71 “Even if they did not
invite [him] to engage [in compassion], he keeps company with [those beings] who act for the
good of others, he serves them, and because of that he acquires qualities [such as compas-
sion].” The allusion to service is clear: Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi refer to the well-
known theme of the kalyāṇamitra, or “spiritual friend,” which is regularly connected with the
complex formed of the two other themes of gotra and conventional bodhicitta.72 The fact that
keeping company with a spiritual friend conditions compassion can easily be documented.
While it is claimed at MSA VII.63cd that73 “the compassion of Bodhisattvas [notably proceeds
due to] … a friend,” Sthiramati comments, based on the MSABh:74 “Once [we can] rely upon a
66
MSABh 125,11 ad MSA 17.34. Note Sthiramati’s explanation at MSAVBh D64b5–6/P76b6: rang bzhin dang
ni zhes bya ba la / rang bzhin ni rigs la bya ste / snying rje’i rigs yod pa las snying rje ’byung ba ni rang bzhin
zhes bya ste /. “… als ‘Natur’ wird die Anlage (gotra) bezeichnet; [d.h.] als ‘Natur’ wird die Tatsache bezeich-
net, daß Mitleid auftritt, weil die Anlage für Mitleid vorhanden ist.” Edited and translated in Maithrimurthi
1999: 414, note 33.
67
See in general Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 77–94, together with BoBh D10,12–13/W15,11–12 and MSABh 15,2.
68
See also Maithrimurthi 1999: 268 and notes 153–154.
69
PVṬ Nye D88b6/P108a4–5: byed pa ste / snying rje nges par sbyar ba’o //.
70
PVṬ Nye D88b5/P108a4: snying rje goms pa can gyi byang chub sems dpa’ dag gis …
71
PVṬ Nye D88b6/P108a5: de dag gis nges par ma sbyar ba de lta na yang gzhan gyi don la ’jug pa rnams dang
lhan cig gnas shing de bsnyen pa las de yon tan can du ’gyur ro //.
72
This could possibly explain Ravigupta’s allusion to kalyāṇamitra at PVṬR D316b2–3/P164b4–5 ad PV 2.34ab1
(reference found in Iwata 2011: 219, note 28). Cf. perhaps also PVA 107,5 (= v. 585): smaraṇaśravaṇenāpi
kṛpādīnāṃ pravartanam / na ca pratyupakārādisavyapekṣāḥ kṛpādayaḥ //.
73
MSA 17.63cd: karuṇā bodhisattvānām … mitrāt …
74
MSAVBh D80a2/P94b3–4: dge ba’i bshes gnyen la brten nas / dam pa’i chos nyan pa’i dbang gis snying rje
skye ste / de ni bdag po’i rkyen to //. Compare with MSAVBh D142b5–6 ad MSA(Bh) 9.76a (dhāraṇāt), where
Sthiramati associates finding a spiritual friend with the Profane. Note also MSABh 131,10–11: uttarārdhena
(= MSA 17.63cd) yathākramaṃ hetumitrasvabhāvaiḥ karuṇāyā hetvadhipatisamanantarapratyayān saṃdarśa-
yati. For a translation, see Maithrimurthi 1999: 387–388. MSAṬ D139a6/P156b6, edited by Maithrimurthi
(1999: 403): dge ba’i bshes gnyen gyi dbang gis snying rje kun tu spyod pa gang yin pa de ni bdag po’i rkyen
spiritual friend, compassion arises through listening to the excellent Dharma (saddharma):
such is the dominant condition (adhipatipratyaya).” Whereas Sthiramati refers to the impor-
tance of hearing the excellent Dharma, the BoBh says that it is up to the kalyāṇamitra to teach
the path to awakening. This is because the spiritual friend is the teacher, the religious instruc-
tor, whereas the “novice” Bodhisattva who serves as his attendant becomes his disciple.75 The
master, who also acts as a friend, therefore enjoys the liberty to exhort his pupil to practice
compassion, to follow his own engagement as an example, he who is described by our sources
as a compassionate being acting for the good of others.76 Let it be noted, finally, that as in the
case of gotra, the theme of kalyāṇamitra is closely connected with that of cittotpāda, a conven-
tional thought of awakening for which the spiritual friend is regularly held as being one of the
causes.77
3.5. We therefore find Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, and after them Kamalaśīla78 and
Ravigupta, using a motif that had already been given a prominent position in major Mahāyāna
sūtras and śāstras (essentially of Idealist persuasion): they present the gotra as a cause for the
compassion motivating the Bodhisattva, whereas keeping company with a kalyāṇamitra is pre-
sented as a condition for the Bodhisattva’s inclination toward the same compassion, so that
gotra and kalyāṇamitra together contribute to the production of the thought of awakening.
Dharmakīrti, it is true, does not say a word about those three central themes. But if, as I will
attempt to demonstrate below (§5), Dharmakīrti indeed considered compassion to be the direct
cause of the thought of awakening, we will be less hesitant to conjecture that together with his
nearly unanimous tradition, he also tacitly recognized gotra and kalyāṇamitra among the
causes/conditions of bodhicitta.
to //. “Das Auftreten des Mitleids aufgrund des Einflusses eines guten (d.h. spirituell günstigen) Freundes (kal-
yāṇamitra) ist die Bedingung, [die im] beherrschenden Faktor [besteht].” See note 38 above.
75
BoBh D163,23/W238,1: bahuśruto bhavati nāvyutpannabuddhiḥ; D164,23/W239,16: anuśāsako bhavati /
dharmadeśako bhavati /. Note also, via negativa, BoBh D7,15–16/W11,4–6: … bodhisattva ādita eva kalyāṇa-
mitraṃ na labhate ’viparītabodhimārgadaiśikaṃ buddhaṃ vā bodhisattvaṃ vā /. vineya at BoBh D163,16/
W237,17 and D164,21/W239,14; BoBh D163,18–19/W237,21–22: … kalyāṇamitrasyāntikād bodhisattvena
dharmaṃ śṛṇvatā …; see also BoBh D165,6–26/W240,7–241,14. On kalyāṇamitrasevā, see in general BoBh
D163,13–165,26/W237,13–241,14 and MSA(Bh) 17.9–16. kalyāṇamitrasevā is used at D164,26/W239,20–21;
kalyāṇamitrasaṃsevā at D163,17/W237,18–19; kalyāṇamitraniṣevanatayā at DBhS (I BB) 13,21.
76
BoBh D163,24–25/W238,3–4: anukampakaś ca bhavati kāruṇikaḥ so ’dhyapekṣya …; BoBh D164,5–
6/W238,15–16: sa hi pareṣām ādita eva hitasukhaiṣī bhavati; BoBh D164,8–9/W238,21: samakāruṇyaś ca
bhavati; MSA 17.10: mitraṃ śrayet … kṛpātmakam …
77
BoBh D10,13/W15,12,13: buddhabodhisattvakalyāṇamitraparigraho dvitīyo hetuś cittasyotpattaye;
DBhS (I R) 11,11–13: … suparigṛhītakalyāṇamitrāṇām … kṛpākaruṇābhimukhānāṃ bodhisattvānāṃ bodhāya
cittam utpadyate; MSA 4.7: mitrabalāt … cittotpādaḥ … (and MSABh 15,1–2 and 5: yo hi parākhyānāc cittot-
pādaḥ paravijñāpanāt sa ucyate samādānasāṅketikaḥ / sa punar mitrabalād vā bhavati kalyāṇamitrānurodhāt /
… sa punar mitrabalād adṛḍhodayo veditavyaḥ /). See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 84–85 and 100.
78
TSP K872,3–7 ad TS no. 3338/S1055,16–20 ad TS no. 3337; see §5.4 below.
4. The “immeasurables” and the Bodhisattva’s career
4.1. In his commentary to PV 1.12, Dharmakīrti attempts to establish that compassion is not, or
at least is not necessarily, a passion (rāga).79 To show that his argument is supported by Bud-
dhist scriptures, he declares:80 “It is in fact admitted [by us Buddhists] that [immeasurables]
like friendliness [not only] have beings as their objects, [but also] dharmas, etc.” In so doing,
Dharmakīrti refers to the well-known Mahāyāna valorization of the four traditional “im-
measurables” (apramāṇa, also named brahmavihāra): friendliness (maitrī), compassion (karu-
ṇā), joy (sympathetic, “co-rejoicing,” muditā) and equanimity (upekṣa).81 Each of these four
apramāṇas, according to the Mahāyāna, is of three varieties: it is named sattvālambana when it
takes beings as its object; it is named dharmālambana when it takes dharmas as its object, i.e.,
the psycho-physical events ultimately constituting the (pseudo-)person according to the Śrāva-
kayāna analysis; and it is named anālambana, “without object,” when it no longer bears upon
anything at all.82 According to the presentation provided by Sthiramati in his commentary to
MSA(Bh) XVII.17–18, this threefold valorization of the apramāṇas has two main sources,
which in several respects represent two competing, though ultimately converging, exegetical
trends concerning that motif: on the one hand, we have the Yogācārabhūmi (and particularly
the BoBh),83 whereas on the other we have the Āryākṣayamati(nirdeśa)sūtra (ANS).84 Dharma-
kīrti’s explicit allusion to this Mahāyāna theme is very important here: first, it establishes the
specific doctrinal and narrative context of the theory developped at PV 2.120–131ab; second, it
offers a credible exegetical hypothesis about one of the three major features of the theory,
namely, the supposed “spontaneity/mechanicity” (svarasavāhitva, etc.) of compassion.
4.2. (1) According to the BoBh, the Bodhisattva shares with the Heretics (anyatīrthya) the im-
mesurables of the sattvālambana type.85 Why are such apramāṇas said to “bear upon beings”?
79
This passage has been discussed by Dunne (1996: 535–540), whose analysis and conclusions I do not share; by
Iwata 2011: 214–215, who properly shows its similarity with PV 2.195–199.
80
PVSV 9,14–15: tathā hi sattvadharmādyālambanā maitryādaya iṣyante /. Introduction at PVṬ Je D24b5/P29b2
= PVSVṬ 53,8: āgamenāpi saṃsyandayann āha …
81
Note the definitions provided by Śākyabuddhi at PVṬ Nye D116a7–b1/P142a6–7: gzhan dag gis* kha na ma
tho ba med pa’i yid bde ba nyid ni dga’ ba’o // rjes su chags pa dang khong khro ba’i rgyu’i yul la ’dod chags
dang khong khro ba dang bral ba nyid kyi btang snyoms yin no // *D gi. On the apramāṇa = brahmavihāra, see
Kośa 7.196–203 (AKBh 452,4–454,23), Traité III.1239–1273, Pagel 1995: 36–48, Maithrimurthi 1999.
82
See the in-depth study by Maithrimurthi, especially 1999: 215–273; Traité III.1250–1254; La Vallée Poussin
1907: 258, note 1; Pagel 1995: 41–44.
83
MSAVBh D54b7/P64b4 (rNal ’byor spyod pa’i sa). The passage has been edited, translated and discussed by
Maithrimurthi (respectively in 1999: 306–307, 317–319 and 246–255); it corresponds to BoBh D166,1–
24/W241,15–243,2 (see also Traité III.1250, note 1).
84
MSAVBh D55a5/P65a3 (’Phags pa blo gros mi zad pa’i mdo). Śikṣ 212,2–4 = Braarvig 1993: II.352: sā tri-
vidhā āryākṣayamatisūtre ’bhihitā / sattvārambaṇā maitrī prathamacittotpādikānāṃ bodhisattvānām / dhar-
mārambaṇā caryāpratipannānāṃ bodhisattvānām / anārambaṇā maitry anutpattikadharmakṣāntipratilabdhā-
nāṃ bodhisattvānām iti /. See also the Tibetan text edited in Braarvig 1993: I.86. For a translation, see Bendall/
Rouse 1971: 204, Braarvig 1993: II.352, Pagel 1995: 138; see also Traité III.1245, 1272–1273 and V.2424–
2425; Viévard 2002: 175, note 327.
85
See BoBh D166,16–17/W242,16–17, together with MSAVBh D55a3–4/P65a1–2. Note also PVṬ Je
According to Sthiramati’s commentary to the ANS,86 it is because “we consider a [pseudo-]en-

tity, the living being, as [truly] existing, and do not know the [fundamental] insubstantiality
(nairātmya) of persons (pudgala) and dharmas.” (2) According to the BoBh, the Bodhisattva
shares the immeasurables of the dharmālambana type with the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas,
but not with the Heretics.87 An immeasurable bearing upon dharmas is characteristic of the
saint88 “who, perceiving dharmas only, clearly understands the metonymic application of [the
notion of a] living being to mere dharmas.” Sthiramati’s explanation goes as follows:89 “Be-
cause [an immeasurable of this type] arises after one has perceived that entities are reducible to
the mere dharmas of the five aggregates such as corporality, etc., and that what is called “self”
or “living being” does not exist, and that [these] five aggregates are by nature impermanent,
suffering, etc.” (3) As for the immeasurable of the anālambana type, it is shared by the Bodhi-
sattvas and Tathāgatas, but not by the Heretics, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.90 According to
the BoBh, is “without object” an immeasurable that is cultivated by the saint without even im-
agining dharmas.91 Sthiramati explains:92 “No longer perceiving living beings since he has
grasped the insubstantiality of persons, and without perceiving dharmas either since he has
grasped the insubstantiality of dharmas, he provides an immeasurable assistance to beings.”
4.3. The ANS and BBhSŚ associate the anālambanā maitrī with the Bodhisattva “who has ac-
quired the conviction that dharmas [ultimately] have no arising” (anutpattikadharmakṣāntipra-
tilabdha). Acquiring that kṣānti generally (though not uniformly) marks the entry of the Bodhi-
sattva into the eighth level, the acalā bhūmiḥ of the DBhS and niyatā bhūmiḥ of the BoBh.93 It
marks the irreversibility of the Bodhisattva’s progression; it is the mark of the Bodhisattva who
cannot regress (avaivartika).94 Whereas the sattvālambanā karuṇā was characteristic of the
D24b6/P29b2–3 = PVSVṬ 53,9: sattvālambanā pṛthagjanānām. On the categories of beings who direct the
immesurables toward beings, see BoBh D166,3–6 and 166,9–16/W241,18–23 and 242,7–15,
MSABh 121,16ff, MSAVBh D55b3–56a1/P65b3–66a2; on the stereotyped formulation of the apramāṇas, see
Maithrimurthi 1999: 35–46, as well as Traité III.1239–1240 and 1246ff.
86
MSAVBh D55a6/P65a5–6: sems can gyi dngos po yod par lta zhing gang zag dang chos la bdag med par ma
rtogs pa’i phyir ro //.
87
See BoBh D166,18–19/W242,17–19, together with MSAVBh D55a4/P65a2–3. Note also PVṬ Je
D24b6/P29b3 = PVSVṬ 53,9: dharmālambanā āryāṇām /.
88
BoBh D166,6–7/W241,23–242,2: yat punar dharmamātrasaṃjñī dharmamātre sattvopacāram āśayataḥ sam-
paśyaṃs tām eva maitrīṃ bhāvayati /.
89
MSAVBh D55a1–2/P64b6–7: dngos po ’di dag gzugs la sogs pa phung po lnga’i chos tsam du zad kyi / bdag
gam sems can zhes bya ba med la / phung po lnga yang mi rtag pa dang / sdug bsngal ba la sogs pa’i rang
bzhin no zhes dmigs nas … ’byung ba’i phyir ro //.
90
See BoBh D166,19–20/W242,19–21, MSAVBh D55a4–5/P65a3, and MSAVBh D55a2/P64b7.
91
See BoBh D166,8–9/W242,3–5.
92
MSAVBh D55a2–3/P64b8–65a1: gang zag la bdag med par khong du chud pas sems can du mi dmigs pa
dang / chos la bdag med par khong du chud pas phung po lnga’i chos tsam du yang dmigs pa med par sems can
la phan ’dogs pa dpag tu med par mdzad pa’i phyir ro //.
93
See DBhS (VIII C) 64,8 and 15, BoBh D253,8/W367,11, and MSABh 122,1–2 ad MSA 17.19 (Maithrimurthi
1999: 360–361).
94
Viévard 2002: 269.
compassionate being who had not realized the insubstantiality of persons,95 and the dharmā-
lambanā karuṇā was characteristic of the compassionate being who had not penetrated the in-
substantiality of dharmas,96 the Bodhisattva who has reached the eighth level knows that dhar-
mas do not arise; having realized the two emptinesses,97 he no longer perceives any object that
can serve to define karuṇā.98 That compassion par excellence, which is concomitant with the
“suppression of the subject/object polarity,”99 is none other than great compassion (mahāka-
ruṇā).
The attainment of dharmakṣānti, however, is not the only defining feature of the revolution
that occurs in the acalā bhūmiḥ. For the acalā bhūmiḥ also coincides with the suppression of
all “intentional effort;”100 it is there that the psycho-cognitive endeavor acquires its spontaneity,
automaticity, mechanicity (anābhogatā):101 “Les membres de l’effort (prayogāṅga) et la
95
According to Sthiramati’s commentary to the ANS at MSAVBh D55a5–6/P65a4–6, the sattvālambanā karuṇā
characterizes the prathamacittotpādika Bodhisattva, who still does not understand the twofold insubstantiality.
On the prathamacittotpādika Bodhisattva, see BoBh D12,8–14,5/W18,10–20,27 and BoBh D166,20–
22/W242,21–24 (to be compared with BoBh D12,13–16/W18,16–21). Some useful information is also found
in Braarvig 1993: II.352, note 2 (sems dang po bskyed pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ ni dang po so so’i skye bo’i
dus na bla na med pa’i byang chub tu sems bskyed pa yan chad mos pas spyod pa’i sa la gnas pa rnams so). On
the Profane and the production of the thought of awakening, see MSAVBh D3a4–5/P3b2.
96
According to Sthiramati’s commentary to the ANS at MSAVBh D55a6–7/P65a6–7, the dharmālambanā karu-
ṇā characterizes the caryāpratipanna Bodhisattva, i.e., between the first and the seventh level inclusively.
Some useful information is provided in Braarvig 1993: II.252, note 3.
97
MSAVBh D56a4–5/P66a6–7: mi dmigs pa’i byams pas ni sems can dang chos kyi stong pa nyid la dmigs te /
de’i tshe sems dang sems las byung ba’i tshogs rnams ci la yang mi rtog pa’i mtshan nyid du ro gcig par gnas
pas sems can tha dad pa dang / chos tha dad pa byed pa med pas na mi dmigs pa’i byams pa zhes bya’o //.
“The friendliness that has no object is directed toward the emptiness of living beings and of constituents(/of
Dharma?). [That is to say:] at that time, the group of thoughts and mental factors (cittacaitta) – which have a
unique flavour (ekarasa) in so far they have as their characteristic [the fact of] no longer imagining anything at
all – no longer perceive distinct living beings and constituents. [We] therefore [say of this friendliness] that is
is without [any] object.” Some useful information is provided in Braarvig 1993: II.352, note 4 (mi skye ba’i
chos la bzod pa ni sa brgyad pa yan chad la bya ste, de dag gi mtshan ma med pa la lhun gyis grub par ’jug pas
de dag gi byams pa …). See also MSA 17.18c2d1, together with MSABh 121,23–24 (Maithrimurthi 1999: 360),
and MSAVBh D56a2–5/P66a3–7.
98
Viévard 2002: 275.
99
Viévard 2002: 276. This is also the opinion of Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin at PVṬ Je D24b6–7/P29b3–4
= PVSVṬ 53,9–10: anālambanā grāhyagrāhakābhiniveśavigatānāṃ buddhabodhisattvānām /. “[The im-
measurables] of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, who are free of [any] adherence to an object and a subject [of
knowledge, are] without object.”
100
Viévard 2002: 276.
101
DBhS (VII F) 58,7–10: yāni bodhisattvena prathamāṃ bodhisattvabhūmim upādāya yāvat saptamī bodhi-
sattvabhūmir ity adhinirhṛtāni jñānābhinirhāraprayogāṅgāni imāny aṣṭamīṃ bodhisattvabhūmim ārabhya
yāvad atyantaparyavasānam ity anābhogena pariniṣpadyante /. Translation by Viévard 2002: 276. Farther, the
DBhS describes the Bodhisattva who has reached the eighth level as sarvābhogavigataḥ (VIII C, 64,15–16 and
25–26) and as anābhogadharmatāprāpta (VIII C, 64,16). The locus classicus of the distinction between
sābhogatā and anābhogatā is found at DBhS (VIII K) 67,10–19: tad yathāpi nāma bho jinaputra mahāsam-
udragāmī poto ’prāpto mahāsamudraṃ sābhogavāhano bhavati / sa eva samanantaram anuprāpto mahāsam-
udram anābhogavāhano vātamaṇḍalīpraṇīto yad ekadivasena mahāsamudre kramate tad sarvasābhogavāha-
natayā na śakyaṃ varṣaśatenāpi tāvad aprameyam anuprāptum / evam eva bho jinaputra bodhisattvaḥ susam-
réalisation du savoir (jñāna) produits par le Bodhisattva depuis la première Terre jusqu’à la
septième Terre du Bodhisattva sont parfaitement achevés (pari-niṣ-PAD-) sans effort (anābho-
gena), de la huitième Terre jusqu’à la toute dernière.” The great compassion henceforth dri-
ving the Bodhisattva is a compassion which has, so to speak, undergone a double revolution
because the Bodhisattva acquiesces to the non-arising of dharmas, and because the intentional
effort that until then directed compassion toward beings and dharmas has ceased:102 “[L]e
Bodhisattva, percevant la masse des êtres précipitée dans les quatre grands courants, ayant
l’intention de les faire traverser, s’appuie sur le grand effort (vyāyāma) et le désir (autsukya)
pour le parfait éveil par le savoir omniscient. Étant parvenu à s’appuyer sur une grande énergie
(mahāvīrya), il obtient, immédiatement après, la [huitième] Terre du Bodhisattva immobile
(acalā) et devient libre de tout effort (sarvābhoga). Aucune des manières de se conduire [ba-
sées] sur la dualité ou les apparences ne lui arrivent plus.” The actions characteristic of the Bo-
dhisattva who has entered the eighth level stand out not only because of their spontaneity and
unintentionality, but also because they are uninterrupted, i.e., because of their serial continu-
ity:103 “In that [context], what is the Bodhisattvas’ abode that is free of intention, effort, and
any character [that can be perceptually apprehended]? The abode is [as follows:] it is the one
that, due to the repeated cultivation (bhāvanābāhulya) of the previous characterless abode, is
associated (anugata) with a path [henceforth] proceeding without intermission or interruption,
strictly spontaneously (svarasena eva).”
Let us now return to compassion and examine Sthiramati’s explanation on the anālambanā
maitrī of the ANS:104 “[Finally,] we say of the friendliness of the Bodhisattvas who have ac-
bhṛtamahākuśalamūlasambhāro mahāyānasamudāgamābhirūḍho mahābodhisattvacaryāsāgaram anuprāpto

yad ekamuhūrtena jñānānābhogatayā sarvajñajñānenākramati tan na śakyaṃ pūrvakeṇa sābhogakarmaṇā kal-
paśatasahasreṇāpi tāvad aprameyam anuprāptum /. “[It is here,] O Jinaputra, as [it is] with the boat [that] is
sailing to the open sea (mahāsamudra): until it has reached the open sea, sailing is difficult (sābhoga°). But as
soon as it has reached the open sea, that same [boat], carried by the winds, sails without any difficulty. [In
fact,] no [boat] that sails with difficulty could ever travel, be it in one hundred or even in an infinite number of
years, the [distance] it will travel in the open sea in one day. It is likewise, O Jinaputra, for the Bodhisattva
who is well provided with the collections [of merit and wisdom] constituting the bases of virtue, who reaches
the great ocean that is the career of the Bodhisattva embarked on the Great Vehicle: [none] of the prior actions
made with effort could [ever] cover in one hundred thousand or even in an infinite number of cosmic periods
what he covers in a [single] instant with his omniscient knowledge, because that knowledge is spontaneous
(anābhoga).” The tenth abode (vihāra) of the Bodhisattva of the BoBh corresponds to the eighth level of the
DBhS; that abode is called anabhisaṃskāro ’nābhogamārgavāhano nirnimitto vihāraḥ (BoBh D217,18–
19/W318,1–2, D239,4/W350,12), and is also characterized by obtention of the anutpattikadharmakṣānti (BoBh
D239,14/W351,13–14 and D239,22–23/W352,22–23).
102
DBhS (VIII C) 64,22–27: bodhisattvaś caturmahaughaprāptaṃ sattvakāyaṃ saṃjānāna uttaraṇābhiprāyaḥ
sarvajñajñānābhisambodhāya mahad vyāyāmautsukyam ārabhate sa mahāvīryārambhaprāptaḥ samanantaram
anuprāpta imām acalāṃ bodhisattvabhūmiṃ sarvābhogavigato bhavato / tasya sarveṇa sarvaṃ dvayasamu-
dācāro vā nimittasamudācāro vā nābhāsībhavati /. Translation by Viévard 2002: 277.
103
BoBh D219,27–220,2/W320,24–321,2: tatra katamo bodhisattvānām anabhisaṃskāro ’nābhogo nirnimitto vi-
hāraḥ / yas tasyaiva pūrvakasya nirnimittasya vihārasya bhāvanābāhulyāt svarasenaiva niśchidranirantara-
vāhimārgānugato vihāraḥ /. See also Maithrimurthi’s very useful summary of that condition (Maithrimurthi
1999: 267)
104
MSAVBh D55a7–55b1/P65a7–8: mi skye ba’i chos la bzod pa rab tu thob pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ rnams
kyi byams pa ni dmigs pa med pa zhes gsungs te / rnam par mi rtog pa lhun gyis grub pas rtsol ba dang ’bad pa
med par byams pa ’byung ba’i phyir ro //. See also MSABh 166,5 ad MSA 19.38 (Maithrimurthi 1999: 256,
quired the conviction that dharmas [ultimately] have no arising that it is ‘without object’, since
[that friendliness] arises intuitively (nirvikalpa), spontaneously (anābhogena), and without dif-
ficulty or effort.” This is also the doctrine reported in the BBhSŚ, of which Lamotte offers the
following summary:105 “Les Bodhisattva qui ont obtenu la conviction que les dharma ne nais-
sent pas (anutpattikadharmakṣāntipratilabdha) cultivent surtout la maitrī sans objet. Bien
qu’elle ait un objet, l’élément fondamental (dharmadhātu), elle est comme les dharma de rétri-
bution (vipākadharma), oeil, etc., dépourvue d’imagination (vikalpa), ne fait pas d’effort
(prayoga) et fonctionne spontanément (svarasena pravartate). C’est pourquoi elle est appelée
la grande maitrī sans objet (anālambana), associée au savoir de l’égalité (samatājñānasampra-
yukta).”
4.4. The ideological complex developed in the DBhS, the BBhSŚ, the BoBh, the ANS and the
MSAVBh around the acalā bhūmiḥ deserves our attention since on the one hand, PV 2 implic-
itly describes the career of the Bodhisattva up to the attainment of awakening and the conco-
mitant perfection of teaching, while on the other, its doctrine is based, as we have seen, on the
notion of a spontaneous and uninterrupted development of compassion. It is therefore worth
asking if this ideological complex is truly echoed among Buddhist theorists of knowledge. To
answer that question, let us quickly examine PV 2.198–199 and its commentaries:106
It is not the case that there is no deliverance (nāmuktiḥ) [from saṃsāra] since [in the absence of a cause], once
former [karmic] formations have been exhausted[, i.e., once the projective force of the previous act is ex-
hausted], there is no reconnection to a new (anya) [suffering]; those immaculate ones (anagha)[, however],
whose [karmic] formations have not lost their potential, do remain [in saṃsāra].107 Now since [their] compas-
sion is weak,108 [the Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves] do not [consent], in order to remain (sthāpana) [in
saṃsāra], to the great effort [characteristic of the Bodhisattva, and therefore do not stay in saṃsāra very long];
but those who are devoted to others (parādhīna) do remain, [they] whose compassion is great.
According to Devendrabuddhi, the “immaculate ones” mentioned in PV 2.198 are, “for exam-
ple, the Bodhisattvas.”109 Śākyabuddhi adds that among those,110 “the potential of the [former]
action is not exhausted, since the result of all [their] provisions [of merit and knowledge] is un-
fixed nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇaphala).” Attaining apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa is generally a charac-
teristic of the Bodhisattva who reaches the seventh level: whereas his understanding (prajñā)
enables him to grasp the emptiness of saṃsāra, his compassion for the beings who are caught
note 142), and MSAVBh D80b2–3/P95b7–8 ad MSABh 131,17

105
Traité III.1251; see also Traité V.1708.
106
PV 2.198–199: nāmuktiḥ pūrvasaṃskārakṣaye ’nyāpratisandhitaḥ / akṣīṇaśaktiḥ saṃskāro yeṣāṃ tiṣṭhanti te
’naghāḥ // mandatvāt karuṇāyāś ca na yatnaḥ sthāpane mahān / tiṣṭhanty eva parādhīnā yeṣāṃ tu mahatī
kṛpā //.
107
PVP D84b7/P97b2: de ltar na dus thams cad du gnas par ’gyur ro //. PVV 79,10–11: yāvad ākāśaṃ tiṣṭhanty
eva /.
108
PVV 79,11–12: karmaṇo niyatakālasthitikadehākṣepakatvān mandatvāt karuṇāyāḥ … Cf. PVP D85a3–4/
P97b7–8.
109
PVP D84b7/P97b3: dper na byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi lta bu’o //. PVV 79,10: samyaksambuddhāḥ.
110
According to PVṬ Nye D131b2–3/P162a2–3: dper na byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi lta bu’o zhes bya ba ni /
byang chub sems dpa’ rnams ni las kyi nus pa zad pa ma yin te / tshogs thams cad mi gnas pa’i mya ngan las
’das pa’i ’bras bu can nyid yin pa’i phyir ro //.
in saṃsāra prevents him from entering into nirvāṇa.111 The great compassion (mahatī kṛpā)
characteristic of “those who are devoted to others” (PV 2.199) also suggests that Dharmakīrti
was making an allusion to the buddhological theme defined above, in which the eighth level
marks the elevation of compassion to the level of great compassion. Devendrabuddhi is even
more explicit: that great compassion belongs to those mahāsattvas whose highly developed
love freely expresses itself;112 due to the former practice of compassion, which was itself pre-
ceded by the thought of awakening, great compassion proceeds spontaneously.113 Even though
the acalā bhūmiḥ is not mentioned explicitly by Devendrabuddhi, his description is most likely
meant to refer to the compassion of the Bodhisattva who has entered the eighth level, that same
level which marks, as we have seen, the disappearance of all intentional effort and the passage
into anābhogatā.
4.5. Let us recall Devendrabuddhi’s suggestive introduction to PV 2.124:114

At a given moment, when one has reached a distinctive practice (prayoga) of [mental qualities] such as com-
passion, [these qualities] no longer depend on a new practice to proceed, but [rather,] the acquisition of [each
new] improvement proceeds without [any] effort.
I would conjecture that the moment to which Devendrabuddhi is referring here coincides with
the Bodhisattva’s access to the eighth level, the abode where his psycho-cognitive endeavor
becomes spontaneous. From that point on, cultivation is said to proceed intuitively (nirvikal-
pena, MSABh) and without interruption (niśchidranirantaravāhin, BoBh). The description of
the corresponding vihāra found in the BoBh also clearly suggests that it proceeds without in-
tentional effort (anābhogena, BoBh, DBhS, MSAVBh), without difficulty or effort whatsoever
(rtsol ba dang ’bad pa med par, MSAVBh), and spontaneously (svarasena eva, BoBh,
BBhSŚ). Now if my interpretation is correct, the subsequent set of arguments (PV 2.124–
131ab) would refer to the anālambanā karuṇā described in Idealist sources. And Dharmakīrti’s
arguments as well as the terminology that he uses tend to confirm this. For he is here not con-
tent with simply fixing as a condition to compassion the need for a durable substratum (sthirā-
śraya), which as we have seen is characteristic of Bodhisattvas alone (§2.7). For compassion to
reach its utmost limit, it must also require no further practice/effort115 (abhyāsa/[pra]yat-
na/*prayoga) to reaccess the last state attained through its cultivation: it must become nature
111
See note 51 above.
112
According to PVP D84a4–5/P98a1: gang dag sems can chen po rgyu med par mchog tu mnyes gshin pa, which
can be reconstructed as follows: *yeṣāṃ mahāsattvānām akāraṇaparamavatsalānām (based on PVV 79,15:
yeṣām akāraṇavatsalānām).
113
According to PVP D85a5/P98a1–2: byang chub kyi sems sngon du song ba can gyi brtse ba goms pa’i stobs
kyis rang gi ngang gis ’jug pa’i brtse ba chen po …
114
For the Tibetan text, see note 26 above.
115
I do not believe that the reference to effort (yatna) found at PV 2.125 weakens my hypothesis. Rather, I believe
that Dharmakīrti keeps with this terminology because he wants to remain coherent: the explicit context of this
passage is not the Mahāyāna doctrine, but his discussion with Kumārila. The effort to which he is here refer-
ring can easily be interpreted in terms of *(punaḥ)prayoga ([yang] sbyor ba, PVP D53a2/P60a3 and
D53a3/P60a4) and (moments of) abhyāsa (PVV 55,7–8). PV 2.130 (see below) by itself suffices to establish
the equivalence between abhyāsa and (pra)yatna. Even though he has entered the eighth level, the Bodhisattva
has not completed his mental cultivation (bhāvanā); it has simply become mechanical, automatic, spontaneous.
(svabhāva), proceed spontaneously (svarasena, *anābhogena). But only among the (great) Bo-
dhisattvas can compassion become nature, not among the lower categories of Buddhist saints
who are aiming only for “individual” nirvāṇa.
5. The role of karuṇā in the general structure of PV 2
5.1. In the footsteps of Dignāga and (first and foremost) against the Mīmāṃsā, the aim of PV 2
is to demonstrate that the Buddha has become and is similar to a means of valid cognition
(pramāṇabhūta). To accomplish this demonstration, PV 2.1–33 first defines the nature of that
authority. At PV 2.1–7, Dharmakīrti presents (what the tradition will construe as) two
(conceptually equivalent but terminologically alternative) definitions of a pramāṇa, or means
of valid cognition. At PV 2.8–28, he goes on to refute the two alternative conceptions of a
permanent pramāṇa: the first conception, that of the Mīmāṃsaka, being of a Veda that has no
beginning and no human/divine author, and the second, of an eternal God who revealed the
Scriptures. Finally at PV 2.29–33, Dharmakīrti defines his own notion of authority in
salvational matters: that of a Buddha who is omniscient not in so far as he knows the totality of
the knowable, but in so far as he knows the totality of the means to salvation.116
PV 2.34 begins Dharmakīrti’s commentary on the property/epithet jagaddhitaiṣin;117 here
commences, therefore, his analysis of compassion. Devendrabuddhi introduces PV 2.34ab1
with a question:118 “Let us accept [that the Buddha] is a pramāṇa of the type [which you just
described]; but what is the sādhana on the basis of which this [pramāṇa] is said to be estab-
lished?” To this question Dharmakīrti answers:119 “The sādhana [of that pramāṇa is] compas-
sion, [and] it [results] from constant practice.” Properly practiced, compassion is therefore the
means to become an authority in salvational matters. At PV 2.34–131ab, Dharmakīrti demon-
strates how, since a virtually unlimited series of births is possible, the cultivation of compas-
sion can grow to the point that it will form the essence of the mental series.
At PV 2.131cd–138, Dharmakīrti goes on to discuss, without any transition, the theme of the
Bodhisattva as śāstṛ. The master devotes those verses to the first philosophical tribulations of
the Bodhisattva as well as to the path to awakening. There he describes the rational discovery
of the cause of suffering (the personalist wrong view, satkāyadṛṣṭi, etc.), the identification of
the antidote to that cause (perception of insubstantiality, nairātmyadarśana, etc.), and the
mental cultivation of that antidote120 up to the definitive eradication of the traces of passions
(PV 2.137), in short, up to awakening and access to buddhahood/sugatatva. PV 2.131cd–136
thus highlight the Buddhist motif of (two among) the three prajñās ([śrutamayī,] cintāmayī,
bhāvanāmayī).
116
On PV 2.1–7, see van Bijlert 1989: 115–168, Franco 1997: 45–66, Krasser 2001; on PV 2.8–16, see Krasser
2002: II.19–55; on PV 2.29–33, see Eltschinger 2001: 101–114.
117
See note 2 above.
118
PVP D16a3/P17a8–b1: tshad ma de ’dra ba nyid ’dod mod kyi / de’i sgrub par byed pa yang ci zhig yin / gang
gis* ’di grub** brjod ce na / *P omits gis; **P ’grub. Cf. also PVV 21,10: nanv īdṛśasya pramāṇasya kiṃ
sādhanam ity āha …
119
PV 2.34ab1: sādhanaṃ karuṇābhyāsāt sā …
120
On PV 2.131cd–142, see Eltschinger 2005a and 2005b: 175–179.
5.2. Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the jagaddhitaiśin–śāstṛ sequence is however quite surpris-

ing. We cannot but be surprised to find that the Bodhisattva practices a compassion that is typi-
cal of the Mahāyāna even before having identified the salvational path and its twofold purpose
(his own good, svārtha, which consists in being a Buddha/sugata, and the good of others,
parārtha, which consists in being a teacher, śāstṛtva). Moreover, traditional buddhologies pro-
fess that these mental qualities of karuṇā and prajñā develop in parallel as one progresses
through the levels. We can therefore wonder what might be the nature and intensity of the
compassion of the Bodhisattva prior to his treading the path commended to him by his philo-
sophical inquiry. In other words, what rhetorical status should we grant to PV 2.120–131ab, to
those verses where, as we have seen, Dharmakīrti evokes the principle that compassion gradu-
ally becomes the intrinsic nature of the mental series? Are we presented with an argument in
favour of a possibility that will only become a reality with practice and with the completion of
the path (i.e., in parallel to the philosophical and cultivation processes described under the
śāstṛ epithet), or rather a description the textual location of which would correspond to a “bio-
graphical” moment in the career of the (future) saint (i.e., before his identification and practice
of the path)? In other words: in arguing that there is a direct causal relation between compas-
sion and the Bodhisattva’s rational discovery and practice of the path, is Dharmakīrti merely
engaged in a rather servile elaboration on Dignāga’s sequence, or does he rely on a narrative
sequence that is both doctrinally and textually identifiable?
5.3. I am not in a position to discuss all the doctrines presenting compassion as a cause. One in-
stance shall be sufficient. In many Mahāyāna śāstras and sūtras, compassion is considered to
be the cause of bodhicittotpāda, the “production of the thought of awakening,” a decisive event
that marks the true beginning of a Bodhisattva’s career.121 The BoBh identifies four causes
(hetu) of the thought of awakening; among those,122 “compassion toward living beings is the
third cause of the arising of [that] thought in the Bodhisattva.” Earlier in the same chapter, the
BoBh moreover states:123 “And that Bodhisattva, compassionate toward the suffering living be-
ings, produces the thought of awakening, motivated by the intention to rescue [them]. The
thought of awakening is consequently the outcome of compassion.” Likewise, MSA 3.5 says
that cittotpāda finds its root in compassion (karuṇāmūla), whereas in the DBhS it is said that124
“a thought for awakening arises in the Bodhisattvas who are turned to commiseration (kṛpā)
and compassion.” According to the same text,125 “that thought [of awakening] has great
compassion for its precursor.” Finally, let us follow Kamalaśīla in quoting the
Daśadharmasūtra:126 “Having seen how living beings are without protection, without refuge
[and] without shelter, [the Bodhisattva] develops a wish for compassion, [and this continues
121
On bodhicittotpāda and concomitant themes (praṇidhāna, etc.), see Dayal 1978: 50–79.
122
BoBh D10,11–14/W15,13–14: sattveṣu kāruṇyaṃ bodhisattvasya tṛtīyo hetuś cittasyotpattaye /. On the first
two causes, see §3 above.
123
BoBh D8,20–21/W13,5–7: duḥkhiteṣu sattveṣu sa kāruṇiko bodhisattvaḥ paritrāṇābhiprāyas tac cittam utpā-
dayati / tasmāt sa cittotpādaḥ karuṇāniṣyandaḥ /.
124
DBhS (1 R) 11,13: kṛpākaruṇābhimukhānāṃ (bodhi)sattvānāṃ bodhāya cittam utpadyate /.
125
DBhS (1 T) 11,20: [tac cittam] … mahākaruṇāpūrvāṅgamam /.
126
Quoted at BhK I.190,16–19: sattvān atrāṇān aśaraṇān advīpān dṛṣṭvā karuṇāyai cittam upasthāpya yāvad an-
uttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhau cittam utpādayati /. See also Traité III.1711.
through various stages] to the point of producing a thought for unsurpassed, perfect
awakening.” The causal sequence uniting compassion and the production of the (conventional)
thought of awakening, or at least the resolution/vow (praṇidhi, praṇidhāna) which is part of it,
certainly does occur in Dharmakīrti’s own tradition. For example, Kamalaśīla makes several
declarations to that effect in each of his three BhK’s, of which the most significant for us goes
as follows:127 “Therefore, for that [Bodhisattva], the promise (pratijñā) to save (abhyuddhara-
ṇa) all beings, [which proceeds] from the practice of commiseration, spontaneously (ayatnata
eva) generates the thought of awakening, the aspect of which is to seek (prārthanā) unsurpass-
able, perfect awakening, as is said in the Daśadharmasūtra.”
In those Mahāyāna śāstras and sūtras, compassion precedes and generates the thought of
awakening: it is the hetu, the mūla, the pūrvāṅgama, whereas the thought of awakening is the
niṣyandaphala. But in the BhK’s, that causal sequence contributes to create a threefold sche-
matisation of the path to awakening or omniscience:128 “To summarize, whoever wishes to
quickly achieve omniscience must make an effort with regard to those three points: compas-
sion, the thought of awakening and the (means of) realization (*sādhana).” In BhK I and II,
Kamalaśīla borrows a similar passage from the Vairocanasambodhi(sūtra):129 “An omniscient
person’s knowledge has compassion for its root, the thought of awakening for its cause, and
[salvational] means for its conclusion (paryavasāya).” In the BhK II, Kamalaśīla explains that
passage as follows:130 “Therefore, those who wish to become omniscient must practice the
three following [factors]: compassion, the thought of awakening and [salvational] means. Dri-
ven by compassion, the Bodhisattvas will necessarily take the vow to save all beings.” That
threefold structure finds a remarkable expression in BhK III:131 “Le Yogin, appuyé sur la mora-
lité pure servant d’équipement au śamatha et à la vipaśyanā, produit envers les êtres une gran-
de compassion; formant une résolution en vue de la Bodhi, il doit exercer l’audition, la réfle-
xion et la méditation.”
127
BhK I.190,14–16: tasyaivaṃ kṛpābhyāsabalāt sakalasattvābhyuddharaṇapratijñayānuttarasamyaksambhodhi-
prārthanākāram ayatnata eva bodhicittam utpadyate / yathoktaṃ daśadharmasūtre /. See also BhK II, in the
Tibetan text edited by Adam (2002: 185): des na rtsa ba’i snying rje goms par byas nas byang chub kyi sems
bsgom par bya’o //. This could be reconstructed as follows: *ato mūlakaruṇāṃ bhāvayitvā bodhicittaṃ
bhāvayet /. “Therefore, having cultivated the compassion, which is [its] root, the thought of awakening must be
cultivated.”
128
BhK I.229,15–17: thams cad mkhyen pa nyid myur du thob par ’dod pas mdor na snying rje dang / byang chub
kyi sems dang / sgrub pa dang gnas ’di gsum la ’bad par bya’o //.
129
BhK I.196,20–21: tad etat sarvajñajñānaṃ karuṇāmūlaṃ bodhicittahetukam upāyaparyavasāyam /.
130
Tibetan text edited by Adam (2002: 180): de lta bas na thams cad mkhyen pa nyid thob par ’dod pas snying rje
dang / byang chub kyi sems dang / thabs dang gsum po ’di dag la bslab par bya’o // snying rjes bskyod na
byang chub sems dpa’ rnams sems can thams cad mngon par gdon pa’i phyir nges par dam ’cha’ bar ’gyur
ro //. This could be reconstructed as follows: *tasmāt sarvajñatām adhigantukāmaiḥ karuṇābodhicittopāyeṣv
eteṣu triṣu śikṣitavyam / karuṇayā preryamāṇā bodhisattvāḥ sarvasattvābhyuddhāraṇārtham avaśyaṃ prati-
jñāsyanti /.
131
BhK III.3,6–8: tatra yoginā śīlaviśuddhyādau śamathavipaśyanāsambhāre sthitena sarvasattveṣu mahākaru-
ṇām utpādya, samutpāditabodhicittena śrutacintābhāvanāyāṃ prayoktavyam /. Translated by Lamotte 1987:
338 (from the Tibetan!), without the Sanskrit reconstructions.
5.4. Can the Mahāyāna sequence of compassion and the thought of awakening, as well as the
threefold structure found in Kamalaśīla, serve as a clavis hermeneutica in our interpretation of
PV 2? The initial and final terms of this threefold schema match with what we already know
from PV 2: (mahā)karuṇā on one side, the path (upāya, *sādhana, śrutacintābhāvanā, etc.) on
the other. What remains to be determined is if an allusion to the middle term, bodhicittotpāda,
can be found in PV 2. To my knowledge, that important motif does not appear expressis verbis
in the works of Dharmakīrti. But PV 2.131cd–132ab would make a good candidate for a func-
tional equivalent to bodhicittotpāda, situated as it is between the half-verse (PV 2.131ab) that
ends the investigation of compassion and the half-verse (PV 2.132cd) that begins the investi-
gation of the path and the prajñās. Let us consider those four pādas:132
[Wishing to calm other people’s suffering,] the compassionate (dayāvat) [Bodhisattva] engages in [the cultiva-
tion of] means (upāya) to [calm suffering] in order to eradicate (hāna) [his own] suffering: [for] it is indeed a
difficult task (duṣkara) for anyone to [correctly] teach [others about] the goal (upeya) and its cause [when they
remain] imperceptible (parokṣa).
Let us first remark that nothing in the direct commentaries suggests any allusion on the part of
Dharmakīrti to the production of the thought of awakening. According to Devendrabuddhi’s
commentary,133 the Bodhisattva’s practice of compassion means that the Bodhisattva will suf-
fer upon witnessing the suffering of others, and that he will consequently strive to calm that
suffering. Compassion serves as the cause for the Bodhisattva’s rational decision that he should
himself directly realize (sākṣāt°/pratyakṣīkaraṇa) the path and its goal in order to teach them to
those who are caught in painful transmigration and thus calm their suffering. That rational de-
cision follows the maxim according to which we can only teach well what we know from ex-
perience. That undertaking is rational in so far as the quest for one’s own good (svārtha > su-
gatatva) is subordinate and becomes a means for insuring the good of others (parārtha >
132
PV 2.131cd–132ab: dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate // parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi
duṣkaram / yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate //.
133
PVP D54b2–7/P62a1–8: brtse ldan te / rgyu’i gnas skabs na yod pa’i ngang tshul can gyi brtse bas byang chub
sems dpa’ sems can gzhan gyi sdug bsngal gyis sdug bsngal bar gyur pa brtse ba la goms par gyur pas de dag
gi sdug bsngal nye bar zhi bar don du gnyer ba can gyi sdug bsngal spang phyir de rab tu zhi ba’i thabs rnams
la ni mngon sbyor mdzad / nyid nyid kyi sdug bsngal rab tu zhi ba dang rjes su mthun pa’i lam rtogs par byed
pa zhes bya ba’i don to // … nyid nyid kyi sdug bsngal rab tu zhi ba’i thabs rtsom pa gang yin pa ’di nyid gzhan
gyi don dang rjes su mthun pa yin no // de lta yin na … de’i rgyu gang yin pa nan tan du byas pa las de’i thabs
las byung ba’i don de gdul bya de dag gis thob par ’gyur ro // … lam mi shes pas phyin ci ma log pa’i lam ston
pa’i skabs med pa’i phyir* re zhig rtogs pa dang ldan pa nyid sems can rnams la de nyid dang de’i rgyu ji ltar
gnas pa bzhin du ’chad par bzhed pas mngon sum du mdzad pa yin no //. *Note Vibh. 57, note 2: na hy
amārgajño ’viparītamārgopadeśe ’dhikriyate /. “[By] ‘compassionate,’ [Dharmakīrti means:] with compassion
as a cause (*hetvavasthābhāvinyā dayayā); having practiced compassion, the Bodhisattva [himself] suffers
from the pain [affecting] other beings (*parasattvaduḥkhaduḥkhita); seeking (prārth-, arthin) to calm
(upaśama) their suffering, he himself engages in [the cultivation of] means to calm (praśama) that [suffering,
first] in order to eliminate (hāna) [his own] suffering. The meaning [intended by Dharmakīrti] is that [the Bo-
dhisattva will] practice (pratipad-) a path capable of calming his own suffering … [In fact,] establishing the
means of calming his own suffering is alone suitable to the good of others. In this way, by practicing (anuṣṭhā-
na) the [path] that [serves] as its cause …, those [beings] who are to be instructed (vineya, vaineyaka) will
reach the goal [associated] with that [means] (tadupeyārtha) … [But] a [person] who does not know [himself]
the path [to be followed] is not qualified to indicate the right path; therefore, [if he is] rational (prekṣāvat), the
[Bodhisattva] who wishes to teach properly the [path] and its end to others [will] first realize (pratyakṣīkaraṇa,
sākṣātkaraṇa) [them for himself].”
tāyitva). In this rational decision I see a functional equivalent of bodhicittotpāda, adapted to the
agenda of Dharmakīrti’s school.
Moreover, I believe that I am not alone in interpreting those four pādas as a logico-episte-
mological variation on the Mahāyāna theme of bodhicittotpāda. In a segment of his long com-
mentary to TS no. 3337(/8), Kamalaśīla brings together all the themes mentioned above: the
notion of a rational choice, a quote of PV 2.132ab and the threefold division of karuṇā – bo-
dhicitta – upāya found in the BhK’s. Here is the passage in question:134
And neither could [our opponent] say the following: ‘A [mental] cultivation that would result in a perceptual
knowledge of the type [that you assert] is not possible for anyone.’ [Our opponent could not say this] for he
would [then] have to state the reason for [such] an impossibility. (…) Here, since the praxis of a rational [per-
son always] implies usefulness, the reason for not engaging in [mental] cultivation could be that [the mental
cultivation of insubstantiality] is useful to nobody whatsoever. (…) First, among the [various reasons supposed
to justify the fact that a rational person does not engage in mental cultivation], uselessness is not established.
Indeed, fear of saṃsāra is the reason (nimitta) why those who are limited to the awakening of the Hearers or
[Buddhas-for-themselves] cultivate insubstantiality: [their] thoughts being tormented by the suffering of birth,
etc., [their] mind being terrified by saṃsāra, they seek to calm it for themselves. But since [a person] to whom
the goal and its cause [remain] imperceptible cannot [properly] teach them [to others], the reason why the
[Bodhisattvas] proceed with the cultivation is compassion: having by nature, due to a specific gotra, the good
of others as their sole delectation, they consider [that] world afflicted by the three sufferings of being condi-
tioned, etc.; and suffering from its painfulness because they rely upon commiseration, they reject [all] self-in-
terest; and considering as themselves all the [beings] who are caught in transmigration, they make the vow to
come to their rescue.
In this passage, Kamalaśīla attempts to demonstrate that the engagement in mental cultivation
meets the conditions of rationality since it serves a purpose. Among the śrāvakas and pratyeka-
buddhas, that purpose is none other than nirvāṇa “for oneself;” their motivation is the fear of
painful transmigration. Among the Bodhisattvas, however, the motivation is compassion alone.
Being awakened, the understanding that results from their mental cultivation will enable them
to teach a path to peace of which they have a “personal” experience. In this way, compassion
leads to the resolution to embrace the Bodhisattva career, i.e., it leads to the vow to implement
the adequate means to awakening.
5.5. If my interpretation of these four pādas as a functional equivalent of bodhicittotpāda(/pra-

ṇidhāna) is correct, Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the jagaddhitaiṣitvaśāstṛtva sequence is
easily explained by means of a narrative micro-sequence common to Mahāyāna buddhologies:
the practice of compassion precedes and generates the thought of awakening, which marks the
beginning of the Bodhisattva’s career as such. For Devendrabuddhi and Kamalaśīla, the
thought of awakening is a rational decision in which a series of means – śrutamayī, cintāmayī,
bhāvanāmayī prajñā, bodhi – are subordinated to the single goal of taking beings out of suf-
134
TSP S1054,19–22 and 1055,14–20 ad TS no. 3337/K871,12–15 and 872,1–7 ad TS no. 3338: na cāpy evaṃ
śakyaṃ vaktum – saiva tādṛśī bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yā tathābhūtapratyakṣajñānaphalā bhaved iti,
yato ’sambhave kāraṇaṃ vacanīyam. tathā hi bhāvanāyām aprayoge sarveṣām evānarthitvaṃ … kāraṇaṃ bha-
vet, prekṣāvataḥ pravṛtter arthitayā vyāptatvāt. … tatra na tāvad anarthitvaṃ siddham. tathā hi ye tāvaj jātyā-
diduḥkhotpīḍitamānasāḥ saṃsārād uttrastamanasas tadupaśamam ātmanaḥ prārthayante, teṣāṃ śrāvakādibo-
dhaniyatānāṃ saṃsārād bhayam eva nairātmyabhāvanānimittam. ye tu gotraviśeṣāt prakṛtyaiva parahita-
karaṇaikābhirāmāḥ saṃskārādiduḥkhatātritayaparipīḍitaṃ jagad avekṣya, kṛpāparatantratayā tadduḥkha-
duḥkhinaḥ svātmani vyapekṣām apāsya, sakalān eva saṃsāriṇa ātmatvenābhyupagatās tatparitrāṇāya
praṇidadhate, teṣāṃ karuṇaiva bhāvanāpravṛttinimittam, parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānasya duṣkaratvāt.
fering existence. From an internal point of view, the Great Vehicle is the very expression of
that rational decision; from an external point of view, it spells out the general context of that
decision as well as its reason, its final goal and the means to its final goal.
We can therefore be sure that Dharmakīrti’s causal interpretation, far from being imposed
by the restrictive wording of the maṅgalaśloka, rests on a Mahāyāna narrative sequence that is
clearly identifiable. Moreover, we can also determine without difficulty the meaning of
PV 2.120–131ab: Dharmakīrti there demonstrates the simple possibility of compassion be-
coming the intrinsic nature of the mental series, and not its actuality in a narrative/“biographi-
cal” sense. Though the practice of compassion starts at a quite early stage, its gradual and cu-
mulative improvement can proceed only in conjunction with the development of prajñā, i.e., in
narrative terms, in parallel with the path describing the Bodhisattva as śāstṛ. Likewise, its cul-
mination will coincide with the definitive eradication of all traces of passions (kleśavāsanā,
PV 2.137 and 141c) and of undefiled ignorance (akliṣṭājñāna, cf. PV 2.141d). The Bodhisattva
will ipso facto become a Buddha whose essence is composed of mental qualities such as com-
passion and insight (vipaśyanā, prajñā), a Buddha superior to the śrāvakas and pratyeka-
buddhas. If, as Dharmakīrti and his epigones would have it, karuṇā is the cause or sādhana of
the Buddha’s authority, it is because it is the direct cause of bodhicittotpāda, which in turn is
the cause of the career leading to awakening; the latter enables the new Buddha to teach the
truths or the path with full authority (PV 2.145–146ab).
6. Abbreviations
Adam 2002 See BhK II.

AK(Bh) Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan. Patna 1975.
ANS Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra: Quoted from Śikṣ, Traité, etc. See Braarvig 1993.
BBhSŚ Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra: Quoted from Traité.
Bendall/Rouse C. Bendall/W.H.D. Rouse, Śikṣā Samuccaya, A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine Compiled
1971 by Śāntideva, Chiefly from Earlier Mahāyāna Sūtras. Delhi 1971.
BhK I First Bhāvanākrama: G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts. Delhi 1986, 497[/187]–529[/229].
BhK II Second Bhāvanākrama: M.T. Adam, Meditation and the Concept of Insight in Kamalaśīla’s
Bhāvanākramas. Montreal 2002 (Unpublished PhD Thesis, McGill University, Faculty of Re-
ligious Studies), 178–229.
BhK III Third Bhāvanākrama: G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts. Part III: Third Bhāvanākrama. Roma
1971.
BoBh D = Bodhisattvabhūmiḥ [Being the XVth section of Asaṅgapāda’s Yogācārabhūmiḥ], ed. N.
Dutt. Patna 1978. W = Bodhisattvabhūmi. A Statement of Whole Course of the Bodhisattva
(Being Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi), ed. U. Wogihara. Tokyo 1971.
Braarvig 1993 J. Braarvig, Akṣayamatinirdeśa. Vol. 1: Edition of extant manuscripts with an index; vol. 2:
The Tradition of Imperishability in Buddhist Thought. Oslo 1993.
BṬ Bṛhaṭṭīkā of Kumārila (lost, only in fragments).
D sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ’gyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of To-
kyo, ed. J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima. Tokyo 1981 and following.
Dayal 1978 H. Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. Delhi 1978.
DBhS Daśabhūmikasūtra et Bodhisattvabhūmi, Chapitres Vihāra et Bhūmi, ed. J. Rahder.
Paris/Louvain 1926.
Decourtemanche J.-A. Decourtemanche, Note sur l’ancien système métrique de l’Inde. Journal Asiatique,
1911 dixième série, XVIII (1911) 367–378.
Dunne 1996 J.D. Dunne, Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha. Journal of the American Academy of
Religion LXIV/3 (1996) 525–556.
Eltschinger 2001 V. Eltschinger, Dharmakīrti sur les mantra et la perception du supra-sensible. Wien 2001.
Eltschinger V. Eltschinger, Études sur la philosophie religieuse de Dharmakīrti: 1. Le Bouddha comme
2005a Śāstṛ et comme Sugata. Études Asiatiques/Asiatische Studien LIX/2 (2005) 395–442.
Eltschinger V. Eltschinger, Études sur la philosophie religieuse de Dharmakīrti: 2. L’āśrayaparivṛtti.
2005b Journal Asiatique 293/1 (2005) 151–211.
Franco 1997 E. Franco, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Wien 1997.
Funayama 2000 T. Funayama, Two notes on Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti. Zinbun 35 (2000) 1–11.
Inami 1986 M. Inami, Dharmakīrti no jihi no shujyu ni giron (= Dharmakīrti’s Discussion on the Practice
of Compassion). Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu 35/1 (1986) 137–141.
Iwata 2011 T. Iwata, Compassion in Buddhist Logic: Dharmakīrti’s view of compassion as interpreted by
Prajñākaragupta. In the present volume, pp. 211–230.
Kimura 1999 T. Kimura, A New Chronology of Dharmakīrti. In: Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on
Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Confer-
ence (Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997), ed. S. Katsura. Wien 1999, 209–214.
Kośa L. de La Vallée Poussin, L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Bruxelles 1980.
Krasser 2001 H. Krasser, On Dharmakīrti’s Understanding of pramāṇabhūta and His Definition of pramā-
ṇa. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens XLV (2001) 173–199.
Krasser 2002 H. Krasser, Śaṅkaranandanas Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa. 2 vol. Wien 2002.
La Vallée Pous- L. de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra: Introduction au Traité du Milieu de l’Ācārya
sin 1907 Candrakīrti avec le commentaire de l’auteur, traduit d’après la version tibétaine. Le Muséon,
nouvelle série, 8 (1907) 249–317.
Lamotte 1952 É. Lamotte, La bienveillance bouddhique. Bulletin de l’Académie Royale de Belgique (Classe
des Lettres), 1952 (juillet) 381–403.
Lamotte 1987 É. Lamotte, Le troisième Bhāvanākrama de Kamalaśīla. Traduction de la version tibétaine.
In : P. Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhasa. Une controverse sur le quiétisme entre bouddhistes de
l’Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l’ère chrétienne. Paris 1987, 336–353.
Maithrimurthi M. Maithrimurthi, Wohlwollen, Mitleid, Freude und Gleichmut. Eine ideengeschichtliche Un-
1999 tersuchung der vier apramāṇas in der buddhistischen Ethik und Spiritualität von den Anfängen
bis hin zum frühen Yogācāra. Stuttgart 1999.
MAVṬ Sthiramati: Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, exposition systématique du Yogācāravijñānavāda, ed. S.
Yamaguchi. Nagoya 1934.
MPPŚ See Traité.
MSA(Bh) Asaṅga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. Exposé de la Doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le Système
Yogācāra, ed. S. Lévi. Paris 1907. MSA(Bh) 17 was the object of two partial editions: (1) =
Maithrimurthi 1999: 329–357 (MSA[Bh] 17.17–65); (2) see Nagao 2000 (MSA[Bh] 17.29–
64).
MSAṬ Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāraṭīkā of *Asvabhāva: D no. 4029, Bi 38b6–174a7/P no. 5530, Bi 45a5–
196a7.
MSAVBh Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya of Sthiramati: D no. 4034, Mi 1–Tsi 266a7/P no. 5531, Mi
1–Tsi 308a8.
Nagao 2000 G.M. Nagao, The Bodhisattva’s Compassion Described in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. In:
Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding. The Buddhist Legacy of Gadjin
M. Nagao, ed. J. Silk. Honolulu 2000, 1–38.
P The Tibetan Tripiṭaka: Peking Edition, ed. D.T. Suzuki. Tokyo/Kyoto 1957.
Pagel 1995 U. Pagel, The Bodhisattvapiṭaka. Its Doctrines, Practices and their Position in Mahāyāna Lite-
rature. Tring (U.K.) 1995.
PS(V) Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) of Dignāga.
PV 1 Pramāṇavārttika, chapter 1 (Svārthānumānapariccheda): See PVSV.
PV 2 Pramāṇavārttika, chapter 2 (Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda): Y. Miyasaka, Pramāṇavārttika-
Kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica II (1972) 1–206. See also PVV.
PVA Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on
Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikam), ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.
PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā of Devendrabuddhi: D no. 4217, Che 1–326b6/P no. 5717, Che 1–
390a8.
PVSV Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the
Autocommentary, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
PVSVṬ Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) Svopajñavṛttyā Kar-
ṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Kyoto 1982 (Allahabad 1943).
PVṬ Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā of Śākyabuddhi: D no. 4220, Je 1–Nye 282a7/P no. 5718, Je 1–Nye
348a8.
PVṬR Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā ad PV 2 of Ravigupta: D no. 4225, Pe 293b1–398a7/P no. 5726, Tshe
137a3–266a6.
PVV Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with Commentary by Manorathanandin, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana.
Journal of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 24–26 (1938–1940), Appendix.
R Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ, ed. A. Thakur. Patna 1975.
Renou/Filliozat L. Renou/J. Filliozat: L’Inde classique: Manuel des études indiennes. 2 vol. Paris 1985.
1985
Seyfort Ruegg D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra. Études sur la Sotériologie et la
1969 Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme. Paris 1969.
Śikṣ Śikshāsamuccaya, A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine Compiled by Śāntideva, Chiefly from
Earlier Mahāyāna-Sūtras, ed. C. Bendall. Mouton & Co – ‘S-Gravenhage 1957.
Traité É. Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitā-
śāstra), vol. III and V. Louvain-la-Neuve 1970 and 1980.
TS(P) S = Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kama-
lashīla, ed. Dvārikadās Śāstrī. Vārāṇasī 1982. K = Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the
Commentary of Kamalaśīla, ed. E. Krishnamācārya. Baroda 1988.
van Bijlert 1989 V.A. van Bijlert, Epistemology and Spiritual Authority. Wien 1989.
Vibh. Notes of Vibhūticandra to PVV: See PVV.
Viévard 2002 L. Viévard, Vacuité (śūnyatā) et compassion (karuṇā) dans le bouddhisme madhyamaka. Paris
2002.

Studies in Dharmakirti S Religious Philo

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Studies in Dharmakirti S Religious Philo

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Studies in Dharmakirti S Religious Philo

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

HELMUT KRASSER, HORST LASIC, ELI FRANCO, BIRGIT KELLNER (ED.

Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis

BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

HELMUT KRASSER, HORST LASIC, ELI FRANCO, BIRGIT KELLNER (ED.)

Religion and Logic in Buddhist

VERLAG DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN

Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Frontispiece: Paricipants at the conference .................................................. v

Junjie Chu, Sanskrit fragments of Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi ........................... 33

Klaus Glashoff, Problems of transcribing avinābhāva into predicate logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Keijin Hayashi, Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of mental perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Yoshichika Honda, Bhoja and Dharmakīrti ................................................... 151

Masahiro Inami, Nondual cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Hisataka Ishida, On the classification of anyāpoha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Takashi Iwata, Compassion in Buddhist logic – Dharmakīrti’s view of compassion as inter-

Kyō Kanō, Dichotomy, antarvyāpti, and dṛṣṭānta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Hisayasu Kobayashi, On the development of the argument to prove vijñaptimātratā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

Shinya Moriyama, pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajña, sarvajña and sarvasarvajña . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Hideyo Ogawa, On the term anupalabdhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395

Masamichi Sakai, Śākyabuddhi and Dharmottara on the inference of momentariness based on

Kiyokuni Shiga, antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti re-examined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

Tom J.F. Tillemans, Dignāga, Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti on apoha. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

Toshikazu Watanabe, Dharmakīrti’s intention to quote Pramāṇasamuccaya III 12 ................ 459

Jeson Woo, Vācaspatimiśra and Jñānaśrīmitra on the object of yogipratyakṣa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469

Zhihua Yao, Non-cognition and the third pramāṇa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477

Translated from the French by

2. The systematics of karuṇā

According to Devendrabuddhi, this svabhāvātikrama consists in “freeing [oneself] from [com-

yojana is equivalent to 15 340.8 metres.

3. Compassion and the initial impulse toward the practice of compassion

4. The “immeasurables” and the Bodhisattva’s career

According to Sthiramati’s commentary to the ANS,86 it is because “we consider a [pseudo-]en-

bhṛtamahākuśalamūlasambhāro mahāyānasamudāgamābhirūḍho mahābodhisattvacaryāsāgaram anuprāpto

note 142), and MSAVBh D80b2–3/P95b7–8 ad MSABh 131,17

4.5. Let us recall Devendrabuddhi’s suggestive introduction to PV 2.124:114

5. The role of karuṇā in the general structure of PV 2

5.2. Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the jagaddhitaiśin–śāstṛ sequence is however quite surpris-

5.5. If my interpretation of these four pādas as a functional equivalent of bodhicittotpāda(/pra-

Adam 2002 See BhK II.

You might also like