TAN, JR. vs. CA G.R. No.
136368 (REMREV1 – CIVPRO)
FACTS: On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of PHP 59,200.00 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over Lot No. 645-C in Bunawan, Davao City in favor of spouses Jose and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of the deed, the contracting parties also entered into another
agreement where Tan was given 1 year to redeem/repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the
property until his death on January 4, 1988. On May 2, 1988, Tan’s heirs filed a suit with the RTC of
Davao against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The complaint alleged that while the
agreement was denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale, the real intention of the parties was to conclude
an equitable mortgage. Barely hours after the complaint was received, the Magdangals were able to
have Tan’s title over the lot cancelled and they were able to secure a TCT in their names. The RTC
approved the reformation of the instrument and ordered the petitioners to pay the Magdangals within
120 days after the finality of the decision PHP 59,200 plus a rate of 12% per annum, and upon the
payment of the aforesaid amount, the TCT in the name of the Magdangals shall be deemed cancelled.
The CA affirmed the aforesaid decision in toto, and the judgment was entered in the book of entries on
March 13, 1996, but the entry stated that the decision has become final and executory on October 21,
1995. This prompted the spouses to file a motion for consolidation and writ of possession on March 21,
1996, alleging that they did not appeal from the decision. Respondent spouses argue that the appealed
judgment of the CA has become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 up to October 20, and
on the latter date, the 120 days redemption period shall commence from there. Tan, Jr. opposed the
same, alleging that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the CA and a copy thereof furnished to
the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in the case cannot be considered final and
executory. The motion for consolidation and a writ of possession has been denied. The respondent
spouses moved for reconsideration, but the judge denied the same for being pro forma and fatally
defective. The RTC applied the old Rules of Civil Procedure, and the CA applied the new 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in determining the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure retroactively was erroneous.
HELD: YES. If the old rule has been applied on the finality of judgment, the subject property was
redeemed within the 120-day period of redemption. The appellate court applied the new 1997 rules
retroactively and under the given facts of the case, the Court deemed that it is erroneous. Generally,
rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect upon pending actions or proceedings. There are,
however, exceptions to the rule: 1. the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that
pending actions are excepted from its operation; 2. to apply the new rules to pending proceedings
would impair vested rights The case falls squarely within the second exception. Application of Rule 39,
Sec. 1 would amount to an injustice to the petitioners. The new rule states that: Section 1. Execution
upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment
or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom
if no appeal has been duly perfected. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought
to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on
motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the
writ of execution. The old rule that was applied by the RTC was Rule 51, Sec. 10-11 which briefly states
that the date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of
its entry and the motion for execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry. The decision,
according to the case at bar, became final on March 13, 1996 and the respondent-spouses filed the
questioned motions on March 21, 1996, well within the redemption period and appeal period given to
petitioners.
