Facts :

A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No.

9207, authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the
National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President
Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land
in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a
national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the
440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No.
1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by
direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in
population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families
who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized
housing program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West
Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario,
Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the
association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government
Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Issue :

Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function
and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical.

Held:

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making

powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that
the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is
not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement.
Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-
legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F.

APOLINARIO, in his personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as General Manager of
the National Housing Authority (NHA), MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Presidential  Commission for the Urban
Poor (PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as
Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER
ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from
enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing
and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a

homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by
its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association.

Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government

Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant
petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor,
Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential
Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon
City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances

authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the
National Government Center (NGC).

On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation

No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be
known as the NGC. 1

On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of
the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. 2

In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by

Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993,
authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the
government’s socialized housing program. 3

On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located
in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic,
educational, religious and other purposes.

Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center

Site to Bona Fide Residents. – Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is
hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on
the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue,
and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the
west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the
determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on
the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey
conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements,
programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken,
consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.

Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center

Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic,
Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. – Certain portions of land
within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby
reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or
structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program
established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in
ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of
these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis
therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation
of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may
be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said
institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, 4 the Committee formulated

the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29,
2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following
issues:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1)
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING
AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1)
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING
AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL. 5

First, the procedural matters.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association
cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2
(c.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1
(b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may be awarded to a resident-
beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price
escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to
sell within the prescribed period. 6 Also, the OSG contends that since
petitioner association is not the duly recognized people’s organization in the
NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question
the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC. 7

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 8

Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition,
whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the
NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner
association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to
be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as
regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified
beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the
IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members.
Contrary to the OSG’s allegation that the failure of petitioner association and
its members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them from
questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely operates
to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner
and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement
of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the
selection process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC
West Side only and thus cannot be affected by the implementation of
Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed
provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1),
govern the disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the
NGC.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The
petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.

There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the

instant petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an
improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. 9 Since in issuing the questioned IRR
of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under
Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant
prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part,
respondent Mayor of Quezon City 10 and respondent NHA 11 contend that
petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant
petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a

consequence.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and

quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or
rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results
in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. 12

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued

by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. 13

The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly
on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the
ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it
seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same. 14
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative
power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. 15

True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, so warrant. 16 A direct invocation of the
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. 17

In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 18 the Court said that it will not

entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such
as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment
of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction. 19 A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition
shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Court’s
taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to
state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the
validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution, 20 the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus,
following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have
been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR
issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an
extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction,
or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 21 Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
22
channels.   Prohibition is the proper remey to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where
there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which
such relief can be obtained. 23 Where the principal relief sought is to
invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents
are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a
writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

In a number of petitions, 24 the Court adequately resolved them on other

grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were
no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant
petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet,
the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to
facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules
may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the
power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the
purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned. 25

Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome,

however, is just as dismal for petitioners.

Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:

Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide

residents

3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries

xxxx

(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code

of Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to
acquire only one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54
sq. m. and subject further to the availability of lots.

xxxx

(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and

evaluated based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and
maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
xxxx

3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell

(a) Westside

(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within
sixty (60) days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot
at P700.00 per sq. m.

xxxx

(c) for both eastside and westside

(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in
item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months
after approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price
escalation.

The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing
Authority factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be
approved by the NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).

Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are

constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with
the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented.

First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to

qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in
harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot
allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used
or occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. The argument
is utterly baseless.

The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two
groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC
site and certain government institutions including the local government.
Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property
within the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by
which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A.
No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot disposition to government
institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso
mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually
used or occupied at the time of the law’s effectivity, this proviso applies only
to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not
have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC.
There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is
likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.

Petitioners’ interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No.

9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The government’s
policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor
but also the local government and various government institutions devoted
to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious purposes. 26 Thus,
although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona
fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was
declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions
being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be
excluded from the housing program for NGC residents. The same policy
of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No. 248
issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the
rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate
additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead
authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified
previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots
would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona
fide residents in the NGC.

In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional

beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence,
the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be
allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not
intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed
among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to accommodate all
qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded to each
beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence.

Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling
rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the
price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a
contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision
plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed
by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict
with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The argument deserves scant
consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained
in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily
contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. 27 All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not
in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law. 28

In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to

administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition
of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statute’s
objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate
the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the
beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in
the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the
lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars
necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely
omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of
the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical
expertise over these matters.

The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened
to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation
of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of
an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied. 29 In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price
of the lots is unreasonable.

The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a

beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed
period is also within the Committee’s authority to formulate guidelines and
policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay
down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots,
provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable
about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the
contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell
and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers
from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and
concurred in by several representatives of people’s organizations contrary to
the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives from
duly recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the NGCAC which
promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner association is
not a duly recognized people’s organization.

In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation

had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is
deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than the minimum
requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned IRR is not a
ground to invalidate the same.

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. LEONARDO A.
PUNO QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONSUELO ANGELINA
YNARES- SANDOVAL-
SANTIAGO GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. MA. ALICIA
CARPIO AUSTRIA-
Associate Justice MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CONCHITA
CORONA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J. ADOLFO S.
CALLEJO, SR. AZCUNA
 Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CANCIO C.
CHICO-NAZARIO GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice