FACTS interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of

survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to
On February 2 1979, Respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena,
lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the
represented by Msgr. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title
fourth parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from the date of the
to 4 parcels of land. As basis for the application, Respondent claims title to
survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse
the said properties through either purchase or donation dating back to
against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
1928.
Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art.
In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest
XIV Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution to the case at bar. Article XIV, Sec. 11
Development, the Solicitor General filed an opposition, alleging that the
of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:
Respondent did not have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the
lands being applied for. Sec. 11. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in
During trial, Respondents introduced evidence pertaining to the ownership
area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
of the said parcels of land. Lot 1 and a portion of Lot 2 were acquired
hectares.
through purchase, while Lot 3 and the remaining portion of Lot 2 were
already owned and possessed by them even prior to the survey of the said Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private
lots in 1928. Meanwhile, the remaining parcel was donated and surveyed respondent is disqualified to own and register its title to the lots in
in 1940. Petitioner did not adduce evidence and submitted the case for question. Further, it argues that since the application for registration was
decision. filed only on February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect
on January 17, 1973, the application for registration and confirmation of
The CFI ordered the registration of the 4 parcels “in the name of the
title is ineffectual because at the time it was filed, private corporation had
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole
been declared ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the public domain
duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said constitution.
Philippines.” The subsequent MR was denied. On appeal, the IAC affirmed
the CFI Decision. Hence, this Petition. The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, which reversed the
ISSUE: WON the Respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a
ruling first enunciated in the 1982 case of Manila Electric Co. vs. CASTRO
corporation sole, is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to 4
BARTOLOME, imposing the constitutional ban on public land acquisition by
parcels of land subject of this case (WON a corporation sole should be
private corporations which ruling was declared emphatically as res judicata
treated as an ordinary private corporation, for purpose of the application
on January 7, 1986 in Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta.
of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution)
Cruz de Mayo, Inc., In said case, (Director of Lands v. IAC, supra), this Court
RULING stated that a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings must be made. If they were
Yes. The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
(4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-in-
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporation or association Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in
Appellate Court in said case, this Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the
Director of Lands vs. IAC, the lands subject of this petition were already
then Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line of cases
private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was
beginning with CARINO in 1909, thru SUSI in 1925, down to HERICO in
filed in 1979. PETITION DENIED.
1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private
property.

It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation
sole should be treated like an ordinary private corporation.

In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land

In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the
following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually
associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common
law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that
unhappy freak of English Law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of
the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of
the church which was regarded as the property owner

A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who
will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are
incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and
advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons
they could not have had.

Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68.
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its
Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate
and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary