THE ROLE OF THE SCADA RTU IN TODAY’S SUBSTATION

Craig Wester Terrence Smith Bob Anderson

Member, IEEE Member, IEEE Orlando Utilities Commission
GE Digital Energy GE Digital Energy 6003 Pershing Avenue
2569 Sable Ridge Court 4650 Parker Loop Road Orlando, FL 32822
Buford, GA 30519 Birchwood, TN 37308 USA
USA USA

Noel Engelman Kehinde Odetunde Joe Reilly

GE Digital Energy GE Digital Energy Orlando Utilities Commission
2998 Belfaire Lake Drive 650 Markland Street 6003 Pershing Avenue
Dacula, GA 30019 Markham, ON L6C0M1 Orlando, FL 32822
USA Canada USA

Abstract – The interface between Supervisory, Control (National Institute of Standards and Technology), SEM
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) functions and Protection (Security Event Management).
and Control (P&C) functions has been blurred since the
acceptance and full utilization of microprocessor based I. INTRODUCTION
relays. The control, data acquisition and protection
functions have been incorporated into a single Intelligent The electric utility has been divided into several
Electronic Device (IED). In many cases this is a clean, departments to reliably and securely provide electricity to their
economically sound, solution. In some cases, the customers. These departments usually include a separate
merging of the SCADA functions into a protective IED has Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
created operation gaps that need to be addressed. There department and a Protection & Control (P&C) department,
needs to be a balance of the merger so that reliability and each with its own focus. SCADA provides a manned control
redundancy are considered. In addition, it is important to center with real-time data in order to monitor and operate their
consider how the substation can be operated if a system, including energy management, outage restoration,
protective relay output is not operational. The merger of safety, and reliability/availability. P&C provides automated
SCADA with protection and control has created protection of primary equipment. The SCADA and P&C
jurisdictional challenges since the SCADA group is a departments each have their individual responsibilities with
separate organization from the protection and control clear lines of functionality and separate hardware as shown in
group. A Human Machine Interface (HMI) is being Figure 1.
installed in substations by many utilities for monitoring
and control purposes. It is important to incorporate local
HMI functionality in this discussion. This paper will
review several distribution and transmission substation
designs that merge SCADA and Protection & Control.
Each design will be discussed with advantages and
disadvantages. The paper will propose designs that
balance SCADA and Protection & Control and include
local HMI functionality, IED access and security.

Index Terms — SCADA (Supervisory Control & Data

Acquisition), IED (Intelligent Electronic Device), RTU (Remote
Terminal Unit), HMI (Human Machine Interface), P&C
(Protection & Control), Input/Output (I/O), Current Transformer
(CT), Potential Transformer (PT), DNP3 (Distributed Network
Protocol), ASCII (American Standard Code for Information
Interchange), RTOS (Real Time Operating System), AAA
(Authentication, Authorization, Accounting), RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial-In User Service), RBAC (Role Based
Access Control), IP (Internet Protocol), VPN (Virtual Private
Network), LAN (Local Area Network), WAN (Wide Area
Network), NERC (North American Electric Reliability
Corporation), CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection), NIST Fig. 1 – Traditional Hardwired Substation SCADA and
Protective Relay System Design

978-1-4799-8722-1/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE 622 ProRelay 2015

 The primary equipment is one place that the SCADA and In a substation that fully utilizes microprocessor based
P&C hardware have connections in common. However, the relays and meters as IEDs, their metered data can be used to
acceptance of IEDs and specifically microprocessor based provide this same capability and communicate it digitally to the
relays for protection, metering and control functions has RTU. IEDs include serial (RS232 and/or RS485) and/or
created a need to look at how to reliably and economically Ethernet ports with various communication protocols, such as
provide electricity to end users by optimizing the functionality DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol), Modbus RTU, ASCII
of the SCADA RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) and (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) and
microprocessor based protective relays or IEDs within the IEC61850 for example. In addition, these new devices
substation. Typical concerns of a SCADA technician are: who typically have configurable data maps with settable scaling
(SCADA or P&C staff) is responsible for configuring the data factors and offer multiple simultaneous connections to the
maps within the microprocessor based IEDs?, and when new devices.
protective relay settings are downloaded to the Transmitting the analog signals from the substation primary
microprocessor based IEDs, who is responsible for the effects equipment is best accomplished by direct substation SCADA
these changes have on the SCADA system? RTU communications to the IEDs via serial or Ethernet
communications as shown in Figure 3. This would eliminate
II. ANALOG INPUT CONSIDERATIONS the discrete transducer hardware and remove associated
installation (less copper wire), operating and maintenance
A traditional hardwired SCADA architecture consists of costs, and improve reliability by reducing the amount of
discrete transducers mounted throughout the substation hardware to manage. When communicating the analog
measuring currents from current transformers (CTs), voltages signals via a protocol, the scaling of the signals would be
from potential transformers (PTs) and station batteries, and configured within the IED. One may also consider
power (MW and MVARs) from the combination of these communication between the substation SCADA RTU and IED
transducers. These DCmA signals are then wired to analog using the IED’s native protocol, such as Modbus RTU or
input terminations that are connected to the substation RTU ASCII, which would not require modification of the existing
(see Figure 2). The disadvantage of this architecture is the microprocessor based relay configuration for example.
quantity and cost of wire connections, the cost and reliability of
discrete transducer hardware and the necessary transducer
calibration to assure measurement accuracy.
SCADA MASTER

Serial or Ethernet
Communications

SUBSTATION SCADA RTU Transformer Alarms &

Temperatures, Breaker
Serial Fiber Statuses
Optic
Remote Peripheral Board or
Control Outputs Protective Relay
T/C #1
Serial or Ethernet
Communications
PRIMARY EQUIPMENT

Currents (from CTs)

MICROPROCESSOR BASED
Voltages (from PTs)
PROTECTIVE RELAY SYSTEM
Contact Inputs

Contact Outputs
T/C #1

Fig. 3 –Merger of SCADA and P&C within Substation

If redundant microprocessor based relays are used, such as

a transmission substation or generating station, one could
configure the substation SCADA RTU to simultaneously poll
analog values from IED-A and IED-B. If IED-A stops
responding or goes off-line, the analog values are replaced
with values from IED-B. This is called redundant I/O
Fig. 2 – Traditional Hardwired SCADA Architecture
functionality in the SCADA RTU. This type of redundancy
would assure that analog signals are continuously transmitted
in an event that IED-A or IED-B were taken out of service for

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maintenance. Additionally, this gives redundancy and status signals are continuously transmitted in an event that
reliability of the signal which is typically not available with IED-A or IED-B were taken out of service for maintenance.
discrete transducer inputs. If a transducer fails, the signal is Additionally, this gives redundancy and reliability of the signal
lost. If an IED fails, the system is simultaneously polling the which is typically not available with discrete termination points.
IED-A and IED-B and continues to operate normally. Removal In a distribution substation, redundant digital status signals are
of the transducer and communication of these signals in possible from microprocessor based feeder IED and separate
substations with redundant relaying offers several rewards terminated status points to the RTU using the redundant I/O
with a lower potential of error or loss of signal. In a distribution functionality.
substation, redundant analog signals are possible from a However, there are still cases where remote statuses need
separate feeder meter and microprocessor based feeder IED to be monitored that are not wired into IEDs because they are
using the redundant I/O functionality. either not necessary to the IED or difficult to route to an IED
An advantage of the redundancy I/O functionality is the (such as door alarms, motion and loss of or low power (DC)
SCADA RTU can transmit alarm to master when an IED is off- sensors, health status points for the IEDs, copper theft alarms
line. A concern using redundant IEDs is the protocol format and transformer/breaker alarms). Critical status points
differences that may be encountered (8 bit vs 16 bit vs 32 bit (breaker / switch status, transformer alarm, or battery alarm) in
for example). Modbus is an 8 bit analog measurement and smaller substations, that do not warrant redundancy, would
has a range of 0 to 4095. DNP3 can be used as a 16 bit benefit from terminated status points to the RTU to serve as
analog with a range of 0 to 65535, giving much better redundant to IED statuses.
resolution and smaller increments of change. This means that This could also be accomplished using RTU remote I/O
in an energy unit, 1 Modbus bit of change might represent mounted in the primary equipment located in the substation
100kW change (depending on total change available). In the switchyard. For example, the application of transformer
same unit, DNP3 with a 16 bit analog, every bit would alarms, transformer temperatures and breaker / switch
represent 6kW in change. statutes can be provided using this remote I/O connection as
In substations where there is a mixture of IEDs and shown in Figure 3. Fiber optic communications is
mechanical or non-intelligent devices, a SCADA RTU with recommended between the substation RTU and the remote
discrete termination points is still the preferred method to I/O for isolation purposes.
integrate all data sources and allow proper analog to digital A concern using redundant IEDs is the protocol format
conversion of these values. Thus, there is a need for a differences that be encountered (Least Significant Nibble first
SCADA RTU, because there is a need to know the status of, vs Most Significant Nibble first, where a nibble represents 8
and a need to control, devices that aren’t connected to status points). An advantage of the redundancy I/O
microprocessor IEDs. functionality is the SCADA RTU can transmit alarm to master
when an IED is off-line.
III. DIGITAL STATUS CONSIDERATIONS
IV. CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
A traditional hardwired SCADA architecture consists of
discrete status signals from primary equipment located A traditional hardwired SCADA architecture consists of
throughout the substation. These status signals are then discrete control relays connected to primary equipment
wired to digital status terminations at the substation RTU (see located throughout the substation. These control relays are
Figure 2). This method is often preferred by substation wired from RTU terminations with momentary or latching
engineers in that every status point has a clear indication light control relays (see Figure 2). The disadvantage of this
of a given point’s status. The disadvantage of this architecture architecture is the quantity of wires and connections and
is costly and congested wiring, often to redundant devices. discrete control relay hardware. The advantages of this
Most IEDs have configurable binary input maps and offer traditional hardwired SCADA architecture include the ability to
multiple simultaneous communication connections. provide a critical control in the event of a relay or IED failure
Transmitting the digital status signals from the substation and the safety of being able to provide a visible air gap on
primary equipment is best accomplished by direct substation substation controls when working under a clearance.
RTU digital communications to IEDs, such as microprocessor Microprocessor based relays have configurable output
based protective relays, as shown in Figure 3. This would controls with momentary or latching states and offer multiple
eliminate duplicated wiring and associated operating and simultaneous communications connections.
maintenance costs. As stated in the analog input The control of substation primary equipment can best be
consideration section, one may also consider communication performed by:
between the substation SCADA RTU and IED using the IED’s A) Direct substation SCADA RTU communications to IEDs
native protocol, such as Modbus RTU or ASCII, which would such as microprocessor based protective relays as
not require modification of existing microprocessor based relay shown in Figure 3. This method would operate the
configuration for example. discrete output contacts of the protective relay IEDs
If redundant microprocessor based relays are used, such as and enable/disable internal protective functions like
a transmission substation or generating station, one could reclosing, ground overcurrent trip, and/or
configure the substation SCADA RTU to simultaneously poll synchrocheck. As stated in the analog input
digital status signals from IED-A and IED-B. If IED-A stops consideration section, one may also consider
responding or goes off-line, the digital status is replaced with a communication between the substation SCADA RTU
value from IED-B. This is called redundant I/O functionality in and protective relay IED using the IED’s native
the RTU. This type of redundancy would assure that digital

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 protocol, which would not require modification of all external operating commands, including protection, are
existing microprocessor based relay configuration. blocked from operating the contact.
B) Using control termination boards with control relays that
are connected to breaker trip and close circuits. This V. BENEFITS OF DISCRETE I/O
method could use a different trip or close coil on the
breaker or switch than the microprocessor based The previous sections explored how to combine functionality
protective relays. The control termination boards would of IEDs in the substation and use existing connections of
be connected to the substation SCADA RTU. analog and digital I/O. In this section, we will review how
For distribution substations that only have one discrete analog and digital I/O within the substation for SCADA
microprocessor based protective relay on a breaker, a system (as shown in Figure 1) is designed to operate within a
combination of Method A and Method B is could be used. In substation and provides flexibility and maintenance benefits.
this configuration, the substation SCADA RTU would be
configured to operate both Method A and Method B for any A. Architecture of Analog and Digital I/O Devices – Ease and
specific control point. This would provide operators the means Cost of Maintenance (Short and Long Term)
to remotely control the substation in the case that the
microprocessor based relay has a damaged output contact, or The architecture of SCADA analog and digital I/O allow for
trouble condition on microprocessor relay, communications multiple [8, 16, 32, 64] I/O interfaces depending on the type of
failure or control termination board trouble. Redundant I/O I/O and analog adapter (0-1mA, 4-20mA, 0-5V, etc.). The
could be accomplished using a combination termination board discrete I/O modularity allows for efficient distributed I/O
with analogs, statuses and controls. As discussed earlier, installations which may minimize wiring and enclosure
redundant control can be configured in the RTU to manage requirements. The active/passive design of discrete I/O
and provide control redundancy between the redundant modules allows users to quickly test, commission, and
hardware used. troubleshoot via hot swappable modules and boards without
If redundant microprocessor based relays are used, such as disturbing existing wiring connections which significantly
in a transmission substation, there are two schemes to speeds up and simplifies maintenance activities. These
consider. Scheme 1 would use Method A and configure the discrete I/O modules have serial communication ports and
substation SCADA RTU to control IED-A, and if IED-A stops various types of field connections. For applications requiring
responding automatically control IED-B. Scheme 2 would use heavy-duty control, ratings, some I/O modules can be
Method A and configure the substation SCADA RTU to connected to field equipment through interposing relays (10A
simultaneously control both IED-A and IED-B. The or 30A). The distributed architecture has allowed utilities to
redundancy of Scheme 1 or Scheme 2 would assure that standardize on particular I/O modules with long service life
controls are performed in an event that IED-A or IED-B failure with little or no interference and disruptions to field wiring.
or taken out of service for maintenance. Additionally Scheme These discrete I/O also have a very attractive installation price
2 would be able to operate the breaker, even if the IED-A had ($) per point versus a microprocessor based IED.
problems with its output contacts of breaker wiring.
Another configuration to consider in a transmission B. By Design [From Choice of Components, Circuitry and
substation is a combination of Method A and Method B. In Capability]
this configuration, the substation SCADA RTU would be
configured to send controls to IED-A and control termination Analog and digital I/O termination boards create a dedicated
boards with control relays either simultaneously or using a fail- and isolated interface that connects to voltage, current,
over scheme within the substation SCADA RTU. temperature and status signals through low noise, high-
One last configuration to consider in a transmission resolution, high availability and high accuracy inputs. These
substation is using a discrete protective relay IED to perform analog and digital I/O modules are isolated from network
all breaker analog, status and control functions as outlined in interfaces and are equipped with capacitors and variable
Method A, analog input considerations section and digital resistors to withstand surge withstanding capabilities. These
status considerations section. The disadvantage of this discrete analog and digital I/O modules are intelligent modules
configuration is that it increases the equipment in the that contain on-board microprocessors and are configured on
substation. However, this configuration would be a piece of a per point or per-system basis to act as slave devices to the
the SCADA system and is not effected by either IED-A or IED- RTU. The analog and digital I/O modules provide specialized
B being out of service and eliminate the earlier stated concern processing and storing/buffering functions for analog
of when new protective relay settings are downloaded to the inputs/outputs by gathering data from field sources or acting
microprocessor based IEDs, who is responsible for the effects as an output unit to interface with field. This type of analog
these changes have on the SCADA system? and digital I/O processing provides flexible, reliable and robust
Control must use different output contacts in the IED than operation. Analog and digital I/O modules have
the protection relay functions. It is recommended to use programmable flexible I/O ranges and variable scan rates.
Select-Before-Operate (SBO) contacts for control purposes. These analog and digital I/O modules provide excellent
There needs to be a clear ownership of output contacts; normal-mode rejection characteristics and provide impulse
protection owns direct trip, SCADA owns control/SBO. In protection on field inputs. The traditional SCADA system is a
addition, configuring a common IED gets complicated. Note distributed architecture that does allow quick removal of
that if SBO is implemented correctly as per IEEE1815 (DNP3) individual discrete analog or digital I/O for troubleshooting and
or IEC61850, that once an SBO command selects a contact, maintenance purposes.

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 VI. RTU OPERATING SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS origin. On a serial connection, only one protocol can be used
at one speed. The disadvantage of using IP is that its use
The typical operating system of a SCADA RTU is a real time imposes many more security concerns and several NERC
operating system (RTOS) developed as proprietary software, (North American Electric Reliability Corporation) CIP (Critical
such as VxWorks. A real time operating system is designed Infrastructure Protection) requirements to insure security.
for use in embedded systems which require real time, Firewalls, encryption, security servers, Virtual Private
deterministic performance, safety and security certification. Networks (VPN), logs, and dynamically changing passwords
An embedded system is not open to network modification and, are possible ways of ensuring security, but come with more
therefore, is not likely affected by viruses. PC-based equipment and software to maintain.
gateways or RTUs, which are not real time operating systems, SCADA communication redundancy to the master may also
are affected by Microsoft Windows obsolescence, Microsoft be accomplished using redundant RTUs at the substation,
Windows software, security patches and viruses. NERC CIP where a single RTU is in service at a time.
standards require security patches to be installed within 30
days of release from the vendor. Thus, the SCADA RTU
operating on a real time operating system is robust for the
VIII. CYBER SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
substation environment and does not require several security Cyber security is a concern of each electric utility. It is
patches a year. recommended to consider microprocessor based protective
relays and substation SCADA RTU that deliver full cyber
VII. COMMUNICATION CONSIDERATIONS security features that help comply with NERC CIP and NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) IR7628 cyber
As mentioned previously, microprocessor based relays security requirements.
include RS232, RS485 and Ethernet ports with various Authentication, Authorization, Accounting (AAA) server
communication protocols, such as DNP3, Modbus RTU, ASCII support and RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User
and IEC61850. It is recommended to connect the devices to Service) within the substation SCADA RTU and
the substation SCADA RTU by direct serial or Ethernet microprocessor based protective relays accomplishes these
communications. security requirements. AAA and RADIUS functionality
The SCADA RTU serves as an important part of the enables integration with centrally managed authentication and
SCADA system. On small systems it may be possible to poll accounting of all user activities of devices (substation SCADA
the IED directly from the SCADA Master. As the system RTU and microprocessor based protective relays) and uses
becomes larger, however, this creates a configuration modern industry best practices and standards that meet and
challenge at each substation in that each device on a system exceed NERC CIP requirements for authentication and
must have a separate address (limiting the number of devices) password management.
and that SCADA masters are often licensed based on the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) within the substation
number of remotes. This challenge is most easily remedied SCADA RTU and microprocessor based protective relays
by allowing the SCADA RTU to serve as a data concentrator. efficiently administrates users and roles within devices
In this way, the SCADA RTU parses the data to be served up (substation SCADA RTU and microprocessor based protective
to the SCADA master and only uses one remote address for relays). These advanced access functions allow users to
many devices. configure up to five roles for up to eight configurable users
Further, there may be a communications bandwidth with independent passwords for example. The standard
limitation to the substation. The more devices that the master “Remote Authentication Dial In User Service” (RADIUS) is
has to poll at one location may impact communications to that used for authentication. If the IED itself can authenticate
site and/or other locations, providing slower response times users, then that IED capability eliminates the need for the
(longer waits between polls), dropped polls, or the need for SCADA RTU to serve as a security gateway.
larger bandwidth with greater cost. It should also be noted Lastly, a detailed substation security log is required by
that most master stations only communicate using one NERC CIP. The substation SCADA RTU and microprocessor
protocol. The use of two protocols would double the based protective relays can provide this security by built-in
bandwidth requirement. A concern if the utility network is security Syslog. A security Syslog captures all cyber security
carried over public network that local network access is not related events within a sequence of event element (login,
used for Internet downloads which will affect bandwidth. Use logout, invalid password attempts, remote/local access, user in
of a SCADA RTU within the substation also allows for protocol session, settings change, firmware update, etc.), and then
conversion to accommodate this requirement regardless of the serves and classifies data by security level using standard
protocol used by the substation IED and allowing legacy Syslog data format. This enables direct integration of
devices to be used. substation SCADA RTU and microprocessor based protective
Modern master stations offer IP (Internet Protocol) relays with established security event management (SEM)
communications to its slave devices. IP allows multiple systems.
devices to communicate on a single network at greater speeds Figure 4 provides an example of Ethernet network
and without losing messages. In fact, many different protocols architecture with secure communications between substation
can be sent over the same Ethernet connection. IP actually SCADA RTU, microprocessor based protective relays,
puts all communications into packets (like envelopes being substation HMI, substation LAN and utility WAN. A firewall or
mailed to a specific address). It doesn’t matter what these gateway would exist between the utility WAN and substation
packets have in them as long as the packets maintain the LAN for security purposes. The connection between the
accepted format. These packets are reassembled at the SCADA master and the SCADA RTU could be a serial or
destination and provided just as they were received at the

626
Ethernet connection. If this connection is an Ethernet IX. PROTOCOL CONVERSION, DATA CONCENTRATION AND
connection, then security could be addressed using firewalls. HMI DATA CONSIDERATIONS
Secure remote engineering access could be accomplished
using firewalls or only allowing remote engineering access A key role of the substation SCADA RTU over the years has
through dedicated computer in a secure area connected to the been protocol conversion between substation equipment and
utility WAN. As discussed earlier, secure access to the SCADA master. Different communications protocols have
microprocessor based relays can be accomplished with IEDs existed for the SCADA master, such as DNP3, Landis+Gyr
that support AAA, Radius, RBAC and Syslog. Alternately, a 8979, Harris 5000/6000, Tejas V, CDC, etc. such that the
utility could use microprocessor based protective relays that SCADA RTU performs the protocol conversion between the
do not allow remote settings changes but allow remote access substation IEDs and the SCADA master. This requirement is
to waveforms and event records for post fault analysis. still important to electric utilities because there is a major cost
Secure remote HMI access could be accomplished using in upgrading the SCADA master to support new protocols
firewalls or only allowing remote HMI access through such as DNP3 or Ethernet communications (i.e. DNP3 / IP).
dedicated computer in a secure area connected to the utility The substation SCADA RTU also functions as a data
WAN. concentrator, polling connected termination boards and IEDs
The substation SCADA RTU provides secure maintenance for data, responding to data requests from the SCADA master
access for the technician to commission and troubleshoot or masters, and performing control requests from the SCADA
analogs, digital status inputs and controls locally at the master.
substation. Analog values and digital status signals can be With the architecture shown in Figure 4, the substation
displayed and viewed locally at the substation SCADA RTU. SCADA RTU could provide data directly to a substation HMI.
Control points can be manually forced at the substation The substation HMI would communicate DNP3 / IP or
SCADA RTU to test control of primary equipment. IEC61850 to the substation SCADA RTU and poll and control
the exact same points as the SCADA master. Thus, the
substation HMI could act as a back-up SCADA master. In
general, it is not recommended to have two devices operating
SCADA MASTER ENGINEERING the same controls due to safety concerns. Control should
ACCESS require authorization from the control center and be passed off
Secure Access
to the HMI in some manner, such as a SCADA on/off 43
Optional control switch for example. This is one of the reasons to use
SBO. Once a contact is selected, only the selecting device
UTILITY WAN can issue commands.
With the HMI having connection to the microprocessor
based protection system through Ethernet commutations as
shown in Figure 4 allows redundancy to provide local control
Transformer Alarms &
SUBSTATION SCADA RTU Temperatures, Breaker
of substation protective relays in the event of SCADA RTU
Secure Access
Statuses being off-line due to maintenance or failure. A disadvantage is
the complexity of the control and status configuration within
Control Outputs
the HMI. In addition, the HMI could be securely accessed
SUBSTATION remotely to retrieve fault data, event data, waveforms and
HMI settings from substation microprocessor based protective
SUBSTATION LAN Secure Access relays.

X. CONCLUSIONS
The merger of SCADA functions and Protection and Control
Secure Access
functions is continuously evolving. This paper has reviewed
PRIMARY EQUIPMENT analog input (metering), binary / digital input (status) and
MICROPROCESSOR BASED binary / contact output (control) considerations and
PROTECTIVE RELAY SYSTEM optimization and redundancy between the substation SCADA
Currents (from CTs)
RTU and IEDs within the substation. Redundant I/O
Voltages (from PTs)
considerations were reviewed. An architecture was reviewed
Contact Inputs
that use substation SCADA RTU, substation HMI,
Contact Outputs microprocessor based relays and discrete termination
modules. Also discussed were Ethernet communications that
Ethernet can be used and have secure remote access to substation
Serial (Copper or Fiber) SCADA RTU and microprocessor based protective relays
using RADIUS authentication, role based access and Syslog
recording for NERC CIP compliance. There are many benefits
Fig. 4 – Secure Merger of SCADA and P&C within Substation of using a SCADA RTU, such as real-time operating system
architecture, protocol conversation, data concentration and
status and control of devices that are not connected to
microprocessor IEDs.

627
 XI. REFERENCES SCADA Engineer at Georgia Transmission Corporation for 13
years and McDonnell Douglas Technical Services Company
[1] D20MX Substation RTU Instruction Manual, as Senior Spacelab Avionics Telemetry Integration Engineer
GE Publication 994-0140 (Version 1.4x Revision 1). for 9 years. He received his Bachelor of Science in Electrical
[2] L90 Line Current Differential Relay Instruction Manual, Engineering from Auburn University.
GE Publication GEK-119564A.
[3] 850 Feeder Relay Instruction Manual, Kehinde Odetunde has been Global Lead Product Manager
GE Publication GEK-119591D. with Grid Automation division of GE Digital Energy for
[4] Utilizing IED Capacity to Reduce Wiring. Terrence Smith substation RTUs and gateways since March 2013. At GE
and Richard Hunt, Western Protective Relay Conference Substation Automation division of GE Digital Energy, he held
2009 the position of lead service manager for about 3 years, prior to
[5] Fully Monitoring Protection and Control Systems. the substation automation systems specialist role for 3 years.
Terrence Smith and Craig Wester, Texas A&M He is a professional engineer registered in the province of
Protective Relay Conference 2011 Alberta and he received his Bachelor of Science in Electrical &
Computer Engineering from the University of Calgary. He
XII. AUTHORS INFORMATION holds a master of engineering degree in Electrical & Computer
Engineering from the University of Ryerson, Ontario.
Craig Wester is Regional Sales Manager for Grid
Automation division of GE Digital Energy, residing in Buford,
Bob Anderson is communications technician for Orlando
GA. He provides sales management, application assistance,
Utilities Commission (OUC). Bob was hired by Orlando
and solution assistance to the OEMs, industrials, electric
Utilities Commission in 2010 to replace retiring RTU/SCADA
utilities, electric cooperatives, electric municipals, and
personnel. He has worked as an IT consultant 12 years
consulting firms throughout the states of Georgia, Alabama,
before that in server and network support. Bob has a
Tennessee and Florida for protection, control and automation.
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science. Current or
He received a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering
previous certifications include MCSE, CCNA, CCDA, CCDP,
with a strong emphasis on power systems from the University
CISSP Associate.
of Wisconsin-Madison in 1989. Craig joined GE in 1989 as a
utility transmission and distribution application engineer. He is
Joe Reilly is Manager of Communication Systems at
a member of IEEE.
Orlando Utilities Commission (OUC), the 16th largest public
power utility in the United States. He is responsible for the
Terrence Smith has been an Application Engineer with Grid
SCADA and communication infrastructure, which includes
Automation division of GE Digital Energy since 2008. Prior to
infrastructure related to SONET, substation Ethernet, fiber,
joining GE, Terrence was with Tennessee Valley Authority as
RTU’s, and substation HMI’s. Joe joined the Orlando Utilities
a Principal Engineer and MESA Associates as Program
Commission in 2007 as Senior Communication Engineer and
Manager. He received his Bachelor of Science in Engineering
has been Communication Systems Manager since 2008.
majoring in Electrical Engineering from the University of
Before joining OUC, he served in the U.S. Army Field Artillery,
Tennessee at Chattanooga and is a professional Engineer
Lockheed Martin Systems Surveillance Division, and AT&T
registered in the state of Tennessee. He is a member of
Mobility. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from
IEEE.
the University of Central Florida and a Master of Science in
Industrial Engineering Management Systems from the
Noel Engelman is an Application Engineer with Grid
University of Central Florida.
Automation division of GE Digital Energy specializing in RTUs
and substation gateways for 5 years. He served as the Senior

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