LIM MOH JOO 

V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

[1970] 2 MLJ 113

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 69 OF 1968

ACRJ ALOR STAR

DECIDED-DATE-1: 16 MAY 1970

WAN SULEIMAN J

CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law and Procedure - Medical report of alleged assault - Report given in
evidence without calling the maker thereof - Copy of report to be given to accused not
less than 10 clear days before trial - Whether provision applicable in case of a
prosecution by private person - Interpretation of statute - Criminal Procedure Code (Cap
6), ss 380 and 399(i)

Interpretation - Statute - Intention of legislature - Where court has to modify language

of law to meet intention of legislature

HEADNOTES:
The appellant had been charged and tried on a private summons for having used
criminal force upon the complainant. In the course of her evidence the complainant
produced two medical certificates from a medical officer but that officer was not called to
give evidence. No copy of the report had been supplied to the appellant.

Held, allowing the appeal: the provisions of section 399(i) of the Criminal Procedure
Code (Cap. 6) which require the Public Prosecutor to deliver a copy of the report to the
accused not less than 10 clear days before the commencement of the trial should be
applied where the prosecution is by a private person and in this case as such provision
was not complied with, the reports were inadmissible in evidence and therefore the order
binding over the appellant must be quashed.

Cases referred to
Wong Kok Keong v R [1954] MLJ xxxix
Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher [1949] 2 All ER 155

 
 
MAGISTRATE'S CRIMINAL APPEAL

Albert SC Hoe for the appellant.

Tunku Mukhtar bin Tunku Yaacob (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent.

ACTION: 
 
MAGISTRATE'S CRIMINAL APPEAL
LAWYERS: Albert SC Hoe for the appellant.

Tunku Mukhtar bin Tunku Yaacob (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent.

JUDGMENTBY: WAS SULEIMAN J

The appellant was charged and tried in the magistrate's court on a private summons
taken out by the complainant, for having used criminal force upon the latter, an offence
punishable under section 352 of the Penal Code.

In the course of her testimony the complainant produced two medical certificates, from
the same medical officer. There is some doubt as to whether the learned magistrate had
considered the one issued on the day of the alleged assault, or the one issued the
following day, the latter adding one more injury to that mentioned in the first report.
From the grounds of judgment, however, it would seem that the latter certificate was the
one taken into account, though failure to include a copy thereof in the appeal file in
which only a copy of the earlier certificate had been included, had given rise to criticism
of his grounds of judgment by learned counsel for the appellant.

No witness was called by the complainant.

The appellant's defence was a denial that there had been any assault on the complainant
since he was not in the vicinity of the building in which both lived at the time of the
alleged assault. He called a witness who testified to the same effect.

The learned magistrate found the appellant guilty and bound him over, and in addition
ordered him to pay $ 45 as compensation to the complainant.

Now there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant had been served with a
copy of the medical report, and it was urged on his behalf that section 399 (i)(b) of the
Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 6) applies not only to the Public Prosecutor, but also to a
case of this sort where there is a prosecution on a private summons by a private person.

The relevant portion of section 399(i) reads as follows:--

      "Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of any of the
      persons mentioned in sub-section (ii) of this section upon any person
      ... examined ... by him ... may be given in evidence in any inquiry,
      trial or other proceeding under this Code unless such person ... shall
      be required to attend as a witness--
      (a)   by the court; or
      (b)   by the accused, in which case the accused shall give notice to
            the Public Prosecutor not less than three clear days before the
            commencement of the trial:
      Provided always that in any case in which the Public Prosecutor intends
      to give in evidence any such report he shall deliver a copy thereof to
      the accused not less than ten clear days before the commencement of the
      trial."
 [*114]  The learned deputy contended that the proviso above-mentioned applies only
where the Public Prosecutor or persons acting under him have custody of the
prosecution, and does not apply to private prosecutions in a non-seizable offence, to
which category the present offence belongs.

It will be pertinent to examine at this stage section 380 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Section 380 reads:--
      "Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter contained--
      (i)   ...
      (ii)  In summary non-seizable cases in the Court of a Magistrate--
      (a)   The Public Prosecutor or a Deputy Public Prosecutor or a Police
            Officer may appear and conduct any prosecution;
      (b)   ...
      (c)   Any private person may appear in person or by advocate or, in the
            State of Trengganu, by a pleader and prosecute for an offence
            against his own person or property."

One would then be faced with the absurd situation, if the learned deputy is correct in his
submission, of the Public Prosecutor (or those appearing on his behalf), having to supply
the defendant with a copy of the medical report 10 clear days before the trial should he
or those deputed by him choose to conduct the prosecution, whilst a private prosecutor
need not do so.

This absurd situation grows in magnitude when one considers the obvious purpose of
section 399 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

In the case of Wong Kok Keong v Regina [1954] MLJ xxxix Spenser Wilkinson J. held
that the effect of section 427(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code (S.S.) (which is identical
in terms with our section 399(i) ) is to make certain documents evidence of the truth of
their contents, which would otherwise not be evidence at all, and that therefore the
provisions of that sub-section are provisions relating to evidence rather than to
procedure. With this conclusion I would with respect concur.

Failure to comply with the sub-section would only be curable, the learned judge goes on,
by virtue of section 488 (Straits Settlements Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 21)), (our
section 422, Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 6)) if, without the inadmissible report there
was evidence sufficient to justify the finding of the court below.

To accept the learned deputy's view is to accept a double standard whereby what is
inadmissible evidence where the Public Prosecutor prosecutes becomes admissible
evidence in the hands of a private prosecutor. Moreover it is reasonable to assume that
in requiring the Public Prosecutor to give no less than ten days notice to the accused
where he intends to give in evidence such report, it is the intention of the legislature that
such notice would enable the accused to opt between allowing such evidence to be
admitted or to require the maker of such report to appear in person under section 399(i)
(b). It would follow that not to require private prosecutors to give notice of a similar
intention would rob an accused person of such option, a result which would surely be
unjust.
This is, in my judgment, a case where this court must modify the language of the law to
meet what must be the intention of the legislature. I need hardly add that there is ample
authority to support this course. As Denning L.J. said in Seaford Court Estates, Ltd v
Asher [1949] 2 All ER 155--
      "It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were
      drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of
      it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and
      blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of
      finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from
      the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the
      social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it
      was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so
      as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature. That
      was clearly laid down (3 Co Rep 7b) by the resolution of the judges
      (Sir Roger Manwood C.B. and the other barons of the Exchequer) in
      Heydon's Case and it is the safest guide to-day."

Both the medical certificates admitted in this case are therefore in my opinion
inadmissible, and without these there is insufficient evidence to support the finding of
the lower court.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order binding over the appellant is set aside, and
sum ordered to be paid as compensation, if paid, should be refunded to the appellant.

Appeal allowed.