Garcia, Gladys

Hermano, Philip

De Facto and De Jure officers

De facto Vs De Jure officers

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure and is one who has the
reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law,
has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or
intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes
upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right
to such office.

To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at

least one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under
color of title or authority.

De facto means “in point of fact.”45 To speak of something as being de facto is,
thus, to say that it is “[a]ctual [or] existing in fact” as opposed to “[e]xisting by right or
according to law,” that is, de jure. Being factual though not being founded on right or
law, de facto is, therefore,“illegitimate but in effect.”

The concept of a de facto officer was explained in Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr.:

The broad definition of what constitutes an officer de facto was formulated by Lord
Holt in Parker v. Kent, and reiterated by Lord Ellenborough and full King’s Bench in
1865 in Rex v. Bedford Level, "One who has the reputation of being the officer he
assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of law." A de facto officer is one who is in
possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of
authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or
informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

A de facto officer is distinguished form a de jure officer, as follows:

The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de
facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the
difference between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is what is
thought of him.
De Facto Officers
The case of Torres vs. Ribo (81 Phil 44) defines a de facto officer as "one who has the
reputation of the officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law." He
must have acted as a officer long enough and came to power under a colorable (read: defective)
authority or by the acquiescence of the people and local authorities. The actions of a de facto
officer are considered to have legal effect and are binding. This is for the protection of people
who get involved in the official acts of a person performing the duties of a public office.

These are the elements:

1.) A validly existing public office
2.) Actual physical possession of that office
3.) The title to the office is colorable/defective

The office has a colorable title in any of the following instances:

1.) By reputation/acquiescence: everybody supposes that the person holding the office is the
legal occupant and nobody questions it. Usually, it happens when somebody has been holding
the office for a considerable length of time and everybody as a result thinks he is the officer that
he claims to be.
2.) There is a valid appointment or election, but the officer didn't meet certain requirements
prescribed by the law (like not taking the oath of office.)

3.) There is an appointment or election that is void because the officer in question isn't eligible or
the appointing/electing authority had no power and nobody knew that this was so (ex. the
president appointing somebody to an elected position.)
4.) Coming to officer through a known appointment or election under a certain law that was later
declared unconstitutional.
The rightful officer can recover all the salaries and other benefits from the de facto officer even
if the de facto officer assumed office in good faith. What matters, in the first place, is that there is
color/doubt to this title. If, however, there is no de jure (lawful) officer the de facto officer is
entitled to the salaries and benefits of his office and can even file a case to recover them. Also, if
the officer committed unlawful acts before legally assuming office, he can be held liable for
damages.

Elements of De Facto officer:

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

The de facto doctrine was devised to benefit the public. On the validity of actions made by
de facto officers, it is settled that “the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.” This is premised on the reality that “[t]hird persons x x x
cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office. They have a
right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such.”
REYNALDO V. TUANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 110544, 1995-10-17
Facts:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome
Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor
sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of
Negros Oriental took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989,
respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the
President for review and recall of said designations.  The latter, however, in a letter dated 20
March 1989, denied the petition
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang
Bayan.  It was dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives, On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines
versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et. al.," charging petitioners... of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and void ab  initio the
designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as
sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg.
337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners.
Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide that the said
appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still the private complainants
are entitled to their salaries and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for
the reason that before such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are
considered at least de  facto public officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid
appointments issued by competent authorities.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution, but it was,
likewise, denied
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act
[RA 3019, sec. 3(e)] due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality,
to pay private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives.  This refusal, however, was...
anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made in violation of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void.  Therefore, should the
Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private
respondents'... designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the
provisions of the Local Government Code [B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146(2)], the charges against
petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on.  Petitioners cannot be
accused of bad faith... and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part
to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to
demand salaries, per diems and other benefits.  In other words, the Court of Appeals'
resolution of the issues... raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not
there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are
entitled to compensation for actual services rendered
Issues:
The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two
alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation
of... petitioners' right to due process
Ruling:
We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start,
private... respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by
petitioners.  They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of
which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after
they took... their oath of office.[17] Hence, private respondents' claim that they have
actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.
we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private
respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de  facto
 public officers entitled to compensation for services actually... rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1. There must be a de jure office;
2. There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3. There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There
can be no de facto officer where there is no de  jure office, although there may be a de  facto
officer in a de  jure... office.

ROBERTO R. MONROY v. CA, GR No. L-23258, 1967-07-01

Facts:
Petitioner
Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his
certificate of candidacy as... representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections... was filed with the Commission on Elections.  Three days later, petitioner filed a letter
withdrawing said certificate of candidacy.
The Commission on Elections approved the withdrawal.
On September 21, 1961, respondent del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took
his oath of office as municipal mayor on the... theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office
upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
Court of First Instance of Rizal held in the suit for injunction instituted by petitioner that
(a) the former had ceased to be mayor after his certificate of candidacy was filed respondent del
Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such petitioner must
reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from
September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office
Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto, Hence, this petition for certiorari argues that both the
lower court and the Court of Appeals... no jurisdiction to do - review a resolution of the
Commission on Elections.
Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in
affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of
actual damages the salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the
date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September 15, 1961.
Ruling:
"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the
one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment
of the filing of his certificate of candidacy," makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently
effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office
Only the moment and act of filing are considered.  Once the certificate is filed, the seat
is... forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official.
The present case for injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of
municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice
mayor... general rule... that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer
de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
entered into the office in good faith and under... color of title" that applies in the present case.
The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who
did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledge that the de facto doctrine
has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather
for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The question of
compensation involves different principles and concepts however.  Here, it is possession of title,
not of the... office, that is decisive.
A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore
account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his
wrongful retention of the public office.