240 Part Two Information Technology Infrastructure

T h e Ter ro r Wa t ch L i s t D at ab a se ’ s Tr ou bl e s C ont i nu e
CASE STUDY

I n the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, the FBI’s

Terrorist Screening Center, or TSC, was
established to consolidate information about
suspected terrorists from multiple government
agencies into a single list to enhance inter-agency
Protection, Secret Service, U.S. Marshals Service, and
the White House. Airlines use data supplied by the
TSA system in their NoFly and Selectee lists for
prescreening passengers, while the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection system uses the watchlist data to
communication. A database of suspected terrorists help screen travelers entering the United States. The
known as the terrorist watch list was created. State Department system screens applicants for visas
Multiple U.S. government agencies had been to enter the United States and U.S. residents applying
maintaining separate lists and these agencies lacked for passports, while state and local law enforcement
a consistent process to share relevant information. agencies use the FBI system to help with arrests,
Records in the TSC database contain sensitive but detentions, and other criminal justice activities. Each
unclassified information on terrorist identities, such of these agencies receives the subset of data in the
as name and date of birth, that can be shared with watch list that pertains to its specific mission.
other screening agencies. Classified information When an individual makes an airline reservation,
about the people in the watch list is maintained in arrives at a U.S. port of entry, applies for a U.S. visa,
other law enforcement and intelligence agency data- or is stopped by state or local police within the
bases. Records for the watchlist database are pro- United States, the frontline screening agency or
vided by two sources: The National Counterterrorism airline conducts a name-based search of the individ-
Center (NCTC) managed by the Office of the ual against the records from the terrorist watch list
Director of National Intelligence provides identifying database. When the computerized name-matching
information on individuals with ties to international system generates a “hit” (a potential name match)
terrorism. The FBI provides identifying information against a watch list record, the airline or agency will
on individuals with ties to purely domestic terrorism. review each potential match. Matches that are
These agencies collect and maintain terrorist clearly positive or exact matches that are inconclu-
information and nominate individuals for inclusion sive (uncertain or difficult to verify) are referred to
in the TSC’s consolidated watch list. They are the applicable screening agency’s intelligence or
required to follow strict procedures established by operations center and to the TSC for closer examina-
the head of the agency concerned and approved by tion. In turn, TSC checks its databases and other
the U.S. Attorney General. TSC staff must review sources, including classified databases maintained by
each record submitted before it is added to the the NCTC and FBI to confirm whether the individual
database. An individual will remain on the watch list is a positive, negative, or inconclusive match to the
until the respective department or agency that watch list record. TSC creates a daily report summa-
nominated that person to the list determines that the rizing all positive matches to the watch list and
person should be removed from the list and deleted distributes them to numerous federal agencies.
from the database The process of consolidating information from
The TSC watch list database is updated daily with disparate agencies has been a slow and painstaking
new nominations, modifications to existing records, one, requiring the integration of at least 12 different
and deletions. Since its creation, the list has databases. Two years after the process of integration
ballooned to 400,000 people, recorded as 1.1 million took place, 10 of the 12 databases had been
names and aliases, and is continuing to grow at a rate processed. The remaining two databases (the U.S.
of 200,000 records each year. Information on the list Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Automatic
is distributed to a wide range of government agency Biometric Identification System and the FBI’s
systems for use in efforts to deter or detect the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
movements of known or suspected terrorists. System) are both fingerprint databases. There is still
Recipient agencies include the FBI, CIA, National more work to be done to optimize the list’s useful-
Security Agency (NSA), Transportation Security ness.
Administration (TSA), Department of Homeland Reports from both the Government Accountability
Security, State Department, Customs and Border Office and the Office of the Inspector General assert
 Chapter 6 Foundations of Business Intelligence: Databases and Information Management 241

that the list contains inaccuracies and that govern- quick redress process for innocents that hope to
ment departmental policies for nomination and remove themselves from it.
removal from the lists are not uniform. There has also The number of requests for removal from the
been public outcry resulting from the size of the list watch list continues to mount, with over 24,000
and well-publicized incidents of obvious non-terrorists requests recorded (about 2,000 each month) and only
finding that they are included on the list. 54 percent of them resolved. The average time to
Information about the process for inclusion on the process a request in 2008 was 40 days, which was not
list must necessarily be carefully protected if the list (and still is not) fast enough to keep pace with the
is to be effective against terrorists. The specific number of requests for removal coming in. As a
criteria for inclusion are not public knowledge. We result, law-abiding travelers that inexplicably find
do know, however, that government agencies popu- themselves on the watch list are left with no easy
late their watch lists by performing wide sweeps of way to remove themselves from it.
information gathered on travelers, using many In February 2007, the Department of Homeland
misspellings and alternate variations of the names of Security instituted its Traveler Redress Inquiry
suspected terrorists. This often leads to the inclusion Program (TRIP) to help people that have been
of people who do not belong on watch lists, known as erroneously added to terrorist watch lists remove
“false positives.” It also results in some people being themselves and avoid extra screening and question-
listed multiple times under different spellings of ing. John Anderson’s mother claimed that despite
their names. her best efforts, she was unable to remove her son
While these selection criteria may be effective for from the watch lists. Senator Kennedy reportedly
tracking as many potential terrorists as possible, they was only able to remove himself from the list by
also lead to many more erroneous entries on the list personally bringing up the matter to Tom Ridge, then
than if the process required more finely tuned infor- the Director of the Department of Homeland
mation to add new entries. Notable examples of ‘false Security.
positives’ include Michael Hicks, an 8-year-old New Security officials say that mistakes such as the one
Jersey Cub Scout who is continually stopped at the that led to Anderson and Kennedy’s inclusion on
airport for additional screening and the late senator no-fly and consolidated watch lists occur due to the
Ted Kennedy, who had been repeatedly delayed in matching of imperfect data in airline reservation
the past because his name resembles an alias once systems with imperfect data on the watch lists. Many
used by a suspected terrorist. Like Kennedy, Hicks airlines don’t include gender, middle name, or date
may have been added because his name is the same of birth in their reservations records, which increases
or similar to a different suspected terrorist. the likelihood of false matches.
These incidents call attention to the quality and One way to improve screening and help reduce
accuracy of the data in the TSC consolidated the number of people erroneously marked for
terrorist watch list. In June 2005, a report by the additional investigation would be to use a more
Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector sophisticated system involving more personal data
General found inconsistent record counts, duplicate about individuals on the list. The TSA is developing
records, and records that lacked data fields or had just such a system, called “Secure Flight,” but it has
unclear sources for their data. Although TSC been continually delayed due to privacy concerns
subsequently enhanced its efforts to identify and regarding the sensitivity and safety of the data it
correct incomplete or inaccurate watch list records, would collect. Other similar surveillance programs
the Inspector General noted in September 2007 that and watch lists, such as the NSA’s attempts to gather
TSC management of the watch list still showed some information about suspected terrorists, have drawn
weaknesses. criticism for potential privacy violations.
Given the option between a list that tracks every Additionally, the watch list has drawn criticism
potential terrorist at the cost of unnecessarily track- because of its potential to promote racial profiling
ing some innocents, and a list that fails to track and discrimination. Some allege that they were
many terrorists in an effort to avoid tracking inno- included by virtue of their race and ethnic descent,
cents, many would choose the list that tracked every such as David Fathi, an attorney for the ACLU of
terrorist despite the drawbacks. But to make matters Iranian descent, and Asif Iqbal, a U.S. citizen of
worse for those already inconvenienced by wrongful Pakistani decent with the same name as a
inclusion on the list, there is currently no simple and Guantanamo detainee. Outspoken critics of U.S.
foreign policy, such as some elected officials and
242 Part Two Information Technology Infrastructure

university professors, have also found themselves on Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, had not made it onto
the list. the no-fly list. Although Abdulmutallab’s father had
A report released in May 2009 by Department of reported concern over his son’s radicalization to the
Justice Inspector General Glenn A. Fine found that U.S. State Department, the Department did not
the FBI had incorrectly kept nearly 24,000 people on revoke Adbulmutallab’s visa because his name was
its own watch list that supplies data to the terrorist misspelled in the visa database, so he was allowed to
watch list on the basis of outdated or irrelevant infor- enter the United States. Faisal Shahzad, the Times
mation. Examining nearly 69,000 referrals to the FBI Square car bomber, was apprehended on May 3,
list, the report found that 35 percent of those people 2010, only moments before his Emirates airline flight
remained on the list despite inadequate justification. to Dubai and Pakistan was about to take off. The
Even more worrisome, the list did not contain the airline had failed to check a last-minute update to the
names of people who should have been listed no-fly list that had added Shahzad’s name.
because of their terrorist ties.
FBI officials claim that the bureau has made Sources: Scott Shane, “Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane,”
The New York Times, May 4, 2010; Mike McIntire, “Ensnared by
improvements, including better training, faster
Error on Growing U.S. Watch List,” The New York Times, April 6,
processing of referrals, and requiring field office 2010; Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, “Review of Jet
supervisors to review watch-list nominations for Bomb Plot Shows More Missed Clues,” The New York Times,
accuracy and completeness. But this watch list and January 18, 2010; Lizette Alvarez, “Meet Mikey, 8: U.S. Has Him
the others remain imperfect tools. In early 2008, it on Watch List,” The New York Times, January 14, 2010; Eric
Lichtblau, “Justice Dept. Finds Flaws in F.B.I. Terror List,” The New
was revealed that 20 known terrorists were not cor- York Times, May 7, 2009; Bob Egelko, “Watch-list Name Confusion
rectly listed on the consolidated watch list. (Whether Causes Hardship,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 20, 2008;
these individuals were able to enter the U.S. as a “Reports Cite Lack of Uniform Policy for Terrorist Watch List,” The
result is unclear.) Washington Post, March 18, 2008; Siobhan Gorman, “NSA’s
Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps Up Data,” The Wall
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian who Street Journal, March 10, 2008; Ellen Nakashima, and Scott
unsuccessfully tried to detonate plastic explosives on McCartney, “When Your Name is Mud at the Airport,” The Wall
the Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Street Journal, January 29, 2008.

CASE STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What concepts in this chapter are illustrated in 4. How effective is the system of watch lists
this case? described in this case study? Explain your answer.
2. Why was the consolidated terror watch list 5. If you were responsible for the management of
created? What are the benefits of the list? the TSC watch list database, what steps would you
3. Describe some of the weaknesses of the watch take to correct some of these weaknesses?
list. What management, organization, and 6. Do you believe that the terror watch list
technology factors are responsible for these represents a significant threat to individuals’
weaknesses? privacy or Constitutional rights? Why or why not?