Rey Butch L.

Bucia
Criminal Law 1 Sec A

Case Digest

3. People vs. Butiong Gr. No. 168932

Oct 19,2011 (Stages of Execution of Rape)

Facts:
This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29
years of age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year-old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited
by Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her
something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and
then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal
knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister
brought AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AAA
underwent a series of Psychological Test with result showed that she had a mild level of mental
retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of Rape.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

Ruling:

G.R. NO. 175457: July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Mayor Francisco Andalim (Mayor Andalim) was the accused in a murder case. During
the trial, Mayor Andalim was transferred from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to
the residence of Governor Ruperto A. Ambil Jr. (Gov. Ambil). The NBI conducted an
investigation and recommended that charges be filed against Gov. Ambil for violation
of R.A. No 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The IBP, which initially
requested investigation in the case, dismissed their request and informed the
Ombudsman they would no longer pursue the case.
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Gov. Ambil and Alexandrino Apelado, Sr. for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan First Division found Gov. Ambil and Apelado, Sr. liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for violation of R.A. No 3019.
HELD:
CRIMINAL LAW: violation of the Anti-Graft Act
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place
other than the provincial jail.The latter was housed in much more comfortable
quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
television.Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayor life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail. As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to
establish the existence of any risk on Adalim safety.
As held by the Court in Sison v. People, in order to be found guilty under the second
mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in
the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
Petition is DENIED.
G.R. NO. 175457: July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Mayor Francisco Andalim (Mayor Andalim) was the accused in a murder case. During
the trial, Mayor Andalim was transferred from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to
the residence of Governor Ruperto A. Ambil Jr. (Gov. Ambil). The NBI conducted an
investigation and recommended that charges be filed against Gov. Ambil for violation
of R.A. No 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The IBP, which initially
requested investigation in the case, dismissed their request and informed the
Ombudsman they would no longer pursue the case.
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Gov. Ambil and Alexandrino Apelado, Sr. for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan First Division found Gov. Ambil and Apelado, Sr. liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for violation of R.A. No 3019.
HELD:
CRIMINAL LAW: violation of the Anti-Graft Act
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place
other than the provincial jail.The latter was housed in much more comfortable
quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
television.Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayor life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail. As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to
establish the existence of any risk on Adalim safety.
As held by the Court in Sison v. People, in order to be found guilty under the second
mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in
the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
Petition is DENIED.
G.R. NO. 175457: July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Mayor Francisco Andalim (Mayor Andalim) was the accused in a murder case. During
the trial, Mayor Andalim was transferred from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to
the residence of Governor Ruperto A. Ambil Jr. (Gov. Ambil). The NBI conducted an
investigation and recommended that charges be filed against Gov. Ambil for violation
of R.A. No 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The IBP, which initially
requested investigation in the case, dismissed their request and informed the
Ombudsman they would no longer pursue the case.
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Gov. Ambil and Alexandrino Apelado, Sr. for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan First Division found Gov. Ambil and Apelado, Sr. liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable for violation of R.A. No 3019.
HELD:
CRIMINAL LAW: violation of the Anti-Graft Act
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place
other than the provincial jail.The latter was housed in much more comfortable
quarters, provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
television.Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayor life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail. As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to
establish the existence of any risk on Adalim safety.
As held by the Court in Sison v. People, in order to be found guilty under the second
mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in
the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
Petition is DENIED.
Yes. The CA fully debunked the argument on the exact date of the rape not being
established by simply quoting from AAA’s testimony that the rape had occurred on October 7,
1998. We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the rape need not be precisely proved
considering that date is not an element of rape. Nor did the absence of spermatozoa from the
genitalia of AAA negate or disprove the rape. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge or
sexual intercourse, not ejaculation. Carnal knowledge is defined as "the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman." This explains why the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates the rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by
the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated
rape. People v. Campuhan has aimed to remove any confusion as to the extent of "touching" in
rape:

That AAA’s recollection on the rape was corroborated by the results of the medico-legal
examination was sufficient proof of the consummation of rape. We have ruled that rape can be
established by the sole testimony of the victim that is credible and untainted with serious
uncertainty. With more reason is this true when the medical findings supported the testimony of
the victim, like herein.

13. Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan Gr. No. 175457

July 6,2011 (Obedience of Lawful Order)

Facts:
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail
and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim,
not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder.  Thus, for
purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
 Petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of right or office. Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the transfer and
detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law
did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his office.
Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for
some lawful purpose.  Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal
liability.
Ambil, Jr. being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R.
Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been public officers,
duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent,
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
order and cause the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor
Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by allowing said
Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil's residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more
or less which act was done without any court order, thus accused in the performance of official
functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to
the prejudice of the government.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty

or the lawful exercise of a right or office?

Ruling:

No. Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any person
who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any
criminal liability.  In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be
satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. Both requisites are
lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s case.

As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he
ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house.  Needless to state, the resulting
violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful
exercise of his office.

In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience
to an order issued for some lawful purpose.  Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any
person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does
not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites
must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some
lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. Only
the first requisite is present in this case.
 While the order for Adalim's transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out
was lawful.  In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado,
Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported him
to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr.  This makes him liable as a principal by direct participation
under Article 17(1) of the RPC.

An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a
view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were
in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments.

Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.'s willful cooperation

in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court
order.  Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the
law.  The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is
elementary.  Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the
law expressed reservations on his power to transfer Adalim.  All said, the concerted acts of
petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally
responsible as conspirators.

23. PP vs. Soriano Gr. No. 142565

July 29,2003 (Analogous Circumstances)

Facts:

The factual backdrop: About midnight of 17 September onto the early dawn of 18
September 1998 accused-appellant Nestor G. Soriano was having an argument with his live-in
partner Honey Rosario Cimagala concerning their son Nestor, Jr., nicknamed Otoy. Honey
worked as Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer house. The disagreement
stemmed from the fact that Honeys brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the
consent of accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to
Manila. But Honey refused. As their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey
his desire to have sex with her, which he vigorously pursued the night before with much
success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him
as her stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.

In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. Nestor then moved away
as he muttered: It is better that I burn this house, and then took a match from the top of a
cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honeys
room.

On 21 September 1998 an Information was filed against accused-appellant Nestor G.

Soriano alias Boy for Arson. On 30 October 1998, the Information was amended to specify the
charge as Destructive Arson under Art. 320, Sec. 10, as amended by RA 7659 and PD 1613.
Again, on 18 January 1999, upon prior motion of accused through counsel for reinvestigation,
the prosecution filed a second Amended Information charging the accused with the same crime
of arson but under Art. 320, Sec. 10 as amended by RA 7659 and PD 1744, and adding the
phrase motivated by spite or hatred towards the occupant of the property.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of analogous to

passion and obfuscation?

Ruling:

Yes. The legal basis of the trial court for convicting accused-appellant is Art. 320, par. 1,
of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, Sec. 10, par. 1. Under this provision, a
person found guilty of Destructive Arson is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death where the
burning affects one (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or
as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of
arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather
than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it
is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and literally in
favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally,
these elements concur in the case at bar.
 The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous
to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.21 On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a
lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on
the qualifying circumstances present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be

heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from
those acts punishable under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance
was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating
circumstance that accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or
occupant of the property burned cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears
that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or
hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned
lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of
the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized
under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or
dwelling.

In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should have been
appreciated by the trial court in determining the penalty to be imposed on the accused-
appellant: a circumstance similar and analogous to passion and obfuscation. An impulse of
invidious or resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and obfuscation. This
circumstance is mitigating since, like passion and obfuscation, the accused who acts with these
feelings suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent, a reduction in his mental and rational
faculties.

33. PP vs. Bariquit Gr. No. 122733

Oct 2,2000 (Fraud and Craft)

Facts:
 In many ways - three times to be exact-the prosecution in the instant case, through the
testimony of state witness Rogelio Lascua, shatters the long-time aphorism that blood is thicker
than water. On appeal via automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-35462, dated 30 June 1995, as modified by its order
dated 20 July 1995, finding accused-appellants Pedro Bariquit, Cristituto Bariquit, and Emegdio
Lascua guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of death. In its order dated 20 July 1995, modifying its decision dated 30 June
1995, the trial court, while likewise finding co-accused Baselino Repe guilty of the crime
charged, Nonetheless appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority on Repes
favor, sentenced him to a reduced penalty of imprisonment of from six (6) years and one(1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and redeemed him from the clutches of the supreme penalty of death. At the time of
the commission of the crime, accused Repe was seventeen years old.

The antecedent facts and proceedings in the instant case unfold.

On 28 February 1994, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Adolfo Alcoseba filed a motion to

drop accused Rogelio Lascua and Baselino Repe to be utilized as state witnesses, prompting
the relatives of the deceased spouses Simon and Corazon Hermida to file a vehement
opposition, to which comment thereto was filed by the prosecution. On 28 June 1994, Baselino
Repe and brothers Pedro and Cristituto Bariquit, and brothers Emegdio and Rogelio Lascua,
were charged, in a Second Amended Information, with Robbery with Homicide, the accusatory
portion of which reads: That on or about the 8th day of February 1994 at around 2:00 o' clock
dawn, more or less, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, by means of violence against and intimidation upon persons, with
intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
without the consent of the owner thereof one (1) gold necklace and Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) cash, Philippine Currency, and one (1) blanket which were placed by the owner
Spouses Simon Hermida and Corazon Manabat Hermida on their wooden trunk, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner spouses Simon Hermida and Corazon Manabat Hermida of said
items and the cash aforestated; that by reason or on occasion of the said robbery and for the
apparent purpose of enabling the said accused to take, steal and carry away the aforestated
personal belongings of spouses Simon Hermida and Corazon Manabat Hermida, the herein
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, armed with bladed weapons, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab the spouses Simon Hermida
and Corazon Manabat Hermida and inflicting upon them several injuries which caused the said
victims' death.

Issue:

Whether or not the court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of fraud?

Ruling:

Yes. In view of the fact that only three accused-appellants- Pedro Bariquit, Cristituto

Bariquit and Emegdio Lascua-conspired and participated in the robbery-killing, band was not
attendant in the commission of the felony.
 Nevertheless, this Court considers the attendance of fraud, dwelling and evident
premeditation in the commission of the offense.

Fraud consists of insidious words or machinations used to induce the victim to act in a
manner which would enable the offender to carry out his design. Hence, in a decided case
where the defendants, upon the pretext of wanting to buy a bottle of wine, induced the victim to
go down to the lower story of his dwelling where the wine was stored, entered it when the door
was opened to him, and there commenced the assault which ended in his death, this Court
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of fraud.

In the case before us, accused-appellants managed to enter the house of the victims-
spouses by employing insidious words and machinations, specifically by feigning to buy Kulafu
and cigarettes from Simon. Pedro even requested Simon to light his cigarette so that the latter
would open the door and pave the way for the accused-appellants' entry into the house.

Likewise, dwelling is deemed aggravating in the instant case where the crime was
perpetrated in the house where the Hermida Spouses lived, and without any provocation from
the victims Simon and Corazon.

Similarly, evident premeditation attended the commission of the felony. For evident
premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime
itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time, between determination and execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences
of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to
harken to its warnings.

The prosecution in the present case established by clear and convincing evidence, as to
how and when the planned robbery was hatched. As borne by the records, accused-appellants
met at the upper hill area around 12:00 AM of 08 February 1994, where the planned robbery
was agreed upon and visualized. Thereafter, accused-appellants, armed with bladed weapons,
trekked from the place of assemblage toward the victims' residence and, upon arrival at the
vicinity thereof, waited under a mango tree for approximately an hour before finally proceeding
to the house to consummate the robbery-killing.

Clearly, the lapse of two hours-from 12:00 AM to 2:00 AM-suffice to satisfy the third
requisite and allow accused-appellants to meditate and reflect upon the consequences of their
criminal acts.

Thus, in one case, we held that there was evident premeditation where two hours
passed from the time the accused clung to his determination to kill the victim, up to the actual
perpetration of the crime. Moreover, evident premeditation can be presumed where conspiracy
is directly established, as in the instant case.

41. PP vs. Temporada Gr. No. 173473

Dec 17,2008 (Indeterminate Sentence Law)

Facts:
 Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco and
Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company, recruited and
promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician in Singapore,
and other overseas workers. The accused were holding office in Makati but eventually
transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of the overseas recruits was able to
leave or recover what they have paid, thus they filed separate criminal complaints against
accused in Manila.

The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and estafa.
Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed with modification on
the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court due to insufficiency of evidence.

A case was filed against

accused-appellant Beth
Temporada of the crime of
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment,
or violation of Article 38 of the
Labor Code,
as amended and five counts of
estafa under Article 315, par.
(2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
They further alleged that
the accused recruited and
promised overseas
employment, for a fee, to
complainants Rogelio Legaspi,
Jr. As technician in
Singapore, and Soledad
Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn
Estacio and Dennis
Dimaano as factory workers
in Hongkong. After
collecting the alleged
placement fees are in
excees of or greater than
that specified in the
scheduled of allowable fees
prescribed of the POEA and
without reasons and
without fault of the said
complainants, failed to actually
deploy them and failed
to reimburse them the
expenses they incurred in
connection with the
documentation and
processing of their papers
for purposes of their
deployment. The accused-
appellant ascribes the lone error
that the trial court
A case was filed against
accused-appellant Beth
Temporada of the crime of
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment,
or violation of Article 38 of the
Labor Code,
as amended and five counts of
estafa under Article 315, par.
(2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
They further alleged that
the accused recruited and
promised overseas
employment, for a fee, to
complainants Rogelio Legaspi,
Jr. As technician in
Singapore, and Soledad
Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn
Estacio and Dennis
Dimaano as factory workers
in Hongkong. After
collecting the alleged
placement fees are in
excees of or greater than
that specified in the
scheduled of allowable fees
prescribed of the POEA and
without reasons and
without fault of the said
complainants, failed to actually
deploy them and failed
to reimburse them the
expenses they incurred in
connection with the
documentation and
processing of their papers
for purposes of their
deployment. The accused-
appellant ascribes the lone error
that the trial court
A case was filed against
accused-appellant Beth
Temporada of the crime of
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment,
or violation of Article 38 of the
Labor Code,
as amended and five counts of
estafa under Article 315, par.
(2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
They further alleged that
the accused recruited and
promised overseas
employment, for a fee, to
complainants Rogelio Legaspi,
Jr. As technician in
Singapore, and Soledad
Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn
Estacio and Dennis
Dimaano as factory workers
in Hongkong. After
collecting the alleged
placement fees are in
excees of or greater than
that specified in the
scheduled of allowable fees
prescribed of the POEA and
without reasons and
without fault of the said
complainants, failed to actually
deploy them and failed
to reimburse them the
expenses they incurred in
connection with the
documentation and
processing of their papers
for purposes of their
deployment. The accused-
appellant ascribes the lone error
that the trial court
Issue:

Whether or not the indeterminate sentence law can be applied?

Ruling:

Yes. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a sentence, the court must
determine two penalties composed of the "maximum" and "minimum" terms, instead of imposing
a single fixed penalty. Hence, the indeterminate sentence is composed of a maximum term
taken from the penalty imposable under the Revised Penal Code and a minimum term taken
from the penalty next lower to that fixed in the said Code.

The maximum term corresponds to "that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the [Revised Penal] Code." Thus, "attending
circumstances" (such as mitigating, aggravating and other relevant circumstances) that may
modify the imposable penalty applying the rules of the Revised Penal Code is considered in
determining the maximum term. Stated otherwise, the maximum term is arrived at after taking
into consideration the effects of attendant modifying circumstances.
 The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the accused, particularly to shorten
his term of imprisonment. The reduction of his period of incarceration reasonably helps "uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness." The law, being penal in character, must receive an
interpretation that benefits the accused. This Court already ruled that "in cases where the
application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting
in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be
applied." In the same vein, if an interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is unfavorable
to the accused and will work to increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation should
not be adopted. It is also for this reason that the claim that the power of this Court to lighten the
penalty of lesser crimes carries with it the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for grave
penalties is not only wrong but also dangerous.