FINC110 Risk & Return in Portfolio - Part A

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FINC/110

IBS Center for Management Research

Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)


This case was written by Surojit Mahato and Ranajee, IBS Hyderabad. It was compiled from
published sources, and is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to
illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a management situation.

 2016, IBS Center for Management Research. All rights reserved.

To order copies, call +91 9640901313 or write to IBS Center for Management Research (ICMR), IFHE Campus, Donthanapally,
Sankarapally Road, Hyderabad 501 203, Telangana, India or email: [email protected]

www.icmrindia.org

Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.


Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
FINC/110

Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a


Portfolio (Part A)
ABSTRACT

Dilip Shangvi (Shangvi), founder of Indian pharmaceutical giant Sun Pharmaceutical Industries
Ltd. (Sun Pharma), had invested his personal wealth in several companies. Some of his major
investments were Rs 250 million in Natco Pharma Limited (Natco Pharma), and Rs 18 billion in
Pune-based Suzlon Energy Ltd. (Suzlon). Shangvi held a 60.8 % stake in Sun Pharma and received
more than Rs 12 billion as dividend from his shares between 2010 and 2015. The case discusses
his investments using a risk return framework.
The case (Part A) considers Shangvi as a marginal investor and attempts to understand the risk of
his investments in Suzlon and Natco Pharma based on the historical data of monthly returns
between 2010 and 2015.
Part B of the case attempts to understand the systematic risk in Shangvi’s investments (Suzlon and
Natco Pharma).

INTRODUCTION

On February 14, 2015, Dilip Shangvi (Shangvi), founder of Indian pharmaceutical giant Sun
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (Sun Pharma), announced that he would buy a 23 percent stake in
Pune-based Suzlon Energy Ltd. (Suzlon) for Rs 18 billioni. Shangvi held a 60.8 percent stake in
Sun Pharma and had received more than Rs 12 billion as dividend between 2010 and 2015. He had
earlier invested his personal wealth in several companies like Bio- Light Sciences1, where he
bought an 11 percent stake for Rs 140 million, and Natco Pharma Limited (Natco Pharma)2, in
which he bought a 3.5 percent stakeii for Rs 250 million in 2011. His investment in Suzlon was the
largest he had ever made and the only one in a company which was not in the pharmaceutical
industry.
Suzlon, a manufacturer of wind turbines and an end-to-end turnkey engineering, procurement, and
construction player in the wind energy space, was founded by Tulsi Tanti (Tanti) in 1995. In a
span of 20 years, the company grew into a global supplier of turbines with customers in 32
countries. However, after the 2008 financial crisis, Suzlon’s debt funded growth strategy failed
and, by 2015, the company had accumulated a huge debt of Rs 160 billion. Under the deal with
Shangvi, Suzlon was to allot 10 million preferential shares to the members of Shangvi’s family and
to the companies owned by him, collectively giving them a 23 percent share in the company.
However, the control of Suzlon would remain with the Tanti family. Post acquisition, Tanti and
promoters would have a stake of 24 percent.

1
Bio- Light Sciences is an Israeli investment company specializing in the Life Sciences sector.
2
Natco Pharma is an Hyderabad-based pharmaceutical company incorporated in 1981.

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Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

According to analysts, Shangvi’s investment would diversify his portfolio for managing risks
compared to returns from his investments in pharma companies (Bio- Light Sciences and Natco
Pharma). According to Shangvi, his investment in Suzlon was justified by the fact that the
company had good potential in the renewable energy market besides a good management team.
“This financial investment is in sync with the PM’s long term vision and immense potential of the
renewable energy market. While we believe Suzlon has the potential to emerge as a global leader
in the renewable energy space from India, it will take substantial and sustained effort on part of the
management team to achieve a significant operating performance improvement. We have strong
faith in the leadership of Tanti to achieve this and will continue as financial investors,”iii said
Shangvi. He also confirmed his collaboration with Suzlon to develop a 450 MW wind farm
through a 50-50 joint venture and said he would help the company in raising non-fund working
capital for projects.
Sudhir Valia (Valia), Shangvi’s brother-in-law, said the family was not viewing the investment as
an entry into the renewable energy space by trying to go in for an acquisition; it was just a
financial investment to deploy family money. According to Valia, Shangvi had received more than
Rs 12 billion as dividend from Sun Pharma between 2010 and 2015 and was looking for an avenue
to invest the moneyiv. “Suzlon is the largest renewable energy company in India and it was a
natural choice for a safe long-term investment,” said Valia.
Shangvi’s investment in Suzlon (23% Stake)
Suzlon was founded by Tulsi Tanti (Tanti) in 1995. Tanti built the company up from scratch into
one of the largest wind turbine makers globally with a wind power generation capacity of 26,000
MW, within a span of 20 years. The growth of the company was mostly fuelled by the acquisition
of companies abroad and from debt raised internationally.
In 2006, the company acquired Belgian wind turbine gear box manufacturing firm, Hansen
Transmissions International NV, for 431 million Euros. In 2007, Suzlon bought a majority stake in
German wind turbine maker Senvion, and progressively increased its stake over the next four years
to buy out the company. Senvion gave Suzlon much needed technology that was new and better
than its existing technology especially in the offshore wind energy space, and greater access to
international markets. (The German company was contributing approximately 73 percent to the
revenues of Suzlon by 2014v).
Till the financial year 2007-08, Suzlon was a profit making company. However, after the 2008
financial crisis, the demand from renewable energy dried up. There was reduced demand for wind
turbines even from international clients. The liquidity crunch caused by the crisis lasted for a few
years. In 2008, the company reported a profit of Rs 10.17 billion on a turnover of Rs 136.79
billion. In 2009, Suzlon reported a profit of Rs 2.36 billion and in 2010, the company reported a
loss of Rs 9.820 billion. Over the next five years – between 2010 and 2015 – Suzlon’s losses
increased 10 times to Rs 91.57 billion. Its turnover during the same period went down marginally
by 3.7 percent to Rs 199.54 billion.
Suzlon had borrowed money from the European markets to finance the acquisition of Senvion, but
after the 2008 financial crisis, the company had to transfer the debt to India. In the process, the
cost of borrowing went up drastically and it became tough for the company to repay as the demand
for turbines had slowed down in emerging markets, including India, after the crisis.
In 2007, Suzlon also raised five-year FCCBs of US$ 300 million to finance the expansion of its
projects in India. However, with the demand for turbines falling after the 2008 crisis, the company
failed to generate enough money to repay the debt. In June 2012, the company managed to borrow
money from a consortium of lenders led by State Bank of India (SBI) to repay only US$ 92 million
as the FCCBs neared maturity. Suzlon defaulted on redemption of debt worth US$ 208 million
after hectic negotiations with the bondholders in October 2012.

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Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

In January 2013, Suzlon went in for Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR). In the restructuring, the
debt related to Senvion was refinanced through a credit enhancement bond issued by Suzlon,
backed by a letter of credit from SBI. The company again raised US$ 647 million in March 2013.
The company was also successful in restructuring the FCCBs with bondholders in May 2014. The
principal value of Suzlon’s outstanding FCCBs was US$ 575.7 million. However, after the
restructuring agreement, the company was liable to pay US$ 28.8 million in April 2016 and the
remaining in July 2019. The price for conversion of the FCCBs into equity shares was pegged at
Rs 15.46 per share. Since Suzlon’s bondholders had a significant upside in converting their bonds
into shares with the company’s stock price above the conversion price, around US$ 248.1 million
worth of FCCBs were converted into equity shares of the company till July 31, 2015. As a result,
FCCBs worth US$327.6 million were left to be repaid.
By 2015, the business environment in India had changed and incentives for renewable energy
companies were back, with the newly elected government giving importance to energy from
renewable sources. Tanti realized that he would not be able to take advantage of the new business
opportunity that the Indian market presented unless the debt was reduced. In January 2015, he
announced that Senvion had been sold to US private Equity firm Center Bridge for 1 billion Euros.
As a result of the deal, Suzlon managed to reduce its debt by 50 percent to Rs 70.1 billion at the
end of June 2015 (excluding FCCBs). According to P Pradeep Kumar, managing director and
group executive at SBI, “Tanti’s initial plan was to take Senvion public and dilute his stake in the
company by around 30 percent. While this may have yielded Tanti a better valuation for his stake,
it would have been a time-consuming process. Suzlon’s lenders convinced Tanti to sell Senvion at
one go because cash was king.”vi
Shangvi bought a 23 percent stake in Suzlon for Rs 18 billion on February 15, 2015. He said in an
interview, “We saw great potential in Suzlon’s business fundamentals due to its world class
technology and R&D capabilities. Now that Senvion has been sold off, Suzlon’s debt has become
manageable. We believe Suzlon has the potential to become a global leader again.” vii
Shangvi’s investment in Natco Pharma (3.5 % stake)
Located in Hyderabad, South India, Natco Pharma was incorporated in 1981 and became a public
company in July 1992. Promoted by VC Nannapaneni, the company was focused on research,
development, manufacturing, and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs for the Indian and
international markets. Natco achieved high success in the initial days of its business and by 1994
was ranked 82nd among the Indian pharmaceutical companies.
Since 2007, the company had grown at 21 percent annually and held a decent market share in the
generic oncology space in the domestic market. It had a strong pipeline for niche products in the
US market. Natco’s consolidated revenue for the year 2014-15 was Rs 8.4 billion and its profit
before taxes was Rs. 1.34 billion.
According to analysts, the market was waiting for the launch of a generic equivalent of Israel-
based pharma company Teva’s multibillion dollar drug, Copaxone, and they believed that even
though Natco would be the second to launch the drug in the market, it could grab a good chunk of
market share if it received US FDA approval.
In December 2011, Dilip Shangvi bought a 3.5 percent stake in Natco Pharma for Rs 250 million
(approximately).

DILIP SHANGVI: THE SELF-MADE BILLIONAIRE

Shangvi, son of a pharmaceutical wholesaler, was born in Kolkata in 1955. He completed his
Bachelor’s degree in commerce from Bhawanipur Education Society College, Kolkata. In 1982, at
the age of 27, Shangvi moved to Mumbai and started Sun Pharma with a capital of Rs 10,000. In
1983, he started his own manufacturing firm in Vapi, Gujarat, with 5 employees. Shangvi initially
focused on a few niche products like psychiatric and neurological drugs. Four years later, the

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Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

company started selling its drugs across India. In 1989, Sun Pharma started exporting products to
neighboring countries and gained tremendous success. It started its own research center in 1991
and, in 1994, it went in for an initial public offering.
Shangvi grew the company at an unprecedented speed, mostly by acquiring good companies in
poor condition. By 1996, Sun Pharma had operations in 24 countries. Nineteen acquisitions and
joint ventures followed, both in India and abroad. One of the notable acquisitions was gaining a
controlling stake in Israeli drug maker Taro Pharmaceutical Industries in 2010. The acquisition
strengthened Sun Pharma’s position in key markets like the US, Canada, and Israel. In April 2014,
Sun Pharma acquired Ranbaxy for $4 billion.
Shangvi held a majority stake in Sun Pharma and considered himself more a manager than a
leader. According to analysts, he believed in letting experts and professionals manage his
companies. Devan Choksey, Managing Director of KR Choksey Securities, said in an interview,
“His biggest asset is people management, and he has followed a very simple path.”viii On March
04, 2015, with a net worth of US$21.8 billion, Shangvi dethroned Mukesh Ambani, Chairman of
Reliance Industries, to become the richest Indian.
Shangvi had gained the reputation of a white knight for companies in trouble. However, all his
investments had been mostly in pharma companies, as pharma was his area of expertise. His
investment in Suzlon was the only exception. According to analysts, Shangvi’s investment in
Suzlon was in tune with the investment trends of business families in the West. Kavil
Ramachandran, Professor at the Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, said, “I see this as an
emerging practice of entrepreneur families investing their personal wealth in long-term, high-
growth, safe businesses run by others, unlike the old practice of entrepreneurs redeploying their
wealth into the same business or for diversifying into other businesses under a group umbrella.”ix
Now, based on Shangvi’s two3 investments (Suzlon and Natco Pharma), answer the following
questions.

ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS

 Calculate the monthly returns of Suzlon, Natco, and Nifty from the given data.
 Calculate and interpret Variance and Standard Deviation of Shangvi’s investments.
 Calculate and interpret Covariance and Correlation between the investments of Shangvi.
 Find out the weights of Shangvi’s investments in the minimum variance portfolio.

3
Though Shangvi had a wide portfolio of investments, for this case study his holdings only in two
companies (Suzlon and Natco Pharma) have been considered.

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Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Suzlon

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


1/1/2016 21 22 20.7 21.85 17188600 21.85
12/1/2015 22.1 23.1 20.35 20.85 5754300 20.85
11/2/2015 24.15 25.25 20.4 21.65 6493400 21.65
10/1/2015 21 25.2 20.95 24.6 8516800 24.6
9/1/2015 21.75 22.45 19.05 20.85 4296600 20.85
8/3/2015 23.45 28 19.8 22.05 10833700 22.05
7/1/2015 22.45 24 20.6 21.9 6225500 21.9
6/1/2015 23.95 24.6 20.05 22.2 7693000 22.2
5/1/2015 23.9 26.9 22.6 25.2 6598000 25.2
4/1/2015 27.25 30.25 22.3 23.9 11645700 23.9
3/2/2015 27.45 31.35 24.5 27.4 13022200 27.4
2/2/2015 16.2 28.3 16 27.85 20496800 27.85
1/1/2015 14.72 18.55 13.7 16.21 12575400 16.21
12/1/2014 14.1 15.54 12.15 14.7 4836700 14.7
11/3/2014 13.9 15.67 13.35 14.07 3565700 14.07
10/1/2014 12.31 13.99 10.89 13.45 4948700 13.45
9/1/2014 21.6 24.4 12.95 12.95 1909000 12.95
8/1/2014 21.25 24.9 20.6 21.5 2045900 21.5
7/1/2014 28.4 28.95 20.55 21.85 1337900 21.85
6/2/2014 23.95 36.8 23.6 28.35 6287200 28.35
5/1/2014 13.1 26.5 13.1 21.96 6478400 21.96
4/1/2014 11.3 15.55 11 13.1 3465800 13.1
3/3/2014 10.05 11.35 9.5 11.1 1374500 11.1
2/3/2014 10.74 11.75 9.9 10.07 1020700 10.07
1/1/2014 10.33 12.23 9.36 10.75 2255500 10.75
12/2/2013 9.9 11.22 9.22 10.32 1537600 10.32
11/1/2013 9.22 10.65 8.24 9.87 2183100 9.87
10/1/2013 6.5 11.85 6.43 9.7 2940500 9.7
9/2/2013 6 7 5.93 6.49 1717300 6.49
8/1/2013 7.19 7.5 5.72 5.94 1492800 5.94
7/1/2013 9.15 9.75 6.25 6.96 1595600 6.96
6/3/2013 11.73 11.73 8.7 9.11 1615200 9.11

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Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


5/1/2013 14.57 14.9 11.74 11.75 1645700 11.75
4/1/2013 13.9 15.1 13.27 14.57 2189800 14.57
3/1/2013 17.65 20.6 13.2 13.65 6215600 13.65
2/1/2013 25.25 26.9 13.55 16.05 26814300 16.05
1/1/2013 18.9 25.65 17.9 24.5 10897900 24.5
12/3/2012 19.75 20.3 16.95 18.55 5847900 18.55
11/1/2012 15.8 20.35 15.15 19.55 4538000 19.55
10/1/2012 17.95 18.4 15.25 15.7 2626400 15.7
9/3/2012 15.1 19.24 14.81 17.76 2724100 17.76
8/1/2012 18.5 18.9 14.75 14.95 2650600 14.95
7/2/2012 18.7 20.2 17.05 18.45 4188500 18.45
6/1/2012 18.05 18.7 17 18.55 4657300 18.55
5/1/2012 22.75 23.2 17.9 18.05 4491500 18.05
4/2/2012 25.5 26.4 21.15 22.8 3395400 22.8
3/1/2012 26.35 30.75 25 25.3 7511200 25.3
2/1/2012 27.9 32.35 24.15 26.6 7916900 26.6
1/2/2012 18.25 29.05 17.25 28 6571800 28
12/1/2011 24.15 24.4 17.5 18 4149000 18
11/1/2011 38.3 38.6 21.1 23.2 6109900 23.2
10/3/2011 36.4 39.1 34.65 38.6 1850100 38.6
9/2/2011 37.55 42.5 36.2 36.55 2915400 36.55
8/1/2011 54.5 54.95 34 37 5178400 37
7/1/2011 48.45 59.9 45 52.4 3053700 52.4
6/1/2011 54.2 54.35 43.85 47.95 2456500 47.95
5/2/2011 53.9 55.15 46.5 53.9 3885200 53.9
4/1/2011 44.65 58.45 44.65 53.15 6645400 53.15
3/1/2011 47.4 50 43.8 44.65 3622300 44.65
2/1/2011 49.8 51.75 42.8 46.65 4532500 46.65
1/3/2011 55.1 57.3 46.45 49.35 6018700 49.35
12/1/2010 47.65 55.35 45.95 54.65 4178900 54.65
11/1/2010 55.75 66.3 43 47.6 2946800 47.6
10/1/2010 53 60.8 52.7 55.45 4314000 55.45
9/1/2010 45 57.85 43.05 52.3 5454600 52.3

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Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


8/2/2010 56.9 58.8 45.9 46.3 3811100 46.3
7/1/2010 57.5 62.45 56.05 56.5 3163600 56.5
6/1/2010 56.85 59.1 52.15 57.9 4597400 57.9
5/3/2010 69.5 71.75 55.55 56.3 6086500 56.3
4/1/2010 63.5 76.2 63.5 68.95 3476400 68.95
3/2/2010 73.1 82.35 70 71.9 5416700 71.9
2/1/2010 79 80.4 68 71.8 6115900 71.8
1/1/2010 90.35 95.6 72 77.25 7202600 77.25

Natco Pharma

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


1/1/2016 581 587.5 572.55 576.4 228400 576.4
12/1/2015 531.9 586.4 490 579.3 343500 579.3
11/2/2015 2560.5 2569.4 492.21 528.85 184600 528.85
10/1/2015 2500 2694.75 2256.7 2560.5 231000 512.1
9/1/2015 2250 2522 2066.65 2471.5 249700 494.3
8/3/2015 2319.8 2519.8 1860 2251.3 528700 450.26
7/1/2015 2300.5 2465 2224.7 2312.95 289600 462.59
6/1/2015 2230 2293.95 1950 2283.45 447200 456.69
5/1/2015 2137.95 2529.05 1925.1 2213.3 552000 442.66
4/1/2015 2112 2709.85 1826.65 2137.95 1094700 427.59
3/2/2015 1373.9 2289 1373.9 2108.95 1340100 421.79
2/2/2015 1379.9 1469.5 1330 1354.5 245600 270.9
1/1/2015 1530 1589 1342 1381.1 316400 271.23
12/1/2014 1363.1 1570.3 1301.2 1530.25 273400 300.52
11/3/2014 1450 1469.9 1303.25 1363.1 164600 267.69
10/1/2014 1450 1573.95 1240.25 1441.85 177500 283.16
9/1/2014 1242 1590 1236.65 1453.75 261800 285.49
8/1/2014 1115 1251 1000.5 1204.25 108300 236.49
7/1/2014 1006 1157 971.25 1079.1 124100 211.92
6/2/2014 759.95 1210 731.7 1004.75 944200 197.32
5/1/2014 802 829 706.3 755.5 305300 148.37
4/1/2014 781 866.85 650 802 1151900 157.5
3/3/2014 849.7 878 770.55 798.55 182400 156.82

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Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


2/3/2014 743.05 851.6 696.05 842.9 427300 165.53
1/1/2014 802 829.8 719.45 743.05 243200 141.38
12/2/2013 778.55 840 745 808.6 280700 153.86
11/1/2013 677.85 826 660.1 777.4 465000 147.92
10/1/2013 620 728 612.1 674.45 444000 128.33
9/2/2013 588.8 629 582 613.35 247000 116.7
8/1/2013 618 650 545.05 583.5 337500 111.02
7/1/2013 445.15 634 445.15 607.1 625000 115.52
6/3/2013 440.15 460 422.05 445.05 238000 84.68
5/1/2013 442.55 467.35 425.1 441.9 229300 84.08
4/1/2013 439.8 477.85 435 442.55 259200 84.21
3/1/2013 420.05 524.8 405.6 429 243000 81.63
2/1/2013 464.95 472 403.05 414.75 142800 78.92
1/1/2013 469.8 503 446.3 461.95 308700 83.86
12/3/2012 444.45 506.8 433 459.55 400000 83.42
11/1/2012 375 467.9 368 441.25 329200 80.1
10/1/2012 367.1 414.9 363 375.5 121400 68.16
9/3/2012 357.9 388.05 342.65 366.7 284400 66.57
8/1/2012 350 379.9 341.35 351.6 157000 63.82
7/2/2012 339.9 372 330 347.45 284900 63.07
6/1/2012 391 396.95 335 337.3 427000 61.23
5/1/2012 426.05 435.7 355.15 389.85 544900 70.77
4/2/2012 356.9 436.85 349.95 428.1 598200 77.71
3/1/2012 277 361.8 260.05 353.9 1093600 64.24
2/1/2012 278.1 287 236.65 280.3 193200 50.88
1/2/2012 231.8 291 231.5 279.45 164700 48
12/1/2011 216 283 212.8 232.2 881600 39.88
11/1/2011 232 254 194.95 214.95 197900 36.92
10/3/2011 229.95 254.8 212.1 235.9 364100 40.52
9/2/2011 257 257.55 220.15 232.25 59600 39.89
8/1/2011 280.1 282 242.9 258.9 98200 44.47
7/1/2011 267 286.55 252.3 280.05 83100 48.1
6/1/2011 279 297.1 255 265.6 119300 45.62

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Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


5/2/2011 278 292.8 274.55 279.7 134300 48.04
4/1/2011 276.3 295.5 265.55 275.2 273400 47.27
3/1/2011 236.25 297 233.55 275.2 227500 47.27
2/1/2011 279.6 288.45 218 232.95 244800 40.01
1/3/2011 311 349 275 279.6 455000 46.12
12/1/2010 319.25 357 286 310.2 596700 51.17
11/1/2010 273.9 344.95 267.5 316.6 1727700 52.22
10/1/2010 294 298 265.1 269.85 845200 44.51
9/1/2010 270 309 252.5 291.25 2530100 48.04
8/2/2010 198.9 278.35 183.65 251.3 3621800 41.45
7/1/2010 198.8 212.75 187 195.35 431600 32.22
6/1/2010 168.25 206.5 157 200.7 838000 33.1
5/3/2010 171 175.75 152.55 169.5 385800 27.96
4/1/2010 134.3 183.4 133.25 169.45 2552900 27.95
3/1/2010 122.95 155.7 120.15 133.3 1889000 21.99
2/1/2010 125 131.7 110.15 123.4 586900 20.35
1/1/2010 123.55 133.9 121.95 125 671900 18.97

Nifty
Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close
1/4/2016 7924.55 7937.55 7241.5 7563.55 8793300 7563.55
12/1/2015 7958.15 7979.3 7551.05 7946.35 144400 7946.35
11/2/2015 8054.55 8116.1 7714.15 7935.25 162300 7935.25
10/1/2015 7992.05 8336.3 7930.65 8065.8 178100 8065.8
9/1/2015 7907.95 8055 7539.5 7948.9 182300 7948.9
8/3/2015 8510.65 8621.55 7667.25 7971.3 197000 7971.3
7/1/2015 8376.25 8654.75 8315.4 8532.85 4562900 8532.85
6/1/2015 8417.25 8467.15 7940.3 8368.5 150700 8368.5
5/4/2015 8230.05 8489.55 7997.15 8433.65 187400 8433.65
4/1/2015 8483.7 8841.65 8144.75 8181.5 187500 8181.5
3/2/2015 8953.85 9119.2 8269.15 8491 185400 8491
2/2/2015 8802.5 8913.45 8470.5 8844.6 182700 8844.6
1/2/2015 8288.7 8996.6 8065.45 8808.9 106200 8808.9
12/1/2014 8605.1 8626.95 7961.35 8282.7 61400 8282.7

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Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


11/3/2014 8348.15 8617 8290.25 8588.25 160800 8588.25
10/1/2014 7960.5 8330.75 7723.85 8322.2 159600 8322.2
9/1/2014 7990.35 8180.2 7841.8 7964.8 139600 7964.8
8/1/2014 7662.5 7968.25 7540.1 7954.35 140600 7954.35
7/1/2014 7629 7840.95 7422.15 7721.3 160200 7721.3
6/2/2014 7264.05 7700.05 7239.5 7611.35 179600 7611.35
5/2/2014 6709.95 7563.5 6638.55 7229.95 218800 7229.95
4/1/2014 6729.5 6869.85 6650.4 6696.4 157400 6696.4
3/3/2014 6264.35 6730.05 6212.25 6704.2 203600 6704.2
2/3/2014 6058.8 6282.7 5933.3 6276.95 156700 6276.95
1/2/2014 6301.25 6358.3 6027.25 6089.5 155700 6089.5
12/2/2013 6171.15 6415.25 6129.95 6304 177100 6304
11/1/2013 6289.75 6332.6 5972.45 6176.1 168300 6176.1
10/1/2013 5756.1 6309.05 5700.95 6299.15 7155900 6299.15
9/2/2013 5480.25 6142.5 5318.9 5735.3 199500 5735.3
8/1/2013 5776.9 5808.5 5118.85 5471.8 243100 5471.8
7/1/2013 5842.2 6093.35 5675.75 5742 28300 5742
6/3/2013 5985.95 6010.3 5566.9 5842.2 0 5842.2
5/1/2013 5930.2 6229.45 5911.25 5985.95 0 5985.95
4/1/2013 5682.55 5962.3 5477.75 5930.2 0 5930.2
3/1/2013 5702.45 5971.2 5604.85 5682.55 0 5682.55
2/1/2013 6040.95 6052.95 5671.9 5693.05 0 5693.05
1/2/2013 5982.6 6111.8 5940.6 6034.75 0 6034.75
12/3/2012 5878.25 5965.15 5823.15 5905.1 0 5905.1
11/1/2012 5609.85 5885.25 5548.35 5879.85 0 5879.85
10/1/2012 5704.75 5815.35 4888.2 5619.7 0 5619.7
9/3/2012 5276.5 5735.15 5215.7 5703.3 0 5703.3
8/1/2012 5220.7 5448.6 5164.65 5258.5 0 5258.5
7/2/2012 5283.85 5348.55 5032.4 5229 0 5229
6/1/2012 4910.85 5286.25 4770.35 5278.9 0 5278.9
5/1/2012 5248.15 5279.6 4788.95 4924.25 0 4924.25
4/2/2012 5296.35 5378.75 5154.3 5248.15 0 5248.15
3/1/2012 5366 5499.4 5135.95 5295.55 0 5295.55

10
Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

Date Open High Low Close Volume Adjusted Close


2/1/2012 5198.15 5629.95 5159 5385.2 0 5385.2
1/3/2012 4675.8 5217 4675.8 5199.25 0 5199.25
12/1/2011 4970.85 5099.25 4531.15 4624.3 0 4624.3
11/1/2011 5278.6 5326.45 4640.95 4832.05 0 4832.05
10/3/2011 4874.4 5399.7 4728.3 5326.6 0 5326.6
9/1/2011 5001 5169.25 4758.85 4943.25 0 4943.25
8/1/2011 5527.5 5551.9 4720 5001 0 5001
7/1/2011 5705.75 5740.4 5453.95 5482 0 5482
6/1/2011 5561.05 5657.9 5195.9 5647.4 0 5647.4
5/2/2011 5766.9 5775.25 5328.7 5473.1 0 5473.1
4/1/2011 5835 5944.45 5693.25 5749.5 0 5749.5
3/1/2011 5382 5872 5348.2 5833.75 0 5833.75
2/1/2011 5537.3 5599.25 5177.7 5333.25 0 5333.25
1/3/2011 6177.45 6181.05 5416.65 5505.9 0 5505.9
12/1/2010 5871 6147.3 5721.15 6134.5 0 6134.5
11/1/2010 6092.3 6338.5 5690.35 5862.7 0 5862.7
10/1/2010 6030.3 6284.1 5937.1 6017.7 0 6017.7
9/1/2010 5403.05 6073.5 5403.05 6029.95 0 6029.95
8/2/2010 5369.55 5549.8 5348.9 5402.4 0 5402.4
7/1/2010 5312.05 5477.5 5225.6 5367.6 0 5367.6
6/1/2010 5086.25 5366.75 4961.05 5312.5 0 5312.5
5/3/2010 5278.4 5278.7 4786.45 5086.3 0 5086.3
4/1/2010 5249.2 5399.65 5160.9 5278 0 5278
3/2/2010 4935.6 5329.55 4935.35 5249.1 0 5249.1
2/1/2010 4882.05 4992 4675.4 4922.3 0 4922.3
1/4/2010 5200.9 5310.85 4766 4882.05 0 4882.05

11
Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.
Calculating Risk and Return of Investments in a Portfolio (Part A)

End Notes:

i
“Dilip Shangvi plays white knight to Suzlon Energy”, Business Standard Report, February 14, 2015
ii
“Dilip Shangvi buys 3.5% stake in Natco Pharma”, www.business-standard.com, December 08, 2011
iii
P R Sanjai, “Dilip Shangvi to buy 23% Suzlon stake for 1800 crore”, www.livemint.com, February 14,
2015
iv
P B Jayakumar, “Color of Knight”, www.businesstoday.com, March 15, 2015
v
Aveek Dutta, “Suzlon’s rise from the ashes”, Forbes India, September 28, 2015
vi
Aveek Datta, “Suzlon’s Rise from the Ashes,” www.forbes.com, September 28, 2015.
vii
Aveek Datta, “Suzlon’s Rise from the Ashes,” www.forbes.com, September 28, 2015.
viii
Madhura Karnik, “How a man Whose Name is not Ambani became the Richest Indian,” www.qz.com,
March 31, 2015.
ix
P B Jayakumar, “Color of Knight”, www.businesstoday.com, March 15, 2015

12
Licensed to use for IBS Campuses only.
Sem I, Class of 2020-2022.

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