TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

Testimonial Evidence are:

1. statements under oath made
2. in court by witnesses
3. that are offered as proof of the matter in issue.

GENERAL QUALIFICATION OF A WITNESS

All persons who can:

1. perceive, and perceiving,
2. can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses,

EXCEPT when disqualified under:

1. the Constitution,
2. laws, or
3. the Rules of Court.

However,
1. religious or political belief;
2. interest in the outcome of the case, or
3. conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground
for disqualification.

A witness can testify only to those facts which he or she knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his or her own perception.1

MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION

1. During their marriage, neither the husband or the wife cannot testify for
or against the other
2. without the consent of the affected spouse,

EXCEPT in:
1. a civil case by one against the other, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

1
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
 In order for the marital disqualification rule to apply, the following
requisites must concur:

(a) Marriage is valid and existing as of the time of the offer of

testimony;

(b) The other spouse is a party to the action;

(c) Consent is not obtained from the spouse-litigant; and

(d) Must not be a civil case by one spouse against the other, or a
criminal case for a crime committed by one spouse against the
other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

When the marriage is dissolved on the grounds provided for by law like in
an annulment or declaration of nullity, the rule can no longer be invoked. A spouse
can already testify against the other despite an objection being interposed by the
affected spouse. If the testimony for or against the other spouse is offered during
the existence of the marriage, it does not matter if the facts subject of the testimony
occurred before the marriage. It only matters that the affected spouse objects to the
offer of testimony.

In the eyes of the law, there is an identity of interests between spouses. If

one were to testify for or against the other, there is a consequent danger of perjury.
Further, the policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of
private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness.

“But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are
so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home.”2

SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE

1. The husband or the wife,

2. during or after the marriage,
3. cannot be examined without the consent of the other
4. as to ANY COMMUNICATION RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE
5. by one from the other during the marriage

EXCEPT in
1. a civil case by one against the other, or
2. in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.3

Spousal privilege protects the hallowed confidences inherent in marriage

between husband and wife. Therefore, the rule is aimed to guarantee the
preservation of the marriage and further the relationship between the spouses as it
encourages the disclosure of confidential matters without fear of revelation.

The following are the principal distinctions between Marital Disqualification

and Marital Privilege:

First, disqualification only applies when one or both the parties are party to
an action or case, while privilege is applicable regardless whether the spouses are
parties;

Second, the disqualification ceases when the marriage is terminated, while

the privilege lasts beyond the marriage;

Third and finally, disqualification covers all testimony, while privilege only
covers privileged communications between spouses during the marriage.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

1. An attorney,

2
Alvarez v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439 (2005).
3
Section 24(a), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
 2. or a person reasonably believed by the client to be licensed to engage in
the practice of law
a. CANNOT, without the consent of his or her client, BE
EXAMINED as to:
b. a. any communication made by the client to him, or
c. his or her advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment,

nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk, or other persons

assisting the attorney be examined, without the consent of the client and his or
her employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity, except in the following cases:

(i) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services or advice of the lawyer

were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what
the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;

(ii) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a communication

relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client,
regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate or by inter vivos
transaction;

(iii) Document attested by the lawyer. As to a communication relevant to

an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting
witness; or

(iv) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common

interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of
them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action by
any of the clients, unless they have expressly agreed otherwise.4

The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and frank communication

between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice.5

The case of Mercado v. Vitriolo6 is enlightening:

4
Section 24 (b), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
5
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)
6
A.C. No 5108 (2005).
 Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean
Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the
privilege, viz.:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a

professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection
be waived.

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a

prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are

protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer
without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used
against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain
information from the prospective client.

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client

to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the
(prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is
the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,7 where the client and his wife leased
to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten
years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a
specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-
lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to
client’s listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors
which he had “confidentially” supplied counsel for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was
disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to
parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client
7
A.C. No. 927 (1970).
himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid
lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the
“confidential” list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that
client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the
professional relation then existing between them, but on account of
the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence
that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a
private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a
lawyer to his client.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a

presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted

by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses
the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.

Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the
instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer
and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to
his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in

his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not

be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal
advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney
for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
 If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal
assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a
communication disclosed for such purpose.

DOCTOR-PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

A physician, psychotherapist or a person reasonably believed by the

patient to be authorized to practice medicine or psychotherapy cannot,

in a CIVIL CASE, without the consent of the patient, be examined to any

confidential communication

made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s physical,

mental, or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction
between the patient or his or her physician or psychotherapist.

This privilege also applies to persons, including members of the patient’s

family who have participated in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient under the
direction of the physician or psychotherapist.

A psychotherapist is: (a) a person licensed to practice medicine engaged in

the diagnosis and treatment of mental and emotional condition of a person; or (b) a
person licensed as a psychologist by the government who is similarly engaged.8

This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make

safe full and confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts,
circumstances and symptoms, untrammelled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community.9

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following

requisites must concur:

1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;

8
Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
9
Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91114 (1992).
 2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is a
physician, a psychotherapist, or a person reasonably believed
by the patient to be authorized to practice medicine or
psychotherapy;

3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to

the patient in his professional capacity;

4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that

capacity; and

5. the information is confidential communication made for the

purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s physical,
mental, or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug
addiction between the patient or his or her physician or
psychotherapist.

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites. Finally, since the object of the privilege is to protect the
patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician’s
testimony.

PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE

A minister, priest, or person reasonably believed to be so cannot, without

the consent of the affected person be examined as to any communication or
confession made to or any advice given by him or her professional character,
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs.10

This is the otherwise known as “confessional privilege.” In Trammel v.

United States,11 the United States Supreme Court made its most definitive
statement on the privilege: “The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human
need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are
believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and
guidance in return.”

10
Section 24(d), Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
11
445 U.S. 40 (1980).
PUBLIC OFFICERS

A public officer cannot be examined during, or after his tenure, as to

communications made to him or her in official confidence,

WHEN THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST

WOULD SUFFER BY THE DISCLOSURE.

The rule is that communications made by and between public officers

are not privileged,12 except those that are declared to be in official confidence by
the person communicating the same.

Under this rule, even official confidential communications may be subject to

examination unless the court finds the public interest shall suffer from its
disclosure.

These communications under Section 24, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
shall remain privileged, even in the hands of a third person who may have obtained
the information, provided that the original parties to the communication took
reasonable precautions to protect its confidentiality.

In the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita,13 the Supreme Court categorically

stated that: “[e]xecutive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or
the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made.”

TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE

Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be COMPELLED to testify

against his
1. parents,
2. other direct ascendants,
3. children or
4. other direct descendants,

12
Pursuant to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest, subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law;
and Section 7, Article III guarantees the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;
13
G.R. No. 169777 (2006).
EXCEPT when such testimony is indispensable
1. in a crime against that person or
2. by one parent against the other.14

This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not

incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant.
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived
like other privileges.15

Privilege relating to trade secrets. — A person cannot be compelled to

testify about any trade secret, unless the non-disclosure will conceal fraud or
otherwise work injustice.

When disclosure is directed, the court shall take such protective measures as
the interest of the owner of the trade secret and of the parties and the furtherance of
justice may require.16

The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez v. Presidential Commission

on Good Government,17 that “the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally
affirmed that aside from national security matters and intelligence information,
trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank
Deposit Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.”

Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of

[their] confidential and privileged character, ingredients or chemical components
of the products ordered by this Court to be disclosed constitute trade secrets lest
[herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted business
competition with others who may imitate and market the same kinds of products in
violation of [respondent’s] proprietary rights. Being privileged, the detailed list of
ingredients or chemical components may not be the subject of mode of discovery
under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which expressly makes privileged
information an exception from its coverage. x x x Courts may still compel
disclosure of trade secrets “where it is indispensable for doing justice [,]” as such

14
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
15
People v. Invencion, G.R. No. 131636 (2003).
16
Section 26, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
17
G.R. No. 130716 (1998).
consideration justifiably overrides the interest of keeping trade secrets
confidential.18

While it is the employer who determines what it deems to be a ‘trade secret,’

‘[a]ny determination by management as to the confidential nature of technologies,
processes, formulae or other so-called trade secrets must have a substantial factual
basis which can pass judicial scrutiny. This is but an ineludible corollary of the
time-tested principle that “(t)he rules, instructions or commands in order to be a
ground for discharge on the score of disobedience, must be reasonable and lawful,
must be known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which the
employees have been engaged to discharge.’ A fictitious or non-existent ‘secret’
(or a publicly known one as in the instant case) can in no wise be the basis of a
reasonable and lawful rule or company policy regarding confidentiality.19”

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

The following are the main distinctions between Admissions and

Confessions:

(i) An admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to

a relevant fact, while a confession is the declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein;

(ii) An admission is a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party

of the existence of the truth of certain facts which are
inconsistent with his claims in an action, while a confession is a
statement by the accused that he engaged in conduct which
constitutes a crime;

(iii) An admission may be implied, as in a party’s silence, while

confessions cannot be implied, but should be a direct and
positive acknowledgment of guilt;

(iv) An admission may be adoptive, which occurs when a person

manifests his assent to the statements of another person, while a
confession is a purely personal act.

18
Air Philippines Corporation v. Penswell Inc., G.R. No. 172835 (2007).
19
Cocoland v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98458 (1996).
 The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him or her.20

In the case of Leynes v. People,21 the Supreme Court held that: “A judicial
admission, verbal or written, is made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case which does not require proof.
To contradict one’s own admission, the person who made the same must
show that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions.”

Quoting Alfelor v. Halasan,22 the Supreme Court in the immediately cited

case ruled that “[a] party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge [the]
fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with.

A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy.
Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to
the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was
pleaded.”

However, “in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of

any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. Neither is
evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations admissible.
Nevertheless, “evidence otherwise discoverable or offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation” are admissible.”23

In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,24 the Supreme Court

examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as evidence
against the offeror:

20
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
21
G.R. No. 224804 (2016).
22
G.R. No. 165987 (2006).
23
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
24
G.R. No. 174141 (2009).
 First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of
court, a person is entitled to “buy his or her peace” without
danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence,
any communication made toward that end will be regarded as
privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could be used as
evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be
prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent
person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her
compromise position could be exploited as a confession of weakness.

Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they

are not intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true
offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an
admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally
liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is
groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid
controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made
tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual
concessions.

Nevertheless, in Lucio Tan v. Rodil Enterprises,25 the Supreme Court ruled:

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not

an admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror. The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated
by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, to wit:

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an

offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the
intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus,
if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the
same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation,
the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof,
the party making the offer admits the existence of an
indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim
amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
25
G.R. No. 168071 (2006); citing Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109172
(1994); and Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 21911, 46 Phil. 176 (1924).
 indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective
admission of a borrower’s loan balance. Similarly, in the case
of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., the Court
applied the exception to the general rule. In Varadero¸ there
was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but
during the course of the abortive negotiations therein, the
defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding
that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the
only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court
did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal

negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.

In People v. Delovino,26 the Supreme Court held in a crime of rape that:

“The accused failed to deny the testimony of Antoinette that he had offered to pay
P40,000.00 to amicably settle these cases. Such an offer was an implied admission
of guilt pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which reads in part as follows: In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.”

However, if the offer of compromise is made prior to and not in the

context of a criminal proceeding, even if a criminal charge is subsequently
filed by the offeree, the offer cannot be admitted as proof of guilt. Hence, in
San Miguel Corporation v. Kalalo,27 a BP22 case, the Supreme Court ruled in the
following tenor:

We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the

Offer of Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the
filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was
clearly not made in the context of a criminal proceeding and,
therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt.

26
G.R. Nos. 116132-33 (1995).
27
G.R. No. 185522 (2012).
 A plea of guilty later withdrawn,
or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense,
is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or
offer,
and any statement made in the course of plea-bargaining with the
prosecution, which does not result in a plea of guilty,
or which resulted to a plea of guilty later withdrawn are also
inadmissible.

As early as US v. Patala,28 a 1903 case, jurisprudence is consistent in

declaring that “[i]t is not an error for the trial court to permit a defendant in a
criminal case to withdraw his plea of ‘guilty’ and interpose a plea of ‘not guilty.’
This is within the discretion of the court. Section 25 of General Orders No. 58,
provides, among other things, that the court may at any time before judgment upon
a plea of ‘guilty’ permit it to be withdrawn and the plea of ‘not guilty’ be
substituted.”

An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses

occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury.

Generally, evidence of payment of medical, hospital, or similar expenses of

an injured party by the opposing party, is not admissible, the reason often given
being that such payment or offer is usually made from humane impulses and not
from an admission of liability, and that to hold otherwise would tend to
discourage assistance to the injured person.

28
G.R. No. 112 (1903).
BREA
K
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA ALTERI NOCERE NON DEBET — It means “a

transaction between others does not prejudice one who was not a party to it.” Or,
“things done between strangers must not cause an injury to people who are not
parties to such acts.”

On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are
binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and
if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.29

In our jurisdiction, the rule has two branches. The first branch of the rule on
res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession
is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused
29
People v. Tena, G.R. No. 100909 (1992).
and is considered as hearsay against them. The second branch of said rule provides
that previous conduct or similar acts at one time is not admissible to prove that one
did or did not do the same act at another time

In Tamargo v. Awingan,30 the Supreme Court reiterated the basis for the rule
as follows: “On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and
if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.”

The first branch of the rule is codified in Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court,31 which reads: “The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.”

Not unlike most general rules, however, the first branch of the rule admits of
the following exceptions, to wit:

(a) Admission by a co-partner or agent (Section 30 Rule 130);

(b) Admission by a co-conspirator (Section 31, Rule 130); and

(c) Admission by privies (Section 32, Rule 130).32

ADMISSIONS BY A CO-PARTNER OR AGENT

The act or declaration of a:

1. Partner; or
2. agent
- authorized by the party to make a statement
- concerning the subject within the scope of his or her authority;
- and during the existence of the partnership or agency,
- may be given in evidence against such party
-after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.

30
G.R. No. 177727 (2010).
31
As amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC
32
As amended by A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC
 The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor,
or other person jointly interested with the party.

The law on agency provides that an agent is a person who performs some
service in representation of or on behalf of his principal. The agent therefore, is
in legal contemplation, a mere extension of the personality of the principal, and
unless the agent acts in his own name, the principal must comply with all the
obligations which the agent may have contracted within the scope of his authority.
Hence, whatever is said by an agent to a third person, during the course of the
agency and within the scope of his actual or apparent authority, relative to the
business contemplated by the agency, is for legal purposes also the statement of the
principal and is therefore, admissible against said principal.

The relationship among partners is on the same footing with the relationship
of an agent to his principal as both the contracts of agency and partnership involve
fiduciary relationships. Under the law,33 every partner is an agent of the partnership
for the purpose of its business and the act of the partner in carrying out the usual
course of business binds the partnership. Hence, under the same principle
governing an agency, the declarations of a partner may be admissible against the
other partners or the partnership.

For the admission of a co-partner or agent to be admissible, the following

requisites must concur:

(a) The partner or agent must be authorized by the party to make a

statement on the subject;

(b) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have been
made or done within the scope of his authority;

(c) The declaration or act of the partner and agent must have been
made or done during the existence of the partnership or agency,
and the person making the declaration still a partner or an
agent; and

(d) The existence of the partnership or agency is proven by

evidence other than the declaration or act of the partner and
agent.

33
Article 1818 of the Civil Code.
 As a rule, statements made after a partnership has been dissolved does
not fall within this exception, but where the admissions are made in
connection with the winding up of the partnership affairs, said admissions are
still admissible as the partner is acting as an agent of his co-partners in
winding up.

Under the principles of agency, where an attorney is employed to

represent a client in a particular matter, his or her acts or statements with
regard to that matter that are within the scope of his authority is ordinarily of
the same effect as though made by the client himself or herself. Statements
made by an attorney while acting in his or her capacity as an attorney, are, like
statements made by any other agent authorized to speak for the principal,
admissible against a party. Admissions by counsel, as by any other agent, are
admissible against a party provided that the statements had been made by the
attorney while acting in his authorized capacity.

ADMISSIONS BY CONSPIRATOR

As early as Gardiner v. Judge Magsalin,34 the Supreme Court has

consistently upheld the rule that: The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration.
In its decision, the Supreme Court opined:

The only question raised here is the interpretation of section 12

of rule 123, which reads as follows:

Section 12. Admission by conspirator. — The act

or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.

That is not a new rule of evidence. It is a re-enactment of

paragraph 6, section 298 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, which
provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence. This
rule has a well-settled meaning in jurisprudence, but apparently the
34
G.R. No. L-48185 (1941).
 respondents completely missed it. It is one of the exceptions to the res
inter alios rule. It refers to an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator
— not to his testimony by way of direct evidence.

In the relatively recent case of People v. Cachuela and Ibanez,35 the

Supreme Court laid out the requisites for this rule to apply:

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission

made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be

received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that:

(a) The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other

than the admission itself;

(b) The admission relates to the common object; and

(c) It has been made while the declarant was engaged

in carrying out the conspiracy.

ADMISSION BY PRIVIES

Where one derives title to property from another, the latter’s act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former. while the latter was holding the title.36

By the term “privies” is meant those between whom an action is deemed

binding although they are not literally parties to the said action.37

The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a

‘privity of estate’ exists between the declarant and the party, the term “privity of
estate” generally denoting a succession in rights. Consequently, an admission of
35
G.R. No. 191752 (2013).
36
Section 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
37
Constantino, et al. v. Heirs of Constantino, G.R. No. 181508 (2013).
one in privity with a party to the record is competent. x x x [A]nd where several co-
parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy,
the admission of one is competent against all.38

ADMISSION BY SILENCE

“[A]n innocent man would certainly strongly protest and deny a false
accusation and do something positive to spare himself of punishment.”39

An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or

observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such
as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible
for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.40

Admission by silence is based upon the principle that when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, the party
against whom such act or declaration is made must assert it as untrue if it is proper
and possible for him/her to do so.

In order to take an admission as admission by silence it must appear:

(1) that the party heard and understood the act or declaration;

(2) that the party was at a liberty to make a denial of such act or
declaration;

(3) that the act or declaration was in respect to some matter

affecting the party’s rights, to which s/he had interest, and
which naturally calls for an answer;

(4) that the facts were within the party’s knowledge; and

(5) that the inference to be drawn from the party’s silence would be
material to the issue.

To qualify as an admission by silence or an implied admission, it is essential

that the accused heard the incriminating statement and that it was made under
38
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154 (2003).
39
People v. Roa, G.R. Nos. 138195-96 (2003).
40
Section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
circumstances which allowed an opportunity for the accused to reply, and where a
man similarly situated would ordinarily have denied the accusation.41

The unexplained silence of a man surprised in company with a woman by

whom he is there and then charged with rape, under circumstances which would
naturally call for an indignant denial of such a charge by an innocent man, is
evidence tending to establish his guilt of the crime thus charged.42

In People v. Tia Fong,43 the Supreme Court held: “It is to be noted that the
implication of guilt in the case at bar is not derived from mere silence; it is inferred
from appellant’s silent acquiescence in participating in the reenactment of the
crime. More than mere silence, appellant committed positive acts without protest
or denial when he was free to refuse. Had he not actually participated in the
commission of the offense for which he is charged, he would have protested being
made to take part in the reenactment thereof; would have informed the public
officials at the time of the reenactment, or immediately prior thereto, that he did
not actually take part in the commission of the offense. We, therefore, find that the
trial court committed no error in taking into account Appellant’s participation in
the reenactment as voluntary and in considering it as evidence against him.”

Quoting Underhill’s Criminal Evidence,44 the Supreme Court in People v.

Gerona,45 held: “Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and
specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a
quasi-confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel
an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person’s silence, therefore, particularly
when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent.”

However, a person under arrest or under custodial investigation46 has a “right

to remain silent” with no duty to engage in argument with his captors. The silence
of one under arrest cannot be construed as conceding the truth of the statement
made in his presence, pursuant to the right against self-incrimination.

Flight as implied admission of guilt

41
People v. Cihak, 169 Ill. App. 3d 606 (1988).
42
United States v. Bay, G.R. No. 9341 (1914).
43
G.R. No. L-7615 (1956).
44
4th Ed., p. 401 (1935).
45
G.R. Nos. 89370-72 (1991).
46
See Republic Act No. 7438.
 Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily
withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings.47

Hence in People v. Medina,48 the Supreme Court held: “[t]he flight of an

accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from
which an inference of guilt may be established for a truly innocent person would
normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his
innocence.”

PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE

Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge;
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. 49 This is
the second branch of the res inter alios acta rule.

The general rule is that evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to
show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly
independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that
he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he
would be likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment. A man may be a
notorious criminal, but this fact may not be shown to influence a jury in passing
upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the particular offense for which he is
on trial. A man may have committed many crimes and still be innocent of the
crime charged in the case on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally
predispose the minds of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one
crime may be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one crime does not
prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is such a relation between
them that proof of one tends to prove the other.50‘

As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show, that the
accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the
offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed

47
United States v. Alegado, G.R. No. L-8448 (1913).
48
G.R. No. 214473 (2016).
49
Section 35, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
50
People v. Asinas, 53 Phil. 59 (1929).
other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he committed the
crime charged in the complaint or information.51

However, evidence of previous acts is admissible in proving specific intent

or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
In People v. Dadles,52 the Supreme Court held:

In this case we find that there is such a relation between both

incidents of kidnapping charged in the two informations that ‘proof of
one tends to prove the other’, and evidence of similar acts committed
about the same time establishes the criminal intent of the appellant to
deprive Salvador and Alipan of their liberty. First of all, both
incidents happened almost simultaneously. The kidnapping of Alipio
and Dionisio occurred only some thirty (30) minutes before Salvador
and Antonio were taken from their home. The appellant and his
companions were apparently well acquainted with the Tehidors and
the Alipans who readily allowed them entrance into their respective
houses on the fateful night of May 24, 1989. Alipio and Dionisio were
taken by the appellant’s group on the pretext that they wanted to talk
to Alipio. Similarly, the appellant claims that they took Salvador and
Antonio only because they wanted to talk to the former. Alipio’s wife
was warned not to tell the authorities about the incident. The same
warning was given to Salvador’s wife.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), circumstances exist to further warrant the conclusion
that it was the appellant’s criminal intent to deprive the victims of
liberty, to wit:

First. If appellant’s group merely wanted to talk to

Salvador Alipan, they could just have talked to him then
and there at the house of the latter without necessarily
taking him together with his son.

Second. Appellant’s group could have elicited the

required information from Salvador in just a matter of
51
People v. Magpayo, G.R. Nos. 92961-64 (1993).
52
G.R. No. 118620-21 (1997).
 hours. Hence, they should have returned Salvador and his
son the following day as promised. To this date,
however, no trace of the two (2) can be found.

Third. If they did not have any ill-motive against

the duo, why did they warn the family of the victims not
to report the incident to anybody or they will be killed?
Clearly, this behavior betrays the falsity of their alleged
intention.

In People v. Acosta,53 the criminal intent was proven by the previous acts of
the accused, thus: “appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by his
previous attempt to set on fire a bed (papag) inside the same house (private
complainant’s) which was burned later in the night.”

In Tanzo v. Drilon,54 the Supreme Court ruled: “Evidence of similar acts

may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit,
because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person, it provides
insight into such person’s motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or
it reveals a mistake.

The series of transactions between MJS International and Liwayway Dee

Tanzo were entered into under similar circumstances as those surrounding the
contract between petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged trust agreement
between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S International and
Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditor shall lend to the debtor a specific
amount for use by the latter in its business operations. Petitioner also admits that he
entrusted the checks to Liwayway Dee Tanzo for investment in private
respondents’ business. This shows that private respondents were transacting
directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the usual manner that they conduct business,
that is the loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, private respondents’ modus
operandi, if there ever was one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S.
International was to borrow money from willing investors. It is thus unlikely,
considering the scheme of things, that private respondents would all of a sudden
deviate from an established business practice to enter into a trust agreement with
the petitioner.”

53
G.R. No. 126351 (2000).
54
G.R. No. 106671 (2000).
 Meanwhile, Section 6 of R.A. No. 8505, otherwise known as the “Rape
Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998” provides: “In prosecutions for rape,
evidence of complainant’s past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her
reputation shall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent that the court finds,
that such evidence is material and relevant to the case.”

Moreover, Section 30 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness55

provides:

(a) Inadmissible evidence. — The following evidence is not

admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual
abuse:

(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim

engaged in other sexual behavior; and
(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of
the alleged victim.

(b) Exception. — Evidence of specific instances of sexual

behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other than the
accused was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence
shall be admissible.

A party intending to offer such evidence must:

(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before

trial, specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for
which it is offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a
different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and

(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem
at least three days before the hearing of the motion.

Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a

hearing in chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad litem, the
parties, and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion
and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal
and protected by a protective order set forth in Section 3(b). The child

55
A.M. No. 004-07-SC.
 shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except with
his consent.

Also, Section 19 of R.A. No. 10364, otherwise known as the “Expanded

Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012” provides:

A new Section 17-B is hereby inserted into Republic Act No.

9208, to read as follows:

Section 17-B. Irrelevance of Past Sexual

Behavior, Opinion Thereof or Reputation of Victims and
of Consent of Victims in Cases of Deception, Coercion
and Other Prohibited Means. – The past sexual behavior
or the sexual predisposition of a trafficked person shall
be considered inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of
proving consent of the victim to engage in sexual
behavior, or to prove the predisposition, sexual or
otherwise, of a trafficked person. Furthermore, the
consent of a victim of trafficking to the intended
exploitation shall be irrelevant where any of the means
set forth in Section 3(a) of this Act has been used.

UNACCEPTED OFFER OF PAYMENT

An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written

instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or
property.

This rule should be read in conduction to Article 1256 of the Civil Code,
which provides that if the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made
refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from
responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due, and that consignation
alone shall produce the same effect in the five cases enumerated therein. The
tender of payment, however, must be followed by consignation of the amount in
court in order to produce the effects of valid payment.56

56
Mclaughlin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57552 (1986).