636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 86787. May 8, 1992.

MILAGROS TUMULAK BISHOP, JUANA PANGILINAN, EMILIO MAXIMO, ANITA

PANGILINAN, MAGDALENA ROSETE, MANUEL DACUT, RECTO DIESTA, VIRGINIA
NOVICIO, and LINDA BONILLA, petitioners,  vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES MANUEL AND JESUSA SALANG, respondents.

Land Titles; Land Regulation; Presumption of regularity covers the finding that the land subject of
the certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens System.—On the first
ground, the Court notes that the private respondents’ title is traceable to an Original Certificate of Title
issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate is now incontrovertible and conclusive
against the whole world. The presumption of regularity applies to the issuance of that certificate. This
presumption covers the finding that the land subject of the certificate was private in nature and
therefore registrable under the Torrens system.
Same; Same; To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it
must be shown that the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there was
actual fraud in securing the Title; A certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against a
court decision declaring the land to be registrable.—To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens
certificate for being void  ab initio,  it must be shown that the registration court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the case and that there was actual fraud in securing the title. Neither of these
requirements has been established by the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the
Bureau of Forestry that the land in question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court
was correct in ruling that this deserved scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a
certification from an administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision declaring the land to be
registrable.
Same;  Same;  Prescription;  An action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud
prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration.—Significantly, it
does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the land registration
proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No less importantly, an action to
invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one (1) year from
the entry of the decree of registration and cannot now be resorted to by the petitioners at this late hour.
Same; Same; Same; The non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax declarations on the
land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it by such omission.—
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also possess it
does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of their tax
declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership thereof or have lost it
by such omission.
Same; Same; Same; The lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any
time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated; The right is never barred by laches.—
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners’ occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.
Same;  Same;  Same;  It is an elementary principle that the owner of a land registered under the
Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.—In urging laches against the private respondents for not
protesting their long and continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect
contending that they have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle
that the owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose it by prescription.
Civil Law; Builder in good faith; A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title
to the land at the time he builds on it.—In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the
petitioners cannot invoke the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the
construction they have made on the lots in dispute. A builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any
flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it. This definition

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ANNOTATED

Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very outset that they had no right at all to
occupy the subject lots.

PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Saturnino Bactad for petitioners.

CRUZ, J.:

The question presented in this case is not novel. As in previous cases resolving the same issue,
the answer will not change.
In dispute are certain portions of a parcel of land situated in Calapacuan, Subic, Zambales,
with a total area of 1,652 square meters. These portions are in the possession of the
petitioners. The entire parcel is registered in the name of the private respondents under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29018.
On January 22, 1985, the private respondents sued the petitioners for recovery of
possession of the lots in question. The plaintiffs invoked their rights as registered owners of
the land. In their answer, the defendants claimed that the lots were part of the public domain
and could not have been registered under the Torrens system. All alleged long and continuous
possession of the lots and produced tax declarations in their names. Two of them maintained
that they had acquired their respective lots by virtue of valid contracts of sale. Another based
her claim on inheritance.
After trial, Judge Nicias O. Mendoza
1
of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.  He held in part as follows:
The plaintiffs, being the registered owners in fee simple of the land in question, necessarily have the
lawful right to the physical possession of the land. The owner of a land has a right to enjoy and possess
it, and he has also the right to recover and repossess the same from any person occupying it unlawfully.
Art. 428—New Civil Code

“The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.

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1 Original Records, pp. 95-103.

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Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

“The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.”

There is, therefore, no doubt in law, that the plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in
question have also the corresponding right to the recovery and possession of the same. The defendants
who are in physical occupancy of the land belonging to the plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to unjustly
withhold the possession of the said land from the plaintiffs. The defendants’ occupancy of the land in
question is unlawful and in violation of plaintiffs’ right to the recovery and possession of the land they
owned. The evidence presented by the defendants claiming as per certifications of the Bureau of Forestry
that the land occupied by them is within the alienable and disposable public land, deserves scant
consideration as the said certification are without basis in law. The moment the land in question was
titled in the name of the plaintiffs, it ceased to become a part of the public domain as the same became
the private property of the registered owner, the herein plaintiffs. Tax declarations of the land made in
the names of the defendants are not evidence of title, it appearing that the land is already titled to the
plaintiffs. The registration of the land in the names of the defendants with the Assessor’s Office for
taxation purposes and the payments of real property taxes by the defendants can not and does not defeat
the title of the plaintiffs to the land. The fact that the defendants have been in occupancy of the land in
question for quite a period of time is of no moment as prescription will not ripen into ownership because
the land is covered by a torrens title. Acquisitive prescription will not be available to land titled under
Art. 496.
PREMISED THEREFORE on the foregoing consideration, the Court finds and so holds that the
plaintiffs being the registered owners of the land in question are entitled to the possession of the same,
and that the defendants who are occupying the land belonging to the plaintiffs in violation of the right of
the latter, are duty-bound to restore possession of the same to the titled owners, the herein plaintiffs.
2
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the respondent court on August 22, 1988.   Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners then came to this Court, urging
reversal of the courts below.

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2 Rollo, pp. 11-15; Melo, J., ponente, with Herrra, M. and Imperial, JJ.,concurring.

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Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

They allege that:

1. The land in question is part of the public domain and could not have been validly
registered under the Torrens system.
 2. The petitioners have acquired title to their respective lots by laches.
3. In the alternative, they should be considered builders in good faith entitled to the
rights granted by Articles 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the Civil Code.

The petition has no merit.

On the first ground, the Court notes that the private respondents’ title is traceable to an
Original Certificate of Title issued way back in 1910 or eighty-two years ago. That certificate
is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world. The presumption of regularity
applies to the issuance of that certificate. This presumption covers the finding that the land
subject of the certificate was private in nature and therefore registrable under the Torrens
system.
To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens certificate for being void ab initio, it must
be shown that the registration court had3
not acquired jurisdiction over the case and that there
was actual fraud in securing the title. Neither of these requirements has been established by
the petitioners. All they submitted was the certification of the Bureau of Forestry that the
land in question was alienable and disposable public land. The trial court was correct in ruling
that this deserved scant consideration for lack of legal basis. To be sure, a certification from an
administrative body cannot prevail against a court decision declaring the land to be
registrable.
Significantly, it does not appear in the record that the Director of Forestry, or any other
representative of the Government for that matter, entered any opposition to the land
registration proceedings that led to the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. No less
importantly, an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after
the expiration of

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3 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Macalindog, 6 SCRA 938; Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89.

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Bishop vs. Court of Appeals
4
one (1) year from the entry of the decree of registration and cannot now be resorted to by the
petitioners at this late hour. And collaterally at that.
The strange theory submitted by the petitioners that the owner of registered land must also
possess it does not merit serious attention. The non-presentation by the private respondents of
their tax declarations on the land is no indication that they have never acquired ownership
thereof or have lost it by such omission.
The second ground must also be rejected.
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject
any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be
supposed that they were aware of the petitioners’ occupation of the property, and regardless of
the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
This right is never barred by laches.
In urging laches against the private respondents for not protesting their long and
continuous occupancy of the lots in question, the petitioners are in effect contending that they
have acquired the said lots by acquisitive prescription. It is an elementary principle
5
that the
owner of a land registered under the Torrens system cannot lose6
it by prescription.
As the Court observed in the early case Legarda v. Saleeby:
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quite title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration in
the certificate, or which may raise subsequent thereto. That being

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4 Section 38 of Act No. 496 (now Section 32 of PD 1529); Hernandez v. CA, 160 SCRA 821; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 144
SCRA 292; Municipality of Hagonoy v. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 73 SCRA 507.
5 Section 47 of PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Valdez, supra; Umbay v. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427; Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona,
et al., 100 Phil. 251.
6 31 Phil. 590.

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Bishop vs. Court of Appeals

the purpose of the law, it would seem that once the title was registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid
the possibility of losing his land.

Applied consistently these many years, this doctrine has been burnished bright with use and
has long become a settled rule of law.
In light of the observations already made, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot invoke
the status of builders in good faith to preserve their claimed rights to the constructions they
have made on the lots in dispute.
A builder in 7good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time
he builds on it.  This definition cannot apply to the petitioners because they knew at the very
outset that they had no right at all to occupy the subject lots.
The petitioners have consistently insisted that the lots were part of the public domain and
even submitted a certification to that effect from the Bureau of Forestry. The land was in fact
registered under the Torrens system and such registration was constructive notice to the
whole world, including the petitioners. Apparently, the petitioners did not take the trouble of
checking such registration. At any rate, the point is that, whether the land be public or
private, the petitioners knew they had no right to occupy it and build on it. The Court of
Appeals was correct in calling them squatters for having entered, without permission or
authority, land that did not belong to them.
In urging reversal of the trial court and the respondent court, the petitioners are asking us
to overturn long established doctrines guaranteeing the integrity of the Torrens system and
the indefeasibility of titles issued thereunder for the protection and peace of mind of the
registered owner against illegal encroachments upon his property. We are not disposed to take
this drastic step on the basis alone of their feeble arguments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

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7  Mercado v. Court of Appeals,  162 SCRA 75;  Granados v. Monton,  86 Phil. 42;  Caram v. Laureta,  103 SCRA

7; Arriola v. Gomez de la Serna, 14 Phil. 627.

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Villamil vs. Court of Appeals

     Narvasa (C.J.), Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
 Petition denied.

Note.—Torrens Title is generally conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to therein. (Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9.)

——o0o——