Classical Quarterly 40 (ii) 396-406 (1990) Printed in Great Britain 396

LOVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN

There are two basic objections to Plato's account of love in the Phaedrus, both raised
by Gregory Vlastos, both metaphysically important in their own right, and both still
unanswered. The first is that the Phaedrus sees men as mere images of another world,
making it folly or even idolatry to treat them as worthy of love for their own sakes.
The other is that it considers the love that we bear for our fellow men to be the result
of human, temporal deficiency. If only we could be free of this deficiency, the
objection runs, we would have no reason to love anything or anyone except the
Forms: seen face to face, these by themselves would absorb all our love.1
My purpose in this paper is to meet these objections.2

I
There is little doubt that in the Phaedrus Plato wishes to express and evoke attitudes
and emotions of metaphysical, religious and epistemological awe towards the Forms.3
They lie, he tells us, not only beyond the earth, but beyond the very dwelling-place
of the gods; they constitute what alone is really real (247c, 249c); they are the proper
objects of reason and true knowledge (247c-d); they are holy realities, dwelling in a
holy place (250a, 254b) ;4 they are the source of the gods' very divinity (249c); they
1
In this paper Vlastos [44, see Works Cited], pp. 32f., concentrates on the Symposium more
than the Phaedrus but it is clear that his objections apply equally to the latter (see his remarks
on p. 20; p. 27 n. 80; p. 31 n. 93). His paper has already received attention from a number of
scholars, but the particular objections that I am concerned with have not to my knowledge been
met. See, e.g., Kosman [17]; Price [27]; Price [28]; Santas [35]; Nussbaum [23] & [24]; Griswold
[10], pp. 128-9; Ferrari [5], pp. 181-4. Price in his excellent paper [27] pays direct attention to
the second objection (p. 34), but concludes that it does not in fact constitute a special difficulty:
by contrast, I hold that it is a serious objection but can be met. Nussbaum, though she does not
attempt to meet the objections head on, says more that is sharply in conflict with Vlastos' views
than anyone else: she asserts in various forms that love in the Phaedrus is love of individuals qua
individuals, and that it is intrinsically worth while, and she implies that the Phaedrus' lover loves
his beloved for the latter's own sake. However, she writes as if love in the Phaedrus were
concerned solely with humans, a thing altogether of this world. This surely is wrong: the human
individual is not even the main object, goal or point of love, and Nussbaum has to contend with
a heavy weight of contrary scholarly opinion on this point. To take examples almost at random
from the last hundred years or so, see: Jowett [16], pp. 554-5; Zeller [49], pp. 191-6, esp. n. 68;
Taylor [40], p. 27; Field [6], pp. 164-5; Hackforth [13], p. 10; Friedlander [7], pp. 55-6; Gould
[9], p. 107; Robin [30], pp. 57-8; Dies [4], pp. 437^48,444-6; Morgan [21], p. 42; Hamilton [14],
p. 8; Guthrie [12], pp. 426-7; and, very recently, Santas [35], pp. 111-12; Rowe [31], pp. 172-3;
Melling [20], p. 100. The majority of these tend towards the view that according to the Phaedrus
'the vision of the eternal forms is the highest aim of divine and human souls; the "desire for the
beyond" is the motivating power; the wings, borrowed from the god of love, are symbolic of
this striving' (Friedlander [7], p. 55).
2
Along with Vlastos I assume that Socrates' second speech can properly be taken as Plato's
own account of love, in spite of its non-dialectical nature. But see Rowe's [32] useful comments
on this, pp. 7-11; and see Rowe [33], passim.
3
While Plato does not talk of' Forms', it is generally accepted without debate that his ' real
Reality' is the world of the Forms.
4
On the religious language and tone of the Phaedrus, see the excellent article by Seeskin [37],
esp. pp. 579-80.

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 LOVE IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS 397

induce in men towards even their images the kind of awe and reverence which is
characteristic of worship (251a); they make up that reality which brings nourishment,
satisfaction and contentment to the gods (247d); until the fall of some, all souls
without exception strive to attain to the vision of them (247b, 248a-b); they are the
objects of that recollection which marks off the madness and splendour of
philosophers and lovers (249c-d).5 In short, the Forms are transcendent, real, awe-
inspiring and holy, and they play a central part in Plato's account of love - a part
which has not always been acknowledged in the recent literature.6
However, does it follow from the supposed fact that the Forms possess these
arresting characteristics that they alone have intrinsic worth, that they alone are
worthy of being loved for their own sakes? Does it follow that all the good, noble and
beautiful things of this world, including men, are to be loved only because they are
images of Reality, occasioning the recollection and subsequent vision of Goodness,
Beauty and the like? Above all, does it follow that in what concerns men 'it would
be folly and even idolatry to treat them as worthy of love for their own sakes'?7
If conclusions of this sort do follow, doubtless they render Plato's account of love
unacceptable to most of us, since they show that of their very nature men cannot be
loved as ends, but only as means: they show that even in love we are condemned to
use one another. But such conclusions do not follow. Quite the contrary. In the light
of what Plato says, we can have good and even compelling reasons for loving men as
ends in themselves, as I will now argue.
It is true that Plato often speaks of the things of this world, men included, as images
of the Forms and as imitating them (TI r<hv ixcl 6^OIW(JM, 250a; ev rois rrjSe
ofwiw/xaaiv, 250b; ras eiKovas, 250b; KaXAos ev fiefiifi.r)fievov, 251a); and as was said
earlier he refers to the Forms themselves as alone being really real (ovaia OVTCOS ovaa,
247c; TO ov OVTWS, 249C). But given the way in which he uses words for 'image' and
their cognates throughout the dialogues (o/xouo^a, CIKO&V etc.),8 what he says here in
the Phaedrus amounts merely to saying that the things of this world are like the Forms

5
There is little doubt that in Plato's mind the lover and the philosopher are one and the same
person. See, e.g., Thompson [43], ad he; Hackforth [13], p. 83; De Vries [3], p. 143.
• See remarks on Nussbaum especially in note 1 above.
' Vlastos [44], p. 32. It is perhaps worth noting here that in order to rebut Vlastos' charge it
is not enough simply to argue that in the Phaedrus the lover in fact treats his beloved as worthy
of love for his own sake (as several scholars have already argued); it needsfirstto be argued that
this is not a case of folly or idolatry.
8
Plato does sometimes use the word eiKwv of existence-dependent images (see Rep. 509el-2,
510e3), but he also uses it of independently existing items, such as statues and paintings (see Rep.
401b5; Crat. 432b6; Soph. 235d-236b). The word O/AOUO/MI etymologically has a broad
connotation and is explicitly given this at Soph. 266d7; it can therefore be used, and is used, of
independently existing items like paintings {Crat. 434a I). Concerning the use of the word etSioXa
at Lysis 219d, discussed by Vlastos [44], p. 10, esp, n. 23, the following is to be said. Socrates has
been discussing what he calls the irpwrov <f>iXov, that for the sake of which all other things and
persons are loved and which alone is really loved - that is, alone is worthy of being loved for its
own sake. He makes the point that we should be careful not to value the various means to
achieving the irpwrov <j>(Xov as if they themselves were really loved. There is a danger, he says,
that 'those other objects, of which we said that they are loved for its sake, should deceive us, like
so many images (ei&wXa) of it' (219d2-4). In saying this, Socrates is not arguing that things and
persons are eiScuAa and therefore not really loved. Rather he assumes in the immediate context
that all sorts of things and persons are not really loved, and adds that there is a danger of
mistakenly believing them to be so - a danger of being deceived by them in the way in which
it is possible to be deceived by images, mistaking them for their originals. Concerning the Lysis
in general and the bearing of its contents on the question of loving persons for their own sakes,
along with Vlastos I take it to be a thoroughly Socratic dialogue.

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 398 F. C. WHITE
but are not as real as they. This neither entails nor even suggests that the things of this
world are deficient in reality, that they are dependent for their existence on the Forms,
and that they are lacking in substance like shadows or reflections in water.9 Still less
does it entail that souls, those realities which number the gods among them and are far
from being of this world, are things of a shadowy, insubstantial kind. Consequently,
Plato's account of love gives us no grounds for imputing ontological folly to loving
men for their own sakes: that is, it does nothing to support the view that to love,
cherish and respect a man is no better ontologically than to love, cherish and respect
his shadow.
While Plato's doctrine then gives no justification for concluding that men are
ontologically unworthy of being loved for their own sakes, it might seem none the less
that he considers them to be thus unworthy on other grounds. For, in the first place,
he holds that when a man is loved this is because he serves as a means to his lover's
recollection and re-communion with the Forms. In the second place, in the course of
analysing love Plato depicts Reality as worthy of love for its own sake, while he sees
the beloved as a mere image of that Reality.
Concerning the first of these supposed grounds of men's unworthiness - the fact
that on Plato's analysis the beloved serves his lover as a means to recollection and
recommunion with the Forms - little needs to be said. For Plato himself makes plain,
in the Republic for example, that a thing's being worth while as a means does not
exclude its being worth while for its own sake (Rep. 357ff.). Thus if the beloved is
worthy of love on the grounds that he serves as a means to recollection and re-
communion with the Forms, he is not for that reason unworthy of love for his own
sake. Concerning the second of the supposed grounds - the claim that Plato sees
Reality as worthy of being loved for its own sake while seeing men as mere images
of that Reality - a lot more needs to be said. We need to answer the general question
whether images qua images can properly be loved for their own sakes.

II
Before the possibility or propriety of loving images for their own sakes can profitably
be discussed, some preliminary points need to be made.
To begin with, the expression ' to love something - or someone10 -for its own sake'
has at least two senses. The first of these suggests that our thoughts are focused upon
our own interests. If I say, for example, that I love music for its own sake, I have in
mind that music of itself constitutes or satisfies one of myfinalgoals or ends, and that
I do not pursue it for the sake of something else, or solely for the sake of something
else. Similarly if I say that I love Mary for her own sake, I mean that Mary constitutes
or satisfies certain of my ends, and that precisely because these are ends I do not love
her for the sake of something else, or solely for the sake of something else. In the
second of the senses the expression suggests that our thoughts are focused upon the
interests of some other person or persons (as well perhaps as upon our own). Thus
if in this sense I say that I love Mary for her own sake, I mean that among other things
I want those of her ends to be fulfilled which I judge to be to her good, and that I want
them to be fulfilled because they are her ends, not mine; that similarly I take delight
9
I have argued the point about the ontological status of images in Plato's dialogues in detail
elsewhere: see especially White [46], passim & [47], passim.
10
Quinton [29], pp. 104-5, and Taylor [42], p. 146, (quoted by Brown [1], p. 20) hold that
only persons can be objects of love, but this seems unduly restrictive. See Hamlyn [15], pp. 1 Iff.
and Brown's [1] (partially persuasive) arguments contra, pp. 20-6, 104-5.

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 LOVE IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS 399
in those of her desires being satisfied which I judge to be beneficial or at least not
detrimental to her; that I wish to contribute to furthering her beneficial or non-
harmful goals and ambitions.
(Because a human being has interests, it is possible in both senses of the expression
to love him or her for his or for her own sake. By contrast, it is possible to love Beauty
for its own sake, or any other of the Forms, in the first sense only. The Forms have
no interests of their own.)
The second preliminary point is this. Loving someone for his or her own sake, in
whichever sense of the expression, does not require that he or she be loved exclusively,
or loved more than other persons or things. If a Christian loves his God for the latter's
own sake, for example, this does not mean that he cannot love his neighbour in a
similar way. And if he loves his neighbour for his neighbour's sake, this does not
mean that he loves the latter more than he loves his God. There are degrees of loving
and many possible hierarchies among the objects of love.
With these preliminary points made, the issue of love and images may now be
turned to, and it will be useful to distinguish henceforth between ' loving something
for its own sake/ (the first sense of the expression) and 'loving something for its own
sake2'.

Loving a person for his own sake in the first sense of the expression
The first important question to be answered here is this. Is it possible, and perhaps
at times even right and proper, to love an image for its own sakej when we already
love it because it is an image of something else which we love for its own sake^ More
specifically, is it possible and in fact sometimes right and proper to love a person for
his own sake! when we already love him because he is an image of Beauty which we
love for its own sake^ I will argue that it is.
If we love a thing for its own sake^ we have eo ipso good grounds for loving an
image of that thing for its own sake! too, provided that the image in question
sufficiently resembles its original in those qualities for which we love the latter in the
first place. To illustrate the point, if we love a sunset for its own sake! in virtue of its
visual beauty, we have good grounds for loving its reflection in the waters of a lake
for its own sakej too. Or if we love Helen for her own sakej in virtue of her physical
beauty, we have similarly good grounds for loving a portrait of Helen for its own
sake1; provided that the portrait adequately captures her beauty. In such cases we can
love the image because it is an image, and at the same time love it for its own sake^
We can love the portrait of Helen because it is an image of her, recalling her to mind
when she is absent and so on, and also love it for its own sakex - for the beauty of
form which it itself possesses.
It follows that the doctrine of the Phaedrus in no way makes it inconsistent to love
a human being for his or her own sakej while loving him or loving her qua an image
of Beauty.
Behind this reasoning lies the assumption - admittedly not universally approved of,
and not approved of by Vlastos11 - that when we love something for its own sakeL,
11
The very general thesis that in all cases x loves y in virtue of some or all of y's qualities,
is defended by Taylor [41], passim, and supported from Plato's point of view, though not always
in the same form, by such commentators on the Phaedrus as Kosman [17], pp. 56-7 (commenting
onNygren [25]) and esp. pp. 64ff.; Price [27], pp. 32-4; Price [28], p. 98; Griswold [10], p. 129;
Ferrari [5], p. 182. It is also splendidly argued for in relation to the Symposium by Warner [45],
passim. But this general thesis is much disputed. For opposing views of various kinds, in addition
to that of Vlastos [44], p. 31, see: McTaggart [19] (quoted by Warner [45], pp. 334-5); Pitcher

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 400 F. C. WHITE
we love it in virtue of all or some of its qualities. It assumes, for example, that if we
love a silver vase for its own sake lt we love it in virtue of such qualities as its shape,
colour and lustre. This assumption is reasonable -pace Vlastos and others - because
it is hard to know how else properly to explain our loving the vase and not, say, the
bronze medallion standing next to it. And the same holds mutatis mutandis of persons.
The assumption is that we love them in virtue of some or all of their qualities, and
this assumption is similarly reasonable because it is difficult otherwise to give a
genuine explanation of our loving Martha rather than Mary. 12 Equally it is difficult
to lend sense to the suggestion that we love persons for their individuality or
particularity, not for their qualities.13
On kindred grounds it is reasonable to assume that there are limits to what kinds
of person we can reasonably love, since it seems absurd to suggest that we might love
a person whatever his qualities, however evil or repulsive.14
It follows as a corollary to these assumptions that the more closely one thing
resembles another that we already love for its own sake^ the better grounds we have
for loving the first thing for its own sake2 too. For example, if a piece of jewellery that
we love for its own sakej has a near pair, we have good grounds for loving that near
pair for its own sake t too. If Helen resembles a film-star that we idolise for her own
sake 1; we have good grounds for loving Helen for her own sake t too. 15
Bearing all of this in mind, we can now ask if the lover described in the Phaedrus
has good grounds for loving his beloved for that beloved's own sake^ in addition to
loving him as an image of Beauty. The answer to the question is plainly ' Yes', because
the beloved as Plato portrays him resembles Beauty not just adequately but to a
striking degree. Plato tells us that the lover sees the godlike face or body of his beloved
closely imitating Beauty (WAAos ev nefj.iixrnj.evov, 251 a3), and that consequently he feels
in the presence of this resemblance the sort of awe which recently he felt in the
presence of Beauty itself (251a); that when looking upon the beauty of his beloved the
lover is moved to worship him as if he were a god (251a); that the lover feels reverence
for his beloved because the latter is possessed of such beauty (252a-b); that when the
soul of the lover draws near, he sees the brilliant vision of his beloved, and
consequently at once recalls the true nature of Beauty (254b); that the beauty of the
beloved sends the lover into a frenzy, into sleeplessness and so on (251dff.). There is

[26], pp. 341-2; Scruton [36], pp. 41-2; Hamlyn [15], p. 13; Scruton [37], pp. 525-6; Goldberg
[8], pp. 38-9; Brown [1], pp. 24,41-6,102-10. However, for the purposes of this paper, although
I do in fact hold to the general thesis, I need only the ' true and even trivial' (Taylor [41], p. 153)
thesis that in some cases x loves y in virtue of certain of y's qualities. More specifically, all that
I need is that it be consistent with Plato's doctrines to hold that the lover loves his beloved in
virtue of the latter's beauty and other qualities, and that this justifies his loving his beloved for
his own sake as well as as a means to recollection and so on.
12
I take the view (perhaps stipulatively) that to assert that you love Mary because she was
thefirstgirl to dance with you, or something else of the sort, is not to give an explanation of your
love at all. It is not uncommon to feel a sentimental attachment to the girl whofirstdanced with
you, but if in addition you actually love her, your appropriate emotional feelings and behaviour
need to be based on beliefs about her lovable qualities.
13
Few of us would beflatteredto learn that it was not in virtue of our qualities that we were
loved.
14
But see: Hamlyn [15], p. 13; Lyons [18], pp. 78-9 and Brown [1] on Lyons, pp. 114-15;
Brown [1], pp. 117-24 on Pitcher [26], pp. 341ff.
15
In the case of loving a person as a sexual partner the grounds here are prima facie grounds
only, and can be overridden by such things as obligations to keep promises. Thus, for example,
I may have good grounds for loving and living with Angela while being morally barred from
doing so by the fact that I have obligations to Mary, my wife. But see Newton-Smith [22], pp.
124ff.

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 LOVE IN PLATO'S PHAEDRVS 401
no doubt then that the beloved resembles Beauty so plainly as fully to justify his being
loved for his own sakeL, in addition to being loved as an image. In fact, given that the
beloved closely resembles or is a good imitation of Beauty (251a), surely reason
demands of the lover that he love him for his own sake r And the same holds of
Justice, Wisdom and the like. The beloved resembles these before he is chosen (252e),
and comes increasingly to resemble them as love develops. And though this
resemblance is less obvious than resemblance to Beauty, there is no reason to believe
it less real or less discernible to the lover.
All of this is a far cry from the assertion that on Plato's account of love it is ' folly
and even idolatry' to love a human being for his own sake.

Loving a person for his own sake in the second sense of the expression
The second important question that needs to be answered is this. Does Plato's
account of love in the Phaedrus make it inconsistent, foolish or even idolatrous to love
a person for his own sake2 - to wish for his (good) ends to be fulfilled because they
are his ends, to take delight in the satisfaction of his (good) desires because they are
his desires, and so on? The answer is ' N o ' . Helen may properly be loved for her own
sake2 in virtue of her beauty, wit and charm, just as she may be loved for her own
sake! in virtue of those or other like qualities. Moreover, if at the same time she is
lovable as an image of Beauty or some other Form or Forms, this does not affect her
lovability for her own sake2 any more than it affects her lovability for her own sake,.
As I argued earlier, if a person closely resembles Beauty, eo ipso he is worthy of
being loved for his own sake;, precisely because Beauty itself is worthy of being so
loved. By contrast, if a person closely resembles Beauty or any other Form, he is not
thereby rendered worthy of being loved for his own sake2. This is because the Forms,
having no interests, are not themselves lovable in that way. So we cannot argue that
Plato's beloved in the Phaedrus is lovable for his own sake2 on the grounds that he
closely resembles Beauty which itself is lovable for its own sake 2 . Beauty is not lovable
in that way. However, what we can argue on the strength of Plato's position is this.
The Forms of Beauty, Wisdom, Temperance and the like are not lovable for their own
sakes2, since they do not have interests. But a person who resembles those Forms, and
thereby has the qualities of beauty, wisdom and temperance, is lovable for his own
sake2. For in addition to having these and similar qualities he is a person, and being
a person he has interests.16

u
Two points are worth noting here. One is that Vlastos' first objection has already been
answered: there are no grounds for saying that it is folly to love a man even qua image for his
own sake. What follows is an argument to show that there are often positive grounds making
it unreasonable not to. The second point is that a number of scholars have already drawn
attention (for reasons different and sometimes opposed to mine) to the part that individuals play
in the Phaedrus' account of love (often as opposed to that of the Symposium - but see Rowe's
[32] sober comments on this point, p. 190). See, e.g., Grube [11], pp. 112-13; Gould [9], p. 120;
Sinaiko [39], pp. 85-6; Price [27], pp. 30-1; Price [28], pp. 96-7; Santas [35], p. 112; Nussbaum
[23], [24], passim; Ferrari [5], p. 184. Nussbaum [24] is particularly insistent on the place of the
individual qua individual in the Phaedrus' account, though the textual basis for her claims is not
always clear. She says of the beloved that' this person is loved and valued in a unique, or at least
a rare and deeply personal way', and 'that this unique person is valued, throughout, as a
separate being with his or her own self-moving soul' (p. 218). Again she tells us, concerning pairs
of lovers, that having found one another 'they treat one another with respect for the other's
separate choices, fostering one another's continuing development towards theflourishingof
their deepest aspirations, "using not envious spite or ungenerous hostility" towards the other,
but genuinely benefiting him for his own sake' (p. 219). Yet again, she says that love is 'a thing
of intrinsic value and beauty, not just a way-station toward the good'; and that the ' best human

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 402 F. C. WHITE
Needless to say, Plato himself does not argue in this way: Plato himself, that is,
does not argue about the interests of persons qua persons. But he has no call to. His
principal concern in the central part of the Phaedrus - pace some - is to bring out
precisely and solely that persons in respect of certain qualities are images of the Forms
and thereby lovable as means to recollection and re-communion with those Forms.
Even so, much of what he says in the course of describing love's transcendent function
suggests that he could well have argued in such a way had he chosen. For what he says
makes plain that a lover loves his beloved because the latter possesses beauty and
other godlike qualities, qualities such as love of wisdom and capability as a ruler
(252e). In addition he makes plain that once the lover on the basis of these qualities
has fallen in love with his beloved,17 he instantly begins to act with zeal to further
what he judges to be the genuine interests of that beloved. For he seeks to obtain for
him everything that he desires and seeks for himself, namely a growing resemblance
to his god (253b-c).18
It does not follow from what has just been said that the lover pursues the interests
of his beloved for the beloved's own sake; he could be a total egoist pursuing things
for his own sake, even the interests of his beloved.19 However, there are things said
in the Phaedrus suggesting that the lover views his beloved as worthy of consideration
in his own right, as an end in himself.20 To begin with, in his behaviour towards those
whom he loves, and towards others, the lover is said to model himself on the god
whose follower he is (252d), from which it may be inferred that he strives to imitate
all of the latter's qualities, including those that the gods have in common.21 From this
in turn it follows that he will behave as the gods in general behave towards men; and
this is exemplified in the Phaedrus by the gods' gift of love to men for men's benefit
and greatest happiness (245b-c). It is more generally exemplified by their begrudging
men nothing in respect of happiness (247a). On the plausible assumption then that in
Plato's view the gods do not act from self-interest,22 we have no grounds for imputing
self-interest to the lover. Again, the lover is said to revere his beloved and stand in
holy awe of him (254e), attitudes of mind which are hard to reconcile with his

life involves ongoing devotion t o a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l ' (p. 219). Finally, she asserts that instead
of 'loving o n e a n o t h e r as exemplars of beauty a n d goodness, properties which they might
conceivably lose without ceasing t o be themselves, these lovers love o n e a n o t h e r ' s character,
memories a n d aspirations - which a r e , a s Aristotle t o o will say, w h a t each person is " in a n d of
h i m s e l f " ' ( p . 220).
17
Kai oTav avTov evpdvres ipaadwat, 252e3-4. It is clear t h a t a l t h o u g h love is described as
a form of m a d n e s s , it is n o n e the less based o n r e a s o n : the lover looks first for the right qualities
in his prospective beloved. A n d surely there is n o suggestion t h a t qua philosopher the lover is
m a d , whatever the majority m a y think. But see Vlastos' [44] c o m m e n t s , p . 27 n. 80. N u s s b a u m
[24], p p . 213ff., wishes to treat the Phaedrus' love as a m o r e extreme form of madness t h a n seems
w a r r a n t e d : she speaks a s if according to P l a t o being in love were incompatible with possessing
the virtue of aw(/>poavvr]. F o r some useful c o m m e n t s o n the m a d n e s s a n d rationality of the
lover-philosopher, see R o w e [33], p p . 117-19.
18
See the q u o t a t i o n from H e r m i a s , Ferrari [5], p . 184.
19
Cf. Vlastos [44], p p . 8f.
20
T h e following r e m a r k s a t t e m p t t o meet Vlastos' [ 4 4 ] ' selfishness o b j e c t i o n ' (p. 4). F o r very
different a n d m o r e radical a t t e m p t s t o meet it see K o s m a n [17], p p . 54ff.; Price [27], esp. p . 30.
See also Price [28], p p . 9 7 - 8 .
21
In other w o r d s , I interpret P l a t o to m e a n at 252c-d t h a t the lover, once seized b y love,
h o n o u r s a n d strives to imitate his god in all the latter's characteristics, n o t just those that
distinguish h i m from the other gods. F r o m this it follows t h a t he strives to imitate his god in
p o i n t of those qualities shared by all the gods.
22
It is clear from Republic 377ff. that the gods are perfect and unable to change, and it is made
explicit at Symposium 203e-204a that the gods, being in no way deficient, can desire nothing.

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 LOVE IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS 403
supposed intentions merely to make use of his beloved. Yet again, it is reasonable to
infer from what is said of the false lover in Socrates' recanted speech - he prefers his
beloved to be weaker than himself, more ignorant, more cowardly, to be kept from
advantageous associations, and so on - that the true lover by contrast genuinely
values his beloved's independence, both of body and of mind (239ff.). Finally, to
switch to the beloved, the latter judges the lover's love to be genuine (255a), and he
is described as being altogether amazed at the goodness of will displayed towards him.
The friendship of his lover, he is convinced, surpasses that of all his other friends
(255b).
The simplest way of interpreting what Plato says, then, is to see the lover as
pursuing with unselfishness the best interests of his beloved.23 Of course his notion of
what constitutes those best interests, namely that his beloved should become like the
gods in wisdom, justice and other virtues, may not entirely accord with what in the
twentieth century many are prepared to allow as the best interests of those whom they
love. Some of us set great store by the freedom of those that we love to make their
own choices and have their own values, even when these conflict with ours. But
differences of that sort could scarcely warrant the conclusion that the lover in the
Phaedrus does not really love his beloved for his own sake2.24

Ill
The following further argument - expressing Vlastos' second objection - needs yet to
be looked at: according to Plato, men are not worthy of love for their own sakes -
in either sense of that expression; for if all that Plato says is true, it follows that when
we love a human being we do so merely as a consequence of a deficiency or
incompleteness which characterizes our mortal condition. Our longing to remedy this
incompleteness expresses itself at times in a passionate craving for a particular human
person, which craving we describe as love. However, while in truth this craving is for
Reality, to us it seems to be for the human person in question; consequently we think
that we love that person for his own sake, and that he is correspondingly worthy of
our love. But here we are in error. For given Plato's theory of Forms in conjunction
with his theory of love, surely it is obvious that 'were we free of mortal deficiency, we
would have no reason to love anyone or anything except the Idea: seen face to face
it would absorb all our love'. 25 It follows that we do not really love human beings for
their own sakes: we love them because they remedy our mortal deficiency, leading us
towards fulfilment through re-communion with the Forms. But once this re-
communion is attained, having served their purpose our fellow men are no longer
needed: the Forms in all their perfection and transcendence now totally absorb us.
This argument is less than compelling for two reasons. First, even if it were true that
seen face to face the Forms would 'absorb all our love', this would not render us
unable in this world to love human beings for their own sakes, nor would it render
them unworthy of such love. For, as was pointed out earlier, if we genuinely love a
83
This is not in conflict with Plato's general doctrine that whatever a person does he does in
some sense for his own good, since it is possible to view acting with unselfishness as in part
constitutive of one's own good. (The latter view is what I believe Plato to have held as early as
the Gorgias: see White [48].) On the other hand, the apparent conflict between egoism and loving
someone for his or her own sake cannot, I believe, be resolved simply by distinguishing between
the object and the aim of love. (See Santas [34], p.54.)
24
See Ferrari's [5] brief discussion on these points, pp. 183-4. For a useful discussion on
behavioural criteria of love, see Brown [1], pp. 33-5, in criticism of Newton-Smith [22].
26
Vlastos [44], pp. 32f.

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 404 F. C. WHITE
person for his own sake, this does not mean that we love him exclusively, nor that we
love him better than anyone or anything else. Nor again does it mean that he cannot
be replaced in our love by someone or something else. Conversely, if he is replaced,
it does not follow that our former love for him was not real. If we come to love John,
or welcome to love Beauty, in such a way that Peter is thereby replaced in our love,
this does not mean that we never loved Peter for his own sake in the first place, nor
that he was unworthy of that love.
The second reason is this. To assert that the Forms would absorb all our love if seen
face to face is to assume that our souls would lack the capacity to love anything
further, or that they could have no reason for doing so - no reason for loving the
imperfect when in possession of the perfect. But there are no a priori grounds for
believing such assumptions; and, more important, they form no part of Plato's
doctrines. This is clear from what he says about the gods.
The gods, he tells us, experience the fullest contemplation of the Forms, and they
do this without suffering periods of forgetfulness in the way that humans do. In fact
it is plausible to assume that on Plato's view the gods' vision of Reality is
continuous.26 Yet the gods are not so engrossed by that vision as to want either
capacity or reason for being considerate of others. Quite the contrary. Zeus, we are
told, benevolently cares for and governs the inanimate universe (246e); it is the gods
who send us the greatest of goods in the form of various sorts of madness (244a); it
is the gods who send us love for our greatest happiness (245b); the gods begrudge
happiness to no one (247a).a7 But there is more to be said. Not only does the vision
of Reality fail to exhaust the gods' love and attention, but in the light of the following
points from Plato's doctrines it is easy to see why.
No souls, divine or human, are unaffected by Reality. Rather, in the course of
contemplating Reality the gods feed upon it and are nourished by it (247d-e); Reality
is the fitting pasturage for the wings of human souls and it constitutes their
nourishment (248b-c); the Forms make the gods what they are (beautiful, wise and
good, 246e) (249c); the Forms make souls resemble them, rendering them just,
temperate and the like (250a-b). In short, souls in contemplating the Forms are
nourished by them and are made to resemble them,28 thereby becoming among other
things good. But souls which are good, as we have seen from the behaviour of the
gods, are other-regardingly good, benevolent towards others. Contemplation of
Reality then, on Plato's own doctrine, far from being all-absorbing, renders souls
benevolent and caring of others. The closer souls approach to the Forms and the
fuller the vision they obtain of them, the more other-regardingly good they become.
The Republic's analogy of the sun and the Good reinforces this conclusion. It tells
us that the Good is essentially radiant, out-pouring and creative of good beyond it.
In proportion then as souls share in the Good and resemble it, they too are radiant,
out-pouring and creative of good beyond them.29
University of Tasmania F. C. WHITE
26
See Hackforth [13], p. 80.
27
It is worth relating 252d-253b to all of this - the passage in which the lover is eager to
discover within himself the nature of his god and to become like that god, and to make his
beloved like him too.
28
Cf. Seeskin [38], p . 583.
29
Compare Cooper [2], esp. sections II & III. I am grateful to the Editors for their carefully-
worded comments; I have made use of them at many points in this paper.

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 LOVE IN PLATO'S PHAEDRUS 405

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