8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

606 Phil. 670

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 171763, June 05, 2009 ]

MARIA LUISA PARK ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS.

SAMANTHA MARIE T. ALMENDRAS AND PIA ANGELA T.
ALMENDRAS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated August 31, 2005 and
the Resolution[2] dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81069.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

On February 6, 2002, respondents Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T.

Almendras purchased from MRO Development Corporation a residential lot located in
Maria Luisa Estate Park, Banilad, Cebu City.  After some time, respondents filed with
petitioner Maria Luisa Park Association, Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to
construct a residential house, which was approved in February 10, 2002.  Thus,
respondents commenced the construction of their house.

Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found out that respondents violated the
prohibition against multi-dwelling[3] stated in MLPAI's Deed of Restriction. 
Consequently, on April 28, 2003, MLPAI sent a letter to the respondents, demanding
that they rectify the structure; otherwise, it will be constrained to forfeit respondents'
construction bond and impose stiffer penalties.

In a Letter[4] dated April 29, 2003, respondents, as represented by their father Ruben
D. Almendras denied having violated MLPAI's Deed of Restriction.

On May 5, 2003, MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out respondents' specific violations of the
subdivision rules, to wit:  (a) installation of a second water meter and tapping the
subdivision's main water pipeline, and (b) construction of "two separate entrances that
are mutually exclusive of each other."  It likewise reiterated its warning that failure to
comply with its demand will result in its exercise of more stringent measures.

In view of these, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7,
a Complaint[5] on June 2, 2003 for Injunction, Declaratory Relief, Annulment of
Provisions of Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)/Preliminary Injunction.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 1/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

MLPAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
failure to comply with the arbitration clause[6] provided for in MLPAI's by-laws.

In an Order[7] dated July 31, 2003, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Respondents moved for
reconsideration but their motion was denied.

Aggrieved, the respondents questioned the dismissal of their complaint in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition in its Decision dated August 31, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed orders of the respondent trial court are declared NULL AND VOID,
and SET ASIDE. Respondent RTC is hereby ordered to take jurisdiction of
Civil Case No. CEB-29002.

SO ORDERED.[8]

MLPAI filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated February 13, 2006.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DISREGARDED LAWS

AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE IN HOLDING THAT JURISDICTION
OVER [THE] DISPUTE BETWEEN HOMEOWNERS AND HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION LIES WITH THE REGULAR COURTS AND NOT WITH HLURB.

II.

WHETHER THERE IS NO OTHER RELIEF AND REMEDY AVAILABLE TO

PETITIONER TO AVERT THE CONDUCT OF A VOID [PROCEEDING] THAN THE
PRESENT RECOURSE.[9]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the appellate court erred in ruling that it was the
trial court and not the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 2/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

Petitioner MLPAI contends that the HLURB[10] has exclusive jurisdiction over the
present controversy, it being a dispute between a subdivision lot owner and a
subdivision association, where the latter aimed to compel respondents to comply with
the MLPAI's Deed of Restriction, specifically the provision prohibiting multi-dwelling.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the case they filed against MLPAI is one
for declaratory relief and annulment of the provisions of the by-laws; hence, it is
outside the competence of the HLURB to resolve. They likewise stated that MLPAI's
rules and regulations are discriminatory and violative of their basic rights as members
of the association.  They also argued that MLPAI's acts are illegal, immoral and against
public policy and that they did not commit any violation of the MLPAI's Deed of
Restriction.

We agree with the trial court that the instant controversy falls squarely within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC),[11] now HLURB.

Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners' associations was vested by law

with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  However, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 535,[12] the HIGC assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
SEC over homeowners' associations.  Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides:

2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing
Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional
powers:

(a) . . . and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are
vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to
homeowners associations, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D.
902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;

(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all

houseowners associations registered in accordance therewith;

xxxx

Moreover, by virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC also assumed the SEC's original
and exclusive jurisdiction under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A to hear and
decide cases involving:

b)    Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,

between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any
and/or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of
which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as
it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity;[13] 
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 3/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

(Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Consequently, in Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association v. Gaston[14] and Metro

Properties, Inc. v. Magallanes Village Association, Inc.,[15] the Court recognized HIGC's
"Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Home Owner's Disputes," pertinent
portions of which are reproduced below:

RULE II

Disputes Triable by HIGC/Nature of Proceedings

Section 1.  Types of Disputes - The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board
or committee duly designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving the following:

xxxx

(b)  Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and

among members of the association, between any or all of them and the
association of which they are members, and between such association
and the state/general public or other entity in so far as it concerns its right
to exist as a corporate entity.[16]  (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

Later on, the above-mentioned powers and responsibilities, which had been vested in
the HIGC with respect to homeowners' associations, were transferred to the HLURB
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8763,[17] entitled "Home Guaranty Corporation Act of
2000."

In the present case, there is no question that respondents are members of MLPAI as
they have even admitted it.[18] Therefore, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the case
involves a controversy between the homeowners' association and some of its
members.  Thus, the exclusive and original jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.

Indeed, in Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association v. Gaston, we held:

. . . the HIGC exercises limited jurisdiction over homeowners'

disputes.  The law confines its authority to controversies that arise
from any of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and
among members of the association; (2) between any and/or all of them
and the association of which they are members; and (3) between the

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 4/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

association and the state insofar as the controversy concerns its right to
exist as a corporate entity.[19]  (Emphasis supplied.)

The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must also
be determined by referring to Section 3 of P.D. No. 957,[20] which provides:

SEC. 3.  National Housing Authority. - The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.  (Emphasis
supplied.)

The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding
subdivisions and condominiums.  The intention was aimed at providing for an
appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the
implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to
said category of real estate may take recourse.  The business of developing
subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any
question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB
which has the technical know-how on the matter.[21]  In the exercise of its powers, the
HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of
private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely
judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.[22]

It is apparent that although the complaint was denominated as one for declaratory
relief/annulment of contracts, the allegations therein reveal otherwise.  It should be
stressed that respondents neither asked for the interpretation of the questioned by-
laws nor did they allege that the same is doubtful or ambiguous and require judicial
construction.  In fact, what respondents really seek to accomplish is to have a particular
provision of the MLPAI's by-laws nullified and thereafter absolve them from any
violations of the same.[23]  In Kawasaki Port Service Corporation v. Amores,[24] the
rule was stated:

. . . where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be

determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights,
status and other relations, commonly expressed in written instrument, the
case is not one for declaratory judgment.[25]

Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, jurisdiction cannot be made to

depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties.[26]  While
respondents are questioning the validity or legality of the MLPAI's articles of
incorporation and its by-laws, they did not, however, raise any legal ground to support
its nullification.  The legality of the by-laws in its entirety was never an issue in the
instant controversy but merely the provision prohibiting multi-dwelling which

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 5/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

respondents assert they did not violate.[27]  So to speak, there is no justiciable

controversy here that would warrant declaratory relief, or even an annulment of
contracts.

We reiterate that in jurisdictional issues, what determines the nature of an action for
the purpose of ascertaining whether a court has jurisdiction over a case are the
allegations in the complaint and the nature of the relief sought.[28]

Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or

will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact.[29]

In the instant case, the HLURB has the expertise to resolve the basic technical issue of
whether the house built by the respondents violated the Deed of Restriction, specifically
the prohibition against multi-dwelling.

As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:[30]

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble
under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing
times.  There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this
function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature.  This quasi-
judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the
principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling
under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages
although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily
only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation
of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the
government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of
the modern world.[31]

We also note that the parties failed to abide by the arbitration agreement in the MLPAI
by-laws.  Article XII of the MLPAI by-laws entered into by the parties provide:

Mode of Dispute Resolution

Mode of Dispute Resolution. Should any member of the Association have any
grievance, dispute or claim against the Association or any of the officers and
governors thereof in connection with their function and/or position in the
Association, the parties shall endeavor to settle the same amicably. In the

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 6/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

event that efforts at amicable settlement fail, such dispute, difference or

disagreement shall be brought by the member to an arbitration panel
composed of three (3) arbitrators for final settlement, to the exclusion of all
other fora. Such arbitration may be initiated by giving notice to the other
party, such notice designating one (1) independent arbitrator. Within thirty
(30) from the receipt of said notice, the other party shall designate a second
independent arbitrator by written notice to the first party. Both arbitrators
shall within fifteen (15) days thereafter select a third independent arbitrator,
who shall be the chairman of the Arbitration Tribunal. In the event that the
two (2) arbitrators respectively nominated by the parties fail to select the
third independent arbitrator within the fifteen-day period, the third arbitrator
shall be jointly selected by the parties. In the event that the other party
does not nominate an arbitrator, the Arbitration Tribunal shall be composed
of one (1) arbitrator nominated by the party initiating the proceedings. The
Arbitration Tribunal shall render its decision within forty-five (45) days from
the selection of the third arbitrator, which decision shall be valid and binding
between the parties unless repudiated within five (5) days from receipt
thereof on grounds that the same was procured through fraud or violence, or
that there are patent or gross errors in facts made basis of the decision. The
award of the Tribunal shall be enforced by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Venue of action covered by this Article shall be in the courts of justice of
Cebu City only.

Under the said provision of the by-laws, any dispute or claim against the Association or
any of its officers and governors shall first be settled amicably.  If amicable settlement
fails, such dispute shall be brought by the member to an arbitration panel for final
settlement.  The arbitral award shall be valid and binding between the parties unless
repudiated on grounds that the same was procured through fraud or violence, or that
there are patent or gross errors in the tribunal's findings of  facts upon which the
decision was based.

The terms of Article XII of the MLPAI by-laws clearly express the intention of the parties
to bring first to the arbitration process all disputes between them before a party can file
the appropriate action. The agreement to submit all disputes to arbitration is a
contract.  As such, the arbitration agreement binds the parties thereto, as well as their
assigns and heirs.[32]  Respondents, being members of MLPAI, are bound by its by-
laws, and are expected to abide by it in good faith.[33]

In the instant case, we observed that while both parties exchanged correspondence
pertaining to the alleged violation of the Deed of Restriction, they, however, made no
earnest effort to resolve their differences in accordance with the arbitration clause
provided for in their by-laws.  Mere exchange of correspondence will not suffice much
less satisfy the requirement of arbitration.  Arbitration being the mode of settlement
between the parties expressly provided for in their by-laws, the same should be
respected.  Unless an arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of
the courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable
arrangements.[34]

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 7/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

Arbitration is one of the alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully
vaunted as "the wave of the future" in international relations, and is recognized
worldwide.  To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of
disagreement between the parties would therefore be a step backward.[35]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2005
and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
81069 are SET ASIDE. The Order dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 7, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago,* Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,** and Brion, JJ., concur.

* Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 645 in place of

Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on official leave.

** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635 in view of the

retirement of Associate Dante O. Tinga.

[1] Rollo, pp. 70-77.  Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate

Justices Enrico A. Lanzanas and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring.

[2] Id. at 83-84.  Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring.

[3] Id. at 35-52.

[4] Records, p. 46.

[5] Id. at 1-9.

[6] Rollo, p. 34 (Article XII-Mode of Dispute Resolution).

[7] Id. at 53-56.  Penned by Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.

[8] Id. at 76.

[9] Id. at 126.

[10] Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986.

IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL SHELTER

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 8/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

PROGRAM AND DEFINING THEIR MANDATES, CREATING THE HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, RATIONALIZING FUNDING SOURCES AND
LENDING MECHANISMS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

xxxx

c)  Human Settlements Regulatory Commission-The Human Settlements Regulatory

Commission; renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, shall be the sole
regulatory body for housing and land development.  It is charged with encouraging
greater private sector participation in low-cost housing through liberalization of
development standards, simplification of regulations and decentralization of approvals
for permits and licenses.

xxxx

[11] RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION

ACT OF 2000, approved on October 13, 2000.

ART. 6.  Re-Naming of the Corporation.  The Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation is renamed as the Home Guaranty Corporation. It shall have its principal
office in Metropolitan Manila.

[12] AMENDING THE CHARTER OF THE HOME FINANCING COMMISSION, RENAMING IT

AS HOME FINANCING CORPORATION, ENLARGING ITS POWERS, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES, done on  May 3, 1979.

[13] PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 902-A, done on March 11, 1976.

[14] G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 396.

[15] G.R. No. 146987, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 312.

[16] Id. at 320.

[17] AN ACT CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NOS. 580, 1557, 5488,

AND 7835 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 535 AND 90, AS THEY APPLY TO THE HOME
INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION WHICH SHALL BE RENAMED AS HOME
GUARANTY CORPORATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on March 7, 2000.

[18] Rollo, p. 19.

[19] Sta. Clara Homeowners' Association v. Gaston, supra at 410.

[20] THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE, done on

July 12, 1976.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 9/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

[21] Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 389 Phil. 318, 336 (2000).

[22] See Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, No. L-50444, August 31,

1987, 153 SCRA 399, 407.

[23] Rollo, p. 21.

[24] G.R. No. 58340, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 230.

[25] Id. at 236.

[26] Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117079, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA

147, 154.

[27] Rollo, p. 19.

[28] Capiral v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 152886, November 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 759, 765.

[29] Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941

(1954).

[30] G.R. No. 80916, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 268.

[31] Id. at 272-273.

[32] Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 135362,

December 13, 1999, 320 SCRA 610, 614.

[33] Fiesta World Mall Corporation v. Linberg Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 152471, August

18, 2006, 499 SCRA 332, 338, citing LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol
Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., G.R. No. 141833, March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 562,
571-572.

[34] Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600, 603 (1932).

[35] Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126212, March 2, 2000, 327

SCRA 135, 143-144, citing BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120105, March
27, 1998, 288 SCRA 267, 286.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System (E-LibCMS)

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 10/11
8/15/2021 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/49258 11/11