2-a Duties of the Police or Arresting Officers

1. PEOPLE VS MATOS- VIDUYA

FACTS: Appellant Virginia Matos-Viduya appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide.

The accused and her husband were asleep in separate beds when she was awakened by her
husband's moans. She saw two men, one pointing a knife at her temple and the other stabbing her
husband. She identified Edito Pateño as the man who poked a knife at her temple. Pateño was
about to stab her so she parried the knife and tried to wrest it away from him and in the process,
the blade became bent. She ran after them shouting "Magnanakaw, magnanakaw" but they had
already escaped. She recognized Melanio Cambel, their family driver, as the man who stabbed
her husband. Cambel even threatened and slapped and nearly choked her to death at the first
night of the wake because he could not force her to sleep. She was misled and deceived by Pfc.
Bagallon into signing her extrajudicial confession since he told her that she will not be detained
if she signs the document.

HELD: The Solicitor General capitalizes on the inconsistencies in the three affidavits which the
accused executed prior to the taking of her extrajudicial confession. He is of the persuasion that
her issuance of three statements, the truth of which she affirmed in open court but the contents of
which differ from each other, is another circumstantial evidence of her culpability. This Court,
however, is of the view that the conflicting affidavits executed by the accused merely weaken her
defense and cannot be considered as circumstantial evidence for the prosecution.

Moreover, the trial court's complete reliance on only one of three (3) extrajudicial statements and
its total rejection of the two other statements without any independent evidence or proof for such
action, is not explained.

Considering the paucity of the State's evidence, we are not satisfied that the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded to the accused-appellant has been overthrown. The
constitutional presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral
certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the appellant's culpability. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA
59 [1971]) The prosecution failed to produce such proof. This Court, therefore, has no other
recourse but to acquit the accused-appellant.

It is high time that our law enforcement agencies learn to live with the new requirements of the
Bill of Rights. A former Senator and distinguished libertarian was reportedly asked about
academic qualifications of policemen and he answered, "they have only one degree—the third
degree." This perception, justified or not, is the reason for the present Bill of Rights provision on
extrajudicial confessions. It should become a thing of the past. Better investigation procedures
and more sophisticated techniques, not to mention industry and persistence, must replace the
former persuading, and coercing of, or total dependence on extrajudicial confessions.

2. PEOPLE VS NICANDRO

FACTS: After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the
confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized. The police team formed
to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, the appellant
Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias ‘Nel’. The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and
gave appellant the two (2) marked P 5.00 bills Thereupon, the appellant delivered to informant
four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette. Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed the
appellant, was frisked and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2), marked P5.00
bills, and from the left pocket of her pants the marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of
newspaper. Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional
rights, appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the
ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her
confession to writing.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the accused constitutional rights to be informed
of his rights and to warnings.

HELD: Yes. When the Constitution requires a person under investigation “to be informed” of
his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled;
he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122
SCRA 312: People VS. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under
interrogation “to be informed” implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been “informed” of his rights. Now, since the right “to be informed”
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon
the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the
subject is unlettered.

3. PEOPLE VS DUHAN

FACTS: In the evening of 29 June 1982, a confidential informer went to Police Station Nof the
Western Police District located at United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila. The Informer claimed
that she could now buy some prohibited stuff (e.g., marijuana leaves or cigarettes) from herein
suspects. Three (3) marked money bins in P5.00 denomination were given to the Informer. The
latter boarded an unidentified taxi, followed by a private vehicle wherein PFC Romeo Jesus, PFC
Segundino Bautista, Pat. Crisanto Garcia and others, all members of the Drug Enforcement Unit
of the said police command, boarded. The latter was following, at a discreet distance, the
Informer's taxi as it was cruising towards the 'suspected' area. By then, the police operatives were
some 5 to 10 yards away. Negotiations ensued but briefly between the Informer and the three
accused. Accused Manuel Recla was seen to have actually hand over the prohibited stuff to the
Informer, just as accused Jose Duhan himself received the marked 3-P5.00 bills as payment for
the marijuana. The marked P5.00 bills were taken from Duhan's pants, more particularly on his
right hand pocket. Accused Reyes in turn was frisked and found inside his wallet was a stick of a
hand rolled suspected marijuana cigarette.

After the body searches of the appellants by the policemen inside the police precinct, appellants
were separately confronted and were asked to give their names, allegedly for verification
purposes.

HELD: When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of his right
to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled;
he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122
SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 312.) In other words, the right of a person under
interrogation 'to be informed' implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights. Now, since the right 'to be informed'
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending upon
the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the
subject is unlettered.’

Thus, in the cited case of People vs. Ramos, this Court said:

In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately
educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and
to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the
interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not
reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that
appellant has been represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that 'any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence,' We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during
custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.

As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his
right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish
compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative
showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted
in evidence. ... (People of the Philippines vs. Nelia Nicandro y Valarma G.R. No. L-59378,
prom. February 11, 1986.)

4. People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eduardo Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2

FACTS: Accused Paquito Yupo was arrested and tried for murder. He pleaded “not guilty.” The
prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of Meycauayan Police Department as witness,
before whom a written statement of the accused and his alleged waiver of his rights to remain
silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken. After the witness had
identified the statement of the accused and the waiver, the prosecution started asking him on the
part of the incriminating answers in the statement of the accused. The defense counsel objected
based on the ground of such statements being inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was
taken by the police without any counsel assisting the accused in the investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver presented was admissible as evidence

RULING: No. The presented waiver was not admissible as evidence.

The right to counsel may be waived as long as such waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily,
with full understanding of its consequence. However, it was not shown that the waiver was given
voluntarily and freely. An even more disturbing factor is that the accused, a 19-year old native of
Samar& was interrogated extensively in Tagalog instead of the language he was most
comfortable which was Waray.

Maybe to impress the Court, the opening statements by the police in the waiver were in Tagalog
followed by a monosyllabic answer “Opo.” However, there was no signature by the accused.
There were only illegible letters, perhaps indicating that they were his initials. This only shows
that the accused was not literate enough to fully understand the legal implication and effects of
the waiver.
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does not make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney& either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however,
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning . Likewise, if the individual is alone and
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.

5. People of the Philippines vs. Miguel Lasac, 148 SCRA 630

FACTS: Miguel Lasac was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then Court of First
Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Eighth Judicial District, Branch II,  of the crime of parricide
committed against his wife, Maria Consolacion Garcia, sentenced to life imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Braulio Dipasupil and the deceased Maria Consolacion Garcia lived together as common-law
husband and wife for about six [6] months. Six [6] months after they separated, or on January 19,
1980, Consolacion married accused-appellant Miguel Lasac.

On March 15, 1980, Consolacion was found dead atop a big stone in the middle of a creek about
70-150 meters away from the conjugal dwelling. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Edgardo
Hernandez, a private practising physician, disclosed that she suffered sixteen [16] stabbed,
incised and hacked wounds in different parts of her body. 4

No one witnessed the killing, but suspicion fen on accused appellant in view of a number of
circumstantial evidence which were later testified to by the prosecution witnesses.

Rufo, the victim’s father, surmised that accused-appellant killed his wife out of jealousy as
Consolacion used to tell him and his wife that she was being maltreated by accused-appellant
because she dressed up nicely. 

After a thorough study of the testimonial evidence from which the circumstantial evidence was
drawn by the trial court, it is our holding that standing alone, said circumstantial evidence is not
sufficient to support a judgment of conviction since they consist primarily of unsubstantiated
suspicions on the part of the witnesses for the prosecution.

The tests of sufficiency for circumstantial evidence to support conviction under Section 5, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., that there is more than one circumstance; that the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and that the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, have not been ably
met.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: On the prosecution's charge that appellant intentionally

misled the persons searching for his wife by claiming he had already looked for her at the creek
but did not find her there, there is nothing in the record to support such allegation nor any other
indication that would totally negate the veracity of appellants' claim that he, indeed, looked for
his wife in said area.

RULING: We agree with the Solicitor General that appellant's explanations have indubitably
cast a reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence to convict him
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of killing his wife.

Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proven should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to but one fair and reasonable conclusion which points
to the defendant to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.

The circumstantial evidence cited by the trial court is not sufficient to produce a moral certainty
as to the guilt of the appellant for the crime charged.

Moreover, as the affidavit of admission executed by the appellant, being the prosecution's basic
evidence, is not admissible against him because he was not assisted by counsel, an other
evidence which tend to support this basic evidence become useless.

Where the principal basic evidence upon which the prosecution rests its case fails, all evidence
intended to support or corroborate it must likewise fail. 

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction appealed from is hereby reversed, and accused-
appellant Miguel LASAC is ACQUITTED D of the crime charged.

6. People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Ramos, 122 SCRA 312

The Court of First Instance of Manila found the accused Rogelio Ramos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i), Article I of the
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675, and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS: At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and
P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue, they had seen and observed one
MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada Street.  The
police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his
possession dried marijuana leaves.  The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under
arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana
leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, alias “Balanchoy”. 
The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o’clock noon, a police team with suspect
Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan in
2366 Singalong, Malate, Manila and arrested him. The police operatives immediately brought
appellant to the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquarters for
investigation.

During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement
implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. 4 The
accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt.
E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted
that he sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00. 5

On May 22, 1981, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a plea of not guilty.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) found the
accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view of the
verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court.

The principal issue in this case is whether there is competent and/or admissible evidence in
the record to justify the conviction of the accused-appellant Ramos.

RULING: We find petitioner's case meritorious. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence
the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the records that Malcon
Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the
marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon
Olevere was not produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is
often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay. The constitutional
right to meet witnesses face to face  in order not to deprive persons of their lives and properties
without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence.

Appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to
understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel.
As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the
interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not
reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that
appellant has been represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that "any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence," We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant
during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.

We hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt
and he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila is REVERSED, and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
2-b Requisites of a valid confession
Greenotes
In order that a confession is admissible, the following requisites must be present:
a. the confession must be voluntary;
b. the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;
c. the confession must be express; and d. the confession must be in writing.

People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Tuniaco

FACTS: Accused Tuniaco, Datulayta, and Aleman were charged with murder before the RTC of
General Santos City. Accused Aleman raises two issues: a) whether or not the prosecution was
able to present evidence of corpus delicti; and b) whether or not accused Aleman’s extrajudicial
confession is admissible in evidence.

ISSUE: What is the doctrine of “interlocking confessions” ? Did the accused Aleman correctly
invoked the Galit doctrine?

RULING: It is improbable that the police fabricated Aleman’s confession and just forced him to
sign it. The confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have
possibly known. What is more, accused Datulayta’s confession corroborate that of Aleman in
important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such corroboration is
circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it.

Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit, that long questions followed by monosyllabic
answers do not satisfy the requirement that the accused is amply informed of his rights. But this
does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to Aleman clearly in the language he knew.
Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the investigator sufficiently
explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.

3. To be informed of the Right to remain silent;

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, 104 SCRA 391

Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence 23 on this
specific portion of the subject provision. In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that
a person detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be
informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all
statements to be given by him may be used against him. Significantly however, there has been no
pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that a person similarly undergoing
investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the
constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having
it inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the
phrase "any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda
doctrine. 24 Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word
"confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies
only to police investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not
only "confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible
against the source of the confession or admission and against third person. 2

A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the

Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. It reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

GREEN NOTES:

From what time must the counsel assist the suspect during custodial investigation? Who must
select such counsel?

In PEOPLE V. JIMENEZ, G.R. No. 82604. December 12, 1991, it was held that the
counsel must be present from the inception of the custodial investigation not at any time
thereafter. Also, the lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the
latter's own choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this
case, the former judge whose assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of Marcos
Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers' own choice; she did not ask Marcos if he was
willing to have her represent him. This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance
contemplated by the Constitution. Furthermore, the former judge was not present when Marcos
was being interrogated by the police. While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the
statements contained in the typewritten document, this is far from being substantial compliance
with the constitutional duty of police investigators during custodial interrogation.

1. People of the Philippines vs. Marcos Jimenez, December 10, 1991

FACTS: On August 13, 1985 the police officers at the Ginatilan, Cebu station received a report
that one Pelagio Jimenez had been found dead at barangay Guiwanon, "below the cliff near the
balite tree." Without much loss of time, Pat. Reynaldo Cinco and other policemen went to the
scene to conduct an investigation. The Municipal Circuit Judge of Ginatilan, Hon. Palmacio
Calderon, accompanied them, as did Dr. Trifina M. Ferraren. They came upon the lifeless body
of Pelagio Jimenez at the place indicated, with stab and lacerated wounds on the head and leg;
and apparently the corpse was beginning to decompose since there were maggots crawling over
the face, arms, hands and feet.

Subsequently, an information dated October 22, 1985 was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu
with the Regional Trial Court accusing Pelagio's widow, Albina Jimenez, and her son by Pelagio,
Marcos, Robert, and Wilkins, of the felony of parricide in that on or about August 11, 1985 at
around 8'clock P.M. a barangay Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu. Said accused, confederating
together and helping one another, with intent to kill and during night time, and without just
cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack Pelagio
Jimenez ... with bolo, inflicting upon the said Pelagio Jimenez mortal injuries on varoius parts of
his body, that soon caused his death thereafter.

All the accused entered a plea of innocent when arraigned.

On December 19, 1986, the Trial Court promulgated its Decision (dated November 21, 1986)
finding "the defendants Marcos Jimenez and Robert Jimenez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,"
and condemning "the said defendants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua." The Trial
Court stressed that "the revelations ... in the confession all tally with the evidences adduced
during the trial, viz.: the hacking by Robert of his father with a bolo is confirmed by the doctor
who examined the cadaver; the carrying of the body from the house to the cliff is confirmed by
the evidences of the bloodstains found along the way from the house to the cliff and of the signs
of a body being dragged along the bushes."

RULING: The information gathered by the police to the effect that Marcos and Robert Jimenez
had been seen by neighbors bathing at the artesian well at midnight of the day of the crime,
ostensibly washing away blood from their bodies and clothing, is patently speculative and arrant
hearsay. Not one of the persons who had supposedly seen the appellants washing themselves
ever took the witness stand to affirm this.

It is not correct to say, that the appellants had tried to cover up the commission of the crime by
not reporting it immediately to the authorities and by attempting, during the search for the
deceased, to prevent others from going to the precise spot where the slain man was eventually
found. That the appellants did not immediately notify the authorities that Pelagio Jimenez was
missing cannot be taken as an inculpatory circumstance against them. The truth is that the
victim's family and neighbors first looked everywhere for him, and when he was finally found
after a day's search, Marcos Jimenez forthwith reported his father's death to the police. The truth
is, too, that as disclosed by the evidence, Robert Jimenez had indeed conducted a search for his
father in the vicinity of the cliff near the balite tree where his father's body was found the
following day. Marcos Jimenez knew this, and this is why he afterwards told other persons
involved in the search not to proceed to that place any more. It bears stressing that the area
covered by the search has been described as a "vast" area, and there were many large boulders
and thick bushes about the balite tree. This might explain why the corpse could not be
immediately located. In fact, were it not for the foul odor emanating from the direction of the
balite tree, the searchers would not have proceeded thereto as the place was so secluded.

It appears that the prosecution has failed to demonstrate the guilt of the appellants the crime with
which they are charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Trial Court dated November 21, 1986 is REVERSED, and
the appellants, Marcos P. Jimenez and Robert Jimenez, are ACQUITTED, with costs de officio.

GREEN NOTES

122. Is the right to counsel available to a suspect during a police line-up?

The Supreme Court had conflicting decisions on this aspect but ended up with the rule
that since the accused will not be made to make any testimony or statement during the police
line-up, then he is not under custodial investigation and therefore, there is no need for him to be
assisted by a lawyer. ( P vs. Usman Hassan, 157 SCRA 261; Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162
SCRA 642; DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196 and PEOPLE VS. HATTON)

2-4

6. GAMBOA VS JUDGE CRUZ

FACTS: Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of
vagrancy. The next day, the petitioner and with other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The
complainant, meanwhile, during the line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of
robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front of the complainant while the latter is being
investigated. An information of robbery has been filed against the herein petitioner.

During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While on the other
hand, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence, file a
Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this motion on the ground that
the conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional right to counsel and to due process.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.

RULING: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not
yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense.
The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from
said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the
waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
 On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive
and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose
not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What
due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987
Constitution. Section 12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. Any
person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. 

7. PEOPLE VS AGUSTIN

FACTS: Quiano, the gunman who killed the victims, confessed during the investigation
conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He
implicated Abenoja, Jr, who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the
armalite and a certain Jimmy. During the investigation, Quiano was assisted by Atty. Reynaldo
Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed with the
sworn statement of Quiano was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to
before the City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was
invesitagated and was afforded with the privileges like that of Quiano. Agustin’s defense
interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint at Kennon Road. He further
declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom, he nevertheless, asked for his unlce Atty
Oliver Tabin and Atty Cajucom interviewed him for only 2 minutes in English and Tagalof but
not Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did
not push through since Quiano escaped. However, the RTC convicted hum, since conspiracy was
established hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements are admissible as evidence

to warrant conviction

RULING: Accused is acquitted. The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present
Constitution have broadened the aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel
means not just any counsel, but a "competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only be waived in writing and in the
presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility expressly includes admissions, not just
confessions.

The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation
of an abstract constitutional principle." 28 It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to
the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
or Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of
such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do,
and in language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a
correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective
communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed. Since it is
comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily
vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the
person undergoing the investigation.

It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such
counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he
would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that
he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing
to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other
independent evidence was offered to prove its existence.

GREEN NOTES

128. If the extrajudicial admission or confession of the accused is declared inadmissible as

evidence, must the accused be acquitted as a matter of right?
 If there is no other evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession, yes, as held by the
Supreme Court in People vs. Galit, supra. However, if there are other evidence to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, no. In PEOPLE VS. ROLANDO FELIXMINIA y CAMACHO,
GR No. 125333, March 20, 2002, the Supreme Court held that though the extrajudicial
confession of the accused was declared inadmissible for violation of his right to counsel, if there
are evidence sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, like circumstantial evidence,
then he can still be convicted of the crime charged. This is so because [1] the compromising
circumstances were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with
moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the crime charged; and [2] the totality
of such circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the possibility of his innocence. In People vs.
Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided the
following requisites are present: [a] there is more than one circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

8. PEOPLE VS GALIT

FACTS: The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim on the occasion of robbery. He had ben
detained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days, to no avail. He consistently maintained
his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. A confession was absolutely
necessary. The investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still he
maintained his innocence. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet
bowl with human feces. He then admitted what the investigating officers wanted and signed the
confession they prepared. Against his will, he posed for the pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a reenactmet.

ISSUE: WON the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him

RULING: Accused is acquitted. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does
not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreveor, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with a
lawyer, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after he had executed the
“salaysay” that his relatives were not allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain
any waiver of his right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At
the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitutes gross violations of his rights.
This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace
officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which
We reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible
— or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

9. PEOPLE VS ALEGRE

FACTS: This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old,
whose body was found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio
Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she
died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen
to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966. Her bedroom was in "shambles,"
evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and
some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the
commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of
the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police
headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day
for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and
Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None
of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. 

ISSUE: whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face of
statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the
crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation therein

RULING: The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure
or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer
an incriminating question. 5 It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his
silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would
be illusory. We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his
failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is
neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a
tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible
with the right of an accused against self-incrimination. This privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such
silence.

It was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in the
face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid
appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of
the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining
evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo,
is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that
herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a
heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same
occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

10. DRACULAN v DONATO

11. PEOPLE v BORROMEO

FACTS: Petitioners seek to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated June 30, 1982 denying
the verbal motion of the City Fiscal of Mandaue City to amend the information for grave
coercion against private respondent Joaquin Borromeo by changing the date of the commission
of the crime from "on or about the 24th day of June, 1981 " to "on or about August 28, 1981, "
after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty and during the testimony of
the complainant, as well as the order of July 28, 1982 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order.

The first amended information was admitted in an order dated March 24, 1982.

After the accused pleaded not guilty, at the trial on or about June 30, 1982 and during the
testimony of the complainant who testified that the crime of grave coercion was committed on or
about August 28, 1981, the prosecution orally moved to further amend the amended information
by changing the date of the commission of the offense from June 24, 1981 to August 28,1981.

In an order dated June 30, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the verbal motion to amend on the
ground that the proposed amendment would impair the substantial rights of the accused as
guaranteed by the Constitution, invoking the case of People vs. Hon. Reyes (G.R. No. L-32557,
Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 23). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an order
dated July 28, 1982. The petition is meritorious. The respondent Judge erred in relying on the
case of People vs. Reyes, supra.

HELD: As opined by the Solicitor General in his comment dated May 9, 1982, the change of the
date of the commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is more formal than
substantial and would not prejudice the rights of the accused, as the said proposed amendment
would not alter the nature of the offense of grave coercion . The difference in the dates is only
about two (2) months and five (5) days, which disparity is amply comprehended within the
allegation that the crime was committed "on or about." Nor will the amendment or correction
cause any surprise on the accused, who has been furnished the affidavits of prosecution
witnesses, all of which uniformly state that the date of the commission was August 28, 1981

Section 10 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that "it is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time
is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any
time as near to the actual date at which date the offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit."

The precise time is not an essential ingredient of the offense of grave coercion.

The phrase "on or about" employed in the information does riot require the prosecution "to prove
any precise date but may prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the
defendant. In case of surprise, the Court may allow an amendment of the information as to time
and an adjournment to the accused, if necessary, to meet the amendment" (U.S. vs. Dichao, 27
Phil. 420, 423 [1914]).

In the case of People vs. Reyes, supra, on which the respondent Judge relies, the change sought
was from 1964 to 1969, a difference of five (5) years, which gap of five years "is so great as to
defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense."

This is not so in the case at bar where the difference is only, as aforestated, two months and five
days, which disparity allows approximation as to the date of the commission of the offense of
grave coercion.

Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the error as to the date of the commission of the
offense was discovered early and the motion to amend or correct the same was as immediate as
to preclude any surprise or prejudice on the part of the accused.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDERS OF RESPONDENT

JUDGE DATED JUNE 30,1982 AND JULY 28,1982 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE, AND THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ADMIT THE ADDITIONAL
AMENDMENT TO THE AMENDED INFORMATION FROM "JUNE 24,1981 TO AUGUST
28,1981. " NO COSTS..

ABAD SANTOS, J.,  concurring:

I concur and express the hope that fiscals should be meticulous in preparing informations. In this
case the affidavits of prosecution witnesses uniformly mentioned August 28, 1981, as the date
when the crime was committed. But the sloppy fiscal who wrote the informations still managed
to state the wrong date twice both in the original as well as the first amended information. A slap
on the wrist is well deserved.
12. PEOPLE V CAMALOG

109 SCRA 816Facts:The accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The
accused statedthat they were never informed about their constitutional rights and that the
policeinvestigators never conducted an investigation as regards their alleged participation in
thecrime. The two accused further testified that during the period covering their custodial
interrogation, they never had the chance to confer with a lawyer.

Issue:Is the extrajudicial confession admissible?

HeLd:No. It appears that the appellants were not informed of their constitutional rights and, even
assuming that they were so informed, there is no indication that they understood those rights.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidenceWith the inadmissibility of the
extra-judicial confessions of appellants, their convictionbecomes baseless. They are entitled to
an acquittal

13. PEOPLE vs CUI

FACTS: In the evening of December 5, 1990, some ten (10) armed robbers raided the compound
of Johnny and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims, their three (3) children,
and the employees of the family-owned business, Williams Educational Supply, were able to see
the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias Toto Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain
Edgar. The other robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks over their heads.
The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). They also blindfolded and forcibly abducted seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the
youngest daughter of the Lims. They demanded a ransom of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
for her release. Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the afternoon of the
next day at an arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father.
Initially, the Lims kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they reported the kidnapping
to the Philippine National Police . The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST)
[1]
 conducted an investigation and Johnny Lim was shown photographs of criminal elements to
identify the suspects. From around ninety (90) photographs, Lim picked that of Toto Garcia.
On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement [2] reiterating these revelations
in writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by executing a Joint Affidavit.
[3]
 The members of the Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team also executed a Joint
Affidavit[4] relating their investigation. With these as bases, Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido N.
Mabanto, Jr. filed an Information[5] for Kidnapping with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and
the members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn statement.
In their Brief dated April 21, 1997, Obeso and Sarte prayed for their acquittal on the
following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATEMENT MADE BY
 EDUARDO BASINGAN AND THE TESTIMONY OF SGT. NARCISO OUANO
JR. THEREON, WHICH ARE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
On June 25, 1997, the Cuis also filed their Brief. They contended:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS-SPOUSES LEONILO CUI AND BEVERLY CUI TO REMAIN
SILENT, TO COUNSEL AND AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION HAD BEEN GROSSLY
VIOLATED DURING THEIR CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.

HELD: There is no question that Basingan escaped and never testified in court to affirm his
accusation against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Thus, the trial court committed reversible error in
admitting and giving weight to the sworn statements of Basingan. In the same vein, the
testimony of Sgt. Ouano confirming the content of Basingans sworn statements is not proof of its
truth and by itself cannot justify the conviction of appellants. Both the extrajudicial sworn
statements of Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano are clear hearsay. Indeed, the records
show that the trial court itself admitted Basingans statements merely as part of the investigation
of Sgt. Ouano, thus:

The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latters extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extra-judicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.[28]

Finally, while we affirm the conviction of the Cui spouses, we acquit Obeso and Sarte.
The only evidence linking Obeso and Sarte to the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim is Basingans
sworn statements that a certain Leos and a certain Laring were among the lookouts who stood as
guards outside the house of the Lims while Toto Garcia and his group were inside. Basingans
sworn statements are hearsay, hence, inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused because he
escaped before he could take the witness stand.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated
December 6, 1993, in Criminal Case No. CBU-20464, is MODIFIED. Appellants Leonilo and
Beverly Cui are CONVICTED as ACCESSORIES and are ORDERED to serve the
indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellants LUIS
OBESO, alias LEOS, and HILARIA SARTE, alias LARING are ACQUITTED and if presently
detained, they are ordered immediately released from detention unless other legal reasons exists
to detain them. The Director of Prisons is ordered to inform this Court within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision his compliance. No costs.
3-a How about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement before he could be advised of
his right to remain silent/ Factors indicating voluntariness

1. PEOPLE vs. VILLARINO

In this special complex crime of rape with homicide, the unsolicited and spontaneous confession
of guilt by the appellant to the police officer is admissible in evidence. The circumstantial
evidence is also sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant even if no spermatozoa was
found in the victim’s body during an autopsy.

FACTS: On April 28, 1995, "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her
younger son "CCC" went to the house of their relative in Barangay "D" to attend the fiesta to be
held the next day. At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, "BBB" told "AAA" to go home
to Barangay "D1" to get a t-shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer
returned. While "BBB" was anxiously waiting for "AAA" in the house of her aunt
in Barangay "D",8 she received information that a dead child had been found in Barangay "D1".
She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s body as that of her daughter, "AAA".9

SPO4 Genoguin also went to the crime scene after being informed by his commander.11 Upon
arrival, he saw the corpse of a little girl behind a big boulder that was about 10 meters away from
the trail junction of the barangays.12People had gathered seven to 10 meters away from the dead
body, but no one dared to approach.13

On the same day, the appellant was found in the house of Aurelia Susmena near the seashore
of Barangay "D1". He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to be bodily carried to
the motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in Almagro, Samar. The arresting
team made the appellant take off his clothes since they were wet. When he complied, his briefs
revealed bloodstains.17On May 2, 1995, the police brought appellant to Calbayog City for
medical examination since he had scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat
ride at 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin was
momentarily left alone to guard the appellant. During this short period, the appellant voluntarily
admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the crime charged. SPO4 Genoguin rejected the
appellant’s offer and reminded him of his right to a counsel and that everything the appellant said
could be used against him in court. Unperturbed, the appellant reiterated his offer.24

On May 19, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Branch 32 rendered a
Decision30 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape
with homicide. The Court of Appeals (CA) found the appellant guilty only of homicide. The
dispositive portion of its Decision31reads as follows:

Still unsatisfied, the appellant comes to us raising the following assignment of errors:
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

RULING: The appeal lacks merit. In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping
and killing "AAA" to SPO4 Genoguin. He even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter
if his sando is thrown into the sea. The appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its
truthfulness. When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no
force or intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and
not elicited through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance
with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.36

In People v. Dy, What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not
elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought
to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. (People v.
Taylaran,  G.R. No. L-19149, October 31, 1981, 108 SCRA 373). The Trial Court, therefore,
cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case, as the defense alleges in its Error
VII.38

At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime
of rape with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through
circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion
that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered
together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the culprit.

The CA ruled that the evidence adduced by the prosecution are sufficient to produce a conviction
for homicide but not for the crime of rape. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated that while there were
lacerations in the vaginal orifice of the victim, the absence of spermatozoa, however, belied that
she was raped.

We disagree. The absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily result in the conclusion that rape was not
committed.51 Convictions for rape with homicide have been sustained on purely circumstantial
evidence.52 In those cases, the prosecution presented other tell-tale signs of rape such as the laceration and
description of the victim’s pieces of clothing, especially her undergarments, the position of the body when
found and the like.

2. PEOPLE v PIA

3. ABALLE v PEOPLE

FACTS: At around seven o'clock in the evening of November 7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril, Davao
City, Quirino Banguis, attended a birthday party. He brought along hiswife and other children,
leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie alone in their house. 2Upon their return at around 8:30
that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying prostrate, bathed in her own blood with
multiple wounds on different parts of her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre
killing.
At daybreak of the following day, November 8, 1980, acting on information furnished by the
victim's father, a police team headed by Sergeant Herminigildo Marante sought the accused Peter
Paul Aballe for questioning. They found him just as he was coming out of the communal
bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing Sgt.
Marante, the accused without anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie Banguis.
Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril police station for interrogation.
While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years old, a school dropout and next door
neighbor of the victim, brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot at the
"bangera" where he had concealed the death weapon which was a four-inch kitchen knife. 4 Also
taken from Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped T-shirt which he claimed he wore
during the commission of the crime. 5 Aballe also made an extrajudicial confession admitting his
guilt in killing Jennie while under the influence of liquor and marijuana. 6 
Whereupon, an information was filed against Aballe, charging him with homicide penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 8 At his arraignment on April 13, 1981, he pleaded
not guilty. 9 He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession on the ground that it was obtained
through coercion and in the absence of counsel.

Aballe's repudiation of his earlier confession notwithstanding, the trial court convicted the
accused of the crime of homicide. 10
In this petition for review on certiorari, Aballe contends that the trial court erred in giving
full weight to his extrajudicial confession taken during custodial investigation and in
imposing a penalty which was not in accordance with law.

HELD: The argument that Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been disregarded by the
lower court for having been obtained in violation of Aballe's constitutional rights is well taken.
Throughout the custodial interrogation, the accused's parents and relatives were almost always
around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it shown that the youthful offender was ever
represented by counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicial statement 11 was admittedly made
in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or  de parte, and the waiver of counsel was not made
with the assistance of counsel as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by the lower court. 12
Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife 13 recovered from Aballe after his capture and
after the police had started to question him. Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal
weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must consequently be
disallowed.

But even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession and the fatal weapon we agree with
the trial court that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is
well to note that even before the taking of the extrajudicial confession, the accused, upon being
picked up in the morning of November 8, 1980 as he was coming out of the communal bathroom
and wearing a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to cover with his hands, suddenly
broke down and knelt before Sgt. Marante and confessed that he killed Jennie Banguis. The
testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral confession is competent evidence to positively link
the accused to the aforesaid killing. His testimony reads in part:
"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be
given in evidence against him." 18
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
(23 C.J.S. 196) 19
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner,
whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. 20
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED with the
penalty modified to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of  prision mayor as maximum. The civil indemnity is
increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. Costs against the accused
Peter Paul Aballe.

4. PEOPLE v DANO
Dano brothers had a previous misunderstanding over the purchase of a horse from his cousin on
installment basis. Emeterio wanted to buy the horse, but appellant bought it ahead of him, which
caused the former to resent him.
On March 16, 1994, at 6:30 in the evening, Wilfredo Tapian (Prosecutir’s witness) saw the
victim pacing back and forth in appellant’s front yard and armed with a scythe, shouting at
appellant, who was looking out of his window to come down so they could fight to the
death. (“Kanaog diri kay magkamatay ta.”) Wilfredo tried to pacify the victim who kept
repeating his challenge while striking his scythe on the ground but he was ignored. Appellant
also advised his younger brother to go home, but the latter refused to listen. Suddenly, Emeterio
leaped at appellant who was standing with his head out of thewindow and slashed appellant with
his scythe but missed.
Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay captain of Tiguian, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain
Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers were quarreling. Demosthenes went to appellant’s home
to investigate. On his way, he met appellant. The latter told Peralta he had killed Emeterio and
voluntarily surrendered to him. Demosthenes left appellant in Wilfredo’s house and proceeded to
appellant’s residence where he saw the bloody corpse of the victim sprawled in the yard, near the
stairs. He noticed that the body bore several hacking and slashing wounds. Demosthenes fetched
appellant from Wilfredo’s house and took him to the police station.
The necropsy report established that the cause of death was acute blood loss, secondary to
multiple hacking wounds.
When interrogated by the police, appellant, without assistance of counsel, admitted he killed his
brother. The pertinent portion of his statement, contained in the police blotter, and read into the
records without objection by the defense, reads:
“Subject admitted of  killing his younger brother as the latter was drunk and provoked him
for a scythe duel right downstairs of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come
down from his house and allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several times
as he was already commanded by his evil thoughts.”
Upon arraignment with the assistance of counsel the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged, but the RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 29 rendered its decision
convicting Alberto Dano herein accused-appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, for
the death of his brother Emeterio Dano, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN ADMITTING “EXHIBIT E” AS
BASIS OF CONVICTION OF THE CRIME CHARGED
Ruling:
The court averred that the constitutional right of the appellant was violated.
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights
by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided one if he cannot afford the services of
counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these rights. These rights “cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.” A confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing. In convicting the accused of the offense charged, 
The trial court erred when it relied on the supposed extrajudicial confession of appellant in the
police blotter. Extrajudicial confessions must conform to the requirements of the Constitution. A
suspect’s confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel
without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it
had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellant’s confession were
gospel truth.
It was also error for the trial court to have considered and relied on the questioned entry in the
police blotter, given the failure of the prosecution to offer it in evidence. Evidence which has not
been formally offered cannot be considered by courts. There is valid reason, therefore, to strike
down the lower court’s reliance on the assailed police blotter entry in convicting appellant.
All these, however, do not suffice to acquit appellant of the offense charged. Appellant admitted
killing the victim before the barangay captain, who is neither a police officer nor a law
enforcement agent. Such admission, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in
violation of appellant’s constitutional rights. The constitutional requirements on custodial
investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted authorship of the crime. What the Constitution proscribes is the
compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts.
The court modifies the decision of the trial court and renders the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt from Murder to Homicide considering the two mitigating circumstances (1)
that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the
killing, and (2) that appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his
agents. The record is categorical that appellant surrendered to the barangay captain of Tiguian
after the incident. A barangay leader is a person in authority and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum,
and to pay the heirs of Emeterio Dano P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and P3,000.00 for
burial expenses.

5. PEOPLE v MAYORGA

Ravishers of the young, chaste and uninitiated are an ignominious breed of evil men. They are
filthier than the slime where they belong, so that even their banishment to Hades for all eternity
would be too low a price to pay for the innocent young lives they ruin and destroy. The case at
bar, involving a sexual assault upon a child of tender years who had been orphaned by her
mother and forsaken by her father, apostrophizes the havoc these despicable and evil beasts can
forge.

FACTS: On June 24 1995five-year old Leney Linayao was playing by the seashore. Suddenly,
she was approached by the accused Jhonnettel Mayorga y Lumague alias Puroy who asked her to
buy for him a bottle of gin commonly known as "bagets." He then brought the child to a marshy
area ("lalao") nearby where he boxed her on the face and chest and wrung her neck until she
fainted. By the time Leney recovered consciousness, Puroy had already raped her and then
disappeared. On her way home she met Macaria M. Gonzales who immediately brought her to a
certain Kapitan Lunario.2Lunario, in turn, asked Richard Magboo, Nicodenes Magboo and
Raquel Laogo to take the child to the barangay hall where she narrated her experience to
the barangay tanods gathered in the hall.

While searching they met Puroy's cousin, Edwin Lumague, who told them that Leney was raped
by Puroy and was "dead" when abandoned. According to Edwin, while he was preparing to join
the search, Puroy dissuaded him from going and confided to him that "iyong bata si Leney ay
napagtripan niya at nilitik niya."3 With Edwin leading the way, they immediately repaired to
where Leney was supposedly taken by Puroy. But she was not there. The search party proceeded
to the military detachment to report the matter

Finally, at around eight o'clock in the evening, Puroy was picked up by the police and brought to
the PC barracks by the barangay tanods who heard Edwin’s account. Afterwards, Puroy was
transferred to the police station.4

Jhonnettel Mayorga alias Puroy was accordingly charged with statutory rape of a child five (5)
years of age.

The trial court did not sustain Puroy's defense of alibi. Edwin’s testimony was also not given
credence on the ground that it was hearsay and was violative of the constitutional rights of the
accused. Solely on account of Leney’s testimony, the court a quo found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of RAPE . Forthwith, the case was elevated to
this Court for automatic review.

In his brief, accused concedes that his defense of alibi is inherently weak. Nonetheless, he faults
the trial court for convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He elaborates that, first, Leney’s testimony should not be given
credence since she had been coached by her grandmother; and second, Edwin’s testimony was
given under compulsion of threat and does not deserve credit.

Accused further asserts that he was being falsely charged by his cousin Edwin because the latter
was threatened by the complainant that he would be implicated in the rape charge unless he
testified against the accused.

HELD:This appeal primarily hinges on the issue of credibility of witnesses. The argument that
Leney has lost her credibility since she admitted that she had been coached by her grandmother
has no merit. The victim, an innocent and guileless five-year old when the crime was committed
against her, cannot be expected to recall every single detail and aspect of the brutal experience
that she went through in the hands of the accused. Besides, at the time of her testimony she had
stopped schooling and did not have the gift of articulation. It is but fair that she be guided
through by her grandmother in recounting her harrowing experience which happened two (2)
years before she testified.

At this juncture, we take exception to the pronouncement made by the court below that "the
testimony of Edwin Lumague that accused Jhonnettel Mayorga conveyed to him that 'May
napagtripan akong bata. (Nalitik daw po niya ang bata)' could not be given credence and
therefore inadmissible, both as violative of the constitutional rights of the accused and as hearsay
evidence."13

The lower court's ruling that the admission of the declaration of the accused would constitute a
violation of his constitutional right is misplaced. His declaration was not made under custodial
investigation; hence, it does not come within the gamut of Sec. 12, Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution.14

Nor is there merit to the court’s finding that Edwin’s testimony was hearsay. This is a
misinterpretation of the hearsay rule. It must be pointed out that the statement to him of the
accused constitutes an extrajudicial admission.15 This admission can be received against the
accused since it is not within the purview of the hearsay rule. Wigmore explains that the hearsay
rule is intended to give the parties a right to object to the introduction of a statement not made
under oath and not subject to cross-examination. Its purpose is to afford a party the privilege, if
he desires it, of requiring the declarant to be sworn and subjected to questions. Wigmore then
adds that where the evidence offered are his statements, the purpose does not apply, and so the
hearsay rule does not likewise apply, as "he does not need to cross-examine himself."16

In the face of Edwin's testimony that the accused had made the admission, it becomes imperative
for the latter to disprove it. His explanation that Edwin was coerced to testify against him is at
best a futile attempt to prop a tottering defense. The allegation can be no better than pure
speculation as nothing was offered to support it. On the other hand, it is indeed incredible that
Edwin could be frightened by the threat of a five-year old child.

All told, the guilt of the accused for the rape of Leney Linayao has been conclusively
established. But, the penalty of death was erroneously imposed. The evidence on record shows
that other than the testimonies of the victim and her grandmother, no independent proof was
presented to show that Leney was below seven (7) years of age when raped. As such, the lower
court should have imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and not death.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused JHONNETTEL
MAYORGA Y LUMAGUE guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty
of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

6.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE,

accused whose death sentence is under review. 

FACTS: 
At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the
national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch
water.

The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed
Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died
upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered
to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang
po kami." 

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the
same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot
investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his
back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck 

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and
Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted
Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus
and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado. 

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following
issues:

ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of
the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const) 
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after
the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon
Tampus to testify 
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and
hearing were held at the state penitentiary 

HELD: 
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already
admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard
whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge.
That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at
the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. 
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the
moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the
right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty
and testimony in court. 

Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in
Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted
by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation. 

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt,
confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution. 

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. 
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain
silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls
the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right 

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the
trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national
penitentiary. 

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in
Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the
judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304). 

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court
may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is
offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant,
exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the
prosecution and defense. 

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: 

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission under the Bill
of Rights. 

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to counsel
and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial confession during his
custodial interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late stage (in propounding
question No. 6, not at the beginning of the interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish
and inform the accused of his rights to counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such
unfortunate disadvantaged persons as the accused should all the more be clearly protected and
observed. At the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of
the penitentiary, if not by the municipal judge of the locality.
Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the prosecutor had
presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel de oficio then
called upon the accused to testify, it became the trial court's duty (contrary to the majority's
ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-
incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or incriminatory statement
obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."

3-b When shall the constitutional rights of the accused as mentioned above demandable? During
police line-up?
1-4

1. The right to counsel, 57 SCRA 481

In places where there are no lawyers:

 
1. PEOPLE V. DECIERDO 149 SCRA 496

FACTS: Pedro Decierdo was apprehended in his residence at Matingon, about 30 kilometers
from Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur on May 23 or 24, 1973, Patrolman Alfredo Bopadora of the
Tambulig police. was brought to the Tambulig municipal building on May 25, 1973, where he
supposedly executed a written confession admitting responsibility for the shooting of Emilio
Montillano on September 27, 1971. He likewise allegedly fingered Regino Duhay lungood as the
mastermind. It was a confession Decierdo was supposed to have reiterated before Baldomero
Fernandez, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, who investigated Criminal Case
No. 905.
On October 9, 1974, Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance found Deciero guilty for murder
and sentenced him to death. The case is now before us on automatic review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Decierdo should be admitted in evidence
considering that the same was made without counsel.

HELD: There is no doubt that the accused's alleged extrajudicial confession is in the nature of an
uncounselled confession and hence, inadmissible in evidence. While the right to counsel is a
right that may be waived, such waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The
waiver must furthermore be in the presence of the accused's lawyer. In the case at bar,
Pedro Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed Exhibits "A"-"A-25", his
supposed confession. Judge Bacarro himself so admitted.

Furthermore, there is no showing that the accused in fact waived his constitutional rights when
he executed, or more precisely, was made to execute, Exhibits "A"-"A-25".

In People v. Pascual, as well as People v. Broqueza, we held that the waiver must rest on clear
evidence, otherwise, the alleged waiver is void. The records are indeed unclear whether or not
Decierdo in fact declined or spurned Judge Bacarro's offer of a lawyer.

It is claimed, however, that Decierdo reiterated his confession before Fiscal Baldomero
Fernandez upon the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 905, before whom he allegedly.
declined anew the assistance of a lawyer. But assuming that this amounts to a waiver, still, it is
an invalid waiver, Decierdo not having been assisted by a lawyer at the time he executed Exhibit
"C". As held in People vs. Jar, whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the
person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently,
the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court
that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking
of that confession. That proof is missing in this case.

We are not satisfied furthermore that the accused was here apprised of his constitutional rights
within the contemplation of the fundamental law.

When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to
remain silent and to counsel it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful
information petition rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to
repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled:
he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands (See People vs. Ramos, 122
SCRA 312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under
interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed"
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon
the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under
investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is renewed where the
subject is unlettered.

Other than the confession in question, the government has no other evidence to support
Decierdo's conviction. As earlier noted, the prosecution presented no eyewitnesses. Complete
reliance is thus placed on the accused's supposed confession. That confession being inadmissible
in evidence, it follows that Decierdo is entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby reversed, and the accused Pedro Decierdo is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

2. PEOPLE V. ESPIRITU FEB. 2, 1999

FACTS: Rizal Espiritu y Kinao appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Baguio City, convicting him of murder.

Between 7:30 and 8:00 oclock in the evening of September 8, 1995, Henry Saclangan saw Sato
Sanad conversing with appellant Rizal Espiritu in front of Starlight Bakery located at Sunflower
Street, Navy Base Subdivision, Baguio City. Later, he saw Sato Sanad and appellant, who placed
his arm around the formers shoulder, walk.

At about 9:00 oclock in that evening, Jeffrey Bernabe was in his house at Sunflower St., Navy
Base Subdivision, Baguio City conversing with friends. Momentarily, he heard someone outside
shouting for help. When he went out, Jeffrey Bernabe saw a man, who turned out to be Sato
Sanad, wounded and bleeding. Other people came out of their houses but no one dared to help
Sato Sanad who lay prostrate on the ground. Jeffrey Bernabe went back to his house and boarded
his truck. Accompanied by his friends and helpers, Jeffrey Bernabe brought Sato Sanad to the
Baguio General Hospital where he died on arrival.

At the wake of Sato Sanad, Reyvo Sanad, his son, was informed by his cousin, Nestor Kinao,
that appellant Rizal Espiritu, a cousin of Nestor mentioned something about the killing of his
father. Together, they sought out appellant. They found him in the company of his uncle, Alfredo
Kinao, who was also related to the wife of Sato Sanad. When confronted, appellant was
persuaded to relate his participation in the killing of Sato Sanad. Appellant eventually
confessed to being one of the assailants of Sato Sanad. Then, all those present agreed to
meet the following day at the Baguio City Police where appellant would surrender.

The following day, or on September 20, 1995, appellant, accompanied by Alfredo Kinao, met
with the victims relatives at the Baguio City Police Station. However, the day before their
meeting, Alfredo Kinao had talked to Atty. Daniel Mangallay in his office and asked him to be
appellants counsel. Atty. Mangallay thus went to the Baguio City Police Station where he met
the others. Atty. Mangallay conferred with appellant regarding the case and agreed to represent
him.

Prior to the investigation, Atty. Mangallay informed the police that appellant would voluntarily
give his statement. Police Officer Wilfredo Cabanayan, who was assigned to take appellants
statements, apprised the latter, in the presence of his lawyer, of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, to have competent and independent counsel of his choice and his right against self-
incrimination. After Atty. Mangallay, himself, had explained to appellant his constitutional
rights, the latter signified his willingness and readiness to give his statement. Police Officer
Cabanayan propounded his questions in Ilocano to which appellant replied in the same dialect.
The questions and answers were then translated into English.

Thereafter, appellant and Atty. Mangallay affixed their respective signatures on the sworn
statement. During the proceeding, Atty. Mangallay was at all times assisting appellant.

Thereafter, appellant, accompanied by Atty. Mangallay and Police Officer Cabanayan, was
presented before Prosecutor Dizon for personal examination. Appellant declared that he
understood his statement as explained to him by Prosecutor Dizon. Thereafter, appellant again
signed his sworn statement.

The trial court convicted Espiritu on the basis of his confession and corroborating evidence of
corpus delicti. The confession was admitted in evidence, because the Court believed that the
appellant voluntarily executed it while being assisted by a competent and independent counsel.
Further, during the investigation conducted by Assistant Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell, Espiritu
affirmed that he had voluntarily executed the extrajudicial confession before the police, and he
even reenacted how Sanad was killed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible.

HELD: The appeal has no merit.

In assailing the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, appellant invokes paragraphs 1 and
3 of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that his confession was obtained
in violation of his rights (1) to have an independent and competent counsel and (2) to be
informed of such right. Further, he argues that he was not advised by Atty. Mangallay of the
consequences of the execution of a confession.
We disagree. We are convinced that the confession of Appellant Espiritu is admissible in
evidence, as it was satisfactorily shown that it was (1) voluntary and (2) made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel.

With respect to the first requisite, we find that Espiritu readily admitted killing Sanad when he
was confronted by the relatives of the deceased. Thereafter, without being invited by the
investigating officers, he went to the police station and voluntarily gave his statement to SPO1
Wilfredo P. Cabanayan. Later, appellant affirmed before Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact
that he, with Atty. Mangallay, had gone to the police station to surrender and that the said
counsel had assisted him when the police started taking his statement. In his confession,
appellant admitted that he and Malicdan killed Sanad, after being hired by Alicoy to do so for the
sum of P20,000. Aside from describing the details of how he and his cohort killed Sanad,
Espiritu, during an ocular inspection, even pointed out the place where the killing had been
committed.

These acts of the appellant are clear manifestations that, contrary to his protestations, no torture,
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means was used against him to force him to
confess.

The defense contends that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by appellant.
It is also argued that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain the contents of the
extrajudicial confession to the appellant before the latter signed it.

We are not persuaded. At the outset, we must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean
that the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is
satisfied when a counsel is (1) engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under
investigation or (2) appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by someone
on his behalf. Thus, that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant personally but by his
uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring
the counsel, acted on behalf of Appellant Espiritu. Besides, Espiritu did not object when Atty.
Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In
fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty. Mangallay as his counsel.

The meaning of competent counsel was explained in People v. Deniega as follows:

xxx [T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in
the accuseds behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accuseds right to be informed
of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latters relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police,
whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.

xxxxxxxxx

x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of
the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

The assistance rendered to appellant by Atty. Mangallay met the standards that had been set in
Deniega for the purpose of safeguarding the right of the accused against involuntary confession.
In the present case, the counsel was vigilant in informing Espiritu of his rights. He was clear in
explaining to his client every question propounded by the investigating officer. And he was not
negligent in relating to the appellant the legal consequences of the latters extrajudicial
confession.

Verily, a review of the records reveals no infirmity in the manner in which appellants
extrajudicial confession was taken. Witness Cabanayan testified that Atty. Mangallay assisted
Espiritu throughout the time that the latter gave his statement.

WHEREFORE, the ASSAILED DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED.

3. PEOPLE V. AGUSTIN 240 SCRA 541

FACTS: In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused, namely Jaime "Jimmy" Agustin, Wilfredo "Sonny
Quiaño, Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., And Freddie "Boy" Cartel, were charged with murder with
frustrated murder and with attempted murder. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6
September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna
Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny
Ancheta.

At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986 in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist,
together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa Francisco; his daughter,
Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the
doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving the car.
While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out
from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia
swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped
away.

All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr. Bayquen's
head was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store
where she telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later, she and her mother
brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought
to the Notre Dame Hospital for treatment. Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral
parlor. The police later arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation. they recovered
some empty shells of an armalite rifle.

In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin,
was picked up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and brought to Baguio city. At
4:00 p.m. of that date, he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he was
investigated in connection with the crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant during
the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeñas took down stenographic notes of the proceedings during
the investigation. The stenographic notes consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was
signed afterwards by the appellant and Atty. Cajucom. Ms. Napeñas subsequently transcribed
these notes which the prosecution marked as Exhibit "C." The appellant narrated therein his
knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime.
In a confrontation two days later, he identified Quiaño as "Sony," the triggerman.

The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant consideration to his
claim of force, intimidation, and other irregularities.

The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct
participant in the crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial
confession" shows that "he was in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be rewarded
monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a statement only when he was not given the money."

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence.

HELD: The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his rights
under Section 11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him,
Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the city Fiscal.
Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, and
conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he understood only Ilocano. Moreover,
when Atty. Cajucom briefly conferred with him and when the city Fiscal interrogated him, his
military escorts were present.
He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the
latter's choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or other parties," and that where
there are serious doubts on the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession, the doubts must be
resolved in favor of the accused. He then concludes that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible and his conviction cannot stand, there being no other evidence linking him to the
crimes charged.

After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a
painstaking evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit.
Indeed, the extrajudicial admission — not extrajudicial confession — of the appellant,
which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime
charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant disregard of the appellant's right under
Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.

We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are satisfied that
nothing therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some
facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is involved is the
issue of admissibly in evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is
irrelevant because Paragraph 3 thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.

These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the
1973 Constitution which read:

Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have broadened the
aforesaid Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a
"competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice"; (2) the right to remain silent
and to counsel can only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on
inadmissibility expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.

In Morales vs. Enrile, this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, laid
down the duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and ruled that the waiver of the
right to counsel would not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible
— or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory of
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation
of an abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to
the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
or Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of
such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under investigation may or may not do,
and in language the subject fairly understands. The right to be informed carries with it a
correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates effective
communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed. Since it is
comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily
vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the
person undergoing the investigation.

In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of
such right; he should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that
he can ask for counsel if he so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he
decides not to retain counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and,
therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must
be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.

The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Consequently, even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without
the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given.

The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages of yellow pad, does,
indeed, appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we find in these yellow
pads are stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the stenographer who took down the
stenographic notes, but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes
(Exhibit "C"), which consists of twelve pages, was not signed by the appellant since it does not
indicate any jurat. On the other hand, the same stenographic reporter, who took down the
stenographic notes when accused Wilfredo Quiaño was being investigated by City Fiscal
Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the transcription 34 was subscribed and sworn to by the
accused before City Fiscal Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom, who represented the
accused in the investigation.

Since we cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we cannot
expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher
its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its accuracy. A perusal of the
transcript convinces us that the appellant was not given a fair deal and was deprived of his rights
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly
informed of his rights.

It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a
competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any
such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not,
whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not
categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and
that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact,
waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of
such right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to
prove its existence.

Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and intelligently "accepted"
by the appellant as his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. Cajucom's presence in the
Office of the City fiscal at the time the appellant was brought there for investigation is unclear to
us. At least two possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense that he
happened to be attending to some professional matter, or he was earlier called by the City Fiscal
for the purpose of giving free legal aid to the appellant. These possibilities are not remote but
whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us that Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the
appellant, for as shown in the above-quoted portion of Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately
suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly asking the appellant if he had
a counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he could hire such counsel; and if he
could not, whether he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel. In short,
after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through
suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him.

Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious
doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights
since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the

Regional Trial Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case
No. 4648-R, and ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN.