G.R. No.

L-44264 September 19, 1988

HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 10201 of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and
was made to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still
unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment below.

The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:

In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was
driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of
house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a
jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two to three
meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused approached the place
where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite
direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it
and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-
on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was
about to cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the
parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to move forward
hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota
Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front
paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear. The body
of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to
the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival. 2

An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the
above incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.

Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of
which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of
hearing on September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the
complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to
the trial court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.

The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the of- offense charged.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to indemnify
the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00)
without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. 3

Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling
directly towards her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in
swerving her vehicle to the right should have also stepped on the brakes or lessened
her speed, to avoid the death of a pedestrian.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru
Simple Imprudence.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the
deceased in the sum of P12,000.00. 4

We reverse.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take
precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.  5

A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence."  6

Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple
Imprudence resulting in Homicide.

The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:

 The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the
opposite direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its
left. She should not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should
have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump into the
pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also the jeepney which was then parked
along the street. 7

The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact
that such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the
situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient
time for appellant to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different
courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.

Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the
relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would
tend to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant
decision to swerve her car to the light without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence
presented by the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to the police   stating::
8

And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake

sa sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin
kotse subalit siya naman biglang pagtawid ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho
naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing
aksidente.  (Emphasis supplied)
9

The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity
to have been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the
appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye
had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused
by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the
coolness of a person under normal conditions.   The danger confronting petitioner was real and
10

imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking but only
enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-preservation.

Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal
limits. We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the
case at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the
incident under consideration.

We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of
the claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of
Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity
awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.