SL CASE PG FACTS + DECISION

. NO
1. Mr. Pankaj Kumar Mishra 2 FACTS: Viking Ship Mangers Pvt. Ltd. was struck off. IT Dept contended that the co had some income in the year
(A) vs. Registrar of 11-12 but had not filled any return. Officials from the ROC had no contention to restore the name. NCLT
Companies, Mumbai & Ors.
restored the co without OBH. Ex-director is contending.
(R)
ISSUE: whether NCLT was right in passing order without giving OBH?
JUDGEMENT: the order is not sustainable in law. NCLAT remitted back to NCLT Mumbai.
2. Alibaba Nabibasha (P) vs. 3 FACTS: 5 cases of cheque dishonour filled against the director. Director contended that he resigned 7 year
Small Farmers Agri- before the said contract was executed and even Form 32 was filled. The opposing parties contended that the
Business Consortium &
said director was present during the negotiations.
Ors.(R)
ISSUE: Is the Director liable for the affairs of the company even after his resignation and form 32?
JUDGEMENT: Delhi HC held the after the resignation and filling form 32 director can no longer be held liable.
Petitions u/s 141 of NI act were duly quashed.
3. Dr. Rajesh Kumar 4 FACTS: A nominee Director was sent an SCN by ASJ charging him u/s 128, 129, 447, 448. The director
Yaduvanshi (P) vs. SFIO & contended that he was there just to attend the meeting on behalf of PNB. The petitioners contended that he
Anr. (R)
was liable because he was negligent in conducting his affairs.
ISSUE: whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for the alleged fraud committed by BSL and/or promoters
solely for the reason that the petitioner was a director of BSL and Whether there is any material on record to
indicate that the petitioner was complicit in the commission of the alleged offence?
JUDGEMENT: There is a material difference between the allegation that a Nominee Director has been
negligent or has failed to discharge his responsibility and an allegation that he has connived or has been
complicit in approving financial statements, which he knows to be false or conceal material information. While
the latter may constitute an offence under Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013, the former does not
constitute any such offence. So there is no liability.
4. QVC Exports Pvt. Ltd. & 5 FACTS: A nominee director of a minority shareholder was removed without giving OBH.
Ors. (A) vs. Cosmic Ferro
ISSUE: can a Nominee Directors appointed in a quasi-partnership company or closely held company
Alloys Ltd. & Ors. (R)
by mutual understanding between partners can be removed by passing majority vote in EGM after
giving special notice?
JUDGEMENT: The NCLAT held that as proper notice was issued to convene EGM and the same was
received by the appellants including the nominee director, but they did not make any representation
and the EGM voted for removal of nominee director with majority. Thus, there is no illegality in this
process and dismissed the appeal.

5 Economy Hotels India 6 FACTS: Due to a inadvertent typographical error’ in the extract of the miniutes a resolution for reduction of SC was
Services Private Limited (A) passed as unanimously by the shareholders instead of special resolution. Due to this the NCLT did not conform the said
vs. Registrar of Companies reduction.
& Anr. (R)
ISSUE: Whether as inadvertent ‘typographical error’ in the extract of ‘Minutes’, characterising the ‘special resolution’ as
‘unanimous ordinary resolution’ will render a resolution passed as ‘special resolution’ as invalid?
JUDGEMENT: NCLAT observed that ‘Reduction of Capital’ under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 is a ‘Domestic
Affair’ of a particular Company in which, ordinarily, a Tribunal will not interfere because of the reason that it is a ‘majority
decision’ which prevails. Moreover because the co had filled the special resolution immediately afters passing the same.
6 K.V. Brahmaji Rao (A) vs. 7 FACTS: Nirav Modi case – the (A) was the executive director of PNB during the relavent time the
UOI (R)
scam took place so an order seizing and freezing his assets was passed. (A) contended that he was
not given any OBH and he was currently an executive of a different company.
ISSUE: can any person who is head of some other organizations can be roped and his/her Assets can be attached in
exercising the powers under Sections 337 & 339 of the Companies Act, 2013?
JUDGEMENT: The NCLAT observed that the person who may be the head of some other organizations cannot be roped
and his or her Assets cannot be attached in exercising the powers under Sections 337 & 339 of ca13 Admittedly, the
Appellant was the Executive Director of PNB, Head Office, New Delhi i.e. employee of other organization. the impugned
order of NCLT is set aside, and the Appeal is allowed.

7 Vijay Goverdhandas 8 FACTS: DIN cancellations – Both petitioners were residents of Mumbai and the co was also
Kalantri & Anr. (P) vs.
registered under ROC Mumbai. Writ petition filled in HC of Punjab.
Union of India & Ors. (R)
ISSUE: can a writ petition be filled for matters outside the territorial jurisdiction of the HC?
JUDGEMENT: it can be filled only if the said writ petition has arisen wholly or in part within the territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court. In the present case the petitioners have failed to est jurisdiction of the HC. Hence the
petition was dismissed with exemplary costs.

8 Aruna Oswal (Appellant) 9 FACTS: (res) filled a suit in civil court against the share inheritance to (A)’s wife claiming that being a
vs. Pankaj Oswal & Ors.
son he had ¼th share in his fathers estate. He got and order to maintain status quo. In the meanwhile
(Respondents)
(Res) filled an O&M case in nclt on the basis of inheritable shares. Nclt without going through the
maintainability and later dismissing the objection of maintainability passed an order. This was
appealed and finally went to SC.
ISSUE: Whether the dispute raised as to the inheritance of the estate of the deceased is a civil dispute or could be said
to be an act of oppression and mismanagement in the affairs of the Co? & Whether such a dispute could be adjudicated
in a company petition filed during the civil suit’s pendency?
JUDGEMENT: SC held the matters of inheritance cannot be decided in proceedings u/s 241/242 of the ca13.
The (res) should have waited till the inheritance judgement was finalised. The order of NCLT and NCLAT is set aside.
9 ROC-WB V. (A) 10 ISSUE: whether Tribunal can impose the compounding fees under Section 441 (1) of the Act, less than
Karan Kishore Samtani minimum fine prescribed for the offence under Section 165 (1) read with Section 165(6) of the Companies Act,
(Res) 2013?
JUDGEMENT: NCLAT held that the NCLT, Kolkata Bench has failed to notice the minimum fine prescribed
under sub-section 6 of Section 165 of the Companies Act, 2013 which was applicable at relevant time. The 50K
already paid by the (res) is allowed to be set off against the min fine of 13,60,000 and asked to pay 13,10,000
within 60 days of this order.
10 S. P. Velumani & Anr. 11 FACTS: The contention of the Appellant that during the financial year 2017-18, an amount of Rs. 48,41,801/- has been
(Appellants) vs. Magnum written off as bad debts, while in the previous year it was nil and the details as to identity of the party, whether related
Spinning Mills India Pvt. party or otherwise is not disclosed. Moreover he also contended that he was removed from operating the companies
Ltd. & Ors. (Respondents) banck a/c by a resolution passed at an allegedly paper meeting. The respondents on the other hand replied that
Appellant was estopped from challenging the transection ex facie, as the relevant purchase documents have been
pursued and passed for payment only by Appellant No. 1 and cheques also issued only by the Appellant No. 1 and also
contended that there was no agreement or was not mentioned anywhere in the MOA or AOA that the apellent had to be
kept as an authorised signatory at all times.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the BOD to write off the bad debt and operation of bank A/c warrants judicial
interference in respect of O&M of Companies?
JUDGEMENT: NCLAT held that The decision of the Board of Directors to write off the bad debt is a commercial
decision, which does not warrant any judicial interference.

11 Late Mona Aggarwal 12 FACTS: A petition for winding up of the company was pending before NCLT and in the meanwhile the
through her Legal heir Mr.
ROC struck off the co. The petitioners filled appeal for the and the appeal was pending judgement.
Vijay Kumar Aggarwal &
Anr. (Appellants) vs. NCLT dismissed the winding up petition cuz the co was struck off with liberty to file a fresh
Ghaziabad Engg. Company application once the co is revived.
Ltd. & Ors. (Respondents) ISSUE: The question for consideration is that during the pendency of winding up petition the name of the company has
been struck off under Section 248 of the Companies Act 2013, in such circumstances whether the NCLT can proceed with
winding up petition or not?
JUDGEMENT: NCLT held that it is clear that Sec 248 in no manner will affect the powers of the Tribunal to wind up the
co, the name of which has been struck off from the ROC. Therefore, even after removal of the name of the co from the
register of companies the NCLT can proceed with the petition for winding up under Sec 271 of the CA13. The impugned
order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to NCLT to be decided as per the merits.
12 Bank of Baroda (Appellant) 14 FACTS: pref shh filled a petition cuz the co was not redeeming their pref shares. The application was
vs. Aban Offshore Limited
rejected by NCLT saying the pref. shh have no locus standi. The present appeal stems out of this
(Respondent)
impugned order.
ISSUE: Whether there is any remedy under law available to preference shareholders for filing application for redemption
of preference shares?
JUDGEMENT: READ PG 15 The judgement is quite big and detailed. In simple words though the ca13 does not
expressly give any remedy u/s 55 but when the object of the entire act is considered ( irredeemable pref shh
cannot be issued) the NCLT can still allow the case by exercising its inherent powers. Moreover the pref shh
are considered a class and can file a class action suit u/s 245. So the impugned order is set aside and the
matter is remitted back to NCLT to consider as per the law.
13 Joint Commissioner of 15 FACTS: simple story the composite scheme u/s 230-232 provided for conversion of Pref. Shares into
Income Tax (OSD), Circle
loan. The IT dept objected to this contending that converting will artificially reduce the profits of the
(3)(3)-1, Mumbai (A) vs.
Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd. co resulting in huge losses for the revenue dept.
& Ors. (R) ISSUE: Whether an assumption that the scheme of C&A may result in reduction of tax liability will furnish a basis for
And challenging the validity of the same?
JUDGEMENT: The NCLAT, held that without going to the record and without placing any evidence or substantiating the
Income Tax Officer, Ward allegation of avoidance of tax by appearing before the Tribunal, it was not open to the income tax department to hold
3(3)-1, Mumbai (A) vs. M/s. that the composite scheme of arrangement amongst the petitioner companies and their respective shareholders and
Reliance Jio Infratel Pvt. creditors is giving undue favour to the shareholders of the company and also the overall scheme of arrangement results
Ltd. & Ors. (R) into tax avoidance. The NCLAT observed that mere fact that a scheme may result in reduction of tax liability does not
furnish a basis for challenging the validity of the same. IN SHORT NO.
14 Registrar of Companies, 18 FACTS: present appeal is from ROC seeking to set aside the NCLT order waiving off the additionalfees
Kerala (Appellant) vs. Ayoli
ISSUE: can NCLT waive off additional fees prescribed under the Act?
Abdulla (Respondent)
JUDGEMENT: NCLT held that NCLT has no power to waive off additional fees. The impugned order is
set aside to that extent and the respondents were asked to pay the min filling fees within 30 days.

15 Regional Director, 19 FACTS: NCLT approved the amalgamation of a llp and a co by using the principle of Cassus Ommisus. This
Southern Region and Ors. was challenged by both RD and ROC u/s 421.
(A) vs. Real Image LLP and
Ors. (R)
ISSUE? Can by applying the principal of casus omissus a Indian LLP incorporated under the LLP Act 2008 can be allowed
to merge into an Indian Company incorporated under the Act, 2013?
JUDGEMENT: NCLT held that The Companies Act, 2013 has taken care of merger of LLP into company. In this regard
Section 366 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that for the purpose of Part I of Chapter XXI the word company includes
any partnership firm, limited liability partnership, cooperative society, society or any other business entity which can
apply for registration under this part. It means that under this part LLP will be treated as company and it can apply for
registration and once the LLP is registered as company then the company can be merged in another company as per
Section 232 of the Companies Act, 2013. The principle of Cassus Ommisus cannot be used if case of clear necessity and
when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself. Hence the order passed by NCLT is set aside.

16 G. Vasudevan (Petitioner) 20 FACTS: The challenge in the instant writ petition is to the vires of the proviso to Section 167(1)(a) of the Companies Act,
vs. Union of India (Rep. by as inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act 2017. Which states that if a director attracts any disqualification he
Secretary, Ministry of remains in the defaulting co and vacated in all other companies. Contended that this provision is arbitrary and lacks
Corporate Affairs and intelligible differentia and violative of Art. 19(1)(g) COI.
Ministry of Law and
Justice) (Respondents) ISSUE: is proviso to sec 167(1)(a) violative of part iii of COI?
JUDGEMENT: HELD NO on 2 grounds refer pg 21 for detailed judgement.
17 Mukut Pathak & Ors. vs. 22 FACTS: The petitioners were disqualified for the co not filling its MGT-7 for consecutive years and
Union of India & Anr.
years form 2013 were counter (i.e., b4 commencement of CA13) contended that it was retrospective
application of law.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of Section 164(2)(a) are retrospective? & Whether OBH is to be given before
publication of the names of the disqualified directors?
JUDGEMENT: It was held that the provisions of Section 164(2) would apply prospectively and that it a well
settled law, that no statute should be construed to apply retrospectively, unless such construction appears clear from
the language of the enactment or otherwise necessary by implication. It was also equally trite that a statute is not
retrospective merely because it affects existing rights or because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a
time antecedent to its passing. & the concept of “audi alteram partem” is not applicable here cuz the ROC is not
exercising any powers but only following what is mentioned in the law.

18 Jindal Steel and Power 23 FACTS: the corp applicant initiated cirp and since there was no resolution plan even after 270, NCLT
Limited (Appellant) vs.
passed the liquidation order. This was appealed the promoter and in the meanwhile he initiated C&A
Arun Kumar Jagatramka
and Ors. (Respondents) procedure u/s 230-232 btw the co and its crs and an order was passed. This order in being challenged
here by the applents.
ISSUES: Whether in a liquidation proceeding under IBC the Scheme for C&A can be made in terms of Sec 230 to 232 of the CA 13?
And If so permissible, whether the Promoter is eligible to file application for C&A, while he is ineligible under Sec
29A of the IBC to submit a ‘Resolution Plan’?
JUDGEMENT: HELD YES for the first question and HELD NO for the second question. (READ PG 24-25)(Judgement already consise)

19 M/s Ind-Swift Limited 24 FACTS: the appellant had failed to repay deposits and applied to erstwhile CLB and got instalments fixed to repay
(Appellant) vs. Registrar of deposits, Appellant again sought re-fixing of periods, instalments and rate of interest from NCLT, New Delhi bench under
Companies (Punjab & Section 74 of the Companies Act, 2013. NCLT rejected the application. This appeal is against rejection of the application/s.
Chandigarh) (Respondent) ISSUES: can a co which has already got relaxation form CLB seek another relaxation from NCLT under the new act?
Judgement: HELD NO (REFER PG 24-25)
20 S. Gopakumar Nair & Anr. 25 FACTS: A german co took over the majority shareholding of an Indian co from the appellants, after
vs. Obo Bettermann India
the purchase the shh of the appealents was reduced to 0.36%. The german co sought to aquire the
Pvt. Ltd.
remaining shares in a lot of way and finally sent a notice u/s 236 CA13.
ISSUE: Whether the appellants’ petition filed u/s 241 is maintainable. And Whether Sec236 could be invoked
to acquire the minority shareholding in the present case?
JUDGEMENT: Appellents are eligible cuz there are only 3 SHH (i.e., 1/10 th of the members rule u/s 241). Section
236 could be invoked only in case of amalgamation, share exchange and conversion of securities and for any other
reasons. It was observed that the words “for any other reasons” had to be read ‘ejusdem generis’ with the preceding
word and must take the same or similar colour.
21 Hari Sankaran (Appellant) 26 Companies Act, 2013 - Section 130 – Application by central government for reopening and recasting of accounts –
vs. Union of India & Ors. Objection by ex-director of the company – NCLT allowed the application by Central Government - on appeal NCLAT
(Respondents) concurred with NCLT
PG 27 – judgement.

22 CADS Software India Pvt. 27 FACTS :- A was removed as a MD on grounds of loss of confidence. The said dir is claiming compensation for loss of office
Ltd. and Ors (Appellant) vs. u/s 202(3) CA13.
Mr. K.K. Jagadish & Ors., ISSUE: Whether a person removed from the post of MD is eligible for compensation, when he is removed due to the
(Respondents) reason of loss of confidence?
JUGEMENT: NCLAT observed that there was no fixed tennur at the time of appointment. The Tribunal held that the term
loss of confidence does not appear in the CA13. Hence, the Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
23 Usha Martin Ventures Ltd. 29 FACTS: the appelent filed Petition under Sec 241 & 242 of CA13 alleging O&M. SBI filed an intervention application, which
& Ors. (Appellant) vs. Usha was allowed by NCLT. Appellants challenged the impleadment of SBI in this appeal. SBI held that it had a nominee dir.
Martin Ltd. & Anr ISSUE: SBI is not a necessary party, inspite of the same, it has allowed to intervene the Respondents by the NCLT, Kolkata
(Respondent) bench.
JUGEMENT: NCLAT held that as the lender SBI has a nominee as one of the Dir of the Co and the petitioner have alleged
O&M of the co, The NCLT rightly allowed the SBI to intervene in the matter. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
24 Kanodia Knits Pvt. Ltd. (A) 29 The documents placed by the Appellant company failed to prove that it was carrying on business or was in operation
vs. ROC Delhi (R) when its name was struck off. PG - 30

25 Shashi Prakash Khemka 31 FACTS: An application was filled b4 CLB seeking rectification of register of member. The case was admitted on
(Dead) Through LRs. and merits. Later an appeal was filled b4 the HC which reversed the CLB order and pulled into a civil suit. An SLP
Anr. (Appellants) vs. Nepc
against this impugned order of the HC.
Micon & Ors.
(Respondents) ISSUE: Whether issue related to transfer of shares would be adjudicated by the Civil Courts or by the CLB?
JUGEMENT: the power conferred on CLB was fairly wide but in case of a serious dispute as to title, the matter could
be relegated to a civil suit. CA13 had been amended which provided for the power of rectification of the Register u/s 59
of the CA13 and conferred such powers on the NCLT. A reference was also made to Sec 430 which completely barred the
jurisdiction of the civil courts in matters in respect of which the power had been conferred on the NCLT. In light of the
above facts, the SC was of the view that relegating the parties to a civil suit would not be appropriate, considering the
manner in which Sect 430 was widely worded.
26 S. Ahamed Meeran (A)vs. 32 Eligibility criteria to maintain petition before the Tribunal & Grant of waiver to maintain application under Sections
Ronny George & Ors (R) 241 & 244 of the Companies Act, 2013 - RONNIE GEORGE CASE – REFER PG 32 – A lot of deliberations.

27 K. J. Suwresh & Anr. (A) vs. 33 FACTS: The appellants challenge the amalgamation of the companies on the ground that they were not put to notice of
Teamlease Staffing the amalgamation.
Services Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ISSUE: The contention of Appellants is that they ought to have been treated either as shareholder or creditors of the
(R) transferee Company and in either case they were entitled to Notice.
JUDGEMET: NCLAT took various factors into consideration and held the appellents were infact aware of the
amalgamation and dismissed the appeal accordingly. REFER PG – 33 for the complete judgement.
28 SAS Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & 34 FACTS: LONG CASE - illegal allotment of shares –
Anr. (P) vs. Surya ISSUE: Whether civil court has jurisdiction over disputes regarding Allotment of shares under the Companies Act, 2013?
Constructions Pvt. Ltd. & JUGDEMENT: general scheme of CA13 spoken off and the powers of NCLT are discussed – refer pg 35
 Ors. (R)

29 Karn Gupta (Petitioner) vs. 36 FACTS: petitioner had resigned as a dir in 2012 the co failed to file form 32. In 2017 his name was featured in the ROC list
Union of India & Anr. of disqualified dirs. He is now challenging this list. This position is not disputed by the respondents.
(Respondents) ISSUE: Whether the petitioner who has resigned from the directorship of the co would incur a disqualification under Sec
164 of the Companies Act, 2013?
JUDGEMENT: ROC was told to rectify the same.
30 Rishima SA Investments 37 FACTS: the petitioner herein had a agreement with the struck off co and that agreement had an arbitration clause. Here
LLC (Petitioner) vs. he is challenging the order of striking off as perverse. The ROC on the other hand contended that the petitioner had no
Registrar of Companies, locus standi as he was not a member/crs/or the co itself to challenge the stikeoff.
West Bengal & Ors. ISSUE: Is a person, not being a member or a creditor or the company itself, entitled to challenge the striking off of the
(Respondent) name of the company under Section 560 of the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956? AND Does the petitioner have the locus
standi to file and maintain the present writ petition? AND If the answers to the first two issues are in the affirmative, is
the impugned order of the Registrar vitiated as being perverse and without reason?
JUDGEMENT: culcutta HC held that eventhough CA13 does not give the petitioner locus standi to challenge the same. He
however is not left with any remedy. He can always approach a HC u/A 226. OTHER LEGAL POINTS COVERED – PG 38
SL CASE PG BRIEF
0 GEORGE VINCI THOMAS (Appellant) vs. IBC 2016 - Sec 9 - Existing dispute - Request for certain information relating to the debt by corporate debtor to operational
1 CAPEDGE CONSULTING PVT. LTD. & ORS creditor no information supplied - Whether constitutes an existing dispute - Held, No.
(Respondent) JUDGEMENT: on perusal of the email communication, we found that the corporate debtor is merely asking for further
information on the services rendered by the operational creditor for each of the invoices raised. Debtor has not raised any
dispute relating to debt nor raised any dispute relating to quality of service of goods.
0 ANAND RAO KORADA RESOLUTION FACTS: A case was pending before HC w.r.t payment of workmen dues. HC directed the commissioner to arrive at a figure
2 PROFESSIONAL (Appellant) vs. M/S VARSHA and later on a few properties were put on auction. In the meanwhile a financial cr initiated a cirp and a moratorium was
FABRICS (P) LTD. (Respondent) fixed. However HC went ahead with the auction.
ISSUE: Can HC do so?
JUDEMENT: Section 238 of the IBC gives an overriding effect to the IBC over all other laws and exclusive jurisdiction is given
to NCLT/NCLAT. HC order are set aside, as parallel proceedings with respect to the main issue cannot take place in the HC.
The union workers are advised to file a application u/s 9 IBC.
0 DUNCANS INDUSTRIES LTD (Appellant) vs. A.J. FACTS: the apeallent had 14 tea estates and 7 of them were being taken over by CG under the TEA act 1953. In the
3 AGROCHEM (Respondent) meanwhile a op cr initiated cirp. The same was dismissed by NCLT on the ground that the consent of CG was not taken later
it was admitted by NCLAT. This admission is being challenged in the SC.
ISSUE: is CG consent required to initiate CIRP when CG has taken over under the tea act 1953?
JUDGEMENT: The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that the provisions of the IBC would have an
overriding effect over the Tea Act, 1953 and that no prior consent of the Central Government before initiation of the
proceedings under Sec 7/9 of the IBC would be required and even without such consent of the CG, the insolvency
proceedings under Sec7/9 of the IBC initiated by the OP creditor shall be maintainable.
0 EXCEL METAL PROCESSORS LTD (Appellant) vs. 149 IBC 2016 – Operational creditor a German company – Corporate debtor an Indian company agreement provides for the
4 BENTELER TRADING INTERNATIONAL GMBH & jurisdiction of German courts whether it can file the petition before the NCLT – Held, Yes.
ANR. (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: Binani Industries Ltd v. Bank of Baroda & Anr. – CIRP insolvency proceedings is not a ‘suit’ or a ‘litigation’ or a
‘money claim’ for any litigation; No one is selling or buying the ‘Corporate Debtor’ a ‘Resolution Plan’; It is not an auction; it
is not a recovery, which is an individual effort by the creditor to recover the dues through a process that had debtor and
creditor on opposite sides; and it is not liquidation. The object is mere to get resolution brought about, so that the Company
do not default on dues.
0 AHLUWALIA CONTRACTS (INDIA) LTD 150 FACTS: the debtor referred the case to arbitration after the demand notice was issued and claimed that the debt is
5 (Appellant) vs. RAHEJA DEVELOPERS LTD disputed. NCLT dismissed the case on the same ground.
(Respondent) JUDGMENT: In Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd SC held that the ‘existence of the dispute’ and/or the
suit or arbitration proceeding must be pre-existing i.e. it must exist before the receipt of the demand notice or invoice.
There is nothing on the record to suggest that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ raised any pre-existing dispute relating to quality of
work performed by Appellant. Hence appeal is allowed.
0 SSMP INDUSTRIES LTD (Appellant) vs. PERKAN 151 Facts: The plaintiff filled a recovery suit, the defendant replied with a counter claim. In the meanwhile the plaintiff went in
6 FOOD PROCESSORS PVT. LTD (Respondent) to IRP and an RP was appointed.
Issue: whether the adjudication of the counter claim would be liable to be stayed in view of Sec 14 of the Code.
Judgement: The Court has considered the plaint and the written statement/ counter claim. The adjudication of the plaint,
Note : - there is more to the judgement than this defences in the written statement and the amounts claimed in the counter claim would have to be considered as a whole in
and 2 other case laws are also referred to at order to determine as to whether the suit or the counter claim would be liable to be decreed. A counter claim would be in
arriving at this judgement. the nature of a suit against the Plaintiff which in this case is the `corporate debtor’. U/S 14(1) (a) of the Code, strictly
speaking, a counter claim would be covered by the moratorium which bars `the institution of suits or continuation of
pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor”. A counter claim would be a proceeding against the corporate
debtor. However, the counter claim raised in the present case against the corporate debtor i.e., the Plaintiff, is integral to
the recovery sought by the Plaintiff and is related to the same transaction. Sec 14 has created a piquant situation i.e., that
the corporate debtor undergoing insolvency proceedings can continue to pursue its claims but the counter claim would be
barred under Section 14(1) (a). When such situations arise, the Court has to see whether the purpose and intent behind the
imposition of moratorium is being satisfied or defeated. A blinkered approach cannot be followed and the Court cannot
blindly stay the counter claim and refer the defendant to the NCLT/RP for filing its claims. Once the counter claims are
adjudicated and the amount to be paid/recovered is determined, at that stage, or in execution proceedings, depending
upon the situation prevalent, Section 14 could be triggered.
0 LALIT MISHRA & ORS (Appellant) vs. SHARON 153 Facts: The Appellants have challenged the order of approval of the ‘Resolution Plan’ on 2 counts namely –(i) The Appellants,
7 BIO MEDICINE LTD. & ORS. (Respondent) promoters were the shareholders and for them no amount has been provided under the ‘Resolution Plan’; and (ii) Some of
the Appellants, promoters are also ‘personal guarantors’ who have been discriminated.
Jugement: The ‘I&B Code’ seeks to protect creditors of the ‘Corporate Debtor’ by preventing promoters from rewarding
themselves at the expense of creditors and undermining the insolvency processes. accepted, as on approval of the
‘Resolution Plan’, the claim of the entire stakeholders stand cleared and the ‘Personal Guarantor’ thereafter cannot claim
that they have been discriminated. All the stakeholders have already been cleared by the 3rd Respondent- ‘Successful
Resolution Applicant’. It was open to them to say that the personal guarantee will not result into any liability towards the
‘Company’ or the ‘Resolution Applicant’. It was not the intention of the legislature to benefit the ‘Personal Guarantors’ by
excluding exercise of legal remedies available in law by the creditors. It is a settled position of law that the liabilities of
guarantors is co-extensive with the borrower.
0 FORECH INDIA LTD. (Appellant) vs. EDELWEISS 154 IBC 2016 – Sec 7&11 – FC filed an IP against the CD – Appellant objecting to the admission on the ground of continuance
8 ASSETS RECONSTRUCTION CO LTD & ANR of winding up petition under the old Act – Objection rejected – Whether correct – Held, Yes.
(Respondent) Facts: a winding up petition instituted by an OC was pending before the HC and in the meantime an application u/s 9 IBC
was filled before the NCLT and the same was admitted. This admission is being challenged.
JUDGEMENT: finally Section 434 was itself substituted in 2018, in which a proviso was added by which even in winding up
petitions where notice has been served and which are pending in the High Courts, any person could apply for transfer of
such petitions to the NCLT under the Code, which would then have to be transferred by the High Court to the adjudicating
authority and treated as an insolvency petition under the Code. At this moment we do not want too interfere with the order
of the NCLAT and give the parties liberty to file an application under the provisio u/s 434.
0 SWISS RIBBONS PVT LTD. (Appellant) vs. UNION 154 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Whether constitutionally valid – Held, yes.
9 OF INDIA (Respondent)

1 SHALINI PUBLICITY CREATIVE PVT. LTD. 156 Sec 7 – Default in repayment of loan by corporate debtor – OTS proposal failed financial creditor filed petition – NCLT
0 (Appellant) vs. DENA BANK (Respondent) admitted the petition whether correct – Held, Yes.
Facts: OTS proposal of the CD was rejected by the FC and FC initiated CIRP. This was challenged inter alia on limitation.
Judgement: Once the debt was acknowledged and the suit for recovery was filed before DRT, the claim cannot be held to be
barred by limitation. Even otherwise, the objection in regard to the claim being barred by limitation has to be determined
during the CIRP only. Triggering of CIRP on grounds of default of a debt that’s payable in law or in fact is different from
admission or rejection of a claim of a creditor during such process.
1 COAL INDIA LTD. (Appellant) vs. GULF COIL 158 IBC– Sec9 – Petition filed by OC admitted – NCLT overlooked the fact of the payment of principal amount under a
1 LUBRICANTS INDIA LTD & ANR (Respondent) settlement – Whether correct – Held, No.
FACTS: While passing the impugned order, the AA had overlooked the factum that the principal amount has been paid and
settled and no interest was required to be paid.
JUDGEMENT: SC in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. UOI & Ors - It is clear that once the Code gets triggered by admission
of a crs petition u/s 7 to 9, the proceeding that is before the AA, being a collective proceeding, is a proceeding in rem.
Being a proceeding in rem, it is necessary that the body which is to oversee the resolution process must be consulted before
any individual corporate debtor is allowed to settle its claim. A question arises as to what is to happen before a COC is
constituted (as per the timelines that are specified, a COC can be appointed at any time within 30 days from the date of
appointment of the IRP). We make it clear that at any stage where the COC is not yet constituted, a party can approach the
NCLT directly, which Tribunal may, in exercise of its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, allow or
disallow an application for withdrawal or settlement. This will be decided after hearing all the concerned parties and
considering all relevant factors on the facts of each case.”
1 AFFINITY FINANCE SERVICES PVT LTD. 159 Corporate insolvency proceedings – Liquidation order passed – Recall rejected – Whether refusal to recall the liquidation
2 (Appellant) vs. KIEV FINANCE LTD (Respondent) order correct – Held, Yes.
Facts: the RP filled for a liquidation order which as granted and the RP was appointed as the liquidator. Later the liquidator
asked the AA to recall the order cuz someone had come to purchase the CD. Which was rejected by the AA. Hence the
present appeal.
JUDGEMENT: Even if it is accepted that any resolution applicant did intend to submit a resolution plan before the order of
liquidation was passed, same could be evaluated for considering its feasibility, viability and financial matrix only during the
period of IRP. The AA has rightly pointed out in the impugned order that even during the liquidation process corporate
debtor can be sold as an ongoing concern. That should allay the apprehension of the appellant, if any, with regard to fair
value of the Assets of the Corporate Debtor. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
1 JK JUTE MILL MAZDOOR MORCHA (Appellant) 160 Whether trade union is an ‘OC’ when representing the interests of the workmen – Held, Yes.
3 vs. JUGGILAL KAMLAPAT JUTE MILLS LTD & FACTS: the petition filled by the union on behalf of 3000 workers was rejected by NCLT with the liberty to file the claims
ORS (Respondent) individually. The same view was upheld by NCLAT. Hence this appeal.
JUDGEMENT: trade union is certainly an entity established under a statute – namely, the Trade Unions Act, and would
therefore fall within the definition of “person” U/S 3(23) of the Code. This being so, it is clear that an “operational debt”,
meaning a claim in respect of employment, could certainly be made by a person duly authorised to make such claim on
behalf of a workman. Rule 6, Form 5 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to AA) Rules, 2016 also recognises the
fact that claims may be made not only in an individual capacity, but also conjointly. Further, a registered trade union
recognised by Sec 8 of the Trade Unions Act, makes it clear that it can sue and be sued as a body corporate under Sec 13 of
that Act.
1 PRANAMI TRADING PVT LTD. (Appellant) vs. 161 Sec238 – Application of Limitation Act to proceedings – Petition of operational creditor rejected by NCLT on the ground of
4 KIEON DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD (Respondent) limitation – Whether correct – Held, No.
Facts: Long story - after the long deliberations – an LC suit was filled for recovery and the respondent acknowledged the
debt due in the written statement. Based on this written statement the plaintiff filled an sec 7 proceeding under IBC which
was rejected on the contention that the acknowledgement in the WS did not amount to acceptance. This is being
contended.
Judgement: the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply “as far as may be”. Moreover the transaction, the term clearly
shows liability of Rs.8, 10,000/- getting created every 6 months for the Respondent to pay the Appellant “till the entire
booking amount has not been repaid”. When the entire booking amount has not been paid, this component keeps getting
attracted and liability invoked and when Section 7 Application was filed, the amount due and outstanding was clearly more
than Rs.1 Lakh and thus, in our view, the Application under Section 7 could not have been rejected as time barred
1 AXIS BANK (Appellant) vs. SBS ORGANICS PVT. 162 SARFASEI Act – Appeal before DRAT – Pre-deposit of 50% of contended sum – Appeal withdrawn – Borrower claimed the
5 LTD & ANR (Respondent) refund of the pre-deposit sum – Bank contended it cannot be refunded – Whether the claim of the borrower tenable –
Held, Yes.
Facts: respondent filled an appeal against the action taken by the appellant u/s 13 SARFESI, an initial stay order was given
and later vacated. The respondent preferred an appeal against this DRAT and made a deposit of 50%(rule) in the meanwhile
the DRT decided setting aside the sale. The respondent pleaded for withdrawal of the appeal and his deposit, which was
allowed subject to disposal of the appeal. Aggrieved by this an writ petition was filled in HC and the order was in favour of
the respondent. Aggrieved by the appellant has preferred the current appeal before SC.
ISSUE: what is the fate of this deposit?
Judgement: There is neither any order of appropriation during the pendency of the appeal nor any attachment on the pre-
deposit. Therefore, the deposit made by the first respondent is liable to be returned to the first respondent.
1 UCO BANK & ANR (Appellant) vs. DIPAK 164 SARFAESI Act, 2002 read with Tripura Land Revenue and land Reform Act, 1960 – Enforcement of security interest – Sale
6 DEBBARMA & ORS (Respondent) of mortgaged assets of the borrower by the bank – Whether prohibited by the provisions of the Tripura Act – Held, No.

1 STATE BANK OF INDIA (Appellant) vs. SANTOSH 165 SARFAESI Act read with COI and constitution of J&K– Whether provisions of SARFAESI Act are applicable to the State of
7 GUPTA & ANR (Respondent) J&K – Held, Yes – Whether COI is superior to the Constitution of J&K – Held, yes.

1 CHUNNU FASHIONS & ORS (Appellant) vs. 167 SARFAESI– Sec 17 & 18 – Borrower filed appeal before DRAT against the attachment order of the secured creditor –
8 EDELWEISS ASSET RECONSTRUCTION CO LTD Appeal admitted with condition of pre-deposit – Borrower failed to pay the pre-deposit amount appeal dismissed by
(Respondent) DRAT – Whether correct – Held, Yes.
JUDGEMENT: U/S 21 of Debt Recovery Act, an appeal is not to be entertained by the AT, unless the person preferring the
appeal has deposited 75% of the amount of the debt due from him as determined by the Tribunal U/s 19. In terms of the
proviso, the AT may for reasons to be recorded in writing waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under the said
section. Unlike Sec 18 of the Debt Recovery Act, Sec 18 of the SARFAESI Act does not permit full waiver. In Narain Chandra
Ghose v. UCO Bank & Ors, the SC held that the condition of pre-deposit for entertainment of an appeal being mandatory
U/S 18 of the SARFAESI Act.
1 MOBILOX INNOVATIONS PVT LTD. (Appellant) vs. 168 IBC – Sec 8 – Operational debt – Term ‘existence of dispute’ – Meaning thereof – Explained by the SC. The Court does not
9 KIRUSA SOFTWARE PVT LTD (Respondent) at this stage examine the merits of the dispute except to the extent indicated above. So long as a dispute truly exists in fact
and is not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, the adjudicating authority has to reject the application

2 SURENDRA TRADING COMPANY (Appellant) vs. 171 IBC – Proviso to sec 9(5) – 7 days time limit to remove defects in the appl– Whether directory – Held Yes.
0 JUGGILAL KAMLAPAT JUTE MILLS CO LTD Issue: whether the 7 days prescribed in the section is mandatory or directory?
(Respondent)

2 INNOVENTIVE INDUSTRIES LTD (Appellant) vs. 173 IBC – Corporate debtor entered into CDR with 19 FCs – One FC (respondent) invoked the provisions the Code –
1 ICICI & ANR (Respondent) Application filed before the NCLT – Objections raised as to the applicability of the Code qua the Maharashtra Act and that
the debt is not due under the CDR agreement – Objections rejected – Application admitted – NCALT dismissed the appeal
– Whether contentions of the appellant are tenable – Held, No
2 M.D. FROZEN FOODS EXPORTS PVT. LTD. 174 Sec 13 of the SARFESI r/w Arbitration and Conciliation Act – Default in payment by borrower – lender invoked arbitration
2 (Appellant) vs. HERO FINCORP LTD (Respondent) – Meanwhile lender became financial institution by virtue of notification – Therefore lender instituted proceeding under
SARFESI Act also – Whether tenable – Held, Yes.
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION: A. Whether the arbitration proceedings initiated by the respondent can be
carried on along with the SARFAESI proceedings simultaneously? HELD YES – PG 175
B. Whether resort can be had to Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act in respect of debts which have arisen out of a
loan agreement/mortgage created prior to the application of the SARFAESI Act to the respondent? & whether the lender
can invoke the SARFAESI Act provision where its notification as financial institution under Section 2(1)(m) has been
issued after the account became an NPA under Section 2(1)(o) of the said Act?
ANS – we are of the view that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act would become applicable qua all debts owing and live
when the Act became applicable to the respondent
2 INTERNATIONAL ASSET RECONSTRUCTION 176 RDBA, 1993 r/w Limitation Act– Proceeding before the RO of the Tribunal – Order of the RO – Appeal filed AFTER 30 days
3 COMPANY OF INDIA LTD. (Appellant) vs. – Whether the delay could be condoned – Held, No.
OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF ALDRICH ISSUE: Can Sec 5 of the Limitation Act be invoked to condone the prescribed period of 30 days, u/s 30(1) of the RDB Act, for
PHARMACEUTICALS LTD & ORS (Respondent) preferring an appeal before the Tribunal, against an order of the Recovery officer ?
JUDGEMENT: An “application” is defined u/s 2(b) of the RDB Act as one made u/s 19 of the Act. The latter provision in
Chapter IV, deals with institution of original recovery proceedings before a Tribunal. An appeal lies against the order of the
Tribunal u/s 20, before the Appellate Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned for sufficient cause under the proviso
to Section 20(3) of the Act. The Tribunal issues a recovery certificate u/s 19(22) to the RO who then proceeds under Ch V for
recovery of the certificate amount in the manner prescribed. A person aggrieved by an order of the RO can prefer an appeal
before the Tribunal under Rule 4, by an application in the prescribed Form III. Rule 2(c) defines an “application” to include a
memo of appeal u/s 30(1). The appeal is to be preferred before the Tribunal, as distinct from the AT, within 30 days. Sec24
of the RDB Act, therefore, manifestly makes the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable only to such an original
“application” made u/s 19 only.
2 MACHHAR POLYMER PVT LTD (Appellant) vs. 177 IBC – Sec 9 – Application by operational creditor – Rejected as time barred – Whether correct – Held, No.
4 SABRE HELMETS PVT LTD (Respondent) JUDGEMENT - M/s. Speculum Plast Pvt. Ltd. v. PTC Techno Pvt. Ltd - In view of the settled principle, while we hold that the
Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable for initiation of CIRP. If there is a delay of more than three years from the date of
cause of action and no laches on the part of the Applicant, the Applicant can explain the delay. Where there is a continuing
cause of action, the question of rejecting any application on the ground of delay does not arise. So tribunal shall give OBH to
find out if there are any latches on the part of the applicant.

2 NEETA CHEMICALS (I) PVT. LTD (Appellant) vs. 178 IBC– Sec 10 – Application by corporate applicant – No liquidation/winding up proceedings pending against the corporate
5 STATE BANK OF INDIA (Respondent) applicant – Rejected on the ground of suppression of facts – On appeal remanded back to NCLT for fresh adjudication.
CRUX OF THE JUDGEMENT: There is nothing on record to suggest that the ‘Corporate Applicant’ has suppressed any fact or
has not come with the clean hands. The AA has also not held that the application has been filed by the Corporate Applicant
“fraudulently” or “with malicious intent” for any purpose other than for the resolution process or liquidation or that the
voluntary liquidation proceedings have been initiated with the intent to defraud any person. In the absence of any such
grounds recorded by the AA, the impugned order cannot be upheld.
2 ITC LTD. (Appellant) vs. BLUE COAST HOTELS 179 SARFESI – Sec13 – Enforcement of security interest – Default by borrower – Secured creditor took symbolic possession of
6 LTD (Respondent) borrower’s property – Property sold in auction by secured creditor – Whether valid – Held, Yes.
READ THE ENTIRE JUDGEMENT.

2 J.P. ENGINEERS PVT. LTD (Appellant) vs. MURTI 181 IBC– Sec 9 – Corporate debtor disputed the debt and also filed civil suit against the operational creditor – Whether this is
7 UDYOG LTD (Respondent) existence of dispute – Held, Yes.
Innovative Industries Ltd v.ICICI Bank & Anr, (2018) 1 SCC 407, wherein the SC taking into consideration the
provisions of the Code held that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ is entitled to point out that default has not occurred in a
sense that the ‘debt’, which also may include a disputed claim, is not due. In the present case, the AA having
noticed that the Respondent has satisfied with the evidence that there is no default on the part of the Respondent
and the ‘debt’ is not due, we find no ground to interfere with the finding of the AA. The appeal is accordingly
dismissed. No cost.
2 PROWESS INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD. 182 IBC – Sec 61 – Appeal – Limitation period to file – Appellant filed appeal after six months of the passing of the order
8 (Appellant) vs. ACTION ISPAT & POWER PVT. without any application for condonation of delay – Whether delay condonable – Held, No.
LTD (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: As per the aforesaid provision, the appeal is required to be filed within thirty-days, means within thirty-days
from the date of knowledge of the order against which appeal is preferred. In the present case, as Appellant had knowledge
of the impugned order as on the date of pronouncement of the said order. It is not the case of the Appellant that its Lawyer
has not informed of the order passed by the AA. The ground as taken in the application for condonation of delay being not
satisfactory, it is fit to be rejected.
2 INDIAN BANK (Appellant) vs. K. PAPPIREDDIYAR 183 SARFAESI– Enforcement of security interest – Agricultural land – No finding of fact – Whether exempt from the provisions
9 (Respondent) of the Act – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: Whether a particular piece of land is agricultural in nature is a question of fact. The classification of land in the
revenue records as agricultural is not dispositive or conclusive of the question whether the SARFAESI Act does or does not
apply. Whether a parcel of land is agricultural must be deduced as a matter of fact from the nature of the land, the use to
which it was being put on the date of the creation of the security interest and the purpose for which it was set apart. In the
absence of a specific finding, we are of the view that it would be appropriate and proper to set aside the judgment of the
High Court and to remit the proceedings for being considered afresh
3 K. KRISHNA (Appellant) vs. VIJAY NIRMAN 183 IBC r/w the A&C act – Operational debt – Arbitration award in favour of OC – Corporate debtor challenged the award –
0 COMPANY PVT. LTD (Respondent) Insolvency petition filed against corporate debtor based on the award as admitted debt – NCLT and NCLAT entertained
the application – Whether tenable-Held, No
FACTS: During the course of a project, disputes and differences arose between the parties and the same were referred to an
Arbitral Tribunal, which delivered its Award in favour of the respondent. KCPL challenged the award, in appeal, under
section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Meanwhile, Respondent sent a demand notice under the I&B Code
and also initiated insolvency proceedings against KCPL. In reply to the notice KCPL claimed that there is a dispute and the
award has been challenged, adjudication of which is pending. NCLT as well as NCLAT admitted the insolvency petition
stating that challenge of award could not be considered to be ‘existence of dispute’ under the I& B Code. This is under
challenge in the present appeals.
ISSUE: whether IBC can be invoked in respect of an operational debt where an Arbitral Award has been passed against the
operational debtor, which has not yet been finally adjudicated upon?
JUDGEMENT: READ THE ENTIRE JUDGEMENT AGAIN AND FILL THIS SECTION.
3 TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF ANDHRA 185 IBC – Time barred claim rejected by arbitral council – OC filed petition before NCLT – Corporate debtor refuted the claim –
1 PRADESH LTD. (Appellant) vs. EQUIPMENT Dismissed by NCLT – On appeal allowed by NCLAT – Whether sustainable – Held, No.
CONDUCTORS & CABLES (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: In a recent judgment of this Court in Mobilox Innovations Pvt Ltd v. Kirusa Software Pvt Ltd, this Court has
 (Respondent) categorically laid down that IBC is not intended to be substitute to a recovery forum. It is also laid down that whenever
there is existence of real dispute, the IBC provisions cannot be invoked. The aforesaid principle squarely applied to the
present case. READ THE ENTIRE JUDGEMENT.
3 RAJESH ARORA (Appellant) vs. SANJAY KUMAR 186 IBC – Sec9 – Application admitted without issuing notice to corporate debtor – Whether correct – Held, No
2 JAISWAL (Respondent)
Judgement: Admittedly, impugned order was passed by the AA without notice to the ‘Corporate Debtor’ in violation of
rules of Natural Justice, we set aside the impugned order. The matter having been settled between the parties, we are not
remitting the matter back to the AA. All the orders passed by the AA and actions taken by the RP are deemed to be illegal
and the proceedings are set aside. The appellant is released form all rigors of law with immediate effect.
SL CASE PG BRIEF
0 Cartelisation in Industrial and Automotive 190
1 Bearings-Suo Motu Case

0 Travel Agents Association of India vs. Department 191 The CCI held that the engagement of a travel agency by a Government department is not in the nature of an agreement
2 of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance and Ors which relates to any economic activity. Accordingly, there was no ‘agreement’ under the Act

0 RH Agro Private Limited vs. SBI and Ors 192 CCI observes that a bank acting as per the remedies available to it under the SARFAESI for recovery cannot be termed as a
3 dominant entity when it acts in accordance with provision thereof as it is acting in recovery of its funds/money in order to
mitigate losses in such transaction (where account has been declared NPA). It is also noted that auction of primary security
by a secured debtor for realization of funds cannot be said to be a transaction done in ordinary course of business. The sale
of security of an account declared NPA is a remedy available to a secured creditor under the provisions of SARFAESI Act.
0 CCI vs Bharti Airtel Limited and Ors 194 SC held that the Competition Act is a special statute and if there is anti-competitive conduct it is within the exclusive domain
4 of the CCI to examine and rule upon it. Even if TRAI finds anti-competitive conduct, its powers would be limited to the action
under the TRAI Act alone. Therefore, contention of the IDOs that the jurisdiction of the CCI stands totally ousted cannot be
accepted. Insofar as the nuanced exercise from the stand point of Competition Act is concerned, the CCI is the experienced
body in conducting competition analysis. Further, the CCI is more likely to opt for structural remedies which would lead the
sector to evolve a point where sufficient new entry is induced thereby promoting genuine competition. This specific and
important role assigned to the CCI cannot be completely wished away and the ‘comity’ between the sectoral regulator (i.e.
TRAI) and the market regulator (i.e. the CCI) is to be maintained.
0 Karnataka Film Chamber & Commerce and other 195 No writ of prohibition can be issued against statutory commission from exercising its jurisdiction
5 associations vs. CCI
0 Uttarakhand Agricultural Produce Marketing 196 Appeal against CCI orders not maintainable if the orders are not passed under sections specifically enumerated in Sec 53A
6 Board Vs. CCI & Ors. of the Competition Act.
CASE: A SCN was issued asking to show cause why an order of inquiry should not be issued? This was appealed against.
NCLAT held that since SCN is not an order passed U/S 53A it cannot be appealed.
0 CADD Systems and Services Pvt. Ltd. vs CCI 197 Absence of a Judicial Member did not preclude CCI from performing its adjudicatory function until such time the Judicial
7 Member was appointed by the Central Government. It was also noted by the court that no act or proceedings of CCI would
be invalid by reason of any vacancy or any defect in its constitution by virtue of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act.
0 CCI Vs. JCB India Ltd. and Ors 197 Authorization for search includes authorization of seizure as well. Provisions of Sec 240A of the CA56 do not merely
8 relate to an authorization for a search but extend to the authorization of a seizure as well. Unless the seizure were to be
authorized, a mere search by itself will not be sufficient for the purposes of investigation. By virtue of Sec 240A r/wSec
41(3) of the Competition Act, DG was authorised to conduct search and seizures. The SC vacated the stay stating that the
blanket restraint which had been imposed by the Delhi HC on the DG from acting on the seized material for any purpose
whatsoever was not warranted. The appeal was allowed and the transferred matters were remitted back to the Delhi HC to
be decided in the writ petitions pending before Delhi HC.
0 Rajasthan Cylinders & Containers Ltd. and Ors. 198 It was observed that the word ‘Commission’ has been conspicuously missing in Sec 42(3), the clause which provides for the
9 Vs. Respondent: CCI and Ors offence. Thus, Sec 42(3) has to be given wider connotation as the legislature clearly intended to cover the failure to comply
with the “orders or directions issued”, irrespective of whether they had been issued by the Commission or by DG.
Further, while rejecting the plea of double jeopardy, it was held that the penalty under Sec 43 as imposed by CCI in exercise
of its powers, is civil in nature and the criminal complaint alleging offence under Sec 42(3) is an additional element of failure
to comply further with the said direction. Even otherwise, the criminal action was held not violative of Article 20(2).
SL CASE PG BRIEF
01 STATE OF M.P. & ANR. (Appellant) vs. M.P. 220 Offences under Industrial & labour laws – State law took away the jurisdiction of criminal courts and entrusted the same
TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION to labour courts – after some time the State reversed this process – Whether tenable – Held, Yes
(Respondent) what has been done is that the cases which ought to have been tried by the regular criminal Courts were sought to be
transferred to the Labour Courts by the Amendment of 1981 and only that process was sought to be reversed by the
impugned Amendment of 2002
Judgement: We have to be conscious of the fact that we are debating the legality of a Legislation which has passed the
muster of the elected Legislative Assembly and has received the assent of the President of India. The scope of challenge to
such a Legislation is within a limited domain i.e. on the twin test of (i) lack of Legislative competence and (ii) violation of any
of Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III of the COI.
02 NEVADA PROPERTIES PVT LTD (Appellant) vs. 221 CrPC – section 102 – police officer’s power of seizure – whether extends to immovable property Held, No.
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Respondent) Sec 102 of the Code is not a general provision which enables and authorises the police officer to seize immovable property
for being able to be produced in the Criminal Court during trial. This, however, would not bar or prohibit the police officer
from seizing documents/ papers of title relating to immovable property, as it is distinct and different from seizure of
immovable property.
Disputes relating to title, possession, etc., of immovable property are civil disputes which have to be decided and
adjudicated in Civil Courts.
The expression ‘circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence’ in Section 102 does not refer to a
firm opinion or an adjudication/finding by a police officer to ascertain whether or not ‘any property’ is required to be
seized.
If we allow the police officer to ‘seize’ immovable property on a mere ‘suspicion of the commission of any , it would mean
and imply giving a drastic and extreme power to dispossess etc. to the police officer on a mere conjecture and surmise, that
is, on suspicion, which has hitherto not been exercised
03 INTERTEK INDIA PVT LTD (Appellant) vs. 222 CPC – Suit for declaration and damages-termination of employee – Employer moved application for rejection of suit-
PRIYANKA MOHAN (Respondent) whether sustainable-Held, No.
READ THE JUDGEMENT AGAIN AND FILL THIS SECTION.
04 RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL (Appellant) vs. 223 Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 65 – Adverse possession – Whether can be used by a plaintiff in a title suit Held, Yes
MANJIT KAUR (Respondent) In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64,
even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title,
a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse
possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who
might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and
unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other Articles
also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and
maintain a suit.
When we consider the law of adverse possession as has developed vis-à-vis to property dedicated to public use, courts
have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession. There are instances when such properties are encroached upon
and then a plea of adverse possession is raised. In Such cases, on the land reserved for public utility, it is desirable that
rights should not accrue.
05 ANIL KHADKIWALA (Appellant) vs. THE STATE 224 CrPC – Section 482 – Quashing of complaint – Whether more than one applications could be filed-Held, Yes.
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI (Respondent)

06 THOMAS CHACKO (Appellant) vs. THE CHIEF 226 COI – Art227 – Supervisory powers of the HC – DRT having seat at Ernakulum – DRAT having seat at Chennai – matter
MANAGER, BANK OF INDIA & ORS (Respondent) emanating from Ernakulum – Whether HC of Kerala has jurisdiction to direct DRAT at Chennai – Held, Yes.

07 CEMENT WORKERS MANDAL (Appellant) vs. 227 Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction of High court – A Kolkatta based company had a cement unit in
GLOBAL CEMENTS LTD (HMP CEMENTS LTD) & Porbandar in Gujarat – Unit became sick and wages were not paid – Labour court passed award in favour of workers –
ORS (Respondent) Lender in Kolkata attached company’s properties and sold in public auction – Workers filed writ before Gujarat High
Court seeking deposit of 50% of their dues by the lender – Single judge overruled the jurisdiction issue in favour of
workers while division bench allowed the objection – Whether correct – Held, No.
08 M/S SCIEMED OVERSEAS INC (Appellant) vs. 229 Petitioner filed false affidavit in judicial proceedings – High court imposed cost of Rs.10 lakhs – Whether correct – Held,
BOC INDIA LIMITED & ORS (Respondent) Yes.

09 VILLAYATI RAM MITTAL (P) LTD (Appellant) vs. 230 CPC– Sec 10 – Defendant filed suit against plaintiff in Shimla for recovery and injunction – Plaintiff filed suit against
SHAMBHAVI CONTRACTORS PVT LTD defendant in Delhi for recovery based on the sub contract – Whether both the suit are based on same cause of action so
(Respondent) that the later suit can be stayed – Held, No.
what is really required u/s 10 cpc is that the main issues or the substantial issues which arise and would be decided in the
earlier suit would be the same as the issues in the later suit.
A reference to the present suit shows that the suit is for a recovery of Rs.3.25 crores no doubt on account of the sub
contract, however, the aspect which differentiates the present suit from the suit filed at Shimla is that the present suit
basically seeks recovery of amounts from the defendant under a different head that the defendant is pleaded to have failed
to perform its obligations under the contract which resulted in the plaintiff having been caused escalation in costs and
expenditure for completion of the project of the hospital in Shimla whereas the suit in Shimla is based on the cause of
action of value of work done by the present defendant for the plaintiff and amounts for which work done is claimed in the
Shimla suit.
The decision in the previously instituted suit at Shimla will not operate as res judicata with respect to issues in the present
suit pertaining to the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of moneys of the damages on account of higher costs and
escalation.
10 SAVELIFE FOUNDATION & ANR (Appellant) vs. 231 Right to live – Victims of road accident – Good Samaritan law – SC approves the guidelines and makes it law.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR (Respondent) The petition is a PIL filled u/A 32 COI.
Right to life is enshrined under Article 21 which includes right to safety of persons while travelling on the road and the
immediate medical assistance as a necessary corollary is required to be provided and also adequate legal protection and
prevention from harassment to good Samaritans.
There is also dire need to enact a Good Samaritan Law in the country since there is a felt need of legislation for affording
protection to Good Samaritans. Prayer has been made on the part of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways of GOI
that the guidelines notified on 12.5.15 and the SOP notified on 21.1.16 may be declared to be enforceable by this Court so
that it is binding on all the States and UT until the Union Government enacts a law to this effect.
JUDGEMENT: This Court can issue such directions under Art32 r/w Art 142 to implement and enforce the guidelines which
are necessary for protection of rights under Art 21 r/w Art 14 of the COI so as to provide immediate help to the victims of
the accident and at the same time to provide protection to Good Samaritans. The guidelines will have the force of law
 under Art 141. By virtue of Art 144, it is the duty of all authorities – judicial and civil – in the territory of India to act in aid of
this Court by implementing them.
CASE MOSTLY ON FACTS READ THE JUDGEMENT.
11 RAMESH RAJAGOPAL (Appellant) vs. DEVI 233 Company having 3 different units – Consultancy business headed by director – Development of separate website for
POLYMERS PVT. LTD (Respondent) consultancy business of the company – Prosecution of director under IPC and IT Act – Whether tenable – Held,No.
it is made clear in the website itself that DCS is a part of DPPL which is apparent from a link, in the website itself, where
they are shown as DPPL as the main Company and DCS as a sister Company. Similarly, in the website of DPPL, which was
moved by the consultant, there is a link which shows that DCS is a sister concern and it is stated that viewers may visit that
site. The address of DCS is shown to be the same address as that of DDPL. We are satisfied that there is no attempt
whatsoever to project the DCS as a concern or a Company which is independent and separate from DDPL, to which both
the parties belong. In any case it is not possible to view the act as an act of forgery.
That apart there is nothing on record to show the commission of offence under Section 65 of the I.T. Act, since the
allegation is not that any computer source code has been concealed, destroyed or altered. We have already observed that
the acts of the appellant did not have any dishonest intention while considering the allegations in respect of the other
offences. In the circumstances, no case is made out under Sections 65 and 66 of the I.T. Act, 2000.
12 RBI (Appellant) vs. ONICRA CREDIT 234 Credit Information Companies (Regulations) Act, 2005 – Section 5(3) – Determination of number of credit information
INFORMATION CO LTD (Respondent) agencies – Whether determination is mandatory before granting certificate of registration– Held, No.
there is no mandate under Section 5(3) requiring the RBI to prescribe the total number of CIC. That is a discretion which has
been given to the RBI and the same is evidenced by the use of the word “may”.
There is also no bar on the RBI in simultaneously considering the application and also determining the total number of CIC
which may be granted a certificate u/s 5(3) when an application by a prospective CIC is moved U/s 4(1) of the said Act.
13 JET AIRWAYS (INDIA) LTD. (Appellant) vs. 236 Carriage By air Act, 1972 – Liability thereunder – Carrier fails to deliver the consignment – Goods appeared to have been
DHANUKA LABORATORIES LTD (Respondent) stolen – Carrier fails to lead evidence – Whether carrier is liable for the loss – Held, Yes.
limited liability of a carrier such as the appellant/ defendant under Rule 22 is subject to Rule 25 which states that the
benefit of limited liability cannot be given to a carrier in case the carrier is found guilty of wilful misconduct or conduct
equivalent to wilful misconduct. There are judgments of various courts which hold that once goods are not traced and
there is an averment of the same being misappropriated, the case then falls under Rule 25 that there is wilful misconduct
or conduct equivalent to wilful misconduct. One such judgment of this Court is in the case of Vij Sales Corporation v.
Lufthansa, German Airlines AIR 2000 Del 220. Of course, whether or not there is wilful misconduct would depend on facts
of each case with, of course the onus being really on the carrier such as the appellant/defendant who is in control and
possession of the goods to show that there is no wilful misconduct. Without leading evidence and merely by cross-
examination of the witnesses of the respondent/plaintiff/shipper/consignor, a carrier cannot say that it has discharged its
onus of proof because onus of proof is discharged by leading positive evidence, with the aspect that positive evidence also
ordinarily does not absolve a carrier because liability of a carrier is a strict liability equal to that of an insurer.
14 BHUPINDER SINGH BAWA (Appellant) vs. ASHA 237 Delhi Rent Control Act, 1954 – Eviction of tenant – Bonafide requirement of the landlord – Landlord has several other
DEVI (Respondent) properties – Whether eviction could be denied on this ground – Held, No.

15 INNOVATIVE TECH PACK LTD. (Appellant) vs. 239 FERA, 1973 – Prosecution of directors for non-filing of exchange control copy of the bill of entry to substantiate the
SPECIAL DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT outward remittances against import of materials – Proceedings initiated after lapse of 6 years – Whether sustainable –
(Respondent) Held, No.
In view of the belated SCN being served on the appellant, the defence of the appellant that it was not in possession of the
copies of Bill of Entry for the 2 txns is plausible. It cannot be held that the respondent has proved its allegation beyond
reasonable doubt and the copies of the Bills of Lading probablise that the remittances were utilised for import.
Consequently, the impugned orders passed by the AT and the AA are set aside.
16 MGR INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION & ANR 239 Section 12A of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 read with article 243Q of the constitution of India –
(Appellant) vs. STATE OF U P & ORS Industrial area not notified panchayat levied tax – Whether tenable – Held, Yes.
(Respondent) READ THE JUDGEMENT WITH Article 243-Q (1) COI.

17 D.M.ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. (Appellant) 241 Accident compensation- tribunal allowed compensation for victims – High court reduced the same – Appeal to Supreme
vs. SWAPNA NAYAK & ORS (Respondent) Court – Insurer sought further reduction in compensation while complainant asked for enhancement – Whether
allowable – Held, No.
On perusal of the decisions cited at the bar and further having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
case and the concurrent findings of two courts and on material issues such as the determination of annual income of the
deceased, his age, the number of dependents etc., we do not find any good ground to interfere in the impugned order. In
our view, such findings, apart from being concurrent, cannot be said to be, in any way, arbitrary and nor they result in
awarding a bonanza or a windfall to the claimants so as to call for further reduction in the compensation awarded by the
High Court. In other words, in our view, what has been eventually awarded to the claimants by the High Court appears to
be just and reasonable compensation within the meaning of Section 166 of the Act and there does not appear any good
grounds.
18) FARIDABAD COMPLEX ADMINISTRATION 242 First appellate court allowed the suit – Second appeal before the High Court – Dismissed in liminie on the ground that no
(Appellant) vs. IRON MASTER INDIA (P) LTD substantial question of law is involved – Whether tenable – Held, No.
(Respondent) the questions raised in the second appeal did constitute substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of
the Code. Indeed, in our considered view, the questions, viz., whether the suit seeking a declaration that the demand of
House Tax raised under the Act is maintainable, whether such suit is barred and, if so, by virtue of which provision of the
Act, whether plaintiff has any alternative statutory remedy available under the Act for adjudication of his grievance and, if
so, which is that remedy, and lastly, whether the plaintiff has properly valued the suit and, if so, whether they have paid the
proper Court fees on the reliefs claimed in the suit were legal questions arising in the appeal and involved jurisdictional
issues requiring adjudication on merits in accordance with law. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any of these
issues much less in its proper perspective in the light of relevant provisions of the Act governing the controversy.
19 JSW INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ANR 243 Awarding contract to operate berth – Successful bidder was already operating a berth in the port – HC cancelled the
(Appellant) vs. KAKINADA SEAPORTS LIMITED & award – Whether correct – Held, No.This Clause will apply only when there is one single private operator in a port. If this
ORS (Respondent) single private operator is operating a berth, dealing with one specific cargo then alone will he not be allowed to bid for next
berth for handling the same specific cargo. The HC erred in interpreting the clause only in the context of the word “next”
and ignored the opening part of the Clause which clearly indicates that the Clause is only applicable when there is only one
private berth operator. It appears to us that the intention is that when a port is started, if the first berth for a specific cargo
is awarded in favour of one private operator then he cannot be permitted to bid for the next berth for the same type of
cargo. However, once there are more than one private operators operating in the port then any one of them can be
permitted to bid even for successive berths. In the present case, as pointed out above there already 5 private operators
other than the first consortium.
20 THE MAHARASHTRA STATE COOPERATIVE 244 Cooperative Societies law – Jurisdiction of cooperative court – Dispute between employee and society – Whether
HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION LTD cooperative court has jurisdiction to try – Held, No.
 (Appellant) vs. PRABHAKAR SITARAM As a consequence, it is held that the petition filed by the respondent before the Cooperative Court is not maintainable. It
BHADANGE (Respondent) would, however, be open to the respondent to file a civil suit. Needless to mention, in such a civil suit filed by the
respondent, he would be at liberty to file application u/s 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to save the limitation.
READ THE JUDGEMENT.

21 M.C. MEHTA (Appellant) vs. UNION OF INDIA & Pollution control – Supreme Court bans registration of BV III stage vehicles further directions.
ORS (Respondent) The manufacturers of such vehicles were fully aware that eventually from 1st April, 2017 they would be required to
manufacture only BS-IV compliant vehicles but for reasons that are not clear, they chose to sit back and declined to take
sufficient pro-active steps. The number of such vehicles may be small compared to the overall number of vehicles in the
country but the health of the people is far, far more important than the commercial interests of the manufacturers or the
loss that they are likely to suffer in respect of the so-called small number of such vehicles.
All the vehicle registering authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are prohibited for registering such
vehicles on and from 1st April, 2017 that do not meet BS-IV emission standards, except on proof that such a vehicle has
already been sold on or before 31st March, 2017.
22 CONSORTIUM OF TITAGARH FIREMA ADLER 247 Holding Company bids on the experience of its subsidiaries – Whether consideration of the bid by the owner is correct –
S.P.A. TITAGARH WAGONS LTD. (Appellant) vs. Held, Yes
NAGPUR METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD READ THE ENTIRE JUDGEMENT AGAIN AND FILL THIS PART.
(Respondent)

23 MAHARISHI MARKANDESHWAR MEDICAL 249 (Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fee) Act, 2006 read with Maharishi Markandeshwar University (Establishment
COLLEGE & HOSPITAL (Appellant) vs. STATE OF and Regulation) Act, 2010 – Whether a medical college affiliated to a private university under the 2010 Act is required to
HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS (Respondent) obtain affiliation with Government university under the 2006 Act- Held, No.

24 GLAXO SMITHKLINE PHARMACEUTICAL LTD 251

(Appellant) vs. UNION OF INDIA (Respondent)

25 APOLLO TYRES LTD. (Appellant) vs. PIONEER 252 Designs Act – Tread pattern of truck tyre – Whether entitled to copyright protection – Held, Yes.
TRADING (Respondent)

26 METERS AND INSTRUMENTS PVT. LTD & ANR 253 NI ACT, 1881– Sec 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Compounding of offence – Principles explained and guidelines laid down.
(Appellant) vs. KANCHAN MEHTA (Respondent)

27 ATMA RAM PROPERTIES PVT LTD. (Appellant) 255 NDMC Act, 1994 read with Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 – Collection of property tax as arrears of rent – Non-payment of
vs. THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD property tax by tenant – Eviction sought by landlord under Rent Act – Whether tenant could be evicted as failure to pay
(Respondent) rent – Held, No.

28 CANARA BANK & ANR (Appellant) vs. LALIT 256 Disciplinary action – Bank clerk fraudulently withdrew money from customer’s account – Dismissed from service –
POPLI (THRIUGH LRs) (Respondent) Retirement benefits withheld by bank and adjusted against the loss caused – Net amount paid to him – Whether correct
– Held, Yes.

29 B SUNITHA (Appellant) vs. STATE OF 257 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Advocate obtaining blank fee cheque from client – Later fills up and presented into
TELANGANA &B ANR (Respondent) the bank – Cheque dishonoured – Complaint filed – Accused sought quashing of proceeding on th ground that there was
no enforceable debt – High Court declined to quash the proceeding – Whether correct – Held, No.

30 ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. 258 Principles of granting stay of lower court proceedings – Should not exceed a period of 6 months – Extension of stay
LTD & ANR (Appellant) vs. CENTRAL BUREAU should be by way of a speaking order – Supreme Court lays down new guidelines.
OF INVESTIGATION (Respondent)

31 SHIV SINGH (Appellant) vs. STATE OF HIMACHAL 260 Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Land
PRADESH & ORS (Respondent) acquisition – Objections not considered-whether the award is tenable – Held, No.

32 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Appellant) vs. 261 Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 read with Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Offences under food Act – whether
SAYYED HASSAN SAYYED SUBHAN prosecution under IPC could be initiated – Held, Yes.
(Respondent)

33 Case Study 262

SL CASE PG BRIEF
0 ICICI Bank Limited (Appellant) vs. SEBI 46 Undue delay in initiating the proceedings by the SEBI by itself causes prejudice and would ultimately attach a stigma
1 (Respondent) pursuant to any adverse order that may be passed.
ISSUE; whether the information relating to signing of a Binding Implementation Agreement by an Authorized Executive
Director of the appellant with the dominant Shareholders of the Bank of Rajasthan was liable to be disclosed on an
immediate basis under Clause 36 of the Listing Agreement and Regulation 12(2) of the PIT Regulations, 1992.
JUDGEMENT: After all the charge against the appellant is one trading day’s delay in disclosure, but the delay on the part of
SEBI to show cause is 2955 days from the date of the event and about 2130 days from the date of the preliminary
investigation report, which is too wide a gap to be ignored. Though there are laches, that by itself in the peculiar
circumstances of the case, will not vitiate the proceedings but definitely the penalty amount of Rs. 10 lakh imposed on the
appellant cannot be sustained and deserves to be substituted by a lesser penalty.

0 India Ratings and Research Private Ltd. 47 SEBI can call for and examine records of any proceedings if it considers the orders passed by the adjudicating officer
2 (Appellant) vs. SEBI (Respondent) erroneous and not in the interests of securities markets. After making inquiry, SEBI may enhance the quantum of
penalty imposed, if the circumstances of the case so justify.
FACTS: A CRA was finned a sum of rs 25l by the AO for giving false cra to IFLS for the year 2018-19. In the meantime the
CRA got another SCN by SEBI (exercising powers u/s 15-I(3) of the SEBI Act as to why the penality should’nt be increased.
An appeal praying that proceedings initiated by SEBI pursuant to the 2nd SCN issued u/s 15-I(3) of the SEBI Act, should be
stayed.
JUDGEMENT: AT directed the Appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.25 lakhs within 4 weeks which would be subject to the
result of the appeal. SAT further directed that the proceedings in pursuance to the 2nd SCN will continue and the
Respondent will pass appropriate orders after giving an OBH to the but any order that is passed by the Respondent shall
not be given effect to during the pendency of this appeal. Misc. Application is accordingly disposed of.
0 Dr. Udayant Malhoutra (Appellant) vs. SEBI 47 There is no doubt that SEBI has the power to pass an interim order and that in extreme urgent cases SEBI can pass an
3 (Respondent) ex-parte interim order but such powers can only be exercised sparingly and only in extreme urgent matters.
FACTS: WTM passed an interim ex-parte order directing the appellant to deposit a certain sum of fine. An SCN was also
issued. This was done on prima-facie fact that the appellant falls within the meaning of term”INSIDER”. The allegation was
that he had avoided a notional loss by using UPSI.
JUDGEMENT: SAT do not find any case of extreme urgency which warranted the respondent to pass an ex-parte interim
order only on arriving at the prima-facie case that the appellant was an insider as defined in the SEBI (PIT) Reg without
considering the balance of convenience or irreparable injury. In the light of the aforesaid, the impugned order cannot be
sustained and the same is quashed at the admission stage itself without calling for a counter affidavit except the SCN. The
appeal is allowed.
0 Indus Weir Industries Limited (Appellant) vs. SEBI 48 Penalty imposed by SEBI on violating SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares)
4 (Respondent) Regulations, 2013, further reduced by SAT to meet the end of justice in the matter.
FACTS: the apellent mobilised funds to the issue of NCRPS to a 32K odd investors. A penality of 1CR was levied for the
violation of reg 4(2) and reg 16 of SEBI(issue and listing of NCRPS) reg 2013. Since the no of inv
estors exceeded 49 in no.
JUDGEMENT: While upholding the impugned order on merit, SAT reduce the amount of penalty imposed on the appellant
from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 50 lakh. If not paid within 4 weeks, SEBI is at liberty to collect an interest of 12% P.A.
0 Mr. Mahendra Girdharilal (Appellant) vs. NSE, 49 Where the buy-back offer is made with the intention to provide an exit opportunity to the existing shareholders at a fair
5 SEBI and T. Stanes And Company Limited price, the stock exchange may remove the company from the Dissemination Board of the stock exchange.
(Respondents) FACTS: the said co was listed of madrass StEx and StEx for some reason closed. The scripts were placed on Dissemination
Board of NSE to be traded for a limited time. On application of the co the NSE by an order allowed the co to be removed
from the dissemination board. This impugned order is being challenged by an agreived SHH.
JUDGEMENT: SAT finds that SEBI issued a circular dated July 25, 2017 permitting the Company to buyback the shares so as
to provide an exit to the public shareholders. In view of the said circular SAT do not find any illegality being made in the
buy-back of the shares by the Company. In the light of the aforesaid, SAT do not see any illegality in the order of NSE dated
July 2, 2018 removing T. Stanes And Company Limited Company from the Dissemination Board. The appeal fails and is
dismissed.
0 Synergy Cosmetics (Exim) Limited (Appellant) vs. 50 The delay in filing the appeal is condoned and the application for condonation of delay is allowed on sufficient cause.
6 BSE Limited (Respondent) FACTS: A co aggrieved by the delisting FMV is filling the present appeal with a delay. of 72 days. The reason for
condonation given are it took them some time to find a specialized lawyer dealing in securities market & to some time to
collect, compile as well as collate various documents as required by the advocate. It has been stated that the co is also in
financial distress.
JUDGEMENGT: SAT of the opinion that sufficient cause has been explained by the appellant which is adequate as well as
satisfactory and, therefore, SAT of the opinion, that the delay of 73 days in filing the appeal should be condoned.
0 Nicer Green Housing Infrastructure Developers 50 In the absence of any evidence that the appellants had refunded and that they are ready and willing to pay the balance
7 Ltd. & Ors. (Appellant) vs. SEBI (Respondent) amount to investors in a time bound manner, SAT is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order passed by SEBI
disposing of their representations.
FACTS: long story – facts is that a co collected funds without following CIS regulations and SEBI by an order directed to
refund and dissolve the co. The co contended that it is ready to follow the orders of SEBI and it had already refunded 27CR
out of 32CR.
JUDGEMENT: SAT finds that no proof has been filed either before SEBI or even before this Tribunal to show that the
appellants had refunded a sum of Rs. 27.48 crore and that they are ready and willing to pay the balance amount in a time
bound manner. In the absence of any evidence being filed, SAT is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order
passed by SEBI disposing of their representations. The appeal lack merit and is dismissed summarily
0 Final Order in the matter of M/s Sungold Capital 51 One of the principles underlying under SAST Regulations is exit opportunity to the public shareholders of the Target
8 Limited Company at the best price and accordingly, the provisions of SAST Regulations deals with offer price, that offer price in
an open offer highest of the prices of shares of the Target Company derived through various methods
SIMPLE FACTS: Shares of the target were acuried beyond the threshold limits without an open offer. SEBI directed to give
an open offer according to reg 10 and 11(1) of SAST Regs, 1997 under reg 35(1) of SAST Regs, 2011.
FYI: SAST Reg, 1997 has been repealed by Reg 35(1) of SAST Regs, 2011 and has been replaced by SAST Regs, 2011. Reg
35(2)(b) of SAST Reg s, 2011,provides that all obligations incurred under the SAST Regs, 1997, including the obligation to
make an open offer, shall remain unaffected as if the repealed regulations has never been repealed.
0 Final Order in respect of Mr. Amalendu Mukherjee 52 The practice of insider trading is intended to be prohibited in order to sustain the investors’ confidence in the integrity
9 (Noticee) in the matter of Ricoh India Limited of the security market.
FACTS: one MR. Amalendu Mukherjee traded In the shares of Ricoh though an a/c in the name of FDSL based of UPSI.
Made a profit of Rs.1,13,56,118 and wrongfully avoided a loss of Rs.1,16,77,892. The said person held 72% of the shares of
FDSL and in the interest of the SHH of RICOH ltd a prayed for lifting the corp veil was prayed for.
Judgement: SEBI directed FDSL MD Amalendu Mukherjee to disgorge an amount worth over INR2,30,34,010/- for insider
trading in the scrip of Ricoh India Ltd. The amount has to be paid along with 12% interest within 45 days. In addition,
Amalendu Mukherjee has been restrained from accessing securities markets for a period of 7 years.
1 Final Order in the matter of inspection of Vishal 53 The objective of opening and maintaining a separate account for the clients’ securities is to segregate and identify them
0 Vijay Shah (Noticee) separately and to prevent its use by the Stock Broker for any purpose. The debiting of any client’s account for
transactions which are not related to that client defeats the very purpose of maintaining client’s account separately.
FACTS: A Stock broker received funds into clients a/c from unknown 3 rd parties and from those funds payments were made
on behalf of the clients. It is also stated that the broker also withdrew funds from the said a/c. Under the SEBI Circulars, a
responsibility has been cast on the Stock Broker to ensure that payments are received directly from the respective clients
and not from third parties. Accordingly, the Noticee should have taken expedient steps to ensure that funds received from
third parties are exceptionally dealt with and suitable explanations should have been asked from the client when such
blatant third party monetary amounts were received. However, there is nothing on record to suggest that such steps were
indeed taken.
JUDGEMENT: STOCK BROKERS registration is suspended for a period of 1 year.
1 Adjudication Order in respect of M/s Beckons 54 It is important to note that timely disclosure of information, as prescribed under the statute, is an important regulatory
1 Industries Limited (Noticee) tool intended to serve a public purpose. Timely disclosures are also an essential part of the proper functioning of the
securities market and failure to do so prevents investors from taking a well-informed investment decision.
FACTS: The Noticee defrauded the Indian investors by entering Pledge Agreement with respect to subscription of GDRs
outside India and thereby inducing the Indian investors to deal in the shares of Beckons by deliberately making
false/misleading statements, misrepresenting, actively suppressing and concealing material facts /regarding GDR proceeds
being available at Beckon’s disposal when in fact GDR issuance, was just a facade to create underlying equity shares
without receipt of consideration.
JUDGEMENT: SEBI imposed monetary penalty of Rs. 10CR on Beckons Industries Limited u/s 15HA of the SEBI Act alleging
that the co issued the GDRs in a fraudulent way by way of credit agreement and account charge agreement, which was not
disclosed to the StEx and also made misleading disclosure to the StExs that “it had successfully closed its GDR issue..” and
thereby violated the provisions of sec 12A (a),(b) and (c) of SEBI Act read with Reg 3 (a) (b) (c) (d), 4 (1), 4 (2) (f) (k) (r) of
SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003.
1 Adjudication Order in respect of Mr. Gurmeet 55 A basic premise that underlies the integrity of the securities market is that entities connected with the securities market
2 Singh (“Noticee-1”), Mr. I.S. Sukhija (“Noticee-2”) conform to standards of transparency, good governance and ethical behaviour prescribed in securities laws and do not
and Mr. H. S. Anand (“Noticee-3”) in the matter of resort to fraudulent activities.
Beckons Industries Limited READ THE CASE AGAIN AND FILL THIS SECTION.

1 Adjudication Order in respect of M/s Ashlar 56 The platform of the stock exchange has been used for a non-genuine trade. Trading is always with the aim to make
3 Commodities Private Limited (Noticee) profits. But if one party consistently makes loss and that too in pre-planned and rapid reverse trades, it is not genuine;
it is an unfair trade practice.
FACTS: allegedly entered into non genuine trades in 528 contracts wherein it executed a total of 1154 trades out of which
1151 trades were allegedly non genuine trades which had resulted into creation of artificial volume of total 2,87,13,000
units in the given 528 contracts. It is further observed that the Noticee, by executing non genuine trades during the
relevant period, registered a positive close out difference of ₹ 8,06,09,700. The trades entered by the Noticee were
reversed on the same day within few minutes with same counterparty at a substantial price difference without any basis
for significant change in the contract price which indicates that these trades were artificial and non-genuine in nature.
JUDGEMENT: Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, SEBI imposed monetary penalty of Rs.
84 lakh on Ashlar Commodities Private Limited under section 15HA.
1 Adjudication Order in respect of Mr. B 57 FACTS: A Subsidiary of EFSL acuried a fintech co through a SPA. The same was disclosed to StEx. it was alleged that the
4 Renganathan (‘Noticee’) in the matter of acquisition was a price sensitive information which had come into existence upon signing of Term Sheet. Despite that, the
Edelweiss Financial Services Ltd. Noticee, being the compliance officer of the co, failed to close the trading window during the period.
JUDGEMENT: Adjudicating Officer, SEBI find non-compliance on the part of the Noticee by failing to close trading windows
when necessary as per law. Therefore, there were repeated instances wherein the Noticee had failed to close the trading
window. In view of the above the argument of the Noticee that there was no repetition of violation is not acceptable.
Adjudicating Officer’s considered view that a repetitive violation, in disregard to the applicable provisions of law, cannot
be construed to be a technical violation. A Penality of rs 5l was imposed to be paid within 45 days.
1 Dr. Uppal Devinder Kumar (Appellant) vs. SEBI Sec 11AA, r/w sec 11B, of the SEBI Act, 1992, and Reg 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Collective Investment Schemes)Reg, 1999 –
5 (Respondent) CIS
IMPORTANT CASE – A LOT OF FACTS ARE DEALT WITH READ THE ENTIRE CASE AGAIN.

1 Bajaj Finance Limited (Appellant) vs. SEBI and 59 FACTS: KARVEY CASE – the appellant is an NBFC and had an o/s LAS to the extent of 345cr for WC purposes. Because of
6 Karvy Stock Broking Limited (Respondent) the impugned order by SEBI stating that the securities are to be blocked until the amount is disgorged to the investors. By
this order the appallent had lost his right to enforce the security. The appelent contenteds that as a bonafide lender it
wasn’t given OBH b4 passing the order.
JUDGEMENT: commenting on the merit of the case, SAT directs SEBI to hear the appellant on the basis of their
representation dated November 23, 2019. Thereafter, the SEBI shall consider the representations of the
appellant and, after giving an opportunity for personal hearing, pass an order as per law. .
1 Adjudicating Officer, SEBI (Appellant) vs. 61 SEBI Act – Section 15J read with sections 15A to H – Powers of adjudicating officer in levying penalty – Supreme Court
7 Bhavesh Pabari (Respondent clarifies law.
READ THE CASE LAW AGAIN AND FILL THIS SECTION.

1 PVP Global Ventures Pvt. Ltd. (Appellant) vs. 63 Section 28A of the SEBI Act, 1992 read with section 220 of the Income Tax Act,1961 – Recovery proceedings – Interest
8 SEBI (Respondent) imposed by recovery officer – Whether tenable – Held, Yes.
ISSUE: appellants have filed the present appeals before the Tribunal challenging that interest cannot be levied by the
recovery officer and that a separate demand notice for the recovery is required to be issued.
JUDGEMENT: This Tribunal in Dushyant N. Dalal & Anr. v. SEBI which judgment was affirmed by the SC reported in 2017,
after considering the provision of Sec 28A of SEBI Act r/w Sec 220 of the Income Tax Act held that the liability to pay
interest u/s 28A r/w Sec220 is automatic and arises by operation of law. We further find that the AO in its order while
imposing penalty had also directed the appellant to pay the penalty amt within 45 days. In our view this order of penalty
would also be deemed to include a notice of demand and thus a formal requirement for issuance of a separate notice of
demand pursuant to the order of penalty is no longer required. Thus, the contention raised by the appellant is not
sustainable and is rejected.
1 M/s Therm Flow Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (Appellant) 64 SEBI takeover code read with SEBI Act – t/o of company – Acquisition of minuscule proportion above the permitted limit
9 vs. SEBI (Respondent) – Transfer of shares b/w promoters via open market – No public announcement made – WTM directed public
“OTHER JUDGEMENTS QUOTED” announcement – Whether correct – Held, No.
Violation of the Takeover Regulation is only to the extent of 0.04%and that too due to transfer of shares between the
promoters via open market and an order to make an open offer would be disproportionate. In the circumstance, the
directions as provided by Rule 32(1) (b) of the Takeover Regulations as cited supra would meet the ends of justice. The
appellant can be directed to transfer 0.04 percent shares i.e. 2000 shares through open market and to direct to deposit an
amount of Rs.3,60,300/- (2000 shares x Rs.180.15 : purchase price) in the Investor Protection and Education Fund would
 meet the ends of justice
2 GRD Securities Ltd. (Appellant) vs. National Stock 65 SEBI Act – Currency derivative segment transaction – Margin money deposited with delay – Heavy penalty levied –
0 Exchange of India & SEBI (Respondents) Whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: The Circular issued by SEBI dated August 10, 2011 specifies different percentages of penalty with respect to
short collection / non-collection of margins from clients in equity and currency derivatives segment. While it specifies small
proportion of 5% to 10% of margin short fall as penalty for non-reporting, it specifies that 100% of the short collection
shall be imposed as penalty. If such violation is noticed at the time of inspection, then in addition to 100% penalty one day
suspension has to be imposed. The said circular does not differentiate between situations involving upfront collection of
cheques but late depositing or late crediting of the said amount and no upfront collection at all and hence suffers from the
proportionality principle. In order to incorporate proportionality, as is provided for small percentages of short falls in
margin collection in the same circular itself, the word ‘shall’ in the circular has to be read as ‘may’ as it would enable the
Exchange authorities to distinguish between no collection of margin at all and delayed collection of margin, particularly, in
situations like no impact on the settlement or market at all. Accordingly, we are unable to agree with the interpretation of
the spirit of the circular provided by SEBI as well as NSE. the law has to be interpreted in its spirit invoking proportionality.
While we totally agree that upfront collection of margin is an important regulatory tool to safeguard market integrity, at
the same time we are equally concerned with proportionality while imposing a penalty of a very heavy amount which can
completely ruin an entity for a single violation.
Though we are inclined to reduce the penalty given these facts, the penalty has to be in tune with the violation. The
appellant’s submission that brokerage from the CD segment is only just over Rs. 3 lakh is incomplete since it has not
disclosed the total earnings including that from other segments of the market. Moreover, it is imperative to underscore
the importance of prompt upfront margin collection for promoting market integrity. Balancing all these, a penalty of Rs
50L and 1 day suspension from the CD segment would meet the ends of justice in the matter.
2 SEBI (Appellant) vs. Kishore Rajmera 67 SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations and SEBI (Stock-
1 (Respondent) Brokers and Sub-Brokers) Regulations – Penalty for matching trade – Whether tenable – Held, No – Penalty for
synchronised trade and circular trade – Whether tenable - Held, Yes.
NOTE: MORE THAN 1 CASE ARE BEING DEALT WITH VIDE A SINGLE JUDGEMENT. SO READ IT AGAIN.
The fact that the broker himself has initiated the sale of a particular quantity of the scrip on any particular day and at the
end of the day approximately equal number of the same scrip has come back to him; that trading has gone on without
settlement of accounts i.e. without any payment and the volume of trading in the illiquid scrips, all, should raise a serious
doubt in a reasonable man as to whether the trades are genuine. The failure of the brokers/sub-brokers to alert
themselves to this minimum requirement and their persistence in trading in the particular scrip either over a long period
of time or in respect of huge volumes thereof, in our considered view, would not only disclose negligence and lack of due
care and caution but would also demonstrate a deliberate intention to indulge in trading beyond the forbidden limits
thereby attracting the provisions of the FUTP Regulations. The difference between violation of the Code of Conduct
Regulations and the FUTP Regulations would depend on the extent of the persistence on the part of the broker in
indulging with transactions of the kind that has occurred in the present cases.
2 Neesa Technologies Limited & ORS 69 SEBI (ILDS) Reg read with SEBI Act& CA13– Issue of NCD violation of provisions- whether the co is liable for the violations – Held, Yes.
2 A whole lot of violations and non-compliances relating to offer and issuance of NCDs of ca56 and ILDS. Told to refund the
amounts. READ THE CASE.
UNRELATED IMPORTANT POINT: refund of funds which are due for refund Is a continuing offence.
The liability of the Company to refund the public funds collected through offer and allotment of the impugned securities is
continuing and such liability would continue till repayments are made.
2 SEBI (Appellant) vs. M/s Opee Stock–Link Ltd. & 70 SEBI Act – Section 15Z – Cornering of shares in IPO through benami demat accounts – Supreme Court upholds the
3 Anr (Respondents) penalty and punishment imposed by SEBI on the erring stock brokers.
FACTS: shares were connered by creating fake DMATs a/c’s. There are many irregularities like the various allottees selling to the
respondent at a price lower than the prevailing mkt price and the allottees having the same address and allottees closing their a/c’s
on SEBI initiating enquiry. The decision of the WTM upheld.
2 SEBI (Appellant) vs. Burren Energy India Ltd. & 72 SEBI SAST– Acquirer entered into a MoU (SPA) for the acquisition of shares on 14/02/05 – Acquirer appointed its
4 Ors. (Respondents) nominees as dirs in the parent co of the target coon 14/02/05 – Public offer made on 15/02/05 – Whether the
appointment of directors violates the provisions of the Takeover Regulations – Held, Yes.

READ THE CASE AGAIN AND FILL THIS SECTION.

2 National Securities Depository Ltd. (Appellant) vs. 73 SEBI Act, 1992 – Sec11 and 15T – Appealable orders – Whether administrative circular issued by SEBI is appealable
5 SEBI (Respondent) before the SAT – Held, No.
ISSUE: A preliminary objection was raised in the appeal filed by the respondent before the Securities Appellate Tribunal. It
was urged that under the SEBI Act, SEBI has administrative, legislative and quasi-judicial functions. Appeals preferred to
the Securities Appellate Tribunal can only be from quasi-judicial orders and not administrative and legislative orders.
JUDEMENT: It may be stated that both Rules made u/s 29 as well as Regulations made u/s 30 have to be placed before
Parliament u/s 31 of the Act. It is clear on a conspectus of the authorities that it is orders referable to Sec 11(4), 11(b),
11(d), 12(3) and 15-I of the Act, being quasi-judicial orders, and quasi-judicial orders made under the Rules and
Regulations that are the subject matter of appeal u/s 15T. Administrative orders such as circulars issued under the present
case referable to Section 11(1) of the Act are obviously outside the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the reasons
given by us above.
In this view of the matter, Civil Appeal being a challenge to the merits of the impugned circular, has necessarily to be
dismissed. We make it clear that LIBERTY IS GRANTED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
TO CHALLENGE THE AFORESAID CIRCULAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. Civil is disposed of accordingly.
2 Laurel Energetics Pvt. Ltd. (Appellant) vs. SEBI 75 SEBI Act r/w Reg10 of SAST – Shares of target co – Interse transfer b/w promoters in July 2014 at Rs.6.20/share –
6 (Respondent) Acquirer promoters of the target co are the promoters of parent co also – PA for open offer made in 2015 at
Rs.3.20/share – SEBI rejected the offer price and directed to increase it to Rs.6.20 – whether corporate veil could be
lifted to avail exemption u/s 10 of the Reg – Held, No.
NOTE: DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DECISION READ THE CASE AGAIN CAREFULLY AND FILL THIS SECTION.
2 Dushyant N Dalal and Another (Appellants) vs. 76 SEBI Act– Sec 28A – Recovery of interest on penalty and disgorgement of unlawful gains cases – Whether interest could
7 SEBI (Respondent) be recovered – Held, Yes.
ISSUE: whether interest can be recovered on orders of penalty issued under the Act and/or orders of disgorgement of
unlawful gains, when the said amounts have remained unpaid.
DECISION: That with respect to the disgorgement order, no penal interest can be imposed in cases where the
adjudicating authority has not mentioned about imposition of penal interest in its main order. This is supported
by the fact that the consequence of default in compliance with the order is already very harsh.
- That with respect to the penalty order, penal interest imposed shall be calculated from the day on which
default begins and not from the day on which order imposing penal interest is passed.
2 Ratnabali Capital Markets Ltd. (Petitioner) vs. 78 SEBI Act r/w sec 391 of the CA56– Merger of companies dealing in stocks and shares – Benefit of payment of
8 SEBI & ORS (Respondent) registration fees – Merged entity operated in derivative market – Whether fee exemption available – Held, No.
FACTS: SEBI passed a Circular that made it mandatory for entities to have a minimum n/w of Rs. 3Cr to get
 operate in the securities market as a broker. RSL did not have the requisite net worth. In order to continue to
work as a broker, RSL merged with an entity called RCML (Appellant). As a result of this all rights, licences,
assets, properties and registrations of RSL stood transferred to RCML. RCML wanted to take advantage of a
circular which stipulated that if a merger happens due to compulsion of law there is no requirement to pay
registration fee afresh. This contention of RCML was rejected by SEBI. Hence this appeal.
JUDGEMENT: Under the circular what SEBI intends to say is that fresh turnover/registration fees would not be payable by
a company which goes for amalgamation/merger as an alternative to liquidation. On the contrary, in the present case,
amalgamation has taken place in order to increase the “reserves” component of the net worth. Further, we do not find
any merit in the argument that the demand raised by SEBI for fresh turnover/registration fees constituted an act
derogatory of the provisions of the CA56. Under the 1992 Act, a duty is cast on SEBI to protect the interest of investors in
securities and to regulate the trade in securities on the StEx. Such Regulation is not a part of the CA56. After the merger of
RSL into RCML a new entity has emerged. In the circumstances, SEBI was entitled to charge the stipulated fees.
2 Penta Gold Limited (Appellant) vs. National Stock 80 SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, 2009 – Regulation 106P – Discharge of underwriter’s obligation – Done through procuring
9 Exchange of India Limited (Respondent) applications from third parties – Whether permissible – Held, Yes.
ISSUE: Where a public issue is undersubscribed, whether, the underwriters to the public issue are entitled to discharge
their obligation by procuring applications from 3rd parties is the basic question raised in this appeal.
JUDGEMENT: There is a discrepancy in the ICDR reg and the model agreement(by sebi) which was adopted by the
appellants and was further vetted by NSE. According to the model agreement the underwriter could procure applications
to discharge his obligation. On the other hand it also gave the issuer without prejudice to take action against the defaulting
underwriter to make necessary arrangements to get the share subscribed. Any of which is not present in the regulations
but in the model agreement prescribed by sebi. Having vetted the underwriting agreement executed by the appellant
company and the underwriters which is in consonance with the model underwriting agreement prescribed by SEBI, NSE is
not justified in rejecting the basis of allotment submitted by the appellant on ground that the underwriters have failed to
subscribe to the unsubscribed shares as contemplated under regulation 106P of the ICDR Regulations. Appeal allowed and
for the detailed order refer pg 81.

3 BOI Shareholding Limited (Appellant) vs. SEBI 81 SEBI Act – Sec 15HB – Delay in implementation of anti-money laundering policy – Imposition of penalty of Rs. 40 lakhs –
0 (Respondent) Whether tenable – Penalty reduced.
JUDGEMENT: From the evidence produced before us it is clear that the appellant has implemented all the requirements of
the AML/CFT policy as specified in the SEBI Circulars though belatedly. For delayed implementation/violation SEBI has
imposed varying penalty including no penalty in some cases. However, under the relevant Secs i.e. 15HB of SEBI Act r/w
19G of the Dep Act the penalty imposable for each violation shall not be < Rs. 1 Lakh which may extend to 1 Cr.
Accordingly, the min penalty imposable in case of 6 violations committed by the appellant should be in tune with the
statutory provisions relating to the penalty. We are of the view that the penalty of Rs.40L imposed on the appellant is
excessive. We, therefore, reduce the amount of penalty imposed on the appellant to Rs.6 Lakh.

SL CASE PG BRIEF
0 EMAAR MGF LAND LIMITED (APPELLANT) vs. 88 Consumer Protection Act r/w Arbitration and Conciliation Act–Flat buyer’s agreement- Consumer dispute-Agreement
1 AFTAB SINGH (RESPONDENT) contained arbitration clause- Purchaser filed consumer complaint -Whether liable to be referred to arbitration – Held
No.
JUDGEMENT: cheap and a quick remedy has been provided to the consumer which is the object and purpose of the Act
Consumer Protection Act being a special remedy, despite there being an arbitration agreement the proceedings before
Consumer Forum have to go on. There can be prohibition both express or implied for not deciding a dispute on the basis of
an arbitration agreement. The amendment in Section 8 cannot be given such expansive meaning and intent so as to
inundate entire regime of special legislations where such disputes were held to be not arbitrable. Something which
legislation never intended cannot be accepted as side wind to override the settled law. The amendment in Sec 8 cannot be
given such expansive meaning and intent so as to inundate entire regime of special legislations where such disputes were
held to be not arbitrable. Something which legislation never intended cannot be accepted as side wind to override the
settled law. We may, however, hasten to add that in the event a person entitled to seek an additional special remedy
provided under the statutes does not opt for the additional/special remedy and he is a party to an arbitration agreement,
there is no inhibition in disputes being proceeded in arbitration. It is only the case where specific/special remedies are
provided for and which are opted by an aggrieved person that judicial authority can refuse to relegate the parties to the
arbitration.
0 CARLSBERG BREWERIES A/S. (PLAINTIFF) vs. 89 Infringement of design and passing off the plaintiff’s trade dress-Composite suit filed–Whether maintainable–Held, Yes.
2 SOM DISTILLERIES AND BREWERIES LTD. JUDGEMENT: two different causes of action in fact can be a part of the same txn. The same txn is that txn of the selling of
(DEFENDANT) goods by the defendant by packing and labelling them in such a manner which infringes the TM & © of the plaintiff. In
such facts there would be common bundle of facts in the 2 causes of action of infringement of TM & ©, because there is a
single and same txn of sale of the goods by the defendant of its goods in cartons under being similar to the cartons in
which the plaintiff sells its goods and which as per plaintiff results in violation of his rights in his registered TM & © in his
label. The Division Bench has concluded that since the txn of sale by the defendant in effect results in the infringement of
both the TMs and violation of © of the plaintiff, therefore under Order II Rule 3 CPC it is permissible to join the 2 causes of
action against the same defendant and that in fact in such cases the joinder of causes of action would result in avoidance
of multiplicity of proceedings.
0 HINDUSTAN INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION 91 Indian Partnership Act r/w NI Act – Dishonour of cheque – Civil suit filed by unregistered partnership firm – Whether
3 CORPORATION LTD. (PETITIONERS) vs. M/S. R.S. suit is barred u/s 69(2) – Held, No.
WOODS INTERNATIONAL & ORS JUDGEMENT: Kerala HC in Afzal Baker observed as under: In the instant case, as noticed above, by virtue of Sec 30 and 37
(RESPONDENTS) of the NI Act, on the dishonour of a cheque, the statute creates a liability on the drawer, apart from the general law of
contracts. The right to sue on the contract is available and open to the party. However, apart from that, the statute creates
a liability as against the drawer of the instrument. If the suit is on the original cause of action based on the original
contract between the parties, there is no doubt, the suit would be hit by Sec 69 (2) of the Indian Partnership Act. But, in
the instant case, what is sought to be enforced is the liability created under the NI Act. It is not a case where suit is filed on
the original cause of action by producing the cheques as a piece of evidence to prove the liability under the original
contract. Here, the suit itself is laid on the instrument. A reading of the plaint leaves no room for doubt regarding that. The
bar U/S 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act would apply only where the suit is sought to be laid on a contract and not in a
case where statutory right/liability is sought to be enforced. In the instant case, the suit being purely based on the liability
U/S 30 and 37 of the NI Act, it is a suit based on statutory liability dehors the contract between the parties. The suit cannot
be held to be barred u/s 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act.”
0 M/S. SICAGEN INDIA LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. 92 NI Act – Sec 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Complaint filed on the basis of 2nd notice – Whether maintainable – Held, Yes.
4 MAHINDRA VADINENI & ORS (RESPONDENTS) JUDGEMENT: Three-Judge Bench of this Court in MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan & Anr held that there is nothing in the
provisions of Section 138 of the Act that forbids the holder of the Cheque to make successive presentation of the cheque
and institute the criminal complaint based on the second or successive dishonour of the cheque on its presentation.
0 UNION OF INDIA vs. KHAITAN HOLDINGS 93 Arbitration under bilateral investment treaties – BIT between India and Mauritius – Investment in India by Mauritius
5 (MAURITIUS) LTD. & ORS entity – Dispute – Arbitration proceedings initiated under BIT by investor – Government of India sought anti-arbitration
injunction – Whether grantable – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: BITs arise out of agreements signed b/w 2 sovereign nations. Under these agreements, each of the States,
signatory to the Agreement agrees to provide Fair and Equitable Treatment to investors from the other State, as also
extend protection against arbitrary, discriminatory and unfair practices. The dispute settlement mechanisms can be
triggered both by the aggrieved State as also an aggrieved investor from a State which is party to the Agreement, against
the other State. Interference by domestic courts in arbitral proceedings that may be commenced under BITs is permissible
but only in `compelling circumstances, in `rare cases. Courts are hesitant to interfere in the arbitral process once the
Tribunal is constituted and is seized of the dispute. UOI seeks an anti-arbitration injunction against the arbitral proceedings
initiated by Defendant No.1 - M/s Khaitan Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. a Mauritius based company. All the above grounds, are
those that can be that with and decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. The arbitration having been invoked in 2013 and the
Tribunal having been constituted and being seized of the dispute, it is not for this Court to adjudicate on these issues. The
above issues ought to be raised by the Republic of India before the Arbitral Tribunal, which under Article 21, would rule
upon the same. The proceedings which are already underway cannot be termed as being oppressive, vexatious or an
abuse of process at this stage. The prayer for adinterim relief seeking stay of the arbitral proceedings commenced by
Khaitan Holdings under the BIT, is accordingly rejected, at this stage.
0 BIR SINGH (APPELLANT) vs. MUKESH KUMAR 94 NI Act– Sec 138 & 139 – Issuance of cheque admitted by drawer – Objection raised that payee filled in the cheque and
6 (RESPONDENTS) the cheque was given as security – Trial court and 1st appellate court convicted the drawer – HC reversed the decision-
whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: Sec 139 of NI Act which mandates that unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that
the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Sec 138, for the discharge, in whole or in
part, of any debt or other liability. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated u/s 139 of the NI Act,
is a rebuttable presumption. However, the onus of proving that the cheque was not in discharge of any debt or
other liability is on the accused drawer of the cheque. Fact that the cheque might be post-dated does not absolve
the drawer of a cheque of the penal consequences of Sec 138 of the NI Act. It is immaterial that the cheque may
have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque
is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Sec 138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily
presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in
itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not
in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. It is not the case of the respondent-accused that he
either signed the cheque or parted with it under any threat or coercion. Nor is it the case of the respondent-
accused that the unfilled signed cheque had been stolen. The existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
payee of a cheque and its drawer, would not disentitle the payee to the benefit of the presumption u/s 139 of the
NI Act in the absence of evidence of exercise of undue influence or coercion.
0 ROHITBHAI J PATEL (APPELLANT) vs. THE NI Act – Sec 138 &139 – Preseumption as to cheque drawn in favour of complainant – Yet trial court put the onus on the
8 STATE OF GUJARAT (RESPONDENTS) complainant to prove the liability – Whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by
bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any
doubt on the complainant’s case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for
 advancing loan to the accused-appellant. Needless to reiterate that the result of such presumption is that existence of a
legally enforceable debt is to be presumed in favour of the complainant. When such a presumption is drawn, the factors
relating to the want of documentary evidence in the form of receipts or accounts or want of evidence as regards source of
funds were not of relevant consideration while examining if the accused has been able to rebut the presumption or not.
On perusing the order of the Trial Court, it is noticed that the Trial Court proceeded to pass the order of acquittal on the
mere ground of ‘creation of doubt’. We are of the considered view that the Trial Court appears to have proceeded on a
misplaced assumption that by mere denial or mere creation of doubt, the appellant had successfully rebutted the
presumption as envisaged by Sec 139 of the NI Act. In the scheme of the NI Act, mere creation of doubt is not sufficient.
0 BHARAT BROADBAND NETWORK LTD. 97 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 12 – Appointment of arbitrator – Agreement provided for CMD as
9 (APPELLANT) vs. UNITED TELECOMS LTD. arbitrator – CMD disqualified and became ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator – Whether such disqualified person
(RESPONDENTS) can appoint an arbitrator – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: where an arbitrator makes a disclosure in writing which is likely to give justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality, the appointment of such arbitrator may be challenged u/s 12(1) to 12(4) r/w Sec 13.
However, where such person becomes “ineligible” to be appointed as an arbitrator, there is no question of challenge to
such arbitrator, before such arbitrator. In such a case, i.e., a case which falls u/s 12(5), 14(1)(a) of the Act gets attracted
inasmuch as the arbitrator becomes, as a matter of law (i.e., de jure), unable to perform his functions u/s 12(5), being
ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. This being so, his mandate automatically terminates, and he shall then be
substituted by another arbitrator u/s 14(1) itself. It is only if a controversy occurs concerning whether he has become de
jure unable to perform his functions as such, that a party has to apply to the Court to decide on the termination of the
mandate, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Thus, in all Sec 12(5) cases, there is no challenge procedure to be availed
of. If an arbitrator continues as such, being de jure unable to perform his functions, as he falls within any of the categories
mentioned in Sec 12(5), r/w the 7th Schedule, a party may apply to the Court, which will then decide on whether his
mandate has terminated. Questions which may typically arise u/s 14 may be as to whether such person falls within any of
the categories mentioned in the 7th Schedule, or whether there is a waiver as provided in the proviso to Sec 12(5) of the
Act. As a matter of law, it is important to note that the proviso to Sec 112(5) must be contrasted with Sec 4 of the Act. Sec
4 deals with cases of deemed waiver by conduct; whereas the proviso to Sec 12(5) deals with waiver by express agreement
in writing between the parties only if made subsequent to disputes having arisen between them.
1 ANJUM HUSSAIN & ORS (APPELLANT) vs. 99 Consumer Protection Act– Sec 12 – Class action by consumers – Delay in handing over possession of flats – All buyers
0 INTELLICITY BUSINESS PARK PVT LTD. & ORS. filed a joint complaint before the NC – NC dismissed the case as not maintainable as class action – Whether correct –
(RESPONDENTS) Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: In Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras v. T. N.Ganapathy it was held by this Court that the persons
who may be represented in a Suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of CPC need not have the same cause of action and all that is
required for application of said provision is that the persons concerned must have common interest or common grievance.
What is required is sameness of interest. Very same issue was dealt with by Full Bench of the National Commission in
Ambrish Kumar Shukla and Ors. v. Ferrous Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. [Consumer Case]. Appeal allowed and impugned order
set aside.
1 RESERVE BANK OF INDIA (PETITIONERS) vs. 100 Right to Information Act, 2005 – Section 8 – Exemptions from disclosure – Informants asked information as to
1 JAYANTILAL N. MISTRY (RESPONDENTS) investigation, audit, bad debts, FEMA violations etc. of various banks from RBI – RBI refused to furnish the same on the
ground of information obtained from these banks on fiduciary relationship – Whether refusal tenable – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: RBI is supposed to uphold public interest and not the interest of individual banks. RBI is clearly not in any
fiduciary relationship with any bank. RBI has no legal duty to maximize the benefit of any public sector or private sector
bank, and thus there is no relationship of ‘trust’ between them. RBI has a statutory duty to uphold the interest of the
public at large, the depositors, the country’s economy and the banking sector. Thus, RBI ought to act with transparency
and not hide information that might embarrass individual banks. It is duty bound to comply with the provisions of the RTI
Act and disclose the information sought by the respondents herein. RBI’s argument that if people, who are sovereign, are
made aware of the irregularities being committed by the banks then the country’s economic security would be
endangered, is not only absurd but is equally misconceived and baseless. The ideal of ‘Government by the people’ makes it
necessary that people have access to information on matters of public concern. The free flow of information about affairs
of Government paves way for debate in public policy and fosters accountability in Government. It creates a condition for
‘open governance’ which is a foundation of democracy.
1 GAUTAM KUNDU (APPELLANT) vs. MANOJ 102 PMLA r/w the CrPC and SEBI Act– Offence committed u/s 3 of the PMLA – Bail sought u/s 439 of the CRPC appellant
2 KUMAR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DOE floating as many as 27 companies – Monies collected through front company routed through these companies –
(RESPONDENTS) Whether appellant entitled for bail – Held, No.
ISSUE: Bail rejected & Appeal dismissed. the appellant collected money by issuing secured debentures by way of private
placement in compliance with the guidelines issued by the SEBI from time to time. Further the appellant had floated as
much as 27 companies and routed the monies collected by his front companies through these companies.
JUDGEMENT: We have noted that Sec 45 of the PMLA will have overriding effect on the general provisions of the CrPC in
case of conflict between them. As mentioned earlier, Sec45 of the PMLA imposes 2 conditions for grant of bail, specified
under the said Act. We have not missed the proviso to Sec 45 of the said Act which indicates that the legislature has
carved out an exception for grant of bail by a Special Court when any person is under the age of 16 years or is a woman or
is a sick or infirm. Therefore, there is no doubt that the conditions laid down u/s 45A of the PMLA, would bind the HC as
the provisions of special law having overriding effect on the provisions of Sec 439 of the CrPC for grant of bail to any
person accused of committing offence punishable u/s 4 of the PMLA, even when the application for bail is considered u/s
439 of the CrPC. We do not find that the HC has exercised its discretion capriciously or arbitrarily in the facts and
circumstances of this case. We further note that the HC has called for all the relevant papers and duly taken note of that
and thereafter after satisfying its conscience, refused the bail. Therefore, we do not find that the HC has committed any
wrong in refusing bail in the given circumstances.
1 KOTAK MAHINDRA BANK LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. 103 Limitation Act, 1963 – Sec 3 r/w articles 55 and 113 – Grant of vehicle loan – Borrower failing to pay the EMIs – Suit
3 ANUJ KUMAR TYAGI (RESPONDENT) filed by the bank – Trial court dismissed the suit as time barred without appreciating articles 55 and 113 – Whether the
rejection of suit tenable – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: In so far as Article 55 is concerned, the fact that that the respondent failed to adhere to the schedule of
repayment, would not deprive the right of the appellant to treat each breach as a fresh cause of action. The last breach,
quite clearly, in the instant case, would have occurred only in May-June, 2012, assuming the last instalment was to be
adjusted by virtue of the respondent having paid an initial amount of Rs. 7544/- as an advance. The suit, admittedly, was
instituted on 20.07.2012. Having said so, there is, as stated above, another aspect of the matter, as regards this case,
which is that, under the loan agreement, the appellant, in terms of clause 48, is conferred with the power, in an event of a
default. Quite clearly, in terms of clause 48, the appellant had discretion to decide when to trigger the recall of loan upon
occurrence of an event of default. The fact that EMIs were to be paid over a period spanning from 10.08.2007 till
10.06.2012, gave the appellant, under clause 48 the right to treat any of the defaulted EMI’s (that is, after the due date for
its payment had passed) as an event of default. Once, such an event of default occurred, the appellant under clause 48
could set in motion the process for recall of the loan. The commencement of the period of limitation, would thus be
triggered, once, the said notice was issued, which in turn would relate to the defaulted EMI.
1 MAHANIVESH OILS & FOODS PVT LTD. 105 PMLA– Sec 5 – Proceeds of crime – Property purchased before the enforcement of the Act attachment of property –
4 (PETITIONER) vs. DIRECTORATE OF Whether tenable – Held, No.
ENFORCEMENT (RESPONDENT) JUDGEMENT: The occurrence of a scheduled offence is the substratal condition for giving rise to any proceeds of crime
and consequently, the application of Sec 5(1) of the Act. A commission of a scheduled offence is the fundamental pre-
condition for any proceeding under the Act as without a scheduled offence being committed, the question of proceeds of
crime coming into existence does not arise. The central issue in the present case is not on whether the scheduled offence
was committed, but whether the attachment under Section 5 of the Act can be sustained where the principal offence as
well as the offence of using its proceeds is alleged to have been committed prior to the Act coming into force. The Act is a
penal statute and, therefore, can have no retrospective or retroactive operation. Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India
expressly forbids that no person can be convicted of any offence except for the violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of the act charged as an offence. Further, no person can be inflicted a penalty greater than what could have
been inflicted under the law at the time when the offence was committed. even if the allegations made by the respondent
are assumed to be correct, the proceeds of crime had been used by the petitioner for acquisition of the property much
prior to the Act coming into force. Thus, funds were already projected as untainted funds unconnected with the crime for
which Mr. Homi Rajvansh and other persons are accused. The funds had, thus, been laundered at a time when money-
laundering was not an offence and proceedings under the Act cannot be initiated.
Although, the impugned order records that the concerned officer has reason to believe that the property in question is
likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in a manner, which may result in frustrating the proceedings relating to
confiscation of the said proceeds of crime, there is no reference to any fact or material in the impugned order which could
lead to this inference. A mere mechanical recording that the property is likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with
would not meet the requirements of Section 5(1) of the Act.

1 SANDEEP GUPTA (PETITIONER) vs. PUNJAB 107 IPA, 1932 – Sec 32 – Retiring partner’s liability petitioner provided guarantee to the respondent bank – Upon retirement
5 NATIONAL BANK & ORS (RESPONDENTS) he sought to withdraw his guarantee – Reconstitution agreement upon which the petitioner retired and new partners
“OTHER CASES REFERED” inducted did not provide for the release of the guarantee – Whether guarantee could be released – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: The said suit was admittedly instituted prior to the institution of this petition. The petition is not
“NOT RES INTREGRA” maintainable on this ground alone. The petitioner cannot maintain a petition under Art 226 of the COI for the relief for
which the petitioner, prior to instituting the writ petition, has already availed of the relief under the civil law. Even
otherwise, the respondent no.1 Bank which is the trustee of public monies cannot be left high and dry by granting the
relief of releasing the security of the outgoing partners without the continuing / new partners substituting the said
security. The petitioner prior to signing the deed of reconstitution of firm ought to have ensured that the security
furnished by him is released, if that was the agreement with the respondents No.3 & 4.
1 TODAY HOTELS (NEW DELHI) PVT LTD. 108 Arbitration and Conciliation–Sec 8– Application to refer to arbitration dismissed–Whether appeal lies against it–Held,
6 (APPELLANT) vs. INTECTURE INDIA DESIGNS No.
PVT LTD. (RESPONDENT) JUDGEMENT: An order passed u/s 8 is an order passed by the judicial authority/forum/court by drawing its power from
sec 8 of the Act and since the order is passed by drawing the power from Sec 8 of the Act, the right to file an appeal being
a creature of statute has also to be found in the Act. If the Act does not provide for an appeal or specifically prohibits an
appeal from an order passed u/s 8, then no appeal would lie under the Act. Since the order is passed in exercise of powers
conferred by the act, reliance cannot be placed for filing an appeal u/s 10 of the Delhi HC Act, 1966 or under the Letters
Patent. Since Sec 37 does not permit filing of an appeal from an order passed u/s 8, no appeal would lie from such an
order under the Act.
1 LAKHMI CHAND (APPELLANT) vs. RELIANCE 108 Consumer Protection Act,1986 – Section 23 – Revision by National Commission – Accident caused due to the rash
7 GENERAL INSURANCE (RESPONDENT) driving of the offending vehicle – Damaged vehicle was carrying excess passenger – National Commission rejected the
compensation on the ground of violating the insurance contract terms – Whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: In B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd Divisional Officer, Hassan, it was held that for the insurer to
avoid his liability, the breach of the policy must be so fundamental in nature that it brings the contract to an end. In the
instant case, it is undisputed that the accident was in fact caused on account of the rash and negligent driving of the
offending vehicle by its driver, against whom a criminal case vide FIR no. 66 of 2010 was registered for the offences
referred to supra under the provisions of the IPC. These facts have not been taken into consideration by either the State
Commission or National Commission while exercising their jurisdiction and setting aside the order of the District Forum.
Therefore, the judgment and order of the National Commission passed in the Revision Petition is liable to be set aside, as
the said findings recorded in the judgment are erroneous in law.

1 INDIAN MACHINERY COMPANY (APPELLANT) vs. 110 Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – First complaint dismissed due to the default of non-prosecution second complaint filed
8 ANSAL HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION LTD. but rejected as not maintainable – Whether correct – Held,No.
(RESPONDENT) JUDGEMENT: Rule 9(6) of the Tamil Nadu Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 is in identical terms with sub-rule (8) of Rule 4
and sub-rule (8) of Rule 8. Under this sub-rule, the appeal filed before the State Commission against the order of the
District Forum, can be dismissed in default or the State Commission may in its discretion dispose of it on merits. Similar
power has been given to the National Commission under Rule 15(6) of the Rules made by the CG u/s 30(1) of the Act. These
Rules do not provide that if a complaint is dismissed in default by the District Forum u/r 4(8) or by the State Commission u/r
8(8) of the Rules, a 2nd complaint would not lie. Thus, there is no provision parallel to the provision contained in Order 9
Rule 9(1) CPC which contains a prohibition that if a suit is dismissed in default of the plaintiff under Order 9 Rule 8, a 2nd
suit on the same cause of action would not lie. That being so, the rule of prohibition contained in Order 9 Rule 9(1) CPC
cannot be extended to the proceedings before the District Forum or the State Commission. The fact that the case was not
decided on merits and was dismissed in default of non-appearance of the complainant cannot be overlooked and,
therefore, it would be permissible to file a second complaint explaining why the earlier complaint could not be pursued and
was dismissed in default.”
1 EITZEN BULK A/S (APPELLANT) vs. ASHAPURA 111 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Seat of arbitration was London and governing law of the contract was English
9 MINECHEM LTD. & ANR (RESPONDENT) law – Foreign award – Execution thereof in India – Whether Indian courts have jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to
the execution of foreign award – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: We are thus of the view that by Clause 28, the parties chose to exclude the application of Part I to the
Arbitration proceedings between them by choosing London as the venue for Arbitration and by making English law
applicable to Arbitration, as observed earlier. It is too well settled by now that where the parties choose a juridical seat of
Arbitration outside India and provide that the law which governs Arbitration will be a law other than Indian law, part I of
the Act would not have any application and, therefore, the award debtor would not be entitled to challenge the award by
raising objections under Section 34 before a Court in India. A Court in India could not have jurisdiction to entertain such
objections under Section 34 in such a case.
2 ROTOMAC ELECTRICALS LTD. (APPELLANT) 112 Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Advance licence – Export obligations – Failure to discharge –
0 vs. UNION OF INDIA & ANR (RESPONDENTS) Penalty proceedings – Failure to produce documents – Penalty imposed – Whether tenable – Held, yes.
JUDGEMENT: finding of fact recorded by the statutory authorities regarding the failure of the appellant to furnish the
documents to establish the fulfilment of the export obligation warrants no interference by this Court in exercise of the writ
jurisdiction under Art 226 COI. We have observed that the dispute was not with regard to the interpretation of clause 4.12
as to whether the exports that had taken place even before the grant of advance licence can be considered or not, but the
issue was whether the appellant could produce authenticated documents to prove the fulfilment of export obligation as
 required under the terms and conditions of the advance licence. A categorical finding was recorded by the respondent
Nos.1 & 2 that the appellant/writ petitioner failed to produce. Therefore, the respondents cannot be said to have
committed any error in imposing the penalty in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 11(2) of FTDR Act, 1992.
We do not find any substance even in the contention that the show cause notices being silent about the proposed levy of
penalty, it is not open to the respondents to invoke Section 11(2) of FTDR Act, 1992. On a perusal of the show cause
notices, we found that the petitioner was put on notice that it failed to submit the documents to prove the fulfilment of
export obligation. It is also relevant to note that the show cause notice dated 01.12.2009 was in fact issued under Section
14 of the FTDR Act proposing to take action under Section 11(2) for non-fulfilment of export obligation against the advance
licence dated 22.12.1999. Hence, the allegation that the show cause notices were silent about the action proposed has no
factual basis.
The contention that the Directors of the appellant company should not have been made liable also deserves no
consideration since none of the Directors approached this Court. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is devoid of merit
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
2 GREAVES COTTON LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. 113 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 8 – Civil suit filed by plaintiff against defendant – Defendant initially
1 UNITED MACHINERY & APPLIANCES sought time to file written statement thereafter defendant filed an application seeking reference to arbitration – Trial
(RESPONDENT) court rejected the application – Whether correct – Held, No.
“other case laws referred” JUDGEMENT: HC cannot treat an application for grant of time to file a written statement as a written statement. The
appleant had not made a categorical reply to the plaint and the HC had not gone into the merits.
2 THOUGHTWORKS INC (PETITIONER) vs. SUPER 114 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – Appellant’s registered trademark – Infringement thereof by the
2 SOFTWARE PVT LTD & ANR (RESPONDENT) respondent in its domain name arbitrator failed to consider certain valid issues in the award – Award passed against the
appellant – Whether appeal to be allowed – Held, Yes.
CASE MOSTLY BASED ON FACTS – READ THE JUDGEMENT
2 FALCON PROGRESS LTD (DECREE HOLDER) vs. 115 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Execution of foreign award challenge as to validity of the contract – Whether
3 SARA INTERNATIONAL LTD. (JUDGMENT tenable – Held, No.
DEBTOR) CASE MOSTLY BASED ON FACTS – READ THE JUDGEMENT

2 CASE MOSTLY BASED ON FACTS – READ THE 117 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 31(7) (a) – Interest on award arbitrator refused to allow interest on
4 JUDGEMENT awarded sum – Whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: It is trite law that the arbitral tribunal cannot ignore the terms of the agreement between the parties. In the
present case, there is no dispute that the Agreement expressly provided for interest on delayed payments. The arbitral
“OTHER CASES REFERRED” tribunal has not found the aforesaid clause to be invalid or inapplicable. Having stated the above, it is also necessary to
observe that the arbitral tribunal would still have the discretion to award interest in cases where the contract is silent.
However, such discretion would have to be exercised objectively keeping in view, the facts of the case. In cases where the
contract expressly provides that interest would be payable on sums withheld, the arbitral tribunal would be bound to
award the same unless there are good reasons to not to do so.
2 DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD. 118 Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1966 – Award in favour of respondent – Single judge directs deposit of Rs.65 crores
5 (APPELLANT) vs. DELHI AIRPORT METRO with the bank of Respondent to cover interest charges – Whether tenable – Held, Yes.
EXPRESS PVT. LTD. (RESPONDENT) JUDGEMENT: AS per SEC 9 - it is clear that the power vested in the Court may be exercised when the proceedings before
the Arbitrator are either “contemplated”, “pending” or even “completed”. The present case is one under the third
category and the Court has the power to order interim measures after the passing of the award, but before its
enforcement in accordance with Sec 36 of the Act. Hence, the Court was clearly vested with the power to grant interim
measures prior to the award becoming a deemed decree under Sec 36 of the Act. We may notice that the order dated
30.05.2017 is only an interim order and all the issues sought to be raised by the parties have been kept open to be
considered by the learned Single Judge on the next date of hearing as is evident upon reading of the order dated
30.05.2017. We find no grounds to interfere in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.
2 ESSAR PROJECTS (INDIA) LTD. (PETITIONER) vs. 119 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Dispute between the parties – Respondent was about to encash the bank
6 INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. & ANR. guarantees given by petitioner – Whether respondent could be restrained from encashing the guarantees – Held, No.
(RESPONDENTS) JUDGEMENT: We are, therefore, of the opinion that the correct position of law is that commitment of banks must be
honoured free from interference by the courts and it is only in exceptional cases, that is to say, in case of fraud or in a case
where irretrievable injustice would be done if bank guarantee is allowed to be encashed, the court should interfere. In this
case fraud has not been pleaded and the relief for injunction was sought by the contractor/Respondent 1 on the ground
that special equities or the special circumstances of the case required it. The special circumstances and/or special equities
which have been pleaded in this case are that there is a serious dispute on the question as to who has committed breach of
the contract, that the contractor has a counter-claim against the appellant, that the disputes between the parties have
been referred to the arbitrators and that no amount can be said to be due and payable by the contractor to the appellant
till the arbitrators declare their award. In our opinion, these factors are not sufficient to make this case an exceptional case
justifying interference by restraining the appellant from enforcing the bank guarantees. The High Court was, therefore, not
right in restraining the appellant from enforcing the bank guarantees.
2 ANANTHESH BHAKTA (APPELLANTS) vs. 120 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966 – Disputes between partners unregistered partnership – Partnership deed as well
7 NAYANA S. BHAKTA & ORS. RESPONDENTS) as retirement deed provided for arbitration – Whether arbitration proceedings could be refused on the ground that
partnership is unregistered – Held, No.
CASE MOSTLY BASED ON FACTS – READ THE JUDGEMENT
2 NEWGEN SPECIALTY PLASTIC LTD. 122 Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 37 – Ex parte award – Liability to repay the loan proved by evidence –
8 (APPELLANT) vs. INTEC CAPITAL LTD. Whether the award could be interfered – Held, No.
(APPELLANT) READ THE JUDGEMENT

2 KANCHAN UDYOG LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. 123 Indian contract Act,1872 – Section 73 – Damages towards loss of anticipated profits – Bottling contract – Termination
9 UNITED SPIRITS LTD . (RESPONDENT) thereof by brand owner – Bottler filed suit claiming damages for loss of anticipated profits – Trial court decreed the suit
while High Court reversed it – Whether the plaintiff is entitled damages for loss of anticipated profits – Held, No.
CASE MOSTLY BASED ON FACTS – READ THE JUDGEMENT
EXTRACT: That leaves the question with regard to reliance loss and the expectation loss. Whether the two could be
maintainable simultaneously or were mutually exclusive? In Pullock & Mulla, 14 th Edition, Volume II, page 1174, the
primary object for protection of expectation interest, has been described as to put the innocent party in the position which
he would have occupied had the contract been performed. The general aim of the law being to protect the innocent
party’s defeated financial expectation and compensate him for his loss of bargain, subject to the rules of causation and
remoteness. The purpose of protection of reliance interest is to put the plaintiff in the position in which he would have
been if the contract had never been made. The loss may include expenses incurred in preparation by the innocent party’s
own performance, expenses incurred after the breach or even pre-contract expenditure but subject to remoteness.
3 M/S DURO FELGUERA S.A (PETITIONER) vs. 124 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Five different contracts and one MoU – Each contract contained arbitration
0 GANGAVARAM PORT LIMITED (RESPONDENT) clause – Whether single arbitration tribunal could be appointed to resolve all the disputes arose in these six contracts –
Held, No.
 JUDGEMENT: The learned Senior Counsel for GPL relied upon Chloro Controls India Private Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water
Purification Inc. & Ors, to contend that where various agreements constitute a composite transaction, court can refer
disputes to arbitration if all ancillary agreements are relatable to principal agreement and performance of one agreement
is so intrinsically interlinked with other agreements. Even though Chloro Controls has considered the doctrine of
“composite reference”, “composite performance” etc., ratio of Chloro Controls may not be applicable to the case in hand.
In Chloro Controls, the arbitration clause in the principal agreement i.e. clause (30) required that any dispute or difference
arising under or in connection with the principal (mother) agreement, which could not be settled by friendly negotiation
and agreement between the parties, would be finally settled by arbitration conducted in accordance with Rules of ICC. The
words thereon “under and in connection with” in the principal agreement was very wide to make it more comprehensive.
In that background, the performance of all other agreements by respective parties including third parties/non-signatories
had to fall in line with the principal agreement. In such factual background, it was held that all agreements pertaining to
the entire disputes are to be settled by a “composite reference”.
3 HIMANGNI ENTERPRISES (APPELLANT) vs. 125 Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 – Sec 8 – Tenancy contract – Arbitration clause in the contract – Landlord initiated
1 KAMALJEET SINGH AHLUWALIA (RESPONDENT) civil proceedings for eviction – Civil court refused to refer the parties to arbitration – Whether correct – Held, Yes.
JUDGEMENT: In Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. & Ors it was held that “36. The well-recognised
examples of non-arbitrable disputes are: (i) disputes relating to rights and liabilities which give rise to or arise out of
criminal offences; (ii) matrimonial disputes relating to divorce, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights, child
custody; (iii) guardianship matters; (iv) insolvency and winding-up matters; (v) testamentary matters (grant of probate,
letters of administration and succession certificate); and (vi) eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes
where the tenant enjoys statutory protection against eviction and only the specified courts are conferred jurisdiction to
grant eviction or decide the disputes.”
The Delhi Rent Act, which deals with the cases relating to rent and eviction of the premises, is a special Act. Though it
contains a provision (Sec3) by virtue of it, the provisions of the Act do not apply to certain premises but that does not
mean that the Arbitration Act, ipso facto, would be applicable to such premises conferring jurisdiction on the arbitrator to
decide the eviction/rent disputes. In such a situation, the rights of the parties and the demised premises would be
governed by the TOPA and the civil suit would be triable by the Civil Court and not by the arbitrator. In other words,
though by virtue of Sec 3 of the Act, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to certain premises but no sooner the
exemption is withdrawn or ceased to have its application to a particular premises, the Act becomes applicable to such
premises. In this view of the matter, it cannot be contended that the provisions of the A&C Act would, therefore, apply to
such premises. In view of foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the appeal, which fails and is accordingly dismissed.
3 INNOX WIND LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. 127 A&C act,1996 – Appointment arbitrator – Purchase orders – Standard terms and conditions containing arbitration clause
2 THERMOCABLES LTD. (RESPONDENT) attached to the purchase orders – Disputes between the parties – whether arbitrator could be appointed – Held, Yes.
JUDGEMENT: We are of the opinion that though general reference to an earlier contract is not sufficient for
incorporation of an arbitration clause in the later contract, a general reference to a standard form would be enough for
incorporation of the arbitration clause. In M.R. Engineers this Court restricted the exceptions to standard form of contract
of trade associations and professional institutions. In view of the development of law after the judgment in M.R.
Engineers’ case, we are of the opinion that a general reference to a consensual standard form is sufficient for
incorporation of an arbitration clause. In other words, general reference to a standard form of contract of one party will be
enough for incorporation of arbitration clause.
3 INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER COOPERATIVE 128 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Arbitrator deciding the issue of limitation – Whether an interim award
3 LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. M/S.BHADRA PRODUCTS amenable to challenge under appeal – Held, Yes.
“READ KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ PRINCIPLE” ISSUE: when an award delivered by an Arbitrator, which decides the issue of limitation, can be said to be an interim award,
and whether such interim award can then be set aside u/s 34.
JUDGEMENT: In our view, therefore, it is clear that the award dated 23/06/2015 is an interim award, which being an
arbitral award, can be challenged separately and independently u/s 34 of the Act. We are of the view that such an award,
which does not relate to the arbitral tribunal’s own jurisdiction u/s 16, does not have to follow the drill of Sec 16(5) and (6)
of the Act. Having said this, we are of the view that Parliament may consider amending Sec34 of the Act so as to
consolidate all interim awards together with the final arbitral award, so that one challenge u/s 34 can be made after
delivery of the final arbitral award. Piecemeal challenges like piecemeal awards lead to unnecessary delay and additional
expense.

3 TOYOTA JIDOSHA KABUSHIKI KAISHA vs. PRIUS 128 TM – Prior use of TM – Use in a particular territory – What to be established to claim prior user right –SC explains law.
4 AUTO INDUSTRIES LTD & ORS. (RESPONDENTS) ISSUE: Delhi HC refrained the respondent to use the trademarks ‘TOYOTA INNOVA’, ‘TOYOTA DEVICE’ but allowed to use
the trademark ‘Prius. Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant had challenged the decision before the Supreme Court.
JUDGEMENT: Indeed, the TM ‘Prius’ had undoubtedly acquired a great deal of goodwill in several other jurisdictions in the
world and that too much earlier to the use and registration of the same by the defendants in India. But if the territoriality
principle is to govern the matter, and we have already held it should, there must be adequate evidence to show that the
plaintiff had acquired a substantial goodwill for its car under the brand name ‘Prius’ in the Indian market also. The car itself
was introduced in the Indian market in the year 09-10. The advertisements in automobile magazines, international
business magazines; availability of data in information-disseminating portals like Wikipedia and online Britannica
dictionary and the information on the internet, even if accepted, will not be a safe basis to hold the existence of the
necessary goodwill and reputation of the product in the Indian market at the relevant point of time, particularly having
regard to the limited online exposure at that point of time.
While it may be correct that the population to whom such knowledge or info of the product should be available would be
the section of the public dealing with the product as distinguished from the general population, even proof of such
knowledge and info within the limited segment of the population is not prominent. All these should lead to us to
eventually agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench of the HC that the brand name of the car Prius had not acquired
the degree of goodwill, reputation and the market or popularity in the Indian market so as to vest in the plaintiff the
necessary attributes of the right of a prior user so as to successfully maintain an action of passing off even against the
registered owner. In any event the core of the controversy between the parties is really one of appreciation of the
evidence of the parties; an exercise that this Court would not undoubtedly repeat unless the view taken by the previous
forum is wholly and palpably unacceptable which does not appear to be so in the present premises.
If goodwill or reputation in the particular jurisdiction (in India) is not established by the plaintiff, no other issue really
would need any further examination to determine the extent of the plaintiff’s right in the action of passing off that it
had brought against the defendants in the Delhi HC.
We cannot help but also to observe that in the present case the plaintiff’s delayed approach to the Courts has remained
unexplained. Such delay cannot be allowed to work to the prejudice of the defendants who had kept on using its
registered mark to market its goods during the inordinately long period of silence maintained by the plaintiff.
3 ROYAL ORCHID HOTELS LTD. (PETITIONER) vs. 130 Copyrights Act – Earlier registration under class 16 upheld – Later classification under class 42 refused – Facts proved
5 KAMAT HOTELS (INDIA) LTD & ORS that petitioner was not able to prove that it was the prior user of the logo- High Court held accordingly – Whether
(RESPONDENTS) requires interference by the Supreme Court – Held, No.
CASE DEPENDENT ON FACTS READ THE JUDGEMENT.
3 SUNDARAM FINANCE LTD. (APPELLANT) vs. 131 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 42 – Execution of award – Whether it can be filed and executed
6 ABDUL SAMAD & ORS (RESPONDENTS) straightaway in the Court where the assets are located – Held, Yes.
ISSUE: The divergence of legal opinion of different HCs on the question as to whether an award under the A&C act is
required to be first filed in the court having jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings for execution and then to obtain
transfer of the decree or whether the award can be straightway filed and executed in the Court where the assets are
located is required to be settled in the present appeal.
JUDGEMENT: The aforesaid provision would show that an award is to be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the
said code in the same manner as if it were a decree. It is, thus, the enforcement mechanism, which is akin to the
enforcement of a decree but the award itself is not a decree of the civil court as no decree whatsoever is passed by the
civil court. It is the arbitral tribunal, which renders an award and the tribunal does not have the power of execution of a
decree. For the purposes of execution of a decree the award is to be enforced in the same manner as if it was a decree
under the said Code. The line of reasoning supporting the award to be filed in a so-called court of competent jurisdiction
and then to obtain a transfer of the decree is primarily based on the jurisdiction clause found in Section 42 of the Act. The
aforesaid provision, however, applies with respect to an application being filed in Court under Part I. The jurisdiction is
over the arbitral proceedings. The subsequent application arising from that agreement and the arbitral proceedings are to
be made in that court alone. However, what has been lost sight of is Sec 32 of the said Act , which provides for arbitral
proceedings to be terminated by the final arbitral award. Thus, when an award is already made, of which execution is
sought, the arbitral proceedings already stand terminated on the making of the final award. Thus, it is not appreciated
how Sec 42 of the said Act, which deals with the jurisdiction issue in respect of arbitral proceedings, would have any
relevance. It does appear that the provisions of the said Code and the said Act have been mixed up. So we are of the view
that the execution of the award can be filled anywhere where such decree is to be executed.

3 ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. 132 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Insurance policy – Clause stipulating disputed claim would not be referred to
7 (APPELLANT) vs. NARBHERAM POWER & STEEL arbitration – Insurer repudiating the claim – Whether referable to arbitration – Held, No.
PVT LTD. (RESPONDENT) ISSUE: the insurer and the claimant had a tussle and the claim was not settled. The insurer sent a notice
refering the matter to arbitration and called on the insurer to appoint an arbitrator. The insurer declined to
refer the disputes to arbitration. The insured moved to HC and HC appointed an arbitrator. This impugned
order is under assail by way of special leave in this appeal.
JUDGEMENT: READ THE JUDGEMENT.
EXTRACTS: It does not need special emphasis that an arbitration clause is required to be strictly construed. Any
expression in the clause must unequivocally express the intent of arbitration. It can also lay the postulate in which
situations the arbitration clause cannot be given effect to. If a clause stipulates that under certain circumstances there can
be no arbitration, and they are demonstrably clear then the controversy pertaining to the appointment of arbitrator has to
be put to rest.
3 SHYAM SUNDER AGARWAL (APPELLANT) vs. P. 133 Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 – Section 7 – Arbitration agreement – Dispute resolution clause in MoU used
8 NAROTHAM RAO (RESPONDENT) words “Mediators/Arbitrators”, “any breaches” and “decision to be final” – Whether such clause is as arbitration
“BASED OF FACTS” clause/agreement – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: when viewed as a whole, it is clear that the two escrow agents are not persons who have to decide disputes
that may arise between the parties, whether before or after the transaction is completed, after hearing the parties and
observing the principles of natural justice, in order to arrive at their decision. A reading of the MOU as a whole leaves no
manner of doubt that the said MOU only invests the two gentlemen named therein with powers as escrow agents to
smoothly implement the transaction mentioned in the MOU and not even remotely to decide the disputes between the
parties as Arbitrators. In the present case, it is clear that the wording of the Agreement, as has been held by us above, is
clearly inconsistent with the view that the Agreement intended that disputes be decided by arbitration. Indeed, 3 of the 4
purchasers did not read Clause 12 as an arbitration clause, but approached the Civil Court instead, strengthening our
conclusion that the subsequent conduct of the parties to the Agreement also showed that they understood that Clause 12
was not an arbitration clause in the Agreement.
3 M/S. NANDHINI DELUXE vs. M/S. KARNATAKA 134 Trademarks Act, 1999 – Section 11 – Similar tradenames “NANDHINI” and “NANDINI” in the same class but for different
9 COOPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION products –whether registration to be rejected – Held, No.
LTD. JUDGEMENT: Applying the aforesaid principles to the instant case, when we find that not only visual
“BASED OF FACTS” appearance of the two marks is different, they even relate to different products. Further, the manner in which
they are traded by the appellant and respondent respectively, highlighted above, it is difficult to imagine that an
average man of ordinary intelligence would associate the goods of the appellant as that of the respondent. Trade
and Merchandise Act, 1958 is equally applicable as it is unaffected by the Trade Marks Act, 1999 inasmuch as
the main object underlying the said principle is that the proprietor of a trade mark cannot enjoy monopoly over
the entire class of goods and, particularly, when he is not using the said trade mark in respect of certain goods
falling under the same class. In this behalf, we may usefully refer to Section 11 of the Act which prohibits the
registration of the mark in respect of the similar goods or different goods but the provisions of this Section do not
cover the same class of goods. It is to be kept in mind that the appellant had adopted the trade mark in respect
of items sold in its restaurants way back in the year 1989 which was soon after the respondent had started using
the trade mark ‘NANDINI’. There is no document or material produced by the respondent to show that by the
year 1989 the respondent had acquired distinctiveness in respect of this trade mark, i.e., within four years of the
adoption thereof. It, therefore, appears to be a case of concurrent user of trade mark by the appellant. As a
result, the orders of the IPAB and High Court are set aside.
4 DEEPAYAN MOHANTY (PLAINTIFF) vs. CARGILL 136 Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Agreement in restraint of trade – Cash portion of bonus paid but
0 INDIA PVT LTD. & ORS. (DEFENDANTS) retention portion refused on the ground of joining competitor’s business – Whether tenable – Held, No.
“ OTHER CASES REFERRED” ISSUE: It is the settled position, in India at least, that no employer has a right to restrain an employee from taking up
competing employment after the term of employment Such a clause is invalid and unenforceable u/s 27 of the ICA. But
what Cargill is doing in the present case is not restraining him from pursuing his competing business but refusing to
disburse the balance incentive award amount to him since he allegedly engaged in a competing business. Can such a
clause be held to be valid and enforceable?
JUDGEMENT: The answer to this question depends upon the nature of the sum being withheld. The deferred incentive is
an amount which was awarded to an employee as a reward for good performance “during the course of employment”.
The said amount is awarded in full in favour of the employee. Only the payment is postponed partially and for the
postponement of the payment, interest is also paid by Cargill to the employee. Thus, the amount belonging to the
employee is being withheld by Cargill.
If the deferment is to enforce a clause which is otherwise unenforceable, the forfeiture based on the said clause, is itself
illegal. The amount does not belong to Cargill. It belongs to the employee and Cargill is merely making the employee agree
to take the amount with interest after the period of two years. That does not mean that under the garb of paying interest,
Cargill can forfeit something on the basis of an invalid and unenforceable clause in the agreement.

4 M/S SHRIRAM EPC LIMITED (APPELLANT) vs. 138 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Ind ia Stamp Act, 1889 – Sections 48 & 49 – Enforcement
1 RIOGLASS SOLAR SA (RESPONDENT) of foreign award – Whether stamp duty on the foreign award has to be paid for enforcement – Held, No.
It will thus be seen that “award” under Item 12 of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 has remained unchanged till
date. As has been held by us hereinabove, in 1899, this “award” would refer only to a decision in writing by an arbitrator
or umpire in a reference not made by an order of the Court in the course of a suit. This would apply only to such award
made at the time in British India, and today, after the amendment of Section 1(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 by Act 43
of 1955, to awards made in the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This being the case, we are of the
view that the expression “award” has never included a foreign award from the very inception till date. Consequently, a
foreign award not being includible in Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, is not liable for stamp duty.
4 SONELL CLOCKS AND GIFTS LTD.(APPELLANT) 138 Insurance Act r/w Appointment of Surveyors Regulations – Claim lodged with delay of about 4 months – Insurer
2 vs. THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. appointed surveyor – Later insurer repudiated the claim – Whether appointment of surveyor operates as waiver against
(RESPONDENT) the insurer – Held, No.
ISSUE: the claimant intimated the insurer of the damage after 3.5 months. Insurer appointed a surveyor and later
repudiated the claim on non fulfilment of clause 6 (intimation within time)
JUDGEMENT: The fulfilment of the stipulation in Clause 6 of the general conditions of the policy is the sine qua non to
maintain a valid claim under the policy. The stipulation in condition No.6 of the policy to forthwith give notice to the
insurer is to facilitate the insurer to make a meaningful investigation into the cause of damage and nature of loss, if any
Thus, the appointment of a surveyor by the respondent after receipt of intimation of the loss from the appellant, in the
context of the present insurance policy, coupled with the 2000 Regulations and in particular an express stand taken in the
repudiation letter sent by the respondent to the appellant after consideration of the surveyor’s report, it cannot be
construed to be a case of waiver on the part of the respondent.
NOTE: It is well established position that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It must involve conscious
abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such a waiver, a party could
have enjoyed. It is an agreement not to assert a right. To invoke the principle of waiver, the person who is said to have
waived must be fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge about the same, he intentionally abandons them.
There must be a specific plea of waiver, much less of abandonment of a right by the opposite party.

4 14 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Appeal – Seat of arbitration London – Venue changed to Delhi with parties’
3 0 consent – Whether courts in Delhi have jurisdiction – Held, No.
DREDGING CORPORATION OF INDIA JUDGEMENT: I cannot not agree with the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner that in the above
(PETITIONER) vs. MERCATOR LTD
correspondence the use of word ‘venue’ by the parties has to be construed as ‘seat’. In my opinion, the parties were very
(RESPONDENT)
well aware of the distinction between the ‘seat’ and ‘venue’ and therefore, the respondent insisted that while the ‘Seat’ of
“ OTHER CASES REFERRED” arbitration shall remain at London, it is only the ‘venue’ which can be shifted to New Delhi. The petitioner also agreed to
the same as in its opinion the change of ‘venue’ would not require any amendment to the Charter Party Agreement, while
a change in seat would have required such amendment. Once the Arbitration Agreement was invoked by the respondent,
though the petitioner wanted such change, the respondent refused. This was the consistent understanding of the
petitioner itself, not only before the Arbitral Tribunal as recorded in its procedural order referred hereinabove, but also by
its conduct of filing a petition under Section 68 of the (English) Arbitration Act, 1996 before the High Court of Justice at
London.
4 141 A&C Act, 1996 – Arbitration agreement – Contract with proprietary concern “Yasikan Enterprise” – Arbitration invoked
4 by “Yasikan Enterprise Pvt Ltd” a company of the proprietor – Whether tenable – Held, No.
GOVT OF N.C.T OF DELHI (PETITIONER) vs. Delhi Iron and Steel Company Limited v. U.P. Electricity Board & Another (2002) 61 DRJ 280.
YASIKAN ENTERPRISES PVT. LTD.
(RESPONDENT) “17. So far as the arbitration clause is concerned it was held that this contract is personal in its character and
incapable of assignment on that ground. However it is a settled law that an arbitration clause does not take away
“IMPORTANT TOPIC READ THE JUDGEMENT the right of a party of a contract to assign it if it is otherwise assignable.
AGAIN AND GET MORE INFORMATION ON
‘PERSONAL CCONTRACTS’ AND ‘ASSIGNMET 18. While distinguishing between two clauses of assignment the Supreme Court observed that a right of
OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS’.” obligations under a contract cannot be assigned except with the consent of the promisee, and when such
consent is given, it is really a novation resulting in substitution of liabilities. In other words, rights under a contract
are assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature or the rights are incapable of assignment either under
the law or under an agreement between the parties.
19. As observed above the petitioner had the liability to perform all contracts of Victor Cables and all benefits
arising therefrom and liabilities thereunder in all or in any form. It does not mean that he had also the obligation
to get the dispute settled by way of arbitration as agreed by Victor Cables. These are two different and
distinguished liabilities. The former is assignable where the latter is not. Thus the undertaking by the petitioner
that “all contracts of Victor Cables Corporation and all benefits arising therefrom and liabilities thereunder in all or
in any form shall be of the petitioner” was in the form of discharging all the liabilities of the Victor Cables and
there was nothing personal about such contracts whereas clause of arbitration was personal in its character and
was even otherwise incapable of assignment.
20. In view of the foregoing reasons the unilateral reference of the alleged disputes to the respondent No.2 and
unilateral appointment of respondent No.2 as arbitrator are hereby held illegal and inoperative and set aside.
Petition is allowed.”
4 TRUSTEE, JACOBITE SYRIAN CATHEDRAL & 142 Consumer Protection Act, 1985 – Cathedral collecting money for permitting to construct family tomb- tomb destroyed
5 ANR vs. JIPPU VARKEY [NCDRC] REVISION – Whether deficiency of services liable for compensation – Held, No.
In my opinion, the grant of permission for construction of a family tomb in the cemetery of Cathredel does not amount to
rendering services within the meaning of Section 2(1) (o) of the Consumer Protection Act. At best, it is a permission
granted by a religious organization to one of its devotees. Even if some amount is charged by the religious organization
from the devotees for granting the requisite permission that would not amount to rendering services as is understood in
the context of the Consumer Protection Act. A devotee availing such a facility from the religious organization to which he
belongs cannot be said to be a consumer in terms of the Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, a consumer complaint for
redressal of the grievance of the complainant was clearly not maintainable. The view taken by the fora below in this regard
cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. the impugned orders are set aside and the complaint is consequently
dismissed, with liberty to the complainant to avail such other remedy as may be open to him in law, including approaching
a Civil Court for the redressal of his grievances.
4 Railway authorities enter into an agreement with Amit 143 Fact in Issue/Questions for Consideration
6 Service Ltd., a service providing company to engage Based on the above facts, following are the questions for the adjudication or consideration:
workers for cleaning the railway platforms in a region.
As per the agreement, the Service provider has to 1) Whether the workers are employees of Railways?
engage certain number of workers daily. The 2) Whether Railways have to reinstate them?
agreement can be renewed every year on mutual
agreement on terms. After a few years, the The facts of the case are similar to facts in the case of Airports Authority of India vs. A S Yadav & Ors. (Del) decided on
agreement is terminated. Amit Services Ltd. also 28.11.2019. Based on that decision, the questions can be answered as under:
terminates the employment of those workers. The 1) The workers have been employed only by Amit Services Ltd for a specific type of work under Railways. The contract by
workers raised an industrial dispute against Railway Railways was only with Amit Services Ltd and who will do the work is the decision of Amit Services Ltd as long as the work
 authorities as well as Amit Services Ltd. for is performed as per the contract. If Railways do not have any licence to employ contract labour, it may be actionable
reinstatement claiming that their work is perennial in against Railways under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 but it does not automatically make these
nature under Railway authorities and they worked workers direct employees of the Railways. Therefore, the workers are not direct employees of railways.
consistently in Railways though under the constant 2) For the above reasons, the question of Railways reinstating the workers does not arise. It is up to Amit Services Ltd. to
supervision of Amit Services Ltd. They also compensate the workers based on any existing agreement with them or to give them employment somewhere else.
substantiate their claim on the ground that Railways
have engaged the services of Amit Services Ltd.
without any licence required under the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) act, 1970 and
therefore they are direct employees of Railways.

SL CASE PG BRIEF
0 POONA EMPLOYEES UNION (Appellant) vs. 294 Trade Union Act, 1926 – Sec19 – Recognition of trade union – Appellant union claiming to command 85% of the
1 FORCE MOTORS LIMITED & ANR (Respondent) workforce of the co sought recognition –Existing union BKS and the co opposed – Industrial court granted recognition
 without appreciating the facts properly – Whether recognition to be accorded to the appellant union – Held, No.

0 MANAGEMENT OF THE BARARA COOPERATIVE 296 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 25H – Workman accepted the compensation in lieu of his right of reinstatement
2 MARKETING-CUM PROCESSING SOCIETY LTD. in service – Later workman seeking reemployment – Whether tenable – Held, No.
(Appellant) vs. WORKMAN PRATAP SINGH
(Respondent)

0 EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION 297 ESI Act, 1948 – Section 2 – Director – Whether an employee – Held, Yes.
3 (Appellant) vs. VENUS ALLOY PVT. LTD.
(Respondent)

0 DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION (Appellant) 298 Industrial dispute – Conductor dismissed from service – Labour court directed to reinstate him with service continuity
4 vs. SATNARAIN (Respondent) and consequential benefits – Employer reinstated the workman but did not pay the benefits – Whether tenable – Held,
No.

0 CENTRAL BOARD OF TRUSTEES (Appellant) vs. 299 Employees Provident funds and miscellaneous Provisions Act,1952 – Section 7A – Scope of enquiry – Employees
5 STANDING CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC employed through contractors – Liability of principal employer – No examination of contractors during the enquiry –
ENTERPRISES (Respondent) Whether determination of liability tenable – Held, No.

0 THE REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND 301 EPF Act – Definition of basic wages – Special allowances – Whether becoming part of basic wages – Held, Yes.
6 COMMISSIONER (Appellant) vs. VIVEKANANDA
VIDYAMANDIR & ORS (Respondent)

0 MODERN TRANSPORTATION CONSULTATION 303 EPF Act – Section 2(f) – Excluded employee – Employees retiring from Railways – Withdrawing their accumulated
7 SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. (Appellant) vs. contribution – Joined another establishment – Whether to be treated as excluded employee – Held, No.
C.P.F. COMMISSIONER (Respondent)

0 DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION (Appellant) 305 Employee dismissed for causing accident – Admitted his guilt and paid compensation in the criminal court – Tribunal
8 vs. JASBIR SINGH (Respondent) directing reinstatement with 50% back wages – Whether correct as to reinstatement – Held, Yes. Whether correct as to
50% back wages – Held, No.

0 GLOBE GROUND INDIA EMPLOYEES UNION 305 Industrial Disputes Act,1947 – Section 10 – Employees of subsidiary company raised dispute over retrenchment –
9 (Appellant) vs. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES Impleadment of the holding company sought – Whether permissible – Held, No.
& ANR (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: Whenever, an application is filed in the adjudication proceedings, either before the Industrial Tribunal in a
reference made under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other legal proceedings, for impleadment of a party who is
not a party to the proceedings, what is required to be considered is whether such party which is sought to be impleaded is
either necessary or proper party to decide the lis. The expressions “necessary” or “proper” parties have been considered
time and again and explained in several decisions. The two expressions have separate and different connotations. It is
fairly well settled that necessary party, is one without whom no order can be made effectively. Similarly, a proper party is
one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for complete and final decision on
the question involved in the proceedings. Further, we are of the view that even in a subsidiary company which is an
independent corporate entity, if any other company is holding shares, by itself is no ground to order impleadment of
parent company per se. In the case at hand, it is clear that the second respondent itself is a company in which the
subsidiary of the first respondent, namely, Globe Ground Deutschland GmbH, was holding 51% shares and 49% shares
were held by the Bird Group. As per the case of the appellant, the Bird Group has floated another company and started
handling services from the month of January, 2009 by uitlizing the same equipments and vehicles belonging to the second
respondent. Further, having regard to limited scope of adjudication, to answer the reference, which is circumscribed by
Section 10(4) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, we are of the view that the first respondent is neither necessary nor
proper party, to answer the reference by the Industrial Court.
1 THE STATE BANK OF INDIA & ORS. Supreme 307 Banking service – Messenger – Convicted for assault and later discharged on probation – Dismissed from service for
0 (Appellant) vs.P. SOUPRAMANIANE moral turpitude – Whether tenable – Held, No. What is moral turpitude-explained.
(Respondent) JUDGEMENT: It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is
different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral
turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an
offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the
victims.
1 REGIONAL MANAGER, U.P.S.R.T.C. & ANR 308 Superannuation of employees – Initially employed in category D – Retirement age 60 years – Subsequently placed in
1 (Appellant) vs. MASLAHUDDIN (DEAD) category C with retrospective effect – Retirement age 58 years – Accordingly retired at 58 years – Employees claimed
(Respondent) they are entitled service up to 60 years – Whether tenable – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: In view of the above, both the Labour Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in
holding that the respective respondents Drivers were in Group “D” category and that their age of superannuation would
be 60 years. As the pay scale of the respective respondents Drivers was revised to Rs.335 with retrospective effect and in
fact they were paid the arrears also, thereafter it was not open for the respondents Drivers to contend that as per their
original pay scale, their salary was less than Rs.200/-, they would be in Group “D” category. Once having taken the
advantage of the revised pay scale retrospectively and that their pay scale was revised to Rs. 335 /- with retrospective
effect and they were paid the arrears which the respective respondents accepted, in that case, they would fall in Group
“C” category and, therefore, considering the Rules, their age of superannuation would be 58 years and not 60 years, as
contended on behalf of the respective respondents Drivers. Therefore, the appellant Corporation rightly
retired/superannuated the respective respondent Drivers on completion of 58 years of age.
1 EMPLOYEE STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION ESI Act – Section 85 – Inspection of establishment – Respondent establishment was not covered under the Act-
2 (Appellant) vs. BATRA HOSPITAL & MEDICAL 309 respondent establishment refused to produce records for inspection – Whether could be prosecuted – Held,No.
RESEARCH CENTRE & ORS (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: Srinivasa Rice Mills v ESI Corporation - As noticed hereinbefore, inspection of the factories was carried out
prior to the date of coming into force of the Act. Such inspections, thus, could have been carried out only in terms of the
provisions contained in Section 45 of the Act, which could mean that the Inspector would be appointed for the purpose of
the Act. He is authorized under the Act to enquire into the correctness of any of the particulars stated in any return
referred to in Section 44 or for the purpose of ascertaining whether any of the provisions has been complied with. It is,
therefore, evident that any action taken prior to or in furtherance of a report made on an inspection, prior to coming into
force of the Act, would be ultra virus Section 45(2) of the Act. Once the inspection is held to be illegal, Respondent could
not have taken any statutory action for imposition of penalty.”
1 NANDRAM (Appellant) vs. GARWARE POLYSTER 310 Industrial Disputes Act, 1954 –Company having registered office at Aurangabad –Workman appointed in Aurangabad
3 LTD. (Respondent) and later transferred to Pondicherry –Pondicherry establishment closed –Workman was terminated –Workman raised
dispute and filed complaint at Aurangabad – Rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction –Whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: The decision to terminate the appellant having been taken at Aurangabad necessarily part of the cause of
action has arisen at Aurangabad. We have no quarrel that Labour Court, Pondicherry is within its jurisdiction to consider
the case of the appellant, since he has been terminated while he was working at Pondicherry. But that does not mean that
Labour Court in Aurangabad within whose jurisdiction the Management is situated and where the Management has taken
the decision to close down the unit at Pondicherry and pursuant to which the appellant was terminated from service also
does not have the jurisdiction. In the facts of this case both the Labour Courts have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
1 JAYA BISWAL & ORS (Appellant) vs. BRANCH 311 Employees Compensation Act, 1923 – Truck driver died due to accident while on proceeding to deliver the goods on the
4 MANAGER, IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE way – Whether accident arose in the course of employment – Held, yes.
COMPANY LTD & ANR (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: The E.C. Act is a welfare legislation enacted to secure compensation to the poor workmen who suffer from
injuries at their place of work. the E.C. Act is a social welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependents
in case of death of workman due to accident caused during and in the course of employment should be construed as such.
In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal
connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in course of employment. The learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has also rightly placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of
Mackinnon Mackenzie (supra). In the facts of the instant case, the deceased was on his way to deliver goods during the
course of employment when he met with the accident. The act to get back onto the moving truck was just an attempt to
regain control of the truck, which given the situation, any reasonable person would have tried to do so. The accident, thus,
fairly and squarely arose out of and in the course of his employment. The next contention which needs to be dispelled is
that the appellants are not entitled to any compensation because the deceased died as a result of his own negligence. We
are unable to agree with the same. Section 3 of the E.C. Act does not create any exception of the kind, which permits the
employer to avoid his liability if there was negligence on part of the workman. The E.C. Act does not envisage a situation
where the compensation payable to an injured or deceased workman can be reduced on account of contributory
negligence. It has been held by various High Courts that mere negligence does not disentitle a workman to compensation.
In the light of the well-reasoned and elaborate order of award of compensation, the High Court could not have reduced
the compensation amount by more than half by merely mentioning that it is in the ‘interest of justice’. It was upon the
High Court to explain how exactly depriving the poor appellants, who have already lost their elder son, of the rightful
compensation would serve the ends of justice.
1 ESIC (Appellant) vs. A.K. ABDUL SAMAD & ANR 313 Employees State Insurance Corporation Act – Section 85 – Prosecution- punishment of 6 months imprisonment and a
5 (Respondent) fine of Rs.5,000/- whether the quantum of the fine could be reduced – Held, No.
ISSUE: statutory provision prescribes punishment for a particular offence as imprisonment which shall not be less than 6
months and the convict shall also be liable to fine of rs 5000. The proviso however empowers the court that it may, “for
any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a lesser term.”
The question to be answered is whether the court has been given judicial discretion only to reduce the sentence of
imprisonment for any term lesser than 6 months or whether it also has discretion to levy no fine or a fine of less than 5000
JUDGEMENT: The object of creating offence and penalty under the ESI Act, 1948 is clearly to create deterrence against
violation of provisions of the Act which are beneficial for the employees. Non-payment of contributions is an economic
offence and therefore the Legislature has not only fixed a min term of imprisonment but also a fixed amount of fine of Rs.
5000 u/s 85(a) (i) (b) of the Act. There is no discretion of awarding less than the specified fee, under the main provision. It
is only the proviso which is in the nature of an exception where under the court is vested with discretion limited to
imposition of imprisonment for a lesser term. Conspicuously, no words are found in the proviso for imposing a lesser fine
than that of Rs. 5000. In such a situation the intention of the Legislature is clear and brooks no interpretation . The law is
well settled that when the wordings of the Stature are clear, no interpretation is required unless there is a requirement
of saving the provisions from vice of unconstitutionality or absurdity. Neither of the twin situations is attracted herein.
1 ROYAL WESTERN INDIA TURF CLUB LTD 315 ESI Act– Sec 2(9) – Casual workers engaged by race club – Whether they are covered under the scheme – Held, Yes.
6 (Appellant) vs. E.S.I.C & ORS (Respondent) ISSUE: Are casual workers are covered under definition of employee as defined in Section 2(9) of ESI Act, 1948.
JUDGEMENT: First we take up the question whether casual employees are covered within the purview of ESI Act. The
definition of “employee” is very wide. A person who is employed for wages in the factory or establishment on any work of,
or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work is covered. The definition brings various types of employees
within its ken. The Act is a welfare legislation and is required to be interpreted so as to ensure extension of benefits to the
employees and not to deprive them of the same which are available under the Act.
A bare reading of the provisions of Sections 2(22) and 2(23) dealing with wages and wage period makes it clear that it
would cover the “casual employees” employed for a few days on a work of perennial nature and wages as defined in
section 2(22) and wage period as defined in section 2(23) does not exclude the wages payable to casual workers. They
cannot be deprived of the beneficial provisions of the Act.
This Court in Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Madras v. South India Flour Mills (P) Ltd, AIR 1986
SC 1686 has held that Section 39(4) and Section 42(3) clearly envisage the case of casual employees. In other words, it is
the intention of the Legislature that the casual employees should also be brought within the purview of the Act.
1 TAMILNADU TERMINATED FULL TIME 315 LIC directed to pay backwages and compensation to all badly workmen whose services were terminated in 1988.
7 TEMPORARY LIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION JUDGEMENT: the appealent pleaded that if the orders of the HC were to be implemented it would be a huge financial
(Appellant) vs. S.K. ROY, THE CHAIRMAN, LIC burden on them and would not be in the interests of the policy holders. The SC in order to meet the ends of justice
(Respondent) reduced the back wages by 50% in the revision judgement.

1 PEPSU ROADWAYS TRANSPORT CORPORATION 316 Transfer of employees from PEPSU roadways PEPSU corporation – Workmen retired after taking all retiral benefits in
8 (Appellant) vs. S.K. SHARMA & ORS 1991 – Pension scheme revised in 1992 – Retired workmen claimed benefits under the pension scheme also – Whether
(Respondent) tenable – Held, No.
“READ THE JUDGEMENT AGAIN”

1 INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION & INVESTMENT 318 Insurance law – Claim against theft and burglary – No forcible house breaking – Whether compensation is payable –
9 CORPORATION OF ORISSA LTD (Appellant) Vs. Held, No.
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD & ANR JUDGEMENT: It is clear from the facts of the present case that the Appellant has made out a case of theft without a
(Respondent) forcible entry. The case of the Appellant is that forcible entry is not required for a claim to be made under the policy.
Following the well- accepted principle that a contract of insurance which is like any other commercial contract should be
interpreted strictly, we are of the opinion that the policy covers loss or damage by burglary or house breaking which have
been explained as theft following an actual, forcible and violent entry from the premises. A plain reading of the policy
would show that a forcible entry should precede the theft, and unless they are proved, the claim cannot be accepted. It is
well-settled law that there is no difference between a contract of insurance and any other contract, and that it should be
construed strictly without adding or deleting anything from the terms thereof. On applying the said principle, we have no
doubt that a forcible entry is required for a claim to be allowed under the policy for burglary/house breaking. This court in
General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain and Anr., held that there is no difference between a contract of
insurance and any other contract except that in a contract of insurance there is a requirement of uberima fides, i.e.,
 good faith on the part of the insured and the contract is likely to be construed contra proferentes, i.e., against the
company in case of ambiguity or doubt. It was further held in the said judgment that the duty of the Court is to interpret
the words in which the contract is expressed by the parties and it is not for the Court to make a new contract, however
reasonable.
2 ELECTROTHEM (INDIA) LTD (Appellant) vs. 319 Environment laws - projects – Environment clearance – Clearance certificate issued without holding public hearing –
0 PATEL VIPULKUMAR RAMJIBHAI & ORS Whether tenable – SC directs of post – Clearance public hearing.
(Respondent) ISSUE: Clearance certificate issued without holding public hearing, on a PIL, HC directed to stop the project and shut it
“ READ THE JUDGEMENT AS IT IS BASED down till clearence is obtained afresh. This impugned order is being challenged. The only question for the consideration
PARTLY OF FACTS “ of the court was whether the Environmental Clearance dated 27.1.2010 can be termed as illegal in the absence of public
consultation or public hearing as mandatorily provided by Notifications dated 2006.
“ CASE RELATES TO CLEARENCE WITH REGARDS TO JUDGEMENT: the case of Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited - T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India and
SUBSTATIAL EXPANSION COMPARED TO THE PRE Others 2011 (7) SCC 338, public consultation/public hearing was considered and found to be mandatory requirement of
SANCTIONED CLEARANCE “ the Environmental Clearance process by this Court. In terms of the principles as laid down by this Court in the case of
Lafarge (supra), we find that the decision making process in doing away with or in granting exemption from public
consultation/public hearing, was not based on correct principles and as such the decision was invalid and improper. At the
same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that in pursuance of Environmental Clearance dated 27.01.2010, the expansion
of the project has been undertaken and as reported by CPCB in its affidavit filed on 07.07.2014, most of the
recommendations made by CPCB are complied with. In our considered view, the interest of justice would be sub-served if
that part of the decision exempting public consultation/public hearing is set aside and the matter is relegated back to the
concerned Authorities to effectuate public consultation/public hearing. However, since the expansion has been
undertaken and the industry has been functioning, we do not deem it appropriate to order closure of the entire plant as
directed by the High Court. If the public consultation/public hearing results in a negative mandate against the expansion of
the project, the Authorities would do well to direct and ensure scaling down of the activities to the level that was
permitted by Environmental Clearance dated 20.02.2008. If public consultation/public hearing reflects in favour of the
expansion of the project, Environmental Clearance dated 27.01.2010 would hold good and be fully operative. In other
words, at this length of time when the expansion has already been undertaken, in the peculiar facts of this case and in
order to meet ends of justice, we deem it appropriate to change the nature of requirement of public consultation/public
hearing from pre- decisional to post-decisional.
2 GEN SECRETARY, COAL WASHERIES WORKERS 321 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Industrial tribunal awards reinstatement and back wages – High court allows lump sum
1 UNION, DHANBAD (Appellant) vs. EMPLOYERS IN 258 compensation and rejects reinstatement whether correct – Held, Yes
RELATION TO MANAGEMENT OF DUGDA “ CASE APPEARS TO BE BASED OF FACT AS NO LEGAL PRINCIPLE COULD BE DEDUCED FROM THE READING”
WASHERY OF M/s.BCCL (Respondent) “ READ AGAIN AND FILL THIS PART”

2 DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION (Appellant) 322 Dismissal of workman on the ground of unauthorised absenteeism – Whether dismissal tenable – Held, Yes.
2 vs. RAJENDER KUMAR (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: The position of law is well settled in the case of DTC v. Sardar Singh, the Supreme Court has held that when
an employee absents himself from duty, even without sanctioned leave for a very long period, it prima facie shows lack of
interest in work. Para 19(h) of the Standing Orders relates to habitual negligence of duties and lack of interest in the
Authority’s work. When an employee absents himself from duty without sanctioned leave the Authority can, on the basis
of the record, come to a conclusion about the employee being habitually negligent in duties and has exhibited lack of
interest in the employer’s work. Conclusion regarding negligence and lack of interest can be arrived at by looking into the
period of absence, more particularly, when the same is unauthorized. It also held that an order passed treating absence as
leave without pay after passing an order of termination is only for the purpose of maintaining correct record of service.
On a perusal of para 4 of the Standing Orders, it is clear, that it shows the seriousness attached to habitual absence. Clause
(i) shows, there is a requirement for prior permission. Non-observance of clause (i) renders the absence unauthorized.
Further, the position of law with regard to Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is very clear, inasmuch as the
Labour Court may interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded by the employer but ordinarily discretion exercised
by employer should not be interfered with. It is not a case where the penalty of removal is unjustified. The Labour Court
could not have set aside the order of removal. Conclusions regarding negligence and lack of interest can be arrived at by
looking into the period of absence, more particularly, when same is unauthorized. Burden is on the employee who claims
that there was no negligence and/or lack of interest to establish it by placing relevant materials.

2 M/S SILVER TOUCH ENTERPRISES (Appellant) 324 Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 – Retired workman dies in the employers premises – Commissioner awards
3 vs. RADHA SHARMA & ANR (Respondent) compensation – Whether tenable – Held, No.
Remanded for fresh adjudication

2 JORSINGH GOVIND VANJARI (Appellant) vs. 324 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Dismissal of workman – Superannuation before the announcement of the award –
4 DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER MAHARASHTRA Labour court awarded all service benefits and 50% of back wages in lieu of reinstatement – High Court modified the
STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION award by allowing only 50% of the back wages – Whether tenable – Held, No.
(Respondent) JUDGEMENT: Heard Learned Counsel appearing on both sides. On facts, it is clear that the High Court has gone wrong in
holding that the Labour Court did not follow the procedure. It is seen from the award that the management had not
sought for an opportunity for leading evidence. And despite granting an opportunity, no evidence was adduced after the
Labour Court held that the findings of the inquiry officer were perverse. Therefore, the Labour Court cannot be faulted for
answering the Reference in favour of the appellant. The Labour Court, on the available materials on record, found that the
termination was unjustified on the basis of a perverse finding entered by the inquiry officer. There was no attempt on the
part of the management before the Labour Court to establish otherwise. It appears that the High Court itself has granted
compensation since the Court felt that the termination was unjustified and since reinstatement was not possible on
account of superannuation. In case, the High Court was of the view that termination was justified, it could not have
ordered for payment of any compensation. In order to deny gratuity to an employee, it is not enough that the alleged
misconduct of the employee constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude as per the report of the domestic inquiry.
There must be termination on account of the alleged misconduct, which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude.
2 LANCO ANPARA POWER LTD (Appellant) vs. 325 Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and Buildings
5 STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS And Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 read with Factories Act, 1948 – Construction of factory building
(Respondent) – Whether the provisions of BOCW Act are applicable – Held, Yes.
ISSUE: The appellants had submitted that Section 2(d) of the BOCW Act which defines ‘building or other construction work’
specifically states that it does not include any building or construction work to which the provision of the Factories Act,
1948 or the Mines Act, 1952 apply. Since the appellants stood registered under the Factories Act, they were not covered
by the definition of building or other construction work as contained in Section 2(d) of the Act and, therefore, said Act was
not applicable to them by virtue of Section 1(4) thereof. All the High Courts have negated the aforesaid plea of the
appellants on the ground that the appellants would not be covered by the definition of factory defined under Section 2(m)
of the Factories Act in the absence of any operations/ manufacturing process and, therefore, mere obtaining a licence
under Section 6 of the Factories Act would not suffice and rescue them from their liability to pay cess under the Welfare
Cess Act. This is, in nutshell, the subject matter of all these appeals.
 JUDGEMENT: On the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions [s.2(m) “factory”, s.2(k) “manufacturing process” & 2(l)
“worker”], it becomes clear that “factory” is that establishment where manufacturing process is carried on with or without
the aid of power. Carrying on this manufacturing process or manufacturing activity is thus a prerequisite. It is equally
pertinent to note that it covers only those workers who are engaged in the said manufacturing process. Insofar as these
appellants are concerned, construction of building is not their business activity or manufacturing process. In fact, the
building is being constructed for carrying out the particular manufacturing process, which, in most of these appeals, is
generation, transmission and distribution of power. Obviously, the workers who are engaged in construction of the
building also do not fall within the definition of ‘worker’ under the Factories Act. It is not in dispute that construction of
the projects of the appellants is covered by the definition of “building or other construction work” as it satisfies first two
elements of the definition pointed out above. In order to see whether exclusion clause applies, we need to interpret the
words ‘but does not include any building or other construction work to which the provisions of the Factories Act ….........
apply’. The question is as to whether the provisions of the Factories Act apply to the construction of building/project of the
appellants. We are of the firm opinion that they do not apply. The provisions of the Factories Act would “apply” only when
the manufacturing process starts for which the building/project is being constructed and not to the activity of construction
of the project. That is how the exclusion clause is to be interpreted and that would be the plain meaning of the said clause.
This meaning to the exclusion clause ascribed by us is in tune with the approach adopted by this Court in Organo Chemical
Industries v. UOI. The aforesaid meaning attributed to the exclusion clause of the definition is also in consonance with the
objective and purpose which is sought to be achieved by the enactment of BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act. As pointed out
above, if the construction of this provision as suggested by the appellants is accepted, the construction workers who are
engaged in the construction of buildings/projects will neither get the benefit of the Factories Act nor of BOCW Act/Welfare
Cess Act. That could not have been the intention of the Legislature. BOCW Act and Welfare Cess Act are pieces of social
security legislation to provide for certain benefits to the construction workers.
2 THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA 328 Employee furnishing a forged certificate as to higher qualification – Drawn additional emoluments on the basis of the
6 (Appellant) Vs. SMITA SHARAD DESHMUKH & forged certificate – Management after conducting disciplinary proceedings dismissed the employee - Labour tribunal
ANR (Respondent) confirmed the dismissal – High court set aside the dismissal - Whether correct – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: The only ground on which the HC interfered with the award was that the Management had not established,
by leading evidence, that the employee was aware of the fact that the certificate produced before the Management was
forged. We find it difficult to appreciate the strange stand taken by the High Court. The Labour Court had clearly analysed
the entire evidence and had come to the conclusion that the employee was fully aware of the forgery. It is a well-settled
principle that the High Court will not re-appreciate the evidence but will only see whether there is evidence in support of
the impugned conclusion. The court has to take the evidence as it stands and its only limited jurisdiction is to examine,
whether on the evidence, the conclusion could have been arrived at. Though learned counsel for the employee made a
persuasive attempt for modification of punishment on the ground of disproportionality, in view of the conduct of the
employee which we have referred to above, we are not inclined to take a different view from that taken by the Disciplinary
Authority
2 ALL ESCORTS EMPLOYEES UNION (Appellant) 329 Trade Union Act – Amendment of membership clause to include workmen working in other industry – Whether
7 vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA (Respondent) permissible – Held, No.
“PECULIER CASE READ THE JUDGEMENT AGAIN”

2 EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION 330 ESI Act – Wages – Interim wages paid to employees – No contribution was made on this – Whether interim wages
8 (Appellant) vs. MANGALAM PUBLICATIONS included in the term ‘wages’ under the Act – Held, Yes.
(INDIA) PVT. LTD (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: A plain reading of the definition of Section 2(22) of the ESI Act makes it amply clear that “wages” means all
remuneration paid or payable in cash to an employee, if the terms of the contract of the employment, expressed or
implied, were fulfilled and includes other additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months. But
payments made on certain contingencies under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(22) of the ESI Act, do not fall within the
definition of “wages”. The interim relief paid to the employees of the respondent in the matter on hand, as mentioned
supra, will definitely not fall within the excluded part of clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(22) of the ESI Act, inasmuch as such
payment is not travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession, contribution paid by the employer to any
pension fund or provident fund; sum paid to an employee to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his
employment; or any gratuity payable on discharge. The inclusive part and exclusive portion of the definition of “wages”
clearly indicate that the expression “wages” has been given wider meaning. As mentioned supra, under the definition,
firstly whatever remuneration is paid or payable to an employee under the terms of the contract of the employment,
expressed or implied, is “wages”. Secondly, whatever payment is made to an employee in respect of any period of
authorized leave, lock-out etc. is “wages”. Thirdly, other additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding
two months is also “wages”. Any ambiguous expression, according to us, should be given a beneficent construction in
favour of employees by the Court. If the definition of “wages” is read in its entirety including the inclusive part as well as
the exclusive portion, it appears that inclusive portion is not intended to be limited only of items mentioned therein,
particularly, having regard to the objects and reasons for which the Employees’ State Insurance Act is enacted.
HC has strangely observed that the interim relief paid for the period from 01.04.1996 to 31.03.2000 can only be treated as
“ex-gratia payment” paid by the employer to its employees and cannot be treated as “wages” for the purpose of ESI
contribution. In our considered opinion, the HC has ignored to appreciate that the effect of ESI Act enacted by the
Parliament cannot be circumvented by the department office memorandum. HC has also failed to appreciate that the
payment of interim relief/wages emanates from the provisions contained in terms of the settlement, which forms part of
the contract of employment and forms the ingredients of “wages” as defined u/s 2(22) of the ESI Act and that the
respondent paid interim relief, as per a scheme voluntarily promulgated by it as per the notification dated 20.04.1996,
issued by the GOI, in view of the recommendations of “Manisana’ Wage Board, pending revision of rates of wages. It was
not an ex-gratia payment. The interim relief paid by the respondent to its employees is not a “gift” or “inam”,
3 UTTARAKHAND TRANSPORT CORPORATION & Industrial Disputes Act – Dismissal of employee – Misappropriation charges – Driver in connivance with conductor
0 ORS. (Appellant) vs. SUKHVEER SINGH allowed passengers to travel without tickets – Whether dismissal is too harsh – Held, No.
(Respondent) JUDGEMENT: The award of the labour court was set aside by the High Court on the sole ground that non-supply of the
“ READ THE CASE IF POSSIBLE” inquiry report prior to the show cause notice vitiated the disciplinary proceedings
It is clear from the above that mere non-supply of the inquiry report does not automatically warrant re-instatement of the
delinquent employee. It is incumbent upon on the delinquent employee to plead and prove that he suffered a serious
prejudice due to the non-supply of the inquiry report. We have examined the writ petition filed by the Respondent and we
find no pleading regarding any prejudice caused to the Respondent by the non-supply of the inquiry report prior to the
issuance of the show cause notice. The Respondent had ample opportunity to submit his version after perusing the report
of the inquiry officer. The Respondent utilised the opportunity of placing his response to the inquiry report before the
disciplinary authority. The High Court committed an error in allowing the writ petition filed by the Respondent without
examining whether any prejudice was caused to the delinquent employee by the supply of the inquiry officer’s report
along with the show cause notice. We are satisfied that there was no prejudice caused to the respondent by the supply of
the report of the inquiry officer along with the show cause notice. Hence, no useful purpose will be served by a remand to
the court below to examine the point of prejudice.
3 P. KARUPPAIAH (D) THROUGH LRS. (Appellant) 333 Industrial Disputes Act – Dismissal of employee – Reinstatement allowed but back wages was not allowed – Whether
1 vs. GENERAL MANAGER, THIRIUVALLUVAR entitled for back wages also – Held, No.
TRANSPORT CORPORATION (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: The law on the question of award of back wages has taken some shift. It is now ruled in cases that when the
“ READ THE CASE” dismissal/removal order is set aside/withdrawn by the Courts or otherwise, as the case may be, directing employee’s
reinstatement in service, the employee does not become entitled to claim back wages as of right unless the order of
reinstatement itself in express terms directs payment of back wages and other benefits. (See M.P. State Electricity Board
vs. Jarina Bee, (2003) 6 SCC 141)
3 NATIONAL KAMGAR UNION (Appellant) vs. KRAN 334 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947– Closure of undertaking – Tribunal on the basis of evidence held that there were less than
2 RADER PVT LTD & ORS. (Respondent 100 workers – High Court affirmed the said finding – Whether requires any interference – Held, No.

3 BATRA HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION 336 Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 – Exemption from coverage – Charitable institution running hospital – Whether entitled for
3 (Appellant) vs. BATRA HOSPITAL & MEDICAL exemption – Held, No.
RESEARCH (Respondent)

3 THAI AIRWAYS INTERNATIONAL LTD (Appellant) 337 Payment of Gratuity Act – Section 7 – Controlling authority directing payment of gratuity – Whether could be challenged
4 vs. GURVINDER SINGH (Respondent) under writ jurisdiction – Held, No.
JUDGEMENT: Transport & Dock Workers Union vs. Mumbai Port Trust – In our opinion the writ petition filed by the
appellants should have been dismissed by the HC on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial
Disputes Act. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be
exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy
available to the appellants by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the HC entertained the
writ petition. It seems to us that some HC by adopting an over liberal approach are unnecessarily adding to their load of
arrears instead of observing judicial discipline in following settled legal principles.
3 PARADEEP PHOSPHATES Supreme 338 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947– Section 9A – Certified standing orders provided retirement age as 58 years –
5 LIMITED(Appellant) vs. STATE OF Management enhanced the same to 60 and later reduced to 58 – Whether violates change of working conditions
ORISSA & ORS (Respondent) provision – Held, Yes.
JUDGEMENT: No doubt, the enhancement of the superannuation age was temporary in nature in order to achieve certain
objectives and also it is not deniable that yet employees would be governed by the Service Rules and the Certified
Standing Orders which were not amended. However, if we allow the plea of the appellant-Company then it would defeat
the object of legislature because legislature could never have intended that employees would be condemned without
giving them right of reasonable hearing. Naturally, every employee is under the expectation that before reducing his
superannuation age, he would be given a proper chance to be heard. Right to work is a vital right of every employee and in
our view, it shall not be taken away without giving reasonable opportunity of being heard otherwise it would be an act of
violation of the Constitutional mandate.
3 DTC SECURITY STAFF UNION (REGD). 339 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947– Public transport corporation – Pay scale of security staff – Should be at par with Delhi
6 (Appellant) vs. DTC & ANR (Respondent) police force – Held, No.
Merely because the pay scale may have been and remained the same, it cannot lead to the conclusion of a conscious
parity on the principle of equal pay for equal work so as to make it discriminatory and a ground for grant of parity to
Assistant Security Officer, Security Havildar and Security Guard also. It is not in dispute that the pay scale of the employees
of the corporation, including the security cadre, have been revised from time to time in accordance with the
recommendations of 4th, 5th, 6th Pay Commission and now the 7 th Pay Commission. There is no material on record that the
appellant at any time filed any objection or raised issues for grant of appropriate pay scale either before the 4 th Pay
Commission or the successive Commissions. If the award of the Tribunal is to be implemented today, it will create a highly
anomalous position in the Corporation, and c=shall lead to serious complications with regard to the issues of pay scale vis-
a-vis recommendations of the Pay Commission and would generate further heartburn and related problems vis-à-vis other
employees of the Corporation.
3 CHENNAI PORT TRUST (Appellant) vs. The 340 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Demand for regularisation of canteen employees- whether allowable – Held, Yes.
7 Chennai Port Trust Industrial EMPLOYEES JUDGEMENT: In our considered view, the Writ Court (Single Judge) and the Division Bench were right in their reasoning
CANTEEN WORKERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION & and the conclusion. The Division Bench, in our opinion, rightly relied upon the decision of this Court in Indian
ORS. (Respondent) Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs Shramik Sena & Ors (1999) 6 SCC 439 and compared the facts of the above case
with that of the case at hand and found great similarities in both for granting relief to the members of the respondent
(Association). if on the undisputed facts, this Court has granted benefit to the canteen workers in the case of Indian
Petrochemicals (supra) then there is no reason that on the same set of undisputed facts arising in this case, the Court
should not grant the benefit to the employees/workers in this case. It is more so when no distinguishable facts are pointed
out in this case qua Indian Petrochemical’s case (supra).
3 ANSAL PROPERTIES & INDUSTRIES LTD 341 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(2)-
8 (Appellant) vs. NEELAM BHUTANI (Respondent) READ THE JUDGEMENT AGAIN

3 M/S. G4S FACILITY SERVICES INDIA PVT LTD 343 Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,1952 – Section 7A & 7O – Determination of contributions –
9 (Appellant) vs. REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND Appeal against – Tribunal directed pre-deposit of 50% of the demand – Whether untenable – Held, No.
COMMISSIONER-I (Respondent) JUDGEMENT: What the appellant complains however, is that the relief should have been not confined to 50% waiver, but
of the whole amount. Now, while it may be justified in so urging, there ought to be exceptional and compelling reasons for
an appellate court (in a third guessing jurisdiction, so to speak) exercising appeal powers over a writ court’s order (in
respect of an interim order of the tribunal) to hold that such determination is unreasonable. In other words, the threshold
of interference in appeals over writ determinations of interim orders is necessarily very high. Keeping in mind the
 limitations spelt out above, the court nevertheless scrutinized the order of the EPFC. That official not only considered
these specific contentions in the light of the materials, but analyzed them in the light of the amounts charged from the
appellant’s clients, by it. Given all these factors, this court is of the opinion that the order of the tribunal cannot be
characterized as unreasonable or erroneous to such extent as to be interfered with in judicial review.
4 MAHENDRA SINGH (Appellant) vs. DELHI POWER 344 Prevention of Corruption Act – Dismissal of employee on the charges of accepting bribe – Whether the punishment of
0 SUPPLY CO. LTD. (Respondent) dismissal is proportionate to the offence – Held, Yes.
JUDGEMENT: The petitioner having been proved to have taken, from Sushil Bansal, bribe of at least ₹ 5,000/-, it is not
possible to say that, in dismissing him from service, the disciplinary authority was unduly harsh. In view of the above
discussion and findings, this Court must necessarily refuse succour, to the petitioner, from the rigour of the impugned
order dated 15th June, 2002, dismissing him from the service of the respondent. Consequently, the writ petition is
dismissed.
4 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, PWD & ORS (Appellant) 345 Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 – Injury to contract labour – Permanent disablement – Whether principal employer
1 vs. COMMISSIONER WORKMEN’S is liable to pay compensation – Held, Yes.
COMPENSATION (Respondent) “ READ THE JUDGEMENT”

4 FEDERATION OF OKHLA INDUSTRIAL 346 Minimum Wages Act, – Section 5 – Power to fix minimum wages – Delhi Government revised minimum wages by
2 ASSOCIATION (REGD) & ORS (Appellant) Vs. Lt. notification in 2016 – On appeal revision of minimum wages quashed.
GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ANR (Respondent) “ BASED COMPLETELY ON FACTS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE, COMMON LAW & CONSTITUTIONAL LAW “
“READ THE JUDGEMENT”

4 UNION BANK OF INDIA (Appellant) vs. C.G. AJAY 348 Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Dismissal from services for misconduct – Forfeiture of gratuity– Whether automatic on
3 BABU (Respondent) dismissal – Held, No.
“ OTHER CASES REFFERED” ISSUE: Whether forfeiture of gratuity is automatic on dismissal?
JUDGEMENT: It is not the conduct of a person involving moral turpitude that is required for forfeiture of gratuity but the
conduct or the act should constitute an offence involving moral turpitude. To be an offence, the act should be made
punishable under law. That is absolutely in the realm of criminal law. It is not for the Bank to decide whether an offence
has been committed. It is for the court. Apart from the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the appellant- Bank, the Bank
has not set the criminal law in motion either by registering an FIR or by filing a criminal complaint so as to establish that
the misconduct leading to dismissal is an offence involving moral turpitude. Under sub-Section (6)(b)(ii) of the Act,
forfeiture of gratuity is permissible only if the termination of an employee is for any misconduct which constitutes an
offence involving moral turpitude, and convicted accordingly by a court of competent jurisdiction. At the risk of
redundancy, we may state that the requirement of the statute is not the proof of misconduct of acts involving moral
turpitude but the acts should constitute an offence involving moral turpitude and such offence should be duly established
in a court of law. That the Act must prevail over the Rules on Payment of Gratuity framed by the employer is also a settled
position as per Jaswant Singh Gill (supra). Therefore, the appellant cannot take recourse to its own Rules, ignoring the Act,
for denying gratuity
4 COAL INDIA LTD (Appellant) vs. NAVIN KUMAR 349 Inter – Company transfer on request – Whether employee loses his service benefit of his transferor company – Held, No
4 SINGH (Respondent) “ CASE COULD NOT BE READ PROPERLY, READ IT AGAIN AND FILL THIS SECTION “