Evidence Rule 132

Rule 132 SECTION 1 - Examination to be Done in Open Ccurt upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and
G.R. No. L-41166 August 25, 1976 personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO CERBO, petitioners, There is also the advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness before
vs. the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as the trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and
HON NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and GREGORIO incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect
OJOY respondents. is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true
Facts: idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. 
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injuction to nullify the Order
of respondent Judge Estenzo was filed by petitioner Atty. Amelia Del Rosario after said respondent judge
Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule  requires that in determining the superior weight of
issued an order sustaining the procedure proposed by the defense counsel that, in lieu of the testimony
evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may
of the witnesses for the accused on direct examination in open court, he was filing their affidavits,
consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent Judge gravely
orally in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial,
abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised
with the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much
Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court.
more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten
transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of
Issue: the witnesses.
Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the order and
violated Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132. RULE 132 SECTION 2 - Proceeding to be recorded
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion. G.R. No. L-29201 January 31, 1974
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 provides that:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
SECTION 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The testimony of vs.
witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation. APOLONIO OBNGAYAN, defendant-appellant.

SEC. 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to writing.- In superior courts the Alingan Bagay heard a gun report. Instinctively Alingan, who was less than a meter from her husband,
testimony of each witness shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name, turned towards the east where the sound emanated, and saw appellant Apolonio Obngayan, standing
residence, and occupation of the witness being stated, and all questions put to the on an open field less than 30 meters away, holding a gun. According to her description the gun
witness and his answers thereto being included. If a question put is objected to and resembled a cal. 30 carbine. Appellant was then with Nestor Taberdo and Delfin Padaoil, but these two
the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection and the ground on which it was were both unarmed. After Pedro Bagay collapsed to the ground, appellant and his companions fled
sustained or overruled must be stated, or if a witness declines to answer a question towards the direction of the forest. She went to succor her husband, who at that time was already
put, the fact and the proceedings taken thereon shall be entered in the record. A prostrate and groaning with pain.
transcript of the record made by the official stenographer or stenotypist and certified
as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testimony and Pedro Daet, Belino Daet and Rosario Taberdo and her other barriomates arrived at the scene of the
proceedings. incident. They brought in the jeep of the town treasurer of Villaviciosa to the clinic of Dr. Bobila in the
Clearly, the rules provides that the testimony shall be given orally in open court. The main and town of Bangued, Abra, arriving there on the evening of that date.
essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse
party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent
authority, demands confrontation, not for the Idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed

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 Evidence Rule 132
Dr. Eleuterio Acosta, testified that when he saw Pedro Bagay he was in a semi-conscious condition, but Held:
after the emergency operation and the administration of intravenous injection and infusion of blood
plasma, his condition improved and he regained fully his consciousness. (1) It is already a settled law that where the accused has already entered a plea of not guilty to the
information he is deemed to have foregone his right to preliminary investigation and to have abandoned
Pedro Bagay was in the clinic of Dr. Bobila that P.C. Investigator Emiliano Agustin was able to take his right to question any irregularity that may have attended the same.  1 Moreover, appellant posted
his ante mortem statement (Exhibit B). According to Emiliano Agustin, he questioned the victim about bail after his arrest, waived the preliminary investigation proper and failed to raise in issue the validity
the incident, and his questions, and the answers given by the latter, were written down by him, after of the preliminary investigation at any stage of the proceedings in the trial court.
which the victim affixed his thumbmark thereon using his own blood. These proceedings were witnessed
by Severo Bello and Federico Belisario who also affixed their signatures on the same document. In the (2) A reading of the questions propounded merely indicate the trial judge's concern to ascertain the
aforesaid ante mortem statement, the deceased pointed to appellant as the person who shot him. truth. There are obviously certain rights inherent to the trier of facts due to the nature of his function.
Among these is the right to question a witness with a view to satisfying his mind upon a material point
Pedro Bagay died. which presents itself during the trial and as to the credibility of such witness.  4 

The constabulary authorities, on the basis of the testimony of Alingan Bagay, and Severo Bello and In thus cross-examining an accused and his witnesses, the trial judge merely makes use of this inherent
Federico Belisario on the ante mortem statement (Exhibit B), filed a criminal complaint for murder with right, and this actuation, if exercised within reasonable bounds, does not amount to a denial of the
the Villaviciosa Municipal Court against Apolonio Obngayan, Nestor Taberdo and Delfin Padaoil. fundamental right of the accused to a fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the due clause of the
Constitution.
At their arraignment on August 15, 1967, the appellant and his co-accused, with the assistance of their
counsel de parte, Atty. Agripino Brillantes, pleaded not guilty. We do, however, advert to the need that such power should be exercised sparingly and judiciously, in
order to obviate any criticism on the part of counsel, and in such manner as not to detract from the
The defense of the appellant was alibi. He denied that he was at the scene of the incident, on the time norm of conduct compatible with the public faith and trust, of the citizenry in the impartiality and sense
and date in question, claiming that he was then constructing a fence near his house at Barrio Callao of responsibility of those entrusted with the solemn duty of administering to them justice.
which is adjacent to Barrio Mañosa, where the spouses Pedro and Alingan Bagay resided. It was while he
was thus engaged that he heard later in the afternoon that Pedro Bagay was shot. While he knew Pedro (3) Appellant makes capital of certain alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Alingan Bagay and of
Bagay, he did not go to Bagay's house, much less attended the victim's funeral, because he was allegedly her failure to mention the name of the appellant as the author of the crime to some people immediately
afraid. No evidence was presented to corroborate the alibi of appellant. On May 28, 1968, the judgment after the incident.
in question was promulgated convicting the appellant but acquitting his two co-accused, Nestor Taberdo
and Delfin Padaoil. The alleged inconsistency consists of the fact that Alingan stated in her affidavit dated March 16, 1967
before the Municipal Judge that after the incident she went to Barrio Mañosa for help, whereas on the
Issue; witness stand, she declared that she cried for help after which her neighbors in Barrio Mañosa arrived.

(1) Irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation viz: the alleged lack of notice to appellant Considering that this incident occurred in the ricefields of Barrio Mañosa, she could have gone to the
and the failure of the investigating magistrate to accord him the opportunity to cross-examine the houses of her barriomates thereat while she was shouting for help. Besides, the same is trivial as it
prosecution witnesses; refers to an inconsequential or insignificant matter and, therefore, could not have impaired the
credibility of her testimony, as it has been found to be consistent on material and important points.  5
(2) the unusual zeal of the trial judge in cross-examining appellant and in propounding questions
favorable to the prosecution, thus allegedly showing his manifest partiality; and At any rate, there is no question that she identified appellant as the one who shot her husband when
investigated by the constabulary authorities and when she executed her affidavit on March 16, 1967
(3) the trial court’s error in giving more credence and weight to the ante mortem statement (Exhibit B) before the Municipal Judge. Delay of a witness in informing other people of what he knew about a
and the testimony of Alingan Bagay than to the testimony of Appellant. criminal offense would not affect his credibility where the delay was satisfactorily explained.  6

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 Evidence Rule 132
There is no question that the declaration was made with full realization on the part of the deceased that Issue: Whether or not Salveron’s right against self-incrimination was violated.
he was in a dying condition. Considering the degree and seriousness of the wound, and the fact that
death supervened shortly afterwards, such circumstances may be considered as substantial evidence of Ruling:
such consciousness. 10
The Court is at the opinion that Salveron misses the point completely. The assumptions he protests are
It is plain from the evidence of record that appellant was identified as the assailant of the deceased, not merely corroborative of the principal evidence of the prosecution, which is the testimony of Gregorio.
only because of the ante mortem declaration, but also by the clear and positive testimony of Alingan
Bagay. Appellant concedes that Alingan Bagay was not actuated by improper motives in implicating him The nitrate burns on Salveron's hands only affirmed that conclusion. The paraffin test did not violate
in the commission of this serious offense. We have held that a prosecution witness' lack of motive to the appellant's right against self-incrimination as it involved only an examination of a part of his body.
make a false imputation against the accused strengthens the credibility of said witness. 11
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
Needless to state, the alibi interposed by appellant is one of the weakest defenses available in criminal of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
cases, and cannot prevail over the positive identification of appellant by Alingan Bagay, corroborated by body as evidence when it may be material.
the ante mortem statement of the deceased, as the perpetrator of the offense. On the basis of the
evidence, the guilt of appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 132 Sec. 3. Rights and Obligations of a Witness in relation to the right against self-incrimination
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the modification that appellant is ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P12,000.00 as civil indemnity. G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996
Rule 132 Sec. 3. Rights and Obligations of a Witness in relation to the right against self-incrimination PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant.
PEOPLE vs. HENRY SALVERON
Facts:
Facts: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit was charged with and convicted of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
The incidents started when Gloria de Felipe was allegedly robbed and raped by Raul Salveron, Jesus On April 15, 1991, the victim, Onofre Malaki was attending to his store while his houseboy,
Dalida, Mauricio Dumangas and several other unidentified persons. Edilberto Batin was busy cooking at the kitchen. Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of
Malaki to purchase chemicals for his farm. After Batin finished cooking, he proceeded to the store to ask
Several of the accused were killed and the crime was pointed to Rosibal de Felipe, the husband of Gloria Malaki regarding supper. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant
de Felipe, Marianito Billones, Jr., and Jessie Vito, who were all eventually charged with frustrated Jose Malimit coming out of the store with a bolo, while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled
homicide. on the floor "struggling for his life". Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the
store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-
stained bolo. Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the store, Rondon clearly
Rosibal de Felipe was himself gunned down. The killing was mounted to the herein appellant, Henry
recognized Malimit.Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met
Slaveron, son of the late Raul Salveron.
Rondon and after a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's
brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along
The prosecution presented Victoriano Gregorio as its star witness. Gregorio saw Salveron with a rifle with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying
seconds after gunshots rang out. Rosibal de Felipe was dead on the ground. prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the
wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket. During the custodial investigation, appellant Malimit
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City acquitted Federico Sadava for lack of evidence of conspiracy but found pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki’s wallet. Malimit sought for the
Henry Salveron guilty as charged. exclusion of Malaki’s wallet together with its contents: (1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his
identification card; and (3) bunch of keys as evidence because it violates his right against self-
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 Evidence Rule 132
incrimination and he allegedly was not informed of his constitutional rights during the custodial PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,
investigation. vs.
Issue: HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG,
Whether or not appellant’s right against self-incrimination was violated. ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY,
Ruling: respondents.
No, Malimit’s right against self-incrimination was not violated. FACTS:
The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he
in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It  is simply a prohibition reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not
against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.  It guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first
does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and
statement but an object evidence. ordering his release; and so he escaped. The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong’s re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution
to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz: moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is now before us
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his on certiorari and mandamus.
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. ISSUE:
xxx xxx xxx WON the denial was right?
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be HELD:
inadmissible in evidence against him. (Emphasis ours.) The judge erred. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he
xxx xxx xxx should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment.
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as
However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made follows:
during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the "Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules,  is not affected even if obtained or taken in the proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses
and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."
identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past
the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant’s escape.
Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside The old doctrine in People v. Avanceña has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in
the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the
detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all
RULE 132 SECTION 4 - Order in the Examination of an Individual Witness further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing.
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
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 Evidence Rule 132
Under the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to his disadvantage by preventing him CIR issued an order by which the strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to take
from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction. them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. 1
The right to be present at one’s trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the
prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under Section 19, the Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service" for the
defendant’s escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law 
the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have
received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he Answer and Counter-Petition was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees
has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law. Association whereby it denied the charges and alleged that the accident was due to a mechanical defect
In the instant case, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the
accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong service was not justified. 
should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be
notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the Petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and
evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction. various documents. After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct testimony, with agreement of the parties, the
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. 
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must
look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his
reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need reinstatement with backwages.
and must use not only learning but also vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the Issue:
city court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result
of his investigation within sixty days. Whether or not the respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner, after
Denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the record, notwithstanding the fact that the
to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not service records of Maximo Jacob, upon the basis of which his dismissal could be justified were admitted
reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs. by it. 
Rule 132 Sec 4 Order in the Examination of an individual witness
Ruling:
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or "BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as operator of the
RURAL TRANSIT, petitioner,  Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness
vs. failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents. he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin,
respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. 
Facts:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc." was in the transportation criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". The Rural Transit Employees fundamental right which is part of due process.
Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court
of Industrial Relations for compulsory arbitration.  Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been
wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru
the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed

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 Evidence Rule 132
due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby On the other hand, it characterized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as "laden with
rendered incompetent.  inconsistencies" and described their manner of testifying as "clearly wanting of candor, honesty, and
Rule 132 Sec 4 Order in the Examination of an individual witness elements of straightforward manner of delivery" and "fraught with hesitations."
G.R. No. 106274 September 28, 1993
Issue:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HENRY PADERO, accused-appellant. Whether or not the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the complainant
and not to the testimony of the defense.
Facts:
Ruling:
16 year old Jocelyn Cadeliña charged her uncle-in-law, Henry Padero with the crime of rape. Yes.
The credibility then of the complainant is under scrutiny here. The trial court gave her
The version of the prosecution stated that together with her sister and friends, the complainant testimony full faith and credit. The general rule is that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is
Jocelyn were renting a house which was owned by Macrina Padero, the mother of the accused, in Bais involved, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the
City.That on the evening of August 31, 1991, upon arrival at the rented house and before she went up to latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
her room on the 2nd floor, she noticed the accused sleeping inside a mosquito net at the ground floor. their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been
She was not surprised on seeing the accused sleeping at the ground floor that night as she had been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 
used to seeing the accused sleep there. On the same night, she woke up to find accused on top of her The core issue here is whether the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant through
with his right arm holding a knife, and his left hand holding her right arm. Accused told her "don't shout the use of force or intimidation, or whether the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse.A
because if you shout I will kill you". For fear, she did not shout. After having removed her blouse and painstaking review of the evidence discloses vital facts of immense importance in the determination of
panty with his left hand, accused successfully raped her. She tried to resist but was pinned down by the this issue — facts which would necessarily affect the result of this case but which the trial court
accused, who was aiming the knife at her. After warning her not to report the incident otherwise he will apparently overlooked or glossed over. This case then falls under the exception to the general rule.
kill her, accused went back to sleep on the ground floor, but she was not able to sleep the rest of the For one, despite the positive testimony of the accused which squarely traversed the
night. With the threat to kill her by the accused, she did not report the incident to anybody, until after complainant's version of force or intimidation by stating that he and the complainant had an intimate
several months, she was forced to tell her mother as she was conceiving. relationship, with the latter as the more aggressive partner, and that their first sexual encounter in
On the other hand,the accused admits having carnal knowledge of the complainant not only on August of 1991 was followed by fifteen more encounters at the same place during week-ends when the
the date alleged in the information but for fifteen (15) more times thereafter but maintains that he and complainant was alone, all of which were new facts, the complainant was never recalled to the witness
the complainant are lovers and that the complainant voluntarily had sex with him. His testimony stand to rebut these obviously damaging revelations of the accused. The prosecution was simply
pictured the complainant as a woman passionately in love with him, who not only initiated the first contented with the presentation of Clara Cadeliña, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadeliña to rebut
sexual encounter but longed for and welcomed the others. some less important, if minor or trivial, matters brought out in the testimonies of Loreta Samane and
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jocelyn Cadeliña and Cherryl Palacios Macrina Padero. Why the complainant herself was not made to rebut the damaging evidence against
for its evidence in chief, and Clara Cadeliña, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadeliña on rebuttal. The her is beyond us. After the second rebuttal witness, Rev. Felecio, had finished his testimony, the
accused took the witness stand in his defense and presented Loreta Samane, Elsa Garcia, Macrina prosecutor simply announced to the court that the last rebuttal witness would be Damiana Cadeliña.
Padero, and Marietta Padero as his witnesses. The function of the rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence
The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of rape. of the adversary.  Its office is "to meet the new facts put in by the opponent in his case in reply" and is
"necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or
because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put forward, or because, on any issue
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the complainant who it said testified whatever, facts discrediting the proponent's witnesses have been offered."  While the presentation of
"with sincerity, honesty and candidness and with answers direct to the point, in a logical and rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal action,in the instant case, the
straightforward manner, and free from inconsistencies." overwhelming import of the new facts disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the

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 Evidence Rule 132
complainant's version made it imperative for the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
the complainant to the background and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or trivial matters called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
brought out in the evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further
story. examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to
RULE 132 SECTION 6 - Cross Examination; its purpose and extent be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial
People vs. Leonardo Fabre. court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely
because he is not cross-examined by the other party.
G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002
The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that
Facts: at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur, of raping his own from the place of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his
daughter Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. wife, merit any better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their
That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the accused located at house at four o'clock in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left
Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the the house in the morning and returned only at ten o'clock that same morning, staying home the whole
above-named accused by force, threats and intimidation, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate
against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of the said victim consisting of moral, actual likewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate
and compensatory damages. vicinity at the time of its commission. Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even
Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.
of Marilou (who narrated the rape), that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and (2) Yes.
that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has been sufficiently
issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou established, the fact of minority of the victim, although specifically averred in the information, has not
and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of been equally shown in evidence. These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin
the accused himself. It also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand. requirements that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt
In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Her during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty. Neither an obvious minority of the
mother stated, however, that she was 14. The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens, victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the
was not presented to ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when desired proof required by law. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing conducted
their house burned down. No other document that could somehow help establish the real age of the under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered sufficient compliance with the
victim was submitted. law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a
The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence,
the young complainant, and sentenced the accused to death, his daughter being a minor. that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. While the declaration of a victim as to
Issue: her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on
pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally different matter.
(1) WON TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL. In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Her
mother stated, however, that she was 14. The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens,
(2) WON TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH SENTENCE UPON ACCUSED-
was not presented to ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when
APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL AGE OF MARILOU
their house burned down. No other document that could somehow help establish the real age of the
FABRE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPE."
victim was submitted.
Held:
Rule 132 Sec10 - Leading or Misleading Questions
(1) No.
The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength
for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal
7
 Evidence Rule 132
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  The other witness, Lydia Posadas, a sister-in-law of the deceased had to wait for four (4) days after the
vs. shooting, and about two (2) weeks after she allegedly overheard the supposed conspiracy, to execute a
EUFEMIO CAPARAS y PAEZ and PATRICIO DIAMSAY y GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.  joint statement with her sister, Priscilla, before the Provincial Fiscal. It defies one's credulity that both of
them, especially Lydia, who is a sister-in-law of the deceased would not immediately expose Caparas as
Facts: the man behind the perpetration of the crime. This stultified silence casts grave doubts as to their
veracity. These doubts deepen when she testified that she did not reveal even to her husband the plot
These are two separate motions for reconsideration for thr conviction of the two abovenamed to kill his brother. The reason given by the lower court is that her father-in-law to whom she told of
appellants. Caparas' plan to liquidate the deceased advised her not to inform anybody, as Atty. Pedro Paez would
arrive on February 6, 1971 to settle the conflict. The explanation is not persuasive.
It seeks the re- examination of the decision insofar as it rejects the plea of self-defense of appellant
Diamsay. The evidence with which to link Caparas in a conspiracy with Diamsay to kill the deceased does not rest
on solid ground. The records do not show that Caparas harbors intense resentment against the Paezes
as to go to the extent of liquidating them. On the contrary, it was the Paezes who had all the reason to
As regards appellant Caparas, the motions for reconsideration seek the review of the testimonies of the
be angry with Caparas who, according to them, was defrauding them of their rightful rights. In the case
two principal witnesses, Laureano Salvador and Lydia Posadas, upon which said appellant was convicted,
of Diamsay , he apparently acted on his own. Diamsay hated the Paezes because of the latter's "insulting
on ground of conspiracy between him and Diamsay. Caparas points out some facts and circumstances
attitude" toward him.
which are alleged to impair the credibility of the aforesaid witnesses and thereby leaves the fact of
conspiracy unproven beyond reasonable doubt as it should be. 
The Court affirmed with respect to appellant Diamsay, but reversed with respect to appellant Caparas.
Issue: Whether or not testimonies were extracted through leading question.

Rule 132 Sec 13 How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements

Ruling: G.R. No. L-14476            November 6, 1919
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
The Court is constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the supposed conspiracy was vs.
elicited by means of leading questions, the probative value of which, according to accepted legal JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.
authorities, is thus diminished or lessened. 

The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading
questions which are so put that the witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or
assertion of an examining consul put with such vocal inflection as to be question. 

Appellant Caparas also points out several inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
two witnesses.

It was after more than two years after the commission of the crime, that Laureano Salvador surfaced
and testified on what he allegedly knew about the crime. This fact in itself is contrary to human
experience because the natural reaction of one who has knowledge of the crime is to reveal it to the
authorities, except only if he is the author thereof.

8
 Evidence Rule 132
RULE 132 SECTION 13 - How Witness Impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements of odorous chemicals over her nose and mouth which caused her to sleep. This fact was not repeated by
G.R. No. L-38790 November 9, 1978 complainant in the trial court but she merely claimed the crime was consummated by appellant through
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, force and intimidation. Such inconsistency, according to appellant, destroys Jovelyn's credibility, thus
warranting a reversal of the lower court's judgment of conviction.
vs.
Rule 132 of Rules of Court provides:
FEDERICO RELUCIO @ "PEDRING", EDRI PINEDA, ROSENDO VELASCO @ "MANGYO", DANTE ARIOLA,
MIGUEL ESPEJO PADRONES @ "EGI", PETER DOE, and RICHARD DOE, accused, ROSENDO VELASCO @ Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. - Before a witness can be
"MANGYO", accused-appellant. impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.
Complainant cannot now be discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements which were not
brought to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo the alleged
contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness
unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to
explain them.
It is evidentiarily proscribed to discredit a witness on the bases of purportedly prior inconsistent
statements which were not called to the attention of that witness during the trial, although the same
are supposedly contained in a document which was merely offered and admitted in its entirety
without the requisite specifications.
Rule 132 Sec 13 How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the supposed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. WINSTON DE GUZMAN, Accused-Appellant. differences in her statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left
with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable
Facts:
explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed
Accused appellant Winston de Guzman was charged with the crime of rape. impeached. Unless the proper predicate is laid during the trial by calling the attention of a witness to
The evidence for the prosecution reveals that 14-year old complainant, Jovelyn A. Geram, 4 was alone in his alleged inconsistent statements given outside of his testimony in court and asking him to explain
their residence when the crime was committed by appellant who had managed to gain entry into the the contradiction, the supposed inconsistencies cannot be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of
house. destroying the credibility of the witness.
Complainant was sleeping at around two o'clock that afternoon when she was awakened by the weight Rule on Examination of Child Witness
of something on top of her. Upon opening her eyes, she saw herein appellant naked and sitting on her G.R. No. 160421             October 4, 2004
thighs. Complainant instinctively tried to shout for help but appellant covered her mouth and nose with
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented by their Attorney-in-fact,
his hand and warned her not to resist or she would be killed. Thereafter, accused had a carnal
GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, petitioners,
knowledge with her.The defense of appellant is denial and alibi. The trial court ruled in favor of the
vs.
offended party.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Facts:
Issue: Whether or not the offended party may be impeached as a witness because of inconsistent
Petitioner Spouses Philip Recto and Ester Recto filed with the RTC an application for registration
statements.
of title over a lot situated in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas under the Property
Registration Decree.Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806 from sisters Rosita
Ruling: Appellant adverts to the fact that complainant stated in her complaint and in her testimony Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres. The two, in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased
given during the preliminary investigation that he committed the crime of rape through the application parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana. Maria, born on October 22, 1917, declared that since 1945, her
9
 Evidence Rule 132
father was already the owner of Lot 806. She became aware of her father’s possession of the subject lot 1. respondent had made it appear in the deed of sale that complainant-vendor sold 150 square meters
in the concept of owner in 1930 when she was 13 years of age. The possession of the subject lot by the of his unregistered land in Pulilan, Bulacan, instead of only 50 square meters which was the real
Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita, who testified that in 1935 when she was 13 agreement of the parties; and
years of age, she first came to know that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The sisters added that 2. at the time respondent Baltazar notarized the deed of sale, she was no longer authorized to do so
during the lifetime of Vicente, he planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their tenant. After his since her notarial commission had expired on 31 December 1956 and was renewed by her only on 17
demise, they continued to plant the same crops through hired farmers. September 1957.
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals contending The Court required respondent Baltazar to file an answer and this she did. The complaint and answer
that petitioners failed to prove possesion of the lot for the period required by law. were then referred to the Office of the Solicitor General on 29 August 1963 for investigation, report and
Issue: recommendation.
Whether or not Rosita and Maria are competent child witnesses. The Solicitor General submitted his report and recommendation dated 28 March 1990.
Ruling: The Solicitor General found that the first charge of malpractice against respondent Baltazar had not
Yes, they are competent child witnesses. been substantiated. The only evidence submitted by complainant was his own testimony given at a
It is well-established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can hearing called by the Solicitor General.
perceive, and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating
truthfully facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a child’s competence as a witness are: (a) Issue:
capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There is no 1. WON respondent had made it appear in the deed of sale that complainant-vendor sold 150 square
showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a meters of his unregistered land in Pulilan, Bulacan, instead of only 50 square meters which was the real
witness’ knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He may have first agreement of the parties.
acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at the age of four, which knowledge was 2. WON the requirements for appointment or renewed appointment of a notary public as a casual
reinforced through the years, up until he testified in court in 1990. formality and setting up good faith as a defense.
Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners, categorically testified that they, Held:
and prior to them their father, had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of owners.
1. NO.
Maria, having been born on October 22, 1917, and Rosita on October 29, 1922, were 13 years of age
when they became aware of their family’s possession of Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, It has not been substantiated.
they were undoubtedly capable and competent to perceive their father’s possession of Lot 806 in the Such testimony alleging the true intention of Marciano, of course, is not competent, in view of the
concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be worthy of belief and credence. parole evidence rule, to vary the terms of the written agreement of the parties with respect to the area
Considering that the judge below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue, having personally of land sold therein. By itself, complainant's testimony is insufficient to show the existence of a mistake
heard the witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, her findings or imperfection in the writing or that the deed of sale failed to express the true intent and agreement of
deserve the highest respect. the parties.
RULE 132 SECTION 19 - Classes of Documents 2. NO.
A.C. No. 575 February 14, 1991 It appears to the Court that the respondent considered the requirements for appointment or renewed
MARCIANO JOSON, complainant, appointment of a notary public as a casual formality, since she did not bother to ascertain whether her
commission had in fact been renewed before acting as such. By respondent's own testimony, she had
vs.
become aware before notarizing the deed of sale that her petition for renewal of her notarial
ATTY. GLORIA M. BALTAZAR, respondent. commission had not been filed. The Court is, therefore, unable to accept her plea of good faith simply
Facts: on the basis of her claimed belief that her commission would, as a matter of course, be approved
In this administrative case for disbarment instituted by Marciano Joson, Atty. Gloria M. Baltazar, now upon the filing of her petition for renewal of her commission.
Gloria Baltazar-Aguirre, is charged with violation of the Revised Penal Code and grave malpractice as a Under the foregoing case, respondent Baltazar's conduct must be similarly characterized as malpractice
lawyer. In his complaint, Marciano Joson alleged that on 10 July 1957, respondent Atty. Gloria Baltazar- and falsification of a public document. Notarization of a private document converts such document
Aguirre notarized a deed of sale executed by complainant in favor of one Herminia Feliciano, but: into a public one,9 and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
10
 Evidence Rule 132
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment The Court of First Instance rendered a decision finding that the allegation of fraud was not supported by
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest Issue:
requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing Whether or not the deed having been notarized and is therefore a public document, carries weight.
upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
Ruling:
Hence, suspension from the practice of law for 3 months.
The fact that the deed of sale itself, specifically the notarial acknowledgment thereof, contains a
RULE 132 SECTION 19 - Classes of Documents statement that its executors were known to the notary public to be the persons who executed the
SEVERO SALES, ESPERANZA SALES BERMUDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO instrument. Thus, the stark denial of the petitioners, specially Sales, that he executed the deed of sale
GONZALES, respondents. fails in the face of Malazo's testimony because the testimony of the notary public enjoys greater
Facts: credence than that of an ordinary witness.
Severo Sales owned an unregistered parcel of land in Bugallon, Pangasinan. Sales mortgaged said A notarial acknowledgment attaches full faith and credit to the document concerned. 25 It also vests
property, together with two other parcels of land, to Faustina P. Agpoon and Jose Agpoon to secure the upon the document the presumption of regularity unless it is impugned by strong, complete and
payment of a loan. conclusive proof. Such kind of proof has not been presented by the petitioners.
Sales, with the consent of his wife, Margarita Ferrer, donated nine hundred (900) square meters of the Rule 132 Section 19 Classes of Documents
same property in favor of their daughter, petitioner Esperanza Sales Bermudez. The duly notarized deed A.C. No. 5957             February 4, 2003
of donation was presented to the Assessor's Office on the day of its execution. WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G. DOMINGO, complainants,
As a consequence of a case filed by Faustina P. Agpoon against Sales the mortgaged property of Sales vs.
was set for foreclosure. To prevent such foreclosure, Sales requested his friend, Ernesto Gonzales, to ATTY. CLETO L. EVANGELISTA, JR., respondent.
pay his total indebtedness. Ernesto Gonzales acceded to the request and asked Sales and his wife to sign Facts:
a document transferring the mortgage to him.
In a sworn letter-complaint dated January 15, 1999 filed with the Integrated Bar of the
On February 3, 1959, a document entitled "Deed of Sale" between Severo Sales and Leonilo Gonzales Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, Winnie C. Lucente and Alicia G. Domingo charged Atty.
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. with gross misconduct, deceit, malpractice and crimes involving moral turpitude
Sales received a photostat copy of the deed of sale appearing to have been signed by him and his wife for falsification of public documents.
The document stated that the Sales spouses had sold the land to Leonilo Gonzales, son of Ernesto Complainants alleged that respondent is the son of the late Atty. Cleto Evangelista, who during
Gonzales. his lifetime notarized a Deed of Quitclaim executed on May 7, 1977 by Pedro, Juanito, Eufracia,
In the Intestate Estate Proceedings of Ernesto Gonzales, the land in question was claimed by respondent Cresencia, Consuelo, Maria, all surnamed Tan, and one Sabina Mascareñas, in favor of Asuncion T. Yared
Leonilo Gonzales. and Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving a lot located in Salvacion, Ormoc City; and a Deed of Absolute Sale
Leonilo Gonzales filed an action for illegal detainer against Sales. Sales and his daughter filed a complaint executed on January 7, 1972 by Wenceslao Magallanes and Apolonia Tan in favor of Salvador Estudillo
for annulment of the deed of sale between Sales and Gonzales on the ground of fraud. and Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving a lot located in Poblacion, Ormoc City. On January 30, 1990,
Defendant's defense hinges on the fact that the Deed of Sale is valid, it having been properly executed respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. issued certified true copies of the said instruments. On the
and notarized, and is therefore a public document, and carries weight. Defendant likewise proved that basis of the certified true copies of the subject deeds, the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City issued on
the money paid by his father, Ernesto Gonzales was his. Arturo V. Malazo, the Notary Public ex-officio February 2, 1990 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23889 in favor of Asuncion T. Yared.
and Justice of the Peace, before whom the Deed of Sale was executed, testified personally in Court and Respondent contended that one Carmen Solidor together with Francisco Aves came to their
confirmed the genuineness and validity of the Deed of sale, together with the signatures appearing law office, Evangelista Law Office in Ormoc City, Leyte, and asked him to certify true copies of the
therein, particularly those of the vendors Severo Sales and Margarita Ferrer, and the witnesses thereto. subject deeds. He acceded to the request considering that the documents were notarized by his late
The bare and naked assertions of the plaintiff Severo Sales and his wife, could not offset the father as notary public. He alleged that he issued the assailed certification as a partner of the law office.
presumption of regularity as to the execution of the Deed of Sale, especially so, that the ratifying officer Issue:
was, and still is, a municipal judge Whether or not Atty. Cleto Evangelista, Jr. Engaged in unlawful and deceitful conduct in
certifying true copies of the subject deeds.
11
 Evidence Rule 132
Ruling: decision of July 8, 1963 penned by His Honor, Judge Conrado O. Honrado, dismissed the complaint,
Yes. declared the deed of donation legal and valid and Consuelo G. Azurin owner of the donated ten (10)
Section 245 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads: parcels of land, with costs. Hence, this appeal direct to this Court.
Notarial Register. — Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial Lower Court: rendered in favor of the Azurins (following the annulment mortgage of the properties
register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified subjcet to the deed of donation whose original titles were held by Mariano Vagilidad and Luz Manaquit.)
copy of such record, or any parts thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees ISSUE:
therefor. Is the document signed was one for administration, not a donation?
x x x. RULING:
Sections 246 and 247 of the same Code also require the notary public to forward his notarial No. A rule of long standing which, through the years, has been adhered to is that a notarial
register to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor
city wherein he exercises his office for safekeeping. the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, as plaintiff now seeks to do, there must be
By certifying true copies of the subject deeds, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. engaged in an evidence that is "clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant." Our task now is to weigh the
unlawful and deceitful conduct. He was not the notary public before whom said documents were evidence with a view of ascertaining whether plaintiff has made out a case conformably to the foregoing
acknowledged and he was neither the custodian of the original copies thereof.1awphi1.nét The Records standard. It is undisputed that plaintiff has been a priest of the Philippine Independent Church for a long
Management and Archives Office, Manila, certified that there was no copy on file of the Deed of time. He talks and writes Spanish very well. He knows how to read English. The judge below, who signed
Quitclaim notarized by respondent’s father. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional the decision and who had the opportunity to observe plaintiff on the witness chair, gave the opinion
Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is broad enough to cover any form of that although plaintiff was already old and a little bit deaf, he was "fairly intelligent to say the least, and
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional and personal capacity. definitely ... not feeble-minded." This is the man who claims to have been misled by defendant Dr.
In this connection, we have consistently held that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, Raymundo Azurin.
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or The fact indeed that plaintiff's present suit was started at a time when the donor, Carmen Yturralde, was
authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not already dead strikes a note of implausibility on plaintiff's claim pressed upon the Court. Because, during
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the the lifetime of Carmen, she joined defendants in the suit against the Vagilidads filed on December 29,
administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public 1956 for the purpose of annulling the mortgage in favor of the latter in order to give effect to the very
converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence donation now being questioned in plaintiff. If Carmen Yturralde, at the time that suit against the
without further proof of the authenticity thereof. For this reason, notaries public must observe with Vagilidads was started on December 29, 1956 to the date of her death on January 23, 1960, ever
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. entertained the belief that she was duped into signing the deed of donation, certainly during that span
RULE 132 SECTION 19 - Classes of Documents of over three years, she could have complained and asked that her name be stricken out from that suit,
and she herself could have commenced an action for the annulment of the donation. That she did not
G.R. No. L-22158 May 30, 1969 28 SCRA 407 do so is a circumstance clear enough that the very party interested really intended a donation to take
REV. CIPRIANO YTURRALDE (deceased), substituted by NENITA YTURRALDE, plaintiff-appellant, place.
vs. Plaintiff himself on rebuttal admitted that he knew of this litigation between the Azurins and the
DR. RAYMUNDO AZURIN, R.F.C. now DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and REGISTER OF Vagilidads. And yet, he did nothing. He waited until Carmen could no longer be able to sustain the
DEEDS OF ANTIQUE,1 defendants-appellees. donation and give the lie to his present complaint. While plaintiff's theory is that he learned of the
FACTS: donation only after the death of his sister in 1960, yet, as rightly observed by the trial court, "he
This is a suit to annul a notarial deed of donation inter vivos, covering ten (10) parcels of land in committed the "lapsus-linguae" of stating that he secured the document [of donation] from Atty. Tayco
Sibalom, Antique, executed by plaintiff's sister, Carmen Yturralde, in favor of defendant Consuelo G. before he left for Manila" in 1955 — long before the death of Carmen. Surely, these circumstances are
Azurin, which deed plaintiff himself, a minister of the Philippine Independent Church, signed as a indicative of lack of merit of plaintiff's case.
witness and which his nephew Apolonio Yturralde also signed as a witness at plaintiff's instance. Therefore, Since the donation was made in a public document specifying the immovables
Plaintiff's claim is that the execution thereof is tainted with fraudulent misrepresentation — that the donated, and the conditions for the donation, and that acceptance thereof was made in the same deed
document is merely one for the administration of properties, not a donation. The lower court, in its of donation, that donation should be given effect.

12
 Evidence Rule 132
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FOURTH CIVIL CASES DIVISION and ENCARNACION
RULE 132 SECTION 19 - Classes of Documents VILLANUEVA, respondents.
AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Facts:
Facts: The subject of this petition is a Conditional Assignment of Rights and Interests over a
Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone Foreclosure Judgment entered into between petitioner Reva Raz and the original private respondent
10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 herein, Encarnacion Villanueva, on August 7, 1972.  The said judgment was rendered in favor of
from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The amount was spent for lighting, Villanueva on February 5, 1969, and ordered the defendants therein to pay her the amount of
cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a P35,000.00, with 12% per annum interest from August 7, 1965, and other amounts, in default of which
financial statement, she submitted Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of the property subject of the proceeding would be sold at public auction to satisfy the amounts owing
P13,565.00 allegedly issued by Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said sales invoice is falsified her. This property was a parcel of land located at Quezon City which had been mortgaged by the
and later misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her personal use and benefit. defendants to secure the payment of a loan she had extended to them. By virtue of the Conditional
Assignment, Villanueva transferred all her rights and interests in the said judgment to Raz in
The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa, because there was no evidence that funds had been consideration of the sum of P75,000.00 to be paid by the petitioner.
misappropriated or converted. Neither was there proof that petitioner had been required to account for
the money received. On April 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against the private respondent, claiming that the latter had reneged on her duty to deliver the property
However, the court a quo convicted her for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted to show to the assignee in accordance with their agreement. In her answer, Villanueva alleged that it was the
that the P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting materials for her barangay. petitioner who had defaulted in her payments and thus given just cause for the rescission of the
Issue: Whether or not the sales invoice, was a commercial/public document agreement. This was authorized in their agreement wherein it was stated that in case of default in
payment, the contract shall be considered rescinded. To support her claim, Villanueva presented two
Ruling: Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document acquires the character of a public letters she said she had sent Raz, the first to remind her of the third installment that had not yet been
document when it becomes part of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly authorized paid and the second to tender her the refund of her earlier payments in view of the rescission of their
by law. contract. 
According to the petitioner, the two letters allegedly sent to her by the private respondents
If the document is intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the preparation of which should not have been admitted in evidence because there was no proof that she had received them. No
being in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the government, the falsification of that less importantly, their genuineness had not been established in accordance with Rule 132, Section 21.
document, although it was a private document at the time of its falsification, is regarded as falsification Issue:
of public or official document. Whether or not the genuineness of the private document has been established.
Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was submitted Ruling:
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus this Sales Invoice is intended to be part of the public Yes, it has been established.
records and the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and regulations. Moreover, Sales Invoice Sec. 21 of Rule 132 provides that:
No. 21568 formed part of the official records of PAGCOR when it was submitted by petitioner as one of
the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability to PAGCOR. Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private
writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. Commercial documents
or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
transactions. b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
Rule 132 Section 20 Proof of Private Documents c) By a subscribing witness.
G.R. No. 73010              April 27, 1990 The petitioner was actually arguing against herself in invoking Rule 132, Section 21, for one of the modes
REVA RAZ petitioner, prescribed therein for proving the execution and authenticity of any private writing is "by evidence of
vs. the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker." This mode must be read with Section 23 of the same
Rule, which says that —
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 Evidence Rule 132
. . . Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the (7) a memorandum from five officers or employees of Solid Cement Corporation recommending the sale
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or of the paper bag-making-machine;
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (8) another gate-pass dated December 3, 1992 from one Ramon Enriquez allowing the pull out of the
We have made such comparison and find that the signature of Encarnacion G. Villanueva on the machine;
Conditional Assignment (which is not disputed) is similar to the signatures affixed to the two letters sent (9) a letter from one Lorenzo P. Ligot thanking Solid Cement, through one Peter Aaliwin, for the former's
to the petitioner. There is no doubt that the agreement and the two letters were signed by private grant of a right of first refusal; and
respondent Encarnacion G. Villanueva. Consequently, their authenticity and execution having been (10) a copy of the resolution dated July 26, 1993 of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Rizal.
established, we hold that the letters were admissible as evidence of the private respondent.
The Court is also convinced that the two letters were correctly sent to and personally delivered at the
MeTC DECISION: demurrer denied. The accused (petitioners here) then filed a petition for certiorari and
petitioner's address as stated in the Conditional Assignment, were actually received there and later
prohibition with the RTC.
presumably conveyed to her. Indeed, the signature of the person who received the first letter closely
resembles that of one of petitioner's counsel as an examination of her pleadings will reveal.  RTC DECISION: reversed decision and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.
RULE 132 SECTION 20 - Proof of Private Document CA DECISION: reversed RTC’s decision. Order dismissing case was set aside and the accused were given
the option to either present their evidence before the trial court below (Metropolitan Trial Court) or to
G.R. No. 140904 October 9, 2000
submit the case for decision based solely on the prosecutor's evidence. Held that petitioners, after the
RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C. AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, denial by the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence, should not have filed a petition for certiorari with the
vs. regional trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Petitioner’s Contention: the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and committed
FACTS: grave abuse of discretion in finding that appeal and not certiorari was the remedy that should have been
Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine from the Solid Cement Corporation but no availed of by petitioners.
machine could be given to her, it appearing that the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a ISSUE:
creditor, who, unfortunately, refused to release the mortgage. Herein petitioners offered to return the 1. WON the court erred in not accepting the demurrer to evidence of petitioners? Yes.
money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a criminal complaint with the City 2. WON the private documents admissible? No.
Prosecutor of Makati.
HELD:
Information for estafa and other deceit was filed with MeTC. Evidence presented consisted of private
1. Yes.
documents and prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny Alfonso. Petitioners filed a
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, attaching thereto their demurrer and stressed that all the Certiorari does not lie to review a trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss (or to
above-mentioned documents being uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented its
signatures are inadmissible in evidence. evidence and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not
appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari HOWEVER if the denial of the
The disputed documents are alleged photo copies of:
demurrer to evidence is attended by grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a
(1) the approval of the sale of the paper bag-making machine supposedly signed by petitioners; petition for certiorari.
(2) an official receipt of Solid Cement Corporation evidencing payment of P362,000.00; The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy of certiorari, the trial
(3) a plant gate pass from one J.P. Valencia dated February 16, 1993 for entry into the Antipolo court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
compound and pull-out of the machine; denying petitioners' demurrer to evidence.
(4) a letter from one Atty. Maximino Robles demanding delivery of the machine to the complainant; It was grave abuse of discretion for the MeTC to consider that there was a prima facie case against
(5) a letter of Solid Cement's Rene S. Ong offering to return P362,000.00 plus interest; petitioners warranting a trial on the merits given the paucity of evidence against petitioners.
(6) a letter from Atty. Robles informing Solid Cement of complainant's refusal to accept the refund of the 2. No.
P362,000.00; In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by petitioners, all documentary evidence

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 Evidence Rule 132
submitted by the private complainant were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the RULE 132 SECTION 22 - Genuineness of handwriting proved
signatures on which were either unidentified or unauthenticated. ERNANDO C. LAYNO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN,
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "before any private document offered Respondents.
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: Facts:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or The petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. As chief executive of the
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. municipality, he had the authority to appoint employees in the municipal government.
Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the identity and authenticity of the The petitioner appointed Fernando Y. Layno, his legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of the
document sought to be presented must first be reasonably established. Where there is no proof as to municipal treasurer of Lianga. He signed the appointment document twice, first as the appointing
the authenticity of the executor's signature appearing in a private document, such private document authority and second, as the personnel officer.
should be excluded. Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the Certification (Exh. "B") signed by the
The documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness are private instruments, being petitioner, reading as follows :"In connection with the appointment of MR. FERNANDO Y. LAYNO, Lianga,
instruments executed by private persons without the intervention of a public notary or of other persons Surigao del Sur, in the Office of Municipal Treasurer, Lianga, Surigao del Sur at the rate of FOUR
legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced, or set forth THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO PESOS ONLY per annum (P4,632.00), effective March 16, 1980. I
(U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 [1907]). HEREBY CERTIFY THAT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and authenticity must "1. He is not related to me to (sic) any person exercising immediate supervision over him within
first be established, either by the testimony of anyone who saw the writing executed or by evidence of the third degree of either consanguinity or affinity.
the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof. Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of falsification of public document.It
Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies of the originals. Thus, they are secondary was alleged that he prepared and falsified a document or certification, wherein said accused is legally
evidence and as such are not admissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the originals (Section bound to disclose the truth, by stating that a certain Fernando Y. Layno of Lianga. Surigao del Sur is not
3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court). However, the loss of the originals have not been proved by the related to him within the third degree of either consanguinity or affinity, when in truth and in fact, as
prosecution, neither have they shown that the original is a public record in the custody of a public office the said accused well knew, said Fernando Y. Layno is his son, thus, making untruthful statements in a
or is recorded in a public office, nor that the same is in the custody or under the control of petitioners. narration of facts.
Petitioner admitted that he appointed Fernando Y. Layno was made subject to the qualification that he
Testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals, however, that the due execution and authenticity later on revoked the appointment upon being advised that it was against the law on nepotism.
of these documents were never proved. The prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and Sandiganbayan found him guilty for the crime charged.
authenticity of these documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these Issue: Whether or not the witness of the prosecution is incompetent to testify as to the identity or
documents are incompetent as evidence. (People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). character of petitioner’s signature.
The due execution and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented not having been proved, Ruling:
and since these are mere photocopies, the loss of the originals of which was not previously established, Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight nor credence to his defense that he did not
the same are clearly inadmissible in evidence. Being incompetent evidence, the only evidence the sign nor issue the certification (Exh. B) in question. He claims that the lone witness for the prosecution,
prosecution could rely on to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the private Amando R. Pandi, Jr., who identified his signature on the said certification is incompetent to testify on
complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is insufficient to sustain a finding of the matter because he admitted during the trial that he never saw him (petitioner) actually signing
culpability. (affixing) his signature on the questioned certification. Petitioner further claims that the said witness is
biased and prejudiced and that his testimony is incredible, unreliable and undeserving of belief. He
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight argues that Pandi did not testify voluntarily but was actually instructed by the incumbent mayor who
or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. was his (petitioner’s) political opponent for the mayorship of the Municipality of Lianga in the last local
To be considered sufficient, therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and election and that he (Pandi) is a relative of the incumbent vice-mayor against whom he (petitioner) has a
(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution long-standing political feud.
miserably failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime of estafa and other deceit.

15
 Evidence Rule 132
The petitioner’s aforesaid contentions are without merit. Under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who "has seen writing purporting
to be his upon which the witness acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person."
Prosecution witness Amando R. Pandi, Jr. was competent to testify on the signature of Petitioner on
the Certification, Exhibit "B" because in the course of his employment as municipal secretary and
designated personnel officer in the municipal government of Lianga. Surigao del Sur, he had seen
records under his charge bearing the long and short signatures of the petitioner, and, as such, he had
acquired knowledge of the general character of the handwriting of the petitioner. RULE 132 SECTION 22 - Genuineness of handwriting proved
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the signature on the certification in question is the SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO. VS. TRIUMPH LUMBER AND CONSTURCTION CORP.
signature of the petitioner was not only based on the testimony of Amando R. Pandi, Jr. Section 22, Rule G.R. NO. 126696. JANUARY 21, 1999
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence further provides that" (e)vidence respecting the handwriting may
FACTS:
also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction Triumph Lumber and Construction Corp (TLCC) is a depositor of Security Bank and Trust Co
of the judge." Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan compared the signature on the certification with the (SBTC). TLCC claims that SBTC was grossly negligent in allowing the encashment of three (3) checks all
signatures of the petitioner on documents filed with the court, and which were proved to be genuine. payable to cash and all drawn against their deposit account with SBTC despite the forgery of the
drawer’s signature. TLCC requested that the amount wrongfully encashed amounting to a total of
Rule 132 Sec 22 How genuineness of handwriting proved
P300,000.00 be credited back to their account but despite demand, SBTC did not heed their request.
G.R. No. 92159 July 1, 1993 Further TLCC claims that per findings of the PC Crime Laboratory, the signatures the authorized
LEDITA BURCE JACOB and BUENAVENTURA JACOB, petitioners, signatories of plaintiff were forged.
vs. Petitioner bank alleged that the failure of TLCC to produce the originals of the checks was a
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO ALCERA FALCON, TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ and PURIFICACION ALCERA fatal omission inasmuch as there would be no evidentiary basis for the court to declare that the
CHAY, rep. by TRINIDAD ALCERA CRUZ, respondents. instruments were forgeries. Further it is of the contention that the opinion of the PC Crime Laboratory
examiner has no weight and deserves no consideration as she did not use as basis of her analytical study
the standard signatures of Chun Yun Kit and Co YokTeng on the specimen signature cards.
Defendant also claims that the savings account pass book and the check booklets were kept by
the plaintiff in its filing cabinet but on March 23, 1987 the plaintiff herein discovered that the door of his
office was forced open including that of the filing cabinet where the check booklets and other bank
documents were being kept by the plaintiff. Defendant further claims that the incident was not reported
to the police authorities by the plaintiff nor was there any advice given to defendant bank and that on
the same day of the discovery by plaintiff of the burglary, said plaintiff nevertheless made three
separate deposits in a total amount of P374,554.10. Defendant also claims that immediately after the
said deposit of P374,554.10 has been made by the plaintiff, three checks namely: check no. 466779
dated March 23, 1987 in the amount of P130,000.00; check no. 466779 dated March 23, 1987 of
P150,000.00 and check no. 466780 dated March 24, 1987 in the amount of P20,000.00 which [were] all
payable to cash were successively presented to defendant bank for encashment which was given due
course by the latter after said checks have passed through the standard bank procedure for verification
the check signatures and the regularity of the material particular of said checks.
On the basis of such factual environment, the trial court found no preponderance of evidence
to support private respondent's complaint. The private respondent failed to show that the signatures on
the subject checks were forged. It did not even present in court the originals of the checks. Neither did it
16
 Evidence Rule 132
bother to explain its failure to do so. Thus, it could be presumed that the original checks were willfully The records only showed mere photocopies of the specimen signatures. Nobody was presented
suppressed and would be adverse to private respondent's case if produced. Moreover, the signatures on to prove that the specimens were those of the authorized signatories. The Crime Laboratory examiner
the checks were not compared with the specimen signatures appearing on the specimen signatures never saw the parties write the specimen signatures, thus she could not be considered to have adequate
cards provided by the private respondent upon opening its current account with petitioner. Thus, the knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures on the questioned checks were
opinion of the expert witness is not worthy of credit. Besides, the private respondent failed to present claimed to be forged. That knowledge could be obtained either by (a) seeing the person write some
Mr. Co Yok Teng, one of the signatories of the checks in question, to deny the genuineness of the other documents or signatures (ex visu scriptionis); (b) seeing documents otherwise known to him to
signatures. have been written by the person in question (ex scriptis olim visis); or (c) examining, in or out of court,
RTC: dismissed for lack of merit for failure of the respondent to exercise due diligence and report the for the express purpose of obtaining such knowledge, the documents said to have been written by the
loss of the passbook and check booklets person in question (ex comparatione scriptorum).
CA: reversed ordered reimbursement for petitioners admission in its answer and failure to detect the The examiner could not be a witness under the first and the second and even on the third.
forgery as well as to notify the respondent of the encashment of more than 10k Under the third, it is essential that (a) certain specimens of handwriting were seen and considered by
her and (b) they were genuinely written by the person in question. Now, as stated above, the examiner
had no adequate basis for concluding that the alleged specimen signatures in the long bond paper were
ISSUE/S: indeed the signatures of the parties whose signatures in the checks were claimed to have been forged.
1. Whether or not forgery was duly established. Moreover, we do not think that the alleged specimens were sufficient in number.
2. Whether or not there was proper identification of the handwriting of the authorized signatories. RULE 132 SECTION 23 - Public Documents as Evidence
RULING: ROSA DUPILAS, administratrix of the estate of the deceased, CECILIO ALUMISING, Plaintiff-Appellant,
1. No, forgery was not duly established. Petitioner categorically denied that the signatures on the v. VICTORIANO CABACUNGAN, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
questioned checks were forgeries. However, by way of an alternative affirmative defense, petitioner Facts:
contended that it had exercised reasonable degree of diligence in detecting whether there was forgery On September 29, 1892, Gregorio Cabacungan, Marcelino Cabacungan, and Mariano Cabacungan
Even assuming that the signatures on the checks were forged, still petitioner could not be held liable for obtained from the Spanish government state grants parcels of land located in the sitio of Patalan,
the value of the checks because all the checks were complete and regular on their face. The alleged municipality of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac.
forged signatures were "sufficiently adroit as to escape detection even under the officer's scrutiny."
The titles were duly registered, the three grantees appeared before a notary public and duly executed
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was not complied with by private respondent. The Exhibits D, E, and F, wherein they acknowledged having sold for cash in hand on that day their
Section explicitly provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence respective parcels of land to Leon Alumising. These documents were likewise duly registered. Leon
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The said policeman, to whom the originals Alumising died in 1897, leaving surviving him his wife and two daughters, where thry sold the lands to
were allegedly under custody was not presented. It was not also shown that the case falls under the Cecilio Alumising, brother of Leon Alumising, This purchase and sale is evidenced by a duly executed and
exceptions provided in the Rules allowing mere photocopies. Thus, the original must be presented. ratified notarial document, but not registered. Subsequent to the death of Cecilio Alumising, Rosa
2. No, the standard or the exemplar must therefore be proved to be genuine. For the purpose Dupilas, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Alumising instituted this action for the
of proving the genuineness of a handwriting provided by Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. purpose of recovering the possession of the parcels of land, together with damages for the illegal
The proper procedure in the investigation of a disputed handwriting was not observed. Thus, detention of the same.
the opinion of the Crime Laboratory Examiner could not be given credence. The rule is that the Several of the defendants denied the allegations and claimed exclusive ownership of the parcels of land.
genuineness of a standard writing may be established by any of the following: (1) by the admission of Whereas, Marcelino Cabacungan and Victoriano Cabacungan answered, denying all the allegations in
the person sought to be charged with the disputed writing made at or for the purposes of the trial, or the complaint, and interposed a counterclaim in which they alleged that Leon Alumising obtained the
by his testimony; (2) by witnesses who saw the standards written or to whom or in whose hearing the deeds (Exhibits D, E, and F) and the possession of the state grants by means of fraud, and prayed for
person sought to be charged acknowledged the writing thereof; (3) by evidence showing that the affirmative relief to the effect that the deeds and the states grants be returned to them.
reputed writer of the standard has acquiesced in or recognized the same, or that it has been adopted A judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants.
and acted upon by him in his business transactions or other concerns.
It was found out that the Cabacungans, as a matter of fact, never sold the lands to Leon Alumising.
Exhibits D, E, and F were executed at the instance of Leon Alumising in order that he might sell or pledge
the lands for the Cabacungans. The Gregorio Cabacungan debt to Leon of P77.50 was paid during the
17
 Evidence Rule 132
lifetime of the latter. At the time Leon’s widow attempted to sell the lands to Cecilio Alumising, Cecilio, evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called to testify as mandated in Sec. 35,
who lived in the same community, knew that the lands were then in the possession of the Cabacungans Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
and had been all the time. He also knew that neither Leon nor Alejandra had ever been in possession Issue:
and had ever received any of the products from the land. If he pad the widow the amount stated in the Whether or not the testimony of a witness inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered at
document, he did so with full knowledge of these facts. the time the witness is called to testify.
Ruling:
Issue: Whether or not Cecilio Alumising acquired title to the lands by virtue of the document executed in The petition is devoid of merit.
his favor by Alejandra, the wife of Leon.
The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court to rule
intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a general rule, the
Ruling: The solution of this question depends upon the effect produced by the registration of Exhibits D, proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the proponent offers evidence
E, and F. deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to
object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made
Public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of
execution and of the date of the latter.They shall also be evidence against the contracting parties and objections.
their legal representatives with regard to the declarations the former may have made therein. Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private
This establishes a rule of evidence with reference to the probative force of public documents. This rule is respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object
not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document in conclusive evidence against the at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably apparent the moment
contracting parties as to the truthfulness of the statements made therein. Neither from any other private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been made by the proponent.
provision of law, may it be concluded that public documents have always greater weight than any other Her failure to make known her objection at the proper time, the procedural error or defect was
evidence. waived. 
Public documents n general, are perfect evidence, even against third persons, if the act which the RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence
officer witnessed and certified to or the date written by him in the document are not shown to be G.R. No. 116149 November 23, 1995
false; but they are not perfect evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made ELVIRA MATO VDA. DE OÑATE, substituted by her heirs MARIA MATO-ALAMEDA, AIDA MATO, ZOE
therein by the interested parties. MATO, PACITA MATO and JUAN MATO II, petitioners,
Cecilio’s purchase was subject to the defendant’s rights and that the recording of Exhibits D, E, and F, vs.
which were obtained by means of fraud.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EULALIA M. TAGUBA, respondents.
Rule 132 Section 34 Offer of Evidence
Facts:
G.R. No. 105813 September 12, 1994
Taguba in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba, filed an action for
CONCEPCION M. CATUIRA, petitioner, specific performance with damages against Vda. de Oñate. Taguba alleged that Leonor bought a parcel
vs. of land from Vda. de Oñate for a consideration of P5,000 payable in 4 installments. After full payment,
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. the parties however failed to reduce their contract in writing. Leonor died later. Demand was but Vda.
Facts: de Oñate refused to execute a public document of sale in favor of Leonor.
Two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira with the The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for having issued two (2) checks in payment of her obligation to Vda. de Oñate appealed to the Court of Appeals faulting the trial court's factual findings. They
private complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to cover the same, which contended that the trial court erred when it took cognizance of the plaintiff's evidence, particularly
checks upon presentment for payment were dishonored by the drawee bank. Exhibits "F," "F-1," "F-2" and "F-3" (receipts of the 4 installment payments), which had been marked but
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira filed a Motion to never formally submitted in evidence as required by the Rules of Court. Consequently, it was claimed
Dismiss (by way of Demurrer to Evidence) under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal that the trial court erred in relying on the said evidence in deciding for private respondents.
Procedure. Petitioner contended that the testimony of private respondent Ocampo was inadmissible in
18
 Evidence Rule 132
CA affirmed RTC decision. Filipina filed a petition for legal separation.The action was later amended to a petition for separation of
Issue: property which was granted by the court.
May the four receipts not formally offered be admitted in evidence?
Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband claiming that we was fetching
Held: her son and while she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
Yes. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: The court shall consider no evidence which computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit her only when he thought she was dead. The RTC convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific physical injuries.
Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary
evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent. The petition was
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party granted on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial respondent.
court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground
However, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and of psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition of Filipina Sy. The Court of Appeals which
considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. Issue: Whether or not a party can raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
In the case at bench, these requisites have been satisfied.
Ruling: Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
The evidence in question were marked at the pre-trial for the purpose of identifying them. Taguba marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual
identified the said exhibits in her testimony which was duly recorded. Herein subject exhibits were also celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license
incorporated and made part of the records of this case. (Vda. de Onate vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. are different and incongruous.
116149, November 23, 1995)
Finally, petitioners' allegation that an action for specific performance cannot be availed of in this case
because the parties did not agree on a fixed price is likewise devoid of merit. Private respondent's Litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of
evidence and testimony remain unrebutted that the contract price for the parcel of land in question is fair play and justice.However, certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so
P5,000.00. doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.
The case at bar requires that issue be addressed regarding the validity of the marriage between Filipina
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order
COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties.
Facts:
It was shown that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage. Their union was license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
blessed with two children. contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30
Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children
were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence Indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity
at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila. between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
19
 Evidence Rule 132
marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,
1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion
is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence
G.R. No. 94736 June 26, 1998
MELECIO MACASIRAY, VIRGILIO GONZALES, and BENEDICTO GONZALES, petitioners, SHERATON PALACE VS. QUIJANO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ROSALINA RIVERA VDA. DE 64 OG 9116
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Facts: FACTS:

The plaintiff in this case, Sheraton had instituted a suit for the recovery of a sum of money

amounting to $1,257.34 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency from defendant Cristina Quijano for
the latter’s alleged unpaid hotel charges when the defendant stayed and lodged in plaintiff’s hotel
in San Francisco, California. 

Plaintiff relies upon Exhibit E-1, which is a letter of Muellerand McLeod, plaintiff’s lawyer in the US, to

plaintiff’s counsel in the Philippines, in an attemptto show that it was the defendant who asked that her
hotel accounts be charged against FredDevine and Company, but the latter declined to pay the bills
claiming that it had not authorizedthe defendant to charge any of her hotel bills
to it. Such evidence was presented together with thetestimony of Atty. Syquia, the plaintiff’s counsel. Th
e trial court rendered judgment dismissing thecomplaint alleging that defendant’sstay at the hotel
was as a guest of a certain Fred Devine whohad assumed to pay all the costs for his account.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Exhibit E-1 constitutes proof of facts related therein independent of thetestimony of
Atty. Syquia.

RULING:
A document or writing which is admitted not as an independent evidence but
merely as part of the testimony of a witness or merely insofar as such witness has made reference
theretoin the course of his testimony, does not constitute proof of facts related therein. It was correct
forthe trial court not to admit the said documentary evidence as an independent piece of
evidence but merely as part of the testimony of Atty. Syquia or merely insofar as Atty.
Syquia has madereference thereto in the course of his testimony so that it cannot constitute proof the
facts relatedin the said exhibit.

Hence, the recitals contained in it about defendant’s request that the bills be charged against Fred
Devine, that the plaintiff extended credit to defendant but Fred Devine refused to pay on the ground
that it did not authorize the defendant to charge it with her hotel bills cannot now be considered as

20
 Evidence Rule 132
evidence in this case as the appellant had not assigned as an error the ruling of the trial acourt admitting prosecution witness Madaraog.The identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open
the said exhibit merely as part of testimony of Atty. Syquia and not as independent evidence. to doubt and cannot serve as a basis for conviction of petitioner.

Besides, the statements in Exh. E-1 to the effect that “when Ms. Quijano came to the hotel, she told Firstly, it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog
them that her bills would be charged to Fred Devine and Company” and that her request, credit was actually saw petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog
extended to her and her bills were sent to Fred Devine and Company, which refused to pay the same are described petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his eyebrows. While Quintal also described
hearsay in nature as they are based on info furnished to plaintiff’s lawyer in America, who wrote the petitioner as 5'3" and with a black mole between his eyebrows. As it turned out, petitioner has no mole
letter, thus having no probative force. but only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall. There is a big difference
between a mole and a scar.

RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence The NBI agent present during the identification of petitioner was not presented to belie petitioner's
testimony. Consequently, the identification of the petitioner in the NBI headquarters is seriously flawed.
ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The mode of identification other than an identification parade is a show-up, the presentation of a single
respondents. suspect to a witness for purposes of identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it constitutes the
most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
Facts:
RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence
Accused was charged with robbery. Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. The other
three (3) are still at-large. RUMBAWA v CA 253 SCRA 78

The incident was reported to the police authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Madaraog and Quintal described the physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI
cartographer. One of those drawn by the artist was a person with a large mole between his
eyebrows.Petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was
pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at
bench.

Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, on the other hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient
identification by the prosecution.

The trial court convicted petitioner of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
assailed Decisions.

Issue: Whether or not the lower courts erred in ignoring or disregarding the glaring and fatal infirmities
of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, specially as identification, as well as to the palpable
improbability of herein petitioner having been a supposed participant in the offenses charged.

Ruling:

Evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but the same must
be credible in itself. The trial court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of

21
 Evidence Rule 132
Held:

1.] No.

RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence No rule in criminal jurisprudence is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and should
be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by
G.R. No. 121204 December 2, 1999 eyewitnesses to the crime. In other words, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses 23 as in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Assuming arguendo that prosecution witness Felix Timkang's testimony is indeed uncorroborated, the
vs.
alleged singularity of his testimonial declarations does not make them any less credible. The Court has
PACIFICO BARELLANO @ "Junior", accused-appellant. consistently stated, time and again, that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, will
suffice to sustain a judgment of conviction even in a charge for murder.
Facts:
Timkang, whose highest educational attainment is Grade 3, could understand neither English nor
Epifanio Cabales and his friends Simplicio Garong, Benjamin Alico and Jose Dayola were drinking tuba in Cebuano and only speaks the Matalomon dialect, 31 remained consistent particularly in stressing the
the evening of August 14, 1993 at the side of the auditorium in the middle of Barangay Tigbao, proximity between him and accused-appellant when the latter shot the victim, despite being intensely
Matalom, Leyte when he was approached from behind and shot at the right side of the head with a .38 grilled by the trial court itself.
(paltik) revolver. He tell down on the ground face up. As he lay thus, his assailant fired a second shot
which hit him at the right side of his upper lip. Thereafter, the malefactor walked away and then fired a Contrary, however, to the claim of accused-appellant, Felix Timkang's account was corroborated by
third shot in the air. Benjamin Alico who was also drinking tuba with Timkang, Simplicio Garong, Jose Dayola and the victim
at the time the latter was shot.
Accused, Pacifico Barellano @ "Junior" was indicted for Murder.
2.] No.
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The argument that the xerox copy of the autopsy report should not be admitted in evidence inspite of
Trial Court: convicted the accused of the charge. his counsel's admission of its authenticity will not extricate accused-appellant from his predicament.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the document is indeed inadmissible in evidence and is not
Accused-appellant's defense is alibi. In insisting on his innocence, he claims that:
given any evidentiary weight, still it would not alter the judgment of conviction because accused-
Issue: appellant was found guilty primarily on the basis of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. The fact of death was sufficiently established through the
1.] the testimony of prosecution witness Felix Timkang which is the only one material from among the credible and straightforward testimonies of these eyewitnesses who saw the victim die as a result of the
testimonial evidence presented, is not corroborated by any witness; gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-appellant.

2.] the autopsy report which is a machine copy of the original should not be admitted in evidence At any rate, it is a trifle too late at this time for accused-appellant to raise the question of the autopsy
despite the admission of said document by accused-appellant's counsel during trial; report's supposed lack of evidentiary value because he never objected to its admissibility when it was
offered in evidence and was, in fact, admitted to be genuine by his counsel during trial. The rule is that
3.] Jose Dayola was not presented as a witness, neither did he execute an affidavit regarding the evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at
shooting incident; and its judgment.
22
 Evidence Rule 132
3.]No. RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence

The prosecution has [the] discretion to decide on who to call as witness during trial and its failure to do G.R. No. 92067 March 22, 1991
so did not give rise to the presumption that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced" 54 since the evidence was at the disposal of both parties. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that Dayola's testimony would merely be corroborative of that of vs.
the two eyewitnesses. Suffice it to state in this regard that the adverse evidentiary presumption invoked
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEPH L.G. CHUA and JALECO DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents.
by accused-appellant does not apply when testimony of the witness not produced would only be
corroborative. 56 In other words, no prejudicial inference can arise against a party who fails to call a Facts:
witness where the only object of presenting him would be to produce corroborative or cumulative
evidence. Philippine Bank of Communications' (PBCOM) filed a complaint for annulment of a Deed of Exchange
executed by respondent Joseph L.G. Chua in favor of Jaleco Development, Inc. (JALECO). The deed of
RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence exchange was alleged to be in fraud of PBCOM as creditor of Chua who previously signed as one of the
sureties in three (3) Surety Agreements executed in favor of PBCOM. It involved a transfer by Chua of his
PEOPLE v SANCEZ 308SCRA 264
real property in exchange for shares of stocks of JALECO.

April 14, 1976, Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. executed a Surety Agreement in favor of
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM for short) with defendant-appellee Joseph L.G.
Chua, as one of the sureties (Exh. "A").

October 1, 1981, Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. executed another Surety Agreement in favor of
PBCOM with Chua likewise acting as one of the sureties (Exh. "A-1").

March 7, 1983 to May 3, 1983 Fortune Motors, (Phils.) thru its authorized officers and/or
RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence representatives executed several trust receipts (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", "B-4", "B-5"
and "B-6") in favor of PBCOM, the total principal amount of which was P2,492,543.00.
PEOPLE v FRANCO 269SCRA211
March 6, 1981, Forte Merchant Finance, Inc., executed a Surety Agreement in favor of
PBCOM with Joseph L.G. Chua as one of the sureties (Exh. "A-2").

On May 13, 1983 to March 16, 1984, Forte Merchant Finance, Inc. obtained credit
accommodations from PBCOM in the form of trust receipt (Exh. "B-7") and loans represented
by promissory notes (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2", and "C-3") in the total amount of
P2,609,862.00.

On October 24, 1983 Chua executed a Deed of Exchange (Exh. "F") transferring a parcel of
land with improvements thereon covered by TCT No. S-52808 (343721) to JALECO
Development, Inc., in exchange for 12,000 shares of said Corporation with a par value of
23
 Evidence Rule 132
P1,200,000.00. As a result, TCT No. 126573 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering the 2. WON property in dispute would be made to answer for the liability. Since JOSEPH L.G. CHUA is
aforementioned parcel of land was issued in the name of JALECO Development, Inc., on liable for the creditors of Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc and the Forte Merchant Finance, Inc. And
November 24, 1983. considering his only property was sold to JALECO.

On November 2, 1983, Chua sold 6,000 shares of JALECO Development, Inc., to Mr. Chua HELD:
Tiong King for P600,000.00 (Exh. "10"-Chua; Exh. "3"-JALECO) and another 6,000 shares of
JALECO Development, Inc. to Guillermo Jose, Jr. also for P600,000.00 (Exh. "5"-JALECO) and 1. No. Action is teneable.
Caw Le Ja Chua, wife of Chua sold the 6,000 share of JALECO Development, Inc., to Chua
In his answer, respondent Chua admitted; the said Deed of Exchange (Annex "F") was done in good
Tiong King for P200,000.00 (Exh. "11"-Chua).
faith, was done in accordance with law and same is valid. Chua's admission of the existence of the
In the meanwhile, for failure of both Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. and Forte Merchant Deed of Exchange, attached to the "Petition as Annex "F" falls squarely within the scope of Judicial
Finance, Inc. to meet their respective financial obligations with PBCOM, the latter filed Civil Admissions under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Case No. 84-25159 against Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc., Joseph L. G. Chua, George D. Tan,
As early as 1925 in the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. (48 Phil. 529), we
Edgar L. Rodriguez and Jose C. Alcantara and Civil Case No. 84-25160 against Forte Merchant
have ruled that documents attached to the complaint are considered a part thereof and may be
Finance, Inc., Joseph L. G. Chua, George O. Tan and Edgar L. Rodriguez with the Regional Trial
considered as evidence although they were not introduced as such.
Court of Manila, both for Sum of Money with Writ of Preliminary Attachment where PBCOM
was able to obtain a notice of levy on the properties of Fortune Motors (Phils.) covered by For its part, JALECO stated in its Answer that it has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
TCT No. S-41915 (Makati, MM IV) and S-54185 to 86 (Province of Rizal). When plaintiff was belief as to the truth of the allegation contained in pars. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the
able to locate Chua's former property situated in Dasmariñas, Makati, Metro Manila, covered Petitioner; (Paragraph 12 refers to the deed of exchange in the petition.)
by TCT No. S-52808 containing an area of 1,541 square meters which was already transferred
to JALECO Development, Inc., under TCT No. 126573 by virtue of the Deed of Exchange dated The Deed of Exchange was attached to the petition. Necessarily, JALECO's contention that it has no
October 24, 1983, PBCOM filed Civil Case No. 7889 for annulment of Deed of Exchange with knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the deed of exchange becomes
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. an invalid or ineffective denial pursuant to the Rules of Court. Under the circumstances, the
petitioner could have easily asserted whether or not it executed the deed of exchange.
RTC: dissmissed the case. The Deed of Exchange was neither submitted nor offered as evidence
rendering the petitioner's cause of action untenable. Considering the admission by Chua and the non-denial by JALECO of the document forming part of
the petition, the appellate court committed reversible error in not admitting the deed of exchange as
CA: affirmed. adding the case for annulment of the deed of exchange was filed at a time when two evidence.
(2) other cases for sums of money were filed against the respondent as one of the sureties of
Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. (Civil Case No. 84-25159) and of Forte Merchant Finance, Inc. (Civil Case 2. Yes.
No. 84-25160) which are both pending. Hence, the annulment case which was filed in the hope of
Upon investigation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the petitioner gathered the
receiving favorable judgments in the two (2) other cases in the future is premature. Finally, the
following facts based on the SEC records: a) JALECO was organized on November 2, 1982 with a
appellate court stated that the petitioner's interests in the meantime are sufficiently protected by a
capital stock of P5,000,000.00; b) the stockholders of said corporation were mostly members of the
writ of preliminary attachment on several properties of one of the principal debtors.
immediate family of Joseph L. G. Chua; c) on April 4, 1983, a Board Resolution was passed authorizing
ISSUE: the issuance of 12,000 shares of stocks worth Pl,200,000.00 to a new subscriber and non-stockholder
Joseph L. G. Chua; and d) prior to the acquisition by the corporation of the property located at
1. WON the cause of action is untenable since the Deed of Exchange was never formally offered. Dasmariñas Village, Makati, the percentage of the shareholding of the members of the family of

24
 Evidence Rule 132
Joseph L. G. Chua was 88% while after the acquisition of the property and the issuance of the shares
to Chua, they owned 94% of the corporation.

In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that Chua and his immediate family control JALECO.
The Deed of Exchange executed by Chua and JALECO had for its subject matter the sale of the only
property of Chua at the time when Chua's financial obligations became due and demandable. The
records also show that despite the "sale", respondent Chua continued to stay in the property, subject
matter of the Deed of Exchange.

These circumstances tend to show that the Deed of Exchange was not what it purports to be.
Instead, they tend to show that the Deed of Exchange was executed with the sole intention to
defraud Chua's creditor—the petitioner. It was not a bona fide transaction between JALECO and
Chua. Chua entered a sham or simulated transaction with JALECO for the sole purpose of transferring
the title of the property to JALECO without really divesting himself of the title and control of the said
property.

Hence, JALECO's separate personality should be disregarded and the corporation veil pierced. In this
regard, the transaction leading to the execution of the Deed of Exchange between Chua and JALECO
must be considered a transaction between Chua and himself and not between Chua and JALECO.
Indeed, Chua took advantage of his control over JALECO to execute the Deed of Exchange to defraud
his creditor, the petitioner herein. JALECO was but a mere alter ego of Chua.

The Deed of Exchange executed by and between Joseph L. G. Chua and JALECO Development, Inc.,
and the title issued in the name of JALECO on the basis thereof are declared NULL and VOID.

RULE 132 SECTION 34 - Offer of Evidence

RAMOS v DIZON 498 SCRA 17

25