Wherever You Go There You Becom - How Mindfulness Arises in Everyday

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp
Wherever you go, there you become: How mindfulness arises in everyday
situations
Christopher S. Reinaa, Ravi S. Kudesiab,
⁎
a
Virginia Commonwealth University, United States
b
Temple University, United States
ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
Keywords: In this article, we suggest that mindfulness is not something entirely inherent within people but is partly elicited
Mindfulness and shaped by situations. Integrating research on metacognitive practice and self-regulation, we introduce a
Attention theoretical framework that explains how mindfulness arises based on capacity for self-regulation as well as three
Metacognition motivational forces: metacognitive beliefs that drive resources into self-regulation, mental fatigue that draws
Self-regulation
resources away from self-regulation, and situational appraisals that influence how much self-regulation is
Experience sampling
Cognitive resources
needed to maintain mindfulness. Across three experience sampling studies that include 558 participants and
Individual differences 9,390 responses, we find that: mindfulness depends less on people’s overall capacity for self-regulation than it
Mental fatigue does on the metacognitive beliefs that motivate them to allocate their resources, these metacognitive beliefs can
Motivation compensate for the negative role of mental fatigue, and situations can influence mindfulness both by pulling
attention toward tasks (e.g., with challenging tasks) and away from them (e.g., with organizational hindrances).
In sum, this article clarifies the understudied antecedents of mindfulness through a theoretical framework and
empirical findings.
1. Introduction Atkins, 2015). What has not been adequately addressed so far, either
empirically or especially at the theoretical level, are the antecedents of
In his early and influential treatment of mindfulness, Kabat-Zinn mindfulness: what makes people more or less mindful from one situa-
(1994) famously remarked that “wherever you go, there you are.” It is tion to the next? If mindfulness indeed produces positive outcomes, it
the quality of mind we bring into situations which determines our fate, seems important to identify what, in turn, produces mindfulness. And to
he suggests, rather than the situations themselves. And mindfulness the extent that mindfulness levels fluctuate from situation to situation,
entails a particular quality of mind: a quality in which people are at- it becomes likely that features of situations can help to elicit or erode
tentive to ongoing events and flexible in how they interpret them, and mindfulness.
that may therefore help people make the most of the situations in which The purpose of the present research is to develop these much-
they find themselves (Bishop et al., 2004; Garland, Gaylord, & needed theoretical underpinnings of the antecedents of mindfulness and
Fredrickson, 2011). As a result, it becomes incumbent on all of us to be to bring empirical results to bear on them. We develop these under-
more mindful: to invoke this particular quality of mind “on purpose” as pinnings through a theoretical model that extends recent insights about
we enter into situations (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4). The underlying pre- mindfulness as metacognitive practice (Kudesia, 2019) in light of re-
mise is that mindfulness is something that people carry within them- search on self-regulation in the workplace (Beal, Weiss, Barros, &
selves, which they then bring into their everyday situations. As mind- MacDermid, 2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Lian, Yam, Ferris, &
fulness research has become increasingly prevalent within Brown, 2017). This theoretical model emphasizes the ways in which
organizational behavior, this premise has grown with it, largely un- mindfulness is elicited both by the situations in which people find
challenged. The vast majority of research, as a result, concerns the themselves and by characteristic features of people that remain more
consequences of mindfulness—i.e., what happens if people bring stable across situations. In particular, it has long been recognized that
greater mindfulness into their situations?—typically finding that mindfulness relies on a capacity for self-regulation, particularly those
mindfulness has positive outcomes (e.g., Good et al., 2016; Reb & processes that regulate attention, thoughts, and feelings (e.g., Hölzel
⁎
Department of Human Resource Management, Fox School of Business, Temple University, 1801 Liacouras Walk, 344 Alter Hall 006-13, Philadelphia, PA 19122,
United States.
E-mail address: [email protected] (R.S. Kudesia).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.11.008
Received 31 December 2017; Received in revised form 12 November 2019; Accepted 25 November 2019
0749-5978/ © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article as: Christopher S. Reina and Ravi S. Kudesia, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.11.008
C.S. Reina and R.S. Kudesia Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
et al., 2011; Vago & Silbersweig, 2012). The theoretical model in- emphasizes a similar possibility by describing mindfulness as emerging
troduced here explains how mindfulness arises as a function of both a from a “coming together” of people and situations, such that mindful
person’s capacity for self-regulation and their motivation to enact self- states cannot be explained solely by factors inherent within people that
regulation, where the motivational aspects of mindfulness have re- remain consistent across situations (Kudesia, 2019, p. 415). Metacog-
ceived little attention to date. The theoretical model more specifically nitive practice instead suggests that a fuller set of factors underlie the
explains how mindfulness levels depend on the interplay of three mo- expression of mindfulness. These factors include not only people’s ca-
tivational forces: metacognitive beliefs that drive resources into self- pacity for self-regulation, but also their motivation to enact self-reg-
regulation, feelings of mental fatigue that draw resources away from ulation, which depends in part on how people appraise their current
self-regulation, and features of situations that influence how much self- situation.
regulation is needed to maintain mindfulness. Ultimately, mindfulness relies on the self-regulatory processes by
By better elaborating the set of processes that underlie the expres- which people monitor and adjust their attention, thoughts, and feelings.
sion of mindfulness, from the more stable aspects of capacity for self- When the mind drifts off or gets immersed in a stream of thoughts and
regulation to the more dynamic appraisals of situations that shape how feelings, people must notice their state of mind and adjust it, by
this capacity is allocated on a momentary basis, this model provides a bringing their attention back to ongoing events or detaching from that
foundation to study the antecedents of mindfulness. Indeed, this theo- stream of thoughts and feelings (e.g., Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall,
retical model motivates three experience sampling studies—one ex- Duncan, & Barsalou, 2012; Hölzel et al., 2011; Malinowski, 2013; Vago
ploratory study followed by two confirmatory studies that replicate and & Silbersweig, 2012). Unless people can enact these self-regulatory
extend the first—which jointly offer new insight into how mindfulness processes of monitoring and adjusting, they will be unable to maintain
arises in situations. This research therefore not only helps scholars to states of mindfulness. What has remained underspecified in mindfulness
conceptualize the antecedents of mindfulness and understand how research is how people’s capacity and motivation to engage in these
these antecedents should be empirically studied, but it also has bearing self-regulation processes are themselves determined. However, because
on how mindfulness should be trained and how practitioners can design these processes of monitoring and adjusting are so fundamental to self-
work to enhance mindfulness in organizations. Taken in sum, in line regulation, they are not exclusive to mindfulness. In fact, these pro-
with the view that cognition in organizations is forever in a dynamic cesses have been discussed extensively in broader workplace self-reg-
process of “becoming” as people enter situations (Tsoukas & Chia, ulation research (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Lian et al., 2017), in-
2002), we suggest the value in a different perspective on mindfulness cluding in terms of their implications for the regulation of attention,
that better integrates the person and situation: “wherever you go, there thoughts, and feelings (Beal et al., 2005; Randall, Oswald, & Beier,
you become.” 2014). And importantly, unlike in the mindfulness literature, the self-
regulation research emphasizes how the processes that give rise to
1.1. Mindfulness and self-regulation mindfulness are not costless to enact, either in terms of capacity or
motivation limitations. Considering the costs of enacting these pro-
As mindfulness has become prevalent within organizational practice cesses as identified in self-regulation research can therefore help ex-
and scholarly research on organizations, there is a growing need to plain how mindfulness arises in situations in a manner that has not yet
situate mindfulness more fully within organizational contexts (Good been widely integrated into mindfulness research. Integrating this self-
et al., 2016; Reb & Atkins, 2015; Sutcliffe, Vogus, & Dane, 2016). Re- regulation research with metacognitive practice can therefore help
cently, metacognitive practice has been introduced as a theory designed provide a foundation to understand how mindfulness arises in situa-
for this purpose (see Kudesia, 2019). Metacognitive practice follows a tions.
growing consensus in psychological and organizational scholarship that
mindfulness is a state that can be characterized by two key components, 1.2. Capacity and motivation in self-regulation
which rely on self-regulation processes to manifest (Bishop et al., 2004;
Garland et al., 2011; Glomb, Duffy, Bono, & Yang, 2011; Hafenbrack, Self-regulation brushes up against limits in both people’s capacity
2017). First, mindfulness entails that people monitor their attention and and motivation (Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015; Lian et al., 2017). A person’s
regulate it toward ongoing events, rather than letting thoughts drift off capacity for self-regulation depends on “the nonmotivational cognitive
into the past or future. This first state of attention directed toward resources serving as an upper boundary on the effort that can be ex-
ongoing events is known as mindful attention. Second, mindfulness en- pended” (Lian et al., 2017, p. 706). This property of limited cognitive
tails that people monitor their thoughts and feelings about these on- resources producing upper bounds in self-regulation capacity has a rich
going events from a more detached perspective, in which they “step history (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Norman &
back” mentally, rather than getting involved in their thoughts and Bobrow, 1975; Wickens, 1984) and remains relevant for workplace self-
feelings. This second state of detached monitoring of thoughts and regulation (Beal et al., 2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Randall et al.,
feelings is called mindful metacognition. Entering states of mindfulness 2014). Cognitive resources refer to the structurally limited amount of
can entail substantive benefits for people. But what factors make people neural information processing power that a person can allocate across
more likely to enter these states? various mental tasks at any one time (Cohen, 2014, pp. 751–758).
Whereas scholars often theorize the factors that make people more Capacity for self-regulation thus partly reflects stable individual dif-
likely to enter states of mindfulness as being entirely “inherent” within ferences in which people “differ in their overall capacity owing to
people, including their “capability, discipline, or inclination,” empirical neuroanatomical differences”—such as those relating to working
work nonetheless reveals that some 71% of people’s mindfulness levels memory, executive functions, or general mental ability (Hofmann,
fluctuate from one situation to the next, with 29% remaining consistent Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015)—and capa-
across situations (Brown & Ryan, 2003, p. 838). Because people’s levels city also partly fluctuates based on temporary factors, such as “stress,
of mindfulness fluctuate so much from situation to situation, it seems alcohol, and sleep deprivation” (Lian et al., 2017, p. 707). Limitations
likely that factors related to situations could influence mindfulness. As in cognitive resources become important because self-regulatory pro-
an analogy, consider flow. Flow, like mindfulness, is a peak psycholo- cesses are the most resource-consuming of the mental tasks that people
gical state (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). The key antecedent enact (Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). Because states of
of flow is the balance between the skills within a person and the mindfulness rely on these resource-consuming self-regulation processes,
challenges posed by the situation (Keller & Landhäußer, 2012). To fully the emergence of mindfulness may depend on a person’s capacity for
understand how flow arises, one must jointly consider the person and self-regulation, that is, on their overall level of cognitive resources
the situation. Neither one alone is sufficient. Metacognitive practice (Isbel & Mahar, 2015; Ruocco & Direkoglu, 2013).
2
Capacity alone, however, only sets an upper boundary on self-reg- objective reality). These three beliefs likely reinforce each other, and
ulation. It is not sufficient to merely have high overall cognitive re- work synergistically. For instance, insofar as holding a virtue of mon-
source levels. People must be motivated to allocate these cognitive re- itoring belief helps people notice their current state of mind, it helps
sources in any specific situation. In particular, people must allocate people put the other two beliefs into practice (Veenman, Van Hout-
their cognitive resources on a situation-to-situation basis across three Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006) and both virtue of monitoring and map-
areas: on-task, off-task, and self-regulation (Beal et al., 2005; Kanfer & terrain differentiation beliefs limit the tendency to see attention as
Ackerman, 1989; Randall et al., 2014). Whether people drive resources depletable (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2013; Saunders, Rodrigo, & Inzlicht,
into self-regulation at all thus depends on motivational factors (Lian 2016). Putting these insights about capacity and motivation together,
et al., 2017). Motivational factors involved in self-regulation are we propose the following:
manifold, and can include: (1) broader intentions to be effective in self-
Proposition 1. Overall cognitive resource level and metacognitive
regulation, (2) current feelings that inform the willingness to self-reg-
beliefs are both associated with greater state mindfulness.
ulate, and (3) appraisals of the amount of resources required to effec-
tively self-regulate in the current situation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989;
Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015). These motivational factors can help connect 1.3.2. Metacognitive beliefs as compensatory for mental fatigue in resource
the more stable and internal aspects of self-regulation capacity to the allocation
more dynamic factors by which specific situations influence a person’s Metacognitive beliefs, however, are not the only motivational factor
mindfulness levels. that could influence the emergence of mindfulness. A second motiva-
tional factor is the feeling of mental fatigue, which should reduce the
1.3. A theoretical model of how mindfulness arises in situations willingness to self-regulate, and thereby reduce mindfulness. Self-reg-
ulatory processes, such as those that regulate attention, are known to
In what follows, we build a theoretical model of how mindfulness generate feelings of mental fatigue (Mulert, Menzinger, Leicht,
arises in situations, which integrates insights from metacognitive Pogarell, & Hegerl, 2005; Sarter, Gehring, & Kozak, 2006). The feeling
practice and self-regulation research. The theoretical model traces the of mental fatigue evolved to play a motivational role in cognitive re-
emergence of mindfulness in situations not only to people’s capacity for source allocation (Hockey, 2011; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014;
self-regulation, but also to three motivational forces: the metacognitive Kurzban et al., 2013). Namely, although mental fatigue can stem from
beliefs that drive their resources into self-regulation, the feelings of many factors, and debate exists about the precise mechanisms through
mental fatigue that draw their resources away from self-regulation, and which it exerts its effects, scholars agree that mental fatigue serves a
the appraisals of situations that influence how much self-regulation motivational role of making people feel as if they cannot continue to
people feel is needed to maintain mindfulness. This theoretical model self-regulate, even if they can (see Kotabe & Hofmann, 2016). This
thereby helps us conceptualize mindfulness as something that arises feeling can be adaptive, as it prompts people to pause their work after
based on the coming together of people and their situations. periods of sustained effort and consume any presently available rewards
in their environment (Evans, Boggero, & Segerstrom, 2016; Hockey,
1.3.1. Cognitive resource level and metacognitive beliefs that motivate 2011; Inzlicht et al., 2014). Without this feeling of mental fatigue, it is
resource allocation possible that available rewards could therefore go unconsumed in the
Turning to the first motivational factor, mindfulness may rely on short-term as people continue self-regulating in favor of their long-term
particular intentions to be effective in self-regulation. Metacognitive goals. For this reason, the feeling of mental fatigue is a central moti-
practice accordingly argues that although “people’s neural capacity to vational factor in the allocation of cognitive resources.
monitor and adjust” certainly matters, mindfulness may be more deeply The feeling of mental fatigue, however, poses a paradox when
implicated in motivational processes “that shape how people monitor or considered in relation to mindfulness (cf. Sonnentag, 2018). On one
adjust” (Kudesia, 2019, p. 413). Mindfulness requires more than the hand, mental fatigue should predict reduced state mindfulness, because
general capacity for self-regulation: it requires specific metacognitive mental fatigue makes people feel as if they cannot continue self-reg-
beliefs that map onto this capacity and help guide how this capacity is ulation (Hülsheger, Walkowiak, & Thommes, 2018). Mental fatigue
utilized. Metacognitive beliefs are beliefs about how the mind works. would therefore help allocate cognitive resources away from the self-
Such beliefs can alter people’s motivation to allocate their cognitive regulatory processes that enable mindfulness. On the other hand,
resources into self-regulation and shape what they envision effective mindfulness is often advocated as an effective means of reducing feel-
self-regulation to look like (Jankowski & Holas, 2014; Teasdale, 1999). ings of mental fatigue (Guidetti, Viotti, Badagliacca, Colombo, &
These beliefs thereby help establish mindfulness as a distinct way of Converso, 2019; Taylor & Millear, 2016). The paradox is thus that
enacting self-regulation that puts these processes of monitoring and mindfulness should become unhelpful in precisely the situations when
adjusting to use in a different manner than the typical. it is most needed. If a person feels mental fatigue, her mindfulness le-
Metacognitive practice identifies three such metacognitive beliefs vels will subsequently drop—leaving her unable to then utilize mind-
that are uniquely emphasized in mindfulness meditation training and fulness as a means to reduce fatigue. Thus, the current understanding of
that supersede typical beliefs about how the mind works and how self- the relation between mental fatigue and mindfulness implies a vicious
regulation should be enacted in order to be effective. In contrast to cycle, in which one must already not feel fatigued in order to utilize the
typical beliefs, in mindfulness, the monitoring process does not merely mindfulness that then helps them reduce their fatigue. This paradox, if
serve to trigger the adjusting process (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, true, suggests that some other additional process may be needed to
Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Rather, monitoring is important in its own right restore mindfulness (e.g., psychological detachment; Haun, Nübold, &
because when people change how they monitor their state of mind, Bauer, 2018).
their state of mind can itself change. These three beliefs are thought to Metacognitive practice can help reconcile this paradox. A key
enhance the expression of mindfulness in everyday situations, particu- function of metacognitive beliefs is to give people the agency to over-
larly by changing how people monitor, and thus adjust, their attention, ride default responses to situations (Kudesia, 2019). Because mental
thoughts, and feelings (Kudesia, 2019). The three metacognitive beliefs fatigue is motivational, in that it does not necessarily indicate that the
are attentional sufficiency (the belief that attention is not depleted with capacity for self-regulation is limited, people can choose to heed or
use over time), virtue of monitoring (the belief that it is valuable to notice override its default motivational effects in any specific situation
one’s internal thoughts and feelings, even unpleasant ones, rather than (Kotabe & Hofmann, 2016). Although all people will feel mental fa-
avoiding them), and map-terrain differentiation (the belief that one’s tigue, and mental fatigue may thus influence their resource allocation,
thoughts and feelings about a situation need not necessarily reflect any metacognitive beliefs can help compensate for this influence by offering
3
a competing motivation. Believing that attention is sufficient rather Gneezy, & Bos, 2017). The smartphone’s presence thereby increases the
than scarce (attentional sufficiency), that there is value in noticing the amount of self-regulation needed to maintain the same mindfulness
feeling of mental fatigue rather than having it, and its default motiva- level as would be possible in its absence. Situations with high atten-
tional influence, go unnoticed (virtue of monitoring), and that one need tional demands thus function as encumbrances, as even greater self-
not treat the feeling that self-regulation is limited as necessarily true regulation is needed to facilitate mindfulness in the presence of these
(map-terrain differentiation) can help people exert greater agency over demands. Appraisals of work situations in terms of their attentional pull
their resource allocation. Even if they feel mental fatigue, they can and attentional demands show how mindfulness can be elicited in
nonetheless allocate resources in a way that enhances mindfulness. This concert with situations. To the extent that situations pull attention to-
theorizing helps augment the current understanding of the relation ward tasks, they serve to supplement the self-regulation processes that
between mindfulness and mental fatigue: there is no need for either a produce mindfulness, and to the extent that situations have attentional
vicious cycle or for any additional processes to restore mindfulness. demands that draw attention away from tasks, they pose additional
Rather, metacognitive beliefs can sustain the allocation of cognitive encumbrances on self-regulation that make mindfulness less likely to
resources to self-regulation processes, even despite the con- arise.
temporaneous demotivating presence of mental fatigue.
Proposition 3. Situations with on-task attentional pull will enhance
Proposition 2. Feelings of mental fatigue will reduce subsequent states state mindfulness, whereas situations with off-task attentional demands
of mindfulness, whereas metacognitive beliefs (held will reduce state mindfulness.
contemporaneously with feelings of mental fatigue) will enhance
Situations may not only influence mindfulness, but their influence
subsequent states of mindfulness, above and beyond the effect of
may be contingent on a person’s capacity and motivation for self-reg-
mental fatigue.
ulation, such as their cognitive resource level and the metacognitive
beliefs that drive resource allocation. Indeed, the degree to which
1.3.3. Situation appraisals as supplementing or encumbering resource people enact self-regulation is a “joint function of the various sources
allocation that factor into control motivation and of trait differences … and state
Given that mindfulness requires allocation of limited cognitive re- influences … that factor into control capacity” (Kotabe & Hofmann,
sources to self-regulation processes, situations can play an important 2015, p. 627). For instance, when situations have more attentional pull,
role in eliciting mindfulness, or in impairing it. In particular, people having a higher overall resource level may become more useful for
recognize various types of situations (such as work or recreation) and maintaining mindfulness, because cognitive resources can continue to
appraise these situations based on their salient characteristics (Edwards be pulled toward the task only up to a person’s upper limit (van der
& Templeton, 2005; Rauthmann, Sherman, & Funder, 2015; Wagerman Meer et al., 2010). In situations that pull attention, mindfulness thus
& Funder, 2009). Metacognitive practice emphasizes that people ac- becomes more likely to the degree that people have cognitive resources
tively adjust their mindfulness levels based on how they appraise the available for use, offering an advantage to those who have more overall
characteristics of their current work situations (Kudesia, 2019). Re- resources. In contrast, when situations lack attentional pull, metacog-
search on self-regulation provides further insight into the specific ap- nitive beliefs may better support mindfulness, as such situations require
praisals people make in their work situations, and how these appraisals an internal source of motivation to continue resource allocation
motivate resource allocation, and thus can influence the emergence of (Kudesia, 2019). People are not limited by their overall capacity in such
mindfulness. situations, but by their motivation to allocate resources in the absence
Namely, when people work, they appraise characteristics of situa- of appraisals that motivate resource allocation. On the other hand,
tions in terms of their “task attentional pull,” which draws cognitive when situations pose high attentional demands, capacity and motiva-
resources toward the task, and their “off-task attentional demands,” tion should both be helpful. Both having available cognitive resources
which draw cognitive resources away from the task (Beal et al., 2005; and being motivated to allocate those resources into self-regulation
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Randall et al., 2014). These appraisals re- should enhance mindfulness, because regardless of the reason the re-
flect the intuitive experience that some situations make it harder or sources are being allocated, having these resources allocated to self-
easier to attend to tasks than do others. Examples of attentional pull regulation will help people overcome the additional encumbrance
include skill-challenge balance noted in flow research among various posed by high attentional demands. Capacity and motivation alike en-
other factors including “the importance of the task, the intrinsic interest able the greater self-regulation needed to facilitate mindfulness in the
of the task, the presence and difficulty of task goals, the existence of presence of such attentional demands.
deadlines, and so forth” (Beal et al., 2005, p. 1059). Attentional de-
Proposition 4. (a) Cognitive resources will especially enhance
mands include factors such as distractions unrelated to the task or
mindfulness in situations where attentional pull is high, whereas
hindrances that make tasks harder to accomplish, and which may
metacognitive beliefs will especially enhance mindfulness when
trigger negative affective reactions (Beal et al., 2005, p. 1058). In other
attentional pull is low. (b) Cognitive resources and metacognitive
words, these characteristics of situations shape the relative ease with
beliefs will both enhance mindfulness in situations where attentional
which one can continuously allocate their cognitive resources toward
demands are high.
the task-at-hand.
As the self-regulation processes underlying mindfulness ensure that
cognitive resources stay allocated to the task-at-hand, rather than
drifting off or getting lost in thoughts and feelings, attentional pull and 2. Overview of studies
attentional demands can thus function as supplements or encumbrances
to the self-regulation process. If a situation helps pull cognitive re- The theoretical model of mindfulness proposed above, and illu-
sources toward the task-at-hand, it essentially performs the same strated in Fig. 1, provides underpinnings to study the antecedents of
function as the self-regulation processes underlying mindfulness. One mindfulness at the level of specific situations. In what follows, we draw
needs to allocate fewer resources to self-regulation because the situa- on this theoretical model to motivate three empirical studies. We begin
tion itself is conducive to states of mindfulness. The opposite is true as with an exploratory initial study to assess the potential of this research
well. Take the example of attempting to perform a task in the presence question. We then replicate and extend findings from this exploratory
of a smartphone. Because the smartphone makes a host of other pos- study across the latter two studies. We finally summarize the pattern of
sible tasks salient, it is incredibly distracting, and pulls cognitive re- results across all three studies in light of our propositions in the dis-
sources away from the task at hand (Kurzban et al., 2013; Ward, Duke, cussion section.
4
tasks, by reducing the need to monitor the actions of others (Mayer &
Gavin, 2005). Focusing on this interpersonal antecedent helps empha-
size that, indeed, factors beyond the individual can still influence their
mindfulness levels in situations.
2.1.2. Off-task attentional demands

Moving to off-task attentional demands, hindrance stressors entail the
uniquely institutional features of situations that limit the ability to al-
locate resources toward tasks, like busy work and other hassles (LePine,
LePine, & Jackson, 2004). They therefore capture one of the most
salient aspects of work design that are known to pose off-task atten-
tional demands, which is why they are a major contributor to failures of
engagement in the workplace (LePine et al., 2004; Podsakoff, LePine, &
LePine, 2007). To the extent that hindrances negatively influence
mindfulness, we can confirm that mindfulness relies on the allocation of
limited resources—and if capacity or motivational factors reduce its
negative influence, we will have identified a crucial buffer for mind-
fulness in organizations. Finally, as noted previously, technology use can
divert resources away from tasks (Ward et al., 2017) and thereby impair
mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 2016), although others suggest that tech-
nology may be actively used to complete tasks with mindfulness (Levy,
2017). The effect of technology use on mindfulness may therefore de-
pend on whether it is being used for passive purposes like social media
Fig. 1. Theoretical model of how mindfulness emerges in situations. or videos or for active purposes like research or word processing. The
former should erode mindfulness whereas the latter may enhance it.
2.1. Selection of situational antecedents This demand was selected primarily for its implications for this prac-
tical debate.
We identified situational antecedents based on a logic of mutual
constraint satisfaction, as the antecedents were selected to simulta- 2.2. Theorizing of situational antecedents
neously: (1) indicate on-task attentional pull or off-task attentional
demand characteristics, (2) be relevant for work situations, (3) and help In selecting these situational antecedents, we sought to maintain
address critical open questions in mindfulness research. We selected parsimony in the total number of constructs while also providing a
three situational features that exert on-task attentional pull (skill- relatively broad exploration of the space of such antecedents. Namely,
challenge balance, conscientiousness goals, positive social interactions) these antecedents concern: the tasks people perform, the tools they use
and two that exert off-task attentional demands (hindrance stressors, in doing so, their goals in engaging the task, hindrances that limit their
technology use). progress, and interactions they have along the way. They also help
address important outstanding questions in mindfulness research, such
as its divergent validity with related constructs and the practical debate
2.1.1. On-task attentional pull over its relation to technology. We also sought to maintain parsimony
For on-task attentional pull, both skill-challenge balance and con- in that we do not separately theorize distinct effects of situations on
scientiousness goals were selected to help establish the divergent va- mindful attention relative to mindful metacognition. The latter choice
lidity of mindfulness from similar constructs. As noted, skill-challenge aligns with Baas and colleagues’ (2014) distinction between the “uni-
balance is the key antecedent of flow, so understanding whether it also formity hypothesis” and the “differential hypothesis” in their study of
predicts mindfulness helps clarify the extent to these two constructs mindfulness and creativity, where their hypotheses concern simply
differ. It also has the benefit of being a quintessential example of at- whether mindfulness components function in a uniform or different
tentional pull (Beal et al., 2005). Conscientiousness goals reflect recent manner, but not why. At the current early stage of theorizing, where
research suggesting that the eponymous personality trait of con- most organizational scholars only assess mindful attention, there is
scientiousness relies on motivational factors to manifest in situations, value even in just assessing both dimensions. From there, in the spirit of
namely goals to be industrious and organized with tasks (McCabe & abduction (Behfar & Okhuysen, 2018), we can note any differential
Fleeson, 2016). Given that mindfulness also entails a rather diligent results and theorize about the causes of those differences a posteriori in
approach to tasks, it is possible that its strong, but unexplained corre- the discussion, rather than attempting to formulate them a priori. In
lation with conscientiousness (Giluk, 2009), could be because they order to take advantage of the replications across studies, such theo-
manifest through analogous situational motivations. Because the mo- rizing about the effects of situational antecedents and the differential
tivational bases of mindfulness are largely unknown but are thought in results for mindfulness components occurs in the general discussion
metacognitive practice to be relatively distinct from the motivations after presenting both the exploratory and confirmatory studies.
that underlie other ways of engaging with tasks, it is therefore im-
portant to see whether the motivational factors that enhance con- 3. Study 1: Exploratory ESM with undergraduate business
scientiousness overlap only minimally with mindfulness. The final on- students
task attentional pull construct, positive social interactions, has been dis-
cussed by organizational scholars (e.g., Kudesia, 2019; Reb, Sim, 3.1. Participants and procedure
Chintakananda, & Bhave, 2015; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006), but so far has
been studied at the between-person level, at which positive interactions Participants were 205 undergraduate business students at a public
with parents (Pepping & Duvenage, 2016) and supervisors (Reb, university in the United States and received course credit (Mage = 23;
Narayanan, & Ho, 2015) relate to trait mindfulness. We explore how its 54% male). They completed an initial assessment of cognitive resource
effects come about at the within-person situational level, as positive levels and a proxy for metacognitive beliefs—as well as trait assess-
social interactions help people allocate their cognitive resources to ments of mindful attention (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and mindful
5
metacognition (Fresco et al., 2007). These measures will soon be de- 3.2.2. Experience sampling measures
tailed. Approximately five days later, they began experience sampling, Mindfulness. Participants reported their mindfulness levels im-
completing surveys of their state mindfulness and situational features mediately prior to receiving the experience sampling request using two
thrice daily (9:30 AM, 2:30 PM, 7:30 PM) for seven consecutive scales. The first assessed mindful attention using the 5-item state Mindful
weekdays (i.e., they were not surveyed on the weekends). Attention Awareness Scale: e.g., “I was doing something without paying
The experience sampling data contain 3,338 responses (77% re- attention” (reverse-scored; Brown & Ryan, 2003), which is the most
sponse rate). Using estimates from prior work, we calculated that our commonly used measure within organizational research (Sutcliffe et al.,
sample size was adequate to detect small or moderate sized cross-level 2016). The second assessed mindful metacognition using 5 items adapted
interaction effects, which were most likely (see Mathieu, Aguinis, from the Experiences Questionnaire: e.g., “I was able to separate myself
Culpepper, & Chen, 2012). Following best practices for experience from my thoughts and feelings” (Fresco et al., 2007), which is a mea-
sampling (e.g., Fisher & To, 2012), we selected survey items that were sure of this component validated for everyday contexts, rather than
concisely worded, previously validated for experience sampling when- after meditation (Bernstein et al., 2015).
ever possible, retained 3–5 items for each construct to test internal Participants then reported the presence of the following situational
reliability, and anchored items on a 7-pt Likert scale to increase features:
variability in responses. None of the initial assessment measures cor- Skill-challenge balance. Participants reported skill-challenge balance
related with experience sampling response rates (p > .250), limiting using 4 items from state flow measures: e.g., “I felt I was competent
bias concerns. enough to meet the high demands of the situation” (Jackson & Eklund,
Because our hypotheses concerned antecedents of mindfulness, we 2002; Payne, Jackson, Noh, & Stine-Morrow, 2011).
sought to ensure greater temporal ordering of measures. Namely, when Conscientiousness goals. Participants reported conscientiousness goals
participants received each experience sampling request, they were first using a 4-item scale entailing goals to be industrious (“How much were
asked to report their mindfulness levels immediately prior to receiving you trying to get tasks done?”) and organized (“How much were you
the request. And then, after reporting their mindfulness levels, parti- trying to use time effectively?”) (McCabe & Fleeson, 2016).
cipants were asked to think back over the time period since their last Hindrance stressors. Participants reported hindrance stressors using a
experience sampling report (or since the start of the day for the first 3-item scale: e.g., “How much time did you spend on ‘busy work’ for
daily report) and to only use their experiences within that time period your classes?” (LePine et al., 2004).
to inform their responses to the subsequent items. Further, for questions Technology use. Participants reported technology use with a 4-item
with a specific referent (skill-challenge balance of specific tasks, posi- scale that captures both active uses (“How much were you utilizing
tivity of specific social interactions), participants were required to enter technology for learning purposes [Wikipedia, Google, etc.]?” and “How
a brief text description of the task or the person referred to in their much were you utilizing technology to accomplish tasks [word pro-
response. By invoking narrative structures of temporal order and cessing, note-taking, spreadsheets, etc.]?”) and passive uses (“How
identifying specific referents, we used conversational norms to reduce much were you spending time on social media [Facebook, Twitter,
threats to inference, such as those related to reverse-causality (Schwarz, Instagram, etc.]?” and “How much were you consuming digital en-
1999). tertainment [YouTube, Netflix, podcasts, etc.]?”) of technology.
Social interactions. Participants reported positive social interactions
3.2. Measures using a 3-item scale (“How much did you like the other person in the
interaction?,” “How much did you trust the other person in the inter-
3.2.1. Initial assessment measures action?,” “How well did you get along with the other person in the
Cognitive resources. Cognitive resources were assessed by Raven’s interaction?”) adapted from prior work (Fleeson & Leicht, 2006). Par-
advanced progressive matrices, in which a complex visual pattern is ticipants responded to this question only if they had social interactions
created by a 3x3 matrix that has one missing cell, and participants must during the relevant time period, which they did in approximately 80%
select one of eight possible solutions that, if inserted into the missing of the responses (N = 2,686 responses for the 205 participants).
cell, would complete the overall visual pattern. We used 20 matrix
problems which, in line with other organizational scholars (e.g., Rafaeli 3.3. Analytical approach
et al., 2012), were from Levels 2 and 3, but not Level 1, as they have
more variability (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). This assessment has 3.3.1. Multilevel model specification
been considered among the best for general mental ability (Spearman, We analyzed the data using mixed-effects models to account for
1946), thus making it well-suited to capture individual differences in their multilevel structure, in which multiple experience sampling re-
overall cognitive resource level (Ackerman, 1988; Kanfer & Ackerman, ports (Level 1) were nested within participants (Level 2), who have one
1989). In particular, it captures the ability to process information and report each for their cognitive resources and resource beliefs (Pinheiro
manage its use in working memory, which is central to the performance & Bates, 2000). In line with best practices (Aguinis, Gottfredson, &
of mental tasks (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). It has also been im- Culpepper, 2013; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998), all Level 1 predictors were
plicated in situation-specific resource re-allocation (van der Meer et al., person-mean centered and random intercepts were estimated. Doing so
2010). removes average values of each predictor for participants, so that model
Resource beliefs. Because no specific measure of metacognitive be- coefficients represent fluctuations above or below typical levels, as is
liefs in mindfulness had been developed, we used the closest available appropriate for within-person analyses. The Level 2 variables of cog-
measure as a proxy. This measure captures beliefs about whether sus- nitive resources and resource beliefs were z-transformed to improve the
tained allocation of resources feels fatiguing or energizing, rather than interpretability of coefficients, given their different scaling, and parti-
whether it is possible to sustain allocation despite those feelings. This cularly the interpretability of the cross-level interactions that test
distinction matters, as mindfulness emphasizes that feelings like fatigue whether they moderate the effects of situational Level 1 features on
will occur, but need not determine resource allocation—as we can state mindfulness.
monitor these feelings as we sustain attention by recognizing that they As multilevel scholars have noted, key theoretical and empirical
are not objective. Despite these reservations, we used a proxy measure differences exist between emergent and contextual effects (Kozlowski &
of resource beliefs using a 6-item scale that gauges the belief that sus- Klein, 2000). In an experience sampling context, this distinction man-
tained allocation feels energizing rather than fatiguing: e.g., “After a ifests in differences among within-person results and between-person
strenuous mental activity, you feel energized for further challenging results (Beal, 2015; Hamaker, Nesselroade, & Molenaar, 2007). The
activities” (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010). effects of any antecedent can occur at the within-person level (e.g.,
6
when a person acts more conscientious than they usually do, does their 3.4.1. Variance partitioning of mindfulness
mindfulness increase?) or at the between-person level (e.g., do people To quantify the degree to which participants’ state mindfulness le-
who tend to be more conscientious also tend to be more mindful?). The vels remain consistent across situations or fluctuate based on their si-
former within-person effect is more emergent, as it captures how fluctuations, we computed intraclass correlations for each mindfulness
tuations in antecedents produce momentary states of mindfulness, component. We found that 32.56% of mindful attention occurs be-
whereas the latter between-person effect better captures how more tween-people (remains consistent across situations) and 67.44% occurs
stable and contextual aspects of the antecedent impact mindfulness. In within-people (fluctuates based on the current situation). And, simi-
this study, we examine the possibility for both these types of effects by larly, 38.36% of mindful metacognition occurs between-people and
predicting mindfulness simultaneously from the person-mean centered 61.64% occurs within-people. The considerable amount of within-
antecedents, which are at Level 1, and the participant’s average levels person variability suggests that situational features may function as
of each antecedent, which are Level 2 variables. Clarifying whether antecedents, thus accounting for some of this variability.
antecedents exert influence through the within-person or between-
person level, or both, can better surface their underlying theoretical 3.4.2. Antecedents of mindfulness
mechanisms, and therefore serve as a useful guide for future research We first tested whether cognitive resources and resource beliefs,
(Kievit, Frankenhuis, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2013). which were both measured at the initial assessment, predicted state
mindfulness. With p-values adjusted to reduce false discovery rates,
cognitive resources marginally predicted mindful attention, γ = 0.11
3.3.2. Temporal model specification (95% CI = –0.01, 0.22), t(203) = 1.79, p = .075, and resource beliefs
In line with Bliese and Ployhart (2002), we used a four step process significantly predicted it: γ = 0.17 (95% CI = 0.06, 0.29), t
to model the effects of time. First, we created a “time” variable at the (203) = 2.90, p = .008. Cognitive resources predicted mindful meta-
continuous measurement level, which represented the number of hours cognition: γ = 0.13 (95% CI = 0.01, 0.25), t(203) = 2.06, p = .041, as
elapsed since the first experience sampling survey was sent. Second, we did resource beliefs: γ = 0.15 (95% CI = 0.03, 0.28), t(203) = 2.45,
tested whether mindfulness components changed over time by mod- p = .030. Thus, although overall cognitive resource level and resource
eling the fixed effect of time as a predictor of each mindfulness com- beliefs do predict state mindfulness, they all straddled the threshold of
ponent. We first tested for a linear fixed effect, and then we tested for a significance aside from the relation between resource beliefs and
quadratic fixed effect. Third, after establishing the functional form of mindful attention, which provides partial support for Proposition 1.
the relation between time and mindfulness, we added a random slope On-task attentional pull factors. We then tested whether, in line with
for time, using the likelihood ratio test to determine whether doing so Proposition 3, situational features indicating on-task attentional pull
improved model fit. Fourth, we tested whether an autoregressive error predicted state mindfulness. Although conscientiousness goals at the
structure—a first-order autocorrelation with a continuous time covar- within-person level predicted both mindful attention, γ = 0.07 (95%
iate—improved model fit. The data support a linear fixed effect and CI = 0.02, 0.12), t(3,126) = 3.06, p = .006, as well as mindful me-
random slope for both mindfulness components. tacognition, γ = 0.08 (95% CI = 0.04, 0.13), t(3,126) = 3.73,
p < .001, conscientiousness goals at the between-person level did not
3.3.3. False positive reduction predict either mindfulness component (ps > .250). Skill-challenge
In this exploratory study, we test a broad set of antecedents of balance at the within-person level predicted greater mindful attention,
mindfulness, as is appropriate given that this topic is under-researched, γ = 0.09 (95% CI = 0.04, 0.14), t(3,126) = 3.38, p = .002, and
and we wanted multiple constructs each to indicate on-task attentional mindful metacognition, γ = 0.15 (95% CI = 0.10, 0.19), t
pull and off-task attentional demands. By treating this study as ex- (3,126) = 6.37, p < .001, but at the between-person level, only pre-
ploratory, we can simply estimate effect sizes of the antecedents and dicted greater mindful metacognition, γ = 0.46 (95% CI = 0.29, 0.63),
identify promising areas for future study. Yet, testing a broad set of t(203) = 5.34, p < .001. Its relation to mindful attention did not
antecedents necessitates multiple comparisons: increasing risk of false approach significance: γ = 0.06 (95% CI = –0.11, 0.23), t
positives and reducing the odds that any statistically significant results (203) = 0.65, p > .250. Whereas positive social interactions at the
will replicate (Asendorpf et al., 2013). We took two steps to address this within-level predicts greater mindful metacognition, γ = 0.08 (95%
issue. First, we included random slopes for all situational predictors. CI = 0.04, 0.13), t(3,126) = 3.69, p < .001, better than it does
When a random slope is included, the corresponding fixed effect is mindful attention, γ = 0.05 (95% CI = –0.01, 0.10), t(3,126) = 1.66,
tested against an error term that captures its variability across partici- p = .146, at the between-person level, it predicts both mindful atten-
pants, which helps to reduce false positives (see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, tion, γ = 0.16 (95% CI = 0.03, 0.30), t(203) = 2.46, p = .026, and
& Tily, 2013; Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 2009). Second, and more di- mindful metacognition, γ = 0.32 (95% CI = 0.18, 0.45), t
rectly, for each set of analyses (i.e., testing the Level 1 and Level 2 (203) = 4.57, p < .001.
predictors of each mindfulness component and the person-by-situation Off-task attentional demand factors. Turning to attentional demands,
interactions for both Level 2 predictors), we adjusted p-values to we find that passive technology use at the between-person level nega-
maintain a 5% false-discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). tively predicted both mindful attention, γ = –0.24 (95% CI = –0.36,
Doing so substantially reduces the chance of incorrectly rejecting null –0.11), t(203) = –3.63, p = .001, as well as mindful metacognition,
hypotheses, while nonetheless allowing for an exploration of the broad γ = –0.28 (95% CI = –0.41, –0.15), t(203) = –4.23, p < .001.
set of antecedents of mindfulness within our framework. Further, whereas passive technology use at the within-person level was
the single strongest predictor of mindful attention, γ = –0.11 (95%
CI = –0.11, –0.07), t(3,126) = –4.77, p < .001, it did not even ap-
3.4. Results proach significance for mindful metacognition, γ = –0.01 (95%
CI = –0.05, 0.03), t(3,126) = –0.30, p > .250. Active technology use,
The means, standard deviations, internal reliabilities, and inter- in contrast, did not approach significance for either mindfulness at-
correlations among all study variables can be seen in Table 1. The tention or mindful metacognition at either the within-person level
mixed-effects models of antecedents appear in Table 2 and the cross- (ps > .250) or the between-person level (ps = .146, .124, respec-
level interactions appear in Table 3. Please note that, for Tables 2 and 3, tively). Like passive technology use, at the between-person level, hin-
although we tested each antecedent and interaction in a separate drance stressors was a strong negative predictor of both mindful at-
model, we present all the results in a single table, as other exploratory tention, γ = –0.21 (95% CI = –0.32, –0.09), t(203) = –3.60, p = .001,
studies have done to facilitate comparisons (see Kane et al., 2007). and mindful metacognition, γ = –0.24 (95% CI = –0.36, –0.11), t
7
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among variables (Study 1).
Mean SD ICC(1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Trait Mindful Attention 4.23 1.03 – (0.84)

2. Trait Mindful Metacognition 4.96 0.90 – 0.38*** (0.81)
3. Trait Cognitive Resources 0.34 0.18 – 0.17* 0.05 (0.75)
4. Trait Resource Beliefs 3.37 1.11 – 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.01 (0.84)
5. Mindful Attention 4.70 1.45 0.32 0.51*** 0.34*** 0.10 0.20** (0.88) 0.28*** 0.08*** –0.14*** 0.00 –0.11*** 0.06*** 0.04*
6. Mindful Metacognition 4.63 1.38 0.39 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.14* 0.17* 0.44*** (0.89) 0.09*** 0.00 0.01 –0.01 0.15*** 0.10***
7. Conscientiousness Goals 4.31 1.66 0.24 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.03 –0.02 0.07 (0.94) –0.15*** 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.34*** –0.01
8. Passive Technology Use 2.62 1.48 0.34 –0.16* –0.11 –0.33*** 0.01 0.24*** –0.27*** –0.05 (0.69) 0.14*** 0.14*** –0.07*** –0.09***
9. Active Technology Use 3.10 1.82 0.25 –0.03 0.16* –0.16* 0.10 –0.10 –0.11 0.49*** 0.47*** (0.81) 0.55*** 0.22*** –0.02
10. Hindrance Stressors 3.08 1.59 0.37 –0.11 0.00 –0.26*** 0.02 –0.23*** –0.25*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 0.64*** (0.82) 0.16*** –0.03
11. Skill-Challenge Balance 4.76 1.35 0.23 0.05 0.21** 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.35*** 0.37*** –0.04 0.06 0.01 (0.88) 0.04*
12. Positive Social Interactions 5.52 1.41 0.38 0.04 0.12 0.07 –0.05 0.15* 0.32*** 0.11 –0.20** –0.11 –0.20** 0.29*** (0.93)
Note: N = 205 participants, n̄ = 3,338 responses (2,687 for positive social interactions). Variables above the horizonal collected at initial assessment, variables below
collected during experience sampling. Standard deviations (SD) pertain to un-centered variables. Reliabilities (α) appear along the diagonal. Correlations below the
diagonal are between-person, representing averaged values. Correlations above the diagonal are within-person, representing person-centered variables. Correlations
between initial assessment and experience sampling variables necessarily refer to between-person variables, as its correlations among trait variables and within-
person centered variables are fixed to zero by definition.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
(203) = 3.98, p = .001, but at the within-person level, it only predicted directions. Cognitive resources positively interacted with skill-chal-
mindful attention, γ = –0.10 (95% CI = –0.14, –0.05), t lenge balance in predicting mindful attention, γ = 0.08 (95%
(3,126) = –4.35, p < .001, and did not approach significance for CI = 0.03, 0.13), t(3,125) = 3.20, p = .008, whereas resource beliefs
mindful metacognition (p > .250). Thus, although the contextual negatively interacted with skill-challenge balance, γ = –0.07 (95%
presence of off-task attentional demands is associated with reduced CI = –0.12, –0.03), t(3,125) = –3.03, p = .015. These interactions are
mindfulness, the situational effects seem to particularly erode mindful plotted in Fig. 2—and to further interpret these interactions, we per-
attention, not mindful metacognition. formed a region of significance analysis (see Bauer & Curran, 2005).
This analysis reveals the range of values for cognitive resource level and
resource beliefs under which skill-challenge balance is a significant
3.4.3. Interactions predicting mindfulness components predictor of mindful attention. Skill-challenge balance becomes a po-
In Proposition 4, we suggested that situational features can make sitive predictor of mindful attention when cognitive resources exceed
cognitive resource level or the beliefs that motivate resource allocation –0.45 (b = 0.05, SE = 0.03, p = .050), a range that includes ap-
more or less facilitative of mindfulness. Statistically, this entails an proximately 58% of our sample, as well as when resource beliefs fall
interaction between people’s cognitive resources or resource beliefs and below 0.43 (b = 0.05, SE = 0.03, p = .050), a range that includes
situational features. As shown in Table 3, only two such interactions approximately 65% of our sample. This pattern of results aligns with
remained significant after correcting for multiple comparisons. Inter- Proposition 4 that when situations demonstrate attentional pull, those
estingly, both interactions concerned the conditions under which skill- with a higher resource level to allocate will better be able to mindfully
challenge balance enhances mindful attention, but pointed in opposite
Table 2
Predictors of state mindfulness (Study 1).
Mindful attention Mindful metacognition
Model predictor γ 95% CI t test γ 95% CI t test
+
Cognitive Resources 0.11 –0.01, 0.22 1.79 0.13 0.01, 0.25 2.06*
Resource Beliefs 0.17 0.06, 0.29 2.90** 0.15 0.03, 0.28 2.45*
Conscientiousness Goals(w) 0.07 0.02, 0.12 3.06** 0.08 0.04, 0.13 3.73***
Conscientiousness Goals(b) –0.02 –0.16, 0.12 –0.24 0.08 –0.06, 0.22 1.09
Passive Technology Use(w) –0.11 –0.16, –0.07 –4.77*** –0.01 –0.05, 0.03 –0.30
Passive Technology Use(b) –0.24 –0.36, –0.11 –3.63** –0.28 –0.41, –0.15 –4.23***
Active Technology Use(w) 0.00 –0.04, 0.03 –0.17 0.01 –0.03, 0.04 0.68
Active Technology Use(b) –0.10 –0.22, 0.02 –1.61 –0.11 –0.24, –0.01 –1.74
Hindrance Stressors(w) –0.10 –0.14, –0.05 –4.35*** –0.02 –0.06, 0.03 –0.79
Hindrance Stressors(b) –0.21 –0.32, –0.09 –3.60** –0.24 –0.36, –0.12 –3.98***
Skill-Challenge Balance(w) 0.09 0.04, 0.14 3.38** 0.15 0.10, 0.19 6.37***
Skill-Challenge Balance(b) 0.06 –0.11, 0.23 0.65 0.46 0.29, 0.63 5.34***
Positive Social Interactions(w) 0.05 –0.01, 0.10 1.66 0.08 0.04, 0.13 3.69***
Positive Social Interactions(b) 0.16 0.03, 0.30 2.45* 0.32 0.18, 0.45 4.57***
Note: N = 205 participants, n̄ = 3,338 responses (2,687 for positive social interactions). Dotted lines separate estimates from each of the distinct models that appear
in this table. For models including experience sampling variables: (w) = within-person (centered predictor), (b) = between-person (averaged predictor). Significance
levels are adjusted for false discovery rate.
+
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
8
Table 3
Cross-level interactions predicting state mindfulness (Study 1).
Cognitive Resources*
Conscientiousness Goals 0.04 –0.01, 0.09 1.63 0.00 –0.04, 0.05 0.06
Passive Technology Use 0.01 –0.04, 0.06 0.42 –0.03 –0.07, 0.01 –1.54
Active Technology Use 0.01 –0.03, 0.04 0.30 0.00 –0.03, 0.03 –0.02
Hindrance Stressors 0.00 –0.04, 0.05 0.13 –0.04 –0.08, 0.01 –1.71
Skill-Challenge Balance 0.08 0.03, 0.13 3.12** 0.04 –0.01, 0.08 1.65
Positive Social Interactions 0.02 –0.03, 0.07 0.77 –0.01 –0.06, 0.03 –0.63
Resource Beliefs*
Conscientiousness Goals –0.02 –0.07, 0.02 –0.91 0.05 0.01, 0.10 2.52
Passive Technology Use –0.03 –0.07, 0.02 –1.21 0.01 –0.02, 0.05 0.73
Active Technology Use –0.02 –0.05, 0.02 –1.05 0.00 –0.03, 0.03 0.09
Hindrance Stressors 0.00 –0.04, 0.05 0.17 0.02 –0.02, 0.07 1.19
Skill-Challenge Balance –0.07 –0.12, –0.03 –3.09* 0.03 –0.02, 0.07 1.23
Positive Social Interactions 0.01 –0.05, 0.06 0.23 0.00 –0.04, 0.05 0.20
Note: N = 205 participants, n̄ = 3,338 responses (2,687 for positive social interactions). Estimates on each line are from distinct models. Significance levels are
adjusted for false discovery rate.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
3.5. Preliminary discussion and motivation for confirmatory studies
This exploratory study reveals that mindfulness is influenced both

by on-task attentional pull and off-task attentional demands. It also
provides some supportive evidence that not only do cognitive resources
and resource beliefs influence mindfulness, but that their influence may
depend on situational features. We unpack these patterns of results and
consider how they may inform critical outstanding questions regarding
mindfulness in the general discussion after first replicating and ex-
tending these results in two subsequent confirmatory studies. These
confirmatory studies are designed to overcome several limitations with
this exploratory study.
First, the exploratory study had a cross-sectional design. This design
allowed us to better capture the immediate effect of situations on state
mindfulness and increased our Level 1 sample size, which would be
halved if we assessed antecedents in one survey and state mindfulness
in another. While this design may be appropriate for an exploratory
study, in the confirmatory studies, we temporally separate state
mindfulness from its predictors to reduce common method bias.
Second, although the variables in this study were relevant to workplace
situations, the subjects of the study were still undergraduates, which is
not the population we intend our results to generalize to. We address
this limitation with confirmatory studies on working populations.
Third, the measure of resource beliefs used in this exploratory study
does not directly assess the metacognitive beliefs relevant to mind-
fulness, which are central to our propositions. Thus, we developed and
validated a 12-item measure to assess metacognitive beliefs in mind-
fulness (MBM). All MBM items appear in the Appendix and a con-
firmatory factor analysis on a sample of working adults reveals better fit
for a 3-factor higher-order model than for alternate models, suggesting
that metacognitive beliefs are best seen as a higher construct with three
lower-order dimensions of attentional sufficiency, virtue of monitoring,
and map-terrain differentiation, as theorized (see Table 4). Fourth, this
Fig. 2. Cross-level interactions with skill-challenge balance (Study 1). measure of metacognitive beliefs, coupled with a study design that
temporally separates state mindfulness from its predictors, also makes it
attend to ongoing events, as they have more available resources to al- possible to properly explore Proposition 2 in the subsequent studies. We
locate (cf. van der Meer et al., 2010). And, conversely, when people do so by comparing the relative influence of metacognitive beliefs and
lack beliefs that motivate them to allocate their cognitive resources, the mental fatigue on mindfulness. Fifth, considering the explained var-
skill-challenge balance of a situation can play a compensatory role, as iance in state mindfulness, the models had an average marginal R2GLMM
such situations have high attentional pull that reduces their need to of 0.01 for mindful attention and 0.03 for mindful metacognition, and a
self-regulate in order to maintain on-task attention. model including all situational features had a marginal R2GLMM of 0.06
for mindful attention and 0.13 for mindful metacognition (Johnson,
9
Table 4 4. Study 2: Experience sampling study on sample of hospital

Omnibus confirmatory factor analyses of the Metacognitive Beliefs in nurses
Mindfulness scale.
Model χ2 df SRMR CFI TLI SCDT 4.1. Participants and procedures
Baseline Model 1 99.23** 51 0.06 0.95 0.94 Participants were 168 nurses in a hospital (~84% female;
Three-factor, higher order
~4.25 years of work experience), who worked in one of nine units in-
MBM model with 12 items
Model 2 472.37** 54 0.17 0.61 0.52 373.14** cluding intensive care, cardiac care, bone marrow transplant, and in-
Unidimensional MBM patient rehabilitation. Nurses were asked to report their metacognitive
model beliefs and current mental fatigue using a pre-shift survey—and then,
Model 3 327.80** 53 0.15 0.74 0.68 228.57**
after their shift ended approximately twelve hours later, nurses re-
Two-factor model (VM and
AS combined; MD alone)
ported the situational antecedents experienced and their current level
Model 4 211.42** 53 0.09 0.85 0.81 112.19** of mindfulness. In total, they provided 999 post-shift responses (an
Two-factor model (VM and average of ~6 responses per participant), for which there were 545
MD combined; AS alone) corresponding pre-shift surveys (55% response rate).
Model 5 263.33** 53 0.13 0.80 0.75 164.10**
Two-factor model (AS and
MD combined; VM alone) 4.2. Measures
Note: AS = attentional sufficiency, VM = virtue of monitoring, MD = map- Pre-shift survey. Participants reported metacognitive beliefs using the
terrain differentiation. SRMR = root-mean-square residual, 12-item MBM (see Appendix). And they reported mental fatigue using 4
CFA = comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker-Lewis index, and items from the State Self-Control Capacity Scale (Ciarocco, Twenge,
SCDT = sequential chi-square difference test. Muraven, & Tice, 2004), e.g., “I feel mentally exhausted,” which has
* p < .05
been previously validated for experience sampling in organizations
** p < .01
(e.g., Christian, Eisenkraft, & Kapadia, 2015).
*** p < .001.
Post-shift survey. Participants reported their current levels of mindful
attention using the 5-item state Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
2014), which are modest to average effect sizes (Richard, Bond, & (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and mindful metacognition using 5 items adapted
Stokes-Zoota, 2003). Perhaps metacognitive beliefs may account for from the Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007). Thinking
more variability in state mindfulness. about their shift, they then reported their conscientiousness goals using
To overcome these issues, we simultaneously collected data from the 4-item scale (McCabe & Fleeson, 2016), skill-challenge balance using
two working samples. These samples included nurses, who reported 4 items from state flow measures (Jackson & Eklund, 2002; Payne et al.,
their pre-shift metacognitive beliefs and mental fatigue, and their 2011), hindrance stressors using a 3-item scale (LePine et al., 2004), and
mindfulness and situational features after their shift ended, and a positive social interactions using the 3-item scale (Fleeson & Leicht,
community sample, who provided reports before, during, and after 2006).
their workday. Given practical concerns about survey length with our
inclusion of measures for metacognitive beliefs and mental fatigue, and 4.3. Analytical approach
because nurses are not permitted to carry their smartphones during
their shifts, we excluded technology use items from these studies. As the We analyzed our data using mixed-effects models, following a si-
nursing study design is narrower in scope (e.g., we were able to secure milar process as in Study 1. We also included fixed effects for each of
buy-in for experience sampling only), we present this study first, and the nine different nursing units represented in our data.
then present the community sample, although data for both were both
collected simultaneously. 4.4. Results
The means, standard deviations, internal reliabilities, and inter-

correlations among study variables can be seen in Table 5—along with
the variance partitioning of experience sampling variables. In these
data, 58% of variability in metacognitive beliefs occurred between-
people, as did 53% of variability for mindful attention, and 34% for
Table 5
Mean SD ICC(1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Metacognitive Beliefs (T1) 5.81 0.71 0.58 (0.88) –0.45*** 0.08 0.08 –0.02 –0.05 0.13** 0.12***
2. Mental Fatigue (T1) 4.63 1.38 0.39 –0.49*** (0.88) –0.06 0.01 –0.02 0.04 –0.07 –0.04
3. Conscientiousness Goals (T2) 5.57 1.25 0.67 0.25** –0.09 (0.91) 0.18*** 0.08** 0.10** 0.01 0.05
4. Skill-Challenge Balance (T2) 5.55 1.03 0.43 0.58*** –0.30*** 0.27*** (0.86) 0.07* 0.02 0.18*** 0.22***
5. Positive Social Interactions (T2) 5.86 1.27 0.43 0.27*** –0.19* 0.22** 0.34*** (0.96) –0.16*** 0.10** 0.08*
6. Hindrance Stressors (T2) 2.64 1.36 0.53 –0.21** 0.21** 0.00 –0.14 –0.43*** (0.83) –0.27*** –0.20***
7. Mindful Attention (T2) 5.09 1.45 0.53 0.32*** –0.46*** 0.01 0.21** 0.26*** –0.49*** (0.89) 0.25***
8. Mindful Metacognition (T2) 5.28 1.20 0.34 0.41*** –0.21** 0.04 0.44*** 0.25** –0.34*** 0.32*** (0.89)
Note: N = 168 participants, n̄ = 999 responses (545 between T1 and T2 variables). Standard deviations (SD) pertain to un-centered variables. Reliabilities (α) appear
along the diagonal. Correlations below the diagonal are between-person, representing averaged values. Correlations above the diagonal are within-person, re-
presenting person-centered variables.
* p < .05
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
10
Table 6
Predictors of state mindfulness (Study 2).
Metacognitive Beliefs(w) 0.33 0.07, 0.60 2.50* 0.19 –0.01, 0.39 1.89+
Metacognitive Beliefs (b) 0.68 0.38, 0.99 4.40*** 0.72 0.50, 0.95 6.37***
Mental Fatigue(w) –0.08 –0.17, 0.01 –1.74+ –0.04 –0.12, 0.05 –0.84
Mental Fatigue(b) –0.46 –0.60, –0.33 –6.69*** –0.19 –0.31, –0.06 –3.03**
Conscientiousness Goals(w) 0.03 –0.13, 0.19 0.37 0.08 –0.06, 0.22 1.09
Conscientiousness Goals(b) 0.05 –0.11, 0.22 0.66 0.02 –0.11, 0.14 0.28
Hindrance Stressors(w) –0.30 –0.39, –0.20 –6.15*** –0.16 –0.27, –0.05 –2.83**
Hindrance Stressors(b) –0.49 –0.63, –0.34 –6.71*** –0.27 –0.39, –0.15 –4.53***
Skill-Challenge Balance(b) 0.36 0.14, 0.58 3.19** 0.47 0.31, 0.63 5.80***
Positive Social Interactions(w) 0.09 –0.01, 0.18 1.64+ 0.06 –0.02, 0.15 1.44
Positive Social Interactions(b) 0.32 0.14, 0.50 3.49** 0.16 0.02, 0.31 2.22*
Note: N = 168 participants, n̄ = 999 responses (545 for metacognitive beliefs and mental fatigue). Dotted lines separate estimates from each of the distinct models
that appear in this table. All predictors variables are within-person.
+
p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
mindful metacognition. γ = –0.30 (95% CI = –0.39, –0.20), t(825) = –6.15, p < .001, and
mindful metacognition, γ = –0.16 (95% CI = –0.27, –0.05), t
4.4.1. Antecedents of mindfulness (825) = –2.83, p = .005. It was also a strong negative predictor at the
Pre-shift. Despite the modest response rate for pre-shift surveys, we between-person level for mindful attention, γ = –0.49 (95%
nonetheless explored whether pre-shift metacognitive beliefs and CI = –0.63, –0.34), t(161) = –6.71, p < .001, as well as mindful
mental fatigue predicted mindfulness at post-shift, treating the results metacognition, γ = –0.27 (95% CI = –0.39, –0.15), t(161) = –4.53,
as provisional relative to our next study. As shown in Table 6, meta- p < .001.
cognitive beliefs at the within-person level significantly predicted
mindful attention, γ = 0.33 (95% CI = 0.07, 0.60), t(386) = 2.50, 4.5. Preliminary discussion and motivation for next study
p = .013, and marginally predicted mindful metacognition, γ = 0.19
(95% CI = –0.01, 0.39), t(386) = 1.89, p = .060. At the between- This study provided initial evidence that metacognitive beliefs re-
person level, metacognitive beliefs predicted significantly greater ported prior to a work shift predict greater subsequent mindfulness
mindful attention, γ = 0.68 (95% CI = 0.38, 0.99), t(150) = 4.40, twelve hours later, in support of our theorizing. We did not, however,
p < .001, and mindful metacognition, γ = 0.72 (95% CI = 0.50, find the expected negative relation between mental fatigue and mind-
0.95), t(150) = 6.37, p < .001. Mental fatigue at the within-person fulness. Given the modest response rate for the pre-shift surveys, we
level marginally predicted less mindful attention, γ = –0.08 (95% leave open for our next study to replicate that metacognitive beliefs
CI = –0.17, 0.01), t(386) = –1.74, p = .082, and did not approach influence mindfulness, whether mental fatigue has the expected nega-
significance for mindful metacognition, γ = –0.04 (95% CI = –0.12, tive effect, and whether, in line with Proposition 2, metacognitive be-
0.05), t(386) = –0.84, p > .250. At the between-person level, mental liefs may compensate for any negative effect of mental fatigue. Because
fatigue significantly predicted less mindful attention, γ = –0.46 (95% in this study, as in Study 1, situational antecedents were reported at the
CI = –0.60, –0.33), t(150) = –6.69, p < .001, and mindful meta- same time as state mindfulness, there is also room to temporally se-
cognition, γ = –0.19 (95% CI = –0.31, –0.06), t(150) = –3.03, parate metacognitive beliefs and mental fatigue, situational ante-
p = .003. cedents, and state mindfulness. Finally, unlike in Study 1, we were
Post-shift. We then tested whether situational features indicating on- unable to collect an initial assessment here, which leaves it to the next
task attentional pull predicted mindfulness (see Table 6). Con- study to replicate the results from Study 1 concerning cognitive re-
scientiousness goals did not approach significance for mindful attention sources, resource beliefs, and their interactions with situational ante-
or mindful metacognition at either within-person or between-person cedents.
levels (p > .250). Skill-challenge balance at the within-person level
predicted both mindful attention, γ = 0.22 (95% CI = 0.07, 0.37), t 5. Study 3: Experience sampling study on community sample of
(825) = 2.89, p = .004, and mindful metacognition, γ = 0.24 (95% full-time workers
CI = 0.11, 0.37), t(161) = 3.51, p = .001. And at the between-person
level, it also predicted mindful attention, γ = 0.36 (95% CI = 0.14, 5.1. Participants and procedure
0.58), t(161) = 3.19, p = .002, and mindful metacognition γ = 0.47
(95% CI = 0.31, 0.63), t(161) = 5.80, p < .001. Whereas positive Participants were 185 community members in a mid-Atlantic city
social interactions at the within-person level significantly predicted (Mage = 27; 63% female) with 6 average years full-time work experi-
neither greater mindful attention, γ = 0.09 (95% CI = –0.01, 0.18), t ence. Participants worked in a variety of industries (65% in healthcare,
(825) = 1.85, p = .065, nor mindful metacognition, γ = 0.06 (95% 11% in finance and banking, 5% each in higher education and manu-
CI = –0.02, 0.15), t(825) = 1.44, p = .151, at the between-person facturing, and 4% in government) and 98% had a bachelor’s degree or
level, it predicted both mindful attention, γ = 0.32 (95% CI = 0.14, equivalent. They were told the study was about wellbeing and were not
0.50), t(161) = 3.49, p = .001, and mindful metacognition, γ = 0.16 financially compensated but could receive personalized summary me-
(95% CI = 0.02, 0.31), t(161) = 2.22, p = .028. Turning to off-task trics of features that influence their mindfulness levels. Addressing the
attentional demands, we find that, at the within-person level, hindrance limitations of the prior studies, participants completed an initial as-
stressors was a strong negative predictor of mindful attention, sessment that included cognitive resource level and resource beliefs
11
variables. Correlations between initial assessment and experience sampling variables necessarily refer to between-person variables, as its correlations among trait variables and within-person centered variables are fixed
variables. Reliabilities (α) appear along the diagonal. Correlations below the diagonal are between-person, representing averaged values. Correlations above the diagonal are within-person, representing person-centered
Note: N = 185 participants, n̄ = 1438 responses. Variables above the horizonal collected at initial assessment, variables below collected during experience sampling. Standard deviations (SD) pertain to un-centered
and, two weeks later, engaged in a 10-workday experience sampling
0.12***
–0.08**
0.15***
0.54***
–0.06*
(0.94)
design (Monday–Friday) where they provided daily reports in three
0.06*
0.02
12
waves. At 7:45 AM before work started, they reported metacognitive
beliefs and mental fatigue, at 1:00 PM halfway through their workday,
they reported on-task and off-task situational features, and at 6:00 PM
–0.09***
–0.13***
0.69***
0.08**
(0.92)
after their workday ended, they reported current state mindfulness le-
0.06*
0.01
0.01
11
vels. Participants provided an average of 27 responses, such that the
experience sampling data contain 5,053 total survey responses (91%
response rate), which, when matched across participants’ three daily
–0.58***
–0.48***
–0.08**
0.19***
0.18***
–0.07**
(0.88)
surveys, totaled into 1,439 complete cases.
–0.04
10
5.2. Measures
–0.35***
0.12***
0.09***
0.23**
(0.96)
Initial assessment. Cognitive resources were assessed with 20 items
0.16*
0.03
0.04
from Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1998) and
9
resource beliefs were assessed with the six-item scale (Job et al., 2010).
First experience sampling wave. Participants reported metacognitive
–0.26***
–0.10***
0.42***
0.54***
0.21***
0.30***
0.19**
(0.91)
beliefs using the 12-item MBM and mental fatigue using 4 items
(Ciarocco et al., 2004).
8
Second experience sampling wave. Participants reported con-
scientiousness goals using the 4-item scale (McCabe & Fleeson, 2016),
0.31***
0.25***
0.11***
0.43***
(0.91)
0.16*
0.03
0.02
skill-challenge balance using 4 items from state flow measures (Jackson &
7
Eklund, 2002; Payne et al., 2011), hindrance stressors using a 3-item
scale (LePine et al., 2004), and positive social interactions using the 3-
–0.53***
–0.59***
–0.58***
–0.43***
–0.48***
item scale (Fleeson & Leicht, 2006). Given that they were at work, they
–0.15*
–0.14*
(0.96)
reported social interactions in 99% of their responses.
6
Third experience sampling wave. Participants reported their current
mindful attention using the 5-item state Mindful Attention Awareness
–0.44***
–0.65***
0.67***
0.34***
0.59***
0.30***
0.49***
Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and their mindful metacognition using 5
(0.91)
items adapted from the Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007).
5
5.3. Analytical approach

–0.34***
0.31***
0.27***
0.30***
0.28***
–0.14*
(0.87)
–0.08
We analyzed our data using mixed-effects models, following the 0.13
4
same process as in Study 1. We modeled time with a fixed effect of

workweek (0 = first week, 1 = second week) and a linear fixed effect
(0.76)
–0.12
–0.13
–0.01
–0.05
for time, but not a random effect or autocorrelated errors (Bliese &
0.11
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.03
3
Ployhart, 2002).
–0.27***
–0.32***
5.4. Results
0.52***
0.43***
0.39***
0.24***
0.32***
0.43***
(0.85)
–0.07
0.09
2
The means, standard deviations, internal reliabilities, and inter-

correlations among study variables can be seen in Table 7—along with
–0.34***
–0.37***
the variance partitioning of experience sampling variables. In these

0.54***
0.43***
0.48***
0.34***
0.29***
0.23**
(0.89)
0.17*
0.15*
data, 61% of variability in metacognitive beliefs occurred between-

0.07
1
people, as did 57% of variability for mindful attention, and 48% for
mindful metacognition.
ICC(1)
0.61
0.50
0.43
0.55
0.47
0.57
0.57
0.48
5.4.1. Antecedents of mindfulness

–
–
–
–
We first tested whether cognitive resources and resource beliefs, as

measured at the initial assessment, predicted state mindfulness.
1.03
0.90
0.18
1.11
0.94
1.83
1.22
1.20
1.65
1.40
1.54
1.38
SD
Cognitive resources predicted neither mindful attention, γ = 0.03 (95%

CI = –0.15, 0.20), t(183) = 0.29, p > .250, nor mindful metacogni-
Mean
tion, γ = 0.01 (95% CI = –0.13, 0.16), t(183) = 0.18, p > .250,

4.06
4.77
4.23
4.96
0.34
3.37
5.32
3.49
4.92
4.95
5.48
2.95
failing to replicate the findings from Study 1. Resource beliefs, in

contrast, significantly predicted both mindful attention, γ = 0.38 (95%
9. Positive Social Interactions (T2)
CI = 0.21, 0.55), t(183) = 4.42, p < .001, and mindful metacogni-

12. Mindful Metacognition (T3)
7. Conscientiousness Goals (T2)
2. Trait Mindful Metacognition
8. Skill-Challenge Balance (T2)
tion, γ = 0.29 (95% CI = 0.15, 0.43), t(183) = 4.04, p < .001. These
5. Metacognitive Beliefs (T1)
10. Hindrance Stressors (T2)

3. Trait Cognitive Resources
findings replicate those of Study 1 and align with Proposition 1, that

11. Mindful Attention (T3)
1. Trait Mindful Attention
4. Trait Resource Beliefs
mindfulness will rely more on the beliefs that motivate resource allo-
6. Mental Fatigue (T1)
to zero by definition.
cation than the level of overall resources.

Metacognitive beliefs. We next sought to test the predictive validity of
*** p < .001.
our metacognitive beliefs in mindfulness scale. To do so, we ran four

** p < .01.
* p < .05.
sequential models. In Model 1, we predicted state mindfulness at the

Table 7
end of the workday solely from within-person metacognitive beliefs at

the start of the workday, which explains whether endorsing these
12
Table 8 (179) = 2.61, p = .010.

Models of metacognitive beliefs predicting mindful attention (Study 3). Turning to mindful metacognition, within-person metacognitive
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 beliefs was a significant predictor in Model 1, γ = 0.30 (95% CI = 0.17,
0.44), t(1,253) = 4.49, p < .001 (see Table 9). It further remained a
Intercept 4.07*** 0.05 0.04 0.46 significant in Model 2, γ = 0.30 (95% CI = 0.13, 0.42), t
(0.13) (0.56) (0.56) (0.58)
(1,253) = 4.49, p < .001, when between-person metacognitive beliefs
Week –0.07 –0.06 0.01 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
was added as a predictor, which was also significant, γ = 0.91 (95%
Time 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 CI = 0.77, 1.06), t(180) = 12.15, p < .001. As with mindful attention,
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) both within-person and between-person levels of metacognitive beliefs
Metacognitive 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.12 0.11 were simultaneously significant as predictors. In Model 3, mental fa-
Beliefs(w)
tigue predicted less mindful metacognition, γ = –0.05 (95%
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Metacognitive 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.69*** CI = –0.10, 0.00), t(1,252) = –2.02, p = .044. In support of
Beliefs(b) Proposition 2, between-person metacognitive beliefs remained a sig-
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) nificant predictor of mindful metacognition, γ = 0.91 (95% CI = 0.76,
Mental Fatigue –0.15*** –0.15***
1.06), t(180) = 12.11, p < .001, as did within-person levels of me-
(0.03) (0.03)
Resource Beliefs 0.22**
tacognitive beliefs, γ = 0.25 (95% CI = 0.11, 0.39), t(1,252) = 3.53,
(0.08) p < .001. This provides evidence that both momentary fluctuations
Dependent Variable Mindful Mindful Mindful Mindful and more stable endorsement of beliefs can exert distinct influences on
Attention Attention Attention Attention mindfulness. And, in support of its incremental predictive validity,
Random Effects
metacognitive beliefs at within-person and between-person levels both
Level 2 Variance 1.17 1.01 1.01 0.99
Metacognitive Beliefs 0.58 0.57 0.51 0.51 remained significant with the inclusion of resource beliefs in Model 4,
Slope which was itself marginally significant, γ = 0.10 (95% CI = –0.02,
Residual Variance 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.22), t(179) = 1.69, p = .093.
Model Information To better quantify these effects, a model that included between-
AIC 4546.97 4506.26 4481.03 4479.52
Log Likelihood –2264.48 –2263.13 –2229.52 –2227.76
person and within-person metacognitive beliefs in the morning had a
Marginal R2GLMM 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.18 R2GLMM in predicting evening mindfulness of 0.15 for mindful attention
Conditional R2GLMM 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 and 0.27 for mindful attention—which is more than twice as much
variance explained by the model in Study 1 data that included within-
Note. N = 185 participants, n̄ = 1438 responses. Coefficients are standardized. person and between-person levels of all the situational features (i.e.,
+ p < .10.
conscientiousness goals, skill-challenge balance, technology use, hin-
* p < .05.
drance stressors, social interactions), which were measured at the same
** p < .01.
*** p < .001. time as mindfulness, and had a marginal R2GLMM of 0.06 for mindful
attention and 0.13 for mindful metacognition. We therefore find strong
evidence that metacognitive beliefs are a crucial antecedent of mind-
beliefs at a particularly high or low level that day influences later fulness, and that, in support of our theoretical framework, they more
mindfulness levels. In Model 2, we added in between-person levels of consistently and powerfully predict mindfulness than overall cognitive
metacognitive beliefs, which explains whether a participant’s general resource level and contemporaneously felt mental fatigue.
tendency to hold metacognitive beliefs predicts their mindfulness be- Situational features. We then tested whether situational features in-
yond the daily fluctuations. In Model 3, we added in mental fatigue dicating on-task attentional pull predicted mindfulness (see Table 10).
experienced at the start of the workday, to directly test Proposition 2 Conscientiousness goals at the within-person level did not predict
that metacognitive beliefs will positively predict mindfulness above and mindful attention, γ = 0.03 (95% CI = –0.05, 0.11), t(1,360) = 1.17,
beyond its negative relation with mental fatigue, leading to a com- p > .250, but did predict mindful metacognition, γ = 0.10 (95%
pensatory effect. In Model 4, we add in the resource beliefs measure to CI = 0.02, 0.17), t(1,360) = 2.44, p = .015. At the between-person
examine whether our scale has incremental predictive validity beyond level, conscientiousness goals predicted both mindful attention,
an established measure that serves only as a rough proxy for the me- γ = 0.14 (95% CI = 0.05, 0.22), t(182) = 3.18, p = .002, and mindful
tacognitive beliefs specific to mindfulness. metacognition, γ = 0.30 (95% CI = 0.14, 0.47), t(182) = 3.58,
As shown in Table 8, within-person metacognitive beliefs sig- p < .001. Skill-challenge balance at the within-person level predicted
nificantly predicted mindful attention in Model 1, γ = 0.30 (95% both mindful attention, γ = 0.09 (95% CI = 0.04, 0.14), t
CI = 0.15, 0.44), t(1,253) = 4.09, p < .001. It further remained a (1,360) = 3.38, p = .002, and mindful metacognition, γ = 0.26 (95%
significant predictor in Model 2, γ = 0.27 (95% CI = 0.13, 0.42), t CI = 0.17, 0.35), t(1,360) = 5.77, p < .001. And at the between-
(1,253) = 3.76, p < .001, when between-person metacognitive beliefs person level, it also predicted mindful attention, γ = 0.54 (95%
was added as a predictor, which itself was significant, γ = 0.77 (95% CI = 0.36, 0.71), t(182) = 6.11, p < .001, and mindful metacognition
CI = 0.56, 0.98), t(180) = 7.32, p < .001. This finding that within- γ = 0.58 (95% CI = 0.45, 0.72), t(182) = 8.56, p < .001. Whereas
person and between-person levels of metacognitive beliefs are si- positive social interactions at the within-person level predicted neither
multaneously significant suggests that momentary fluctuations and greater mindful attention, γ = 0.01 (95% CI = –0.04, 0.06), t
more stable endorsement of metacognitive beliefs may offer distinct (1,360) = 0.34, p > .250, nor mindful metacognition, γ = 0.03 (95%
influences on mindfulness. In Model 3, mental fatigue predicted less CI = –0.02, 0.07), t(1,360) = 1.23, p = .221, at the between-person
mindful attention, γ = –0.15 (95% CI = –0.20, –0.10), t level, it predicted both mindful attention, γ = 0.17 (95% CI = 0.02,
(1,252) = –5.82, p < .001, as expected. In support of Proposition 2, 0.32), t(182) = 2.31, p = .022, and mindful metacognition, γ = 0.20
between-person metacognitive beliefs remained a significant predictor (95% CI = 0.08, 0.32), t(182) = 3.37, p = .001. Turning to off-task
of mindful attention, γ = 0.77 (95% CI = 0.56, 0.98), t(180) = 7.33, attentional demands, we find that, at the within-person level, hindrance
p < .001, whereas within-person levels of metacognitive beliefs be- stressors was a strong negative predictor of mindful attention,
came marginal, γ = 0.12 (95% CI = –0.03, 0.26), t(1,252) = 1.60, γ = –0.15 (95% CI = –0.23, –0.08), t(1,360) = –3.99, p < .001, and
p = .110. In support of its incremental predictive validity, in Model 4, mindful metacognition, γ = –0.09 (95% CI = –0.16, –0.02), t
metacognitive beliefs remained significant with the inclusion of re- (1,360) = –2.62, p = .009. It was also a strong negative predictor at the
source beliefs, which was significant, γ = 0.22 (95% CI = 0.05, 0.38), t between-person level for mindful attention, γ = –0.64 (95%
13
Table 9
Models of metacognitive beliefs predicting mindful metacognition (Study 3).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 4.74*** –0.04 –0.02 0.19

(0.12) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42)
Week 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Time 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Metacognitive Beliefs(w) 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Metacognitive Beliefs(b) 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.87***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Mental Fatigue –0.05* –0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
Resource Beliefs 0.10+
(0.06)
Dependent Variable Mindful Metacognition Mindful Metacognition Mindful Metacognition Mindful Metacognition
Random Effects
Level 2 Variance 0.96 0.69 0.69 0.68
Metacognitive Beliefs Slope 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50
Residual Variance 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
Model Information
AIC 4405.05 4302.34 4306.16 4309.17
Log Likelihood –2193.53 –2141.17 –2142.08 –2142.58
Marginal R2GLMM 0.02 0.27 0.27 0.27
Conditional R2GLMM 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56
Note. N = 185 participants, n̄ = 1438 responses. Coefficients are standardized. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
CI = –0.77, –0.51), t(182) = –9.63, p < .001, as well as mindful

metacognition, γ = –0.44 (95% CI = –0.56, –0.32), t(182) = –7.28,
p < .001.
5.4.2. Interactions predicting mindfulness components

In Proposition 4, we suggested that situational features can make
cognitive resource level or the beliefs that motivate resource allocation
more or less facilitative of mindfulness. Exploring this proposition in
Study 1, we found two such cases: in how cognitive resources and re-
source beliefs interacted with skill-challenge balance to predict mindful
attention. Failing to replicate Study 1, we found no such interaction
with cognitive resources in this study, γ = 0.03 (95% CI = –0.06,
0.12), t(1,359) = 0.58, p > .250, In contrast, the interaction with
resource beliefs did replicate, γ = –0.07 (95% CI = –0.13, –0.01), t
(1,360) = –2.22, p = .026. This interaction is plotted in Fig. 3—and the
region of significance analysis reveals that skill-challenge balance be- Fig. 3. Cross-level interactions with skill-challenge balance (Study 3).
comes a positive predictor of mindful attention when resource beliefs
fall below 0.69 (b = 0.09, SE = 0.05, p = .050), a range that includes
Table 10
Situational predictors of state mindfulness (Study 3).
Conscientiousness Goals(w) 0.03 –0.05, 0.11 0.77 0.10 0.02, 0.17 2.44*
Conscientiousness Goals(b) 0.23 0.03, 0.44 2.25* 0.30 0.14, 0.47 3.58***
Hindrance Stressors(w) –0.15 –0.23, –0.08 –3.99*** –0.09 –0.16, –0.02 –2.62**
Hindrance Stressors(b) –0.64 –0.77, –0.51 –9.63*** –0.44 –0.56, –0.32 –7.28***
Skill-Challenge Balance(b) 0.54 0.36, 0.71 6.11*** 0.58 0.45, 0.72 8.56***
Positive Social Interactions(w) 0.01 –0.04, 0.06 0.34 0.03 –0.02, 0.07 1.23
Positive Social Interactions(b) 0.17 0.02, 0.32 2.31* 0.20 0.08, 0.32 3.37**
Note: N = 185 participants, n̄ = 1438 responses. Dotted lines separate estimates from each of the distinct models that appear in this table. All predictors variables are
within-person.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
14
approximately 78% of our sample (Bauer & Curran, 2005). significant. It is therefore possible either that capacity may not be a
particularly strong predictor of mindfulness or that Raven’s advanced
5.5. Preliminary discussion progressive matrices may not be the best way of operationalizing cog-
nitive resources. Because Raven’s matrices most strongly relate to
This study addresses key limitations of prior studies by temporally working memory and the executive function that updates it (e.g.,
separating measures of metacognitive beliefs and mental fatigue, si- Carpenter et al., 1990; Friedman et al., 2006), different measures that
tuational antecedents, and mindfulness—and also by assessing cogni- assess executive functions related to shifting or inhibiting may better
tive resources. In it, we found strong support for Propositions 1, 2, and predict mindfulness. In contrast, we found strong and consistent sup-
3 and mixed support for Proposition 4. Metacognitive beliefs were a port that metacognitive beliefs positively relate to mindfulness. In
stronger and more consistent predictor of mindfulness than cognitive Study 2, metacognitive beliefs reported prior to a work shift sig-
resources and compensated for mental fatigue felt contemporaneously. nificantly predicted state mindfulness levels in nurses 12 hours later,
We also found that situations, with their on-task attentional pull and after their shift ended. In Study 3, metacognitive beliefs reported in the
off-task attentional demands, could function as supplements or en- morning before their workday began predicted state mindfulness in the
cumbrances to the self-regulatory processes that produce mindfulness. evening after their workday ended.
Supporting Proposition 2, metacognitive beliefs also remained a
6. General discussion significant predictor of state mindfulness beyond the negative effects of
mental fatigue in Study 3. Indeed, metacognitive beliefs alone predicted
Despite the increasing prevalence of mindfulness in organizational more than twice as much variance in mindfulness as a model in Study 1
research, we have yet to seriously consider its antecedents: how and that included all the situational antecedents: conscientiousness goals,
why people become more or less mindful from one situation to the next. skill-challenge balance, technology use, hindrance stressors, social in-
The purpose of the present research was to offer theoretical and em- teractions. This finding supports a key contention of metacognitive
pirical contributions to that end, which have clear implications for practice, that metacognitive beliefs are an important driver of state
practice as well as future research. mindfulness. In so doing, it helps resolve the paradoxical relation be-
tween mindfulness and mental fatigue: these metacognitive beliefs can
6.1. Contributions of theoretical framework motivate people to continuously allocate their resources toward self-
regulation, despite contemporaneous feelings of mental fatigue that
At the theoretical level, we introduced a novel framework that in- serve to draw resources away from self-regulation. Across Study 2 and
tegrates insights from research on mindfulness as metacognitive prac- Study 3, approximately 60% of the variability in metacognitive beliefs
tice (Kudesia, 2019) and self-regulation (Beal et al., 2005; Kanfer & remains stable across situations, whereas only 45% of variability in
Ackerman, 1989; Lian et al., 2017). Whereas much of the prior work mental fatigue remains stable across situations. The relative stability of
has focused on mindfulness as related to a capacity for self-regulation metacognitive beliefs provides a motivational basis for people to
(Isbel & Mahar, 2015; Ruocco & Direkoglu, 2013), very little work has overcome the limiting demotivational effect of mental fatigue.
examined its motivational aspect. One exception found that people who In Proposition 3, we suggested that situational appraisals of on-task
lack mindfulness training require a financial incentive to allocate the attentional pull and off-task attentional demands would, respectively,
same amount of cognitive resources to a task as people who receive either supplement or encumber the self-regulatory processes that pro-
mindfulness training are willing to do for free (Jensen, Vangkilde, duce mindfulness. We found strong support for this proposition, in-
Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2012). The theoretical framework introduced cluding a pattern of results that differed for some of the respective si-
here provides a way to systematically think about this motivational tuational antecedents. The first on-task attentional pull factor, skill-
aspect in terms of three motivational forces: the metacognitive beliefs challenge balance, was a rather consistent predictor of mindfulness at
unique to mindfulness that drive resources into self-regulation, the both within- and between-person levels across the three studies. How-
feelings of mental fatigue that draw resources away from self-regula- ever, the effect sizes were modest. This finding sheds light on the fre-
tion, and the on-task attentional pull and off-task attentional demand quently debated relation between mindfulness and flow (e.g., Aherne,
appraisals of situations that serve to supplement or encumber self- Moran, & Lonsdale, 2011; Kee & John Wang, 2008; Sheldon, Prentice, &
regulation. By integrating insights on metacognitive practice and self- Halusic, 2015). Namely, the situational feature that is most responsible
regulation in this manner, the former research develops a richer un- for flow is also conductive to mindfulness but still leaves much of the
derstanding of how mental fatigue and situational appraisals can shape emergence of mindfulness unexplained. The second on-task attention
the emergence of mindfulness, whereas the latter gains a more nuanced pull factor, conscientiousness goals, in contrast, showed no discernable
understanding of how metacognition can put self-regulatory processes pattern across the three studies: it was only significant at within-person
to unique uses. This theoretical framework, in turn, extends our un- level in Study 1, not at all significant in Study 2, and showed mixed
derstanding of mindfulness in line with recent personality psychology significance in Study 3. As such, we can conclude that mindfulness
models of how people and their situations are connected (e.g., Fleeson demonstrates sufficient divergent validity from the similar constructs of
& Jayawickreme, 2015; Mischel, Shoda, & Ayduk, 2008) as well as flow and conscientiousness, but we are no closer to explaining the
human factors and ergonomic approaches, which have more fully correlation between conscientiousness and mindfulness. The final on-
considered the demands that situations pose on attention (see Wickens task attentional pull factor, positive social interactions, significantly
& McCarley, 2008). These new connections elicited by the theoretical predicted mindfulness across all three studies at the between-person
framework introduced here provide a resource to further develop the level, but not at the within-person level. As will be discussed subse-
literature. quently, this finding suggests that some of the potential antecedents of
mindfulness may need to be systematic to be effective, rather than in-
6.2. Contributions of empirical studies cidental.
In terms of the off-task attentional demands, hindrance stressors
In terms of the empirical contribution, we have resolved some showed a rather consistent negative relation with mindfulness at both
puzzles and leave others yet to be resolved. In Proposition 1, we sug- within- and between-person levels and had the largest average effect
gested that cognitive resources and metacognitive beliefs would both size across all the predictors. As will be discussed subsequently, this
relate positively with states of mindfulness. We found limited support finding also has practical implications about how to design work en-
for cognitive resources as operationalized in Study 1 and Study 3, with vironments to facilitate mindfulness. The final off-task attentional de-
the former being significant only at the p < .05 level and the latter not mand, technology use, was only assessed in Study 1. In line with our
15
suggestion, both sides of the debate about mindfulness and technology mindfulness training can offload the burden of maintaining wellbeing
may be correct: the immediate consequences of technology use on onto the employee, rather than the management. Our finding that or-
mindfulness more depend on how we engage with it than the tech- ganizational characteristics over which managers have specific control,
nology itself. But the between-person results suggest a further nuance: such as hindrances, can substantially erode mindfulness rightfully
not all people are equally prone to use technology passively. Whereas places the onus back onto managers, rather than employees. Mind-
those who tend to be less mindful also tend toward using technology fulness requires a conducive work environment to blossom.
passively, perhaps people who are typically more mindful can with- Similarly, our findings can help inform practitioners who seek to
stand the temptation to mindlessly browse social media or may not find implement mindfulness as an “on-the-spot” workplace intervention
doing so particularly tempting in the first place. These results in par- (Hafenbrack, 2017). For instance, we find that positive social interac-
ticular merit further replication and extension. tions enhance mindfulness at the between-person level, but not at the
Finally, in Proposition 4, we suggested an interactive effect between within-person level. This finding suggests that managers cannot en-
situations and cognitive resources and motivational beliefs. We found hance an employee’s mindfulness levels by a single positive interaction.
no such interactions with off-task attentional demands and only one They must instead ensure that the employee consistently experiences
such effect with skill-challenge balance, the most quintessential ex- positive social interactions. The work climate matters more for mind-
ample of an on-task attentional demand. While finding an interactive fulness than specific interactions. In contrast, a single task assignment
effect between cognitive resources and skill-challenge balance in pre- that balances the employee’s skills with challenges will enhance their
dicting mindful attention in Study 1, this interaction did not replicate in mindfulness. Finally, given the expansion of technology in everyday
Study 3. As noted previously, there is value in attempting to replicate life, and our finding that passive technology use (like scrolling through
this interactive effect using a different operationalization of cognitive Facebook) was the strongest feature eroding mindful attention in Study
resources. We did, however, replicate an interaction between resource 1, practitioners can and should consider how to better manage tech-
beliefs and skill-challenge balance in predicting mindful attention. As nology use. With the growth of mindfulness apps (e.g., Headspace,
the interaction plots show, people who believe that sustained attention Calm, 10% Happier), it becomes important to clarify whether such
can feel energizing do not require their situations to be high in atten- specialized forms of active technology use can enhance mindfulness,
tional pull (skill-challenge balance) to maintain mindful attention. This and whether they may exert any spillover effects that reduce the ad-
interaction reveals the value in considering motivation in conjunction verse effects of passive technology use (cf. Sliwinski, Katsikitis, & Jones,
with characteristics of situations both in general (Lian et al., 2017), as 2017).
well as specifically in clarifying the emergence of psychological states
like mindfulness. Taken in sum, we find rather limited support for 6.4. Future research directions
Proposition 4, particularly in relation to off-task attentional demands.
This finding is not entirely surprising, as prior work has typically failed Our hope is that the theoretical framework introduced here can help
to find such “buffering” interactive effects of personal resources on si- motivate further research on the antecedents of mindfulness and how
tuational demands (Bakker & Demerouti, 2017). mindfulness emerges from the coming together of people and their si-
Finally, although we found differences between the components of tuations. Such work could follow any one of several promising avenues.
mindful attention and mindful metacognition, we could not detect any Scholars could explore additional operationalizations of self-control
theoretically meaningful pattern underlying these differences. Thus, we capacity. For instance, although assessments of general mental ability,
found no support for the uniformity hypothesis, instead supporting the working memory, and executive functions overlap, they can still be
differential hypothesis that mindfulness components function differ- meaningfully distinguished (Friedman et al., 2006). Future work could,
ently from each other (Baas, Nevicka, & Ten Velden, 2014). Given that as noted previously, assess self-control capacity using executive func-
most organizational research to date has only assessed mindful atten- tions like shifting or inhibiting. Any such work should pair objective
tion, even when conceptualizing mindfulness as both present-moment assessments of self-control capacity with an experience sampling de-
attention and detached monitoring of thoughts and feelings (Sutcliffe sign, as in the current design. Doing so integrates the precision of la-
et al., 2016), the differential hypothesis raises some concerning issues boratory assessment with the naturalistic realism of everyday situa-
for the literature. First, measures of mindful attention alone may in- tions, to better shed light on the emergence of mindfulness (cf. Kane
adequately cover the conceptual space of mindfulness (see Grossman, et al., 2007). A further refinement of this approach could include the
2011). Second, even results consistently found with this measure may use of a field-experiment, in which self-control capacity is assessed
not characterize mindfulness more broadly. As such, at this stage, our before mindfulness training and the role of self-control capacity in
study can only suggest value in assessing both components of mind- generating states of mindfulness is then compared across a condition of
fulness and placing greater confidence in results that hold for both participants who received training and those who did not. Such an
components. approach would more seriously tackle the transfer problem: that we still
understand very little about how the activities that occur during
6.3. Practical contributions mindfulness training transfer to impact everyday work activities. Si-
milarly addressing the transfer problem, future research could unpack
The present research offers several contributions for practitioners. how metacognitive beliefs are developed, particularly by focusing on
Most generally, it exemplifies the idea that mindfulness entails a two key pathways suggested in metacognitive practice: mindfulness
“coming together” of people and situations (Kudesia, 2019, p. 415). The training and interpersonal contact with individuals who actively role
related implication—that the self-regulatory processes underlying model these metacognitive beliefs in their actions (Kudesia, 2019).
mindfulness become easier to enact in certain situations—is utilized, for Such work could clarify, for instance, whether mindfulness training
instance, in mindfulness meditation training. This is why mindfulness is done in groups might better facilitate mindfulness than solitary prac-
typically first trained on neutral stimuli, like the breath, and cultivated tice, because it not only develops metacognitive beliefs through the
in supportive situations before being put toward emotionally-charged meditation instructions, but also affords interpersonal contact with
stimuli and demanding situations (Jha, Stanley, Kiyonaga, Wong, & people attempting to embody the beliefs. Such work would have clear
Gelfand, 2010; Wells, 2002). To the extent that practitioners consider practical implications for mindfulness training.
the role of situations, and differences in the within- and between-person Another avenue for future work could take the overarching prin-
effects of situations, they can better cultivate mindfulness in organi- ciple of Proposition 3—that situations can supplement or encumber the
zations. For instance, as critical treatments of mindfulness have cau- self-regulation processes upon which mindfulness relies—as a helpful
tioned us (e.g., Møllgaard, 2008; Purser, Forbes, & Burke, 2016), guide in identifying additional situational features to study. In the
16
short-term, mindfulness research would benefit greatly from studies financial support from the Future Resilient Systems project at the
that replicate and extend the present results by examining additional Singapore-ETH Centre, which is funded by the National Research
features of situations that represent on-task attentional pull and off-task Foundation of Singapore under its Campus for Research Excellence and
attentional demands. Such work could also shift to objective assess- Technological Enterprise program (FI 370074011).
ments of these features, rather than relying on self-report as we did in
the present research. As an example, we encouraged further work on Appendix. Metacognitive beliefs in mindfulness scale (MBM)
how technology use—including both passive use of social media and
specialized use of mindfulness apps—might impact mindfulness. Attentional sufficiency
Technology use is one situational feature in particular that could
profitably rely on objective metrics (see Ellis, 2019). There are, how- 1. I can stay attentive for extended periods without needing to take
ever, diminishing marginal returns to continually expanding the list of breaks.
situational features appraised as on-task and off-task. The purpose of 2. I believe my ability to pay attention will remain strong over time.
our theoretical framework is to enrich thinking about the ways that 3. I can remain focused on my work for long periods of time.
situations could influence mindfulness, as mindfulness scholarship has 4. I feel confident that I can remain focused on my work for quite some
not considered that situations can supplement or encumber self-reg- time.
ulation. There is a clear danger that such frameworks can be used in a
post-hoc manner to motivate incremental work (see Cortina, 2016). Virtue of monitoring
Thus, once it becomes evident that the various features appraised as
on-task attentional pull and off-task attentional demands exert their 5. It is valuable for me to monitor my thoughts and feelings as I work.
theorized influence on state mindfulness, it may be useful to shift the 6. I’m motivated to notice how my mind works through problems that
research focus. Such a shift could entail assessing on-task attentional may occur.
pull and off-task attentional demands more directly (e.g., Kanfer, 7. It’s important that I step back and notice any strong feelings that
Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale, & Nelson, 1994; Wickens & McCarley, may arise.
2008) and focusing on other aspects of metacognitive practice. For 8. I’m motivated to stay alert to changes in my thoughts and feelings as
instance, work could contribute to important psychological debate on I work.
how, precisely, features of situations become appraised as meaningful
(Rauthmann et al., 2015). Perhaps mindfulness entails not only unique Map-terrain differentiation
metacognitive beliefs, but unique metacognitive strategies as well. Such
strategies could influence the meaningfulness of situational appraisals 9. I believe there are many possible explanations for why people act
of on-task attentional pull and off-task attentional demands. As an ex- the way they do.
ample, people who receive mindfulness training are often encouraged 10. I’m very willing to put my assumptions on hold if unexpected
to treat situations with low attentional pull, like snacking, driving, and events occur.
washing dishes, as an opportunity to practice their mindful attention. 11. I’m open to different ways of interpreting events than my own.
This strategy therefore changes the meaning of a low attentional pull 12. I’m willing to revisit my beliefs even if I feel strongly about them.
appraisal. Qualitative research that analyzes the instructional content
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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

2.1.2. Off-task attentional demands

1. Trait Mindful Attention 4.23 1.03 – (0.84)

Model predictor γ 95% CI t test γ 95% CI t test

Model predictor γ 95% CI t test γ 95% CI t test

3.5. Preliminary discussion and motivation for confirmatory studies

This exploratory study reveals that mindfulness is influenced both

Table 4 4. Study 2: Experience sampling study on sample of hospital

The means, standard deviations, internal reliabilities, and inter-

Model predictor γ 95% CI t test γ 95% CI t test

5.3. Analytical approach

same process as in Study 1. We modeled time with a fixed effect of

The means, standard deviations, internal reliabilities, and inter-

the variance partitioning of experience sampling variables. In these

data, 61% of variability in metacognitive beliefs occurred between-

5.4.1. Antecedents of mindfulness

We first tested whether cognitive resources and resource beliefs, as

Cognitive resources predicted neither mindful attention, γ = 0.03 (95%

tion, γ = 0.01 (95% CI = –0.13, 0.16), t(183) = 0.18, p > .250,

failing to replicate the findings from Study 1. Resource beliefs, in

CI = 0.21, 0.55), t(183) = 4.42, p < .001, and mindful metacogni-

8. Skill-Challenge Balance (T2)

10. Hindrance Stressors (T2)

findings replicate those of Study 1 and align with Proposition 1, that

4. Trait Resource Beliefs

cation than the level of overall resources.

our metacognitive beliefs in mindfulness scale. To do so, we ran four

sequential models. In Model 1, we predicted state mindfulness at the

end of the workday solely from within-person metacognitive beliefs at

Table 8 (179) = 2.61, p = .010.

Intercept 4.74*** –0.04 –0.02 0.19

CI = –0.77, –0.51), t(182) = –9.63, p < .001, as well as mindful

5.4.2. Interactions predicting mindfulness components

Model predictor γ 95% CI t test γ 95% CI t test

(Methodological), 57(1), 289–300. Organizational Psychology, 91(2), 385–410. https://doi.org/10.1111/joop.12200.

89.5.883. psychology quantitatively described. Review of General Psychology, 7(4), 331–363.

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