Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Forest Policy and Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol

Post-conflict transition and REDD+ in Colombia: Challenges to reducing

deforestation in the Amazon
Jean Carlo Rodríguez-de-Francisco a, *, Carlos del Cairo b, Daniel Ortiz-Gallego b, e,
Juan Sebastian Velez-Triana c, e, Tomás Vergara-Gutiérrez b, Jonas Hein a, d
a
German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn, Germany
b
Department of Anthropology, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia
c
Institute of Development Policy, Antwerp University, Antwerp, Belgium
d
CAU Kiel, Department of Geography, Kiel, Germany
e
Center for Alternatives to Development – Cealdes, Bogotá, Colombia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: REDD+ is a mechanism to address climate change by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. In this
Colombia article, the implementation of the REDD Early Movers- REM/Visión Amazonia program in Guaviare, Colombia, is
Amazon analyzed, focusing on the implementation challenges and scope of the program when addressing deforestation
Post-conflict
drivers in a post-conflict context. By taking a historical perspective on regional deforestation challenges in
REDD+
Deforestation
Guaviare, we link these challenges to the recent deforestation trends in the region. This article demonstrates the
Power particular challenges to implementing REDD+ in the Colombian post-conflict context related to the power
vacuum left by the FARC retreat, land grabbing for speculation and cattle ranching, power asymmetries and
corrupted regional elites. The article concludes that the current scope of REM does not sufficiently address the
main drivers of deforestation, and that REM’s focus on campesinos and indigenous communities will not
significantly reduce the substantial deforestation rates in the present post-conflict context.

1. Introduction agreed that the payments will reward the reduction of emissions caused
by deforestation in the Amazon biome and that 60% of funds will benefit
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation local actors (KfW and GIZ, 2015).
(REDD+) is a climate mitigation mechanism based on providing eco­ REM is implemented by the Colombian government through the
nomic incentives to tropical, forested countries to conserve and sus­ Visión Amazonia program, the Colombian National REDD+ Strategy to
tainably manage forest resources. The REDD Early Movers Program control deforestation in the Amazon (Minambiente, 2016). REM started
(REM) provides performance-based payments for verified emission re­ implementation in the midst of the peace negotiations in Colombia in
ductions from deforestation prevention, thereby managing REDD+ in 2016, aiming to stop deforestation by 2020. FARC guerrillas once
line with the decisions agreed in the context of the United Nations occupied large strips of Colombia’s vast forests, including the Colombian
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). REM works as a Amazon. The presence of the guerrillas, who used the region’s thick
funding incentive for countries in the Global South that already have forests as shelter, kept deforestation actors away from the far-flung re­
shown reductions in deforestation. In the case of Colombia, REM is gions under their control (Castro-Nunez et al., 2017; Paz-Cardona, 2017;
financed jointly by Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom. It fo­ Steffens, 2018). After the signing of the peace agreement, the rate of
cuses on creating conditions for implementing and operating Colombia’s deforestation in Colombia rose by 44%. This dramatic increase is
zero-deforestation strategy on two fronts: first, by improving forest attributed to the action of powerful actors who quickly moved in to fill
governance, institutions and land use planning; and second, by sup­ the power vacuum left after the retreat of the FARC from these frontier
porting “sustainable productive activities” and other low-carbon areas of the country which, even today, have yet to be consolidated by
development alternatives and safeguarding the livelihoods, territories the Colombian state.
and rights of indigenous peoples. The involved governments have There is significant evidence that deforestation rates tend to increase

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected] (J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2021.102450
Received 2 August 2019; Received in revised form 24 February 2021; Accepted 25 February 2021
Available online 23 March 2021
1389-9341/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

in the aftermath of conflict-peace transitions due to the creation of 2.1. Case study area
windows of opportunity for resource appropriation (e.g. Álvarez, 2001;
Clerici et al., 2020; Grima and Singh, 2019; Van Dexter and Visseren- Two rural areas of the municipality San Jose del Guaviare were
Hamakers, 2019). Focusing on the actors embodying deforestation, selected as case studies. San José del Guaviare covers an area of 16,500
there is an important environmental narrative portraying local actors – km2 and consists of the departmental capital San José, with 48,877 in­
communities and subsistence farmers in general – as the primary agents habitants, and 12 sparsely populated rural centers, with 20,000 in­
responsible for clearing forest, largely because of their practices of “slash habitants in total. The municipality of San José del Guaviare lies along
and burn”, extensive farming or because of their lack of options due to the right bank of the Guaviare River, in a transition area between the
their impoverished conditions (Brady, 1996; Schuck et al., 2002; grassland plains of the Orinoco region to the north and the Amazon
Skutsch and Turnhout, 2020). This narrative is still present in REDD+ tropical rainforests to the south. Until 2017, many parts of the munici­
policy discourse, and particularly in national REDD+ policy documents pality, mainly those located far from the town, were strongholds of the
(Skutsch and Turnhout, 2020), together with the assumption that FARC.
poverty is one of the main factors driving deforestation (for a counter In San José, this research focused on two areas (see Fig. 1), selected
narrative, see Geist and Lambin, 2003). In this sense, narratives can be because of their unique features regarding land tenure, land use and
considered as “stories” that frame environmental problems in particular conflicts, and because of previous research there on local participation,
ways and in turn suggest particular solutions that legitimize particular development, and conflict and cooperation in socio-environmental
development interventions (Fairhead and Leach, 1998). However, as processes. At the time of the fieldwork, REM/Visión Amazonia had
Goldman et al. (2011:3) stress, “the politics surrounding environmental just started activities in this region. The first rural area of the munici­
management is not simply the playing out of material interests but is pality to be selected was the conservation zone of the Serranía de la
animated by competing knowledge claims about the environment”. Lindosa (west of the city of San José). In this location, the aim was to
Actual knowledge of specific environmental problems such as defores­ analyze how a protected area influences the land tenure of campesinos
tation and forest degradation is characterized by great uncertainty and (peasants) and indigenous people. The second rural area selected was at
consequently by multiple and competing knowledge claims (Goldman the border of the Forest Reserve Zone, towards the east of San José city,
et al., 2011). It is important to assert that historically Colombian policies including the neighborhoods of Damas del Nare, La Fuga. The aim in the
on the Amazon region reproduced powerful narratives about campe­ second area was to explore the limitations that the Forest Reserve Zone
sinos and indigenous communities inhabiting these areas. In the first creates for the land tenure of the local population (c.f. Hein et al., 2020).
case, for decades campesinos were seen as agents of civilization bringing
development to the unproductive wild natural landscapes of the 2.2. Data collection and analysis
Amazon. However, after global environmental concerns regarding
tropical lands emerged during 1980s, this narrative started to change, The research on which this article is based was carried out in 2017.
framing campesinos as predators and as the main agents of environ­ Qualitative research methods included observations, semi-structured
mental degradation in the Amazon owing to their backward agricultural interviews, open interviews, focus groups and bibliographical and
practices and the cultivation of coca. Likewise, indigenous people were document research. Initially, five open interviews were conducted with
initially portrayed as the savage inhabitants of these unproductive lands, donors, policy designers and implementers in Germany (i.e. BMZ, KfW,
and later as stewards of the forests (Del Cairo, 2012; Hein et al., 2020). and GIZ). Subsequently, fieldwork was carried out in two phases in
In this article, we analyze the challenges of forest conservation in the Colombia. The first field work phase consisted of interviews with 13
transition from armed conflict to peacebuilding in the Colombian stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of REM in
Amazon. We conceive deforestation as a multidimensional process that Bogotá. The interviewees represented Visión Amazonia, the Ministry of
must be understood by acknowledging the historical roots and narra­ Environment and Sustainable Development (Minambiente), GIZ
tives that shape contemporary socio-ecological dynamics. In doing so, Colombia, the Global Green Growth Institute and the Fondo Patrimonio
we reflect upon how REDD+ relates to the historical processes in the Natural. In addition, representatives from the three funding countries
region and to the above-mentioned narratives, and how it aims to tackle (German, British and Norwegian embassies) were interviewed. The
drivers of deforestation in the case studies. We emphasize the impor­ second field work phase was carried out in San José del Guaviare, where
tance of an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the way in 35 stakeholders from the regional authorities (e.g. Guaviare government
which war-peace transitions affect deforestation processes in a multi­ and Corporation for Sustainable Development of the North and East
dimensional milieu, where historical, social, economic, cultural and Amazonia − CDA), campesino associations (e.g. Corpolindosa), local
political factors converge. organizations (e.g. Communal Action Boards or Juntas de Accion
The article is structured as follows. In Section Two, the area of study Comunal − JACs), indigenous reservations (e.g. resguardos La María, La
and methods used for this research are described. In Section Three, we Fuga and Barrancón) and demobilized guerrilla combatants were
describe REM/Vision Amazonia. We focus on knowledge claims made by interviewed using semi-structured interviews. Interview partners were
the involved agencies and identify intertwined policy narratives. In identified using snowball-sampling. In addition, three focus groups were
Sections Four and Five, based on historical insights into environmental conducted separately with campesinos, indigenous peoples and ex-
governance, deforestation and colonization processes and on post- guerrilla combatants: one in the Serranía de la Lindosa and two in the
conflict drivers of deforestation, we explain the reasons why REM/ rural areas bordering the Forest Reserve Zone.
Vision Amazonia is not able to reduce deforestation sustainably. The In addition, bibliographic and documentary research was conducted,
article closes with a section discussing our findings and suggestions for systematizing and analyzing technical and legal documents related to
future research and policy. environmental and territorial planning in Guaviare. To relate the gath­
ered information to land-use patterns, we employed data from Global
2. Research methods Forest Watch and IDEAM. Interviews were recorded in the form of field
notes and audio recordings (with informed consent), and systematized
This study was designed as an in-depth case study of the REM /Visión in field journals. All information was systematized and manually coded
Amazonia program in the Amazon region of San José del Guaviare, for analysis. All information was handled anonymously and the in­
Colombia. Because of its exploratory nature, the research followed a terviewees were debriefed on the outcome of the research by means of
qualitative approach. expert panels in Bogotá and at the BMZ in Germany.

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J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

Fig. 1. Case study area and land designations in San José del Guaviare, Colombia. Source: Hein et al. (2020).

3. REM/Vision Amazonia and its approach to reducing mitigate and compensate (for) deforestation. This pillar seeks to create a
deforestation consensus that development interventions should not lead to additional
deforestation, to connect peripheral regions to the transport system, and
REM/Vision Amazonia is an anti-deforestation strategy based in five to promote commercial activities that maintain biodiversity (Min­
pillars. Pillar 1 (Forest Governance) focuses on forest resource planning, ambiente, 2017). In practical terms, this includes measures such as the
strengthening of managerial and control capacities (including a military development of a multipurpose land register by the National
environmental control unit called the environmental bubble1) and the Geographical Institute Agustín Codazzi and the strengthening of spatial
promotion of participatory processes and environmental education. The planning at the municipal level and in the wider Amazon region (Min­
establishment of forest business cores (FBC) for timber and non-timber ambiente, 2019).
products, together with the signing of conservation agreements are Pillar 3 (Agro-environmental Development) has a special focus on
considered key measures of pillar 1 for developing a community-based agricultural producers (campesinos and farmers), seeking to create pri­
and conservation-oriented forestry sector. Forest business cores are ex­ ority value chains for sustainable non-timber products, rubber, cocoa,
pected to create a reliable income for frontier communities through meat and milk products. The implementation of pillar 3 builds on a
sustainable timber extraction (Minambiente, 2019). Initially, the CDA number of projects involving campesino associations, with seven pro­
and the regional associations for sustainable development invested ca. jects in Guaviare in 2019, for example, contributing to the conservation
USD 1980 for direct payments for families of FBCs. Payments will be of 22,886 ha of forests. These projects include conservation agreements
made on the condition that IDEAM approves families of NDFs who fulfil signed by the campesino associations, and support agroforestry, the
the predefined conservation goals (Minambiente, 2019). Thirty-six reconversion of pastureland, ecotourism and the production of non-
families in two FBCs in Guaviare received an initial payment of ca. timber forest products. In the Serrania la Lindosa, for example, the
USD 250 for the period between November 2019 and January 2020 eco-tourism initiative Corpolindosa receives support for conserving
(Minambiente, 2019). Moreover, a tender for the establishment of a 4649 ha of forest (Minambiente, 2019).
jungle school (Escuela de selva) for 600 community leaders to promote Pillar 4 (Supporting Environmental Governance of Indigenous Ter­
environmental education was launched in 2019, and 176 joint opera­ ritories) tries to address its goals by combining policies that acknowl­
tions to control deforestation were conducted by the environmental edge the indigenous land-use practices that have contributed to
bubble (Minambiente, 2019). maintaining the forest cover of the Colombian Amazon. The REM
Pillar 2 (Intersectoral Coordination) focuses on coordination be­ 2018–2019 management plan lists 10 projects that cover more than 1
tween ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Mining and Environment) to prevent, million ha of land in the Amazonia. One project focusing on strength­
ening indigenous land tenure and traditional land management prac­
tices is located in Guaviare (Minambiente, 2019). Other projects focus
1 on governing capacity-building for indigenous leaders, spatial planning
The environmental bubble is composed of the Colombian army, the Na­
by indigenous communities, food security and life planning and the
tional Police, the Attorney General’s Office, Environmental Authorities, Natural
National Parks and the Governor’s Offices. transnational REDD Indigena initiative.

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J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

Pillar 5 (Enabling Policies) places emphasis on policies that cattle-ranching elites that in turn are linked to political elites (Latorre-
strengthen the remote-sensing forest and carbon monitoring system and Coronado and Pacheco, 2019). In 2017, deforestation in the Colombian
the national forestry inventory for the Amazon region (Minambiente, Amazonia totaled 183,000 ha, 60% due to illegal land grabbing for
2015, 2016). This includes a system operated by IDEAM that localizes cattle ranching, 20% to illegal coca cultivation and 20% to other causes
and identifies deforestation hotspots, based on Sentinel 1/2 and Planet (IDEAM cited in Semana-Sostenible, 2019.). In an interview, a staff
Scope images (Minambiente, 2019). member of the region’s environmental authority CDA explained that:
REM/Visión Amazonia acknowledges that the peace agreement and
Praderización for livestock is the main driver of deforestation in
the associated power void has created new risks to the integrity of the
Guaviare at the moment. However, it is not the campesinos who are
Amazon biome. Its work plan clearly states that land speculation and the
to blame, as they use secondary forests or fallow lands for their own
expansion of the “cattle frontier” increase the pressure on natural forests
consumption. The problem is deforestation carried out by big capital,
(Minambiente, 2019). Hence, the responsible government department,
who come with armored trucks and armed escorts. They come to a
Minambiente, concludes in its REM work plan that monitoring and law
village and hire the inhabitants to cut down primary forest in reserve
enforcement have to be improved, the insecure atmosphere in the region
areas. When we arrive to carry out the operations, those who are
has to be addressed, and the alternative deforestation-free productive
there are the campesinos. (Interview in Pardo-Ibarra, 2019).
systems of campesinos and indigenous communities have to be sup­
ported (Minambiente, 2019). Summing up, praderización for land speculation is driven by
economically powerful regional and national cattle-ranching elites who
4. Drivers of deforestation and other historical and current invest money to directly hire campesinos as labor to clear trees or buy
sociopolitical issues in Guaviare deforested land from campesinos who are forced to move on into the
forest to establish new households. This process, says Salgado (2012), is
Forests cover around 51% of Colombian territory – 60 million ha a cycle of colonization and land grabbing in which campesinos are
(IDEAM, 2017). The Amazon region hosts 67% of these forests, and repeatedly dispossessed. It can be linked to state economic development
currently this region hosts at least 70% of the deforestation in the policies that have historically supported extensive cattle ranching and
country. Among the departments in this region, the two main Colombian currently push for agribusiness expansion in the area (i.e. palm oil).
hotspots of deforestation were located in Guaviare from the end of 2016 Praderización is related to deforestation but also to consolidation of
until the second half of 2020 (Hotspot 1: Retorno and Hotspot 2: Mar­ the great historical inequality of land distribution that is currently
ginal de la Selva) (IDEAM, 2020). Figures from Global Forest Watch (see accelerating in Colombia. Today, Colombia is one of the most unequal
Fig. 2) show the increasing trend in deforestation in Guaviare. countries in the world in terms of land distribution, with an estimated
According to CDA environmental office staff, at the time of our 0.4% of the population owning 62% of the country’s most productive
research the most pressing drivers of deforestation included land grab­ land (USAID, 2017). In Guaviare, according to IGAC (2012), roughly
bing, infrastructure – mainly related to roads, coca crops and cattle 90% of the area is in the hands of large landholders (large-scale cattle
ranching. These drivers come together in a context where violence and ranching). The expansion of latifundios is carried out via many strategies,
weak law enforcement make it difficult to deal properly with environ­ such as large landholders taking advantage of bankrupt campesinos to
mental crimes (interview with CDA staff, July 2017). A contextual buy cheap land: “Whenever generalized crops fail, or when forceful
analysis of deforestation drivers in the area suggests that these drivers eradication comes and campesinos face difficulties, then the land market
are interlinked. For example, there are clear indications that land gets active” (Campesino; pers. comm. July 2017).
grabbing is connected to powerful large-scale cattle ranchers, and at the For example, Deispaz (2014) explains that in the past, the economic
same time linked to infrastructure (Dávalos et al., 2014). downturn and fall in illicit production helped latifundia, causing cattle
ranches to expand, today this is still the case as wealthy people buy
4.1. Praderización complete villages and deforest 200 to 500 ha of forest in one go (Yunis-
Mebarak, 2018).
Recent reports on deforestation dynamics in the region have iden­ There is strong evidence suggesting that many large-scale cattle
tified praderización as the main underlying cause of deforestation (Paz- ranchers, with political connections to the departmental government,
Cardona, 2017). Praderización is described as the illegal deforestation of have joined this land rush. In this sense, many of our interview partners
large portions of forest and the de-facto establishment of property rights explained how large-scale cattle ranchers use political connections to
over land in legal terms by fencing it and grazing cows on it to dodge environmental control and to find ways to normalize land tenure
demonstrate productive use (Armenteras et al., 2019a; Armenteras in former forested land subject to praderización.
et al., 2019b; Yunis-Mebarak, 2018). Such land is then legalized via
corrupt political connections. Cattle ranching allows landowners to le­ Everyone in the department knows that Governor Nebio Echeverry
gally demonstrate that these lands are used “productively”. The grass­ … buys land from campesinos and indigenous people at low prices
lands are kept for speculative purposes, for example, to sell to projects and then sells it at twice the price to large landowners, granting them
such as road construction, mining or agribusiness development. titles and all the legal documentation. And with it, the Public Force
Interviewed community members have reported such processes has entered to take care of these lands, to prevent one from
leading to deforestation in several areas of the municipalities of Gua­ approaching and asking who the owner is and what they are doing in
viare, most of them in the Forest Reserve Zone. Many of the actors the jungle. (Campesino leader in PARES, 2019).
involved are enticed by capital investment and large financiers, and The identity of actors responsible for the deforestation in Guaviare
appropriate land through praderización. After converting forestland to has been made public at the national level in news stories, as in one
pastureland, as a means to legitimize land tenure, some owners sell or entitled “Deforestation in Guaviare finally has a name” (Latorre-Coro­
rent the land for profit, while others keep the pastureland for cattle nado and Pacheco, 2019). This report highlighted that the former
ranching. Currently, the formal and informal land market in Guaviare is governor of Guaviare, Nebio Echeverry, was one of the many large-scale
accelerated, with many actors seeking to gain control of land. cattle ranchers responsible for deforestation. Furthermore, in 2019, the
Land is later “legalized” according to de facto processes using various governor and two mayors of municipalities in Guaviare were formally
techniques (e.g. testaferrato (front man), letter of purchase-sale, nota­ sanctioned with fines for allowing (or driving) deforestation to build or
rized statement), resulting in rural areas becoming depopulated by their improve roads in protected areas (Ardila, 2019). The irony of these cases
original inhabitants and falling under the control of outside interests is that the officials in charge of law enforcement were directly
(Del Cairo, 2018b). In other words, large scale praderización is linked to

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J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

Fig. 2. Deforestation in Guaviare in kha for period 2002–2019. Source: Adapted from GFW (2019).

responsible for breaking the law. by several criminal groups, including BACRIM (criminal bands)2
(McDermott, 2014). For example, the Gulf Clan, which mainly operated
4.2. Infrastructure in the Cordoba and Urabá regions (Chocó and Antioquia), has expanded
its area of influence into the Amazon territory. The Puntilleros, a
As a driver of deforestation in this case study context, infrastructure BACRIM, are also fighting for control over coca production and distri­
development refers to the illegal road between Calamar and Miraflores, bution. Remaining FARC dissidents, who have more territorial control in
and other secondary roads such as Marginal de La Selva (Dávalos et al., Guaviare than other criminal groups, are also fueling deforestation,
2016). Some 40 years ago, fur and rubber traders opened the road that among others, through coca production. Recent journalistic in­
connects Calamar and Miraflores. Since then, inhabitants and the FARC vestigations state that FARC dissidents offer up to ca. USD 1400 to
have gradually added stretches to it resulting in its current 138 km impoverished campesinos for each hectare of deforested land for coca
trajectory. crops (Semana-Sostenible, 2020). These various groups are also linked
The construction of this road is a source of conflict between the to deforestation in a large part of the Guaviare, as the presence of these
neighboring communities (which demand it), the Guaviare Government groups and their interest in buying pasta base (coca paste) gives
(which promised it), the CDA (which rejects it), and other actors who impoverished campesinos an incentive to expand coca crops.
want to protect the forest. Planned since the 1950s, the Marginal de la Looking back in history, one of the main factors that helped illicit
Selva is a highway project intended to create a paved land passage economies thrive in Guaviare included the promotion of colonization by
through the Andean foothills into Colombia’s Amazon region. The landless campesinos without agricultural extension services, limited
highway, when completed, would allow land freight to cross South commercial connections to Colombia’s major markets, and the weak and
America from the Atlantic to the Pacific without having to enter the sporadic on-the-ground attention paid to colonization programs (Arcila
Andean Mountains, opening an enticing trade route from Venezuela to et al., 1999; Del Cairo, 2012). All this combined with the strategic in­
Ecuador through Colombia. In Guaviare, the Marginal de la Selva would terest of illegal groups in strengthening their economic income from the
connect San José del Guaviare with San Vicente del Caguán. In 2018, collection of taxes on coca transactions (a practice known as gramaje)
this project was cancelled due to the expansion of the Chiribiquete and on coca commercialization. This accelerates the coca economy by
National Natural Park, but deforestation in the area continues, as many opening new veins of colonization following the course of certain rivers,
actors, especially big capital investors from Bogotá (Del Cairo, 2018a), such as Guaviare, Vaupés and Inírida, which represented new hotspots
are grabbing land, through praderización, in the areas where the road is of deforestation during the 1970s and 80s.
planned in order to speculate with land or claim compensation. In the late 1980s, the government began implementing anti-drug
Infrastructure influences the dynamics of praderización for specula­ policies that included the eradication of coca crops through aerial-
tive purposes, as investors seek to gain clear land close to the projected spraying of herbicides (Ortiz, 2016) and the substitution of coca crops
highway and secondary roads, which guarantees future land valoriza­ for legal crops (e.g. rubber, cocoa, amazon fruits). Aerial fumigations
tion, therefore road investment has enhanced the value of land (Dávalos meant that deforestation moved inside the national parks and also into
et al., 2014). This encourages land grabbing processes related to indigenous resguardos (reservations), as Colombian legislation prohibits
deforestation not due to an expectation of income based on value fumigations inside resguardos or national parks (Gómez-Maseri, 2015).
changes in cattle ranching, but due to expectation of land revenues
obtained by future valorization resulting from infrastructure invest­
ment. In other words, the expectation of infrastructure investment is a
2
key factor to understand land grabbing practices associated with McDermott (2014) explains that the name BACRIM was created by the
government of former President Alvaro Uribe in the aftermath of the demobi­
praderización.
lization of the AUC. Any drug trafficking organizations post-2006 were not to
be considered paramilitary groups but, rather, “criminal bands” (from the
4.3. Illicit crops Spanish “bandas criminales” – BACRIM). Yet all but one of the BACRIM had
their roots in the AUC. The exception that proves the rule was the Rastrojos,
Control of illicit crop production such as coca is now being contested which emerged from the military wing of a faction of the Norte del Valle Cartel.

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The war on drugs reinforced the narratives of coca growers as “criminal” from its natural condition – into productive agricultural land were
campesinos who were one of the key pieces of the illegal value chain of granted property titles. However, the state did not grant access to all
the drug trade and also allies of the FARC rebels who must be prose­ areas and established National Forest Reserve Zones (Zonas de Reserva
cuted. This framing of campesinos as doubly illegal became another Forestal (ZRF) – Law 2/1959) in order to establish a “land reserve or
growing driver of land dispossession and further colonization of the cushion” (Del Cairo, 2012) on which the state could draw for “free” land.
Amazonian forests (Ortiz, 2016; Ramírez, 2017; Salgado, 2012). This, Thousands of campesinos in the Andean region of Colombia who did not
and the intensification of the armed conflict in the mid-1980s, resulted have land or had been violently displaced were able to access the tierras
in an unprecedented mobilization of campesinos demanding land baldías in the northwestern Amazon (Molano, 1987; Salgado, 2012), and
property rights and better infrastructure, such as the 1985 and 1986 deforestation rates increased as a result of the very conditions that the
campesino strikes in Guaviare. As a result of these strikes, the Ministry of state promoted in order to give titles to landless campesinos. Later, in
Agriculture freed up (subtracted) 221,000 ha from the Amazon Forest response to the large number of land claims and colonizers, the state
Reserve Zone (ZRF) in Guaviare (Incora Resolution 128 of 1987) and issued Law 4/1973 to free up (subtract) more land from the forest
distributed this land among the strikers. reserve zone (ZRF).5 These colonization programs followed the narra­
Dávalos et al. (2011:1220) argue that in recent decades, coca culti­ tive of migrant campesinos as agents civilizing unproductive natural
vation has been directly or indirectly associated with drivers of defor­ wild lands and, later, as key actors for rural development.
estation in Amazonia, and that the “eradication program itself could However, in general, many scholars argue that the promises of rural
contribute to deforestation by facilitating the degradation of forest development that were part of the state-led agrarian colonization pro­
remnants, pushing growers out of targeted areas to new lands making grams did not materialize, as is evident in the current lack of infra­
colonization and deforestation more dynamic”. In addition, the histor­ structure, tertiary roads and services such as drinking water, healthcare,
ical conditions that have produced these frontier areas make political education, access to credit, technical assistance and social security for
and social violence a decisive factor in the way in which many powerful the majority of inhabitants (Dávalos et al., 2016; Moreno-Sanchez et al.,
actors compete with campesinos and indigenous people over land and 2003).
local resources. Along with the convoluted precedents of the coca economy, coloni­
Interestingly, Latorre-Coronado and Pacheco (2019) reported that in zation, expansion of cattle ranching, coca eradication and alternative
Guaviare, between 2016 and 2017, deforestation grew by 233% while at development policies in Guaviare, the Colombian government has
the same time, coca cultivation decreased by 28%. A similar finding was striven since 1990 to manage the Amazon according to the international
confirmed by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2018). This environmental script (Del Cairo et al., 2014). In fact, environmental
contradicts the official narrative of the government about illicit crops as legislation began to boom in Colombia’s northwestern Amazon, aligned
the main current cause of deforestation, suggesting that other drivers with growing global concern over the environmental crisis and climate
such as land grabbing play a larger role than officially recognized. change. Policy implementation progressively echoed the narrative of
campesinos as predators of natural forests and biodiversity and, conse­
quently, led to new land ownership limitations outside the ZRF and,
4.4. Changing development paradigms in the Amazon and social
above all, to various types of restrictions on land use (Del Cairo et al.,
differentiation
2014).
In the 1990s, an environmental legislative started to develop in
The colonization of the Amazon was a state-led strategy aimed
Colombia. First, the 1991 Political Constitution upgraded Guaviare from
mainly at consolidating state control in this frontier area by supporting
a “special commissariat” to a department with administrative auton­
agrarian colonization, instead of redistributing the highly concentrated
omy. This change allowed for the consolidation of local power by eco­
land in the Andean region of the country (Dávalos et al., 2016; Del Cairo
nomic elites of the region. Over time, these elites made convenient use of
et al., 2014). At the beginning of 20th century, land concentration was a
environmental surveillance instruments in order to exert pressure on
source of social conflict, and the Law 200/1936 was an attempt to solve
small rural landowners to leave the land, seeking to increase land con­
such conflict by declaring the Amazon as vacant land (or tierra baldia)3
centration among the elite, and banish campesinos to more distant
to be colonized and developed by Andean campesinos. However, most of
agrarian frontiers that extended into the national forest reserve (Del
this land lacked (and still lacks) infrastructure for development,
Cairo et al., 2014). Second, Colombia subscribed to the 1992 Rio Con­
contributing to the continued livelihood struggle of migrant campesino
ference agreements and the ratification of the 1992 United Nations
populations. With Law 200/1936, the Colombian state claimed to be the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. In Guaviare, these inter­
owner of this “empty” land, thereby denying any form of pre-existing
national conventions translated into the promotion of several protected
land tenure, such as might be held, for instance, by indigenous peo­
areas to reduce carbon emissions, placing the need to conserve
ples. At the time, indigenous peoples – mainly those established in
Amazonian ecosystems at the center of the global public debate (Ruiz,
frontier areas – were portrayed by policymakers, among others, as un­
2003). In the case of Guaviare, the rise of environmental legislation and
productive, savage populations that had to be “civilized” to truly
the legal capacities of state institutions to carry out environmental
become part of the Colombian nation (Escobar, 2010; Molano, 1987).
surveillance work led, according to our interviewees, to serious conflicts
Between the 1940s and 1970s the Colombian state started to pro­
between campesino communities and state institutions over property
mote a model of directed migration to colonize the Amazonia following
rights and land use, especially when lands that had been occupied for
the narrative: “a land without men, for men without land” which was
decades were declared as protected areas.
also used in other Amazonian contexts (Del Cairo and Montenegro-
The emergence of the environmental agenda reconfigured the soci­
Perini, 2015; Hecht and Cockburn, 1989). Colonizers who converted
etal roles of the different actors living in Guaviare. For example,
wild frontier land4 (Billington, 1971; Turner, 1962) – or transformed it

3 5
Tierras baldias refers to urban or rural unconstructed or uncultivated land The ZRF in Guaviare has been reduced in size through various legal sub­
that is part of the State’s property. De jure, tierras baldias are owned by the state tractions (e.g. Res. 217/1965, Res. 222/1971 and Res. 128/1987). These sub­
and are imprescriptible. However, the state can grant ownership under certain tractions were the result of social pressures to which the state has responded by
conditions. liberating land for private and communal titling. What remains of the original
4
Turner (1962) and Billington (1971) refer to frontier areas as underpopu­ ZRF in Guaviare is now under Res. 1925/2013, sub-classified into three types:
lated, peripheral areas on the fringes of civilization and state control, waiting to allowing no intervention (type a), allowing sustainable forestry activities (type
be civilized and put into production. b) and allowing agro-forestry activities (type c).

6
J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

campesinos initially labeled by the state as the development engines of control is carried out in deforestation hotspots in the Amazon region,
the region (through the establishment of agricultural activities), were and has to date deployed seven military operations. Artemisa has led to a
now labeled as nature’s destroyers. Likewise, indigenous communities shift of government strategy in which the policies based on incentives
moved from being perceived by the state as backward, savage and un­ such as Vision Amazonia/REM have become less relevant in comparison
productive actors to being stewards of conservation (Del Cairo, 2012; to disincentive or military conservation policies in which deforestation
Hein et al., 2020). Such changes in the connotations of social classifi­ is made a national security issue (Ortiz and Sánchez, 2021). Nonethe­
cations also imply changes in what was considered legal and appro­ less, Artemisa is a controversial military operation as it has focused
priate, and redefined the rights and responsibilities of social actors mainly on controlling campesinos with small plots of lands, while large
regarding access to /control of land and related natural resources. In landowners, illegal groups and the investors behind deforestation
general, the presence of the state authorities was always relatively weak remain untouched (El-Tiempo, 2020).
(other than in close proximity to San Jose del Guaviare, the de­
There is a selective application of the law: there is no control or
partment’s capital) and large parts of Guaviare were controlled by
surveillance towards latifundistas [large-scale cattle ranchers], usu­
armed groups and/or self-governed by local communities (Del Cairo and
ally the law captures those with the axe, but not those directing
Montenegro-Perini, 2015).
major land grabs (Campesino, pers. comm. July 2017).
This brief historical account of agrarian colonization, coca crops and
eradication policies in Guaviare shows the context of deforestation, A member of a Guaviare-based campesino association argued that
which has been part of the historical construction of the economy and land speculation and the conversion of forests to pasture is backed by
landscape of the region, closely linked to multiscale dynamics such as large-scale cattle ranchers and other groups that he calls “neo­
land distribution changes and international trade and environmental paramilitary”, with close ties to regional elites. These statements indi­
agreements. cate that despite attempts to strengthen environmental law enforcement
by REM/Visión Amazonia, and new initiatives such as Artemisa, actors
5. Deforestation in the post-conflict period driving large-scale deforestation are well positioned within webs of
political and economic power, and are consequently, in most cases, not
The peace agreement with FARC influenced the reconfiguration of targeted by environmental control actions.
socio-ecological dynamics in the region, leading to rising rates of The relationship between deforestation and agribusiness is becoming
deforestation (Sierra et al., 2017). According to Tobón-Quintero and increasingly apparent in Guaviare. During our research, one of the ru­
Herrera-Jaramillo (2016) and Fajardo (2017), the cause of this peace­ mors brought to our attention by some of our interviewees was the
–deforestation paradox is the power vacuum left by the FARC. As potential creation of a Zone of Interest for Rural, Economic and Social
guerrilla fighters began to demobilize, several groups (e.g. guerrilla Development, Zidres for short (Law 1776/2016). According to inter­
dissidents, criminal bands and large-scale cattle ranchers with strong viewee statements, this is on the local decision-making agenda. This
political connections) started to move in, taking advantage of the power potential future development illustrates the interest of the government
vacuum left behind in order to accumulate land for speculation, cattle in supporting the expansion of agribusinesses on tierras baldías. Zidres
ranching and mining (Brodzinsky, 2017). Some of the illegal groups are promoted as a means of incorporating landless campesinos into
rushing for land include FARC dissidents and criminal gangs such as the agricultural production in alliance with large private investors. How­
Gulf Clan and Los Puntilleros (Paz-Cardona, 2017). ever, many such campesinos have land that is used/managed without
It has become evident that the de facto withdrawal of the FARC from official legal rights, although it is recognized by communal institutions
its controlled territories in the context of the peace process generated such as JACs. In this sense, customary land rights such as continued use
opportunities that ultimately increased deforestation in areas where the and occupation are tied to local legitimacy.
FARC was previously present (Prem et al., 2020). Prem et al. (2020) Even though a Zidres has not been officially confirmed in Guaviare,
shows how deforestation is mainly linked to large-scale cattle ranching in some political circles at regional level this idea has been discussed in
and land speculation, rather than to small-scale agriculture (including relation to the introduction of intensive, monoculture crops like palm oil
coca growing). Castro-Nunez et al. (2017) confirm these findings, in Guaviare (Ebus, 2017; Minagricultura, 2018). During a field visit to a
explaining that campesinos work mainly on fallow land and – to a lesser recently established water buffalo farm, a worker explained the
extent – in secondary forests. Dávalos et al. (2016) further supports this following to us:
by stating that even before the signing of the peace agreement, defor­
estation rates from coca cultivation were at least one order of magnitude Water buffalos are widely used for palm oil cultivation in the
lower than deforestation for legal uses. In this sense, there are vested neighboring department of Meta and we are now preparing for its
interests from powerful actors in pushing forward the narrative that development in Northern Guaviare (pers. comm. July 2017).
deforestation is mainly carried out by small farmers linked to coca At the social and economic level, analyses of the implementation of
cultivation, although this is not the case as we have shown in the article. Zidres show how alliances between private investors, the state and
The focus of REM/Vision Amazonia on environmental control is also campesinos negatively affect campesino rights to property, as well as
controversial. During our interviews with campesinos and members of producing negative environmental effects (Arias-Henao, 2016; Burgos,
campesino associations, participants argued that law enforcement is 2016). In this context, foreign and national capital investments might be
highly unequal, mainly tackling “small holders” and not land specula­ deployed to erode the land rights of campesinos, and to enhance the land
tors, whom they consider mainly responsible for deforestation. This rights of large investors aligned with land deals for large-scale export
view is shared to some degree by CDA staff, who argue that it is difficult agribusiness. This could occur in territories where, according to Law
to control environmental crimes by armed groups but that it is even 160/1996, land should be distributed to landless campesinos.
more difficult to control large-scale cattle ranchers with political con­ As long as deforestation and extractivist practices are deeply
nections. Moreover, a staff member explained that because of the se­ entangled with regional elites and actors that operate beyond the law, it
curity situation and a recent incident in which a soldier and CDA staff remains unclear how REM/Visión Amazonia can effectively reduce
member were killed in a joint operation against environmental crimes, deforestation. Fundamentally, underlying causes of deforestation are
the environmental bubble is not currently operating in areas where not being adequately addressed. These include direct drivers such as
armed groups and organized crime are present. Until 2019, the activities praderización, illicit crop production (and eradication policies), along­
of the environmental bubble and environmental law enforcement were side governmental economic development policies linked to extracti­
mainly focused on areas close to the department’s capital. Under the vism, agribusiness expansion and land grabbing. In this sense, REM/
military operation Artemisa, implemented since 2019, deforestation

7
J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

Visión Amazonia failures are related to the political economy of result- commonalities with more progressive concepts such as the “conserva­
based aid (Angelsen, 2017; Hout, 2004; Klingebiel and Janus, 2014). tion basic income” proposed by Büscher and Fletcher (2019). However,
Hout (2004:591) argues that “donors tend to overlook the underlying these measures are unlikely to reduce deforestation rates since most of
structural causes of bad governance”. In our case study, donors, in the the targeted actors are already practicing “low carbon and low defor­
search for potential new REDD+ success candidates, were plausibly estation” lifestyles.
attracted by decreasing deforestation rates prior to the peace accord and
by the subsequent political momentum for policy change. Donors likely 6. Final remarks
hoped that peace, followed by the strengthening presence of the state
and the additional incentives provided through REM, would help to The deforestation trends in Colombia demonstrate what Grima and
further reduce deforestation rates. In this context, however, donors may Singh (2019:273) have shown for Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Ivory Coast and
have overlooked or ignored at least two issues. First, low deforestation Peru: deforestation rates increase during the transition period between
rates were likely caused by political uncertainty and insecurity and were war and peace because “the immediate aftermaths of violent conflicts
also, at least to some extent, the result of the FARC preventing the entry present windows of opportunity for resource appropriation”. The
of other actors. Second, as Hook (2020) has shown for Guayana and contribution of our article is to show how REDD+ operates with respect
Krause (2020) for Colombia, the result-based payments are often to deforestation politics and narratives. In the transition from armed
insufficient to control deforestation and the REM/Visión Amazonia is conflict to peacebuilding, this case study has been framed by the his­
not designed to replace the extractivist development paradigm (Krause, torical, economic and political processes surrounding structural social
2020), and is consequently not able to reduce deforestation in the long struggles for land and natural resource control in the Colombian
run. In addition, REM’s relatively unambitious baseline (Kill and Amazon.
Fatheuer, 2018) seems to be designed to spend REDD+ funds, rather For environmental development policy, this article depicts how
than to promote real structural change (Hook, 2020; Krause, 2020). If certain environmental narratives, which are not necessarily based on
funds are not fully disbursed, as in 2019 because of rising deforestation facts, guide anti-deforestation action. At the same time, the article also
rates (Krause, 2020), this indicates a lack of success for the recipient shows the difficulties faced when tackling political drivers of defores­
country as well as for the donor, which is a scenario both parties seek to tation, as environmental policy reinforcement is selective and in­
avoid (Angelsen, 2017). Referring to the global Norwegian REDD+ stitutions are weak. This is especially the case in frontier areas that are,
engagement, Angelsen argues that “donors [are] eager to spend and paradoxically, often biodiversity hotspots. So far, the government has
recipient countries unwilling to reform” (2017: 242). This analysis not recognized or tackled deforestation drivers related to politically
suggests REM may have little capacity to force a political system change strong actors or drivers beyond the local level. While REM/Visión
so that the political drivers of deforestation are tackled. Moreover, many Amazonia has focused on campesinos and indigenous communities,
of the measures, such as the incentives provided by the FBCs and by deforestation in Guaviare is currently mainly driven by a land-control
pillar 3, are rooted in a typical deforestation narrative or even myth rush where large state owners/powerful cattle ranchers and other land
(Fairhead and Leach, 1998) that deforestation is ultimately caused by grabbers operate. Until REM and similar programs − and public policy −
poverty. Or they follow the assumption that environmental problems address these land grabbing processes, large-scale deforestation will
can be solved by a number of technical fixes such as improved moni­ continue its current course.
toring based on remote sensing, improved forest zoning and better For national anti-deforestation policy, we also show how deforesta­
equipped law enforcement. The Vision Amazonia, as an environmental tion is driven historically by ineffective state policies and national–local
activist in Guaviare explains, “is a technocratic initiative that was state discrepancies that reflect issues of multi-level governance (Loft
formulated in Bogota and which underestimates complex social condi­ et al., 2017). Furthermore, we have shown how these mainly centrist
tions in the Amazon” (pers. Com. July 2017). Critical analyses of REDD+ policies are based on changing cultural essentialism or stereotypes of
suggest that it rarely targets underlying drivers of deforestation and actors (previously, indigenous “bad” and campesinos “good”; now the
forest degradation as they are mainly found in the global political opposite) and a lack of understanding of the natural resource conflicts
economy (Hein et al., 2020; Henders et al., 2015; Krause, 2020; Skutsch they generate (Hein et al., 2020). Moreover, deforestation is also about
and Turnhout, 2020; Weatherley-Singh and Gupta, 2015). politics and structural conditions favoring land grabbing, and specula­
Our research suggests that REM/Visión Amazonia should further tion associated with regional elites − similar to Brazil’s current political
support campesinos and indigenous groups in conservation activities. storm driving Amazon deforestation (de Area Leão Pereira et al., 2020).
Now that secure land tenure for indigenous peoples has made some Karsenty and Ongolo (2012:38-42) warn that it is important to consider
headway (at least in formal terms), it is important to start promoting the political economy of the state, especially when dealing with “fragile”
secure (common and private) land tenure for campesinos together with or even “failing” states, facing severe and chronic institutional crises,
an effective rural development policy (access to credit, roads, technical which are often ruled by “governments with private agendas fueling
assistance, agricultural insurance, etc.) in order to avoid “titled exclu­ corruption”. The history of centralized forest ownership illustrates that
sions” (Hall et al., 2011). Promoting the legal adoption and effective although governments may be unable to enforce forest regulations
implementation of legal figures like territories and areas conserved by against powerful corporate or elite interests, they are certainly able to
indigenous peoples and local communities (abbreviated to ICCAs), exclude less powerful, poor forest peoples (Agrawal, 2010). In this sense,
OECMs (other effective area-based conservation measures) and campe­ the impact of economic incentives to stop deforestation is not as sub­
sino reserves (ZRC- Zonas de Reserva Campesina)6 can provide effective stantial as REDD+ promoters initially considered. Rather, it is a piece in
conservation solutions under local modes of governance. The REM the jigsaw puzzle of the everyday realities of deforestation and conser­
support for indigenous communities, in particular, has some vation in the forest frontier regions of the Amazon. Despite the wide
scope of REM/Visión Amazonia pillars, there are key regional processes
acting as structural deforestation drivers that remain outside the scope
6 of REM actions. If these issues are not addressed by conditional pay­
The first ZRC was established in Guaviare in 1997, granting collective
ments for basic improvements in the institutional context (e.g. regula­
property titles for productive land and forest conservation inside ZRF. However,
ZRCs were discriminately stigmatized as narcoterrorism hotspots by the gov­ tions and political will to support ICCAs or the like, regulations
ernment of Uribe and their organizations and leaders were harassed, threat­ hindering corruption related to land concentration and land-grabbing),
ened, displaced or killed (Ortiz, 2016). This and the lack of political will to REM’s actions will remain disconnected from structural processes
support them, ended up weakening campesinos to effectively control and defend driving deforestation in the local and regional context of the Colombian
ZRCs against interventions by external agents. Amazon.

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J.C. Rodríguez-de-Francisco et al. Forest Policy and Economics 127 (2021) 102450

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